Category: Jeff Abramson

Disconnect: the United States, the Arms Trade, Humanitarian Disarmament, and the Summit for Democracy

5/17/2022

by Jeff Abramson

In 2021, the United States hosted the Summit for Democracy, inviting more than 100 countries as well as individuals from civil society and the private sector to engage in a "shared effort to set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest threats faced by democracies today through collective action," with a focus on three themes: "(1) strengthening democracy and defending against authoritarianism; (2) fighting corruption; and (3) promoting respect for human rights."

Aside from some aspects of the corruption track, there appears to have been very little recognition or discussion of the role that weapons actually have on the challenges at the heart of the Summit. We certainly do know that weapons can enable authoritarians, corruption, and human rights abuses. With the war in Ukraine also increasingly being framed as a fight between autocracy (namely Russia) and democracy (Ukraine), having an understanding of where there are disconnects between rhetoric and practice is essential.

A dive into just a couple data sources, using a filter of who was invited to the Summit and who was not, indicates that much of what the United States has done over the past decade appears to run counter to Summit goals - by providing weapons to autocracies. And, U.S. policy is out of step with other democracies, especially when it comes to supporting humanitarian disarmament.

Nearly half of U.S. major weapons have gone to countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy

Over the past decade (2012-2021), 46% of the United States' deliveries of major weapons systems went to countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy - based on SIPRI data of major arms deliveries during that period. (View data.)

Democracies support key humanitarian disarmament treaties that the United States continues to eschew.

Of those invited to the Summit, 89% are states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 75% to the Arms Trade Treaty, and 63% to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (View data.)

Regarding the newer Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which only has 61 states parties, the majority of those states parties (61%) were invited to the Summit. [updated May 20, 2022]

The United States is not a state party to any of these treaties. (The United States did sign the Arms Trade Treaty. The Trump administration took steps to reject that signature. See resource page.)

For more thoughts on these disconnects and the opportunities that the humanitarian disarmament approach provide, please see Responsible Statecraft (March 2022 and July 2020) and Defense News (November 2020).

Special thanks to Hadeel Abu Ktaish who aided in compiling this data in March and April 2022.

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U.S. Arms Sales Restraint in 2022?

1/6/2022

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Looking at what is often the most common metric of arms sales intention and volume -- notifications of potential government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) -- the Biden administration at first blush appears to be exercising restraint in the arms trade. FMS notifications made to Congress in calendar year 2021 totaled just over $36 billion, the lowest annual amount since 2011 and second lowest since FMS grew sharply in 2006.

(See dedicated spreadsheet on 2021 FMS notifications here (see all 3 tabs), which was created using the spreadsheet linked to the Forum's resource page.)

While the 2021 total is the lowest in a decade, there are still many problematic sales on last year's list. Top of mind is the one that raised the most attention -- the $650 million November notification of 280 air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. The administration argued that those weapons could not be used for "offensive" purposes and therefore were in line with its human rights goals, especially as related to avoiding harm to civilians in Yemen. Nonetheless, a majority of the President's party voted (unsuccessfully) to block the sale in the Senate last month, with many arguing that providing weapons to oppressive regimes serves to legitimize them, regardless of whether you consider weapons offensive or defensive.

Those arguments can and should also be applied to others on last year's list, perhaps most noticeably the Philippines, where the administration told Congress it wanted to sell F-16s, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles valued at more than $2.5 billion to the oppressive Duterte regime. Scrutiny is also rising on countries that have in the past been less controversial, such as Israel and India, for which there were FMS notifications as well as human rights concerns.

It's Not Just Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS itself also does not tell the full arms sales picture, which appears to be increasingly comprised of company-initiated Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that are much less transparent to the public. The May scandal of JDAMs on offer to Israel during a flare up of conflict in which civilian areas were bombed was via the DCS program. Part of the controversy was that a Congressional leak was needed to raise awareness of the potential deal, in part because DCS notifications are not shared on a convenient website, whereas FMS notifications are.

The State Department arms sales factsheet from January 2021 indicates both the scale and relative lack of information we have on the DCS program. It details that in fiscal year 2020 more than $124 billion in DCS licenses were authorized, but only $38.5 billion of which were notified to Congress. (In the latest factsheet, released last month, the Biden administration provides even less clarity, removing details about how much of the $103.4 billion fiscal year 2021 DCS approvals were notified to Congress.)

There is also a billion dollar request for Israel's Iron Dome program supported by the administration, assistance to Egypt that the Biden administration did not fully withhold, and $20+ billion F-35 and drones sales to the UAE that raise the question of how much restraint this administration will support.

New Policy Anticipated

As soon as this month, we expect the Biden administration to unveil a new conventional arms transfer policy that was previewed in part in November. At that time, Tim Betts, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, said the policy will "seek to elevate human rights, stress the principles of restraint and responsible use." That is certainly welcome. In all likelihood, however, the new policy will follow earlier ones in that the list of reasons to engage in weapons transfers will not be weighted. Those looking to argue for commercial interests will find language they want, and no indication that human rights have a higher priority. How the administration actually implements the policy will likely be more telling than the words in it.

An initial follow-on step should be for the Biden administration to recommit to the U.S. signature to the Arms Trade Treaty. President Trump’s repudiation of the one global treaty that establishes baselines for responsible trade of broad categories of conventional weapons, and which is already consistent with U.S. law, is a stain on U.S. international credibility and inconsistent with shared goals.

