Forum on the Arms Trade
  • Home
  • Experts
  • Emerging Experts
  • Expertos y Expertas Emergentes
  • Trump's First 100 Days
  • Events
  • Arms Transfers to Ukraine
  • U.S. Arms Transfers to Israel - Trump
  • Biden Arms Transfers To Israel
  • Jobs Corner
  • Media directories
    • Middle East
    • General US arms sales
    • Ukraine
  • Major Arms Sales Notifications Tracker
  • U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy
  • U.S.-Saudi Arms Sales
  • U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
  • U.S. Arms Sales to India
  • U.S. Landmine Policy
  • Resource Page - Under Threshold Arms Sales
  • Resource Page - USML Cat I-III to Commerce
  • HD State Tracker
  • Get on the list
  • About
  • Archives
    • All archives
    • Newsletter
    • Blog

Implementation and Innovation: Humanitarian Disarmament in 2023

2/2/2023

0 Comments

 
This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

(photo, right: 
Bonnie Docherty (author) delivers statement at the endorsement conference of explosive weapons declaration in Dublin, November 2022. Credit: Erin Hunt, 2022.)

This post also is also published on humanitariandisarmament.org’s Disarmament Dialogue blog.  ​
Picture
Bonnie Docherty

The past year underscored the need to have and to ensure respect for strong and effective humanitarian disarmament law. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, cluster munitions, antipersonnel landmines, and explosive weapons with wide area effects have been used in populated areas, mostly by Russia. Russia has in addition repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons.
 
These attacks and threats have inflicted a horrific civilian toll, but they have also generated international opprobrium because they involved weapons banned or practices restricted under humanitarian disarmament treaties and commitments. While more work needs to be done to minimize the civilian suffering in Ukraine and other armed conflicts around the world, demonstrating robust and united support for global civilian protection norms is an important step.
 
Humanitarian disarmament, which seeks to prevent and remediate arms-inflicted human and environmental harm, was advanced as well as reinforced in 2022. States adopted important new standards and commitments on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, nuclear weapons, and the environment and armed conflict. To ensure that these standards and commitments achieve their potential, 2023 will be critical for implementation. It is also a time for innovation, especially in addressing the risks and dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems.
 
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

A political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, endorsed by 83 countries on November 18, aims to better protect civilians from humanitarian consequences of the bombing and shelling of cities and towns. It goes beyond urging greater compliance with existing international humanitarian law to establishing guidelines for preventing and remediating the harm from this method of warfare. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas is one of the greatest threats to civilians in contemporary armed conflicts, and the declaration contains strong provisions with the potential to address both direct and reverberating effects. But it will only be as effective as its interpretation and implementation.
 
Over the next year, signatories to the declaration should ensure that they interpret it through a humanitarian lens. Its core provision calls on states to adopt “policies and practices to help avoid civilian harm, including by restricting or refraining as appropriate from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects.” According to a report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, to live up to the declaration’s humanitarian purpose, states should understand the paragraph to mean they should refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and restrict their use of all other explosive weapons in those areas.
 
State signatories should also carry out the commitments they made in the declaration and be ready to report on their progress at the first follow-up meeting in Norway in 2024. They should, for example, review, develop, and improve relevant national policies and practices; train their armed forces on the declaration’s provisions; collect and share data; and provide assistance to victims. Several civil society organizations have published recommendations for how most effectively to implement the declaration’s commitments.
 
Nuclear Weapons

Implementation is also key for the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty’s landmark First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna last June adopted the Vienna Declaration, reaffirming states parties’ commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons and stressing the treaty’s underlying moral and ethical imperatives. The meeting further agreed to the Vienna Action Plan, which lays out steps to advance the process of implementing the treaty. Expanding support for the treaty remains a top priority. Five years after its initial signing conference, the treaty has 68 states parties and an additional 27 states have signed.
 
Another area of focus is the positive obligations to assist victims, remediate environmental contamination, and provide international cooperation and assistance. The Action Plan identifies initial steps states parties should take to establish an implementation framework. They should assess the harm caused by nuclear weapons use and testing and their capacity to address it, develop a national plan with a budget and time frame, establish a government “focal point” to guide these efforts, and adopt relevant laws and policies. In addition, they should follow principles of accessibility, inclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency at all stages of carrying out these obligations.
 
