分类: Explosive Weapons

Prioritising the protection of civilians from explosive weapons: Bringing about change through the framework of the Political Declaration

1/19/2024

This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

“The biggest challenge in this war is dealing with my children’s fear during the constant bombings. Evacuation is tough, moving from one place to another with my two children with disabilities, trying to appear strong despite my own fears. Sadly, nowhere is safe in Gaza anymore.”
Testimony from Hani, staff member of Humanity & Inclusion in Gaza

2023 was a bleak year for the protection of civilians from explosive weapons. Data collected by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicates that use of explosive weapons increased in 2023 and was experienced across a greater number of countries than the previous year, and that more civilians were killed and injured from explosive weapon use than in recent years.

The unrelenting bombing and shelling of Gaza after the Hamas attacks of 7 October, the eruption of conflict in Sudan, and continued fighting in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen all led to increased documented civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons. In short, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas remains widespread and continues to be one of the greatest threats to civilians in armed conflicts today.

The endorsement by 83 states of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas in Dublin in November 2022 was welcomed by many as a milestone achievement. The Declaration is a recognition of this grave humanitarian problem, an expression of solidarity with those affected, and a commitment to take further action to strengthen the protection of civilians both during and after conflict. But it will only succeed in better protecting civilians if it is implemented effectively by endorser states.

Driving forward change and building new norms and expectations for behaviour takes time. Moving away from use of explosive weapons in populated areas – through the framework of the Declaration and associated revisions to policy and practice – is a long-term undertaking that must begin expeditiously at a national level.

So, what do we want to see in this area of work and under the framework of the Political Declaration in 2024? What does progress on this issue look like and what opportunities exist to push this agenda along in an effective way internationally?

States that have endorsed the Declaration start to operationalise it through national-level policy reviews and changes to practice.

Joining the Declaration comes with an expectation that changes should take place in national-level policy and practice. States should therefore review their commitments under the Political Declaration against existing national policies and practice.

A good first step to beginning the process of implementation is to identify a focal point in government responsible for coordination and oversight. The focal point should review the Declaration and its commitments, looking at how existing policies and practice can be strengthened or new ones developed, and where/how the Declaration needs to be disseminated domestically. A key priority will be to ensure dissemination of the Declaration to armed/defence forces at different levels given the crucial changes required in the areas of military doctrine and policy, as well as of training, planning and conduct of military operations. It will also be essential that states approach implementation through a humanitarian lens, focused on harm reduction and strengthening the protection of civilians.

Many states will have existing relevant policies and procedures on the conduct of military operations, and some may have tools to assess and mitigate harm to civilians. But there are specific commitments in the Declaration that need to be implemented, including placing restrictions on the use of explosive weapons, and making determinations on when it will be necessary to refrain from such use entirely, and how this is done. International Network on Explosive Weapons calls on states to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and to otherwise restrict the use of other explosive weapons in populated areas due to the likely risk of civilian harm.

The Declaration also puts considerable emphasis on addressing indirect or so-called “reverberating” effects, that stem from damage to and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, in the planning and conduct of military operations. Other key priority areas include establishing mechanisms to collect and share data on direct and indirect effects on civilians and civilian objects, and providing assistance to conflict-affected communities.

The International Network on Explosive Weapons has put together a “Questions and Answers” document on implementation of the Declaration, and in a few weeks’ time will be launching an “Implementation Framework” with further guidance for states on undertaking this process.

The first meeting to review implementation of the Declaration takes stock of the state of play and sets direction for the period ahead.

Norway will convene the first meeting under the framework of the Political Declaration since its endorsement in November 2022. The Oslo conference will take place on 23 April 2024, with a civil society forum the day before on 22 April, co-convened between International Network on Explosive Weapons and the Norwegian Red Cross which will invite state delegates to participate alongside civil society in a day of discussion and exhibitions.

The official conference aims to review implementation of the Declaration over the preceding 17-months, by giving space to discussions on approaches to implementation, opportunities to share examples of good policy and practice, and by sharing challenges and needs. It will also be important that it provides a clear sense of direction and stimulates efforts for the work ahead, by setting out priority areas for implementation and a road map for the coming year or so until states meet again.

The conference should also shine a spotlight on the devastating humanitarian consequences of explosive weapon use, especially given the recent and notable contexts where civilians continue to suffer immensely from explosive weapons use, as well as maintaining a focus on reducing civilian harm and suffering.

Norway has invited all endorsing states and other interested states to participate in the conference, alongside civil society organisations, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As such, it should be an opportunity to both encourage some new states to join ahead of, or at, the Oslo conference, and to start to build a community of practice. Working in partnerships of states, civil society and international organisations provided a solid foundation for developing the Declaration. Maintaining these partnerships and dialogue between states, their armed forces, and humanitarian organisations is going to be just as critical in this next phase of work around its implementation.

More countries join the Political Declaration

Whilst a broad range of states joined the Declaration in Dublin, no new countries have joined the Declaration since. A key aim ahead of the Oslo is for more countries to join this agreement, including across all world regions.

At the end of January, a regional workshop in Togo for West African states will be an important opportunity to encouraging more endorser states from this subregion, as well as Africa more broadly, to join.

During the Declaration negotiations and the Dublin adoption conference, the war in Ukraine and civilian suffering in Mariupol, Kharkiv and other cities placed the explosive weapons issue high on the agenda of many states, prompting their endorsement of the Declaration. The disastrous humanitarian consequences and stark examples of civilian suffering and harm from urban warfare that we have seen over the past year in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan, and elsewhere should continue to provide impetus and show that this Declaration and issue is more relevant than ever and a global issue of concern for all states.

The Declaration starts to set new norms and expectations for behaviour.

In addition to national level implementation, efforts must continue to raise awareness and understanding of this humanitarian issue, including through promotion of the Declaration and its commitments. By doing so, and by highlighting the goal and purpose of the Declaration – to reduce civilian harm and suffering – new norms and standards can be set and will start to take hold.

Speaking out in response to bombardment of populated areas and when civilians suffer is an important means to stigmatise harmful behaviour and to help establish new global norms for civilian protection. In the world today, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is the cause of immense civilian harm and suffering in Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere. States must be attentive to acknowledging this harm, wherever it takes place, and whichever actor is responsible.

Whilst it is perhaps too soon to expect to see a reduction in civilian casualties, or other significant reductions in harm, it is never too soon to start work towards this goal.

Laura Boillot is a Director at Article 36 and Coordinator for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and the publication of these posts, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Explosive Violence: Projections for 2024

1/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Chiara Torelli

Also available in PDF

The signing, in November 2022, of Ireland’s Political Declaration on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), raised hopes that the impact of such violence would be curbed in the years to come. However, where 2022 saw a marked rise in the use of explosive weapons against civilians, 2023 saw the levels of harm rise higher still. With at least four high intensity conflicts carrying over into 2024, the picture continues to look bleak.

Between December 2022 and November 2023, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 6,904 incidents of explosive weapons use around the world, which caused 28,733 reported civilian casualties (11,501 killed, 17,232 injured). Civilians represented 69% of all 41,820 reported casualties in that time.

This marks a 67% increase in reported incidents compared to the same period the year prior, when AOAV picked up 4,133 incidents. Similarly, the number of civilian casualties rose by 42%, from 20,200 civilians reported killed and injured in 2022, while civilian fatalities grew by 69%, from 6,807.

Reflecting the increasing use of explosive weapons globally, the number of countries impacted by explosive violence rose by 11%, from 57 countries impacted between December 2021 and November 2022, to 63 between December 2022 and November 2023.

The standout trends in 2023 have been the considerable increase in the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the rise in civilian casualties of explosive weapons use by state actors, and a sharp increase in the use of, and harm from, manufactured air-launched explosive weapons.

An explosive year

A number of new conflicts and contained flare ups involving state actors emerged in 2023, causing recorded incidents and civilian casualties to spike. These include Azerbaijan’s offensive in the Karabakh and heightened tensions in Kosovo, as well as catastrophic escalations in Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In Sudan, armed clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued into 2024 despite hopeful steps taken in late December and early this year, while the Israeli military has warned Operation Swords of Iron will continue throughout 2024. This latter conflict has spilt over into neighbouring countries, notably Lebanon, where regular artillery exchanges between the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah have claimed casualties, combatant and civilian, on both sides. Similarly, Israel has targeted Hezbollah and Iranian affiliates in Syria, while Iranian-backed groups have increased attacks on US bases in the country. In Yemen, the Houthis have been targeting ships in the Red Sea and firing missiles towards Israel. Both the Sudanese civil war and Israel’s military operation are likely to loom large in the year to come. On the other hand, Armenia and Azerbaijan recently released a joint statement sharing the view that ‘there is a historical chance to achieve long-awaited peace in the region,’ raising hopes that explosive violence between these two states will decrease.

