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Looking Ahead - Child Soldiers

1/9/2020

1 Comment

 
This is the seventh blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Rachel Stohl
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Ryan Fletcher
Children represent some of the most vulnerable populations in armed conflicts around the world. Too often, children shoulder the burden of conflict and are exploited by armed groups to serve on the frontlines and/or support armed operations – with national militaries, government-supported paramilitaries, and non-state armed groups recruiting and using child soldiers as tools of warfare. According to recent estimates by Child Soldiers International, 240 million children around the world live in countries affected by ongoing armed conflict and children have been exploited by armed forces and groups in at least 18 countries since 2016 – including in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, among others.
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An often-overlooked component of this tragic reality is the impact of global arms transfers on the use of children in armed conflict. The dynamics of the international arms trade have made weapons more accessible to more actors – including those that forcibly recruit child soldiers. Many countries with known records of child soldier abuse rely on weapons and military assistance from some of the world’s leading arms exporters, including the United States. Yet few major arms exporters have incorporated the nexus between arms transfers and the recruitment and use of child soldiers into their national export policies or legislation. To underscore this connection and identify means to encourage national governments around the world to stop the recruitment and use of child soldiers, U.S. lawmakers adopted the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) of 2008. The CSPA requires the U.S. Secretary of State to publish an annual list of countries whose armed forces or government-backed armed groups recruit or use child soldiers. This list is commonly referred to as the CSPA list and is published in the State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons report. Countries included on the list are prohibited from receiving certain types of U.S. military assistance, training, and defense equipment.

This new year marks ten years of CSPA implementation and offers an important opportunity to review the CSPA’s efforts and examine its impact. Although the United States is one of few countries in the world to leverage U.S. military assistance to end the use of child soldiers, thus far, implementation of the law has been lacking.

One reason for poor implementation is the frequent use of what is known as a “national interest waiver” as detailed in the law itself. The CSPA allows the president to waive the law’s prohibitions, in whole or in part, “if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.” The Obama and Trump administrations have both used these national interest waivers regularly. As a result, more than $4.3 billion in otherwise prohibited U.S. military assistance has been provided to countries known to recruit and use child soldiers over the last nine years, thereby limiting the consequences (or perceived consequences) for not aligning with the law’s requirements.

Another notable challenge to comprehensive CSPA implementation has been the omission of key countries from the CSPA list itself. For years, countries known to support the recruitment and use of child soldiers – such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia – have been deliberately kept off the CSPA list for political reasons. In a positive move, the State Department included Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burma on the 2019 CSPA list – countries it neglected to include in 2017, with notable controversy. However, absent from the 2019 list is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has been widely reported to be using children as young as 14 to fight its war in Yemen.

With his 2019 determination, President Trump waived all of the CSPA’s prohibited assistance, allowing all relevant military assistance to go to the seven countries currently budgeted to receive such assistance. The four countries absent from the waiver announcement – Iran, Burma/Myanmar, Sudan, and Syria – do not receive any U.S. military assistance.

The application of the CSPA over the last nine years has not lived up to the hope of the law’s potential. Children in conflict continue to be put at risk with no accountability by the governments that continue to violate the rights of their most vulnerable populations. In 2020 we must reflect on the trends of the CSPA’s implementation over the last 10 years and identify potential fixes to the law’s loopholes and weaknesses.
 
Rachel Stohl is vice president of the Stimson Center, where Ryan Fletcher is a research associate.
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Drones and the Development of International Standards

1/7/2020

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Rachel Stohl
In the first half of the Trump administration, the United States demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. The Trump administration has placed a primacy on immediate military action, resulting in a U.S. drone policy that appears less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable.

As the number one user of lethal drone technology in the world, the United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and setting a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our adversaries utilize drones for their own purposes.

Although the high profile drone-strike killing of Iranian general Soleimani is now front-page news, U.S. use of armed drones also remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding their lethal use -- especially outside of traditional battlefields -- and the resulting lack of accountability that often goes hand in hand with limited transparency. These trends have only been amplified during the Trump administration, where U.S. drone policy has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, and Trump has reversed course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows. Additionally, the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes has increased and the threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, while the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes has reportedly broadened.
 
The Trump administration also seems recommitted to pursuing a flawed multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which, in its current form, could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to those of the United States. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN member states signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on export and subsequent use of armed drones. Now, a core-group of states, including the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Japan, and observer states Turkey, Israel and France, are working to develop this initiative into so-called International Standards on the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed Drones, as communicated by the U.S. State Department in October 2017. While the results of this process and the standards themselves are unclear, it is moving forward.