Environment and Armed Conflict

New standards were set during the past year with regard to the environment and armed conflict. On December 7, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus the International Law Commission’s Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts. The non-binding principles cover situations before, during, and after times of armed conflict.
 
The principles call for designating protected zones, explicitly applying existing international humanitarian law to the environment, and laying out rules to protect the environment during times of occupation. They also underscore the importance of cooperation in developing post-conflict remedial measures.
 
The Conflict and Environment Observatory, which advocated heavily for the principles, said that, “The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the principles and their commentaries represents the transition point between [the principles’] development and the beginning of its implementation phase.” Early steps in this stage include raising awareness about the principles and adopting national measures, such as training armed forces on their content.
 
Autonomous Weapons Systems
​

While the new standards and commitments on explosive weapons, nuclear weapons, and the environment in armed conflict require implementation, the dangers raised by autonomous weapons systems are still not constrained by specific legal rules. Innovation will, therefore, be crucial in 2023. International talks at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) have been ongoing since May 2014, but no action has been taken. At the CCW’s annual meeting in November, states parties yet again failed to make any meaningful progress despite calls from a majority of states parties, plus the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society organizations, to open negotiations for a new treaty to prohibit and regulate autonomous weapons.
 
Due in large part to the CCW’s reliance on consensus-based decision making, however, states parties could only agree to discuss—for the tenth year—“possible measures” for addressing the myriad threats such weapons systems pose. States parties will need to break out of the CCW if they want to make progress toward a new instrument on autonomous weapons systems.
 
States need to innovate by changing their tactics for achieving a treaty, and there is ample precedent for taking a different approach. Existing disarmament treaties offer models for successfully adopting legal instruments in alternative forums. As discussed in a recent report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, states could turn to an independent process outside the UN, as was done for the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. Or they could initiate a UN General Assembly process, as was used for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Both approaches have several benefits: a common purpose, voting-based decision-making, clear and ambitious deadlines, and a commitment to inclusivity.
 
In 2023, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Austria are all planning conferences outside of the CCW on autonomy in weapons systems. States and others that support creating new law to address the moral, legal, accountability, and security concerns about this emerging technology should take advantage of these meetings to build momentum for negotiations.


Bonnie Docherty is a senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch and a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, where she is Director of the Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection Initiative in the International Human Rights Clinic. 

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

0 Comments

Tackling militarism’s contribution to the climate emergency

1/5/2022

1 Comment

 
This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Doug Weir
The past year saw the dial finally shift on reducing the carbon bootprint of the military. Since the topic was excluded from international climate processes by the United States back in the late 1990s, it has received scant attention. Efforts to track and estimate the emissions that $2 trillion of annual global military spending creates had largely been the preserve of a few academic researchers and peace organisations. That changed in 2021.

Many highly industrialised countries have been moving towards declaring goals to reach Net Zero emissions by 2050 for a while. For some of them, the fact that militaries are the largest emitters within government – often responsible for more than 50% of emissions - has made them increasingly difficult to ignore, particularly where whole of government targets have been enshrined in law. It should be noted that Net Zero is not a panacea and will likely come too late but the concept has been widely accepted by governments as a safely distant and impressive sounding target.

But this is also a story of individuals. We saw multiple voices within national militaries, and NATO, advocating for change. These are people who could see that the wind is changing, and who could also see that the future of military energy consumption was not going to be one wholly based on fossil fuels. Moreover, Western governments have been orienting towards the security risks of climate change, with actors like NATO keen to play a leading role. However, legitimacy in this space requires that those who seek to lead it aren’t contributing to the problem.

More broadly, militaries reflect the societies that provide them licence to operate. There is a rising tide of concern over climate change and therefore pressure on militaries to be seen to be acting on it, and not just in response to it. And if the policy changes that we saw in 2021 have appeared to be rapid, this should be seen as a reflection of just how far behind the curve militaries have been in this space. They and their political masters had opted to exclude themselves from international efforts to reduce emissions.

