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A medida que aumentan los conflictos, los Estados partes del ATT deben comprometerse a una mayor transparencia

2/5/2025

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PictureSol Zoe Nottage
Se prevé que los conflictos armados se intensifiquen en la próxima década. Datos recientes revelan no sólo un aumento en el número de conflictos en todo el mundo, sino también un incremento en su intensidad. En 2024, los niveles de violencia se dispararon un 25 por ciento en comparación con 2023, dejando a una de cada ocho personas expuestas al conflicto y resultando en aproximadamente 223,000 fallecidos. Regiones como Oriente Medio, África y Europa del Este están experimentando tanto el agravamiento de conflictos de larga data como la aparición de nuevas tensiones. Sin intervenciones diplomáticas e institucionales efectivas, es probable que esta inestabilidad persista —o incluso empeore.

El 24 de diciembre de 2024, el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (ATT) celebró una década regulando el comercio mundial de armas y promoviendo la transparencia entre sus Estados partes. Como el primer marco legalmente vinculante que integra el derecho internacional humanitario con la regulación del comercio de armas, el ATT se esfuerza por fomentar la paz global, reducir el sufrimiento humano y mejorar la cooperación entre naciones. A pesar de estos objetivos admirables, persisten desafíos significativos. Solo 116 estados han suscrito el tratado, dejando fuera a muchos de los principales exportadores e importadores de armas. Además, obstáculos como lograr la membresía universal, fortalecer el cumplimiento, perfeccionar los mecanismos de la Conferencia de Estados Partes (CSP), abordar la desviación y garantizar la transparencia en los flujos de armas continúan entorpeciendo el progreso.

El último Informe del Monitor del TCA, que revisa la presentación de informes sobre transferencias de armas para 2022, ofrece un panorama preocupante. Solo 69 de los Estados partes obligados a presentar un informe anual lo hicieron, lo que representa una tasa de cumplimiento del 63 por ciento, la más baja desde que se comenzaron a presentar informes en 2015. Asimismo, únicamente 35 estados (32 por ciento) presentaron sus informes a tiempo. Mientras tanto, la proporción de informes confidenciales aumentó de seis (3 por ciento) en 2015 a 23 (31 por ciento) en 2021, antes de experimentar un leve descenso en 2022.

Cada año, los Estados partes están obligados a presentar informes detallados sobre exportaciones e importaciones de armas antes del 31 de mayo. Entre 2015 y 2022, 53 Estados partes reportaron más de 121 millones de exportaciones de armas, mientras que 65 registraron más de 4 millones de importaciones. Como señala el informe del Monitor del ATT, la discrepancia entre estas cifras se puede atribuir a varios factores, entre ellos la limitada capacidad de los países importadores para monitorear las transferencias, la exclusión de los principales exportadores o importadores que no son miembros y la omisión de transferencias sensibles.

El Mapa del Índice Global de Paz subraya aún más la gravedad de la situación. Los conflictos en Gaza y Ucrania han contribuido significativamente a la disminución de la paz global, registrándose 162,000 muertes en combate en 2023. Un récord de 92 países están ahora involucrados en conflictos transfronterizos, el mayor número desde la creación del GPI. Cabe destacar que la guerra en Ucrania —la primera vez desde 1945 que un conflicto en suelo europeo involucra a un miembro del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas como agresor o defensor principal— sirve como un claro recordatorio de la urgente necesidad de transparencia, especialmente considerando que 40 países europeos (35 por ciento de los Estados partes) se encuentran en la región.

Otra tendencia es el aumento de las exclusiones de información sensible. Estas exclusiones crecieron de manera constante desde 2015 hasta 2017, alcanzando su punto máximo en 2022. Entre 2015 y 2022, solo 20 informes indicaron explícitamente qué categorías de datos se clasificaron y por qué. Aunque países como Australia y Suecia aclararon consistentemente dónde clasificaron sus datos y el motivo de ello, muchos informes no alcanzan este nivel de detalle. Si bien el Artículo 13(3) del tratado permite la exclusión de información considerada comercialmente sensible o relacionada con la seguridad nacional, para el 9 de enero de 2025, 16 Estados partes optaron por clasificar información en 2023.

Proporcionar detalles adicionales en los informes, aunque no es obligatorio, mejora significativamente la transparencia y se alinea con los objetivos del tratado. El Monitor del TCA ha identificado varias buenas prácticas que no solo mejoran la claridad y precisión de los informes, sino que también respaldan los esfuerzos para prevenir la desviación de armas y promover la rendición de cuentas. Por ejemplo, en 2022, Países Bajos señaló claramente que las cifras exactas de armas suministradas a Ucrania fueron retenidas por razones de seguridad nacional. Entre 2017 y 2023, mientras que seis Estados partes ocultaron información sobre transferencias a Ucrania —con un pico durante el estallido de la guerra— la mayoría continuó presentando informes de acceso público. De manera similar, el reporte voluntario de categorías adicionales —como escopetas, municiones y definiciones nacionales de armas— puede estandarizar y mejorar la comparabilidad entre informes.

Durante la última década, la Secretaría del ATT, junto con diversas organizaciones de la sociedad civil, ha desarrollado directrices y organizado talleres para ayudar a los Estados partes a cumplir con sus obligaciones de reporte y reforzar la transparencia. Organizaciones como Control Arms y el Monitor del TCA han desempeñado roles destacados en estos esfuerzos. Sus reportes anuales no solo han seguido las tendencias en la presentación de informes, sino que también han ofrecido recomendaciones específicas por país para que logren mejorar. Desde 2024, la introducción de un tablero en Power BI por parte del Monitor del ATT ha proporcionado una visión integral de los datos de transferencias de armas reportados públicamente. De cara a 2025 y más allá, el trabajo colaborativo del Monitor del TCA y otros actores será vital para construir confianza entre los Estados partes mediante la promoción de la transparencia, la cooperación y una conducta responsable en el comercio internacional de armas convencionales.


Sol Nottage es Investigadora Asociada de Control Arms en el Monitor del ATT y profesora auxiliar en la Universidad de San Andrés y en la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina).

La inclusión en el Foro sobre el programa de expertos emergentes en el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no indica acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son únicamente las de los autores de cada artículo.

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As Conflicts Rise, ATT States Should Commit to Greater Transparency

2/5/2025

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PictureSol Zoe Nottage
Armed conflicts are projected to intensify over the coming decade. Recent data reveals not only a surge in the number of conflicts worldwide but also an increase in their intensity. In 2024, violence levels spiked by 25 percent compared to 2023, leaving one in eight people exposed to conflict and resulting in approximately 223,000 fatalities. Regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe are experiencing both the deepening of long-standing conflicts and the emergence of new tensions. Without effective diplomatic and institutional interventions, this instability is likely to persist—or even worsen.

On December 24, 2024, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) marked a decade of regulating the global arms trade and promoting transparency among its State Parties. As the first legally binding framework to integrate international humanitarian law with arms trade regulation, the ATT strives to foster global peace, reduce human suffering, and enhance cooperation among nations. Despite these laudable goals, significant challenges remain. Only 116 states have joined the treaty, leaving many major arms exporters and importers outside its framework. Moreover, hurdles such as achieving universal membership, strengthening compliance, refining Conference of States Parties (CSP) mechanisms, addressing diversion, and ensuring transparency in arms flows continue to impede progress.

The latest ATT Monitor Report, which reviews arms transfer reporting for 2022, paints a concerning picture. Only 69 of the States Parties required to submit an annual report did so—a 63 percent compliance rate that marks the lowest level since reporting began in 2015. Additionally, just 35 states (32 percent) submitted their reports on time. Meanwhile, the proportion of confidential reports increased from six (3 percent) in 2015 to 23 (31 percent) in 2021 before experiencing a slight decline in 2022.