Other conflicts were carried over from 2022, notably armed resistance to the military government in Myanmar, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict between the Ethiopian government and regional armed groups, as well as the longstanding conflicts in Syria and in Yemen, amongst others. While Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDF) units, and allied Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have claimed significant successes in their battle against the military government, the junta’s superior air power is likely to draw the conflict out for many more months, if not years. Similarly, the entrenched, intractable conflicts in Syria and Yemen, while witnessing decreasing incidents when compared to previous years, remain amongst the most harmful to civilians and show no signs of abating.

Of note, an emerging trend on AOAV’s radar has been the increasing use of explosive weapons, mainly Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), by organised crime groups. This was especially apparent in Mexico and Sweden. While the violence remains low-level when compared to the uncountable casualties in larger-scale conflicts, it’s a trend that is likely to see continued growth.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

Last year, AOAV noted the increasingly blurred distinction between civilians and armed combatants in warfare, a phenomenon which has continued to define conflicts in 2023. Many conflicts involve non-state actors who are embedded in local communities, as in Myanmar, or civilians who are recruited into or organise themselves into militias, for example in Somalia, Nigeria or Burkina Faso. Ukraine relies predominantly on an army of mobilised citizens and volunteers, while civilians have continued to play an active part by providing information to the Ukrainian army via smartphone apps. Myanmar’s resistance groups are chiefly made up of civilians who mobilised in response to the 2021 coup. In Gaza, Israel claims that Hamas is present across civilian and protected infrastructure, and hides among civilian communities. These factors are all reflected in the systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure in support of the war effort, as seen in, amongst others, Syria, Myanmar, Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan.

Between December 2021 and November 2022, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) dominated, representing 69% (2,846) of incidents, 95% (19,105) of civilian casualties, and 94% (6,428) of civilian fatalities. That trend continued into 2023: between December 2022 and November 2023, the use of EWIPA accounted for 75% (5,165) of incidents, 95% (27,362) of civilian casualties, and 96% (11,024) of civilian fatalities. On a more granular level, the use of EWIPA increased by 81% last year, with a 71% increase in associated civilian fatalities.

Perpetrators

2023 saw a notable increase in the reported use of explosive weapons by state actors when compared to the year before: between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 4,621 incidents of state-perpetrated explosive violence, which resulted in 20,993 civilian casualties of whom 8,884 were killed. Explosive weapons use by state actors consequently accounts for 67% of all recorded incidents in that time, 73% of civilian casualties, and 77% of civilian fatalities.

The year prior, between December 2021 and November 2022, AOAV recorded 2,476 incidents of explosive weapons use by state actors, resulting in 13,601 civilian casualties of whom 4,854 were killed. This means state use of explosive weapons increased by 87%, and civilian casualties of such violence by 54%. Civilian fatalities from state-perpetrated explosive violence increased by 83% last year. With conflicts involving state actors looking set to carry over into the coming year, it is likely the use of explosive weapons by these actors will continue to increase.

Weapons

Ground-launched weapons continued to be the dominant weapon-type recorded by AOAV in terms of recorded incidents. Last year, these weapons accounted for 51% (3,497) of incidents, 41% (11,645) of civilian casualties, and 26% (2,967) of civilian fatalities. Comparatively, in 2022, ground-launched weapons represented 51% (2,109) of incidents, 50% (10,099) of civilian casualties, and 44% (2,992) of civilian fatalities.

In accordance with the decreased proportion of harm from ground-launched weapons, both the use of and harm from air-launched explosive weapons have increased dramatically. Last year, air-launched weapons represented 20% (1,355) of incidents, 41% (11,727) of civilian casualties, and 59% (6,782) of civilian fatalities. The rate of average civilian fatalities per air strike was therefore 5.0. The year prior, these weapons accounted for 13% (527) of incidents, 20% (4,090) of civilian casualties, and 44% (2,065) of civilian fatalities, with a rate of average civilian fatalities per air strike of 3.9.

The use of air-launched weapons consequently increased by 157% last year, and civilian fatalities of such weapons by 228%. As state actors continue to be heavily involved in conflicts, and to mobilise their air forces in populated areas, this is a trend that is likely to continue into 2024.

Zones of Conflict

AOAV highlights several conflict zones, including both international and non-international armed conflicts, which are likely to continue to experience intense explosive weapon use over the coming year.

Gaza

While Israel carries out relatively frequent operations in Gaza, including a highly injurious operation in May 2021, Operation Swords of Iron has been one of the longest and most damaging: 2023 has so far been the deadliest year for civilians in Gaza recorded by AOAV. Between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 615 incidents of explosive weapons use in Gaza, resulting in 8,610 civilian casualties of whom 5,811 have been killed. By contrast, during the same period in the year prior, AOAV recorded 30 incidents of explosive weapons use, and 159 civilian casualties of whom 37 were killed.

Of note, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), AOAV’s analysis showed that English-language media captures only a third of the civilian deaths from specific explosive incidents in Gaza reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Furthermore, the use of explosive weapons in the OPT has been so intensive that it is difficult to attribute civilian casualties to specific incidents of use, as required by AOAV’s methodology. It is equally difficult to track rising injury or death tolls from specific incidents. For these reasons, AOAV’s data underrepresents the extent of harm caused by explosive weapons in the OPT.

Incessant air strikes and a prolonged ground incursion have characterised Operation Swords of Iron, launched on October 7th in response to the massacre perpetrated by Hamas across Israel. From October 7th to the end of November 2023, AOAV recorded 587 incidents of explosive weapons use in the context of Operations Swords of Iron, and 8,483 civilian casualties of whom 5,783 were killed. While air strikes have dominated the explosive violence landscape in Gaza in that time, accounting for 95% (555) of incidents and 95% (8,047) of civilian casualties, the use of ground-launched weapons has increased as the ground-invasion, which began on October 27th, progresses. AOAV has recorded Israeli artillery shelling (51 civilian casualties), non-specific shelling (48), and tank shelling (40) in the enclave, as well as Hamas mortar and rocket shelling, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. In early 2024, Israel announced a shift in strategy, pulling troops out of Gaza in a move US officials have interpreted as reflecting a transition to lower intensity operations. The use of ground-launched weapons is therefore likely to decrease in line with reduced ground operations, while air strikes might be expected to take up the slack.

Operation Swords of Iron has divided nations. Protests, violence, and rising anti-semitism and Islamophobia have accompanied governments across the globe coming down in support of one or the other party. While initially support for Israel from Western governments, in particular the United States and United Kingdom, was relatively unequivocal, criticism regarding the high civilian death toll and catastrophic humanitarian crisis has been growing, with calls for a ceasefire gaining in intensity. Allegations of violations of International Humanitarian Law have been raised against all parties to the conflict, in particular Israeli military tactics that seem to subject the civilian population of Gaza to collective punishment. Israel has repeatedly stated that it would not bow to international pressure as it pursues the stated goal of eliminating Hamas, while Hamas demands a full cessation of Israeli operations in Gaza before a second truce can be negotiated.

Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has carried on well into its second year with no signs of abating, although levels of reported harm to civilians have been decreasing. Between December 2022 and November 2023 AOAV recorded 2,765 incidents of explosive weapons use in Ukraine, and 8,399 civilian casualties, of whom 1,831 have been killed. While this represents a 66% increase from 1,666 incidents recorded in the same period the year prior, civilian casualties have dropped by 12% from 9,557, and civilian fatalities by 47% from 3,477. This could reflect a multitude of factors, including the evacuation and migration of civilians away from conflict zones, or reporting fatigue, which would result in less of the granular reporting on which AOAV’s methodology relies.

