| This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations. |  Hiruni Alwishewa |
The measures designed to safeguard human rights in the arms trade are currently under immense strain. The first half of the 2020s has seen an unprecedented rise in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises alongside surging rearmament. Protecting human rights and ensuring accountability in this period of heightened global insecurity will require greater and more sustained action in 2026 to reverse the erosion of human rights commitments. With the dynamics between states, corporations and citizens shifting, a wider range of non-state actors can play significant roles in these efforts.
Undermining the protection of human rights
Mitigating and preventing human rights violations in the arms trade primarily depends on the export controls and risk assessments of states, and their willingness to apply them in practice. States can update their export controls to reflect the changing geopolitical context – for example, Australia added a new condition that prohibits domestic arms manufacturers from directly exporting weapons to Israel.
For the most part, however, human rights obligations continue to be avoided or ignored, including by states that have strengthened their human rights criteria since Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force. Germany, for instance, updated its Political Principles for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment in 2019 to require an export licence to be denied where there is sufficient suspicion that the arms would be used for internal repression or other ongoing, systematic human rights violations. However, it was not until August 2025 that Germany imposed a partial export ban on arms to Israel – more than a year after the International Court of Justice found a plausible claim of genocide in Gaza.
Moreover, the withdrawal of states from key arms control treaties such as the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2025, and Ukraine also signalling its intention to withdraw) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Lithuania in 2024), highlights the sidelining of important humanitarian arms control instruments as peacetime obligations.
Simultaneously, new and emerging technologies have become interwoven into military strategies, further blurring the distinctions between civilian and military technologies. For example, digital technologies developed for civilian use such as cloud storage, facial recognition and data-mining systems have been used by Israel as part of its military operations in Gaza. The increased reliance on commercial technologies that fall outside traditional arms control frameworks creates new challenges for human rights protection and complicates the attribution of responsibility for abuses.
Together, weakening political commitments by states, the retreat from humanitarian arms control, and technological advancement are eroding human rights safeguards in the arms sector. Reversing this trend will be critical in 2026.
Changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens
Human rights protection is no longer solely the responsibility of states. A wider constellation of actors now holds both the ability and the responsibility to affect human rights outcomes through their products and services. Since the adoption of the ATT over a decade ago, momentum around human rights risk assessment has expanded beyond States Parties to include formal recognition of the expectation that corporations in the arms sector conduct independent human rights due diligence.
As states abandon their human rights commitments, with changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens provide opportunities for non-state actors to engage in human rights protection. For example, corporations involved in production, financing and delivery operations can leverage their positions in the supply chain to promote human rights safeguards – a supplier can halt delivery of key components; a shipping company can decline to transport weapons; a financial institution can refuse to fund arms deals involving specific parties or high-risk destinations. Such actions, whether framed as commercial, ethical or risk-management decisions, can enhance the protection of human rights.
Unlike corporations, individual citizens may have limited direct influence on the arms sector as they are not the direct clients of the arms industry. However, through collective movements and organised groups such as trade unions, citizens can build pressure on governments and corporations. Boycotts and coordinated efforts to block shipments by port workers, for example, can disrupt supply chains and prompt institutional responses and greater transparency behind export decisions.
As always, civil society organisations and NGOs remain integral to human rights protection, transparency and accountability in the arms trade. Accountability mechanisms such as domestic litigation have been particularly useful in recent years and in relation to ongoing conflicts. Even when courts do not mandate changes to export practices, litigation and advocacy have proven critical in exposing decision-making processes, generating public interest and raising political costs.
Civil society actors must continue leveraging their collective power to compel, for instance, financial institutions and logistics companies to reassess their participation in arms transfers associated with human rights risks. By increasing reputational and legal pressures on both public and private entities, their advocacy can drive policy reforms, divestments, and the implementation of stronger human rights safeguards.
Looking ahead to 2026
The global security environment is in a period of profound instability due to escalating conflicts, intensifying rearmament, and accelerating technological change. Against this backdrop, 2026 will be a critical inflection point.