The past 12 months have seen a flurry of announcements. In May, NATO members gave the first vague commitments that they would cut military emissions. The UK and Switzerland had already acknowledged that military emissions cuts would be part of their 2050 Net Zero goals. NATO also announced that it would work on an emissions tracking methodology for its members – a good example of how far behind other sectors the military are on cuts. Almost unnoticed during the Glasgow climate summit in November, the U.S. Department of Defense quietly announced that it too would aim to be Net Zero by 2050. NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg had attended its first COP to confirm that global emissions targets would not be met without military emissions being included.

The acknowledgement by states that their militaries are major emitters, and that they cannot be exempt from society-wide decarbonisation feels like a watershed moment. But it is just the first step in what will be a very long and difficult road. Militaries, and the technology companies that support them, are highly polluting industries. Just like cement, steel or aviation, tackling emissions will be a huge challenge. It also carries with it risks. These include military-grade greenwashing when targets can’t be met, increasing military spending to rearm with less polluting vehicles, the temptation to offset difficult emissions instead of reducing them at source, or transitions to costly new synthetic fuels, diverting resources away from other more important reduction pathways.

Looking ahead

In 2022, the trends initiated in 2021 will intensify and accelerate. We will see more industrialised countries accept the need for military decarbonisation. Luxembourg’s Green Party defence minister set out his its plans in December, South Korea did likewise, following a pledge made at COP26 in Glasgow. But beyond the headline pledges, the hard work needs to begin to establish expectations and standards on militaries. The historic environmental exceptionalism that kept them out of climate talks, and global environmental norm-setting bodies more generally, will continue. Scrutiny will be needed over how they record and what they report. Transparent data is at the core of any action to reduce emissions, which is why we launched the data portal militaryemissions.org with colleagues from Lancaster and Durham universities at COP26. What we can’t see, they won’t cut, so making emissions reporting open and standardised is a critical first step.

The UK will pass on its COP presidency to Egypt in November 2022. We do not expect them to be overly sympathetic to calls for military emissions to be placed on the formal agenda of COP27. But it is vital that they are. While the U.S.’s massive military expenditure and relative transparency has meant that much of the discourse has focused on the Department of Defense’s gargantuan annual emissions – equivalent to those of Portugal, or Sweden – this is a global problem, and it needs global standards. As we show on militaryemissions.org there are many large military spenders who report very little emissions data, this includes China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Israel. We hope and expect that 2022 will see increasing attention on their emissions.

Beyond military emissions themselves, we expect to see a steady uptick in attention on the linkages between conventional arms and climate change. We have already documented how the arms industry reports its environmental footprint – more transparently than most militaries, as it turns out – and colleagues at UNIDIR have posed several research questions in this space. But we need to get ahead of this issue. The pledges made in Glasgow are far short of what is needed to slow global heating. The climate crisis will have a massive impact on human security globally and it’s critical that we understand how arms transfers and militarism will be influenced by it, and how they will drive and exacerbate insecurity. We would encourage everyone working in this space to spend a little of 2022 exploring how the issues they work on will be impacted by a hotter, more insecure world, and how they may make that world a more dangerous place.
 
Doug Weir is the Research and Policy Director of the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), www.ceobs.org @detoxconflict  Find our more about military emissions on CEOBS’ dedicated page www.ceobs.org/projects/military-emissions and explore the military emissions that your government reports to the UN at militaryemissions.org
1 Comment

Novel approaches to State responsibility for conflict pollution and environment damage

12/14/2017

1 Comment

 
This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Wim Zwijnenburg
Wim Zwijnenburg
The ongoing fighting in the Middle East has painfully demonstrated how vital and fragile the role of environment in armed conflict is. Scorched earth tactics used by the so-called Islamic State left oil wells burning, polluted agricultural lands and rivers, and the war itself severely damaged urban and industrial areas -- all posing acute and chronic health risks to local populations living there or returning there. 2017 was also the year where again numerous warnings were given by UN organisations and experts on the risks of targeting sensitive civilian infrastructure as happened, for example, when water filtration stations in Donetsk (storing thousands of liters of toxic chloride) were hit by incoming fire, causing a severe chemical disaster.

