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Manipur's 'Pumpi Guns:' Why Should We Care About Them?

12/11/2024

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
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Henrique Garbino
Introduction

The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state of India, began in mid-2023 as ethnic violence erupted between the majority Meitei community, based in the Imphal Valley, and the tribal Kuki-Zo community from the surrounding hill districts. The unrest, rooted in disputes over land rights and affirmative action measures, has led to significant destruction, including over 225 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people, and the burning of thousands of homes and religious structures. Deep-seated historical grievances and recent tensions over migration and Scheduled Tribe status have intensified the violence, turning the state into a complex humanitarian crisis.

In Manipur, non-industrial weapons present yet another set of challenges to policymakers and law enforcement given their unique characteristics, the environments in which they are produced, and their users' motivations. Non-state actors with limited resources worldwide resort to them over commercial counterparts primarily for their accessibility, affordability, and anonymity. They are made from easy-to-source materials, are significantly cheaper to acquire, and lack serial numbers or standardized markings allowing them to operate under the radar. In addition to the physical characteristics, they are perceived to symbolize resourcefulness and resilience, especially in asymmetric conflicts or resistance movements.

‘Pumpi guns’ are a lesser-known, contemporary example of this phenomenon. While usually reported and clustered under ‘long-range mortars’ by Manipur law enforcement, ‘Pumpi gun’ is an umbrella term used to refer to a variety of improvised light weapons, including light cannons, light and medium mortars, and shoulder-fired grenade launchers, owing to their inherently non-standard nature. A recurring find among the weapons and other contraband seized by security forces from the ongoing violence in the state, their widespread use and novel ways of fabrication underscores a much deeper issue that needs a multilayered policy intervention.

What are Pumpi guns?

Pumpi guns are improvised weapons locally made in the Indian state of Manipur. They originated from the resistance movements of 1917-18, when they were crafted with indigenous, easy-to-source materials to fight British colonial rule. According to media reports, Pumpi guns are largely fabricated from parts of uprooted electric poles, water pipes, and galvanized iron pipes. Their production and sourcing knowledge has been passed down through generations, especially among the Kuki tribal groups. In their most rudimentary form, they are manufactured by repurposing a metal pipe or tube with a variety of make-shift stabilizing mechanisms including bi-pods, baseplates, and buttstocks to guide the projectile, which may or may not be fin-stabilized. They are chambered for both medium (20-57mm) and large-caliber ammunition (greater than 57mm) and may be either direct or indirect fire weapons.

Based on their identifiable physical characteristics, they can be classified into four major types: (i) improvised mortars; (ii) improvised cannons; (iii) improvised shoulder-fire grenade launchers; (iv) and one with multiple barrels.
PictureSource: Manipur Police, 2024. (click image for original)

Further, there seem to be striking similarities between the weapons used by the People’s Defence Force in Myanmar and Manipur’s pumpi guns. A recent video unveiled the DIY factories that are arming the anti-junta fighters and provides insights into the sourcing and manufacturing processes of improvised weapons across the Indo-Myanmar border. Given the historical and civilizational ties, and geographical proximity between Manipur and Myanmar, the transfer of knowledge and materials needed to manufacture these weapons between non-state actors is likely. Further, recent reports of 3D-printed guns found in Manipur have allegedly been trafficked from Myanmar, lending support to the existence of cross-border exchanges.

Perceived tools of resistance: One year since the Manipur Conflict

At the collective level, improvised weapons often symbolize resilience and defiance against an oppressive system. From landmines in Colombia to combat drones in Ukraine, self-narratives around improvised weapons reflect a determination to resist when denied formal means and demonstrate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of a group in duress. At the individual level, beyond self-defense and survival, owning a weapon is often linked to status in the community; reflecting gender norms and cultural traditions. In the context of armed conflicts such as in Manipur, traditional weaponry has been adapted and modernized, to now been self-seen as serving as effective tools of resistance. Armed groups rely on existing values and traditions, as well as social and economic interdependence, to manage the knowledge of weapons production and networks for their distribution.

The residents of the hill districts of Manipur are known for their prowess in improvising weapons and guerilla warfare techniques. As such, pumpi guns are an archetype of societal and community pride. Perceived as a form of resistance and self-defense, they symbolize the community’s craftsmanship and proficiency, as illustrated in social media accounts of pumpi guns’ effectiveness. They are regarded as important installments in community checkpoints and underground bunkers guarded by village youth, who allegedly undergo mandatory weapon training as part of community service. 

According to local law enforcement officials, pumpi guns are manufactured by village blacksmiths, or ‘Thih-Kheng Pa,’ as part of their community service. They are installed in trenches and bunkers built to monitor movement from long distances and are employed to create a virtual ‘geographical divide’ between the valley and hill districts of the state. As problematic as they may be to those concerned about violence, they have proved to be a strategic addition for the groups stationed at the inter-district boundaries, or the ‘buffer zone,’ to extend their area of influence, inflict serious injury to approaching security personnel, and keep infiltrators from opposing sides at bay. Pumpi guns are also used for offensive purposes to carry out raids and ambushes to gain access to strategic territories. 

Potential misfires and explosions from employing repurposed metal tubes cannot be overruled but is deemed a necessary risk its users are willing to take. There are a few media reports on injuries from shelling clubbed under “gun and mortar attacks,” which could be attributed to pumpi guns. Still, no instances of accidents with unexploded pumpi gun munitions could be found. However, the range of mortar bombs, both improvised and factory-made, recovered by Manipur Police suggests their omnipresence in the conflict.

Addressing the Challenges
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With renewed violence in the already devastating conflict in Manipur, pumpi guns have seemed to evolve in accuracy and reliability. Modifications done in recent years make use of novel technologies and adapt to the growing needs of the warring parties. Recent reports from state security forces reveal their seemingly improved parts and components. 

In addition to the improvised weapons, the warring groups’ arsenals also feature sophisticated industrial weapons. These include INSAS, AK-type, and M-16 assault rifles, as well as No. 36 hand grenades, which have been previously looted from the government stockpiles and armories. On multiple occasions, the state police and central reserve forces have reported incidents of an estimated 5,600 arms and over 650,000 rounds of ammunition being raided by non-state actors, though it is hard to verify these figures. Pumpi guns appear to be filling in a gap in the technical capabilities of groups who may not have access to industrial alternatives.

To address the proliferation of pumpi guns and their role in the ongoing conflict in Manipur, policymakers should focus on a multi-pronged strategy that balances enforcement with socio-economic development and peacebuilding efforts. Legal reforms must prioritize stricter arms control legislation and impose severe penalties for violations. Simultaneously, enhancing the management and security of government stockpiles and armories is crucial to prevent looting by non-state actors. Advanced surveillance technologies and intelligence sharing should be leveraged to monitor the supply chain of precursor materials and dismantle illicit workshops. Combating corruption within the armed forces, police, and industries involved in the supply of critical materials remains a core challenge that must be addressed through independent oversight mechanisms. Importantly, regional cooperation with Myanmar is necessary to curb the cross-border trafficking of both weapons and precursors, as well as the transfer of knowledge among non-state actors.

Economic development initiatives should provide alternative livelihoods for those involved in illicit weapons production, especially blacksmiths and community members engaged in pumpi gun manufacturing. This could involve vocational training, financial support for sustainable enterprises, and the integration of traditional craftsmanship into legal economic activities. However, such measures alone may prove insufficient, as pumpi gun production is deeply rooted in community pride and linked to genuine grievances. Community engagement must play a central role in addressing these issues by building trust between law enforcement and local populations to encourage cooperation. Integrating rebel groups into state structures, such as law enforcement or other community-oriented roles, could also be explored as part of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework. A peacebuilding perspective is essential to resolve the underlying tensions driving conflict, ensuring that solutions are holistic and inclusive rather than solely punitive.


Monalisa Hazarika is a consultant at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University and a 2024-25 Emerging Expert.

Henrique Garbino is a doctoral candidate at the Swedish Defence University and an expert listed by the Forum.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list or emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).


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Event Guide and Resources - Accountability for Gun Violence: What’s Next In Mexico’s Case Against U.S. Gun Manufacturers? (February 29, 2024)

3/5/2024

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On February 29, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asser Institute for International and European Law co-organized an event focused on lawsuits filed by Mexico against U.S. gun manufacturers and distributors that have important implications not only for armed violence in the United States and Mexico, but also for European and other manufacturers who produce weapons in the U.S.
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​Video of the event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDluRxQxXFA&t=351s
A guide to the recording, and suggested resources are below:

6:12 Welcome and event framing - León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Senior Researcher, Asser Institute for International and European Law, The Hague
  • “Appeals Court Revives Mexico’s Lawsuit Against Gunmakers,” New York Times, January 22, 2024. See also Transnational Litigation Blog, January 24, 2024, and Just Security, April 4, 2023.
  • "El Blindaje de las Armerías Europeas," El País, July 31, 2023. In English: "The armor of the European arms industry." 

11:35 Importance for Mexico – Fadia Ibrahim, Director of International Litigation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico 
  • Why Mexico is taking legal action… High profile events in El Paso and in Mexico, and daily gun violence. Cases in Massachusetts and Arizona. Also Inter American Commission on Human Rights (request, update).
  • Why suing in the United States, and actions of gun industry. 

23:57 Impact of U.S. Gun Policy on Mexico - Carlos Pérez Ricart, Professor of International Relations, Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE, Mexico)  
  • The relaxation of restraint on guns in the United States, particularly via termination of assault weapons ban in 2004 and enaction of Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) in 2005, had a disastrous effect in Mexico.
  • Lawsuit needs to be part of a broader strategy in Mexico (see next intervention).

