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Event Report: Challenges and Opportunities in Firearms Marking and Record-Keeping (February 12, 2026)

2/23/2026

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On February 12, the Forum on the Arms Trade convened a webinar exploring the critical role of firearms marking and record-keeping in stockpile management, diversion prevention, and traceability. This event brought together field investigators, policy researchers, and technical experts to examine how strengthening national systems can disrupt trafficking networks and enhance accountability. Panelists discussed the technical limitations of current marking methods, the challenges of digitizing fragmented databases, and the importance of international cooperation in line with the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The discussion bridged high-level policy perspectives with practical field experiences from West Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

Video of the event is available at: https://youtu.be/vFt4dx3NP2o
Experts shared how marking codes (such as ECOWAS standards) allow investigators to identify the point of diversion from state stockpiles to illicit groups. Case studies from Burkina Faso highlighted how marking internal components can link separate terrorist attacks to a common transit point.

The importance of tracking a weapon from manufacture or import through to destruction was emphasized. Currently, many systems only capture segments of a weapon's life, leading to "fragmented records" that hamper tracing. While new technologies like laser engraving, chemical taggants, and RFID offer precision, experts stressed that the "basics", such as moving away from paper-based systems to secure, searchable digital registries, remain an urgent priority globally. A significant portion of the webinar focused on whether modern markings can withstand obliteration, with case studies of the specifics of laser markings restored by forensic laboratories.

Panelists
  • Ashley Hamer, Senior Investigator, Conflict Armament Research
  • Callum Lloyd, Senior Project and Research Coordinator, Arquebus Europe
  • Silvia de Pedro, Project Advisor, UNLIREC
  • Natalia Pollachi, Project Manager, Sou da Paz Institute
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations

1. Accelerate the Digital Transformation of National Record-Keeping Systems

Member States are encouraged to prioritize the transition from manual or fragmented record-keeping to integrated, digital life-cycle management systems. Such modernization facilitates the creation of a "single source of truth," ensuring that national registries employ transaction-based logic to maintain a comprehensive history of ownership, upholding the principles of transparency and accountability.

2. Establish Technical Standards for Marking to Ensure Forensic Recoverability

Recognizing that the permanence of markings is vital for successful tracing, it was recommended that relevant authorities and manufacturers adopt standardized technical specifications. Specifically, to enhance the prospect of forensic recovery following attempted obliteration, experts proposed examples of best practices from their past and ongoing research. 

3. Promote the Harmonization of Data Protocols and Technical SOPs

To facilitate seamless international cooperation and information exchange, member states are urged to align their data entry protocols with globally recognized standards, such as the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table. Such harmonization minimizes discrepancies in the classification of calibers and models. Additionally, the development and institutionalization of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are essential to bridge the gap between domestic record-keeping and regional or international tracing frameworks, thereby strengthening the global response to illicit trafficking.

4. Strengthen the Capacity of National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)

States are encouraged to designate or enhance National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs) to serve as central hubs for the systematic collection and analysis of firearms data. By integrating registry information with ballistic intelligence, NFFPs can develop "proactive intelligence" capabilities. This strategic approach enables the identification of emerging trafficking trends and illicit flows in a timely manner.

Suggested Resources
​
  • Slides
    • Ashley Hamer, Conflict Armament Research (link) 
    • Callum Lloyd, Arquebus Europe (link)
    • Silvia de Pedro, UNLIREC (link)
    • Natalia Pollachi, Sou da Paz Institute (link)
  • ”International Exchange of Information in the Context of Firearms Control,” REGISYNC project, Policy Paper, October 2023.
  • “Effective and Innovative Practices among European Civilian Firearm Registries,” REGISYNC project, 2023. 
  • Bruno Langeani, Natalia Pollachi, “Blind Fire: The Rise of Military-Style Firearms amid Regulatory Failures and Data Deficiency in Brazil,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development,” September 2025.  
  • [Portuguese only] Detailed analysis of seized firearms in the Southeast region of Brazil (2018-2023), Sou da Paz. 
  • “The growing and multifaceted global threat of privately made and other non-industrial small arms and light weapons,” Working paper from Small Arms Survey, Instituto Sou da Paz, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), June 2024.
  • The FireCycle Solution https://arquebus.uk/products/firecycle/ 
  • Project VISTA https://www.projectvista.eu/ 
  • Joshua Bata and Erica Mumford, “Can Arms and Ammunition Flows Data Inform Conflict Early Warning and Early Response?” May 2023

*This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.
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Event Report - Women at the Frontlines: Integrating GBV Prevention into National and Community Arms-Control Strategies (December 4, 2025)

12/18/2025

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On December 4, the Forum on the Arms Trade convened a webinar exploring the critical intersection between gender-responsive small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, Gender-Based Violence prevention, and women’s leadership in peace and security. Organized as part of the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence (GBV), the event brought together researchers, civil society actors, and community leaders to examine how arms-control frameworks can more effectively address gendered harms. Experts highlighted how the presence and misuse of firearms significantly increase the severity and lethality of GBV across both conflict and domestic settings and how existing arms-control and security governance mechanisms remain highly militarized and masculinized, limiting their ability to address the lived realities. 

In their presentations, they shared insights into the interconnected nature of firearms-human-narcotics trafficking, noting how these illicit economies shape social, economic, and political spaces while restricting women’s participation in public and decision-making domains. Drawing from field experience, experts underscored the barriers women face in engaging with security institutions, while also demonstrating how women’s leadership contributes to uncovering gaps in accountability, particularly in relation to firearm access by convicted offenders and civilians. During Q/A session, the discussion also surfaced critical policy blind spots, including weak data management systems, insufficient firearm registries, and limited protections for survivors engaging with law enforcement. Speakers stressed that integrating women’s perspectives into SALW governance is not only a matter of inclusion but a necessary step toward more effective violence prevention and community safety.
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Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/1Tn82Ads8wI?t=217
Panelists
  • Natalia Pollachi, Project Manager, Instituto Sou da Paz
  • Folade Mutota, Executive Director, Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD)
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations
1. Integrate GBV prevention into SALW governance frameworks

States should embed gender-responsive safeguards into licensing, stockpile management, and disarmament processes, ensuring firearms policies account for risks of domestic and gender-based violence.