Every year, States Parties are required to submit detailed reports on arms exports and imports by May 31. Between 2015 and 2022, 53 States Parties reported over 121 million arms exports, while 65 recorded more than 4 million arms imports. As the ATT Monitor report shows, the discrepancy between these figures can be attributed to several factors, including the limited capacity of importing countries to monitor transfers, the exclusion of major non-member exporters or importers, and the omission of sensitive transfers.

The Global Peace Index Map further underscores the gravity of the situation. Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine have been primary contributors to a decline in global peacefulness—with battle deaths reaching 162,000 in 2023. A record 92 countries are now involved in cross-border conflicts, the highest number since the inception of the GPI. Notably, the war in Ukraine—marking the first time since 1945 that a conflict on European soil involved a United Nations Security Council member as the primary aggressor or defender—serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for transparency, especially when 40 European countries (35 percent of the States Parties) are based in the region.

Another trend to look at is the increase in sensitive information exclusions. These exclusions rose steadily from 2015 to 2017, peaking in 2022. Between 2015 and 2022, only 20 reports explicitly indicated which data categories were withheld and why. Although countries like Australia and Sweden consistently showed where they excluded information, many reports fall short of this standard. While Article 13(3) of the treaty permits the exclusion of commercially sensitive or national security information, by January 9, 2025, 16 States Parties had chosen to withhold information in 2023.

Providing additional details in reports, although not mandatory, significantly enhances transparency and aligns with the treaty’s objectives. The ATT Monitor has identified several best practices that not only improve the clarity and accuracy of reports but also support efforts to prevent arms diversion and promote accountability. For example, in 2022, The Netherlands clearly noted that the precise numbers of arms supplied to Ukraine were withheld for national security reasons. Between 2017 and 2023, while six States Parties clearly stated where they withheld information on transfers to Ukraine—peaking during the outbreak of war—the majority continued to submit publicly accessible reports. Similarly, voluntary reporting on additional categories—such as shotguns, ammunition, and national definitions of arms—can further standardize and enhance comparability across reports.

Over the past decade, the ATT Secretariat, together with various civil society organizations, has developed guidelines and organized workshops to assist States Parties in meeting their reporting obligations and bolstering transparency. Organizations like Control Arms and the ATT Monitor have played leading roles in these efforts. Their annual reports have not only tracked trends in reporting but have also offered country-specific recommendations for improvement. Since 2024, the introduction of  a dashboard by the ATT Monitor has provided a comprehensive overview of publicly reported arms transfer data. Moving forward into 2025 and beyond, the collaborative work of the ATT Monitor and other stakeholders will be vital in building trust among States Parties by promoting transparency, cooperation, and responsible conduct in the international trade of conventional arms.



Sol Nottage is a Research Associate for Control Arms at the ATT Monitor and auxiliar professor at the Universidad de San Andrés and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina).
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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El panorama de seguridad en México para 2025 ante la llegada del presidente Trump

1/19/2025

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Esta entrada de blog forma parte de una serie serie que analiza una serie de cuestiones en 2025 relacionadas con el uso de armas, el comercio de armas y la asistencia en materia de seguridad, y a menudo ofrece recomendaciones.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(version in English)

Al hablar de democracia, 2024 fue un año preponderante y decisivo. 74 países (más el Parlamento Europeo) tuvieron elecciones en las que más de 1,600 millones de personas participaron a nivel mundial. Si bien cada uno de estos procesos tienen una importancia particular, ninguno de ellos será tan decisivo para el escenario internacional de 2025 como la reelección de Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

La victoria de Trump en noviembre fue vista como positiva para algunos, sin embargo, para la mayoría era algo que se temía, incluida la recientemente electa presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum. Su enfoque, desde el inicio de su campaña política a principios de 2024, ha sido darle continuidad al anterior gobierno del presidente López Obrador y temas como la seguridad y el narcotráfico, dos de los más relevantes para los votantes de Trump, no han sido la excepción.

El 22 de diciembre, Trump dijo que el día uno de su administración nombraría a los cárteles de droga como organizaciones terroristas, sumándose así al aumento en los aranceles como amenazas que ha lanzado contra México. Sheinbaum respondió mencionando que está dispuesta a cooperar con su gobierno, pero que el país nunca se “subordinaría”. Desde que inició su gobierno se han llevado a cabo con éxito alrededor de 12 operativos antidroga de alto perfil, incluyendo el decomiso de casi una tonelada de fentanilo en Sinaloa, el más grande en la historia de México, y que ocurrió 10 días después de los llamados de Trump a aumentar los aranceles. Se espera que la frecuencia de estos operativos aumente durante el año, en parte debido a la presión estadounidense.

Desde un punto de vista narrativo, es probable que Sheinbaum trate de mantener la opinión pública enfocada en estas operaciones, a la par de la importancia de la cooperación bilateral para atender no solo la producción de fentanilo en el país pero también la crisis de consumo en Estados Unidos. El respeto a la soberanía de México también será un elemento clave de la narrativa oficial.

Adicionalmente, el tema del contrabando desde la frontera norte también será recurrente en los medios mexicanos, considerando que el gobierno se encuentra actualmente en un proceso legal en contra de distintas empresas estadounidenses de distribución de armas por facilitar su acceso a organizaciones criminales. El 9 de enero, durante su conferencia matutina, Sheinbaum se expresó de manera favorable sobre un reciente reporte del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos que reconoce la situación, argumentando que 74% de las armas confiscadas por autoridades mexicanas han sido introducidas al país desde Estados Unidos. Sheinbaum también reconoció que este reporte podrá ser de utilidad para futuras negociaciones.

La política migratoria, intrínsecamente relacionada con la seguridad nacional de ambos países, también cambiará drásticamente en 2025. En México diversas oficinas gubernamentales, incluyendo el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), sufrieron un recorte de presupuesto en comparación con el año pasado, en línea con los principios de austeridad de Sheinbaum. Mientras que la llegada de Trump previsiblemente influenciará a las autoridades mexicanas a incrementar las deportaciones y detenciones a migrantes, el reto está en el hecho de que los recursos disponibles para una gestión adecuada de las rutas migratorias se verá reducido.

No obstante, la respuesta del gobierno a esta disyuntiva podría estar en las Fuerzas Armadas. Desde los primeros años de la administración de López Obrador, el presupuesto asignado al Ejército, la Fuerza Aérea, la Marina y la Guardia Nacional ha incrementado de manera continua en comparación con otras instituciones. Para este año su presupuesto fue reducido en un 36%, sin embargo, distintas reformas legislativas de los últimos años les han dado cada vez más facultades. En los siguientes meses (y años) es probable que veamos tareas que antes pertenecían a otras instancias ser asignadas a estas instituciones.

Mientras que la presencia de las Fuerzas Armadas es necesaria para preservar la seguridad nacional, también es cierto que han habido diversos incidentes relacionados con el uso excesivo de la fuerza y otros abusos de derechos humanos en contra de distintos grupos vulnerables (incluyendo migrantes) que las involucran, siendo uno de los más recientes el asesinato de tres personas, incluyendo una niña de ocho años, en Nuevo Laredo el 11 de octubre del año pasado. Se espera que el número de este tipo de incidentes aumente.