More to Watch

Getting this right is not easy, of course. But if the United States, the world’s largest weapons provider by far, actually wants to show arms transfer restraint, it needs a consistent approach to existing or future conflicts that moves away from adding more weapons to volatile situations. It must find ways to engage the Middle East and elsewhere through commercial ties, cultural and academic connections, and other approaches. And in many cases, especially in pulling back, it will need to increase and enable humanitarian assistance to those places impacted by war. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, while a positive for those supportive of a less militarized approach, has not been followed by a humanitarian response sufficient for the suffering country.

Nor has aid that would help those in Yemen been able to reach them, in part because the United States has not truly used its full power to demand that the blockade on the country be immediately ended. In Yemen, the Houthi are no saints. They have committed horrible abuses. U.S. leverage and complicity, however, is tied much more closely to Saudi Arabia, for which the U.S. continues vital aircraft maintenance support, and to the UAE, which despite claims of exiting the war is still engaged via proxy groups and control of the Socotra island.

Even more than relations with Saudi Arabia, that with the Emiratis may be most telling on potential U.S. arms restraint in the coming months and years. In December, the UAE threatened to walk away from the massive F-35 deal. The administration has consistently said it wants to make the deal work, but has insisted on publicly unspecified end-use and other conditions. In my close reading of the comments by State Department and Defense Department officials last month, it’s unclear that human rights and civilian protection concerns are being raised at all with the Emiratis. That must change.

Finally, Congress may also play a role. A wide array of legislation has been introduced that would impact on arms trade restraint should it be adopted. A short, but incomplete, list includes the progressive Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act introduced by Rep. Ilhan Omar; the SAFEGUARD Act, led by the influential chairs of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees; and the bipartisan National Security Reforms and Accountability Act/National Security Powers Act that would “flip the script” and require Congressional approval on many arms sales -- similar to an approach once introduced by then-Senator Joe Biden in the 1986.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade

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Early Actions to Watch for a More Responsible U.S. Arms Trade Policy

1/4/2021

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

We should know almost immediately if the next U.S. administration will take a more responsible approach to the arms trade. That's because a 30-day Congressional review period on the sale of 7500 precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia will end just after the expected January 20 inauguration of the next President. At that point, the new Biden administration would be able to issue licenses for the sale (unless Congress quickly takes blocking actions before then). If Biden keeps to expectations, he will not issue those licenses. That would be consistent with his October 2 pledge:

Under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relationship with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.

If Biden truly wants to uphold values and make U.S. weapons recipients accountable for their actions, his administration could also take steps to slow and suspend major weapons sales to the United Arab Emirates. Less than a month ago, nearly all the Democrats in the Senate made clear their opposition to much of a $23 billion arms package to Abu Dhabi that the Trump administration is attempting to rush forward in its closing days. The UAE, which remains a key partner in the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen and is violating the UN arms embargo on Libya, simply should not be receiving U.S. arms at this time.

At present, there is not a clear indication from the incoming President on what he will do with these time-sensitive sales. Whether any of the necessary letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) have been signed with the UAE that would put contracts in place is not clear, despite Trump administration efforts to move ahead. If not, Biden can delay concluding them. If some LOAs are signed, he can also hold off on delivery, especially for armed drones, precision-guided and other munitions that could be transferred most quickly. While the Abraham Accords offer great promise for improving regional relations in the Middle East, the reward for the accords should be peace and a lessening of prospects for conflict, not the influx of tens of billions in new weaponry.

How the U.S. approaches arming yet other countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Qatar, Bahrain and more, will be closely watched as the Biden team has indicated a desire to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (a.k.a. the Iran nuclear deal). Fueling regional arms races could make that more difficult.

Biden has also promised to reverse the Trump administration policy that transferred export oversight for semi-automatic and many other small arms to the Commerce Department, which ended Congressional transparency into such sales. Quick steps to return to the previous policy would also show his administration seeks a more responsible arms trade approach.

As the Obama presidency was nearing its end in late 2016 and early 2017, his administration held back on weapons sale to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that the Trump administration later moved forward. It will be promising if Biden renews concerns about arms sales to many regimes with highly problematic human rights records that Trump has supported, including to the Philippines (amongst a long list of countries).

Even more telling would be actions to again support the Arms Trade Treaty. An easy early first step would be for the Biden administration to retract the letter Trump sent to the United Nations in 2019 that denied legal obligations from the United States' 2013 signature. Further efforts to honor U.S. signature to the ATT, including to seek ratification of the treaty (as embedded in the 2020 Democratic party platform), may take longer but would also show U.S. dedication to again align itself with nearly all its allies in promoting global norms on responsible arms trade.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade

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Arms Trade Issues Should See Center Stage in 2020 US Election

12/13/2019

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

The "should" in the title to this post is not an admonition, but rather a prediction. And a bold one. An impeachment effort is now underway related to conditions placed on security assistance to Ukraine. Plus, four Presidential vetoes were used in 2019: one to stop Congressional assertion of war powers in relation to the war in Yemen, and three to override rejection of "emergency" arms sales primarily intended to Saudi Arabia for that war. So, how could arms trade issues take an even greater public stage in 2020?

