Category: SALW

Understanding Firearms Trafficking to Mexico and Central America - resources

4/6/2022

On March 24, 2022, a number of experts shared resources in a closed meeting on firearms trafficking to Mexico and Central America, building in part off of recent publications by the Government Accountability Office, including Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis and Firearms Trafficking: More Information is Needed to Inform U.S. Efforts in Central America. The information presented brought to the conversation additional data as well as recommendations for possible U.S. Congressional action.

The slides of those briefings are below and named experts can be contacted directly.

John Lindsay-Poland- Us Firearms Exports to Mexico & Central America
Susan Waltz- Firearms Trafficking to Central America: Inspecting the data for Guatemala and considerations for Congressional action
Eugenio Weigend Vargas- Beyond our Borders: U.S. Guns Contribute to Violent Crime Abroad

Inclusion of these resources does not indicate endorsement or agreement with others. The Forum on the Arms Trade does not take positions, but does share resources by its listed experts and others, as part of its goal to provide resources for strengthening public efforts to address the humanitarian, economic and other implications of arms transfers, security assistance, and weapons use.

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Event Recap: Legal Approaches to Reduce Gun Violence -- Mexican and U.S. Strategies, August 18, 2021

8/30/2021

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Video of event available at https://youtu.be/cg3WshmbtfI?t=124

This recap should not be quoted directly and does not fully describe the nuances of comments made. Please listen to video for direct quotations. The Forum thanks Lauren Speiser for the notes and initial draft of this recap. Panelists are not responsible for the summaries provided here. This event was hosted by the Network to Prevent Gun Violence in the Americas, the Forum on the Arms Trade, the Giffords Law Center, and Global Exchange

Panelists

Ioan Grillo (website) - journalist and author, including of Blood Gun Money: How America Arms Gangs and Cartels -- recent Foreign Policy argument "Why Mexico Is Right to Sue U.S. Gun Companies," and NBC news interview
Steve Shadowen (website) - Founding Partner, Hilliard & Shadowen LLP -- legal complaint (link)
Kristen Rand (website) - slides (pdf), Violence Policy resources on gun industry regulation (link)
John Lindsay Poland (website) - Coordinator, Project to Stop US Arms to Mexico -- proposed legal sale discussed (link), Stop US Arms to Mexico press release "Mexico vs. Gun Companies",

Welcome and Opening Remarks: John Lindsay-Poland described Mexican gun violence as an “unprecedented and growing humanitarian crisis.” (link) He then spoke about the Mexican government’s unprecedented lawsuit (filed August 4th) against 11 US gun manufacturers and distributors, who allege that those companies are responsible for much of the violence occurring in Mexico. Lindsay-Poland briefly introduced the panelists and provided descriptions of their recent work.

Panel: Each panelist gave an overview of their unique expertise regarding the legalities and challenges in current U.S.-Mexico gun relations.

Ioan Grillo (link) spoke of gun violence in Mexico since the early 2000s as growing “from... crime story... to what seemed like an armed conflict.” Grillo explained that gun violence has a massive impact in Mexico, describing the intensity of the violence. Grillo used anecdotal evidence of how a now-imprisoned gun trafficker would drive to Dallas gun shows and buy 12 AR-15 rifles with no identification. Grillo urged for change, saying that buying guns is not a question of challenging 2nd Amendment rights. His suggested recommendations include universal background checks in the U.S., and regulations targeting ghost guns and straw buyers. Grillo finds the lawsuit to be a powerful move by the Mexican government.

Steve Shadowen (link) speaking on his own behalf, briefly began by indicating that there is little controversy with “respect to the facts.” The lawsuit alleges that the gun manufacturers’ policies are insufficient in preventing U.S. guns from entering Mexico in large numbers, thus materially contributing to the damage suffered in Mexico. On the legal theory, Shadowen explained the nuance of tort law, which is the law governing negligence and recovery of damage for negligence, which secures the balance between the economic interests of the gun manufacturers and those who are harmed with those products. Shadowen expressed that tort law as applicable in Mexican jurisdiction can be applied to U.S. gun manufacturers because they are knowingly selling products that cause harm to the people and economy of Mexico. Shadowen explains that, in international law, this is not a controversial principle. Shadowen briefly outlined the nuance of Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), explaining that the Mexican government intends to prove in this case that the PLCAA does not apply when the injury occurs outside the US.

Kristen Rand (link) presented on the marketing strategies of U.S. gun manufacturers, specifically addressing the militaristic imagery and language used in their advertisements. Rand used examples of advertisement from a variety of manufacturers and weapons to support her argument that manufacturers explicitly target Mexican and U.S. buyers looking to build what are in essence their own armies (slides). Rand noted the challenges of firearms and ammunition being the only consumer products that are exempt from federal health and safety regulations, and that PLCAA bars some types of civil liability.