The current U.S.-led process to develop global drone standards raises a number of concerns. For one, it risks giving the veneer of promoting responsible decision-making while proving meaningless in establishing appropriate controls, as higher standards already exist in several legal frameworks. The process also continues to be directed by a small group of states and remains closed to outside input from subject matter experts, relevant practitioners, and communities affected by drone transfers and use. Therefore, it is important that civil society representatives continue to remain engaged with states and inform them of policies and practices that support the development of responsible national policies on drones, as well as international standards to guide drone transfer and use.

In 2020, it is likely that we will continue to see increased proliferation and use of drones, but also a proliferation of new multilateral regimes and agreements. Differing standards or rules guiding drone transfers and use – that is, those enumerated in the international standards, the global counterterrorism forum, in the ATT, and in other export control regimes – could lead to confusion for states, both exporters and importers, over which rules and standards to follow or to apply. This risk could compound those already modeled by the U.S. drone program, such as the risks to civilians and challenges to the rule of law, both domestically and internationally.

As drones continue to proliferate and more countries look to acquire and use lethal drone capabilities, questions of efficacy, legality, transparency, and accountability will continue to raise concerns about the precedent being set by the current U.S. drone program. The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on this issue and ensure that U.S. policy on drones is responsible and transparent and sets an appropriate benchmark for drone transfers and use around the world. As we move into the next election cycle, it will be important for civil society to remain engaged and pursue forward progress on the issue of drones.
 
Rachel Stohl is vice president of the Stimson Center.
3 Comments

U.S. Drone Policy

12/18/2018

2 Comments

 
This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Rachel Stohl
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Shannon Dick
Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly referred to as drones, have become increasingly common in military operations and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions around the world. Although the United States is the world’s leader in possessing and using armed drones, other countries are increasingly acquiring, seeking, and using lethal drone technology. In 2019. these countries may look to the U.S. example for guidance in developing their own policies on drones – which raises a number of concerns.  

Although the U.S. drone program in its current form has been active for over 15 years, it remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding the use of lethal drone strikes outside traditional battlefields and the resulting lack of accountability. Such features have come to define the U.S. drone program and ultimately hinder effective oversight as well as challenge assessments of the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S operations.
 
The United States has demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. And U.S. drone policy appears to be becoming less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable, lacking safeguards and transparency over the legal framework, use, and results of use.

In June 2018, Stimson released a report, An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy, that examined worrying trends surrounding the U.S. drone program with a particular view towards the Trump administration’s use of lethal drone strikes outside of traditional battlefields. The report found key concerns regarding changes the Trump administration has made to U.S. drone policy and use:
  • U.S. drone policy under the Trump administration has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, reversing course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows.
  • The Trump administration has increased the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes.
  • The threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, and the administration may have reasserted the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes.
In addition to concerning regressions in U.S. drone policy, the United States also seems recommitted to pursuing a problematic multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to the United States’. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN Member States signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones.

The development of international standards through the joint declaration process has raised serious concerns that the U.S.-led process will undermine existing frameworks and result in weak standards guiding drone transfers and use. In August 2018, Stimson released The ATT and Drones to support the discussion on international standards and provide a primer on existing international standards related to drones, cautioning that any international standards should not be lower than what already exists in legally binding law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and set a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our enemies utilize drones for their own purposes.

​Rachel Stohl is Managing Director at the Stimson Center and Shannon Dick is Research Associate with the Conventional Defense Program.

2 Comments

Trump on Arms Sales

4/25/2017

1 Comment

 
This is the third entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.
Stohl
Rachel Stohl
Dick
Shannon Dick
Three months into the Trump administration and President Trump has used arms sales to support security priorities and demonstrate a commitment to industry. Yet it remains unclear how and to what extent arms sales will be used as a tool of Trump’s foreign and defense policies.

Recent actions, however, appear to suggest that human rights will no longer be a priority for advancing or withholding U.S. arms sales and thereby supporting larger U.S. foreign policy interests. Indeed, since taking office, the Trump administration has pushed forward (but Congress has yet to fully review) arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that were previously put on hold by the Obama administration due to human rights concerns. The rationale behind these decisions to provide U.S. weapons to consistent human rights violators is largely based on counterterrorism priorities and the view that these arms transfers will significantly support campaigns against terrorist groups. But there is scant evidence that allowing these arms sales will contribute to U.S. strategic goals and objectives and will not result in further human rights abuses and civilian suffering. For example, the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen has resulted in devastating impacts on the Yemeni civilian population. The campaign, undertaken with U.S. supplied weapons, has consistently struck civilian targets and could help fuel anti-American sentiment and play into terrorist groups’ narrative, ultimately working against larger interests in working to stabilize the country and end the conflict.