31:24 Transition to discussion about recent decisions and implications on future legal action

34:00 Understanding the cases, their status, and next steps - Jonathan Lowy, Founder and President, Global Action on Gun Violence and co-counsel for Mexico on cases discussed in event  
  • Global Action on Gun Violence Work in Mexico - documents and other resources, including amicus briefs, on the two cases
  • Fundamental claim is negligence by manufacturers and distributors, and explanation why special protection under PLCAA should not apply here (under predicate exception). Defendants seeking review by Supreme Court, but believes Supreme Court will not choose to take it up. Some additional issues to take up at district court, after which discovery could take place.

43:28 Possibilities in International and U.S. Law - Leila Nadya Sadat, James Carr Professor of International Criminal Law, Washington University and Fellow, Schell Center for Human Rights, Yale Law School
  • Initially took steps at the Inter American Commission on Human Rights. 
  • Recognizes that connection between migration and flow of weapons is not made often enough. 
  • Cases are strong on facts and the harm. Latest decision is conservative and may not draw attention of Supreme Court.   
  • Supreme Court and other actions on guns, including Rahimi case and others. 

54:30 International Implications including in Europe, León Castellanos-Jankiewicz
  • European companies manufacturing on U.S. soil to skirt European laws, for example.

Reaction Round

56:35 Fadia Ibrahim
  • Importance the Mexico case proves exception to perceived PLCAA immunity and expects positive outcome.

57:47 Carlos Pérez Ricart
  • Mexico needs data, to build a central firearms authority (such as ATF in the U.S.), focus on most vulnerable groups (particularly those already harmed), make a central topic in relationship with U.S. including calling for background checks in neighbor states and border infrastructure, and create binational effort to deal with technology advances (3D printers, etc). 
  • Violence in Mexico is beyond the United States but within control of the United States. Mexico itself must have a better policies too.

1:03:00 Jonathan Lowy
  • Crisis on both sides of the border, would not happen without this gun pipeline. 

1:04:32 Leila Nadya Sadat
  • Has been a huge shift in political dialogue… no longer solely about Second Amendment but rather that is about the guns (as a vector).

1:07:03 Beginning of Q&A 

1:07:33 What is your take on the attempt of some US politicians to consider drug traffickers as terrorists? What are the impacts of this attempt on the lawsuits? 
  • 1:08:24 Carlos Pérez Ricart replies that always hear this around time of election, and it’s a political issue, and less about a real response. Not believe will impact the cases.
  • 1:09:44 Fadia Ibrahim asks would that mean that the gun industry is helping terrorist groups? 

1:10:32 Is the case a game changer? What makes the Mexico case different? 
  • 1:10:51 Jonathan Lowy replies is important because federal appeals court is upholding claims against gun manufacturers as not protected under PLCAA. Also new that a country is bringing suit. Scope of the problem is massive and if addressed would have huge impact.
1:13:17 Do you see this case having broader legal implications for weapons/arms companies exporting to countries/regimes violating international humanitarian law or engage in systematic human rights abuses?
  • 1:14:04 Leila Nadya Sadat says the Mexico case is beautifully simplistic and difficult to replicate in U.S. courts. But, international courts do communicate with each other. Notices Netherlands case on F-35, and there are international treaties involved that would be good to get the U.S. to join (such as the Arms Trade Treaty). [Note: see January event as well]

1:16:00 Possibility of other countries filing lawsuit
  • 1:16:12 Jonathan Lowy replies that if Mexico cases continues to succeed it could greatly reduce the flow of weapons in the region without other countries bringing suit because it could change practices and accountability of gun industry.

This event was co-organized by the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asser Institute for International and European Law. The Forum and the Institute provide a platform for expert views but do not themselves take positions.

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3D Printed Firearms: Prospects for International Action in 2024

1/9/2024

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
Additive manufacturing (AM), colloquially known as 3D printing, has dramatically expanded in recent years to accommodate the manufacturing and accessibility requirements of producers -- authorized and illicit alike. The speed, accuracy, and relative ease with which private actors can build parts and components of a functioning firearm have profoundly influenced the way gun ownership is regulated and have opened a Pandora’s box of forthcoming challenges. The anonymity associated with both the acquisition and use of such weapons, despite their initial set-up cost, is what makes them the weapon of choice for many individuals, especially in countries where national laws restrict the legal acquisition of firearms. Additionally, the modularity of weapon design with exchangeable components has fanned the flames for national and international law enforcement agencies by increasing the risk of misidentification as a result of multiple serial numbers appearing on different parts of the weapon. Today, there are an array of  fully 3D printed, hybrid and PKC (parts kit conversion) firearm designs made of polymer and metal components available on the internet. While not as easy as ‘Ctrl + P’, the current advent of technological innovation has blurred the barriers for acquiring a firearm, which is only bound to expand with decreasing production costs and rising quality, making them a promising alternative to a purchase on the black market.
 
A lot has changed since the single shot .380 ACP ‘Liberator’ by Defence Distributed made headlines back in 2013. The blueprints, or computed aided designs (CAD), are no longer limited to the households and workspaces of hobbyists and enthusiasts. This was established by EUROPOL, which recently helped dismantle 10 illegal firearms workshops in Canada, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom in December 2023. With recorded cases of their use in an attempted murder in Reykjavik, mass shootings in Halle synagogue, and arrests for their illicit manufacture in Indiana (in relation to ISIS) and Winnipeg, these weapons have also found their way in a major armed conflict, by the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) in Myanmar.
 
International instruments and the current state of play
 
3D-printed firearms and their components are within the scope of existing international instruments regulating the transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW), namely the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), the Firearms Protocol, and the Arms Trade Treaty, under which the method of production is irrelevant. Perhaps most important is the UN PoA adopted by all UN member states in 2001. It assembles every six years for a review conference and every two years for a biennial meeting of states to report on their progress in implementing the commitments and deliberate on novel and pressing issues regarding the illicit trade of SALW.
 
Previously in 2015, at the Second Meeting of Government Experts (MGE2), the overarching theme of discussion was the growing threat of fabrication and sharing of schematics for undetectable firearms. While some states considered it exaggerated given their operational limits constraining major dangers in the years ahead, others appraised it to be an imminent threat.
 
At the 3rd Review Conference (RevCon3), which took place in 2018, states noted the recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design and welcomed initiatives that raise awareness of possible associated risks, notably the difficulties encountered in marking and tracing these “ghost” guns. They agreed to streamline relevant national laws, regulations, and administrative procedures and strengthen cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement agencies to prohibit their illicit trade across online platforms and the dark web. Pushback was seen in the inclusion of “3D printing, polymer, and modular weapons” in the draft outcome document, with states expressing concerns over their explicit mention inhibiting their access to technology and how the situation was not as dire as being portrayed. While a  technical annex to the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) was proposed during RevCon3, it was ultimately dropped. Suggestions of using less aggressive and generic language and removing the paragraphs altogether suggest a lack of agreement on the severity of the issue, let alone a consensus to adopt measures for the changing security landscape. Despite the back and forth on the language used, from “distributed manufacturing” to “additive manufacturing," the outcome document had no reference to 3D printing and backtracked on the limited progress made by states who had pushed for more.
 
During the seventh and eighth Biennial Meeting of States (in 2021 and 2022, respectively), the topic of new and emerging technology, remained a contested locus among states for being “overly specific” on the implications of 3D printing for arms production. More recently, at the 78th UN General Assembly meeting in 2023, states discussed the sobering impact of conventional weapons, including the proliferation trends associated with 3D printing without engaging in a deeper dive into the affair.
 
Projections for 2024
 
The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has since 2022 launched a multiyear project for advancing global policies and commitments in the context of RevCon4 of the UN PoA, undertaking “New technologies and innovation – challenges and opportunities for the UN PoA and ITI'' as one of its 3-pillar approaches. A noteworthy agenda item from the BMS8 Outcome Document for the upcoming conference scheduled for June 2024 is to reflect on the UN Secretariat proposal for the establishment of an open-ended technical expert group to assess recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design of modular and polymer weapons and 3D printing.
 
RevCon4 presents an opportunity to assess the current state of play in the use and misuse of technology and, alternatively, how new monitoring technologies could be used to effectively track and control SALW throughout their entire life cycle. Substantial progress is anticipated under the leadership of President-designate of RevCon4, Amb. Maritza Chan, on ways of addressing the impact of new technologies, among other topics, with a series of expert-level roundtable discussions and regional preparatory meetings taking place over the next three months.
 
Some experts are of the opinion that the UN PoA and its ITI are too weak and inflexible to address the problem of illicit trade and manufacture of firearms posed by additive manufacturing due to their “vague or unelaborated” commitments and agreements, which are politically and not legally binding. However, doing away with the existing frameworks will not garner any strategic advantage unless replaced by a more effective mechanism, which is easier said than done. Getting states to agree on a legally binding text is an arduous task requiring years of negotiation and diplomatic deliberations, which at the end may result in a loss of critical momentum and a watered-down version. Instead, employing the same resources to revive trust in the efficacy of the existing frameworks, such as the PoA, by strengthening their ability to fulfill the aims that are reflected in the purpose and object of their text, could potentially yield more robust results.
 
Even though the issues surrounding additive manufacturing may appear incidental, their growing usage across fields merits greater consideration than the lowest common denominator and should be on the radar of security analysts. By bolstering existing norms and regulations and keeping them relevant to emerging threats, progress can be ensured on issues that have already been identified and anticipated in this sphere.
 
 
 
Monalisa Hazarika is an Intern at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and holds a M.A. in Conflict Management and Development from Banaras Hindu University, India. She is one of the #Leaders4Tomorrow & Leaders2theFuture under the UNODA’s Youth4Disarmament initiative.
 
​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Free Carrying of Firearms: A Dangerous New Trend in the Argentine Presidential Campaign

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión original en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.