It's the election. As the 2020 campaigns kick into full gear, we should expect that those vying for the highest elected office will look for more areas where they can assert their differences with the President, especially on issues that the public supports. As the Forum's research into candidates positions is showing, there is a stark divide emerging in the approach Democratic candidates are taking on arms trade issues compared to Donald Trump. And opinion polling suggests many of these have a majority of Americans behind them.

At this moment, the divide is most striking as relates to support to Saudi Arabia. Of the seven Democratic candidates slated to appear in the December debate, six have indicated that they would cut off arms supplies to Saudi Arabia given Riyadh's behavior in the war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen. (Tom Steyer's position is unclear.) While public opinion polling highlighted by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs indicates that Americans are divided on the US relationship with Saudi Arabia, a majority, regardless of party, do believe selling weapons makes the United States less safe. It is easy to see, and unfortunately tragic to predict, that another incident of misuse of US weapons by the Saudis will occur and make it into the headlines. With it will come attention again to US arms trade decisions.

Also at odds with the President, all the Democratic candidates have indicated their support for an assault weapons ban, another issue that has majority public backing. Thus far, however, Democratic candidates have not made the connection that it is illogical to oppose assault weapons at home while at the same time making their export more efficient. While the administration is pushing for just such changes, it is easy to expect more gun control-minded Democratic candidates to make the case that the Commerce Department is not the proper home for oversight of assault weapon exports. Two have done so thus far. As some members of Congress are already doing, candidates can also make the connection to US gun laws and exports with violence in Latin America that fuels Central Americans to flee north. We quickly then link to the wall and broader immigration debates, driving the arms trade into the brighter spotlight.

It's a bit more difficult to predict that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) itself will become an election issue. President Trump's repudiation of the treaty at an NRA convention in Indianapolis in April certainly was popular with the crowd there and echoed the ill-informed stance that Congressional detractors have taken that the treaty infringes on US rights. It would not be surprising that candidates who publicly criticize the NRA would also then take up the ATT. Three have explicitly supported the treaty thus far, and a number others have taken steps in the past to block opposition to it.

Candidates seeking to distinguish themselves from each other may also branch out into issues where positions have yet to be claimed. Public opinion polling shows that a majority of Americans are strongly or somewhat opposed to using lethal autonomous weapons systems in war (aka killer robots). This is an obvious area where a candidate such as Andrew Yang, who comes from the tech field and talks frequently about artificial intelligence, could be the first to also acknowledge where human-centered limits make sense and support efforts such as those led by the growing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots to ban the development and use of such weapons.

Other issues ripe for candidates to explore include declarations on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, an initiative with increasing international attention that currently lacks US diplomatic support. Treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, that are supported by nearly all of NATO and other traditional US allies, but to which the US has yet to commit, can also provide candidates a way to distinguish themselves.

It is, of course, much too early to predict who will be elected as president roughly 11 months from now. It is, however, a much safer bet that arms trade issues will have a prominent role in the public discourse that leads up to the November 3 vote.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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Improved Prospects for U.S. Arms Sales Restraint? Look to Congress

1/3/2019

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

The odds may at first appear to be against greater restraint in U.S. arms sales in 2019 given a president who loudly touts the supposed economic benefits of weapons sales and refuses to reconsider arms transfers to Saudi Arabia despite (1) the Saudi role in the devastating humanitarian crisis in Yemen and (2) a global outcry over the ghastly embassy assassination of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. But a close examination of Congressional action, much of it building over the last three years, reveals real prospects for limiting the president’s dangerous approach on conventional arms trade.

The most high profile signs of this restraint revolve around the most high profile U.S. arms purchaser, Saudi Arabia. A loud rebuke of Trump’s approach to the kingdom came in December when a bipartisan group of 56 Senators took the highly unusual step of using the 1973 War Powers Resolution to direct the president to end U.S. military action in the war in Yemen, including any refueling to the Saudi-led coalition. An earlier vote in March garnered only 44 votes. The outcry over Trump’s unabashed arms support to Saudi Arabia played a large role in changing many Senators’ minds.

Another War Powers-based resolution should expect to win Senate approval in the new Congress, when it is re-introduced. In the House, the new Democratic majority would also be likely to approve such a resolution. While leader Nancy Pelosi (D-California) has yet to indicate when a such a measure might be brought forward, she is one of 101 co-sponsors of the previous House version, which was blocked by a late procedural action in December.

The War Powers Resolution came on the heels of steps more explicitly addressing the arms trade. In June 2017, 47 Senators voted to block more than $500 million in precision-guided munitions (PGM) sales to Saudi Arabia; and in September 2016, 27 Senators supported stopping a $1 billion tank sale. While neither of these measures were successful, they indicate the building Congressional opposition to unrestricted arms sales to Riyadh. That sentiment was encapsulated after the recent War Powers vote when co-sponsor Chris Murphy (D-Connecticut) said that “momentum is…only growing. Congress has woken up to the reality that the Saudi-led coalition is using U.S. military support to kill thousands of civilians, bomb hospitals, block humanitarian aid, and arm radical militias.”