2. Strengthen data systems and accountability mechanisms

Improved firearm registries, data protection standards, and information-sharing across justice institutions are essential to close loopholes that allow perpetrators continued access to weapons.

3. Invest in women’s leadership and community-based prevention

Supporting women peacebuilders, early-warning initiatives, and survivor-centered advocacy strengthens accountability and improves the effectiveness of arms-control and violence-prevention efforts.

Suggested resources
  • “Pela Vida Das Mulheres: O Papel Da Arma De Fogo Na Violencia De Genero” Instituto Souda Paz, 2025  (portuguese only)
  • “The Role Firearms Play in Violence Against Women,” Instituto Souda Paz, 2024


​* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.

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Why are arms sales likely to increase in 2026?

12/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Tabitha R Agaba
As 2025 draws to a close, arms sales are likely to increase in 2026 because of the increasing geopolitical tensions, from Cambodia and the Philippines in Asia, to the recent calls by some European countries like Germany and France for their young men to join the military in preparation for a possible confrontation with Russia, and the threat of war on Venezuela by the United States.
 
In recent weeks, the U.S. has threatened violence against Nicholas Maduro's government in Venezuela over what it calls a war on drugs. The Trump administration has previously accused the Maduro government as source of drugs that flow into the U.S.. These claims have been followed by the seizing of an Venezuelan oil tanker by the U.S. in addition to the closure of the Venezuelan airspace by the Trump administration in November. In August the U.S. started deploying air and naval forces near the Venezuelan border, including the world's largest aircraft carrier the USS Gerald R. Ford, which is deployed 950km away from the Venezuelan coast according to the BBC (as of December 5).
 
The conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan have persisted in 2025 without a foreseeable solution in 2026, with the M23 armed group in the DRC gaining more ground in Eastern DRC and Uganda having promised to join the conflict should M23 take over Uvira, which it did last week. The fighting in the DRC automatically creates a need for arms whether illegally acquired or not.
 
The conflict in Sudan has intensified between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army (SAF); the United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting the RSF with weaponry.  Important to note is that the UAE, Rwanda, Thailand and the DRC haven't ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, an agreement that guides arms sales, transfers, end use control and overall international trade of arms. 
 
The French president, Emmanuel Macron asked youth above 18 years of age to sign up for a 10-month military training amidst threats of war from Russia; this is a program expected to start in 2026.  The president noted that this is a program whose main objective is to respond to threats from Russia. This voluntary military is not limited to France alone as other countries like Germany have followed suit. In November 2025, Germany voted to introduce voluntary military service.
 
Such calls not only prepare individuals for war but also put pressure for increased military spending in preparation of war. In 2026 there's likely to be an increase in the manufacture and purchase of arms as European countries prepare for a possibility of war with Russia.
 
These are just a few of the possible conflicts likely to arise in addition to the already existing ones. These developments are important to note because they will contribute to military spending in 2026 and some of the conflict actors are non-signatories to the ATT, which is a key component in arms control, and arms diversions are likely to continue.
 
Despite the presence of controls such as the UN arms embargo and the ATT, countries often divert arms to conflict zones such as Chad and the UAE's support for the RSF or Uganda’s arms diversion to South Sudan.
 
An overview of 2026 on the arms trade highlights the gaps that could easily be utilized for countries to access arms despite the numerous measures in place to mitigate them.
Tabitha R Agaba is a freelance writer and researcher based in Uganda, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Event Report -  Armed Networks:  Understanding the Nexus of Illicit Firearms and Organized Crime Across Continents (November 13, 2025)

11/21/2025

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On November 13, the Forum on the Arms Trade hosted an event to explore the nexus between illicit firearms and organized crime across two regions: Southeast Asia and East Africa. Hosted on the margins of the International Day Against Transnational Organized Crime, experts outlined how firearms trafficking overlaps with other crimes, examples of smuggling routes and actors involved, and regional factors that shape these dynamics. In their presentations, they provided a broad understanding of the convergences in violence and illicit economies, while identifying shared challenges and distinct patterns across the regions. During the Q&A, the experts offered valuable insights into the nuances of SALW circulation, highlighting the layered actors and factors shaping consumer–producer dynamics. Their reflections also introduced a fresh way of understanding ‘organised crime’ and ‘trafficking,’ drawing attention to the complex intersections of trade, survival, and security.
​
Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/jmCZ_KK1Tuk 
Panelists
  • Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow with the China Program at the Stimson Center
  • Khristopher Carlson, Senior Researcher and Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations

Reflecting on the current gaps in policy and research, they shared the following recommendations:

1. Integrating informal networks into the analysis of illicit arms flows, not just formal ‘criminal’ actors.  

In East Africa, the networks that move weapons often overlap with legitimate economic and social systems, such as livestock trading, cross-border and seasonal migration, community protection, and local governance. Effective interventions must account for these overlapping livelihood and protection networks rather than treat illicit arms flows as the work of purely criminal groups.

2. Treat illicit arms control as a governance issue, not only a law-enforcement problem.

Disruption of illicit arms flows occurs where the local authority is legitimate and trusted. Effective policy responses should therefore strengthen accountable governance in peripheral and pastoral areas where the state is either absent, lacks capacity, or is predatory. Identifying legitimate local authorities is key in this regard.

3. Improve Oversight of Financial Flows Linked to Illicit Markets

Efforts to curb illicit SALWs would benefit from stronger oversight of financial systems that enable the acquisition and movement of weapons. Support for national authorities in meeting anti–money laundering and counter-terror finance standards can help close gaps identified by international bodies. As many transactions now move through cryptocurrencies, online scams, and informal remittance systems, targeted technical assistance and partnerships with digital service providers would be useful.