For the first time in Argentine history, the free carrying of firearms has become a topic of debate in a presidential election campaign. Why is this happening in one of the countries with the lowest homicide rates in Latin America and internationally recognized for its disarmament program? Does the citizenry desire firearms or security?
 
Insecurity has been one of the most concerning issues for Argentine society for over 20 years. During that same period, public policies regarding the control of firearms and disarmament have experienced unprecedented development in our country. The understanding that firearms are not a source of security but rather a factor that jeopardizes it has, for the first time, become a central topic of discussion on the electoral agenda.
 
"I am definitely in favor of the free carrying of firearms," said former deputy Javier Milei in 2022, who is now a presidential candidate and emerged as the most voted for candidate in the primary elections. However, this eccentric outsider, a follower of Trump and Bolsonaro, is not the only member of his party who publicly expressed such views. His vice-presidential candidate admitted to being a firearm user and stated that ownership is a "right" for "law-abiding citizens who want to defend themselves." While the controversy surrounding these statements led these candidates to downplay their remarks, the electoral platform presented by the candidate at the beginning of his presidential campaign proposed, regarding firearm ownership, the "deregulation of the legal market and the protection of its legitimate and responsible use by citizens."
 
"Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed."

Milei is not the first Argentine politician to raise this debate. Five years ago, the then Minister of Security and current presidential candidate for the other major opposition front, Patricia Bullrich, had said in an informal interview outside a restaurant, "Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed; whoever doesn't want to be armed, shouldn't be armed. Argentina is a free country." While her complete statement added that she and her party preferred that people not be armed, controversy quickly erupted. For the first time, the absolute political consensus regarding the need to restrict access to firearms was called into question.
 
Beyond their ambivalences, two of the three main presidential candidates in Argentina have expressed support for free carrying. Can it be inferred that Argentine society has changed its view on firearms? The answer is not so simple. However, there are signs that the public's demand for security does not translate into support for free carrying.
 
Argentina is not a heavily armed country. Its rate of 7.4 firearms per 100,000 civilians is, according to the Small Arms Survey, lower than most countries in the region. A recent nationwide survey conducted in May 2023 reflected that 77% of respondents were against "the free carrying of firearms." The society's participation in the disarmament program allowed for the removal of over 200,000 firearms from circulation between 2007 and 2022. Due to the results achieved in its early years, this program was internationally recognized as a model policy in 2013.
 
The laws on firearm restriction passed in the National Congress in recent years also reflect this consensus, with virtually unanimous votes in favor of firearm control and disarmament. However, the last extension of the disarmament program, voted on in 2021, already sounded an alarm: while 93% of deputies voted in favor, votes against the renewal of the program were recorded for the first time, even though it had been extended seven times before.
 
An initial conclusion from this data, pending the final results of the presidential elections, is that Argentine society remains predominantly opposed to firearms. However, it can also be inferred that, like in other countries, the threshold of rejection of pro-arms rhetoric may have decreased, even if only relatively, in recent years. It is true that voting for a presidential candidate does not necessarily mean support for all of their proposals, but it probably does indicate a tolerance for most of them.
 
If this hypothesis is correct, it is necessary to pay attention to this symptom. While Argentina has a well-established social, institutional, and cultural tradition of restricting the circulation of firearms, recent experiences in other Latin American countries demonstrate how easily such controls can be undermined.
 
What's Happening with Firearms in Argentina?

Argentina currently has around 1,000,000 legally registered firearm users, although most of them are in a situation of illegality due to expired authorizations. Additionally, it is estimated that, including unregistered firearms, the total number of firearms could be three to four times the 1,700,000 recorded in official records.
 
Between 2011 and 2019, an average of 8 people per day died in Argentina as a result of firearm use. One out of every two intentional homicides in Argentina is committed with a firearm. In 2021, 76% of intentional homicides in Argentina were recorded without the involvement of other crimes.
 
Firearms are also used for gender-based violence. In general, women and gender-diverse individuals do not possess firearms (as 97% of registered users are males), but they disproportionately suffer the consequences: 1 out of every 4 femicides is committed with a firearm.
 
Since 2015, Argentina has a model law at the regional level that created and regulates the National Agency for Controlled Materials, responsible not only for the registration and control of the legal firearms market but also for "developing policies aimed at reducing the circulation of firearms in civil society and preventing the effects of armed violence" (Law 27,192). Among other functions, this agency is responsible for implementing the mentioned National Voluntary Firearm Surrender Plan. The creation of the agency was a significant advancement in this regard, although the law is still not fully implemented, as the agency lacks sufficient budgetary resources to carry out all the actions it is responsible for.
 
The Risks of Free Carrying

Various studies confirm that an increased presence of firearms in society, far from reducing crime (as stated by Milei himself), contributes to an increase in violence, crime, and deaths. Conversely, control policies are associated with a reduction in these problems. The case of the United States, the country with the highest civilian firearm ownership in the world (120 firearms per 100 people), is illustrative. Its homicide rate was 7.5 times higher than the rate in other high-income countries, which is often attributed to its firearm homicide rate, which is nearly 25 times higher. From mass shootings, some of them in schools, to a higher number of suicides and femicides, the effects of the free circulation of firearms have been widely verified in other countries.
 
Insecurity is undoubtedly a central problem for Argentine society. Even though its homicide rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries, the LAPOP survey reflects that it is one of the three countries in the region with the highest number of respondents reporting being victims of crime in 2021. Crime has been a top concern for Argentine citizens for years.
 
However, there is no serious indication that the demand for more security implies a desire among the citizenry to carry firearms. Discussions about the role of the state, primarily focused on economic policy, cannot be linearly transferred to security policies. Even those sectors with a more reductionist view of the size of the state have historically been in favor of recognizing the state's role in monopolizing the use of force.
 
Therefore, whoever assumes office in December will have a dual responsibility. On one hand, they must develop effective security policies to reduce crime rates and the perception of insecurity. On the other hand, they must ensure the validity and extension of firearm restriction policies in the face of voices seeking to downplay the significant risks of loosening firearm regulations.
 
Society is not asking for firearms; it is asking for security. And the data demonstrates that more firearms equate to less security.
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Julián Alfie is Deputy Executive Director of the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP), based in Argentina.

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Libre portación de armas: una peligrosa novedad en la campaña presidencial de Argentina

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Voces de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes (see English translation)
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Esta publicación forma parte de una serie especial de contribuciones al blog "Mirando hacia el Futuro" realizadas por miembros de los programas de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro.

Por primera vez en la historia argentina, la libre portación de armas de fuego ha sido tema de debate en una campaña electoral presidencial. ¿Por qué sucede esto en uno de los países con menor tasa de homicidios de América Latina y premiado internacionalmente por su programa de desarme? ¿La ciudadanía quiere armas o seguridad?

La inseguridad es, desde hace más de 20 años, uno de los temas que más preocupa a la sociedad argentina. En ese mismo lapso, las políticas públicas de control de armas de fuego y desarme tuvieron un inédito desarrollo en nuestro país. La comprensión de que las armas no son una fuente de seguridad, sino un factor que la pone en riesgo aparece, por primera vez, como un eje de discusión en la agenda electoral.

“Estoy a favor de la libre portación de armas, definitivamente”, dijo en 2022 el entonces diputado Javier Milei, hoy candidato presidencial, que resultó el más votado en las elecciones primarias. Pero este excéntrico outsider, seguidor de Trump y Bolsonaro, no es el único integrante de su partido que se expresó públicamente en ese sentido. Su candidata a vicepresidenta admitió ser usuaria de armas y opinó que la tenencia es un “derecho” para “el ciudadano de bien que se quiera defender”. Si bien la polémica que desataron esas declaraciones llevaron a esos candidatos a relativizar sus dichos, lo cierto es que la plataforma electoral presentada por el candidato al comienzo de su campaña presidencial planteaba, sobre la tenencia de armas de fuego, la “desregulación del mercado legal y proteger su uso legítimo y responsable por parte de la ciudadanía”.
 
“El que quiera andar armado, que ande armado”

Milei no es el primer político argentino en plantear este debate. 5 años atrás, la entonces Ministra de Seguridad y actual candidata a presidenta por el otro gran frente opositor –Patricia Bullrich-  había dicho, en una entrevista informal a la salida de un restaurante, que “el que quiera estar armado, que ande armado; el que no quiera estar armado, que no ande armado. La Argentina es un país libre”. Si bien su frase completa añadía que ella y su espacio preferían que la gente no estuviera armada, la polémica no tardó en estallar. Por primera vez se ponía en duda el absoluto consenso político respecto a la necesidad de restringir el acceso a las armas de fuego.

Más allá de sus ambivalencias, dos de los tres principales candidatos a ocupar la Presidencia de Argentina tuvieron expresiones favorables a la libre portación. ¿Puede inferirse que la sociedad argentina cambió su mirada sobre las armas? La respuesta no es tan sencilla. Sin embargo, existen señales de que el reclamo de la ciudadanía por seguridad no se traduce en un apoyo a la libre portación.

Argentina no es un país armado. Su tasa de 7.4 armas de fuego en manos de civiles cada 100 habitantes se encuentra, según Small Arms Survey, por debajo de la mayoría de los países de la región. Una reciente encuesta realizada en mayo de 2023 a nivel nacional reflejó que el 77% de las personas encuestadas se mostró en contra de “la libre portación de armas de fuego”. La participación de la sociedad en el plan de desarme permitió quitar de circulación más de 200.000 armas de fuego entre 2007 y 2022. Por los resultados alcanzados durante sus primeros años, en 2013 ese programa fue premiado a nivel internacional como una política modelo.