As well as reporting fatigue, Ukraine is growing vulnerable to donor fatigue, with stakeholders becoming frustrated by the lack of progress, and other conflicts moving into focus. Weapons for Ukraine were diverted to Israel in October, and in the US, Republican leaders have made their support for further aid to Ukraine conditional on a substantial tightening of US immigration policy. Biden, one of Ukraine’s major supporters, was unable to reach a compromise with Senate leaders, who announced that any military support to Ukraine will be deferred until early 2024. European Union members have continued to be vocal in their support of Ukraine and their pledges of aid, although European artillery production is not set to meet their goals. The shortage of weapons and funds is being felt on the frontlines.

State actors were responsible for the majority, 98% (2,708), of explosive weapons use in Ukraine last year, with the Russian armed forces accounting for 92% (2,544) of reported incidents and 91% (7,621) of civilian casualties. The Ukrainian armed forces were the reported perpetrators of 4% (111) of recorded explosive violence incidents and 7% (599) of civilian casualties. This represents a 74% increase in state actors’ use of explosive weapons in Ukraine, from 1,560 incidents recorded the year prior, and in particular a 70% increase in Russian explosive weapons use (from 1,497 recorded incidents), and a 109% increase in explosive weapons use by the Ukrainian armed forces (from 53). With the reported use of explosive weapons by both states party to the conflict increasing significantly, the mutual unwillingness to engage in negotiations reflects the likelihood of ongoing hostilities.

Sudan

The current war in Sudan finds its roots in the country’s long history of coups, in particular the 2019 ousting of Omar al-Bashir, following which the military and pro-democracy movement agreed to share power. In October of 2021, General Abdel-Fattah Burhan dissolved this agreement, temporarily detaining the civilian Prime Minister and effectively taking control of the country. He has since acted as Sudan’s de facto ruler, with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, working alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to maintain the military’s ascendance. However, growing tensions between the two armed forces coalesced into an intractable power struggle, and on April 15th 2023, a full-scale armed conflict broke out between Burhan and Dagalo. The resulting insecurity and armed violence have spread far beyond the capital to other cities, displacing thousands and exacerbating Sudan’s existing humanitarian challenges, as well as compounding the challenges of an eventual transition to civilian, democratic rule.

The impact of the conflict is stark: 2023 was the most harmful year AOAV has recorded in Sudan since 2010. Between December 2021 and November 2022, AOAV recorded three incidents of explosive weapons use in Sudan, and 30 resulting civilian casualties of whom five were killed. Between December 2022 and November 2023, the number of recorded incidents rose by 4,167% to 128; civilian casualties of explosive violence rose by 7,193% to 2,188; and civilian fatalities increased by 18,420% to 926.

It has been consistently challenging to attribute particular incidents to either the SAF or the RSF, the two major parties to the conflict, with around 63% (81) of incidents attributed to unknown actors, or to both state and non-state actors during clashes. However, state actors, specifically the SAF, are reportedly responsible for 23% (29) of incidents and 24% (534) of civilian casualties, while non-state actors, specifically the RSF, reportedly caused 14% (18) of incidents and 14% (316) of civilian casualties.

The SAF has predominantly made use of air strikes, which account for 79% (23) of incidents attributed to Burhan’s forces, and 65% (349) of civilian casualties ascribed to them. SAF air strikes also account for 75% (229) of all 305 civilian fatalities attributed to the SAF. On the other hand, the RSF has chiefly relied on ground-launched weapons, in particular non-specific shelling and artillery shelling. Such weapons account for 89% (16) of incidents attributed to the RSF, and 88% (279) of resulting civilian harm. Ground-launched weapons represent 85% (104) of all 122 civilian fatalities attributed to the RSF.

In early December, mediators had indefinitely suspended talks between the SAF and RSF, but in mid-December Burhan agreed to a one-on-one meeting with Dagalo. The meeting was supposed to take place on December 28, but was postponed for ‘technical reasons’ to January 2024. With neither side having gained the upper-hand militarily, 2024 is likely to bear witness to further escalations between the two if the scheduled meeting fails to bear fruit.

Myanmar

In February of 2021, Myanmar’s military imposed a year-long state of emergency, and arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as other senior government officials. The coup quickly devolved into a non-international armed conflict as civilians rose to protest, then mobilised into civilian defence forces loosely allied under the National Unity Government (NUG). In 2022 and 2023, these defence forces increased their attacks against the military junta and suspected collaborators, demonstrating the ability to adapt their military strategy and score significant military successes with improvised and makeshift weaponry. Established Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) also intensified their attacks against the military government, and alliances between EAOs and various People’s Defence Forces (PDF) units have held and borne military successes. The military junta, in response, has continued its tried-and-trusted ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks which support the opposition. Towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of the junta’s operations.

Last year saw a significant escalation in the number of recorded incidents of explosive weapons use in Myanmar, and in civilian casualties. Between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 932 incidents of explosive weapons use in the beleaguered country, and 2,014 civilian casualties of whom 687 were killed. This is up from 525 incidents the year prior, which resulted in 957 civilian casualties of whom 309 were killed - a 78% increase in incidents, 110% increase in civilian casualties, and a 122% increase in civilian fatalities.

The use of explosive weapons by the military junta accounted for 43% (400) of incidents last year, 84% (1,695) of civilian casualties, and 87% (598) of civilian fatalities. Conversely, non-state actors account for 53% (496) of recorded incidents, 9% (174) of civilian casualties, and 7% (45) of civilian fatalities.

Accordingly, air-launched weapons account for a small proportion of incidents, 14% (130), but the majority of civilian harm: these weapons represent 47% (946) of civilian casualties, and 54% (374) of civilian fatalities. As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, air strikes will likely continue to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in the coming year, remaining responsible for the bulk of civilian harm from explosive weapons in the country.

Chiara Torelli is lead explosive violence researcher at at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and a member of the Forum's emerging expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Implementation and Innovation: Humanitarian Disarmament in 2023

2/2/2023

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

(photo, right: Bonnie Docherty (author) delivers statement at the endorsement conference of explosive weapons declaration in Dublin, November 2022. Credit: Erin Hunt, 2022.)

This post also is also published on humanitariandisarmament.org’s Disarmament Dialogue blog.

Bonnie Docherty

The past year underscored the need to have and to ensure respect for strong and effective humanitarian disarmament law. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, cluster munitions, antipersonnel landmines, and explosive weapons with wide area effects have been used in populated areas, mostly by Russia. Russia has in addition repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons.

These attacks and threats have inflicted a horrific civilian toll, but they have also generated international opprobrium because they involved weapons banned or practices restricted under humanitarian disarmament treaties and commitments. While more work needs to be done to minimize the civilian suffering in Ukraine and other armed conflicts around the world, demonstrating robust and united support for global civilian protection norms is an important step.

Humanitarian disarmament, which seeks to prevent and remediate arms-inflicted human and environmental harm, was advanced as well as reinforced in 2022. States adopted important new standards and commitments on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, nuclear weapons, and the environment and armed conflict. To ensure that these standards and commitments achieve their potential, 2023 will be critical for implementation. It is also a time for innovation, especially in addressing the risks and dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

A political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, endorsed by 83 countries on November 18, aims to better protect civilians from humanitarian consequences of the bombing and shelling of cities and towns. It goes beyond urging greater compliance with existing international humanitarian law to establishing guidelines for preventing and remediating the harm from this method of warfare. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas is one of the greatest threats to civilians in contemporary armed conflicts, and the declaration contains strong provisions with the potential to address both direct and reverberating effects. But it will only be as effective as its interpretation and implementation.

Over the next year, signatories to the declaration should ensure that they interpret it through a humanitarian lens. Its core provision calls on states to adopt “policies and practices to help avoid civilian harm, including by restricting or refraining as appropriate from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects.” According to a report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, to live up to the declaration’s humanitarian purpose, states should understand the paragraph to mean they should refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and restrict their use of all other explosive weapons in those areas.

State signatories should also carry out the commitments they made in the declaration and be ready to report on their progress at the first follow-up meeting in Norway in 2024. They should, for example, review, develop, and improve relevant national policies and practices; train their armed forces on the declaration’s provisions; collect and share data; and provide assistance to victims. Several civil society organizations have published recommendations for how most effectively to implement the declaration’s commitments.

Nuclear Weapons

Implementation is also key for the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty’s landmark First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna last June adopted the Vienna Declaration, reaffirming states parties’ commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons and stressing the treaty’s underlying moral and ethical imperatives. The meeting further agreed to the Vienna Action Plan, which lays out steps to advance the process of implementing the treaty. Expanding support for the treaty remains a top priority. Five years after its initial signing conference, the treaty has 68 states parties and an additional 27 states have signed.