In addition to these very public votes, some Congressional leaders are acting in other ways to reign in unwise arms sales. Under the U.S. system, leaders within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee are pre-notified of potential arms sales. That pre-notification period has been the more traditional place for an opposition hold on controversial sales. For a period in 2017, former SFRC chair Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) declared a hold on new arms sales to Gulf Cooperation Council countries. More recently, ranking member Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) placed a hold on PGM sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While Corker is no longer in Congress, Menendez retains his position and his June 2018 hold remains in place. During the recent War Powers debate, he argued that the Trump administration view of the U.S.-Saudi relationship was “unhinged” in thinking that “selling weapons to the Saudis was more important than America’s enduring commitment to human rights, democratic values, and international norms.”

These actions are promising, and creative Congressional leaders have the opportunity to do more. While the public can be an ally for responsible action on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) because such government-to-government negotiated sales are quickly added to a public website, the increasingly important business-led Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are not as transparent, in part because any public notification often comes after the initial review period has passed. Congressmembers could insist that, or possibly take it upon themselves to make, these potential DCS transactions public immediately. Saudi PGM sales, for example, have come through the DCS process and relied upon concerned leaders to share in raising awareness.

While the notification period garners the most attention, Congress also can block a sale up until weapons are delivered. Given how security, geopolitical, and humanitarian realities can change between the time of notifications and often years-later deliveries, leaders should follow the entire process. To the best of my knowledge, however, the relevant chair and ranking committee members have only once used the power they gave themselves to receive from the State Department a notification of an arms shipment at least 30 days prior to its delivery. It’s time to exercise, and to expand, such authority (see Section 201).

In general, transparency around arms deliveries remains too obscure as a New Hampshire NPR reporter recently discovered. When U.S. Census export data showed weapons worth more than $61 million were sold from his state to Saudi Arabia in August, he could not uncover what was in the sales nor which companies provided the weapons. Annual reports on U.S. arms transfers have grown increasingly opaque. Congress should mandate a change, demanding much greater transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S. weapons deliveries.

Finally, sometime in the first quarter of this year, we can expect the administration to publish final rules transferring export authority on select firearms from the State Department to the Commerce Department, despite a large number of negative public comments and great deal of concern. These rules have been at the heart of the 3-D gun printing controversy that energized public debate in the middle of last year. Members of Congress have raised an alarm that they will lose notifications about these sales, and need to be prepared to stop, or counteract, this dangerous export process change. Just as Trump’s broad approach on arms sales does, these changes risk making it easier for weapons to end up in the hands of terrorists, international criminals, and abusive regimes as well as further undermine the promotion of human rights norms that should be central to U.S. actions.

Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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Using Non-State Initiatives to Address Non-State Actors: Lessons from the Humanitarian Disarmament Approach

5/21/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its author.

Jeff Abramson

Over the past two decades, an approach now termed “humanitarian disarmament” has had increasing success in creating multilateral instruments that ban some of the world’s worst weapons, most notably landmines, cluster munitions, and nuclear weapons. At first glance, treaty-making would appear to have little relevance to non-state actors, who functionally have rejected the authority of their state. Yet, the humanitarian disarmament approach, when perceived more broadly and examined more closely, has had and continues to offer lessons for addressing non-state actors. The key is reframing the discussion as being about human security and using the power of civil society-led initiatives to create change.

This short essay looks more closely at efforts to: (1) convince armed non-state actors to abide by international agreements (namely the Mine Ban Treaty via deeds of commitment); (2) end production of banned weapons (primarily via the Stop Explosive Investments campaign related to cluster munitions); and (3) stop weapon creation by pre-emptive efforts led by scientists, industry and others (as relates to killer robots).

Humanitarian Disarmament

At the core of humanitarian disarmament is defining security at a human level, rather than using more traditional assessments of security based on a state’s domestic strength or power relative to another state. By defining security based on human needs, members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in the 1990s were successfully able to argue that victim-activated antipersonnel landmines were inherently indiscriminate, harming civilians long after hostilities ceased, and should no longer be used. The Mine Ban Treaty, which was one result of their efforts, is today one of the world’s most successful international agreements—with use of factory-made antipersonnel mines now limited to only a small handful of states and non-state actors. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was concluded in 2008 and built on the same principles of banning an indiscriminate weapon. Humanitarian disarmament principles also guided the discussion around the unacceptable human consequences of nuclear weapons use and helped the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) lead the world to conclude the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and garner the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017. Efforts to implement the first of these treaties have already resulted in significant destruction of weapons stockpiles, clearance of contaminated land around the world so it could be put to productive use, assistance to victims, and declines in new casualties.[i]

While these three treaties are the best-known examples of the humanitarian disarmament approach, additional efforts are ongoing to address current and potential future use of weapons in indiscriminate ways. For example, the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) is working to tackle the use of weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas because they inflict instant and ongoing human suffering. As the name suggests, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots seeks to prohibit autonomous machines from being developed and used, highlighting the dangers of lethal weapons that act without human control. And the Control Arms campaign, in continuing to promote effective implementation and universalization of the Arms Trade Treaty, focuses on addressing the humanitarian harm caused by the arms trade.

Convincing Non-State Actors to Abide by International Norms: Landmines and Deeds of Commitment

From a traditional security perspective, directly approaching armed non-state actors can be dangerous and is always fraught with the challenge of appearing to take the side or assessing the validity of an actor’s deeds. From a human security perspective, however, there is value in making sure that armed non-state actors behave as responsibly as possible. Educating and attaining commitments from armed non-state groups can in some instances prove possible and useful.