Por otro lado, uno de los ejes del gobierno actual (aunque su principal función sea publicitaria) es mostrarse a sí mismo como el más humanista y progresista en la historia, lo cual puede directamente contradecirse con esta ampliación de tareas que las fuerzas armadas tendrán. También se espera más presión por parte de organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

Mientras que la administración pasada de Donald Trump nos dio cierta noción de cómo podría ser su segundo periodo, la realidad es que la incertidumbre es la característica más exacta con la que podemos describir nuestros tiempos, no solo en ambos países pero también a nivel global. Hasta ahora, la retórica de Trump hacia México (y hacia otros socios también) ha sido bastante confrontativa y Sheinbaum tendrá que maniobrar el periodo 2025-2029 de manera hábil y cuidadosa, a la par de dirigir un escenario político, económico y social interno cada vez más complejo.

Gestionar el problema del narcotráfico es una tarea desafiante y delicada y, desde una perspectiva realista, ni la política hostil de Trump ni la popularidad de Sheinbaum lo resolverán. El populismo es muy próspero hoy en día y, para ambos países, hay un largo camino que se puede complicar fácilmente por ideas que en la teoría parecen buenas pero que en la práctica pueden no funcionar, a expensas tanto del pueblo estadounidense como del mexicano.


Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega es Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales con especialidad en Gobierno y Transformación Pública, por el Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
La inclusión en el programa de expertos y expertas emergentes del Foro sobre Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no implican el acuerdo ni la aprobación de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son las del autor de cada artículo.
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The 2025 security landscape in Mexico amid the arrival of President Trump

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(Versión en español. English updated January 19, 2025.)

2024 was a remarkable year when talking about democracy. 74 countries (plus the European Parliament) held elections with more than 1.6 billion people going to the ballots worldwide. While all of these processes have their own particular importance, none of them will be that defining for the 2025 global scenario as the reelection of Donald Trump in the United States.
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Trump’s victory in November was seen as a hope for some but dreaded by most, including the recently elected president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s approach, from the beginning of her political campaign in early 2024, has been focused on giving a certain continuity to the previous government of president López Obrador, and topics like security and drug-trafficking, two of the most relevant for Trump’s voters, have not been the exception.

On December 22nd, president Trump said that he would name drug cartels as terrorist organizations on day one of his administration, joining his calls for higher tariffs he had previously threatened. Sheinbaum responded that she was willing to cooperate with his government, but that the country would never “subordinate” [to Trump]. Since Sheinbaum took office on October 1st,
around 12 high-profile successful anti-drug operations have been held, including the siege of almost one ton of fentanyl in Sinaloa, the biggest in Mexico’s history, which also happened to occur about 10 days after Trump’s tariff threats. It is expected that this rate will only increase during 2025, substantially due to Trump’s pressure.

From a narrative perspective, Sheinbaum will likely try to keep the public opinion focused on these security operations, side to side with the importance of bilateral cooperation to attend not only the production of fentanyl in the country but also the consumption crisis in the U. S. The respect to Mexico’s sovereignty will also be a key element of the government’s narrative.

In addition, the issue of arms trafficking coming from the U. S. into Mexico will likely be recurring in the Mexican media, considering that the government is currently involved in a legal process against several American arms distribution companies for facilitating their access to criminal organizations. On January 9th, during her daily morning conference, Sheinbaum talked about her favorable views on a recent Justice Department report that acknowledges the issue, saying that 74% of the confiscated weapons by the Mexican government come from the northern side of the border. She stated that this report will be a helpful leverage for future negotiations.

Immigration policies, intrinsically related to national security and of both countries, will drastically change in 2025 as well. In Mexico, several government divisions, including the National Institute of Migration (INM), suffered a budget cut in comparison with last year, in line with Sheinbaum’s austerity principles. While Trump’s arrival will expectedly influence the Mexican authorities to increase deportations and migrant detentions, the challenge will lay in the fact that the available resources for the proper management of the migration routes will get reduced.

Nevertheless, the government’s answer to this issue may lay in the military. Since the first years of López Obrador’s administration, the budget assigned towards the army, the navy and the National Guard steadily increased compared to other government offices. For this year, their budget was cut by around 36%, however, different legislation reforms in recent years have granted them more and more faculties. In the coming months (and years) we will likely see more tasks assigned to these three institutions that previously were performed by others.

While the involvement of the military is necessary for preserving national security, there also have been several incidents of excessive use of violence and other human rights abuses towards different vulnerable groups (including migrants) that involved them, particularly the National Guard, one of the latest being the assassination of three people, including an eight year old child, in Nuevo Laredo on October 11th. This number is expected to increase.

On the other hand, one of the bases of the current government (but mostly a political marketing element) is to show themselves as the most humanistic and progressive in history, which may be contradictory with this broader range of tasks the military will get. More pressure from civil society organizations is likely to increase as well.

While the 2017-2021 administration of Donald Trump gave us a rather wide glance of what his second period may be, the truth is that uncertainty is the most accurate word to describe the current times, not only in both countries but also globally. So far, Trump’s rhetoric towards Mexico (and towards other partners as well) has been very confrontative and Sheinbaum will have to cleverly and carefully maneuver a highly unpredictable 2025-2029 term while managing an increasingly complex political, economic and social internal landscape. Managing the drug crisis is a delicate and challenging issue and, from a realistic perspective, neither Trump's hostile politics nor Sheinbaum’s political marketing will solve it. Populism is thriving in current times and, for both countries, there is a long path that may be easily clouded by big ideas that may not work when put into practice, at the expense of both American and Mexican people.



Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega has a B. A. in International Relations with a minor degree in Government and Public Transformation from Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program (Spanish program) and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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How military technologies and alliances in the Russia-Ukraine war will impact global peace and security in 2025

12/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Olena Kryzhanivska
The third year of the Russian war in Ukraine has brought several surprising developments, including Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the direct involvement of North Korean troops on the battlefield, and a series of long-range strikes on Russia’s strategic targets conducted by Ukraine, at times with the use of autonomous technologies. The scope of this war has clearly exceeded regional dimensions and is evolving into a global confrontation.
 
Over 50 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defense Contact Group, collaborating to coordinate military aid. Nations from at least five continents are contributing both lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia's military allies include the global power China, along with regional players like North Korea and Iran, whose involvement in the conflict continues to expand.
 
Involvement in this war is not driven solely by ideological reasons. Allied states and private-sector actors are paying close attention to weaponry deployed on the battlefield, tested against a technologically advanced adversary, and then further refined. What could these developments mean for the world?
 
Ukraine’s military and technological innovations and the need for responsible arms control
 
Both parties to the war, Ukraine and Russia, have significantly increased their military production since February 2022. While Ukraine cannot match Russia's weapon production in terms of quantity, it has deliberately prioritized quality. Ukraine's strategic objective is enhancing its domestic long-range capabilities and creating conditions for achieving a technological advantage over Russian forces.
 
Ukraine's most significant military assets are unmanned aerial systems, which have  reshaped the basic outlines of modern warfare. The main trends in UAV development in Ukraine include increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and sensor technologies; integration of computer vision and real-time data processing; as well as swarm technology. Ukraine is on track to produce 1.2 million drones in 2024, with plans to grow production toward 4 million annually. 
 
Ukraine’s drone technologies and electronic warfare systems have already attracted interest from parties involved in conflicts in other regions. The Iranian-made drones being launched at Israel from Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran motivate both the private and military sectors in Israel to consider closer cooperation with Ukraine in this domain and to learn from its battlefield experience. This development could lead to enhanced military cooperation between Ukraine and Israel, including an extensive exchange of military technologies.
 
In addition to drones, Ukraine already launched the production of artillery systems, ballistic missiles, and 155-mm caliber ammunition.
 