Another area of focus is the positive obligations to assist victims, remediate environmental contamination, and provide international cooperation and assistance. The Action Plan identifies initial steps states parties should take to establish an implementation framework. They should assess the harm caused by nuclear weapons use and testing and their capacity to address it, develop a national plan with a budget and time frame, establish a government “focal point” to guide these efforts, and adopt relevant laws and policies. In addition, they should follow principles of accessibility, inclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency at all stages of carrying out these obligations.

Environment and Armed Conflict

New standards were set during the past year with regard to the environment and armed conflict. On December 7, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus the International Law Commission’s Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts. The non-binding principles cover situations before, during, and after times of armed conflict.

The principles call for designating protected zones, explicitly applying existing international humanitarian law to the environment, and laying out rules to protect the environment during times of occupation. They also underscore the importance of cooperation in developing post-conflict remedial measures.

The Conflict and Environment Observatory, which advocated heavily for the principles, said that, “The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the principles and their commentaries represents the transition point between [the principles’] development and the beginning of its implementation phase.” Early steps in this stage include raising awareness about the principles and adopting national measures, such as training armed forces on their content.

Autonomous Weapons Systems

While the new standards and commitments on explosive weapons, nuclear weapons, and the environment in armed conflict require implementation, the dangers raised by autonomous weapons systems are still not constrained by specific legal rules. Innovation will, therefore, be crucial in 2023. International talks at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) have been ongoing since May 2014, but no action has been taken. At the CCW’s annual meeting in November, states parties yet again failed to make any meaningful progress despite calls from a majority of states parties, plus the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society organizations, to open negotiations for a new treaty to prohibit and regulate autonomous weapons.

Due in large part to the CCW’s reliance on consensus-based decision making, however, states parties could only agree to discuss—for the tenth year—“possible measures” for addressing the myriad threats such weapons systems pose. States parties will need to break out of the CCW if they want to make progress toward a new instrument on autonomous weapons systems.

States need to innovate by changing their tactics for achieving a treaty, and there is ample precedent for taking a different approach. Existing disarmament treaties offer models for successfully adopting legal instruments in alternative forums. As discussed in a recent report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, states could turn to an independent process outside the UN, as was done for the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. Or they could initiate a UN General Assembly process, as was used for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Both approaches have several benefits: a common purpose, voting-based decision-making, clear and ambitious deadlines, and a commitment to inclusivity.

In 2023, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Austria are all planning conferences outside of the CCW on autonomy in weapons systems. States and others that support creating new law to address the moral, legal, accountability, and security concerns about this emerging technology should take advantage of these meetings to build momentum for negotiations.

Bonnie Docherty is a senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch and a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, where she is Director of the Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection Initiative in the International Human Rights Clinic.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Humanitarian Disarmament in 2022: Negotiations, Implementation, and a Fresh Start

2/8/2022

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This is the fifth and final blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

This post was originally published by Disarmament Dialogue.

Bonnie Docherty

While the year 2021 ended on an intense and draining note, with the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), 2022 has begun slowly for humanitarian disarmament. The COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to affect progress in the field, has postponed planned negotiations and milestone meetings.

Nevertheless, barring further pandemic-related interference, the new year promises to advance several key humanitarian disarmament issues. It should produce a new political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, see states parties convene for their first meeting under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and mark a turning point in efforts to address the threats posed by autonomous weapons systems.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

A new international instrument is on the horizon for dealing with the use in populated areas of explosive weapons, such as mortars, artillery shells, rockets, and air-dropped bombs. This method of war causes extensive civilian harm both at the time of attack and long after. That harm is exacerbated when the explosive weapons have wide area effects because they are inaccurate, have a large blast or fragmentation radius, or deliver multiple munitions at once.

Ireland initiated a process in 2019 to develop a political declaration to protect civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Draft versions of the declaration recognized the harm this practice inflicts and included commitments for restricting the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects, providing victim assistance, and collecting data.

While the latest draft should be strengthened, the negotiations for the final version have been at the mercy of COVID-19. The consultations to conclude the document, originally scheduled for late March 2020, were the first major disarmament meeting to fall victim to the global pandemic. After at last being able to reschedule the consultations for February 2022, Ireland was compelled to postpone them once again when the Omicron variant meant that the relevant state and civil society representatives would be unable to attend an in-person meeting in Geneva.
Although a new date has not yet been set, Ireland reportedly aims to hold the negotiations in the first half of 2022. If it succeeds, humanitarian disarmament will have another instrument in its toolbox—a political commitment that addresses one of the most significant humanitarian concerns of contemporary armed conflict.

Nuclear Weapons

In addition to celebrating the “Banniversary” of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first anniversary of its entry into force, on January 22, states and civil society have been busy preparing for the treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The meeting was previously moved from January to March 2022, and Austria, president of the meeting, recently announced it will need to be rescheduled again, most likely until mid-year.

Whenever it takes place, the 1MSP will be a crucial moment in the life of the TPNW. It provides states parties the opportunity to set priorities for the years ahead and to begin the process of turning the treaty’s obligations into actions.

Discussions around the TPNW’s “positive obligations” for victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance will be particularly important for advancing the humanitarian disarmament agenda. These obligations ensure that the treaty provides a comprehensive response to the consequences of nuclear weapons, i.e., addressing the harm from past use and testing as well as preventing future harm. The 1MSP’s declaration and action plan should commit states parties to establishing an implementation framework, approving an intersessional workplan, developing reporting guidelines, and including affected communities at all stages.

A working paper from Kazakhstan and Kiribati, which Austria appointed co-facilitators of the 1MSP’s work on the positive obligations, recommended addressing these and other measures in the 1MSP’s outcome documents. Many states parties and civil society organizations expressed their support in written submissions, and consultations are ongoing.

Other important areas that the 1MSP will deal with include universalization and deadlines and verification procedures for dismantling nuclear arsenals.

Killer Robots

For killer robots, the significance of 2022 is the opportunity it presents for supporters of a new treaty to change direction.

Weapons systems that select and engage targets based on sensor processing rather than human inputs raise a host of moral, legal, accountability, and security concerns. As a result, the majority of states at the CCW’s Sixth Review Conference called for negotiations to create a new legally binding instrument on the topic. Most called for a combination of prohibitions on weapons that lack meaningful human control, prohibitions on autonomous weapons systems that target people, and restrictions on all other autonomous weapons systems to ensure that they are never used without meaningful human control.

The failure of the conference to adopt a negotiation mandate underscored the shortcomings of that forum and the inability of this consensus body to make real progress on a matter of grave and urgent humanitarian concern. After eight years, CCW discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems have more than run their course.

It is time, therefore, for states that support a legally binding instrument on these emerging weapons to pursue negotiations in an alternative forum. They can look for models to the origins of other humanitarian disarmament treaties, notably the independent processes that led to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the UN General Assembly process that led to the TPNW.

Many states said that they could not consider alternative forums until after the Review Conference, but that moment has passed and the CCW has failed to produce results. This year presents a clean slate. It is time for all supporters of a treaty to shift their sights and for champion states to step up and take the lead on a new process.

* * * * *

While the pandemic is likely to play a role in the timing of progress this year, humanitarian disarmament—not a global disease—should determine 2022’s developments.

Participants in the negotiations of the explosive weapons political declaration should ensure the final draft maximizes civilian protection. States, international organizations, civil society groups, and survivors should work together to produce strong 1MSP outcome documents that help the treaty live up to its humanitarian potential in practice. Finally, proponents of a new legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems should start fresh and focus on what process can best lead them to the strongest humanitarian outcome.

Bonnie Docherty is a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, where she is Associate Director of Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection in the International Human Rights Clinic, and senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch.

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Looking Ahead: Civilians Must Be Protected from Bombing and Shelling in Towns and Cities

1/13/2022

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

Brian Castner

In mid-2021, as the Taliban ramped up their offensive against government forces across Afghanistan, the fighting grew especially fierce in Zakhail, just west of the city of Kunduz. The Taliban used motorbikes to seize civilian areas and took cover in homes and schools, while the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) launched mortars from police checkpoints into the densely populated neighborhood.