One of the best known efforts was originally organized as the Non-State Actors Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, but later became a separate organization named Geneva Call. Geneva Call engages armed non-state actors to adopt unilaterally the “Deed of Commitment” (officially “Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action”), by which armed non-state groups publicly sign and pledge to adhere to the norms embodied in the Mine Ban Treaty. Today, Geneva Call lists 52 armed non-state actors as having signed the deed of commitment relevant to landmines. A total of 63 have signed at least one of what are now three deeds (the others are related to protection of children, and sexual violence and gender discrimination).[ii]

This effort and other similar ones, while controversial, are examples of how the humanitarian disarmament approach to promotion of international agreements can have relevance to and impact the actions of non-state actors (as well as states).

[Please see essays in this publication by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Maria Pia Devoto and Camilo Serna Villegas, for additional successful examples of reaching out to and working with non-state armed groups on landmine-related efforts.]

Ending Weapons Production: Stop Explosive Investments and Cluster Munitions

In 2009, the year after the conclusion of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the first “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: A shared responsibility” report was published and the Stop Explosive Investment campaign launched. The report raises awareness about financial institutions that invest in cluster munition production, identifying both a “Hall of Fame” to recognize financial institutions that stop doing so, and “Hall of Shame” for those who do not. The campaign also identifies and encourages states to adopt legislation banning such investment. The latest report, published in May 2017, continued to identify new institutions for its Hall of Fame; additional countries and institutions have since stopped investment or stated that they would.[iii]

Ultimately, this has successfully pressured some cluster munition producers to discontinue making the weapons. A key example is found in the actions of U.S. companies Textron and Orbital ATK that are not barred by U.S. law from producing cluster munitions, but have reiterated they would not do so even after U.S. policy changes last year walked away from government commitments to destroy certain stockpiles.[iv] In March 2018, Orbital ATK sponsored an issue brief, which read in part “there is broadly supported consensus among the world’s nations that CM [cluster munition] does not belong in modern military arsenals.” It explicitly cited the disinvestment campaign as creating risk for companies and as contributing to the wisdom of moving away from cluster munition production.[v]

Using financial pressure to change behavior is, of course, not unique to humanitarian disarmament campaigns. But approaching human security challenges with these tools in mind brings recent developments on gun control efforts in the United States into new focus. In the wake of the outcry and advocacy after the February 2018 student shooting that killed 17 people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, many major financial institutions, stores, and other non-state entities took measures that stopped the sale of assault-style weapons, barred gun-purchasing transactions, cut ties to the National Rifle Association, or took other actions that broadly supported gun control.[vi] This apparently spontaneous effort indicates the power of treating a weapons-related issue from a human security perspective and building financial and other pressure to convince non-state actors (broadly defined) to act differently.

Killer Robots: Actions by the Scientific Community To Pre-empt Weapons

Within the traditional state-based international arms control system, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the current home for discussion about the creation and use of machines that can autonomously identify and use lethal force against humans. Called lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within that structure, but more popularly termed “killer robots,” these weapons have been condemned by many who believe that machines should not be making life or death decisions and fear the human security consequences of doing so. While definitional issues of what constitutes “meaningful human control” continue to animate discussion at the CCW, 26 states have now agreed with the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’ conclusion that these weapons should be prohibited, as of the latest round of CCW meetings in April 2018.[vii]

A key fear associated with the development of killer robots is their likely use by non-state actors, in part because they could be inexpensive and ubiquitous. Many scientists, artificial intelligence (AI) experts, and industry members, who have been key voices promoting the agenda against killer robots, have explicitly raised these concerns. A 2015 open letter against autonomous weapons, which as of early May 2018 had been signed by nearly 4,000 AI/robotics researchers, reads in part:

Unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce. It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc.

High profile signers of the letter, such as Elon Musk and the recently deceased Stephen Hawking, bring international attention to the topic.[viii] The issue is also raised among the global industrial elite, such as at annual World Economic Forum gatherings in Davos. Recently, national open letters signed by AI experts, in places such as Australia, Belgium, and Canada, have called on their governments to support a ban on killer robots. A fictional video depicting these concerns, “Slaughterbots,” produced by a professor at the University of California now has had more than 2.5 million views on YouTube.[ix] In April 2018, more than 3,000 Google employees signed a letter opposing work on weapons after learning about Google’s involvement in AI technology that could improve drone targeting,[x] and controversy erupted at a South Korean university over possible collaboration with companies to make killer robots.[xi] Ultimately, actions being taken by civil society, including among those who could be responsible for creating killer robots, are building a stigma against the weapons and could serve to pre-empt their use even before states decide exactly what they want to do.

Rethinking

A key lesson to learn from these diverse examples is to rethink the challenge of non-state actors. While state-based activity has its place, so too do efforts by civil society-led initiatives that directly engage or impact upon non-state actors, some armed and some responsible for producing arms. The creative work being done in support of humanitarian disarmament is grounded in concern about human security, which is often a better lens for thinking about security challenges. Many successes have been made to date, and a diverse array of approaches continue—all meriting greater attention and support.

Jeff Abramson manages the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor for the ICBL-CMC (International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition), is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, and coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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[i] See the latest editions of the Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor for details on the use of these weapons, casualties caused by them, assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated land, and other related information, www.the-monitor.org.