Moderator Lindsay-Poland (link) spoke briefly about U.S. government-licensed legal exports to Mexico and the lack of transparency surrounding the final destination of U.S.-made guns, including those to be sold to the Mexican Navy under a new sale proposed in July (link), which has been accused of torturing detainees and committing other forms of inhumane treatment.

Q&A:

Grillo (link) explained how the link to guns and violence in Mexico had fallen off the table for about a decade after Fast and Furious and that the lawsuit is a “solid strategy,” noting that in the lawsuit he sees two “big deals”:
- First, he believes the judicial process has led in the past to big changes through law where politics has failed, drawing parallels to tobacco and pharma lawsuits.
- Second, the lawsuit has put the issue in the news. Grillo believes there are concrete changes that can be made.

Shadowen (link) dove further into the legalities of the Mexican lawsuit, comparing it to actions in the late 1990s and early 2000s by local governments related to gun violence, as well as the opioid litigation in the U.S. today, with hopes that Mexico can prove a causal chain similar to those used in opioid lawsuits. His main point was, when one knowingly sends their products to another jurisdiction that causes harm in a systematic way, they are responsible. He also briefly discussed the capabilities, and in a broad way, what manufacturers could do to avoid the harm caused. The lawsuit alleges that it is a relatively small number of gun traffickers that are responsible for the majority of these guns sales to Mexico. It’s the absence of U.S. tort law being applied that has allowed this situation to develop.

Rand (link) noted that the strategy of marketing guns with militarized images is especially relevant to Mexico and the Caribbean, with U.S. manufacturers knowing what's going on and being culpable. Lindsay-Poland added that the weapons are used in essence to build armies as a way to contest territory, gaining legal and illegal control over economic activities.

Lindsay-Poland spoke (link) on legal exports, including why Sig Sauer may not be in the lawsuit, as well as possible needed legislative and policy changes. He highlighted the need for end-use controls, also recommending the return of all firearms export oversight from the Commerce Department’s Commerce Control List to the State Department’s U.S. Munitions List.

Rand (link) suggests activists get involved with local and national groups, and recommends that the U.S. pass a universal background check. She also emphasizes the need for further regulations on ghost guns and pistol braces.

Grillo (link) suggests strengthening measures on private sellers, straw buyers, theft, and ghost guns. He says that they must all be confronted or as one is addressed another will become more prevalent. Grillo similarly recommends universal background checks, passing a federal firearm trafficking law, increasing recommended sentences, extended background checks, and further legislation. He also suggested joint actions by other Central and South American governments with Mexico would be interesting to explore.

Lindsay-Poland (link) noted that checks on legal firearms exports often occur after export, not before license, that a very small percentage are checked, and that those checked are not often held accountable for human rights abuses. He further recommends identifying end users and committing to controls for excluding end users implicated in human rights abuses. He also said that key knowledge gaps include the circumstances around where and how firearms were distributed and recovered.

Shadowen (link) discussed possible paths of the suit and predicts it could last 3-4 years, or even longer.

Final comments:

Rand (link) spoke about her excitement about the new lawsuit, and the need for gun industry accountability.

Grillo (link) emphasized that gun violence is not normal -- it's not a natural force -- and that simply saying other countries might provide weapons if the U.S. didn't is not credible nor a reason for inaction.

Shadowen (link) spoke about the effect of violence on families and his frustration about the acceptance of such unbelievable harm. “We will do everything we can within the confines of a lawsuit..." to create change.

Lindsay-Poland (link) commented how the lawsuit was important to helping everyone see that lives of Mexican individuals are as important as all lives, including those in the U.S.

Additional resources:

The Daily (podcast) from the New York Times, "Why Mexico is Suing U.S. Gunmakers," August 24, 2021.
William S. Dodge and Ingrid Wuerth, "Mexico v. Smith & Wesson: Does US Immunity for Gun Manufacturers Apply Extraterritorially?" Just Security, August 19, 2021.
Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, legal advisor to Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington Post op-ed, August 14, 2021
Center for American Progress: "Frequently Asked Questions About Gun Industry Immunity"
Esther Sanchez-Gomez, litigation attorney at Giffords Law Center, "Mexico, drowning in American guns, is suing gun manufacturers," Daily Journal, August 11, 2021
Ghost guns
- proposed rule change, public comment period now closed
- new lawsuit filed in San Francisco, see San Francisco Chronicle, August 18, 2021
Research on exports to Mexico
- "Invisible Weapons, Indelible Pain: The Urgent Necessity for Transparency in the U.S. and Mexican Gun Trade," Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, Stop US Arms to Mexico,Center for Ecumenical Studies., July 2021
- "Deadly Trade: How European and Israeli Arms Exports are Accelerating Violence in Mexico," Global Exchange (US), Vredesactie (Belgium), OPAL (Italy), Agir pour la Paix (Belgium), American Friends Service Committee (Israel), Ohne Rüstung Leben (Germany), NESEHNUTÍ (Czech Republic), Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, and the Centro de Estudios Ecuménicos (Mexico), see p. 25 for more on Sig Sauer, December 2020
- "Fact Sheet on Sig Sauer Arms Exports to Mexico," Stop US Arms to Mexico, last updated 2018
U.S. export licensing of assault weapons - see Forum on the Arms Trade resource page on USML changes

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The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

12/19/2018

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Ray Acheson

2018, for some reason, was a turning point for international diplomatic recognition of gender dimensions of weapons and disarmament policy. After years or even decades—or in WILPF’s case, a century—of feminist advocacy for governments and activists to take gender into account in their work, we seem to breaking new ground.