Las leyes sobre restricción de armas de fuego aprobadas en el Congreso de la Nación en los últimos años también reflejan ese consenso, con votaciones afirmativas al control de armas y el desarme prácticamente unánimes. Sin embargo, la última prórroga del plan de desarme, votada en 2021, ya había dado una señal de alerta: si bien el 93% de los diputados votó a favor, por primera vez se registraron votos en contra de la renovación de ese programa, que ya había sido prorrogado en 7 oportunidades anteriormente.

Una conclusión inicial de estos datos, a la espera del resultado definitivo de las elecciones presidenciales, es que la sociedad argentina sigue siendo mayoritariamente contraria a las armas de fuego. Pero también es posible inferir que, al igual que en otros países, el umbral de rechazo a los discursos armamentistas puede haber disminuido, aunque sea relativamente, en los últimos años. Es cierto que el voto a un candidato a presidente no significa un apoyo a todas sus propuestas; pero probablemente sí indique, aunque sea, una tolerancia a la mayoría de ellas.

Si la hipótesis es cierta, es necesario prestarle atención a este síntoma. Si bien Argentina cuenta con una tradición social, institucional y cultural consolidadamente restrictiva de la circulación de las armas de fuego, recientes experiencias en otros países latinoamericanos demuestran la facilidad con la que esos controles pueden socavarse.
 
¿Qué pasa con las armas en Argentina?

Argentina actualmente tiene alrededor de 1.000.000 de usuarios de armas de fuego legalmente registrados, aunque la mayoría de ellos se encuentra en una situación de ilegalidad por tener su autorización vencida. Además, se estima que, incluyendo las armas de fuego no registradas, el número total de armas podría triplicar o cuadruplicar a las 1.7000.000 que constan en los registros oficiales.

Entre 2011 y 2019, en Argentina murieron en promedio 8 personas por día por la utilización de armas de fuego. Uno de cada dos homicidios dolosos en Argentina es producido con un arma de fuego. El 76% de los homicidios dolosos producidos en Argentina en 2021 se registraron sin concurrencia de otros delitos.

Las armas de fuego también son utilizadas para el ejercicio de violencias por motivos de género. En general, las mujeres y disidencias sexogenéricas no poseen armas de fuego (ya que el 97% de los usuarios registrados son varones), pero sí sufren desproporcionadamente sus consecuencias: 1 de cada 4 femicidios es cometido con armas de fuego.

Desde 2015, Argentina cuenta con una Ley modelo a nivel regional, que creó y regula la Agencia Nacional de Materiales Controlados, que tiene a su cargo no sólo el registro y control del mercado legal de armas, sino también “el desarrollo de políticas tendientes a reducir el circulante de armas en la sociedad civil y prevenir los efectos de la violencia armada” (Ley 27.192). Entre otras funciones, esa Agencia tiene a su cargo la implementación del mencionado Plan Nacional de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego. La creación de la Agencia fue un enorme avance en la materia, aunque lo cierto es que la ley sigue sin implementarse en su totalidad, ya que el organismo sigue sin contar con los recursos presupuestarios suficientes para implementar todas las acciones que tiene a su cargo.
 
Los riesgos de la libre portación

Diversos estudios confirman que la mayor presencia de armas de fuego en una sociedad, lejos de disminuir el delito (como afirmó el propio Milei), contribuyen al aumento de la violencia, el delito y las muertes. Y, a la inversa, las políticas de control se relacionan con una reducción de esos problemas. El caso de EEUU, el país con más armas de fuego en manos de civiles del mundo (120 armas por cada 100 personas), es paradigmático. Su tasa de homicidios fue 7.5 veces mayor a la tasa de otros países de altos ingresos, lo cual suele atribuirse a su tasa de homicidios con armas de fuego, que es casi 25 veces mayor. Desde matanzas masivas, algunas de ellas en escuelas, hasta un mayor número de suicidios y femicidios, los efectos de la libre circulación de armas de fuego han sido ampliamente verificados en otros países.

​La inseguridad es, sin lugar a duda, un problema central para la sociedad argentina. Aun cuando su tasa de homicidios sea relativamente baja en relación a otros países de América Latina, la encuesta realizada por LAPOP refleja que es uno de los tres países de la región con mayor cantidad de encuestados que reportan haber sido víctimas de la delincuencia en 2021. La delincuencia se ubica dese hace años en el podio de preocupaciones de la ciudadanía argentina. 

Sin embargo, no existen indicios serios de que el reclamo por más seguridad signifique que la ciudadanía quiera portar armas. Las discusiones sobre cuál debe ser el rol del Estado, principalmente centradas en la política económica, no pueden trasladarse linealmente a las políticas de seguridad. Incluso aquellos sectores con una visión más reduccionista del tamaño estatal han sido históricamente favorables a reconocerle el rol de monopolizar el uso de la fuerza.

Por lo tanto, quien asuma el gobierno en diciembre tendrá una doble responsabilidad. Por un lado, desarrollar políticas de seguridad eficaces, que permitan reducir los índices de criminalidad y la percepción de inseguridad. Y, por el otro, garantizar la vigencia y la extensión de las políticas de restricción de las armas de fuego, ante la aparición de voces que buscan relativizar los enormes riesgos de liberar las armas.
​
La sociedad no pide armas, pide seguridad. Y los datos demuestran que más armas implica menos seguridad.
​
Julián Alfie es Subdirector Ejecutivo del Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (INECIP).

La inclusión en el programa de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro sobre el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estas publicaciones no indican acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas representan las vistas de los autor(es) de cada publicación.
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Understanding Firearms Trafficking to Mexico and Central America - resources

4/6/2022

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On March 24, 2022, a number of experts shared resources in a closed meeting on firearms trafficking to Mexico and Central America, building in part off of recent publications by the Government Accountability Office, including Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis and Firearms Trafficking: More Information is Needed to Inform U.S. Efforts in Central America. The information presented brought to the conversation additional data as well as recommendations for possible U.S. Congressional action.
​
The slides of those briefings are below and named experts can be contacted directly.
  • John Lindsay-Poland-  Us Firearms Exports to Mexico & Central America
  • Susan Waltz- Firearms Trafficking to Central America: Inspecting the data for Guatemala and considerations for Congressional action
  • Eugenio Weigend Vargas-  Beyond our Borders: U.S. Guns Contribute to Violent Crime Abroad
 
Inclusion of these resources does not indicate endorsement or agreement with others. The Forum on the Arms Trade does not take positions, but does share resources by its listed experts and others, as part of its goal to provide resources for strengthening public efforts to address the humanitarian, economic and other implications of arms transfers, security assistance, and weapons use.
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Event Recap: Legal Approaches to Reduce Gun Violence -- Mexican and U.S. Strategies, August 18, 2021

8/30/2021

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Video of event available at https://youtu.be/cg3WshmbtfI?t=124

This recap should not be quoted directly and does not fully describe the nuances of comments made. Please listen to video for direct quotations. The Forum thanks Lauren Speiser for the notes and initial draft of this recap. Panelists are not responsible for the summaries provided here. This event was hosted by the Network to Prevent Gun Violence in the Americas, the Forum on the Arms Trade, the Giffords Law Center, and Global Exchange


Panelists
  • Ioan Grillo (website) - journalist and author, including of Blood Gun Money: How America Arms Gangs and Cartels -- recent Foreign Policy argument "Why Mexico Is Right to Sue U.S. Gun Companies," and NBC news interview
  • Steve Shadowen (website) - Founding Partner, Hilliard & Shadowen LLP -- legal complaint (link) 
  • Kristen Rand (website) - slides (pdf), Violence Policy resources on gun industry regulation (link)
  • John Lindsay Poland (website) - Coordinator, Project to Stop US Arms to Mexico --  proposed legal sale discussed (link), Stop US Arms to Mexico press release "Mexico vs. Gun Companies", 

Welcome and Opening Remarks: John Lindsay-Poland described Mexican gun violence as an “unprecedented and growing humanitarian crisis.” (link) He then spoke about the Mexican government’s unprecedented lawsuit (filed August 4th) against 11 US gun manufacturers and distributors, who allege that those companies are responsible for much of the violence occurring in Mexico. Lindsay-Poland briefly introduced the panelists and provided descriptions of their recent work.
 
Panel: Each panelist gave an overview of their unique expertise regarding the legalities and challenges in current U.S.-Mexico gun relations.
 
  • Ioan Grillo (link) spoke of gun violence in Mexico since the early 2000s as growing “from... crime story... to what seemed like an armed conflict.” Grillo explained that gun violence has a massive impact in Mexico, describing the intensity of the violence. Grillo used anecdotal evidence of how a now-imprisoned gun trafficker would drive to Dallas gun shows and buy 12 AR-15 rifles with no identification. Grillo urged for change, saying that buying guns is not a question of challenging 2nd Amendment rights. His suggested recommendations include universal background checks in the U.S., and regulations targeting ghost guns and straw buyers. Grillo finds the lawsuit to be a powerful move by the Mexican government.
 
  • Steve Shadowen (link) speaking on his own behalf, briefly began by indicating that there is little controversy with “respect to the facts.” The lawsuit alleges that the gun manufacturers’ policies are insufficient in preventing U.S. guns from entering Mexico in large numbers, thus materially contributing to the damage suffered in Mexico. On the legal theory, Shadowen explained the nuance of tort law, which is the law governing negligence and recovery of damage for negligence, which secures the balance between the economic interests of the gun manufacturers and those who are harmed with those products. Shadowen expressed that tort law as applicable in Mexican jurisdiction can be applied to U.S. gun manufacturers because they are knowingly selling products that cause harm to the people and economy of Mexico. Shadowen explains that, in international law, this is not a controversial principle. Shadowen briefly outlined the nuance of Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), explaining that the Mexican government intends to prove in this case that the PLCAA does not apply when the injury occurs outside the US.
 