[ii] “Deed of Commitment” and “Armed Non-State Actor” webpages found under the “How we work” section of the website, Geneva Call.

[iii] “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: A shared responsibility.” PAX, May 2017. The Stop Explosive Investment website details more recent developments, including: “Japanese companies divest from cluster bombs” December 2, 2017; and “Italy bans investments in cluster bombs producers,” October 4, 2017. Note, a similar report, “Don’t Bank of the Bomb,” first published in 2013 uses the same approach to identify investments in nuclear weapons production, and now supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

[iv] Textron spokesperson reconfirms that it will not make cluster munitions in John Ismay, “U.S. Will Keep Older Cluster Munitions, a Weapons Banned by 102 Nations,” New York Times, December 1, 2017.

[v] “Modernizing the U.S. Munitions Arsenal,” Government Business Council, underwritten by Orbital ATK, March 2018.

[vi] See for example: Brad Tuttle, “All the Companies Cutting Ties With the NRA After Deadly Florida School Shooting” Time, March 1, 2018; Kate Taylor, “Here are all of the retailers that have stopped selling assault-style rifles and changed firearm policies following gun-control activists' protests,” Business Insider, March 2, 2018; Stacey Samuel, “National Teachers Union Cuts Ties With Wells Fargo Over Bank's Ties To NRA, Guns,” National Public Radio, April 20, 2018.

[vii] Find a list and recap of latest meeting at “Convergence on retaining human control of weapons systems,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, April 13, 2018.

[viii] “Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers,” Future of Life Institute.

[ix] An overview of these and other developments in 2017 is found in “National campaigning against killer robots,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, December 7, 2017.

[x] Scott Shane and Daisuke Wakabayahsi, “‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon,” New York Times, April 4, 2018.

[xi] David Gilbert, “A South Korean university is building killer robots — and AI experts are not happy,” VICE News, April 5, 2018.

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Finding Leadership Outside the White House

12/21/2017

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Less than one year into the Trump administration, it is clear that the United States is unlikely to provide positive leadership in promoting responsible arms trade and weapons use. While the Obama administration certainly did not shy away from arms deals, it did sign the Arms Trade Treaty and withhold some arms transfers due to human rights concerns. What restraint Obama showed, Trump has jettisoned, evidenced in arms sales notifications of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia in May, F-16s to Bahrain in September, and Super Tucanos to Nigeria in August – all deals that Obama had put on hold.

Further under Trump, drone use/air strikes have dramatically increased in number and/or in numbers of civilians harmed. The Defense Department has backed away from a policy that would have barred the use of certain cluster munitions, in particular older ones with an awful record for humanitarian harm. The administration also appears set to make it easier to sell small arms by transferring their control to the Commerce Department, completing the last steps of a controversial export reform initiative. In December, the United States abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the ATT, saying during First Committee that it was reviewing its policy. These and other indicators suggest that US arms use and trade, as well as any eventual new US conventional arms transfer policy, will simply remove the concept of restraint and further undermine commitment to and promotion of human rights.

This is an admittedly bleak initial picture, but there are many places the world can and should look for leadership outside of a US administration espousing an “America First” world view. Perhaps surprisingly, the first place to look is the US Congress. The close 47-53 Senate vote in June in opposition to the PGM sale to Saudi Arabia is an indicator that the Senate could take a more proactive role, especially if the rumored additional $7 billion in PGM sales come before it. Republican Senator Rand Paul and Democratic Senator Chris Murphy partnered on that work and together or separately merit watching in 2018. So too does Republican Senator Todd Young, especially in relation to the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy reacted quickly to the cluster munition policy reversal, and along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Ben Cardin have identified the need for Congressional involvement in any changes that would send small arms to Commerce control. A number of members of the House of Representatives have also taken up US weapons sales and use. A short list includes Democrats Ro Khanna, Mark Pocan and Republican Walter Jones, who co-wrote a New York Times oped critical of US support to Saudi Arabia, as well as Republican Justin Amash, and Democrat Ted Lieu, who has long expressed concerned about potential US complicity in war crimes.

Arming Saudi Arabia, or rather a commitment not to do so is also an appropriate litmus test on international leadership as the Saudi-led coalition continues to use weapons to the detriment of civilians in Yemen. In 2017, the European Parliament again called for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia -- a call not heeded by suppliers such as France and the United Kingdom, but one other European countries can and do support. Related, Sweden’s pending “democracy criterion” in arms sales is worth watching for an impact nationally and regionally. So too is Japan’s leadership of the Arms Trade Treaty for the 2018 Conference of States Parties, where thus far countries have frustratingly refused to directly address the inconsistency of arming the Saudis.

The recent conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the international civil society coalition that fought hard for the treaty (ICAN), draws global attention to the truth that leadership need not come from the normal “big players.” Those countries, led by the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), tend to put traditional state-centered security over the needs of individuals (aka human security). But human security is at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty and a host of other successful treaties and initiatives broadly classified as “humanitarian disarmament.” On key treaties in this realm, Nicaragua is taking on the presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Afghanistan will have leadership of the Mine Ban Treaty. They have the potential to bring a different type of leadership to arms-related issues in 2018. So too do some of the countries that were at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty, such as Mexico and New Zealand, who were also progressive voices during the Arms Trade Treaty negotiation.