Safeguarding human rights in 2026 will depend on the willingness and capacity of non-state actors in the arms sector to act when states fail to do so. By exercising their influence and mobilising collective action, corporations, citizen movements and civil society organisations can play a decisive role in reversing the alarming erosion of human rights protection in the arms trade.
Undermining the protection of human rights
Mitigating and preventing human rights violations in the arms trade primarily depends on the export controls and risk assessments of states, and their willingness to apply them in practice. States can update their export controls to reflect the changing geopolitical context – for example, Australia added a new condition that prohibits domestic arms manufacturers from directly exporting weapons to Israel.
For the most part, however, human rights obligations continue to be avoided or ignored, including by states that have strengthened their human rights criteria since Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force. Germany, for instance, updated its Political Principles for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment in 2019 to require an export licence to be denied where there is sufficient suspicion that the arms would be used for internal repression or other ongoing, systematic human rights violations. However, it was not until August 2025 that Germany imposed a partial export ban on arms to Israel – more than a year after the International Court of Justice found a plausible claim of genocide in Gaza.
Moreover, the withdrawal of states from key arms control treaties such as the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2025, and Ukraine also signalling its intention to withdraw) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Lithuania in 2024), highlights the sidelining of important humanitarian arms control instruments as peacetime obligations.
Simultaneously, new and emerging technologies have become interwoven into military strategies, further blurring the distinctions between civilian and military technologies. For example, digital technologies developed for civilian use such as cloud storage, facial recognition and data-mining systems have been used by Israel as part of its military operations in Gaza. The increased reliance on commercial technologies that fall outside traditional arms control frameworks creates new challenges for human rights protection and complicates the attribution of responsibility for abuses.
Together, weakening political commitments by states, the retreat from humanitarian arms control, and technological advancement are eroding human rights safeguards in the arms sector. Reversing this trend will be critical in 2026.
Changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens
Human rights protection is no longer solely the responsibility of states. A wider constellation of actors now holds both the ability and the responsibility to affect human rights outcomes through their products and services. Since the adoption of the ATT over a decade ago, momentum around human rights risk assessment has expanded beyond States Parties to include formal recognition of the expectation that corporations in the arms sector conduct independent human rights due diligence.
As states abandon their human rights commitments, with changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens provide opportunities for non-state actors to engage in human rights protection. For example, corporations involved in production, financing and delivery operations can leverage their positions in the supply chain to promote human rights safeguards – a supplier can halt delivery of key components; a shipping company can decline to transport weapons; a financial institution can refuse to fund arms deals involving specific parties or high-risk destinations. Such actions, whether framed as commercial, ethical or risk-management decisions, can enhance the protection of human rights.
Unlike corporations, individual citizens may have limited direct influence on the arms sector as they are not the direct clients of the arms industry. However, through collective movements and organised groups such as trade unions, citizens can build pressure on governments and corporations. Boycotts and coordinated efforts to block shipments by port workers, for example, can disrupt supply chains and prompt institutional responses and greater transparency behind export decisions.
As always, civil society organisations and NGOs remain integral to human rights protection, transparency and accountability in the arms trade. Accountability mechanisms such as domestic litigation have been particularly useful in recent years and in relation to ongoing conflicts. Even when courts do not mandate changes to export practices, litigation and advocacy have proven critical in exposing decision-making processes, generating public interest and raising political costs.
Civil society actors must continue leveraging their collective power to compel, for instance, financial institutions and logistics companies to reassess their participation in arms transfers associated with human rights risks. By increasing reputational and legal pressures on both public and private entities, their advocacy can drive policy reforms, divestments, and the implementation of stronger human rights safeguards.
Looking ahead to 2026
The global security environment is in a period of profound instability due to escalating conflicts, intensifying rearmament, and accelerating technological change. Against this backdrop, 2026 will be a critical inflection point.
Safeguarding human rights in 2026 will depend on the willingness and capacity of non-state actors in the arms sector to act when states fail to do so. By exercising their influence and mobilising collective action, corporations, citizen movements and civil society organisations can play a decisive role in reversing the alarming erosion of human rights protection in the arms trade.
Hiruni Alwishewa is an independent researcher and expert in arms control, human rights, and corporate responsibility.
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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