4. Reduce Diversion Risks Through Stockpile Management and Localized Engagement

Limiting diversion of small arms and ammunition requires continued investment in secure stockpile management and transparent inventory systems. Capacity-building in these areas, aligned with national priorities, can help reduce accidental leakage in challenging operating environments. Engagement with local governance actors, including those involved in ceasefire arrangements, may also strengthen awareness of diversion risks in border and transit areas.

Suggested resources
  • “Transnational Organized Crime – The Globalized Illegal Economy,” United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
  • “Illicit weapons fuelling conflicts worldwide, officials warn,” UN News, November 10, 2025
  • “Firearms and Drugs: Partners in Transnational Crime”, UNODC – Flemish Peace Institute, 2024
  • “Beyond legacy weapons: South East Asia’s illicit arms trade is diversifying”, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, June 25, 2025
  • Lauren Pinson, “Addressing the linkages between illicit arms, organized crime and armed conflict,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2022 
  • Nicolas Florquin, Sigrid Lipott, and Francis Wairagu, “Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa” Small Arms Survey, January 2019

* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.
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A medida que aumentan los conflictos, los Estados partes del ATT deben comprometerse a una mayor transparencia

2/5/2025

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PictureSol Zoe Nottage
Se prevé que los conflictos armados se intensifiquen en la próxima década. Datos recientes revelan no sólo un aumento en el número de conflictos en todo el mundo, sino también un incremento en su intensidad. En 2024, los niveles de violencia se dispararon un 25 por ciento en comparación con 2023, dejando a una de cada ocho personas expuestas al conflicto y resultando en aproximadamente 223,000 fallecidos. Regiones como Oriente Medio, África y Europa del Este están experimentando tanto el agravamiento de conflictos de larga data como la aparición de nuevas tensiones. Sin intervenciones diplomáticas e institucionales efectivas, es probable que esta inestabilidad persista —o incluso empeore.

El 24 de diciembre de 2024, el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (ATT) celebró una década regulando el comercio mundial de armas y promoviendo la transparencia entre sus Estados partes. Como el primer marco legalmente vinculante que integra el derecho internacional humanitario con la regulación del comercio de armas, el ATT se esfuerza por fomentar la paz global, reducir el sufrimiento humano y mejorar la cooperación entre naciones. A pesar de estos objetivos admirables, persisten desafíos significativos. Solo 116 estados han suscrito el tratado, dejando fuera a muchos de los principales exportadores e importadores de armas. Además, obstáculos como lograr la membresía universal, fortalecer el cumplimiento, perfeccionar los mecanismos de la Conferencia de Estados Partes (CSP), abordar la desviación y garantizar la transparencia en los flujos de armas continúan entorpeciendo el progreso.

El último Informe del Monitor del TCA, que revisa la presentación de informes sobre transferencias de armas para 2022, ofrece un panorama preocupante. Solo 69 de los Estados partes obligados a presentar un informe anual lo hicieron, lo que representa una tasa de cumplimiento del 63 por ciento, la más baja desde que se comenzaron a presentar informes en 2015. Asimismo, únicamente 35 estados (32 por ciento) presentaron sus informes a tiempo. Mientras tanto, la proporción de informes confidenciales aumentó de seis (3 por ciento) en 2015 a 23 (31 por ciento) en 2021, antes de experimentar un leve descenso en 2022.

Cada año, los Estados partes están obligados a presentar informes detallados sobre exportaciones e importaciones de armas antes del 31 de mayo. Entre 2015 y 2022, 53 Estados partes reportaron más de 121 millones de exportaciones de armas, mientras que 65 registraron más de 4 millones de importaciones. Como señala el informe del Monitor del ATT, la discrepancia entre estas cifras se puede atribuir a varios factores, entre ellos la limitada capacidad de los países importadores para monitorear las transferencias, la exclusión de los principales exportadores o importadores que no son miembros y la omisión de transferencias sensibles.

El Mapa del Índice Global de Paz subraya aún más la gravedad de la situación. Los conflictos en Gaza y Ucrania han contribuido significativamente a la disminución de la paz global, registrándose 162,000 muertes en combate en 2023. Un récord de 92 países están ahora involucrados en conflictos transfronterizos, el mayor número desde la creación del GPI. Cabe destacar que la guerra en Ucrania —la primera vez desde 1945 que un conflicto en suelo europeo involucra a un miembro del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas como agresor o defensor principal— sirve como un claro recordatorio de la urgente necesidad de transparencia, especialmente considerando que 40 países europeos (35 por ciento de los Estados partes) se encuentran en la región.

Otra tendencia es el aumento de las exclusiones de información sensible. Estas exclusiones crecieron de manera constante desde 2015 hasta 2017, alcanzando su punto máximo en 2022. Entre 2015 y 2022, solo 20 informes indicaron explícitamente qué categorías de datos se clasificaron y por qué. Aunque países como Australia y Suecia aclararon consistentemente dónde clasificaron sus datos y el motivo de ello, muchos informes no alcanzan este nivel de detalle. Si bien el Artículo 13(3) del tratado permite la exclusión de información considerada comercialmente sensible o relacionada con la seguridad nacional, para el 9 de enero de 2025, 16 Estados partes optaron por clasificar información en 2023.

Proporcionar detalles adicionales en los informes, aunque no es obligatorio, mejora significativamente la transparencia y se alinea con los objetivos del tratado. El Monitor del TCA ha identificado varias buenas prácticas que no solo mejoran la claridad y precisión de los informes, sino que también respaldan los esfuerzos para prevenir la desviación de armas y promover la rendición de cuentas. Por ejemplo, en 2022, Países Bajos señaló claramente que las cifras exactas de armas suministradas a Ucrania fueron retenidas por razones de seguridad nacional. Entre 2017 y 2023, mientras que seis Estados partes ocultaron información sobre transferencias a Ucrania —con un pico durante el estallido de la guerra— la mayoría continuó presentando informes de acceso público. De manera similar, el reporte voluntario de categorías adicionales —como escopetas, municiones y definiciones nacionales de armas— puede estandarizar y mejorar la comparabilidad entre informes.