The Nobel Peace Prize also reminds us that civil society campaigns play a critical role. In 2018, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots will continue calling for all countries to ban the development of fully autonomous weapons (“killer robots”). The countries participating in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) working group may choose that path, which a growing number (22) are supporting. Leading roboticists and artificial intelligence experts are banding together with that message and writing letters to governments, spurring national parliamentary debates. In another campaign, the International Network on Explosive Weapons is helping to build momentum to address and end the practice of using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. These weapons are particularly devastating to civilians and civilian infrastructure, causing both immediate harm at the time of use and ongoing suffering from the disruption of economic and social activity.

Members of industry and the financial sector will also have the opportunity to display leadership. Late in 2016, German arms manufacturer Heckler and Koch announced that it would no longer sell weapons to undemocratic and corrupt countries. More recently in Japan, four banks and insurance companies recently announced that they would ban investments in cluster munition producers, joining a growing group that have made similar commitments in other countries.

While the future is always difficult to predict, in 2018 it would be wise to look outside the White House for leadership on proper restraint in the use and sale of weapons – without which, we can unfortunately foresee new suffering by civilians and the undermining of their human rights.

Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association.

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Trump’s First 100 Days of Foreign Military Sales Notifications Were More Than Eight Times That of Obama’s - No Restraint in Sight

5/1/2017

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Jeff Abramson

This is the eighth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Occurring under the news radar, the general public was notified last Friday afternoon of an additional $2.6 billion in proposed foreign military arms sales, bringing the Trump administration’s first 100 day total to more than $6 billion. That figure dwarfs President Obama’s first 100 days, which included notifications totaling just $713 million.

FMS notifications that went online Friday, April 28

The Forum on the Arms Trade’s notification tracker maintains an overview and online spreadsheet of proposed government-to-government arms sales and services through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. While just one of many sources of arms transfers, the FMS program is typically the largest and most visible, offering a good indication of what countries will be priority arms trade partners for the United States in the coming years.

The value of FMS notifications this calendar year totals nearly $6.7 billion (note: $418 million of which was officially notified the day before Donald Trump took office). While many of these potential arms sales were already in the works, the pace of notifications suggest that the weapons trade will be a significant part of the president’s approach to foreign policy. Tellingly, nearly half ($3.1 billion) of the potential sales are to countries in the Middle East (Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) for pilot training, missiles, helicopters, naval guns, equipment for artillery and infantry troops, and other weapons and services. Other countries included so far in 2017 FMS notification are Australia, Canada, Greece, Kenya, NATO, New Zealand, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

At the hundred-day marker of Obama’s first term, FMS notifications only included Australia ($560 million) and Mexico ($93 million and $60 million) for helicopters and patrol boats. By the time his presidency ended, Obama had proposed approximately $430 billion in FMS, including a record-setting $103 billion in 2010 alone -- the vast majority of that going to Saudi Arabia.

Given the United States’ dominance of the global arms trade market and the Obama administration’s high level of sales, it might have been difficult to expect a Trump presidency to further expand U.S. arms transfers. But that now appears likely as this administration moves controversial deals to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain that Obama had put on hold. While not yet publicly notified, they are making their way through Congress. Deals to those countries, especially without preconditions, would appear to only reward suppression of human rights (Bahrain) and reckless engagement in fighting that fails to protect civilians (Saudi Arabia). Unless Congress chooses to exercise its authority over arms agreements and deliveries, there appears to be no restraint in sight.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

12/21/2016

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

At a time when it may be easy to anticipate the faltering of international instruments and global approaches, especially as countries in the West -- starting with the United States and United Kingdom -- put national interests above regional and international ones, it is wise to remember that states are not the exclusive drivers of change. Progress-pushing work by civil society using legal, financial, industry-led, investigative and transparency tools has impacted weapons use and the conduct of the arms trade. We should expect those tools again to make a difference in 2017.

Beginning early in the year, a UK court case initiated by civil society will address the legality of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, with potential ramifications on the European Union and more broadly on all states party to the Arms Trade Treaty. Already, legal concerns have been expressed in the United States by leading independent experts about sales and assistance to Saudi Arabia, and could be renewed should the incoming Trump administration continue a policy of arming Riyadh during the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

The persistent investigative efforts of many civil society groups, including by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that documented indiscriminate use of weapons by the Saudi-led coalition undoubtedly played a role in the Obama administration’s recent decision to hold off on delivery of precision-guided munitions. That research work also helped push the UK government to reverse its earlier conclusion that the coalition had not used cluster munitions in Yemen; explicitly in reference to weapons that had originally been supplied by London more than a quarter century ago. On Monday this week, the UK Secretary of State for Defence confirmed a pledge by Saudi Arabia not to employ the weapons (BL755s) again.

The stigma on cluster munition use, in particular, has been strengthened by the creative financial focus of the Stop Explosive Investments campaign that publishes original research into the financial institutions (and states) that invest in -- or pledge not to invest in -- companies producing cluster munitions. As such efforts help shrink the financial incentives and marketplace for indiscriminate weapons, it makes more likely decisions such as the one taken recently by Textron to suspend its product line, functionally ending production of cluster munitions in the United States.