  • Kristen Rand (link) presented on the marketing strategies of U.S. gun manufacturers, specifically addressing the militaristic imagery and language used in their advertisements. Rand used examples of advertisement from a variety of manufacturers and weapons to support her argument that manufacturers explicitly target Mexican and U.S. buyers looking to build what are in essence their own armies (slides). Rand noted the challenges of firearms and ammunition being the only consumer products that are exempt from federal health and safety regulations, and that PLCAA bars some types of civil liability.
 
  • Moderator Lindsay-Poland (link) spoke briefly about U.S. government-licensed legal exports to Mexico and the lack of transparency surrounding the final destination of U.S.-made guns, including those to be sold to the Mexican Navy under a new sale proposed in July (link), which has been accused of torturing detainees and committing other forms of inhumane treatment. 
 
Q&A:
 
  • Grillo (link) explained how the link to guns and violence in Mexico had fallen off the table for about a decade after Fast and Furious and that the lawsuit is a “solid strategy,” noting that in the lawsuit he sees two “big deals”:
    • First, he believes the judicial process has led in the past to big changes through law where politics has failed, drawing parallels to tobacco and pharma lawsuits.
    • Second, the lawsuit has put the issue in the news. Grillo believes there are concrete changes that can be made.
 
  • Shadowen (link) dove further into the legalities of the Mexican lawsuit, comparing it to actions in the late 1990s and early 2000s by local governments related to gun violence, as well as the opioid litigation in the U.S. today, with hopes that Mexico can prove a causal chain similar to those used in opioid lawsuits. His main point was, when one knowingly sends their products to another jurisdiction that causes harm in a systematic way, they are responsible. He also briefly discussed the capabilities, and in a broad way, what manufacturers could do to avoid the harm caused. The lawsuit alleges that it is a relatively small number of gun traffickers that are responsible for the majority of these guns sales to Mexico. It’s the absence of U.S. tort law being applied that has allowed this situation to develop.
 
  • Rand (link) noted that the strategy of marketing guns with militarized images is especially relevant to Mexico and the Caribbean, with U.S. manufacturers knowing what's going on and being culpable. Lindsay-Poland added that the weapons are used in essence to build armies as a way to contest territory, gaining legal and illegal control over economic activities.
 
  • Lindsay-Poland spoke (link) on legal exports, including why Sig Sauer may not be in the lawsuit, as well as possible needed legislative and policy changes. He highlighted the need for end-use controls, also recommending the return of all firearms export oversight from the Commerce Department’s Commerce Control List to the State Department’s U.S. Munitions List. 
 
  • Rand (link) suggests activists get involved with local and national groups, and recommends that the U.S. pass a universal background check. She also emphasizes the need for further regulations on ghost guns and pistol braces.
 
  • Grillo (link) suggests strengthening measures on private sellers, straw buyers, theft, and ghost guns. He says that they must all be confronted or as one is addressed another will become more prevalent. Grillo similarly recommends universal background checks, passing a federal firearm trafficking law, increasing recommended sentences, extended background checks, and further legislation. He also suggested joint actions by other Central and South American governments with Mexico would be interesting to explore.
 
  • Lindsay-Poland (link) noted that checks on legal firearms exports often occur after export, not before license, that a very small percentage are checked, and that those checked are not often held accountable for human rights abuses.  He further recommends identifying end users and committing to controls for excluding end users implicated in human rights abuses. He also said that key knowledge gaps include the circumstances around where and how firearms were distributed and recovered.
 
  • Shadowen (link) discussed possible paths of the suit and predicts it could last 3-4 years, or even longer.
 
Final comments:
 
  • Rand (link) spoke about her excitement about the new lawsuit, and the need for gun industry accountability.
 
  • Grillo (link) emphasized that gun violence is not normal -- it's not a natural force -- and that simply saying other countries might provide weapons if the U.S. didn't is not credible nor a reason for inaction. 
 
  • Shadowen (link) spoke about the effect of violence on families and his frustration about the acceptance of such unbelievable harm. “We will do everything we can within the confines of a lawsuit..." to create change.
​
  • Lindsay-Poland (link) commented how the lawsuit was important to helping everyone see that lives of Mexican individuals are as important as all lives, including those in the U.S. 

Additional resources:
  • The Daily (podcast) from the New York Times, "Why Mexico is Suing U.S. Gunmakers," August 24, 2021.
  • William S. Dodge and Ingrid Wuerth, "Mexico v. Smith & Wesson: Does US Immunity for Gun Manufacturers Apply Extraterritorially?" Just Security, August 19, 2021.
  • Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, legal advisor to Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington Post op-ed, August 14, 2021
  • Center for American Progress: "Frequently Asked Questions About Gun Industry Immunity"
  • Esther Sanchez-Gomez, litigation attorney at Giffords Law Center, "Mexico, drowning in American guns, is suing gun manufacturers," Daily Journal, August 11, 2021
  • Ghost guns
    • proposed rule change, public comment period now closed
    • new lawsuit filed in San Francisco, see San Francisco Chronicle, August 18, 2021
  • Research on exports to Mexico
    • "Invisible Weapons, Indelible Pain: The Urgent Necessity for Transparency in the U.S. and Mexican Gun Trade," Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, Stop US Arms to Mexico,Center for Ecumenical Studies., July 2021
    • "Deadly Trade: How European and Israeli Arms Exports are Accelerating Violence in Mexico," Global Exchange (US), Vredesactie (Belgium), OPAL (Italy), Agir pour la Paix (Belgium), American Friends Service Committee (Israel), Ohne Rüstung Leben (Germany), NESEHNUTÍ (Czech Republic), Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, and the Centro de Estudios Ecuménicos (Mexico),  see p. 25 for more on Sig Sauer, December 2020
    • "Fact Sheet on Sig Sauer Arms Exports to Mexico," Stop US Arms to Mexico, last updated 2018
  • U.S. export licensing of assault weapons - see Forum on the Arms Trade resource page on USML changes
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The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

12/19/2018

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Ray Acheson
2018, for some reason, was a turning point for international diplomatic recognition of gender dimensions of weapons and disarmament policy. After years or even decades—or in WILPF’s case, a century—of feminist advocacy for governments and activists to take gender into account in their work, we seem to breaking new ground.
 
In March, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva collaborated with WILPF, Small Arms Survey, and the Gender Mine Action Programme on a one-day training for disarmament diplomats about including gender perspectives in their work. In April, WILPF coordinated with the Canadian mission in New York on a meeting that brought together the women, peace and security (WPS) and disarmament diplomatic communities to exchange on the same subject.
 
In May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his new disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future. It includes a section on “Ensuring the equal, full, and effective participation of women,” and there are several references throughout the document to the gendered impacts of weapons, gender-sensitive arms control, or women’s participation in disarmament, including urging states to incorporate gender perspectives in their national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control.
 
In June, the Third Review Conference to the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) adopted a report with groundbreaking references to armed gender-based violence, the gendered impacts of small arms, and women’s participation in disarmament. The document builds on gains made in 2012 and 2016 to alleviate the overall gender blindness of the UNPoA. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network coordinated input and advocacy amongst civil society groups and diplomats for the inclusion of these elements in the outcome document, including through the civil society Call to Action on gender and small arms control.
 
In August, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) considered gender issues for the first time, in a side event hosted by the government of Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Mines Action Canada, Project Ploughshares, and WILPF on the relationship between gender and fully autonomous weapons. Participants addressed gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms in relation to the development and use of weapons, gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.
 
In October, the Canadian mission to the UN organized a push to increase gender references in resolutions at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Working with other governments and civil society groups, they managed to achieve language in 17 resolutions that advocates for women’s equal participation, recognizes gendered impacts of weapons, or urges consideration of gender perspectives more broadly. This accounts for 25 percent of all First Committee resolutions in 2018. Six of these resolutions included gendered language for the first time, while three improved the gendered language. For comparison, in 2017, 15 per cent of resolutions made gender references. This figure was 13 per cent in 2016 and 12 per cent in 2015. The number of First Committee delegations speaking about gender and disarmament in their statements also continued to increase this year. Namibia on behalf of 56 states dedicated a whole statement to this topic, urging examination of how “underlying assumptions about how gender shapes [delegations’] own work and the dynamics of joint disarmament efforts.”
 
Also in October, the Latvian ambassador, who will preside over the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, announced that the conference and its preparatory meetings will focus on the gender-based violence provision of the Treaty as a special theme. This will provide an opportunity in 2019 to advance consideration of how to implement this aspect of the ATT, including using guidance and case studies published by groups like WILPF previously.
 
In addition to these forum-based efforts, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research joined the governments of Ireland, Namibia, and Canada to form the Disarmament Impact Group as an output of the International Gender Champions. The Group aims to “support the disarmament community in translating gender awareness into practical action across the range of multilateral disarmament processes and activities.” Meanwhile, academic sources like Critical Studies on Security and the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, news sources like The Nation, and public speaking forums from TEDx to the London School of Economics featured articles and talks about feminism, gender, and weapons. This has signaled an opening of academic and activist spaces for increased consideration of these issues.
 
So, why has all this happened so quickly? In reality, it hasn’t. It is built on a firm foundation of activism and analysis. Feminist disarmament activists and academics, particularly those with groups like WILPF and the IANSA Women’s Network, have been writing and campaigning on gender and disarmament for decades. UN agencies and some governments have been working to mainstream gender in their programming for a long time, certainly since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This has led to concrete outcomes at international disarmament diplomacy forums in recent years: the first UN General Assembly resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in 2010; the inclusion of gender-based violence in the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013; the recognition of the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and encouragement of women’s effective participation in disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Chair’s summary and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.
 
External factors are also at play. The #MeToo movement has arguably awoken new acceptability and credibility of previously hidden or shamed perspectives and experiences. Women, trans, queer, non-binary, and non-conforming folks, as well as men who have experienced sexual and gender-based violence have collectively created new spaces to amplify these realities and demand change.
 