Currently, all weaponry produced in Ukraine is intended for domestic use, as military exports are prohibited. However, the potential opening of military exports in 2025 is anticipated to generate significant revenue for the country’s war-affected economy.
 
To prepare for this development, Ukraine will need to implement responsible arms transfer procedures, including robust end-user controls. A crucial step in this process would be Ukraine's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty, as it is currently only a signatory to the agreement.
 
As Ukraine ramps up military production drawn from battlefield experience,  the private sector in many Western countries is considering expanding production into Ukraine or neighboring region. Currently, more than 40 foreign defense companies operate in Ukraine. Collaboration with Ukrainian engineers and technical staff on producing drones, ammunition, and air defense systems is particularly attractive.
 
Prominent players such as U.S.-based Skydio, Germany’s Quantum-Systems, and Turkey’s Baykar have swiftly established offices or drone manufacturing plants in Ukraine. Meanwhile, German Rheinmetall plans to set up at least four factories in Ukraine to produce artillery shells, military vehicles, gunpowder, and anti-aircraft weapons.
 
This expansion would significantly boost Ukrainian defense production amid ongoing ammunition shortages. However, in the long term, it is difficult to predict how these advanced technologies and direct involvement in the Ukrainian battlefield might be utilized in other conflicts. A notable example is the plan to deploy battle-tested American NASAMS systems, initially used in Ukraine, to Taiwan.
 
The Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Online Portal (RULAC), based in Geneva, tracks over 110 armed conflicts globally. Military producers, motivated by profit, are likely to attract customers seeking battlefield-tested innovations that provide a decisive edge in warfare.
 
Although the full impact of these developments may not be visible by 2025, it is expected that, within a few years, military technologies refined in the Russian-Ukrainian war will begin to emerge in other parts of the world, particularly in areas where Western states are engaged.
 
Deepening military cooperation within the Russia-led alliance: potential for immediate global threats
 
Russia has mobilized its defense industry to sustain its ongoing military operations, significantly increasing production by introducing additional shifts, expanding production lines at existing facilities, and reopening decommissioned factories. These measures have led to substantial increases in output.
 
At the start of 2023, Russia was producing six Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles per month, with a stockpile of approximately 50. By early 2024, despite extensive use, its stockpile had grown to nearly 200 Iskander 9M723 ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. Russia has already increased its overall annual artillery shell production to three million rounds. In the realm of drone warfare, Russian state sources report plans to ramp up production by nearly tenfold, targeting 1.4 million units in 2024.
 
A trend that is already alarming in the short-term perspective is the deepening cooperation between Russia, North Korea, and Iran, both on the battlefield and in defense production, as well as with China.
 
All these countries have been on (and off) various arms embargo lists for decades. Since 2006, North Korea has been under a comprehensive and open-ended UN arms embargo, prohibiting both the export and import of weapons. Iran faced a partial UN embargo on the export of technology related to nuclear weapon delivery from 2006 to 2023. Both Russia and China have been sanctioned by the EU, the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and other states.
 
The purpose of these sanctions is to limit military capabilities and pressure states to improve their behavior in the interest of international peace and security. However, the coordinated support for Ukraine provided by the Western-led coalition since 2022 has brought these states together, strengthening their military cooperation.
 
In June 2024, the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships was signed between North Korea and Russia, and in October 2024, Russia and Iran announced the preparation of a similar treaty, that "confirms the parties’ desire for closer cooperation in the field of defense and interaction in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels." The involvement of both countries in the war includes substantial military support for Russian capabilities, with Iran transferring drones and ballistic missiles, engaging in joint drone production with Russia. North Korea’s contributions include providing rocket, artillery systems, and artillery shells to Russia, as well as deploying troops to the battlefield. The Russian-Chinese cooperation is more sophisticated, and although China has never formally endorsed the war on Ukraine, its role in sustaining Russian military capabilities is significant.
 
Despite sanctions, Moscow has significantly bolstered its defense manufacturing capabilities with support from its allies, allowing for large-scale production of advanced weapon systems, drones, and artillery. This marks the most substantial military-industrial expansion since the Soviet era. This partnership is reciprocal, with Russia also transferring military equipment to its allies.
 
The close-knit cooperation between these states presents significant dangers, including the transfer of military technologies and battlefield experience gained in Ukraine to North Korea and Iran, effectively undermining the purpose of the sanctions. The widespread human rights abuses committed by Russia and its allies, coupled with their reluctance to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law, heighten concerns about how swiftly they may apply these newly acquired innovations in other conflicts.
 
Russia’s security interests span the globe, with a military presence (including private military companies) across four continents and at least 34 countries. Iran exercises influence in several regional conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestine war and in Syria and Lebanon. North Korean forces deployed alongside Russian troops are likely to learn to conduct drone warfare, which could be used in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea’s drone capabilities, along with its decision to begin serial drone production, poses a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.
 
Arms transfers between these states, carried out without consideration of international conventional arms control treaties and mechanisms, along with the exchange of critical technologies and battlefield experiences, are expected to have a profound impact on remote regions of the world, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America, both in the short and long term.
 
Conclusions
 
While the promise of incoming US President Donald Trump to quickly end the war makes predictions for 2025 difficult, it is entirely possible that we witness a deepening conflict between the large coalition supporting Ukraine and a smaller group of states aligned with Russia. The already expanded military cooperation on both sides, along with the exchange of military technologies and battlefield experiences,  will almost certainly continue and affect armed conflicts in other regions and contribute to the rise of armed violence globally.
 
In the short term, the arms transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran are particularly concerning, as all three countries openly use belligerent rhetoric. Their involvement in armed conflicts across different regions could lead to the rapid spread of advanced technologies, such as drone warfare, beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
 
The growing involvement of the private sector of both Ukraine and Russia in the war highlights the timely issue of the role of industry and other private sector actors in global arms control efforts, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments. As the war progressed and is likely to in the future, we see how the negligent actions of some military producers directly affect the lives of civilians, contributing to human suffering. The efforts of civil society organizations and media outlets that investigate and document the irresponsible transfer of weapons and their components should be supported and continued.
 
 
​Olena Kryzhanivska is an independent researcher with a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
​
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Lack of control over civilian weapons in Brazil: recent shootings should raise alarm

11/21/2024

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PictureGabrielli Thomaz
disponível em português​

On Wednesday, October 23, a 45-year-old man, identified as Edson Fernando Crippa, killed four people and injured eight others in Novo Hamburgo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Among the dead are the shooter's father and brother, as well as two military police officers. Edson held his family members hostage at home, and the police negotiations lasted about nine hours. Among the survivors are a municipal guard, five military police officers, as well as the shooter's mother and sister-in-law. Edson was killed by the police during the exchange of gunfire.

The attack occurred after the shooter reacted to the police approach during the investigation of a report of abuse of an elderly couple who, according to reports, were being held in private confinement and prevented from leaving their home. According to information from a local radio station, the shooter has four registered weapons under his name, including two pistols, a rifle, and a shotgun.

What happened in Novo Hamburgo brings to the forefront the risks of living with gun owners. A study from Stanford University in the United States, published in 2022 in the Annals of Internal Medicine, showed that people living with handgun owners died by homicide at twice the rate of their neighbors in gun-free homes.

The debate on civilian weapons has for years been led by far-right politicians in Brazil. With the slogan "It's not about guns, it's about freedom," the pro-gun discourse has gained strength, and as explained in the report "What does the National Congress say about civilian weapons?", authored by Terine Husek, research manager at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, since 2015 pro-gun speeches have dominated the plenary sessions of the Federal Congress.