As Amnesty International documented in a new report on the conflict in Afghanistan, on the evening of June 23rd a family huddled in their home in Zakhail, trying to take cover from the fighting, when they heard a series of explosions. One by one the detonations got closer, until the fourth round struck the central courtyard of the house.
Heavy metal fragments from a mortar tore through the family members. One 30-year-old woman, Bibi Shahnaz, and her 12-year-old son Faisal were killed immediately. Another child, a 16-yearold boy, lost both legs at the knee. A man and a third child were also badly hurt. An Amnesty International researcher examined the wounds of the injured man, and after removing a leg bandage bone was still visible in the deepest wounds.

These civilians were killed and injured because they were trapped in their home, unable to flee the fighting, and caught between the explosive weapons of the Taliban and the ANDSF. “The people who can afford to leave do but the poor people stay because they will starve if they leave,” one witness said.

In this case, the family was hit when the ANDSF unit “walked” their mortars to a Taliban position, a process in which the crew makes targeting adjustments through observation and correction with each round launched to gradually direct the ordnance to the target through repeated firings. But doing so in an area with civilians is extremely reckless, and such negligence in failing to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects can constitute a war crime. But even in lawful attacks against a military objective, when fighting occurs in populated areas military forces ought to exercise extreme caution over the choice of weapons.

Attacks such as the one in Zakhail are an example of the risks that civilians face from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas – a pattern of harm which has been widely documented and results in the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of civilians each year. Amnesty International has reported other cases in point including use of inaccurate explosive weapons in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syrian and Russian air and ground launched strikes in northern Syria, Saudi Arabia and UAE-led Coalition air strikes in Yemen, and US-led Coalition air and artillery strikes in Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq, to name just a few recent examples.

Over the past several years the ICRC and UN have raised the alarm over civilian devastation and suffering from bombing and shelling in towns, cities, and other populated areas. The current and former UN Secretary-Generals have called on Member States to engage constructively in a process to develop an international political declaration that aims to address the harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, described as “widespread’” and “largely foreseeable.”

In response to this growing concern, the government of Ireland has led talks with states and organisations to agree to new international standards in the form of a political declaration that will be finalised and adopted by states over the coming months.

The aim of this political instrument is to set new international standards that would strengthen the protection of civilians by promoting good practice and stigmatizing harmful behaviour through the declaration’s commitments.

Whilst not legally binding, a political declaration can reinforce important principles of international humanitarian law and help reaffirm application of the law, and build upon these by providing clearer guidance.

The declaration would see curbs placed on use of explosive weapons in populated areas, with a specific commitment to prevent use in populated areas when explosive weapons have “wide area effects.” Meaning, when the effects of the weapon are likely to extend beyond a particular military objective. This may be due to the large blast and fragmentation radii of the weapon, the use of inaccurate weapons systems that may strike at a distance from the intended target, the use of a weapon system that delivers multiple munitions across an area, or a combination of these factors. The Zakhail example is a case in point, where mortars, which are highly inaccurate, can require multiple rounds to “dial in” on a target. These extra rounds can fall on areas populated by civilians and cause significant harm, as they did in this case. Beyond restrictions on use and other measures aimed at shaping military policy and practice, the declaration text will also contain other important commitments to assist individuals and communities affected and to address the long-lasting humanitarian impact when infrastructure is destroyed. And it will call on states to gather data on the impact on civilians – including direct and reverberating effects – that can help to provide responses that will reduce harm and respond effectively to the needs of all.

The declaration presents a unique opportunity to set stronger normative expectations, coupled with practical operational guidance which can offer new prospects that reduce harm experienced by civilians in conflict. It is urgently needed.

Laura Boillot is Programme Manager for Article 36 and Coordinator for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).

Brian Castner is a Senior Crisis Advisor with Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Programme, specializing in weapons and military operations.

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Syria in 2020: the deadly legacy of explosive violence and its impact on infrastructure and health

12/17/2019

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

Jennifer Dathan

According to Action on Armed Violence’s data, throughout the course of the conflict in Syria, about three-quarters of injurious attacks there occurred in populated areas. This devastating use of explosive weapons has led to the destruction of towns and cities across Syria. In Aleppo alone, at least 15 million tons of rubble were created by this violence by 2017. These mountains of rubble, as well as the consequential redevelopment process, pose many environmental concerns for 2020 that could have a continuing and significant impact on the health of Syria’s beleaguered population.

Scale of the damage

By 2017, 50% of basic social infrastructure in Syria was non-operational, mostly due to the destruction incurred during hostilities. This damage continued through 2018, including over 34,000 buildings damaged or destroyed just in Eastern Ghouta. Such harm continued across the country this year, and will do so until the conflict is brought to an end.

Estimates on the levels of rubble generated have only been carried out for Aleppo and Homs, with war damage creating 15 million and 5.3 million tons respectively. A 2019 study by REACH, a humanitarian initiative providing data from contexts of crisis, further revealed that Aleppo had almost 36,000 buildings damaged or destroyed, similar to Ghouta. Raqqa, with almost 13,000 buildings damaged or destroyed has witnessed a similar level of harm as Homs.

Figure 1 REACH, 'Syrian Cities Damage Atlas', 2019.

Overall, about a third of homes in Syria were thought to have been damaged or destroyed by 2017. In 2018, the UN estimated the cost of material destruction in Syria at $120 billion. By 2019, 12 million people – half Syria’s pre-war population – were displaced. To clear the debris in Aleppo alone would take six years of continuous work and 26 million ‘truck-kilometers’ – but these are academic calculations. There is not yet the equipment, funds, or capacity to carry out this work.

Combined the devastation of Syria raises serious environmental issues and health concerns, especially for those who remain or return, and those involved in clearing the destruction.

Concerns with debris

The debris poses serious health risks, exposing those in the impacted areas to hazardous material in both the air and the ground, such as toxic smokes and heavy metal. An indication of the consequences this may have on local populations might be seen from the significantly increased cancer risk for those exposed to the release of toxic dusts in the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001; some 43,000 people have been certified with a 9/11 related health condition, including almost 10,000 with a related cancer. More recently, in Paris, there has been concern over potential lead poisoning of the residents living nearby Notre-Dame Cathedral, after the fire and destruction in April 2019.

Further environmental concerns for 2020 will be likely faced in things such as informal waste dumping and an increase in burning of waste as land is attempted to be cleared. In Lebanon, for instance, the debris left from the destruction of downtown Beirut in the civil war, which ended in 1990, contributed to the country’s lasting garbage problem, which – in turn - has led to pollution in the Mediterranean and caused significant air pollution for Beirut’s inhabitants.

A similar situation occurred in post-WWII Germany. Much of the 10 million tons of rubble taken from Nuremburg’s Old Town was deposited in an excavation pit. In the post-war years, waste continued to be dumped there. As few safety measures were carried out, leaching of this waste saw the connected Silver Lake become severely polluted, with lethal concentrations of hydrogen sulphide entering the lake. While the landfill has since been landscaped, forested and incorporated into the Volkspark Dutzendteich, the Silver Lake, or Silbersee, continues to be heavily polluted and at least fifty people have lost their lives after bathing in that lake.

Explosives among the debris

The failure rate of modern weapons is estimated to be about 10%. To give a scale of the numbers of weapons that may be lying in Syria unexploded, in just five months, the US-led coalition fired 30,000 artillery shells on Raqqa. With a 10% failure rate, this leaves about 3,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from just one party to the conflict in just one city. By 2018, at least 25,000 munitions had been dropped by the US-led coalition, while Russia declared more than 39,000 airstrikes in the first three years of fighting, and improvised explosive devices are littered across Syria’s scarred landscape. The appetite for these state actors to identify the harm their bombing campaigns have caused, let alone address this harm, is minimal.

This mountain of lethal legacy makes clearance a far deadlier task. While IEDs are likely to cause injuries, the UXO from manufactured weapons generally contains significantly higher levels of explosives and tend to result in fatalities. Those carrying out the clearance are often unprepared for the task.

When AOAV interviewed members of the Rojova Mine Control Organisation (RMCO) in 2018, they reported significant challenges to clearance efforts in Raqqa, including a lack of large and armored vehicles to clear the rubble, something necessary due to the ammunition and booby traps among the debris.