Durante la última década, la Secretaría del ATT, junto con diversas organizaciones de la sociedad civil, ha desarrollado directrices y organizado talleres para ayudar a los Estados partes a cumplir con sus obligaciones de reporte y reforzar la transparencia. Organizaciones como Control Arms y el Monitor del TCA han desempeñado roles destacados en estos esfuerzos. Sus reportes anuales no solo han seguido las tendencias en la presentación de informes, sino que también han ofrecido recomendaciones específicas por país para que logren mejorar. Desde 2024, la introducción de un tablero en Power BI por parte del Monitor del ATT ha proporcionado una visión integral de los datos de transferencias de armas reportados públicamente. De cara a 2025 y más allá, el trabajo colaborativo del Monitor del TCA y otros actores será vital para construir confianza entre los Estados partes mediante la promoción de la transparencia, la cooperación y una conducta responsable en el comercio internacional de armas convencionales.


Sol Nottage es Investigadora Asociada de Control Arms en el Monitor del ATT y profesora auxiliar en la Universidad de San Andrés y en la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina).

La inclusión en el Foro sobre el programa de expertos emergentes en el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no indica acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son únicamente las de los autores de cada artículo.
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As Conflicts Rise, ATT States Should Commit to Greater Transparency

2/5/2025

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PictureSol Zoe Nottage
Armed conflicts are projected to intensify over the coming decade. Recent data reveals not only a surge in the number of conflicts worldwide but also an increase in their intensity. In 2024, violence levels spiked by 25 percent compared to 2023, leaving one in eight people exposed to conflict and resulting in approximately 223,000 fatalities. Regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe are experiencing both the deepening of long-standing conflicts and the emergence of new tensions. Without effective diplomatic and institutional interventions, this instability is likely to persist—or even worsen.

On December 24, 2024, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) marked a decade of regulating the global arms trade and promoting transparency among its State Parties. As the first legally binding framework to integrate international humanitarian law with arms trade regulation, the ATT strives to foster global peace, reduce human suffering, and enhance cooperation among nations. Despite these laudable goals, significant challenges remain. Only 116 states have joined the treaty, leaving many major arms exporters and importers outside its framework. Moreover, hurdles such as achieving universal membership, strengthening compliance, refining Conference of States Parties (CSP) mechanisms, addressing diversion, and ensuring transparency in arms flows continue to impede progress.

The latest ATT Monitor Report, which reviews arms transfer reporting for 2022, paints a concerning picture. Only 69 of the States Parties required to submit an annual report did so—a 63 percent compliance rate that marks the lowest level since reporting began in 2015. Additionally, just 35 states (32 percent) submitted their reports on time. Meanwhile, the proportion of confidential reports increased from six (3 percent) in 2015 to 23 (31 percent) in 2021 before experiencing a slight decline in 2022.

Every year, States Parties are required to submit detailed reports on arms exports and imports by May 31. Between 2015 and 2022, 53 States Parties reported over 121 million arms exports, while 65 recorded more than 4 million arms imports. As the ATT Monitor report shows, the discrepancy between these figures can be attributed to several factors, including the limited capacity of importing countries to monitor transfers, the exclusion of major non-member exporters or importers, and the omission of sensitive transfers.

The Global Peace Index Map further underscores the gravity of the situation. Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine have been primary contributors to a decline in global peacefulness—with battle deaths reaching 162,000 in 2023. A record 92 countries are now involved in cross-border conflicts, the highest number since the inception of the GPI. Notably, the war in Ukraine—marking the first time since 1945 that a conflict on European soil involved a United Nations Security Council member as the primary aggressor or defender—serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for transparency, especially when 40 European countries (35 percent of the States Parties) are based in the region.

Another trend to look at is the increase in sensitive information exclusions. These exclusions rose steadily from 2015 to 2017, peaking in 2022. Between 2015 and 2022, only 20 reports explicitly indicated which data categories were withheld and why. Although countries like Australia and Sweden consistently showed where they excluded information, many reports fall short of this standard. While Article 13(3) of the treaty permits the exclusion of commercially sensitive or national security information, by January 9, 2025, 16 States Parties had chosen to withhold information in 2023.

Providing additional details in reports, although not mandatory, significantly enhances transparency and aligns with the treaty’s objectives. The ATT Monitor has identified several best practices that not only improve the clarity and accuracy of reports but also support efforts to prevent arms diversion and promote accountability. For example, in 2022, The Netherlands clearly noted that the precise numbers of arms supplied to Ukraine were withheld for national security reasons. Between 2017 and 2023, while six States Parties clearly stated where they withheld information on transfers to Ukraine—peaking during the outbreak of war—the majority continued to submit publicly accessible reports. Similarly, voluntary reporting on additional categories—such as shotguns, ammunition, and national definitions of arms—can further standardize and enhance comparability across reports.

Over the past decade, the ATT Secretariat, together with various civil society organizations, has developed guidelines and organized workshops to assist States Parties in meeting their reporting obligations and bolstering transparency. Organizations like Control Arms and the ATT Monitor have played leading roles in these efforts. Their annual reports have not only tracked trends in reporting but have also offered country-specific recommendations for improvement. Since 2024, the introduction of  a dashboard by the ATT Monitor has provided a comprehensive overview of publicly reported arms transfer data. Moving forward into 2025 and beyond, the collaborative work of the ATT Monitor and other stakeholders will be vital in building trust among States Parties by promoting transparency, cooperation, and responsible conduct in the international trade of conventional arms.