After a series of measures signed during the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) to facilitate the possession of weapons, the number of restricted-use weapons in the hands of civilians in Brazil increased. A survey conducted by the lawyer and manager of the Instituto Sou da Paz, Bruno Langeani, showed that the number of firearms in circulation in the Collector, Sports Shooter, and Hunter (CAC) category in Brazil is already higher than the total number of weapons of the Military Police institution. These are weapons that, when they reach the streets, are stolen, diverted, and end up in the hands of organized crime, as shown by a survey conducted by the newspaper O Globo, which explained that between January and October 2023, Brazil recorded 1,259 occurrences of weapons that were stolen, robbed, or lost, which would be an average of 126 per month or four per day.

In Brazil, CAC is the term used for “Collector, Sports Shooter, or Hunter.'”To practice any of these categories, one must obtain a CAC certificate by presenting a series of documents required by the Army, such as identity, background check certificate, and proof of lawful occupation. However, during the first months of former president Jair Bolsonaro's government, the decrees he signed allowed shooters to purchase up to 60 weapons, and hunters could purchase up to 30 weapons, without authorization from the Army or any security force. The number of ammunition that could be purchased also increased to 2,000 rounds for restricted use (weapons for exclusive use by the Armed Forces, public security institutions, and qualified individuals and legal entities, duly authorized by the Army Command), and 5,000 for permitted use. 

In 2019, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians was approximately 1.9 million, in 2022, the last year of the Bolsonaro government, this number increased to 4.4 million. In 2023, the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, revoked part of the rules that facilitated access to weapons and ammunition. Among the measures are the suspension of new registrations of weapons by hunters, shooters, and collectors (CACs) and by individuals (who are civilians without a CAC license, but who have permission to have a weapon at home, such as for personal security); reduction of the limits for purchasing permitted-use weapons and ammunition; suspension of new registrations of shooting clubs and schools; suspension of granting new registrations for CACs; and the creation of a working group to propose new regulations for the Disarmament Statute. Despite the measures taken by Lula in the first year of his term, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians grew again in 2023, and the 18th edition of the Brazilian Public Security Yearbook showed that Brazil recorded 4.8 million officially registered firearms.

The rules revoked by Lula have been discussed again this year in the Federal Senate plenary with the legislative decree project (PDL) 206/2024, which, among other modifications, includes the elimination of the requirement for shooting clubs to be at a minimum distance of 1 kilometer from schools.(Shooting clubs are places that offer facilities for shooting training and competitions, as well as training programs for beginners. The weapons and ammunition used inside shooting clubs can be owned by members, or provided by the club.)

The level of safety in shooting clubs has been discussed again after a 4-year-old boy was hit in the head by a firearm shot in Herval d'Oeste, in Santa Catarina, Brazil. The child was playing on a farm located near a shooting club. The accident occurred a week before the Novo Hamburgo shooter case.

What these two cases have in common, besides the proximity of the dates, is that they show how the relaxation of control norms has left the population vulnerable. The number of shooting clubs jumped 1,400% during the four years of Jair Bolsonaro's government, going from 151 clubs in 2019 to 2,038 in 2022. In addition, the number firearms registered by CACs grew by 665%, rising from 117,467 in 2018 to 783,385 in 2022.

The consequence of the irresponsibility of the weapon access policy, in addition to these tragic episodes, has been reflected for years in the percentage of violent deaths in the country. The most recent edition of the Violence Atlas shows that in 2022, 72.4% of the total homicides in the country were committed with firearms, which corresponds to 15.7 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In some states, the numbers are even more alarming, with Bahia having a rate of 37.2 and Amapá 33.0.

This scenario points more than ever to the importance of having serious and strict policies on access to weapons and ammunition. In the National Congress, the discourse of those who defend gun control in Brazil has lost strength. It is necessary to resume the discussion so that cases like the one in Novo Hamburgo, Santa Catarina, and many other Brazilian states no longer happen.


Gabrielli Thomaz is a journalist, Press Advisor at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, and a member of the Emerging Expert program at the Forum on the Arms Trade.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Multilateralism and the Prevention of Gender-Based Violence: Reflections in the Framework of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women

11/21/2023

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PictureAngélica María Pardo Chacón
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.

When we talk about violence prevention, the first thing that comes to mind is the creation of care routes, public policy for victim support, accompaniment, and any action that mitigates violence. For Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention, prevention is often focused on awareness and symbolic actions; such as the "pink" wagons in Mexico or the purple police shackles in Colombia. Elements that, although provide much needed visibility and influence public discussion, it is still seen as a joke for some sectors; which they call an unnecessary expense that will not contribute to the solution of a real problem that kills women and diverse community in the world and which is closely linked to the impact and disarmament agenda.

But why disarmament? The debate on the impact of weapons on gender-based violence prevention is a narrative that has been present in recent years, mainly encouraged by the feminist agenda. In some sectors the issue has made more progress than in others, and this month, on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women I would like to put into perspective some case studies and what we could continue to learn from them.

The international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) regulates the international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms. It is one of the first, if not the only one, to explicitly include in the text the risk of using arms to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children, as one of the elements to be evaluated for export authorization, included in other articles of the treaty. It is therefore natural that only four years after its entry into force, Latvia focused its work as chair of the treaty on the relationship between arms and GBV, issuing recommendations based on the Working Paper submitted by Ireland to the Conference of the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty: Article 7(4) and the assessment of GBV. Thus, since its inception ATT has been mindful of the impact of weapons in increasing the risk of GBV.

In the case of the Ottawa treaty, also known as the Convention for the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines, it has had several years of revisions and recommendations, both from civil society and the States parties aiming at the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach in mine action. Therefore, in the latest action plans of the convention, needs and strategies for the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach under the humanitarian principle of "leaving no one behind" are welcomed and proposed. This space also has advocacy groups such as the Gender and Diversity Working Group, which aims to promote inclusive and effective humanitarian interventions in mine action, through an intersectional approach, incorporating gender and other diversity factors mainly within the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

In this framework, and precisely this month, the gender program of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research delivered a report taking stock of the Oslo Action Plan, in terms of the implementation of the action points related to gender and diversity.

Other examples and cases related to the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach could be discussed at greater length. Fortunately today, multilateral processes such as Stop Killer Robots, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) have included intersectional approaches.

All these experiences in the framework of humanitarian disarmament processes and multilateralism demonstrate the importance of gender mainstreaming and the prevention of gender-based violence in all international spheres and efforts. By recognizing gender equity and overcoming all types of violence and inequality as one of the Sustainable Development Goals, the issue has begun to acquire more relevance in multilateral spaces, but why mainstreaming the gender approach in international instruments could contribute to the prevention of gender-based violence?

Weapons are one of the expressions that humanity has historically found to promote "superiority", which for the purposes of this text we will not discuss. But if we take into account that war, in a very light analysis, has been defined from the absence of its counterpart, peace, it links elements of superiority, which has been traditionally linked to masculinity and its ability to exercise power.

It is not surprising, then, that the possession, production and use of weapons is identified as a real and useful mechanism in the search for that superiority, which has been at the head of patriarchal models, such as Mark Antony, Napoleon and other male figures who have been at the forefront of the arms industry. However, if we take into account that in contrast, peace is usually associated as a "soft, weak, vulnerable" practice, characteristics traditionally assigned to the feminine, it is to be expected that social disputes and the distribution of power, related to discourses and practices in international spaces, will also result in a masculinization of peace; This is why only having men in the room makes the real inclusion of strategies that mitigate the differentiated risks and impacts of weapons on women and diverse communities more distant and less rapid, maintaining glass ceilings.