As such, as organizations and experts do not have the capacity or equipment to clear the debris, many civilians will carry on in 2020 conducting this dangerous work. An Amnesty investigation found at least 1,000 people killed by explosives between October 2017 and April 2018 in contaminated areas – with many more dying before reaching medical care, and so going unrecorded.

Looking Ahead in Syria - and Beyond

Overall in 2020, Syria will face a mountain of conflict debris contaminating its land, air, and water, a large proportion of this caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. And it is not just Syria. Iraq, Yemen, and the Philippines are among those who have also experienced such destruction in recent years. And so, as Syrians begin to clear rubble and slowly rebuild, the safety of civilians in such clearance should be a pressing priority for humanitarian agencies. This means minimizing civilians’ exposure to toxic dust, ensuring materials are disposed of in a way that minimizes contamination of soil and water supplies, and clearing UXO. Without such measures – and fast – the Syrian conflict will continue to claim more lives.

Iain Overton is Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and Forum-listed expert. Jennifer Dathan is a Researcher at AOAV.

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Explosive weapons in populated areas: looking ahead to 2020

12/16/2019

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

After a decade of work building concern over the use of explosive weapons in towns, cities and other populated areas, an ambitious timeframe has now been set out for developing an international political declaration in the first half of 2020. The aim of the initiative is to develop a tool to tackle the high levels of civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas by driving change in government and military policy and practice.

It is urgently needed. Over the past decade, data shows that when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, 90% of the casualties are civilians. Explosive weapon systems - including aircraft bombs, artillery, mortars and rocket systems - function by projecting blast and fragmentation across an area, and around the point of detonation, often causing multiple casualties in a single incident. This is a pattern of harm documented in Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, among other places.

Even looking beyond the tens of thousands of civilians that are killed and injured each year, and the many more that are traumatised, the effects of explosive weapon systems have a devastating impact on the fabric of a city and the built environment. Buildings are reduced to rubble, hospitals and medical facilities are destroyed, and schools are forced to close. The provision of essential services is hampered. The scale of impact goes far beyond those immediately hurt, or those in the vicinity of the attack, and the impact can be felt long after the bombing ends.

Ill-suited for use in urban centres and other populated areas, heavy explosive weapon systems are particularly problematic owing to their large destructive capacity and high explosive content, inaccuracy, and ability to fire multiple warheads across an area – or a combination of these factors. Particular emphasis has rightly been put on addressing use of explosive weapons with wide area effects – and excessively wide in relation to the military objective being targeted.

Key milestones in 2019
The situation is not entirely without hope. Important progress has been made in 2019 to address this issue at the political level.

This issue featured prominently once again in the UN Secretary-General’s report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict issued in May 2019. Citing examples from a range of countries devastated by conflict, he concluded that the protection of civilians in armed conflict is both “tragic and appalling.” A case in point is the city of Raqqa, Syria, which experienced regular airstrikes and shelling, where nearly 80 percent of buildings in the city were destroyed or damaged and essential services, such as water, electricity and health care were absent or severely limited, rendering it inhabitable.

A central recommendation in this report is to avoid use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, owing to the cumulative, complex and long-term harm resulting from such use. The Secretary-General also reiterated his call on states to develop a political declaration on explosive weapons that would see states commit to avoiding the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas and develop operational policies based on a presumption against such use.

A joint warning by the UN Secretary-General and ICRC President was issued in September 2019 and reiterated the same message warning against use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area in populated areas, cautioning that “civilian devastation and suffering must stop.” It proposes militaries reassess and adapt their choice of weapons and tactics to avoid civilian harm, including taking combat outside of populated areas to try to reduce urban fighting altogether.

States are starting to respond to the repeated calls of the UN Secretary-General. Following regional conferences in Africa in 2017, and Latin America in 2018, over 130 states met in Vienna in October 2019 for the first global conference on the protection of civilians in urban warfare, with a specific focus on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

The Vienna conference represented a turning point. The outcome of the meeting was broad support among participating states to start negotiations on developing an international political declaration on explosive weapons.

Later the same month, a joint statement at the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, led by Ireland and joined by a group of 71 states from all regions, expressed collective concern over the humanitarian impacts on civilians from the bombing and shelling in towns and cities and laid out the aim of negotiating an international political declaration in 2020.

Towards a political declaration in 2020
A widely-attended initial consultation with states on a declaration was convened by Ireland at the United Nations in Geneva in November 2019, gathering views from states and organizations on the type of actions endorsing states can be committed to undertaking. Some key themes from that discussion include:

Establishing a presumption of non-use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas

Many states and organisations highlighted that central to the issue, is recognising and addressing the link between the area effect of explosive weapons, and the risk of harm that using such systems in populated areas presents to civilians.

To address this, a presumption of non-use of explosive weapons with wide area effects should be established along with a requirement on states to actively implement this through the development and review of national operational policies and procedures.

How to articulate the necessary restrictions over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in a declaration text will be a contentious issue, however. States engaged in military operations have expressed concerns over such restrictions.

“Existing law is adequate”

Some states argue that existing law is adequate. However, it is not an initiative aimed at changing the legal framework. There has been widespread support from states to develop a political declaration in order to drive operational change, and set clearer standards and expectations of behaviour around the use of explosive weapons.

“National military policies and procedures are adequate”

Certain states maintain that they have sufficiently robust military policies and procedures to adequately deal with the humanitarian harm from explosive weapon use in towns and cities, such as collateral damage estimation methodologies (CDEs) and complex targeting procedures.

However, the high levels of civilian harm point to the need for clearer guidelines that relate specifically to the use of explosive weapons with wide area effect in populated areas.

There are limitations to the extent that existing tools and procedures are sufficient in the absence of international standards that ensure the risk of harm from explosive weapon use is adequately reflected in these assessments. Nor do all states have policies, capabilities, and trainings relevant to the use of explosive weapons or are applying them. A declaration can help to identify, develop and exchange good practices.

Assisting victims and affected communities

A declaration should assist people and affected communities, including fulfilling the rights of victims, and ensuring basic needs are met in a timely manner, as well as safe and timely access to services.

Given the number of people that are impacted, and the extensive costs and work associated with rebuilding towns and cities, as well as the burden falling upon affected countries, the scope of this commitment has received some push back from certain states. But the fact that there are a large number of victims is not a justification for denying people their rights, but rather should be driver of the urgency of addressing this problem.

The next six months
The process laid out by Ireland is expected to conclude in May or June of 2020 in Dublin, following a series of meetings in Geneva in February and March or April of 2020. Ahead of the next meeting, a draft text will be circulated in the new year, and will be the basis of discussions moving forward.

It’s an ambitious timeframe but it can be concluded successfully in this period. It is a similar timeframe and approach that delivered the Safe School’s declaration a few years ago. Civil society’s goal will be on getting a declaration that is sufficiently strong in its commitments to have a meaningful humanitarian impact.

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Further reading

INEW has published a paper on key elements for a political declaration on explosive weapons in populated areas which can be found here: http://bit.ly/Elements4Declaration as well as a Frequently Asked Questions document http://bit.ly/INEWQandA which lays out more information on policy positions on key issues.

Laura Boillot is the Coordinator of the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) and Programme Manager for Article 36.

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Explosive violence and the health challenges ahead for Syria

1/11/2019

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

It is a hard truth that explosive weapons have a devastating impact on health – from the direct blast that can tear limbs and families apart, to the widespread destruction of health infrastructure and all the painful reverberations this has. And nowhere else is this truism more evident than in war-torn Syria.

There, according to data by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), not only has the use of explosive weapons caused at least 79,000 direct casualties - of which about 85% (67,000) were civilians - but it has also devastated state and civilian infrastructure, causing immeasurable harm to healthcare. In Syria, direct casualties from such violence is just the beginning.