Sol Nottage is a Research Associate for Control Arms at the ATT Monitor and auxiliar professor at the Universidad de San Andrés and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina).
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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El panorama de seguridad en México para 2025 ante la llegada del presidente Trump

1/19/2025

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Picture
Esta entrada de blog forma parte de una serie serie que analiza una serie de cuestiones en 2025 relacionadas con el uso de armas, el comercio de armas y la asistencia en materia de seguridad, y a menudo ofrece recomendaciones.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(version in English)

Al hablar de democracia, 2024 fue un año preponderante y decisivo. 74 países (más el Parlamento Europeo) tuvieron elecciones en las que más de 1,600 millones de personas participaron a nivel mundial. Si bien cada uno de estos procesos tienen una importancia particular, ninguno de ellos será tan decisivo para el escenario internacional de 2025 como la reelección de Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

La victoria de Trump en noviembre fue vista como positiva para algunos, sin embargo, para la mayoría era algo que se temía, incluida la recientemente electa presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum. Su enfoque, desde el inicio de su campaña política a principios de 2024, ha sido darle continuidad al anterior gobierno del presidente López Obrador y temas como la seguridad y el narcotráfico, dos de los más relevantes para los votantes de Trump, no han sido la excepción.

El 22 de diciembre, Trump dijo que el día uno de su administración nombraría a los cárteles de droga como organizaciones terroristas, sumándose así al aumento en los aranceles como amenazas que ha lanzado contra México. Sheinbaum respondió mencionando que está dispuesta a cooperar con su gobierno, pero que el país nunca se “subordinaría”. Desde que inició su gobierno se han llevado a cabo con éxito alrededor de 12 operativos antidroga de alto perfil, incluyendo el decomiso de casi una tonelada de fentanilo en Sinaloa, el más grande en la historia de México, y que ocurrió 10 días después de los llamados de Trump a aumentar los aranceles. Se espera que la frecuencia de estos operativos aumente durante el año, en parte debido a la presión estadounidense.

Desde un punto de vista narrativo, es probable que Sheinbaum trate de mantener la opinión pública enfocada en estas operaciones, a la par de la importancia de la cooperación bilateral para atender no solo la producción de fentanilo en el país pero también la crisis de consumo en Estados Unidos. El respeto a la soberanía de México también será un elemento clave de la narrativa oficial.

Adicionalmente, el tema del contrabando desde la frontera norte también será recurrente en los medios mexicanos, considerando que el gobierno se encuentra actualmente en un proceso legal en contra de distintas empresas estadounidenses de distribución de armas por facilitar su acceso a organizaciones criminales. El 9 de enero, durante su conferencia matutina, Sheinbaum se expresó de manera favorable sobre un reciente reporte del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos que reconoce la situación, argumentando que 74% de las armas confiscadas por autoridades mexicanas han sido introducidas al país desde Estados Unidos. Sheinbaum también reconoció que este reporte podrá ser de utilidad para futuras negociaciones.

La política migratoria, intrínsecamente relacionada con la seguridad nacional de ambos países, también cambiará drásticamente en 2025. En México diversas oficinas gubernamentales, incluyendo el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), sufrieron un recorte de presupuesto en comparación con el año pasado, en línea con los principios de austeridad de Sheinbaum. Mientras que la llegada de Trump previsiblemente influenciará a las autoridades mexicanas a incrementar las deportaciones y detenciones a migrantes, el reto está en el hecho de que los recursos disponibles para una gestión adecuada de las rutas migratorias se verá reducido.

No obstante, la respuesta del gobierno a esta disyuntiva podría estar en las Fuerzas Armadas. Desde los primeros años de la administración de López Obrador, el presupuesto asignado al Ejército, la Fuerza Aérea, la Marina y la Guardia Nacional ha incrementado de manera continua en comparación con otras instituciones. Para este año su presupuesto fue reducido en un 36%, sin embargo, distintas reformas legislativas de los últimos años les han dado cada vez más facultades. En los siguientes meses (y años) es probable que veamos tareas que antes pertenecían a otras instancias ser asignadas a estas instituciones.

Mientras que la presencia de las Fuerzas Armadas es necesaria para preservar la seguridad nacional, también es cierto que han habido diversos incidentes relacionados con el uso excesivo de la fuerza y otros abusos de derechos humanos en contra de distintos grupos vulnerables (incluyendo migrantes) que las involucran, siendo uno de los más recientes el asesinato de tres personas, incluyendo una niña de ocho años, en Nuevo Laredo el 11 de octubre del año pasado. Se espera que el número de este tipo de incidentes aumente.

Por otro lado, uno de los ejes del gobierno actual (aunque su principal función sea publicitaria) es mostrarse a sí mismo como el más humanista y progresista en la historia, lo cual puede directamente contradecirse con esta ampliación de tareas que las fuerzas armadas tendrán. También se espera más presión por parte de organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

Mientras que la administración pasada de Donald Trump nos dio cierta noción de cómo podría ser su segundo periodo, la realidad es que la incertidumbre es la característica más exacta con la que podemos describir nuestros tiempos, no solo en ambos países pero también a nivel global. Hasta ahora, la retórica de Trump hacia México (y hacia otros socios también) ha sido bastante confrontativa y Sheinbaum tendrá que maniobrar el periodo 2025-2029 de manera hábil y cuidadosa, a la par de dirigir un escenario político, económico y social interno cada vez más complejo.

Gestionar el problema del narcotráfico es una tarea desafiante y delicada y, desde una perspectiva realista, ni la política hostil de Trump ni la popularidad de Sheinbaum lo resolverán. El populismo es muy próspero hoy en día y, para ambos países, hay un largo camino que se puede complicar fácilmente por ideas que en la teoría parecen buenas pero que en la práctica pueden no funcionar, a expensas tanto del pueblo estadounidense como del mexicano.


Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega es Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales con especialidad en Gobierno y Transformación Pública, por el Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
La inclusión en el programa de expertos y expertas emergentes del Foro sobre Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no implican el acuerdo ni la aprobación de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son las del autor de cada artículo.
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The 2025 security landscape in Mexico amid the arrival of President Trump

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(Versión en español. English updated January 19, 2025.)