But what does multilateralism have to do with it?

Bearing in mind that men are traditionally exposed to reproducing elements related to protection, having to show virility, strength and courage, it is to be expected that in the multilateral spaces for negotiation and consensus-building around disarmament, the need for men to comply with the patriarchal logic of "real men" hinders the generation of new ideas. If we add to this the lack of real representation of women and their vision, we find a longer road for the prevention of gender-based violence in these scenarios, since they continue to replicate unequal relationships in which women, children and LGBTTIQA+ community tend to be those who occupy the categories of vulnerability and low agency, while the symbolic dispute around the values attributed to the "feminine" and "masculine" permeate all processes and institutions.

In order to speak of effective multilateralism, among other things, we must speak of substantive representation, which implies a qualitative change during the consultation processes and the results of specific advocacy in favor of overcoming unequal relations. Although progress has been made in efforts to include a gender perspective, in the inclusion of women in delegations, in advocacy campaigns, women and their vision continue to be in the background in most processes and while there are strategies and processes that continue to appeal, unconsciously, to the superiority of the strongest - the strongest masculinized - weapons and the potential risk of their use continue to perpetuate dynamics of inequality that contribute to the increase of Gender Based Violence.

In this order of ideas, if we take into account that the spaces where international instruments are defined are par excellence scenarios of dialogue and socialization occupied mostly by political and social elites, in which men have the majority control, and that as a space for defining agendas and building international consensus there is still a greater male representation and agency, it is possible to identify that the road to prevention and attention to GBV is still ahead of us.

For this I would like to bring an experience with the Mine Action Fellows, a Mines Action Canada program (of which I am a part), at the States Parties meeting of the Ottawa 2022 convention. There, we decided to keep a tally of minutes of statements made by women in relation to those made by men; and the result was not surprising but alarming, women spoke less than 8% of the plenary time during 3 days! And yet, according to the research "Beyond Oslo: Taking Stock of Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention" conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, by 2022, 69% of the States attending the meeting of States Parties to the MBT recorded the participation of women in their delegations.

This is what I mean when I say that there is still much to learn, when we talk about effective multilateralism, we talk about representation, but also about the quality of that representation, which has been descriptive, counting percentages of participation but not the effectiveness of that participation.

Multilateralism in some humanitarian disarmament processes has made progress in recognizing the role of weapons in gender-based violence, but there is still much to be done in relation to substantive representation, the use of time, space and therefore the distribution of power in these spaces of discussion where agendas are defined and international consensus is built. Yes, we women are increasingly part of these spaces, but the voice and decisions continue to be made by the men in the room, who often have a masculinized, patriarchal and hegemonic vision of reality; this continues to mark the long road to talk about a real response from multilateralism to gender-based violence perpetuated by or in the context of the use of weapons, whether massive, indiscriminate, autonomous, or small arms and light weapons.
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Angélica María Pardo Chacón is a political scientist from Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá and currently is pursuing a master's degree in Global Affairs and Political Processes at the Universidad del Rosario. She is a member of the Women in Security and Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean network (Amassuru).

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Free Carrying of Firearms: A Dangerous New Trend in the Argentine Presidential Campaign

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión original en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.

For the first time in Argentine history, the free carrying of firearms has become a topic of debate in a presidential election campaign. Why is this happening in one of the countries with the lowest homicide rates in Latin America and internationally recognized for its disarmament program? Does the citizenry desire firearms or security?
 
Insecurity has been one of the most concerning issues for Argentine society for over 20 years. During that same period, public policies regarding the control of firearms and disarmament have experienced unprecedented development in our country. The understanding that firearms are not a source of security but rather a factor that jeopardizes it has, for the first time, become a central topic of discussion on the electoral agenda.
 
"I am definitely in favor of the free carrying of firearms," said former deputy Javier Milei in 2022, who is now a presidential candidate and emerged as the most voted for candidate in the primary elections. However, this eccentric outsider, a follower of Trump and Bolsonaro, is not the only member of his party who publicly expressed such views. His vice-presidential candidate admitted to being a firearm user and stated that ownership is a "right" for "law-abiding citizens who want to defend themselves." While the controversy surrounding these statements led these candidates to downplay their remarks, the electoral platform presented by the candidate at the beginning of his presidential campaign proposed, regarding firearm ownership, the "deregulation of the legal market and the protection of its legitimate and responsible use by citizens."
 
"Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed."

Milei is not the first Argentine politician to raise this debate. Five years ago, the then Minister of Security and current presidential candidate for the other major opposition front, Patricia Bullrich, had said in an informal interview outside a restaurant, "Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed; whoever doesn't want to be armed, shouldn't be armed. Argentina is a free country." While her complete statement added that she and her party preferred that people not be armed, controversy quickly erupted. For the first time, the absolute political consensus regarding the need to restrict access to firearms was called into question.
 
Beyond their ambivalences, two of the three main presidential candidates in Argentina have expressed support for free carrying. Can it be inferred that Argentine society has changed its view on firearms? The answer is not so simple. However, there are signs that the public's demand for security does not translate into support for free carrying.
 
Argentina is not a heavily armed country. Its rate of 7.4 firearms per 100,000 civilians is, according to the Small Arms Survey, lower than most countries in the region. A recent nationwide survey conducted in May 2023 reflected that 77% of respondents were against "the free carrying of firearms." The society's participation in the disarmament program allowed for the removal of over 200,000 firearms from circulation between 2007 and 2022. Due to the results achieved in its early years, this program was internationally recognized as a model policy in 2013.
 
The laws on firearm restriction passed in the National Congress in recent years also reflect this consensus, with virtually unanimous votes in favor of firearm control and disarmament. However, the last extension of the disarmament program, voted on in 2021, already sounded an alarm: while 93% of deputies voted in favor, votes against the renewal of the program were recorded for the first time, even though it had been extended seven times before.
 
An initial conclusion from this data, pending the final results of the presidential elections, is that Argentine society remains predominantly opposed to firearms. However, it can also be inferred that, like in other countries, the threshold of rejection of pro-arms rhetoric may have decreased, even if only relatively, in recent years. It is true that voting for a presidential candidate does not necessarily mean support for all of their proposals, but it probably does indicate a tolerance for most of them.
 
If this hypothesis is correct, it is necessary to pay attention to this symptom. While Argentina has a well-established social, institutional, and cultural tradition of restricting the circulation of firearms, recent experiences in other Latin American countries demonstrate how easily such controls can be undermined.
 
What's Happening with Firearms in Argentina?

Argentina currently has around 1,000,000 legally registered firearm users, although most of them are in a situation of illegality due to expired authorizations. Additionally, it is estimated that, including unregistered firearms, the total number of firearms could be three to four times the 1,700,000 recorded in official records.
 
Between 2011 and 2019, an average of 8 people per day died in Argentina as a result of firearm use. One out of every two intentional homicides in Argentina is committed with a firearm. In 2021, 76% of intentional homicides in Argentina were recorded without the involvement of other crimes.
 
Firearms are also used for gender-based violence. In general, women and gender-diverse individuals do not possess firearms (as 97% of registered users are males), but they disproportionately suffer the consequences: 1 out of every 4 femicides is committed with a firearm.
 
Since 2015, Argentina has a model law at the regional level that created and regulates the National Agency for Controlled Materials, responsible not only for the registration and control of the legal firearms market but also for "developing policies aimed at reducing the circulation of firearms in civil society and preventing the effects of armed violence" (Law 27,192). Among other functions, this agency is responsible for implementing the mentioned National Voluntary Firearm Surrender Plan. The creation of the agency was a significant advancement in this regard, although the law is still not fully implemented, as the agency lacks sufficient budgetary resources to carry out all the actions it is responsible for.
 