At the same time, several governments have begun pursuing what they term “Feminist Foreign Policy”. While it is debatable whether or not the foreign policies outlined by these governments can yet be truly described as feminist, it is a welcome development for government offices to be considering feminism not just a valid but an imperative approach to their international engagement.
 
In disarmament forums, momentum certainly seems to be on our side. There is a growing acceptance among a diverse range of governments, international organizations, and civil society groups about the reality that weapons have gendered impacts, and that women’s participation in disarmament is important. This is good progress, and imperative to making change in this field. But it’s not enough.
 
The work ahead
 
For one thing, the demand for women’s equal, effective, or meaningful participation—while necessary and welcome—is insufficient for truly making change in weapons policy. Our current situation is dire. Trillions of dollars are being spent on militaries and technologies of violence while poverty, inequality, and climate change threaten our collective security and safety. Disarmament, as a policy and practice that leads us away from militarism and towards peace, requires new understandings, perspectives, and approaches to weapons and war. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of survivors of gun violence, of nuclear weapons use and testing, of drone strikes, of bombardment of towns and cities. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of marginalized communities—LGBT+ folks, people of color, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, people with disabilities.
 
Diversity is not about political correctness. It is the only way we are ever going to see change in the way that we confront issues of peace and security. Where we have achieved the most disarmament progress in recent years—banning landmines and cluster bombs and nuclear weapons, for example—we have engaged with diverse communities and put humanitarian perspectives over the profits of arms industries or the interests of powerful governments. This is not just about including women, especially women who come from the same or similar backgrounds as the men who already rule the table. It’s about completely resetting the table; or even throwing out the table and setting up an entirely new way of working.
 
Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behavior of those who have the most privilege. Diversity is not for its own sake, but for how it impacts what is considered normal, acceptable, and credible. Confronting norms, especially gendered norms, around weapons and war is imperative to making progress on disarmament.
 
As a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. This association comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”.
 
This type of violent, militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not comply with that gender norm—women, queer-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. It also results in violence against men. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. A big part of this is about preserving or protecting their masculinity—a masculinity that makes male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless resolutions and reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.
 
We are all suffering from the equation of violence and power with masculinity. It prevents those who identified as men from being something else—from performing gender differently. It prevents all of us as human beings to promote or explore strength, courage, and protection from a nonviolent perspective. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd.
 
It also makes it impossible to achieve gender justice. It keeps men and women in binary boxes based on their biological sex. It maintains a strict hierarchy between these boxes, in which men are tough, rational, and violent, while women are weak, irrational, and passive. In this narrative, men are agents; women are victims. (And reinforces the idea that there is nothing outside of this binary.)
 
The norm of violent masculinity will continue to cause suffering and reinforce inequalities until we get serious about doing something differently. This is a project of dismantling the patriarchy, which is a big project, but it starts with the language we use, the people we include in discussions, and the norms we are willing to challenge.
 
For 2019, let’s stop using the term “women and children”. They are not the same legally or politically. They have different needs and abilities. Let’s talk about the different impacts of weapons based on gender and age, instead of womenandchildren on one side and men on the other. Let’s talk about gender diversity in disarmament, instead of just the equal participation of women and men. Let’s get away from binary language to something more inclusive. Let’s also include survivors and those impacted by weapons, war, and violence. Let’s think about what we consider credible or powerful, and why we think that way.
 
As more and more governments and organizations become interested in taking up gender, and as feminists around the world from all walks of life smash down barriers outside the disarmament field, let’s not waste the opportunities ahead of us. An intersectional feminist approach to disarmament is imperative, and we have all the tools we need to achieve it.
 
Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
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A Worrisome Conundrum: Latin American Defense and Security Forces and Weapons Trafficking

5/18/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its author. ​
Sanchez
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Latin America continues to face internal and transnational security threats that include drug cartels, transnational gangs, insurgent movements, as well as street crime. Naturally, preventing criminals and terrorists from obtaining weapons is an objective for any government. This goal becomes even more complicated when the weapons in question are obtained from the very institutions that are tasked with combating criminal and violent organizations. 
 
Tragically, in recent years there have been a number of incidents in which weapons were taken from military bases and police stations across Latin America; this suggests a lack of adequate security measures in such facilities at best, or collusion between corrupt defense personnel and criminal enterprises at worst. When it comes to preventing violent non-state actors in Latin America from obtaining weapons to commit crimes, step one should be, unsurprisingly, that they do not come from military and police depots.
 
Recent Cases from Regional Armed Forces
 
There are a number of recent cases of the theft of weapons from military depots across Latin America. For example, in early January 2016, two rifles were robbed from the Uruguayan Army's battalion “Florida”.[i] One soldier was accused of helping criminals sneak into the facilities to steal the weapons. Unfortunately, these crimes have occurred before in the small South American state: in 2011 the Uruguayan daily El Observador reported that throughout the 2009-2011 period, as many as 19 weapons (15 FAL rifles, two submachine gun, and two Browning 9mm guns) were stolen from the Uruguayan air force and navy. Uruguayan sailors were found to have traded their weapons for recreational drugs.[ii]
 
Similar thefts have also occurred in Peru: in early April 2017 as many as 130 grenades were stolen from the Peruvian Air Force’s Punta Lobos base.[iii] A year earlier, 18 Galil rifles were reported missing from the arsenal of the 115th ordnance battalion in Loreto region (in the Peruvian Amazon).[iv] The hypothesis was that the weapons were delivered to FARC insurgents in Colombia or Brazilian criminals - the theft likely took place sometime in late 2015 but the weapons were only reported missing in January 2016.[v]
 
As for Bolivia, a group of Brazilian criminals, in cahoots with a Bolivian citizen, stole equipment from a Bolivian naval base in 2015.[vi] The weapons taken included 11 rifles, five guns as well as ammunition.
 
One particularly troubling incident occurred in Colombia in 2015, as some 400 weapons (109 rifles, 87 pistols, among others, according to the Colombian media) were stolen from the artillery battalion “San Mateo de Pereira.”[vii]  One sergeant and one soldier were reportedly charged for the theft.
 
Finally, in August 2017 there was a violent incident in Venezuela when a group of individuals (who apparently were anti-government, former military personnel) attempted to steal weapons from the Venezuelan Army’s Paramacay base, where the 41st armored brigade is headquartered.[viii] A firefight that reportedly lasted three hours between the military and the thieves, ensued, with several of the latter killed. It is unclear if any weapons were stolen.
 
Recent Cases from Regional Police Forces
 
As for weapons taken from police bases, there have been similar incidents, particularly in Mexico. For example, in October 2016, unidentified individuals entered a police station in Nezahualcóyotl, State of Mexico, overpowering the police officers. According to the local media, the criminals left with three handguns, one carbine and one shotgun.[ix] That same month, 20 long-range and 10 short-range weapons disappeared from a different police station in Morelos region.[x]
 
Meanwhile, in late October 2017, 28 guns disappeared from a police base in Iquique, Chile.[xi] The media reports on the incident stressed that the weaponry was not part of the local police’s own depot, but rather that they were delivered there for safekeeping. The origin of the weapons aside, such a crime is very problematic.
 
Other recent thefts have been reported across police stations in Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru.[xii]
 
Successful Recoveries
 
It is worth noting that there have been several successes when it comes to stopping these crimes and retrieving the lost weapons. Case in point, Uruguayan authorities foiled an attempt to rob an army base in Chuy in early July 2017 – according to Uruguay’s El Pais, one of the criminals was a former soldier.[xiii]
 
Additionally, many lost weapons have been retrieved. For example, in 2015, several individuals were detained in Brazil, and security forces retrieved the 11 AK-47 rifles that had been stolen from the aforementioned Bolivian naval base.[xiv] That same year the Chilean police (Policía de Investigaciones de Chile) recovered one Ingram Mac-10 machine pistol and one FN/FAMAE Norinco pistol, which had been stolen from a military base in Arica.[xv] Also in 2015, the Colombian army reported that it had retrieved some 12 weapons out of the 400 that were stolen from a military base in Pereira.[xvi]
 
An Issue that Hinders An In-depth Analysis
 
Before we continue with our analysis, one disclaimer is necessary: The author has not been able to find reliable governmental statistics that detail how many weapons are missing from military and police depots. There have been sporadic reports that have tried to keep track of the data. For instance, a March 2015 article in the Argentine daily La Nacion explains that a preliminary report by the Comisión Provincial por la Memoria (provincial commission for remembrance) stated that, at that time, in  Buenos Aires region alone, some 900 weapons were believed to be missing from local police stations, although that was a conservative estimate.[xvii]  Similarly, a 2015 report in Peru’s daily La Republica explains how, at the time, 86 members of the country’s police and military were charged with stealing weapons from their respective units and police bases.[xviii] Colombia’s renowned Semana has also reported on this problem.[xix]
 
Similarly, research centers such as FLACSO and the Small Arms Survey have drafted occasional case studies about weapons trafficking in different Latin American states (Ecuador and Honduras, respectively).[xx]
 
Nevertheless this problem requires constant monitoring not only by governmental offices, but also by non-governmental organizations in order to ensure transparency.[xxi]
 
Discussion
 
The objective of this essay is not to imply that Latin American criminals are exclusively obtaining weapons from military or police depots; in reality that number is probably minuscule when compared to other sources – many U.S. media reports consistently point out that most of the weapons Mexican cartels utilize come from the United States.[xxii] Nevertheless, this analysis has demonstrated that this is a recurring issue in the region, with missing weaponry that includes pistols, rifles, and grenades. It is a problem that should be addressed.
 
In many cases, weapons were taken from military bases or police stations because corrupt police or military personnel willfully cooperated with criminal organizations, begging the question: what convinces a Latin American police or military officer to provide criminals with weapons that will be most likely utilized against security forces?
 