Today, with half of Syria’s basic infrastructure non-functioning owing to the war, civilians lack access to energy systems, clean water and other basic essentials – all factors that increase the risk of the spread of disease.[1] At the same time, explosive violence has radically reduced the capacity of health facilities across the country;[2] 60% of health-care services in Syria today lie damaged or destroyed.[3] So, whilst the demand for healthcare is greater than ever, access is significantly reduced and civilians are left ‘dying from injuries and illnesses that are easily treatable and preventable.’[4]

Many medical personnel have also been killed in bombardments; 57% of Syrian medical personnel deaths between March 2011 and December 2017 were caused by explosive weapon use.[5] Others have left; by 2018, with thousands of clinicians having fled the violence, just a third of healthcare workers are said to remain in the beleaguered nation.[6] Such an exodus poses a serious problem. Many physicians are unlikely to return; for some it may be unsafe to do so, for others they may have made a new life elsewhere. In a post-conflict environment, where demand is high and resources are few, medical staff may decide that a better quality of life is to be found in the countries they fled to.[7]

The result of this is that access to care is stretched thin. Doctors’ caseloads have more than doubled,[8] while the lack of staff means there are few specialised services, particularly as donor efforts focus on emergency funding for ‘cost effective intervention’.[9]

Blast survivors are amongst the worst impacted by this reality, faced with highly limited rehabilitation services and considerable difficulties reaching care in the first place. In desperate response to this, living with suppurating wounds and mounting ill-health, many patients have been increasingly misusing antibiotics, a considerable problem in the country even prior to the conflict.[10] Evidence suggests this has likely exacerbated antimicrobial resistance in Syria[11] – causing further significant obstacles for the future.

More than 11.3 million people are said to be in need of health assistance within Syria, including 3 million with injuries and disabilities.[12] A large percentage of those injured are likely to be due to explosive weapons. Amongst 25,000 injured Syrian refugees examined by Humanity and Inclusion, 53% had been injured by such weapons.[13]

In some of the worst impacted areas, the rate of injury and disability is disturbingly high. In a survey of injury and disability across Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa, as many as 50% of responders were said to be living with some form of disability.[14] The main cause of these injuries were airstrikes (54%), followed by other explosions (28%).[15]

Amputations are common – one doctor commented that Syria will be left with ‘a generation of amputees.’[16] Alongside this, a Humanity and Inclusion report found that, of injured people in Syria, around 8% required an orthopaedic fitting.[17] Furthermore, with the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) predicted to take 50 years, blast injuries are likely to continue to occur long after the conflict ends.[18]

Amputees have life-long healthcare needs: from rehabilitation and tissue management to further associated conditions, such as ectopic bone formations and osteoarthritis. Such conditions are difficult to manage in a developed healthcare system, let alone a post-conflict environment with a severely dilapidated and destroyed healthcare infrastructure.

The ruin of civilian infrastructure in Syria, beyond health infrastructure, will also have long lasting health impacts on the population. Again, with the displacement of skilled construction workers, alongside the sheer level of redevelopment needed, it is likely that such a threat to health will linger for a long time to come. Syria will almost certainly be witness to increased rates of water-borne or similar diseases in the coming years.[19] One study found physical damage to 457 water supply and sanitation infrastructure assets, not including damage to pipe networks.[20]

The mountains of rubble and waste left in the wake of the bombardment has – and will - also provide the perfect habitat for sand flies, leading to severe outbreaks of leishmaniasis; cases there have increased in recent years by a rate of at least 150%.[21] The most common form of leishmaniasis (cutaneous) causes severe skin lesions which can leave scars and inflict serious disability, but there has also been an increase in visceral leishmaniasis, which is often fatal. [22]

The widespread devastation may also herald further health disasters ahead. When explosive weapons destroy buildings, dangerous and toxic substances are often exposed.[23] Little research has been conducted into this harm, and we are only just beginning to understand the consequences. But studies of those exposed to the toxic dust in the collapse of the World Trade Center give stark warnings. By October 2018, over 43,000 people had been diagnosed with a 9/11 related health condition – 10,000 with cancer – and more still are likely to have been affected.[24] This was also in the US, where the medical infrastructure remained intact after the terror attack. In Syria, a lack of safety equipment in clearance operations, a prolonged and widespread exposure due to uncleared waste, and a lack of health infrastructure, only increase the health risks.

Beyond the physical harm, many more Syrians will be left psychologically affected by the bombardment. One Save the Children study found that, among Syrian refugees interviewed, almost all children and 84% of adults reported that bombing and shelling was the number one cause of psychological stress in children.[25]

The outlook for psychiatric care in Syria is dire. With less than 100 psychiatrists across the whole country prior to the crisis and many of those forced to flee, it is certain that most Syrians will be unable to access the psychological support they desperately need.

Overall, the scale of civilian harm and damage to infrastructure has left a health crisis in Syria which is likely to last decades. The lack of infrastructure and staff is unlikely to be quickly remedied, whilst the harm from explosive weapons, both physically and psychologically, will in many cases require lifelong treatment. Such consequences should serve as a warning on the long-term harm from explosive weapons, and states should commit in 2019 to stop using such weapons in populated areas. That is the least that can be done in the name of humanity.

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Iain Overton is Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence

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Footnotes

[1] Interview with Omar Sobeh, Hand in Hand for Syria, WASH cluster coordinator, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[2] Cierra Carafice, ‘Where Do We Go From Here? The Story of Syria's Public Health System’, October 09 2017, Middle East Studies Center.

[3] Speech by Peter Maurer, ‘Even wars have limits: Health-care workers and facilities must be protected’, May 03 2016, ICRC.

[4] WHO, ‘Seven years of Syria’s health tragedy’, March 14 2018.

[5] Raja Abdulrahim, ‘After the Gas and Bombs: The Health Crisis That’s Killing Syria’, April 17 2018, Wall Street Journal.

[6] Interview with Dr Mohamad Katoub, Advocacy Manager at Syrian American Medical Society, August 7th 2018.

[7] See Dathan, J. ‘When the bombs fall silent: the reverberating effects of explosive weapons’, May 2018, Action on Armed Violence.

[8] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[9] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[10] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[11] Esmita Charani, Senior Lead Pharmacist, Imperial College London, Faculty of Medicine, at the Global Health Forum: The impact of conflict on health care, 19 May 2018.

[12] WHO, ‘Seven years of Syria’s health tragedy’, March 14 2018.

[13] Handicap International, ‘Syria, a mutilated future’, May 2016.

[14] Presentation by Keiko Tamura, Head of Programmes, HIHFAD, Child Protection Sub-Cluster meeting in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[15] Presentation by Keiko Tamura, Head of Programmes, HIHFAD, Child Protection Sub-Cluster meeting in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[16] Interview with Dr Mohamad Katoub, Advocacy Manager at Syrian American Medical Society, August 7th 2018.

[17] Anne Garella, ‘‘80,000 people in Syria need a prosthesis or an orthosis’’, Humanity and Inclusion, 2015.

[18] Wilton Park and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2017, ‘Clearance of improvised explosive devices in the Middle East Monday 22 – Wednesday 24 May 2017 | WP1548’.

[19] Interview with Omar Sobeh, Hand in Hand for Syria, WASH cluster coordinator, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[20] World Bank, 2017, ‘The Toll of War. The economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria’.

[21] The Lancet, ‘Leishmaniasis unleashed in Syria’, February 2017, Volume 17, pp.144-145.

[22] The Lancet, ‘Leishmaniasis unleashed in Syria’, February 2017, Volume 17, pp.144-145.

[23] Andy Garrity, ‘Conflict rubble: a ubiquitous and under-studied toxic remnant of war’, July 10 2014, Conflict and Environment Observatory.

[24] Erin Durkin, ‘September 11: nearly 10,000 people affected by 'cesspool of cancer'’, September 11 2018, The Guardian.

[25] McDonald, A. 2017. ‘Invisible Wounds: The impact of six years of war on the mental health of Syria’s children’, Save the Children. Available at:

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Finding Leadership Outside the White House

12/21/2017

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Less than one year into the Trump administration, it is clear that the United States is unlikely to provide positive leadership in promoting responsible arms trade and weapons use. While the Obama administration certainly did not shy away from arms deals, it did sign the Arms Trade Treaty and withhold some arms transfers due to human rights concerns. What restraint Obama showed, Trump has jettisoned, evidenced in arms sales notifications of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia in May, F-16s to Bahrain in September, and Super Tucanos to Nigeria in August – all deals that Obama had put on hold.

Further under Trump, drone use/air strikes have dramatically increased in number and/or in numbers of civilians harmed. The Defense Department has backed away from a policy that would have barred the use of certain cluster munitions, in particular older ones with an awful record for humanitarian harm. The administration also appears set to make it easier to sell small arms by transferring their control to the Commerce Department, completing the last steps of a controversial export reform initiative. In December, the United States abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the ATT, saying during First Committee that it was reviewing its policy. These and other indicators suggest that US arms use and trade, as well as any eventual new US conventional arms transfer policy, will simply remove the concept of restraint and further undermine commitment to and promotion of human rights.