The Risks of Free Carrying

Various studies confirm that an increased presence of firearms in society, far from reducing crime (as stated by Milei himself), contributes to an increase in violence, crime, and deaths. Conversely, control policies are associated with a reduction in these problems. The case of the United States, the country with the highest civilian firearm ownership in the world (120 firearms per 100 people), is illustrative. Its homicide rate was 7.5 times higher than the rate in other high-income countries, which is often attributed to its firearm homicide rate, which is nearly 25 times higher. From mass shootings, some of them in schools, to a higher number of suicides and femicides, the effects of the free circulation of firearms have been widely verified in other countries.
 
Insecurity is undoubtedly a central problem for Argentine society. Even though its homicide rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries, the LAPOP survey reflects that it is one of the three countries in the region with the highest number of respondents reporting being victims of crime in 2021. Crime has been a top concern for Argentine citizens for years.
 
However, there is no serious indication that the demand for more security implies a desire among the citizenry to carry firearms. Discussions about the role of the state, primarily focused on economic policy, cannot be linearly transferred to security policies. Even those sectors with a more reductionist view of the size of the state have historically been in favor of recognizing the state's role in monopolizing the use of force.
 
Therefore, whoever assumes office in December will have a dual responsibility. On one hand, they must develop effective security policies to reduce crime rates and the perception of insecurity. On the other hand, they must ensure the validity and extension of firearm restriction policies in the face of voices seeking to downplay the significant risks of loosening firearm regulations.
 
Society is not asking for firearms; it is asking for security. And the data demonstrates that more firearms equate to less security.
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Julián Alfie is Deputy Executive Director of the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP), based in Argentina.

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Libre portación de armas: una peligrosa novedad en la campaña presidencial de Argentina

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Voces de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes (see English translation)
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Esta publicación forma parte de una serie especial de contribuciones al blog "Mirando hacia el Futuro" realizadas por miembros de los programas de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro.

Por primera vez en la historia argentina, la libre portación de armas de fuego ha sido tema de debate en una campaña electoral presidencial. ¿Por qué sucede esto en uno de los países con menor tasa de homicidios de América Latina y premiado internacionalmente por su programa de desarme? ¿La ciudadanía quiere armas o seguridad?

La inseguridad es, desde hace más de 20 años, uno de los temas que más preocupa a la sociedad argentina. En ese mismo lapso, las políticas públicas de control de armas de fuego y desarme tuvieron un inédito desarrollo en nuestro país. La comprensión de que las armas no son una fuente de seguridad, sino un factor que la pone en riesgo aparece, por primera vez, como un eje de discusión en la agenda electoral.

“Estoy a favor de la libre portación de armas, definitivamente”, dijo en 2022 el entonces diputado Javier Milei, hoy candidato presidencial, que resultó el más votado en las elecciones primarias. Pero este excéntrico outsider, seguidor de Trump y Bolsonaro, no es el único integrante de su partido que se expresó públicamente en ese sentido. Su candidata a vicepresidenta admitió ser usuaria de armas y opinó que la tenencia es un “derecho” para “el ciudadano de bien que se quiera defender”. Si bien la polémica que desataron esas declaraciones llevaron a esos candidatos a relativizar sus dichos, lo cierto es que la plataforma electoral presentada por el candidato al comienzo de su campaña presidencial planteaba, sobre la tenencia de armas de fuego, la “desregulación del mercado legal y proteger su uso legítimo y responsable por parte de la ciudadanía”.
 
“El que quiera andar armado, que ande armado”

Milei no es el primer político argentino en plantear este debate. 5 años atrás, la entonces Ministra de Seguridad y actual candidata a presidenta por el otro gran frente opositor –Patricia Bullrich-  había dicho, en una entrevista informal a la salida de un restaurante, que “el que quiera estar armado, que ande armado; el que no quiera estar armado, que no ande armado. La Argentina es un país libre”. Si bien su frase completa añadía que ella y su espacio preferían que la gente no estuviera armada, la polémica no tardó en estallar. Por primera vez se ponía en duda el absoluto consenso político respecto a la necesidad de restringir el acceso a las armas de fuego.

Más allá de sus ambivalencias, dos de los tres principales candidatos a ocupar la Presidencia de Argentina tuvieron expresiones favorables a la libre portación. ¿Puede inferirse que la sociedad argentina cambió su mirada sobre las armas? La respuesta no es tan sencilla. Sin embargo, existen señales de que el reclamo de la ciudadanía por seguridad no se traduce en un apoyo a la libre portación.

Argentina no es un país armado. Su tasa de 7.4 armas de fuego en manos de civiles cada 100 habitantes se encuentra, según Small Arms Survey, por debajo de la mayoría de los países de la región. Una reciente encuesta realizada en mayo de 2023 a nivel nacional reflejó que el 77% de las personas encuestadas se mostró en contra de “la libre portación de armas de fuego”. La participación de la sociedad en el plan de desarme permitió quitar de circulación más de 200.000 armas de fuego entre 2007 y 2022. Por los resultados alcanzados durante sus primeros años, en 2013 ese programa fue premiado a nivel internacional como una política modelo.

Las leyes sobre restricción de armas de fuego aprobadas en el Congreso de la Nación en los últimos años también reflejan ese consenso, con votaciones afirmativas al control de armas y el desarme prácticamente unánimes. Sin embargo, la última prórroga del plan de desarme, votada en 2021, ya había dado una señal de alerta: si bien el 93% de los diputados votó a favor, por primera vez se registraron votos en contra de la renovación de ese programa, que ya había sido prorrogado en 7 oportunidades anteriormente.

Una conclusión inicial de estos datos, a la espera del resultado definitivo de las elecciones presidenciales, es que la sociedad argentina sigue siendo mayoritariamente contraria a las armas de fuego. Pero también es posible inferir que, al igual que en otros países, el umbral de rechazo a los discursos armamentistas puede haber disminuido, aunque sea relativamente, en los últimos años. Es cierto que el voto a un candidato a presidente no significa un apoyo a todas sus propuestas; pero probablemente sí indique, aunque sea, una tolerancia a la mayoría de ellas.

Si la hipótesis es cierta, es necesario prestarle atención a este síntoma. Si bien Argentina cuenta con una tradición social, institucional y cultural consolidadamente restrictiva de la circulación de las armas de fuego, recientes experiencias en otros países latinoamericanos demuestran la facilidad con la que esos controles pueden socavarse.
 
¿Qué pasa con las armas en Argentina?

Argentina actualmente tiene alrededor de 1.000.000 de usuarios de armas de fuego legalmente registrados, aunque la mayoría de ellos se encuentra en una situación de ilegalidad por tener su autorización vencida. Además, se estima que, incluyendo las armas de fuego no registradas, el número total de armas podría triplicar o cuadruplicar a las 1.7000.000 que constan en los registros oficiales.

Entre 2011 y 2019, en Argentina murieron en promedio 8 personas por día por la utilización de armas de fuego. Uno de cada dos homicidios dolosos en Argentina es producido con un arma de fuego. El 76% de los homicidios dolosos producidos en Argentina en 2021 se registraron sin concurrencia de otros delitos.

Las armas de fuego también son utilizadas para el ejercicio de violencias por motivos de género. En general, las mujeres y disidencias sexogenéricas no poseen armas de fuego (ya que el 97% de los usuarios registrados son varones), pero sí sufren desproporcionadamente sus consecuencias: 1 de cada 4 femicidios es cometido con armas de fuego.