Environmental degradation due to climate change is grabbing headlines and showing how important our environment is for well-being, peaceful existence, security, and stability. How conflict impacts the environmental, however, receives little attention from states and the international community. But times seem to be changing. At the third UN Environmental Assembly in Nairobi, states adopted a new resolution on conflict pollution, submitted by Iraq. The resolution acknowledges the intrinsic link between conflict, environmental damage and pollution. Among many other important references, it calls for identification, assessment and remediation of pollution caused by conflict and terrorist acts; inclusion of communities in post-conflict assessment work; and collection of data for  identifying health outcomes that should be integrated into health registries and risk education programs. Therefore, the resolution is an important step towards mitigating the effects conflict pollution and toxic remnants of war can have on human health and the environment. This was the second resolution that takes on this subject; the first one, Protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflict was adapted in 2016 at the second UN Environmental Assembly.  There has been a long road since the first UNGA resolution A/47/37 on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict was introduced in 1992, with multiple discussions undertaken with the ICRC, the International Law Commission, and others in the interim to improve the work on conflict and environmental protection.
 
Wars and conflicts that rage on today continue to have disastrous environmental consequences,  ranging from earlier cases of  pollution in Iraq to the rise of civilian-run artisanal oil refining in Syria, and also broader environmental security struggles in Columbia and Lake Chad. Clearly, a comprehensive approach is needed on multiple levels that hold both state and non-state actors accountable for military activities before, during, and after conflict. The international community will need to step up its efforts to tackle the environmental health risks in and after conflict by providing expertise, capacity, and funding to affected states and international organisations. Implementing the UNEA resolution should involve exploring with civil society, the academic, and the scientific community how to minimize and prevent environmental damage in conflicts. Next, more work can also be done by the humanitarian community to support identification and monitoring environmental pollution in their response work, which should support faster clean-up and remediation. This can be done through the UN Cluster systems, and by engaging with experts to start a community of practice where various tools and techniques are shared in order to develop methods on data collection, analysis, and joint humanitarian response to toxic remnants of war.

2018 will see several donor conferences dealing with rebuilding Iraq and Syria where the environmental component should be a key element in reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, the ICRC Is likely to publish an update on their guidelines of military manuals where there can be room for improvement on discussion of targeting procedures.  With these and other key opportunities, states should move forward in 2018 on the conflict and environment nexus, striving for progressive change that can help save lives, livelihoods and the environment we all depend on.
 
Wim Zwijnenburg is a Humanitarian Disarmament Project Leader at PAX, based in the Netherlands
1 Comment

Saving Rhinos while Protecting Human Rights: The Value of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Anti-Poaching Efforts

12/14/2016

2 Comments

 
This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Matthew Bolton
PictureA family of white rhinos. Photo courtesy of Control Arms.
The world is facing what the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has described as an “Environmental Crime Crisis,” with an unprecedented slaughter of large mammals, particularly in the African continent. More than 100,000 elephants have been killed by poachers in the last five years and, over the same period, the number of rhinoceroses poached has increased every year.

The illicit wildlife trade is now increasingly sophisticated, dangerous and globalized, integrated with armed groups and organized crime. It has been fueled by a proliferation of military-grade guns in unstable regions with high concentrations of rhinos and elephants. Since 2014, the UN Security Council has identified poaching as a regional security threat in Africa (S/RES/2134 and S/RES/2136). This month UNEP released a new report showing how environmental crime “threatens peace and security.” In 2017, the Arms Trade Treaty and other international measures could offer tools to address these problems in an integrated way.

United States Contributes to Militarization of Counter-Poaching

There is an emerging global trend toward militarizing wildlife protection, including expansive arming and training of paramilitary rangers. These aggressive counter-poaching tactics are supported by policy changes that have reframed wildlife crime as a security issue. In 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking, stating that poaching had “significant effects…on the national interests of the United States.” This October, Congress passed the bi-partisan Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act, which encourages the administration to “provide defense articles (not including significant military equipment), defense services, and related training to appropriate security forces” to African countries for counter-poaching.