When it comes to discussing the best practices to combat weapons trafficking, some suggestions are self-evident. Case in point, having a database with the model and serial numbers of missing weapons is necessary, so that when a gun is retrieved from criminal organizations, the authorities can track where said weapon came from. A problem with this proposal is that, as aforementioned, many weapons are smuggled across border lines so that crime syndicate “X” in country “Y” uses a weapon that was taken from country “Z” – as was probably the case for the Galil rifles stolen in Peru. This is a particular problem for Ecuador, which serves as a corridor for weapons smuggled from Peru to Colombia (known as “ant-type smuggling” or tráfico hormiga).[xxiii] Ideally, cooperation initiatives between regional police and armed forces should include greater sharing of information regarding the weapons that are seized from criminals.
 
There are already several agreements in place to promote record sharing between regional governments, such as the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA) [xxiv] Additionally there are a number of bilateral agreements among hemispheric governments to combat crimes related to weapons trafficking – for example the governments of Ecuador and the United States signed an agreement to improve cooperation to combat crimes such as drug and weapons trafficking in late April 2018.[xxv]
 
Furthermore, there is something particularly disappointing about finding out that the individuals tasked with protecting a country and its citizens from criminals and insurgents are precisely those providing the latter with weapons to attack the former. Is there a “best practice” that can be suggested for those specific crimes? Harsher prison sentences for those found guilty is an obvious option. In fact, several military and police personnel have been prosecuted (fairly or unfairly depends on how one interprets the evidence) for some of the aforementioned incidents: as a result of the missing Galil rifles, four army officers were given six-month prison sentences.[xxvi] Similarly, in Chile, four ex police officers have been prosecuted for the missing guns in Iquique.[xxvii]
 
Another suggestion would simply be, as naive as it may sound, stronger indoctrination courses in military and police academies, so that new recruits do not forget the pledge they are making to protect their country and fellow citizens, and how helping criminals obtain weapons is the polar opposite of said oath. A Latin American military officer interviewed by the author argued in favor of this proposal, arguing that “you can put five more guards, four more security cameras and three more locks at weapons arsenals, but such incidents will continue to occur… you have to train soldiers better, educate them better, pay them better.”[xxviii] On the other hand, another Latin American army officer explained to the author, that such incidents should prompt armed forces to “take security measures of the weapons depots to the extreme.”[xxix] There is certainly no one-stop-solution to address the issue of weaponry theft.
 
As a final point, it is important to highlight that the theft of weaponry from military bases is not a problem solely relegated to Latin America. In the U.S. “more than $1 million in weapons parts and sensitive military equipment was stolen out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and sold in a vast black market,” according to an August 2017 report by the Associated Press.[xxx] Another theft occurred in the U.S. Army’s facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, in 2016.[xxxi] Without a doubt, “rotten apples” exist in defense and security forces across the world.
 
Final Thoughts
 
Weapons trafficking is a major crime across the world, as it adds the proverbial wood to the destructive fire that is crime and terrorism. Latin America is no exception to this problem as it is not difficult to find at least one incident within the last decade of wicked  personnel who have helped criminals obtain weapons from military or police arsenals. To the credit of regional defense forces, several weapons have been successfully retrieved, but the lack of open-source data that shows how many weapons are missing from depots makes it difficult to figure out what quantities we are talking about.
 
In any organization, including those tasked with security and defense, it is inevitable that there will be bad personnel that will seek to profit by committing criminal acts, which apparently include providing weapons to criminal entities. But while avoiding such incidents may be a utopia, it is important for Latin American police and military forces to constantly come up with new preemptive strategies not only to prevent robberies from happening – like better salaries and stricter security protocols– but, when they do occur, to be able to quickly track them, particularly across borders. Weapons trafficking is a complex and very profitable crime, and Latin American security and defense forces should be combating it, not be involved in it.
 
 
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues.
  
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

---

[i] “Militar sospechoso de robo de armas en Uruguay,” Ecos – Latinoamerica, Actualidad, January 30, 2016.

[ii] “Militares procesados por robo y tráfico de armas,” El Observador (Uruguay), April 11, 2011

[iii] “Roban 130 granadas de una base de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú,” Perú21, April 6, 2017. 

[iv] “Loreto: Roban 18 fusiles de guerra de base militar en Iquitos,” Perú21, January 5, 2016.

[v] “Ministro inspecciona base militar tras robo de 18 fusiles,” RPP Noticias (Peru), January 4, 2016.

[vi] Alonaca, Jesus, “Un imputado por el robo de armas en base militar,” El Deber (Bolivia), December 11, 2015.

[vii] “Capturan a dos militares por robo de armamento en batallón de Pereira,” El Espectador, Judicial, February 2, 2015; “Ejército recupera 12 armas que fueron robadas del batallón San Mateo de Pereira,” El Espectador, Nacional, July 9, 2015.

[viii] “De base militar de Carabobo habrían robado más de 100 fusiles y lanzagranadas,” RCN Noticias, August 7, 2017; “Dos muertos dejó enfrentamiento en la 41 Brigada Blindada del Ejército en Carabobo,” La Patilla, August 6, 2017.

[ix] “Comando irrumpe en cuartel y roba armas de la Policía Estatal en Neza,” Proceso (Mexico), October 18, 2016.

[x] Pedro Tonantzin, “’Madrugan’ a policias, les roban 30 armas en cuartel de Morelos,” Excelsior (Mexico). October 5, 2017.

[xi] “Desaparecieron 28 armas que custodiaba Carabineros en la Primera Comisaría de Iquique,” SoyChile.cl, October 30, 2017.

[xii] “Un policía estaría detrás de robo de armas en Estación de Carabineros,” Noticias RCN (Colombia), December 23, 2014; “Policía sin pistas sobre responsables de robo de armas en Jicaral,” La Nacion (Costa Rica), Crimenes, May 5, 2017; “Policía incautó más de mil armas y municiones en megaoperativo,” El Comercio (Peru). April 27, 2017.

[xiii] “Detuvieron a delincuentes que planeaban asaltar cuartel en Rocha,” Radio Montecarlo, July 7, 2017.

[xiv] “Operativo en Brasil recupera 11 fusiles AK47 robados de un puesto militar boliviano,” La Razon (Bolivia), December 17, 2015.

[xv] “PDI recupera armas robadas al Ejército en Arica,” Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Publica (Chile). August 28, 2015.

[xvi] “Ejército recupera 12 armas que fueron robadas del batallón San Mateo de Pereira,” El Espectador, Nacional, July 9, 2015.

[xvii] Jesus Cornejo, “Los policías bonaerenses pierden un arma cada 48 horas,” La Nacion (Argentina), March 9, 2015. 

[xviii] “86 militares y policías enjuiciados y condenados por robo de armas y granadas,” La Republica (Peru), September 29, 2015. 

[xix] “Escándalo: mil armas perdidas en guarniciones militares,” Semana,  June 13, 2015.

[xx] Carlos Valdivieso, “Armas de fuego en Ecuador, ”FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales), Perfil Criminológico, No.17, July 2015; “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras,” Small Arms Survey, Research Notes, No. 62, November 2016.

[xxi] This would also serve to understand better not only how many weapons are lost or stolen, but how many are also found. The author has relied on open-source news articles and reports for this analysis. Sources consulted by the author explained that a person can request ministries and specific government agencies for information regarding the incidents discussed in this analysis, but it would take time for these petitions to be processed.

[xxii] Analyzing weapon sales and weapons trafficking in Mexico is complicated due to its proximity to the United States. For example, see: German Lopez, “Where do Mexican drug cartels get their guns? The US,” VOX, January 14, 2016. Also see: Bill Chappell, “In Mexico, Tens Of Thousands Of Illegal Guns Come From The U.S.,” NPR, International, January 12, 2016. And see: John-Lindsay Poland, “How U.S. Guns Sold to Mexico End Up With Security Forces Accused of Crime and Human Rights Abuses,” The Intercept, April 16, 2018.

[xxiii] “El tráfico de armas permea la frontera norte de Ecuador,” El Comercio (Ecuador), February 19, 2018; “Autoridades ecuatorianas identifican rutas para el tráfico de armas hacia Colombia, Centroamérica y México,” Andes, June 5, 2015.

[xxiv] The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA), 1997, http://www.weaponslaw.org/instruments/1997-oas-convention-cifta.

[xxv] “Ecuador y EEUU firman convenio de cooperación en lucha contra crimen y drogas.” EFE/El Espectador, April 16, 2018.

[xxvi] “Iquitos: Dictan 6 meses de prisión preventiva para implicados en robo de fusiles | VIDEO,” La Republica (Peru), January 22, 2016.

[xxvii] “Ex carabinero procesado por extravío de armas en Iquique dijo que se matará ‘para que ese fiscal se pudra en la cárcel,’" SoyChile.cl,  November 30, 2017; “Nueva polémica en Carabineros: acusan ‘montaje’ del Labocar Temuco por el Caso Armas en Iquique,” Soychile.cl, February 1, 2018.

[xxviii] Telephone conversation between the author and a Latin American military officer, March 2018, off-the-record.

[xxix] Telephone conversation between the author and a Latin American military officer, March 2018, off-the-record.

[xxx] Kristin M. Hall. “'Easy Money' Made Selling Army Weapons Stolen by US Soldiers,” Associated Press, August 31, 2017.

[xxxi] John Vandiver, “Army offering $25K reward in search for weapons stolen from Stuttgart arms room,” Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2018.