Desde 2015, Argentina cuenta con una Ley modelo a nivel regional, que creó y regula la Agencia Nacional de Materiales Controlados, que tiene a su cargo no sólo el registro y control del mercado legal de armas, sino también “el desarrollo de políticas tendientes a reducir el circulante de armas en la sociedad civil y prevenir los efectos de la violencia armada” (Ley 27.192). Entre otras funciones, esa Agencia tiene a su cargo la implementación del mencionado Plan Nacional de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego. La creación de la Agencia fue un enorme avance en la materia, aunque lo cierto es que la ley sigue sin implementarse en su totalidad, ya que el organismo sigue sin contar con los recursos presupuestarios suficientes para implementar todas las acciones que tiene a su cargo.
 
Los riesgos de la libre portación

Diversos estudios confirman que la mayor presencia de armas de fuego en una sociedad, lejos de disminuir el delito (como afirmó el propio Milei), contribuyen al aumento de la violencia, el delito y las muertes. Y, a la inversa, las políticas de control se relacionan con una reducción de esos problemas. El caso de EEUU, el país con más armas de fuego en manos de civiles del mundo (120 armas por cada 100 personas), es paradigmático. Su tasa de homicidios fue 7.5 veces mayor a la tasa de otros países de altos ingresos, lo cual suele atribuirse a su tasa de homicidios con armas de fuego, que es casi 25 veces mayor. Desde matanzas masivas, algunas de ellas en escuelas, hasta un mayor número de suicidios y femicidios, los efectos de la libre circulación de armas de fuego han sido ampliamente verificados en otros países.

​La inseguridad es, sin lugar a duda, un problema central para la sociedad argentina. Aun cuando su tasa de homicidios sea relativamente baja en relación a otros países de América Latina, la encuesta realizada por LAPOP refleja que es uno de los tres países de la región con mayor cantidad de encuestados que reportan haber sido víctimas de la delincuencia en 2021. La delincuencia se ubica dese hace años en el podio de preocupaciones de la ciudadanía argentina. 

Sin embargo, no existen indicios serios de que el reclamo por más seguridad signifique que la ciudadanía quiera portar armas. Las discusiones sobre cuál debe ser el rol del Estado, principalmente centradas en la política económica, no pueden trasladarse linealmente a las políticas de seguridad. Incluso aquellos sectores con una visión más reduccionista del tamaño estatal han sido históricamente favorables a reconocerle el rol de monopolizar el uso de la fuerza.

Por lo tanto, quien asuma el gobierno en diciembre tendrá una doble responsabilidad. Por un lado, desarrollar políticas de seguridad eficaces, que permitan reducir los índices de criminalidad y la percepción de inseguridad. Y, por el otro, garantizar la vigencia y la extensión de las políticas de restricción de las armas de fuego, ante la aparición de voces que buscan relativizar los enormes riesgos de liberar las armas.
​
La sociedad no pide armas, pide seguridad. Y los datos demuestran que más armas implica menos seguridad.
​
Julián Alfie es Subdirector Ejecutivo del Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (INECIP).

La inclusión en el programa de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro sobre el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estas publicaciones no indican acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas representan las vistas de los autor(es) de cada publicación.
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South Korean Arms Sales Grow in the Years Ahead

1/16/2023

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Hoshik Nam
Last year, Russia and South Korea had largely different experiences in the global arms market, with it being fair to expect that South Korea will take a much larger role in arms exports in the coming years. The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed many flaws of Russian weapons systems. Rusty weapons, poor training and planning inflicted a huge loss of Russian soldiers and even some generals. Moreover, Russian defense industry failed to produce weapons fast enough to catch up the demand generated by its invasion of Ukraine. Late last year, the Russian government is reportedly known to have imported arms from North Korea and is also importing weapons from Iran. Considering the reputation of Russia as the second largest arms exporter for decades, this was a chaotic event that significantly harmed the reputation of the country’s defense industry.

On the other hand, the war contributed to the significant expansion of the South Korean defense industry. Its new arms export sales more than doubled in 2022 (about $17 billion compared to $7.5 billion in 2021) mostly due to a huge deal with Poland ($12 billion). This also diversified destinations of South Korea’s weapons to a major European NATO member. The number of NATO countries that import South Korea’s weapons may increase in the near future. For example, Norway and Estonia have expressed interest in buying weapons from South Korea since the outbreak of Russo-Ukrainian War. What does this mean to South Korean defense industry and its role in the global arms market this year and into the near future?
 
South Korea’s defense industry

The development of South Korean defense sector is largely attributed to the political tension with North Korea. Because both Koreas are technically still at war, the South Korean government has consistently and thoroughly invested in its defense industry since the 1970s.  The government’s strong push to try to produce its own defense weapons has led the country’s defense industry to become not only a producer, but also an exporter of howitzers, battle tanks, warships, and other weapons. In addition, South Korean weapons are compatible with Western NATO weapons, particularly US ones. This is largely due to the country’s close relationship with the US as both countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and engage in an active R&D. This benefits the recipients of South Korean weapons. For example, the arms deal between Poland and South Korea last year gives Poland a chance to replace their old Soviet-era arms into more advanced technology that is compatible with US and other NATO members’ weapons.

In addition, South Korean defense companies can produce and export the weapons in a timely manner with relatively cheap prices and generous technology transfers. These are also crucial factors that have made the South Korean weapons competitive in the global arms market, which has been enhanced with the Russo-Ukraine War as major producers focus on providing weapons to the conflict. For example, even though Poland originally was interested in importing German howitzers, the German government kept postponing exporting them largely due to prioritizing exporting to Ukraine. In addition, South Korean defense industry is more open to transfer technologies, overseas production, and R&D. These factors made South Korean weapons great alternatives for countries that want to replenish their military capabilities with reasonable conditions. After seeing the recent deal with Poland, it is probable that other countries are also interested in importing arms from South Korea. Last year, countries such as Romania expressed their interests to purchase weapons from South Korea, as did Norway and Estonia, as mentioned earlier.
 
Can South Korea replace Russia in the global arms market?

For now, it seems unlikely. While aircraft comprise almost half of Russian arms exports between 2016 and 2020, there are only a few light combat aircrafts that South Korea has successfully exported. In addition, as many South Korean weapons still include components that are produced by foreign manufacturers, exporting the weapons require additional permission from those countries. For example, in 2020 South Korean K9 Thunder howitzers that use German diesel engines were prevented from being exported by a German defense export ban. Considering that the majority of foreign manufacturers that either coproduce or provide components of South Korean weapons are from Western countries, exporting South Korean arms to former clients of Russian arms exports (such as China, or Iran) is likely to be very difficult.

There are, however, signs that South Korea is becoming more favored in the global arms market by some Russian arms importers. For example, after having bought howitzers from South Korea in 2021, Egypt has expressed its interest to buy South Korean aircraft as well. Egypt was the fourth largest arms importer of Russian weapons between 2016-2020. Also, Vietnam
, another major importer of Russian arms for decades, recently bought arms from South Korea. 
 
Conclusion

Some experts may suggest that last year’s increase in South Korean defense industry’s exports could be just a short-term change due to the demand caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, South Korean defense industry still has major limitations of being dependent on foreign manufacturers for some internal components of their weapons. However, the growth of the country’s defense industry did not just happen in a day. Instead, the country’s arms industry has made progresses to become more competitive in the global arms market. If recently exported arms are deployed and judged reasonably well-performing this year, the country’s arms industry will become more competitive and credible. If that is the case, South Korean defense industry may export more weapons now and in years to come.
 
Hoshik Nam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Iowa and a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program. 

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Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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