2024 was a remarkable year when talking about democracy. 74 countries (plus the European Parliament) held elections with more than 1.6 billion people going to the ballots worldwide. While all of these processes have their own particular importance, none of them will be that defining for the 2025 global scenario as the reelection of Donald Trump in the United States.
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Trump’s victory in November was seen as a hope for some but dreaded by most, including the recently elected president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s approach, from the beginning of her political campaign in early 2024, has been focused on giving a certain continuity to the previous government of president López Obrador, and topics like security and drug-trafficking, two of the most relevant for Trump’s voters, have not been the exception.

On December 22nd, president Trump said that he would name drug cartels as terrorist organizations on day one of his administration, joining his calls for higher tariffs he had previously threatened. Sheinbaum responded that she was willing to cooperate with his government, but that the country would never “subordinate” [to Trump]. Since Sheinbaum took office on October 1st, around 12 high-profile successful anti-drug operations have been held, including the siege of almost one ton of fentanyl in Sinaloa, the biggest in Mexico’s history, which also happened to occur about 10 days after Trump’s tariff threats. It is expected that this rate will only increase during 2025, substantially due to Trump’s pressure.

From a narrative perspective, Sheinbaum will likely try to keep the public opinion focused on these security operations, side to side with the importance of bilateral cooperation to attend not only the production of fentanyl in the country but also the consumption crisis in the U. S. The respect to Mexico’s sovereignty will also be a key element of the government’s narrative.

In addition, the issue of arms trafficking coming from the U. S. into Mexico will likely be recurring in the Mexican media, considering that the government is currently involved in a legal process against several American arms distribution companies for facilitating their access to criminal organizations. On January 9th, during her daily morning conference, Sheinbaum talked about her favorable views on a recent Justice Department report that acknowledges the issue, saying that 74% of the confiscated weapons by the Mexican government come from the northern side of the border. She stated that this report will be a helpful leverage for future negotiations.

Immigration policies, intrinsically related to national security and of both countries, will drastically change in 2025 as well. In Mexico, several government divisions, including the National Institute of Migration (INM), suffered a budget cut in comparison with last year, in line with Sheinbaum’s austerity principles. While Trump’s arrival will expectedly influence the Mexican authorities to increase deportations and migrant detentions, the challenge will lay in the fact that the available resources for the proper management of the migration routes will get reduced.

Nevertheless, the government’s answer to this issue may lay in the military. Since the first years of López Obrador’s administration, the budget assigned towards the army, the navy and the National Guard steadily increased compared to other government offices. For this year, their budget was cut by around 36%, however, different legislation reforms in recent years have granted them more and more faculties. In the coming months (and years) we will likely see more tasks assigned to these three institutions that previously were performed by others.

While the involvement of the military is necessary for preserving national security, there also have been several incidents of excessive use of violence and other human rights abuses towards different vulnerable groups (including migrants) that involved them, particularly the National Guard, one of the latest being the assassination of three people, including an eight year old child, in Nuevo Laredo on October 11th. This number is expected to increase.

On the other hand, one of the bases of the current government (but mostly a political marketing element) is to show themselves as the most humanistic and progressive in history, which may be contradictory with this broader range of tasks the military will get. More pressure from civil society organizations is likely to increase as well.

While the 2017-2021 administration of Donald Trump gave us a rather wide glance of what his second period may be, the truth is that uncertainty is the most accurate word to describe the current times, not only in both countries but also globally. So far, Trump’s rhetoric towards Mexico (and towards other partners as well) has been very confrontative and Sheinbaum will have to cleverly and carefully maneuver a highly unpredictable 2025-2029 term while managing an increasingly complex political, economic and social internal landscape. Managing the drug crisis is a delicate and challenging issue and, from a realistic perspective, neither Trump's hostile politics nor Sheinbaum’s political marketing will solve it. Populism is thriving in current times and, for both countries, there is a long path that may be easily clouded by big ideas that may not work when put into practice, at the expense of both American and Mexican people.



Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega has a B. A. in International Relations with a minor degree in Government and Public Transformation from Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program (Spanish program) and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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How military technologies and alliances in the Russia-Ukraine war will impact global peace and security in 2025

12/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Olena Kryzhanivska
The third year of the Russian war in Ukraine has brought several surprising developments, including Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the direct involvement of North Korean troops on the battlefield, and a series of long-range strikes on Russia’s strategic targets conducted by Ukraine, at times with the use of autonomous technologies. The scope of this war has clearly exceeded regional dimensions and is evolving into a global confrontation.
 
Over 50 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defense Contact Group, collaborating to coordinate military aid. Nations from at least five continents are contributing both lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia's military allies include the global power China, along with regional players like North Korea and Iran, whose involvement in the conflict continues to expand.
 
Involvement in this war is not driven solely by ideological reasons. Allied states and private-sector actors are paying close attention to weaponry deployed on the battlefield, tested against a technologically advanced adversary, and then further refined. What could these developments mean for the world?
 
Ukraine’s military and technological innovations and the need for responsible arms control
 
Both parties to the war, Ukraine and Russia, have significantly increased their military production since February 2022. While Ukraine cannot match Russia's weapon production in terms of quantity, it has deliberately prioritized quality. Ukraine's strategic objective is enhancing its domestic long-range capabilities and creating conditions for achieving a technological advantage over Russian forces.
 
Ukraine's most significant military assets are unmanned aerial systems, which have  reshaped the basic outlines of modern warfare. The main trends in UAV development in Ukraine include increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and sensor technologies; integration of computer vision and real-time data processing; as well as swarm technology. Ukraine is on track to produce 1.2 million drones in 2024, with plans to grow production toward 4 million annually. 
 
Ukraine’s drone technologies and electronic warfare systems have already attracted interest from parties involved in conflicts in other regions. The Iranian-made drones being launched at Israel from Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran motivate both the private and military sectors in Israel to consider closer cooperation with Ukraine in this domain and to learn from its battlefield experience. This development could lead to enhanced military cooperation between Ukraine and Israel, including an extensive exchange of military technologies.
 