The Trump administration is also trying to change the bureaucratic process surrounding arms sales to foreign governments. Reportedly, the Trump administration is considering replacing foreign military financing  (FMF) grants with loans. The Trump administration seems to believe that having governments pay back their weapons purchases will save the United States money in the long run. However, such thinking fundamentally misunderstands the intent of the FMF program. FMF enables foreign governments to use U.S. government grants to purchase U.S. weapons primarily through the Foreign Military Sales program. The program is often used to support foreign militaries that would otherwise be unable to purchase U.S. systems and is often cited as a crucial means to promote national security interests. Indeed, FMF allows foreign partners and allies to acquire U.S. equipment – which is often more expensive than systems from other countries – and thus augment their own military capabilities while fostering stronger security relations with the United States.

Additionally, because FMF funds are almost exclusively reserved for the procurement of U.S. weapons and equipment, the program supports U.S. industry. As Andrew Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs under the Obama administration, aptly noted in commentary for Defense News, the FMF program “helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base, it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities.” Should the administration follow through with converting grants to loans, it could harm U.S. industry and lead business into other markets that offer less expensive alternatives, such as those maintained by Russia and China. In its budget blueprint, the administration stated that the shift to loans would “potentially [allow] recipients to purchase more American-made weaponry with U.S. assistance, but on a repayable basis.” But why would buyers pay for systems they used to get for free, and in fact pay more than if they were to seek military equipment from other suppliers?

The Trump administration’s initial arms sales efforts may work to weaken long-standing U.S. policy priorities regarding conventional arms transfers. In the short term, Trump’s policy decisions are minimizing the extent to which human rights concerns are taken into consideration.  In the long-term, these arms sales may result in continued sales to a wider scope of actors with poor records of good governance. Additionally, in seeking changes to grant programs, Trump’s policies may undercut U.S. industry. Such decisions could ultimately backfire on U.S. interests, both economically and politically, and leave an arms trade legacy that risks negative consequences for years to come.

Rachel Stohl is a director of the Conventional Defense program at the Stimson Center.
Shannon Dick is a research associate at the Stimson Center and and a participant in the Forum’s emerging expert program.

Note: this post was edited at 12:11PM EDT on April 26 to clarify the status of the sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Nigeria.


1 Comment

A New U.S. Drone Policy?

4/24/2017

3 Comments

 
This is the first entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.
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Rachel Stohl
U.S. drone policy under President Donald Trump is slowly coming into focus, despite the absence of any new executive orders or regulations.  However, we can begin to assess the ways in which President Trump plans to utilize drones in his administration. The Trump administration’s approach seems to be based on undoing the limits put in place by the Obama administration.

Trump has not been shy about using drones in operations around the world. In the first three months of the administration, U.S. drone strikes averaged about one strike per day, as compared to an estimated one strike per 5.4 days under President Obama, according to analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Trump Administration has also granted a new authority to the CIA that restores the CIA’s role in lethal strikes and has seemingly lowered the threshold on the level of acceptable civilian casualties for drone strikes. This is in direct contravention of the Obama administration approach in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) largely shared responsibility. Under Obama, the CIA gathered intelligence and identified suspected terrorists, and then provided information to the military, which was responsible for the actual strikes.

Moreover, recent actions in Yemen and Somalia have altered the designation of certain provinces to be identified as “areas of active hostilities,” allowing for less stringent battlefield rules and potentially less protections for civilians on the ground than what was required during the Obama administration. Trump’s actions call into question the status of the Presidential Policy Guidance put in place by Obama to guide the United States’ use of armed drones – as these steps appear to mark a reversal of Obama-era policies – and bring to focus repeated concerns about the lack of information on the legal framework underpinning the U.S. drone program.

The Trump Administration thus far has accepted a higher risk to civilian life in determining when to undertake drone strikes and seems undeterred by concerns about secrecy and a lack of accountability. Allies and partners are watching the ways in which U.S. drone strikes unfold under the Trump administration, particularly as they look to conduct their own drone operations and develop relevant national legislation and policies to support such operations. Yet, the apparent disregard for developing international standards on drones undermines U.S. efforts to continue work on the development of international drone standards that were begun under the Obama administration.

Trump’s reversals in his approach to U.S. drone policy appear to walk back some of the previous efforts (however limited such efforts may have been) to establish an appropriate standard for armed drone use. As such, Trump risks instituting a dangerous precedent for lethal drone use marked by secrecy, limited accountability, and legal ambiguity.