It is unclear how seriously the incoming administration will take the threat of global wildlife crime. Trump’s climate change-denying pick for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Scott Pruitt, wants to strip away protections from the environment. Trump has defended his sons’ hunting of endangered species in Zimbabwe; photos surfaced last year of Donald Trump, Jr. holding the severed tail of an elephant and of him with a dead leopard. Nevertheless, co-sponsor of the Wildlife Trafficking Act Senator Jeff Flake (R-Arizona) told National Geographic that he will continue to advocate for action on poaching in the incoming Congress.  

The Human Rights Impact of Militarization

As with the “War on Drugs”, the militarization of poaching has had unintended consequences. In several countries, the military, police and even wildlife rangers have been involved in poaching, either directly or indirectly. The flow of arms into already unstable regions also means that many poachers obtain their weapons and ammunition from state sources, either through theft or corruption. Militarized rangers have also been implicated in human rights abuses (see, for example, this disturbing report about a counter-poaching operation in Tanzania).

Last week, I was speaking with wildlife rangers in a major East African national park, home to many rhinos. The park has suffered due to serious threats from poaching since 2011; two rhinos were recently killed by poachers using large-caliber rifles. In the last few years the country has stiffened the penalties for wildlife crimes and deployed an eight-fold increase in rangers – many with paramilitary training – in the park. The government attributes to this more aggressive response a reduction in killing of rhinos in the park from 24 in 2013 to three this year.

However, many of the poachers caught following incidents in the park are low-level criminals, often from poorer, rural areas around the park where the profits from rhino horn can be very tempting. They risk being killed on the spot or long-term prison sentences, while the international organized crime bosses evade punishment.

The paramilitary rangers' rules of engagement are also concerning. I asked a ranger about his rules of engagement when encountering a suspected poacher. He replied that if they are armed, “You shoot to kill, that's what we are told in training. If someone has a rifle, what do you do? That's why we shoot first.” Shoot-to-kill policies contravene international human rights law. Police (and rangers) are supposed to try to persuade a suspect to lay down their weapon, avoid killing a suspect if possible and try to make an arrest. The ranger told me, “if they pose a threat you forget about human rights.” But governments are not allowed to forget about human rights, even if they are inconvenient. The ranger also admitted that the militarized tactics could encourage poachers to also be better armed and more aggressive themselves.

Addressing Poaching through International Arms Control

If Trump does decide to take wildlife crime seriously (or is encouraged to by Congressional Republicans) it is unlikely that he will be a strong champion for addressing the human rights concerns of militarized counter-poaching. Congress, the policy community and activists must therefore make a compelling case for alternative methods of addressing poaching, while respecting the rule of law.

The last African elephant poaching crisis, in the 1980s, was fueled by the influx of guns in Africa’s Cold War proxy conflicts. It was stopped not so much by militarizing wildlife protection, but rather through international legal and normative change, including the ivory ban and a broad-based public awareness campaign in countries creating the demand. More recently, the Obama Administration has supported diplomatic and aid efforts beyond militarized conservation, raising awareness of the impact of poaching, seeking a stronger ivory ban and supporting peace and conservation projects in affected areas.

This September, I authored a report, published by Control Arms and Pace University, that outlines how the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) could be used as part of a broader effort to address poaching in ways that are consistent international human rights standards. The report was produced for a  training program on the ATT for East African officials and civil society advocates.

The ATT, negotiated within the UN, establishes global rules for the transfer of conventional weapons, preventing the sale of arms to those who engage in human rights and humanitarian law abuses, organized crime, terrorism and gender-based violence. It provides a framework for governments to engage collaboratively in “risk mitigation measures” to prevent potential diversion of guns to unauthorized people or uses. It has 91 member governments, including several major exporting countries.

In my report and the training of officials we argue that governments should use the ATT to reduce the risk of automatic and large-caliber weapons being diverted to poaching. We also show how to use the treaty to improve armed rangers’ respect for human rights.