In addition to drones, Ukraine already launched the production of artillery systems, ballistic missiles, and 155-mm caliber ammunition.
 
Currently, all weaponry produced in Ukraine is intended for domestic use, as military exports are prohibited. However, the potential opening of military exports in 2025 is anticipated to generate significant revenue for the country’s war-affected economy.
 
To prepare for this development, Ukraine will need to implement responsible arms transfer procedures, including robust end-user controls. A crucial step in this process would be Ukraine's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty, as it is currently only a signatory to the agreement.
 
As Ukraine ramps up military production drawn from battlefield experience,  the private sector in many Western countries is considering expanding production into Ukraine or neighboring region. Currently, more than 40 foreign defense companies operate in Ukraine. Collaboration with Ukrainian engineers and technical staff on producing drones, ammunition, and air defense systems is particularly attractive.
 
Prominent players such as U.S.-based Skydio, Germany’s Quantum-Systems, and Turkey’s Baykar have swiftly established offices or drone manufacturing plants in Ukraine. Meanwhile, German Rheinmetall plans to set up at least four factories in Ukraine to produce artillery shells, military vehicles, gunpowder, and anti-aircraft weapons.
 
This expansion would significantly boost Ukrainian defense production amid ongoing ammunition shortages. However, in the long term, it is difficult to predict how these advanced technologies and direct involvement in the Ukrainian battlefield might be utilized in other conflicts. A notable example is the plan to deploy battle-tested American NASAMS systems, initially used in Ukraine, to Taiwan.
 
The Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Online Portal (RULAC), based in Geneva, tracks over 110 armed conflicts globally. Military producers, motivated by profit, are likely to attract customers seeking battlefield-tested innovations that provide a decisive edge in warfare.
 
Although the full impact of these developments may not be visible by 2025, it is expected that, within a few years, military technologies refined in the Russian-Ukrainian war will begin to emerge in other parts of the world, particularly in areas where Western states are engaged.
 
Deepening military cooperation within the Russia-led alliance: potential for immediate global threats
 
Russia has mobilized its defense industry to sustain its ongoing military operations, significantly increasing production by introducing additional shifts, expanding production lines at existing facilities, and reopening decommissioned factories. These measures have led to substantial increases in output.
 
At the start of 2023, Russia was producing six Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles per month, with a stockpile of approximately 50. By early 2024, despite extensive use, its stockpile had grown to nearly 200 Iskander 9M723 ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. Russia has already increased its overall annual artillery shell production to three million rounds. In the realm of drone warfare, Russian state sources report plans to ramp up production by nearly tenfold, targeting 1.4 million units in 2024.
 
A trend that is already alarming in the short-term perspective is the deepening cooperation between Russia, North Korea, and Iran, both on the battlefield and in defense production, as well as with China.
 
All these countries have been on (and off) various arms embargo lists for decades. Since 2006, North Korea has been under a comprehensive and open-ended UN arms embargo, prohibiting both the export and import of weapons. Iran faced a partial UN embargo on the export of technology related to nuclear weapon delivery from 2006 to 2023. Both Russia and China have been sanctioned by the EU, the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and other states.
 
The purpose of these sanctions is to limit military capabilities and pressure states to improve their behavior in the interest of international peace and security. However, the coordinated support for Ukraine provided by the Western-led coalition since 2022 has brought these states together, strengthening their military cooperation.
 
In June 2024, the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships was signed between North Korea and Russia, and in October 2024, Russia and Iran announced the preparation of a similar treaty, that "confirms the parties’ desire for closer cooperation in the field of defense and interaction in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels." The involvement of both countries in the war includes substantial military support for Russian capabilities, with Iran transferring drones and ballistic missiles, engaging in joint drone production with Russia. North Korea’s contributions include providing rocket, artillery systems, and artillery shells to Russia, as well as deploying troops to the battlefield. The Russian-Chinese cooperation is more sophisticated, and although China has never formally endorsed the war on Ukraine, its role in sustaining Russian military capabilities is significant.
 
Despite sanctions, Moscow has significantly bolstered its defense manufacturing capabilities with support from its allies, allowing for large-scale production of advanced weapon systems, drones, and artillery. This marks the most substantial military-industrial expansion since the Soviet era. This partnership is reciprocal, with Russia also transferring military equipment to its allies.
 
The close-knit cooperation between these states presents significant dangers, including the transfer of military technologies and battlefield experience gained in Ukraine to North Korea and Iran, effectively undermining the purpose of the sanctions. The widespread human rights abuses committed by Russia and its allies, coupled with their reluctance to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law, heighten concerns about how swiftly they may apply these newly acquired innovations in other conflicts.
 
Russia’s security interests span the globe, with a military presence (including private military companies) across four continents and at least 34 countries. Iran exercises influence in several regional conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestine war and in Syria and Lebanon. North Korean forces deployed alongside Russian troops are likely to learn to conduct drone warfare, which could be used in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea’s drone capabilities, along with its decision to begin serial drone production, poses a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.
 
Arms transfers between these states, carried out without consideration of international conventional arms control treaties and mechanisms, along with the exchange of critical technologies and battlefield experiences, are expected to have a profound impact on remote regions of the world, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America, both in the short and long term.
 
Conclusions
 
While the promise of incoming US President Donald Trump to quickly end the war makes predictions for 2025 difficult, it is entirely possible that we witness a deepening conflict between the large coalition supporting Ukraine and a smaller group of states aligned with Russia. The already expanded military cooperation on both sides, along with the exchange of military technologies and battlefield experiences,  will almost certainly continue and affect armed conflicts in other regions and contribute to the rise of armed violence globally.
 