Other industry members, including the scientists and researchers that make sophisticated weaponry possible, have taken a proactive position for a ban on so-called “killer robots.” In 2015, thousands of artificial intelligence experts and researchers -- including prominent scientists and industry leaders such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak -- issued an open letter calling for autonomous lethal weapons not to be developed. In 2014, the first robotics company -- Clearpath Robotics in Canada -- pledged not to make killer robots, In 2017, work on this issue will enter a new phase as states parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons agreed last week to formalize discussion on the topic, a step that may lead to an official protocol that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and a growing number of states say should ban the weapons.

Civil society will also play a critical role in improving transparency in many areas related to the arms trade and security assistance, at times by making sense of public-but-hard-to-gather-or-understand data. For example, SIPRI will continue its highly respected research and publications on global arms trade trends, especially related to major weapons systems. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor will track global developments on landmines and cluster munitions, serving as the de facto monitoring regime for two treaties. For the newer Arms Trade Treaty, projects such as the ATT Baseline Assessment Project and the ATT Monitor have already established a track record of aiding states in understanding their obligations as well as assessing their efforts. In the United States, the Security Assistance Monitor is now pulling together vast amounts of U.S. data into one place for improved transparency on the world’s largest arms and security assistance provider.

In looking ahead, these civil society members and many others should be watched as they employ and develop the tools that shape change in 2017 and beyond.

Jeff Abramson, who coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade, is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manager of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition’s (ICBL-CMC) Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor program

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Deadline Approaches on Landmine and Cluster Munition Reporting

4/28/2016

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Jeff Abramson

In recent decades, international agreements on conventional weapons trade and use have recognized the value of greater transparency, in part by creating reporting mechanisms and requirements. A short list of such agreements, whether legally binding or simply voluntary, include the UN Register on Conventional Arms, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the more recent Arms Trade Treaty. With the creation of these and other agreements, many government officials now complain of reporting fatigue, drawing into question the value and functioning of many transparency measures. In a series of blog posts over the next two months, Forum on the Arms Trade-listed experts will examine official transparency reporting, where it struggles, and the important role civil society often plays in monitoring and improving global understanding of the trade and use of conventional weapons.

April 30 marks the annual reporting deadline for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. These reports provide a wealth of government-certified information on weapons stockpiles and their destruction, contaminated land and its clearance, measures to protect and assist those endangered or already harmed by these indiscriminate weapons, as well as national laws and implementing measures. Such official reports make it much easier to track progress as well as hold governments accountable to treaty mandates, as well as broader efforts to promote conventional weapons control.

In times of conflict, they can also assist in understanding weapons flows and potential dangers. For example, the appearance of East German PPM-2 landmines in Yemen suggests that new supplies (of old landmines) are coming into the country because those types of mines had not been previously reported by Yemen as part of its stockpile or contamination. Similarly, Ukraine’s most recent transparency report indicates that hundreds of landmines have fallen out of their control, stockpiled in Crimea before the separation of the region.

These reports alone, however, often need to be augmented by additional information, typically gathered and analyzed by members of civil society. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor -- with its weapons use research led by Human Rights Watch -- as well as many other groups contribute to tracking supplies of landmines and cluster munitions and documenting their use. This is critical, for example, in places such as Syria and Yemen where these weapons have recently been used and are often supplied by countries not party to the treaties, and therefore outside the treaties’ reporting regimes. Importantly, this collective work has contributed to growing international efforts to cut off arms supplies to Saudi Arabia -- in part because of Saudi-led coalition use of cluster munition in civilian areas.

With the upcoming reporting deadline, states have the opportunity, and obligation, to again contribute to improved transparency. Their collective record, however, is a bit disappointing. When last year’s Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor were published, 94 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had failed to meet their annual reporting obligations and more than three dozen States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions had failed to meet their initial or annual reporting mandates. Since then, Mine Ban Treaty members have adopted a new guide to assist in reporting.
As is common at this point in the year, the number of reports available on the official treaty websites is low (Mine Ban Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions). Hopefully the upcoming intersessional meeting on the Mine Ban Treaty will spur countries to submit their reports before that meeting opens on May 19. For the first time, however, there will be no intersessional meeting for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. There is a danger that reporting will lag without that mid-year spur to action.

An additional opportunity, however, exists for states that have not yet joined the treaties to demonstrate commitment to transparency and treaty objectives by submitting voluntary reports, as a number of states have done in the past. The United States, in particular, has expressed a goal of eventually joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Given the size of the US stockpile, and lack of transparency in the progress of destroying it, submitting such a report would be an important step in demonstrating U.S. commitment to the treaty.

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<<Previous

Disconnect: the United States, the Arms Trade, Humanitarian Disarmament, and the Summit for Democracy

U.S. Arms Sales Restraint in 2022?

Early Actions to Watch for a More Responsible U.S. Arms Trade Policy

Arms Trade Issues Should See Center Stage in 2020 US Election

Improved Prospects for U.S. Arms Sales Restraint? Look to Congress

Using Non-State Initiatives to Address Non-State Actors: Lessons from the Humanitarian Disarmament Approach

Finding Leadership Outside the White House

Trump’s First 100 Days of Foreign Military Sales Notifications Were More Than Eight Times That of Obama’s - No Restraint in Sight

Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

Deadline Approaches on Landmine and Cluster Munition Reporting

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