2 Comments

U.S. Security Assistance to Non-State Actors: Unintended Consequences and Long-term Instability

5/18/2018

1 Comment

 
This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its authors. ​​
Binder
Seth Binder
Watson
Robert Watson
Since the Cold War, the United States has been the dominant arms supplier in the world, providing billions per year in arms to well over 160 countries.[i] Most of the time these weapons go to the security forces of a sovereign state, but occasionally the United States has seen it in its interest to provide arms to non-state actors (NSAs), primarily rebel groups not sanctioned by their domestic state to take up arms. Despite the justifications for providing such lethal aid in the short-term, overwhelmingly the aid has not proven successful, resulting in unintended consequences and long-term instability.
 
There are justified reasons the United States may decide to provide security assistance to non-state actors, including support for counterterrorism operations, the responsibility to protect innocent civilians, pushback against foreign invasion, as well as other possibilities. For example, when the United States began providing the mujahideen with weapons in the 1980s, it not only helped protect innocent Afghans from callous attacks by Soviet forces, it increased the cost of the Soviet invasion until they ultimately withdrew a decade later. At a relatively low financial cost to the United States, it was able to protect lives and weaken its rival superpower.
 
However, even if we take the most generous view of U.S. intentions when providing security assistance and weapons to NSAs, several unintended consequences can and have occurred. In Afghanistan,[ii] the United States trained and armed fighters who later went on to join al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, which ultimately led the United States to return in 2001 where it is still fighting in a nearly two-decades long war at the cost of trillions of dollars.[iii]
 
More recently, the United States has been providing more than $2 billion[iv] in weapons and training to Syrian rebels, with an additional $300 million requested for fiscal year 2019.[v] The rebels’ specific task has been to help the U.S. coalition defeat the Islamic State (ISIS), but while Kurdish militias have seen success on the battlefield against ISIS, numerous reports have documented human rights abuses[vi] by U.S.-trained Syrian rebels[vii] and the diversion of U.S. provided weapons.[viii] This has perpetuated the fighting and fostered new grievances among the victims. Yet, this shouldn’t come as a surprise. U.S.-supported Nicaraguan rebels, commonly referred to as the Contras, were frequently accused of human rights abuses,[ix] and trafficking drugs and weapons.[x] But they weren’t the only ones. U.S.-supported UNITA rebels in Angola[xi] and the mujahideen in Afghanistan have also received credible allegations of human rights abuses.[xii]
 
Much of this comes down to the unavoidable principle-agent problem associated with the provision of arms to other forces. As the principle, the United States only has so much control over the Syrian rebels (the agent) receiving the equipment and training. The agents have different concerns, objectives, and goals, making it near impossible to guarantee arms will not be diverted, power abused, or objectives carried out.[xiii] Yet, US involvement makes it culpable.
 
In addition, security assistance to non-state actors is an inherently destabilizing activity. The weapons and training provided grant the recipients an extraordinary capacity for violence. Security assistance can be a powerful tool, but it is only as effective as the recipients’ capacity to receive, contain, and direct these resources toward positive ends. States often struggle to fully implement the institutional frameworks required to prevent the misapplication of assistance; the challenge for non-state actors can be even greater.[xiv]
 
The problem of capacity is compounded by the fact that defense articles and training have a life span that can far exceed the scope of their intended use.[xv] Arms and ammunition linger in the communities that receive them. While U.S. policy, priorities, and interests turn to other areas, the arms and training remain, potentially creating long-term instability. Arms provided to the Contras in Nicaragua have been used by drug traffickers; UNITA rebels in Angola returned to the “battlefield”;[xvi] and many of the mujahideen turned to international terrorism.
 
In part, this is why relations with neighboring states can be strained when providing NSAs with security assistance. But it is not the only reason. By injecting defense articles outside the pre-existing state structures, the United States undermines the “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.”[xvii] This monopoly provides the foundation for state institutions, and underpins a state’s legitimacy domestically and internationally. Unilaterally arming non-state actors upends domestic and regional security relationships already strained by conflict.
 
For example, relations with Turkey, a major NATO ally who sees the provision of arms to the Kurds as a direct threat, have been severely damaged by U.S. assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This has led to U.S. allies fighting each other in Syria, detracting from the mission’s original objectives and further destabilizing the region.[xviii] Former-President Obama promised there wouldn’t be mission creep,[xix] but in Syria the United States is providing training and operations support, U.S. equipment to various state and non-state actors involved in the conflict, and has attacked the Syrian regime, Russian mercenaries, and Iranian-supported militias. Now the United States is coming dangerously close to being involved in direct fighting against Turkey. All risking a further conflagration of the region.
 
Whether U.S. assistance has turned to short-term responses, such as U.S. support for Libyan rebels, or the long-term engagement evidenced by current U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, problems have arisen. In 1984, a Congressional resolution stated that it would be “indefensible to provide the freedom fighters [mujahideen] with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.”[xx] Now, the US is providing the “Vetted Syrian Opposition” with just enough assistance to defeat ISIS and anger nearly every ally and foe alike, but not enough assistance to decisively end the conflict against al-Assad and the Syrian regime. Despite the different policy approaches, security assistance has perpetuated and further complicated the wars, while doing nothing to address the endemic problems at the heart of the conflict.
 
International attempts to regulate the arming of non-state actors have been restrained by the lack of an international consensus on the definition of a “non-state actor.” The term is broad enough to include a range of groups, including armed rebels, warlords, private security companies, terrorist organizations, and even “semi” recognized states such as Taiwan and Kosovo. In 2001, John Bolton, then U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, rejected an effort to ban military aid to non-state actors defined as “irresponsible end-users of arms” on the grounds that this would “preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal government.”[xxi]
 
While a definition may not determine whether a group is a responsible end-user, it would give states a better idea of their own responsibility in providing weapons, and the risks associated with doing so. The Canadian delegation to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, argued for a blanket ban on arms transfers to non-state actors, and attempted to include language in the preamble that would have emphasized states’ responsibility in providing arms to non-state actors. However, due to U.S. opposition, neither effort made it into the final document.
 
One solution could be to forgo any UN consensus, and instead push for regional agreements. The ECOWAS Convention of 2006[xxii] and the Kinshasa Convention of 2010 define non-state actors and prohibit the transfer of small arms and light weapons to them. The ECOWAS Convention defines NSAs as “any actor other than State Actors, mercenaries, armed militias, armed rebel groups and private security companies.” By comparison, the Kinshasa Convention defines “non-state armed groups” as any group that “is not part of the formal military establishment of a state, alliance of states or intergovernmental organization and over which the state in which it operates has no control.”[xxiii] While the definitions vary significantly, they both address the risk of arming NSAs, and contribute to a customary definition for the groups themselves. Regional arms control regimes like these could discourage interstate meddling, in that parties would have a vested interest in preventing proliferation in their neighborhood(s) and could provide a unified voice against outside intervention.
 
Ultimately, U.S. provision of security assistance to non-state actors carries enormous risk and should only be executed as policy after thorough cost-benefit analysis that weighs short-term benefits against the likely unintended long-term consequences.  Mitigation strategies must also be considered to address the inevitable consequences if in fact assistance is initiated. Non-state actors’ lack of institutional capacity, the lifespan of materiel provided, and the general inability of the United States to align its objectives with those of its non-state proxies exposes the tension between security assistance’s long and short-term goals. An internal CIA study reportedly notes that covertly arming and training rebels has rarely worked in the past.[xxiv] America’s recent covert and overt support in Syria hasn’t seemed to fair much better. While these policies have the potential to achieve short term objectives, they create lasting and long-term consequences that have too often failed to achieve peace and stability.

​Seth Binder is an independent researcher focused on U.S. security assistance and arms sales. Robert Watson is a member of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s Emerging Expert program.

---


[i] Arms Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (accessed April 3, 2018), .

[ii] Jason Burke “Frankenstein the CIA Created,” The Guardian, January 17, 1999.

[iii] Cost of War Project, Brown University’s Watson Institute, November 2017.

[iv] Security Assistance Monitor data on U.S. security aid to Syria, (accessed April 1, 2018).

[v] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2019 (2018, February) Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).

[vi] “We Had Nowhere Else to Go: Forced Displacements and Demolitions in Northern Syria,” Amnesty International, October 2015.

[vii] “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2014.

[viii] “US-Allied Syrian Rebel Officer Handed Trucks and Ammunition to al-Qaeda Affiliate,” Associated Press, September 23, 2015.

[ix] Doyle McManus, “Rights Groups Accuse Contras: Atrocities in Nicaragua Against Civilians Charged,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1985.

[x] “Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,” Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, December 1988.

[xi] Edward Girardet, “Angolans Describe Human Rights Abuse During Civil War,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983.

[xii] Patricia Gossman, “The Forgotten War,” Human Rights Watch, February 1991.

[xiii] Kareem Shaheen, “US-Trained Syrian Rebels Refuse to Fight al-Qaida Group After Kidnappings,” The Guardian, August 6, 2015.

[xiv] An Vranckx, “Containing diversion: arms end-use and post-delivery controls,” GRIP, April 2016.

[xv] Paul Holden, Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain the Global Arms Trade, Zed Books, February 2017.

[xvi] “Peace in Angola When Savimbi,” Afrol News, April 11, 2001.

[xvii] Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1918.

[xviii] Carlotta Gall, “72 Turkish Jets Bomb US-Backed Kurdish Militias in Syria,” New York Times, January 20, 2018.

[xix] Micah Zenko, “Your Official Mission Creep Timeline of the US War in Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2015.

[xx] “Afghan Freedom Fighters: United States Support,” 98 Statute 3499, U.S. Congressional Resolution, October 4, 1984.

[xxi] Paul Holtom, “Prohibiting Arms Transfers to Non-State Actors and the Arms Trade Treaty,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2012.

[xxii] ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, June 14, 2006.

[xxiii] Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, Kinshasa, April 30, 2010.

[xxiv] Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels,” October 14, 2014, New York Times.
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