In the short term, the arms transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran are particularly concerning, as all three countries openly use belligerent rhetoric. Their involvement in armed conflicts across different regions could lead to the rapid spread of advanced technologies, such as drone warfare, beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
 
The growing involvement of the private sector of both Ukraine and Russia in the war highlights the timely issue of the role of industry and other private sector actors in global arms control efforts, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments. As the war progressed and is likely to in the future, we see how the negligent actions of some military producers directly affect the lives of civilians, contributing to human suffering. The efforts of civil society organizations and media outlets that investigate and document the irresponsible transfer of weapons and their components should be supported and continued.
 
 
​Olena Kryzhanivska is an independent researcher with a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
​
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Lack of control over civilian weapons in Brazil: recent shootings should raise alarm

11/21/2024

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PictureGabrielli Thomaz
disponível em português​

On Wednesday, October 23, a 45-year-old man, identified as Edson Fernando Crippa, killed four people and injured eight others in Novo Hamburgo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Among the dead are the shooter's father and brother, as well as two military police officers. Edson held his family members hostage at home, and the police negotiations lasted about nine hours. Among the survivors are a municipal guard, five military police officers, as well as the shooter's mother and sister-in-law. Edson was killed by the police during the exchange of gunfire.

The attack occurred after the shooter reacted to the police approach during the investigation of a report of abuse of an elderly couple who, according to reports, were being held in private confinement and prevented from leaving their home. According to information from a local radio station, the shooter has four registered weapons under his name, including two pistols, a rifle, and a shotgun.

What happened in Novo Hamburgo brings to the forefront the risks of living with gun owners. A study from Stanford University in the United States, published in 2022 in the Annals of Internal Medicine, showed that people living with handgun owners died by homicide at twice the rate of their neighbors in gun-free homes.

The debate on civilian weapons has for years been led by far-right politicians in Brazil. With the slogan "It's not about guns, it's about freedom," the pro-gun discourse has gained strength, and as explained in the report "What does the National Congress say about civilian weapons?", authored by Terine Husek, research manager at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, since 2015 pro-gun speeches have dominated the plenary sessions of the Federal Congress.

After a series of measures signed during the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) to facilitate the possession of weapons, the number of restricted-use weapons in the hands of civilians in Brazil increased. A survey conducted by the lawyer and manager of the Instituto Sou da Paz, Bruno Langeani, showed that the number of firearms in circulation in the Collector, Sports Shooter, and Hunter (CAC) category in Brazil is already higher than the total number of weapons of the Military Police institution. These are weapons that, when they reach the streets, are stolen, diverted, and end up in the hands of organized crime, as shown by a survey conducted by the newspaper O Globo, which explained that between January and October 2023, Brazil recorded 1,259 occurrences of weapons that were stolen, robbed, or lost, which would be an average of 126 per month or four per day.

In Brazil, CAC is the term used for “Collector, Sports Shooter, or Hunter.'”To practice any of these categories, one must obtain a CAC certificate by presenting a series of documents required by the Army, such as identity, background check certificate, and proof of lawful occupation. However, during the first months of former president Jair Bolsonaro's government, the decrees he signed allowed shooters to purchase up to 60 weapons, and hunters could purchase up to 30 weapons, without authorization from the Army or any security force. The number of ammunition that could be purchased also increased to 2,000 rounds for restricted use (weapons for exclusive use by the Armed Forces, public security institutions, and qualified individuals and legal entities, duly authorized by the Army Command), and 5,000 for permitted use. 

In 2019, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians was approximately 1.9 million, in 2022, the last year of the Bolsonaro government, this number increased to 4.4 million. In 2023, the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, revoked part of the rules that facilitated access to weapons and ammunition. Among the measures are the suspension of new registrations of weapons by hunters, shooters, and collectors (CACs) and by individuals (who are civilians without a CAC license, but who have permission to have a weapon at home, such as for personal security); reduction of the limits for purchasing permitted-use weapons and ammunition; suspension of new registrations of shooting clubs and schools; suspension of granting new registrations for CACs; and the creation of a working group to propose new regulations for the Disarmament Statute. Despite the measures taken by Lula in the first year of his term, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians grew again in 2023, and the 18th edition of the Brazilian Public Security Yearbook showed that Brazil recorded 4.8 million officially registered firearms.

The rules revoked by Lula have been discussed again this year in the Federal Senate plenary with the legislative decree project (PDL) 206/2024, which, among other modifications, includes the elimination of the requirement for shooting clubs to be at a minimum distance of 1 kilometer from schools.(Shooting clubs are places that offer facilities for shooting training and competitions, as well as training programs for beginners. The weapons and ammunition used inside shooting clubs can be owned by members, or provided by the club.)

The level of safety in shooting clubs has been discussed again after a 4-year-old boy was hit in the head by a firearm shot in Herval d'Oeste, in Santa Catarina, Brazil. The child was playing on a farm located near a shooting club. The accident occurred a week before the Novo Hamburgo shooter case.

What these two cases have in common, besides the proximity of the dates, is that they show how the relaxation of control norms has left the population vulnerable. The number of shooting clubs jumped 1,400% during the four years of Jair Bolsonaro's government, going from 151 clubs in 2019 to 2,038 in 2022. In addition, the number firearms registered by CACs grew by 665%, rising from 117,467 in 2018 to 783,385 in 2022.

The consequence of the irresponsibility of the weapon access policy, in addition to these tragic episodes, has been reflected for years in the percentage of violent deaths in the country. The most recent edition of the Violence Atlas shows that in 2022, 72.4% of the total homicides in the country were committed with firearms, which corresponds to 15.7 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In some states, the numbers are even more alarming, with Bahia having a rate of 37.2 and Amapá 33.0.

This scenario points more than ever to the importance of having serious and strict policies on access to weapons and ammunition. In the National Congress, the discourse of those who defend gun control in Brazil has lost strength. It is necessary to resume the discussion so that cases like the one in Novo Hamburgo, Santa Catarina, and many other Brazilian states no longer happen.


Gabrielli Thomaz is a journalist, Press Advisor at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, and a member of the Emerging Expert program at the Forum on the Arms Trade.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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