This is an admittedly bleak initial picture, but there are many places the world can and should look for leadership outside of a US administration espousing an “America First” world view. Perhaps surprisingly, the first place to look is the US Congress. The close 47-53 Senate vote in June in opposition to the PGM sale to Saudi Arabia is an indicator that the Senate could take a more proactive role, especially if the rumored additional $7 billion in PGM sales come before it. Republican Senator Rand Paul and Democratic Senator Chris Murphy partnered on that work and together or separately merit watching in 2018. So too does Republican Senator Todd Young, especially in relation to the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy reacted quickly to the cluster munition policy reversal, and along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Ben Cardin have identified the need for Congressional involvement in any changes that would send small arms to Commerce control. A number of members of the House of Representatives have also taken up US weapons sales and use. A short list includes Democrats Ro Khanna, Mark Pocan and Republican Walter Jones, who co-wrote a New York Times oped critical of US support to Saudi Arabia, as well as Republican Justin Amash, and Democrat Ted Lieu, who has long expressed concerned about potential US complicity in war crimes.

Arming Saudi Arabia, or rather a commitment not to do so is also an appropriate litmus test on international leadership as the Saudi-led coalition continues to use weapons to the detriment of civilians in Yemen. In 2017, the European Parliament again called for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia -- a call not heeded by suppliers such as France and the United Kingdom, but one other European countries can and do support. Related, Sweden’s pending “democracy criterion” in arms sales is worth watching for an impact nationally and regionally. So too is Japan’s leadership of the Arms Trade Treaty for the 2018 Conference of States Parties, where thus far countries have frustratingly refused to directly address the inconsistency of arming the Saudis.

The recent conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the international civil society coalition that fought hard for the treaty (ICAN), draws global attention to the truth that leadership need not come from the normal “big players.” Those countries, led by the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), tend to put traditional state-centered security over the needs of individuals (aka human security). But human security is at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty and a host of other successful treaties and initiatives broadly classified as “humanitarian disarmament.” On key treaties in this realm, Nicaragua is taking on the presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Afghanistan will have leadership of the Mine Ban Treaty. They have the potential to bring a different type of leadership to arms-related issues in 2018. So too do some of the countries that were at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty, such as Mexico and New Zealand, who were also progressive voices during the Arms Trade Treaty negotiation.

The Nobel Peace Prize also reminds us that civil society campaigns play a critical role. In 2018, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots will continue calling for all countries to ban the development of fully autonomous weapons (“killer robots”). The countries participating in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) working group may choose that path, which a growing number (22) are supporting. Leading roboticists and artificial intelligence experts are banding together with that message and writing letters to governments, spurring national parliamentary debates. In another campaign, the International Network on Explosive Weapons is helping to build momentum to address and end the practice of using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. These weapons are particularly devastating to civilians and civilian infrastructure, causing both immediate harm at the time of use and ongoing suffering from the disruption of economic and social activity.

Members of industry and the financial sector will also have the opportunity to display leadership. Late in 2016, German arms manufacturer Heckler and Koch announced that it would no longer sell weapons to undemocratic and corrupt countries. More recently in Japan, four banks and insurance companies recently announced that they would ban investments in cluster munition producers, joining a growing group that have made similar commitments in other countries.

While the future is always difficult to predict, in 2018 it would be wise to look outside the White House for leadership on proper restraint in the use and sale of weapons – without which, we can unfortunately foresee new suffering by civilians and the undermining of their human rights.

Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association.

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Tackling the humanitarian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas: What’s in store for 2018?

12/15/2017

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

Shelling and bombing in towns and cities has continued to cause high levels of harm and destruction throughout the course of 2017. The battle over Mosul saw extensive use of mortars, rockets, and other unguided munitions, fundamentally inaccurate weapons that have devastated the city, with reports that 40,000 civilians died. In Raqqa, it was reported that 20,321 munitions were dropped on the city over a five month period, amounting to about 133 munitions every day, making 80% of the city uninhabitable.

These examples are particularly stark, but each year across the globe 60-70 countries experience explosive violence, with tens of thousands of civilians being killed and injured. Clear illustrations of this persistent pattern of harm can be found across different countries and contexts, including in Côte d’Ivoire, Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen – raising concerns over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

Armed conflicts are increasingly being fought in towns and cities, with some 50 million people bearing the brunt of the consequences. Too often the weapon of choice in these situations are the tools of the military – weapons designed for use in open battlefields and that impact a wide area. But their use in civilian areas including villages, town and cities, puts civilians at excessive risk of harm and must change.

Beyond direct deaths, injuries, and trauma, civilians also suffer from living under the bombing: many are forced to flee their homes, and for those that stay - and those that want to return - the widespread destruction of buildings and essential infrastructure, and the services that they provide including health care, education, water, sanitation, power supply and transportation, are severely impeded.

What can we work towards in 2018?

There is widespread and growing concern over the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas – these being weapons that are inherently inaccurate, weapons that have a large explosive content, or those that scatter explosives over a wide area, or a combination of these factors. A recent study in the Lancet on the impact of shelling in Syria, found “disproportionate lethal effects on civilians, calling into question the use of wide-area explosive weapons in urban areas.” This follows warnings not to use explosive weapons with a wide area impact in densely populated areas from the ICRC and the UN Secretary-General, who emphasised the “widespread” and “largely foreseeable” humanitarian harm such weapons use causes. Civil society organizations affiliated with the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) and other non-governmental organizations have also raised repeated concerns over the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in areas where there is a concentration of civilians. Greater recognition by states and other armed actors of this specific pattern of harm, which is largely foreseeable and has been extensively documented, is needed as a first step towards enhancing the protection of civilians, as well as a firm commitment not to use explosive weapons with wide area effects in towns and cities.

A focus on revising or otherwise developing specific operational policies and procedures that better guide the choice of weapons in populated areas that set an operational direction against the use of those that present the gravest risks to civilians and by doing such minimizing harm, is sorely needed. OCHA’s Compilation of Military Policies and Practice, which looks at existing policies and practices by militaries to protect civilians from explosive weapons, provides some useful examples of how militaries have restricted the use of explosive weapons to protect the civilian population and reduce civilian causalities, and how this choice has at the same time supported the strategic objective of their operations. Geneva Call reports that protecting civilians from the effects of weapons is also of concern to a number of non-state actors also, as documented in their latest report on this theme, Despite hostilities more and more often taking place in urban centers, few militaries have specific operational guidance on the use of explosive weapons in such challenging, densely populated environments. Whilst collateral damage estimates and other procedures help to provide important assessments, a specific focus on the choice of weapons as the primary instruments of violence and the cause of harm would be enormously beneficial in strengthening the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

A key focus of work for states and others concerned about the protection of civilians in armed conflict must be the development of an international political declaration on the prevention of harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Austria and Mozambique are among the states that have been leading discussions on this issue following calls from the UN Secretary General to engage constructively in developing a political declaration. A declaration would set an important political standard, and provide operational direction for parties to armed conflict with a view to avoiding the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. It could provide a framework for states to develop national measures and guidance, and a forum to discuss results and assess the effectiveness of such measures. Furthermore, it could contribute to assisting affected communities and individuals in addressing civilian harm from the effects of explosive weapons.

Whilst a political declaration would not solve this widespread problem overnight, a commitment led by a partnership of states and organizations dedicated to reducing humanitarian suffering would lay the foundations for greater action. This issue is urgent: treating it as such means that significant and concrete progress must be made in 2018.

Laura Boillot is the Coordinator of the International on Explosive Weapons (INEW) and Programme Manager for Article 36.

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Prioritising the protection of civilians from explosive weapons: Bringing about change through the framework of the Political Declaration

Explosive Violence: Projections for 2024

Implementation and Innovation: Humanitarian Disarmament in 2023

Humanitarian Disarmament in 2022: Negotiations, Implementation, and a Fresh Start

Looking Ahead: Civilians Must Be Protected from Bombing and Shelling in Towns and Cities

Syria in 2020: the deadly legacy of explosive violence and its impact on infrastructure and health

Explosive weapons in populated areas: looking ahead to 2020

Explosive violence and the health challenges ahead for Syria

Finding Leadership Outside the White House

Tackling the humanitarian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas: What’s in store for 2018?

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