Rachel Stohl is a Senior Associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center.
3 Comments

The ATT and Transparency

5/23/2016

1 Comment

 
PictureRachel Stohl
This is the fourth blog post in a series on official transparency reporting, where it struggles, and the important role civil society often plays in monitoring and improving global understanding of the trade and use of conventional weapons.

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Paul Holtom
Increasing transparency and oversight of the international arms trade are at the heart of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Under the ATT, States Parties have three reporting obligations. First, States Parties must provide a one-off report that outlines the measures it has undertaken to implement the Treaty; although this has to be updated if new measures are undertaken. Second, States Parties have to make available an annual report on their authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms, which could contain the same information as provided to the UN Register. Third, States Parties are encouraged to report on measures they have taken to address the diversion of arms. 
 
The First Conference of States Parties (CSP1) took note of provisional reporting templates for the initial report on measures to implement the ATT and the annual report on arms exports and imports. However, The ATT does not require States Parties to utilize a standardized reporting form. The ATT requires States Parties to provide useful information on implementation of the ATT with regards to arms transfer control systems and responsible transfer decisions. States, international organizations, and civil society will utilize these reports to monitor ATT implementation and better understand how States Parties interpret and understand the treaty’s provisions and obligations. Reports also provide insights into how States have incorporated the ATT into their national systems. They can highlight best practices, lessons learned, and model legislation that other countries can utilize in the development or enhancement of their own national systems. Additionally, reports provide opportunities to match assistance requests with available resources. In these ways, reporting allows for accurate monitoring and assessment of ATT implementation by States and by civil society – and can provide a greater understanding of the global arms trade overall.

States Parties considered the production of reporting templates a useful endeavor to assist with the provision of information on implementation and transfers. Thirty-five States Parties to-date are known to have used the provisional reporting template for their initial report on measures to implement the ATT. A further six States Parties used their completed ATT-BAP Baseline Assessment Survey and France provided a narrative report.

For the annual report – the first of which is due on 31 May 2016 – States Parties may utilize the provisional reporting template or their submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (Register), including the separate form for additional information on transfers of small arms and light weapons. It will be important to encourage States Parties to provide information on authorizations and actual exports and imports for all categories required under the ATT, including the number of units transferred, a description of these items transferred and information on the end-user.

​The annual report is crucial for getting a global picture of what types of weapons States are importing and exporting. The annual report will therefore go a long way in helping identify trends in the global arms trade, if the reports are made public and States are comprehensive in the provision of information.
 
In the very near future – potentially at the Second Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in August – States Parties will need to consider how to best ensure universal reporting.  CSP2 will also be asked to decide if the adoption of reporting templates is the best approach for achieving this goal. States Parties also need to consider whether to develop a reporting template for the voluntary report on diversion, which could help to improve accountability and mitigate potentially harmful arms transfers. Comprehensive reporting will lead to increased transparency of the systems governing arms transfers and how the provisions of the Treaty are applied to international arms transfers. In the end, robust reporting has the opportunity to contribute to greater accountability in the global arms trade and encourage States to undertake more transparent and responsible arms transfers.

​Rachel Stohl is Senior Associate, Managing Across Boundaries, at the Stimson Center. Paul Holtom is Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University (UK). Together, they developed the ATT-Baseline Assessment Project.
1 Comment

The Age of Drones

3/11/2015

2 Comments

 
Rachel StohlRachel Stohl
The increased U.S. reliance on unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more colloquially known as “drones,” has been controversial in the United States and around the world. Although drones have many peaceful applications, most policy attention is focused on the proliferation and use of armed drones, particularly away from traditional battlefields.

In February 2015, the United States announced a new export policy for U.S.-origin military and commercial drones. The new policy assesses each potential transfer on a case-by-case basis, includes the potential for enhanced end-use monitoring, and could require all sales through the Foreign Military Sales program. Commercial U.S.-origin drones are to be reviewed under the Export Administration Regulations. In addition, drone transfers will require recipients to agree to “Principles for Proper Use” before the export is authorized. These four principles require compliance with international legal precedents focused on human rights, international humanitarian law, privacy and use of force regulations. Implementation of these principles will be crucial and enforcement key to ensuring the technology is used with transparency and accountability.

Eighty-five countries are estimated to have armed and unarmed drones in their military arsenals and for commercial purposes. The United States has already sold sophisticated drones to close allies such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, France, and South Korea. Experts and market forecasters estimate that the market for drones will double in the next decade and other governments are eager to enter the drones market. As the use of drones in commercial and military realms increases, governments and other relevant entities will need to develop international norms and policies governing drone use and transfers to address proliferation challenges and appropriate standards of use.

Rachel Stohl is a Senior Associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center.

2 Comments

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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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