The United States has signed the ATT, but not yet ratified, stymied by gun lobby conspiracy theories claiming the treaty would threaten Second Amendment rights. In fact, the treaty affirms governments’ right to allow “lawful ownership” of guns, such as for “recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities.” In 2014 President Obama revised U.S. arms export control measures, which are broadly consistent with the ATT, without actually fully joining the treaty. Given the NRA’s endorsement of Trump, it is unlikely the incoming administration will think highly of the treaty’s potential.

But multilateral diplomacy, international law and arms control offer sophisticated tools (such as the ATT) for solving global problems (like poaching) that cannot simply be shot at. They make it possible to defend wildlife and human rights at the same time. In 2017 we must mobilize to shield both rhinos and people from roll back of their much-needed protections.

Dr. Matthew Bolton is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pace University

2 Comments

    About

    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

    We have a number of special series including: 


    Looking Ahead 2025
    Looking Ahead 2024
    Looking Ahead 2023
    Looking Ahead 2022
    ​Looking Ahead 2021
    Looking Ahead 2020

    Looking Ahead 2019
    Looking Ahead 2018
    First 100 Days (April/May '17)

    Looking Ahead 2017

    Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. Institutional affiliation is indicated for identification purposes only.

    Archives

    May 2025
    February 2025
    January 2025
    December 2024
    November 2024
    September 2024
    March 2024
    January 2024
    November 2023
    October 2023
    August 2023
    April 2023
    March 2023
    February 2023
    January 2023
    December 2022
    September 2022
    August 2022
    May 2022
    April 2022
    February 2022
    January 2022
    October 2021
    September 2021
    August 2021
    July 2021
    April 2021
    January 2021
    July 2020
    May 2020
    January 2020
    December 2019
    July 2019
    April 2019
    January 2019
    December 2018
    May 2018
    December 2017
    May 2017
    April 2017
    January 2017
    December 2016
    October 2016
    June 2016
    May 2016
    April 2016
    June 2015
    May 2015
    March 2015

    Pdf's

    March 11 (2015)

    Categories

    All
    Adam Isacson
    Africa
    Alejandro Sanchez
    Allison Pytlak
    Amy Nelson
    Anna Stavrianakis
    Arms Sales
    Arms Trade Treaty
    Arms Trafficking
    Aude Fleurant
    Bonnie Docherty
    Brian Castner
    Child Soldiers
    Colby Goodman
    Corruption
    Cyber
    Dan Gettinger
    Danielle Preskitt
    Divestment
    Doug Weir
    Drones
    Emerging Experts
    End-use Monitoring
    Environment
    Erin Hunt
    Europe
    Exploration Of Arms Reduction And Jobs
    Explosive Weapons
    First 100 Days
    Frank Slijper
    Gender
    Global Trade Trends
    Harm To Civilians
    Hector Guerra
    High School Debate '19 20
    High School Debate '19-20
    Humanitarian Disarmament
    Human Rights Due Diligence
    Iain Overton
    Investors
    Jeff Abramson
    Jen Spindel
    Jobs
    John Lindsay Poland
    John Lindsay-Poland
    Jordan Cohen
    Kate Kizer
    Killer Robots
    Landmines/cluster Munitions
    Latin America
    Laura Boillot
    Lode Dewaegheneire
    Looking Ahead 2017
    Looking Ahead 2018
    Looking Ahead 2019
    Looking Ahead 2020
    Looking Ahead 2021
    Looking Ahead 2022
    Looking Ahead 2023
    Looking Ahead 2024
    Looking Ahead 2025
    Maria Pia Devoto
    Martin Butcher
    Matthew Bolton
    Middle East
    Military Expenditures
    Natalie Goldring
    Nicholas Marsh
    Non State Actors
    Paul Holtom
    Rachel Stohl
    Ray Acheson
    Robert Muggah
    Robert Watson
    Roy Isbister
    SALW
    Samuel Perlo Freeman
    Samuel Perlo-Freeman
    Security Assistance
    Seth Binder
    Shannon Dick
    Suicide Bombing
    Summit For Democracy
    Sustainable Development
    Tobias Bock
    Transparency
    Ukraine War
    UN Register
    Victim Assistance
    Wanda Muñoz
    War In Ukraine
    William Hartung
    Wim Zwijnenburg
    Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan

    RSS Feed

Proudly powered by Weebly