In March, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva collaborated with WILPF, Small Arms Survey, and the Gender Mine Action Programme on a one-day training for disarmament diplomats about including gender perspectives in their work. In April, WILPF coordinated with the Canadian mission in New York on a meeting that brought together the women, peace and security (WPS) and disarmament diplomatic communities to exchange on the same subject.

In May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his new disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future. It includes a section on “Ensuring the equal, full, and effective participation of women,” and there are several references throughout the document to the gendered impacts of weapons, gender-sensitive arms control, or women’s participation in disarmament, including urging states to incorporate gender perspectives in their national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control.

In June, the Third Review Conference to the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) adopted a report with groundbreaking references to armed gender-based violence, the gendered impacts of small arms, and women’s participation in disarmament. The document builds on gains made in 2012 and 2016 to alleviate the overall gender blindness of the UNPoA. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network coordinated input and advocacy amongst civil society groups and diplomats for the inclusion of these elements in the outcome document, including through the civil society Call to Action on gender and small arms control.

In August, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) considered gender issues for the first time, in a side event hosted by the government of Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Mines Action Canada, Project Ploughshares, and WILPF on the relationship between gender and fully autonomous weapons. Participants addressed gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms in relation to the development and use of weapons, gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.

In October, the Canadian mission to the UN organized a push to increase gender references in resolutions at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Working with other governments and civil society groups, they managed to achieve language in 17 resolutions that advocates for women’s equal participation, recognizes gendered impacts of weapons, or urges consideration of gender perspectives more broadly. This accounts for 25 percent of all First Committee resolutions in 2018. Six of these resolutions included gendered language for the first time, while three improved the gendered language. For comparison, in 2017, 15 per cent of resolutions made gender references. This figure was 13 per cent in 2016 and 12 per cent in 2015. The number of First Committee delegations speaking about gender and disarmament in their statements also continued to increase this year. Namibia on behalf of 56 states dedicated a whole statement to this topic, urging examination of how “underlying assumptions about how gender shapes [delegations’] own work and the dynamics of joint disarmament efforts.”

Also in October, the Latvian ambassador, who will preside over the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, announced that the conference and its preparatory meetings will focus on the gender-based violence provision of the Treaty as a special theme. This will provide an opportunity in 2019 to advance consideration of how to implement this aspect of the ATT, including using guidance and case studies published by groups like WILPF previously.

In addition to these forum-based efforts, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research joined the governments of Ireland, Namibia, and Canada to form the Disarmament Impact Group as an output of the International Gender Champions. The Group aims to “support the disarmament community in translating gender awareness into practical action across the range of multilateral disarmament processes and activities.” Meanwhile, academic sources like Critical Studies on Security and the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, news sources like The Nation, and public speaking forums from TEDx to the London School of Economics featured articles and talks about feminism, gender, and weapons. This has signaled an opening of academic and activist spaces for increased consideration of these issues.

So, why has all this happened so quickly? In reality, it hasn’t. It is built on a firm foundation of activism and analysis. Feminist disarmament activists and academics, particularly those with groups like WILPF and the IANSA Women’s Network, have been writing and campaigning on gender and disarmament for decades. UN agencies and some governments have been working to mainstream gender in their programming for a long time, certainly since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This has led to concrete outcomes at international disarmament diplomacy forums in recent years: the first UN General Assembly resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in 2010; the inclusion of gender-based violence in the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013; the recognition of the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and encouragement of women’s effective participation in disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Chair’s summary and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

External factors are also at play. The #MeToo movement has arguably awoken new acceptability and credibility of previously hidden or shamed perspectives and experiences. Women, trans, queer, non-binary, and non-conforming folks, as well as men who have experienced sexual and gender-based violence have collectively created new spaces to amplify these realities and demand change.

At the same time, several governments have begun pursuing what they term “Feminist Foreign Policy”. While it is debatable whether or not the foreign policies outlined by these governments can yet be truly described as feminist, it is a welcome development for government offices to be considering feminism not just a valid but an imperative approach to their international engagement.

In disarmament forums, momentum certainly seems to be on our side. There is a growing acceptance among a diverse range of governments, international organizations, and civil society groups about the reality that weapons have gendered impacts, and that women’s participation in disarmament is important. This is good progress, and imperative to making change in this field. But it’s not enough.

The work ahead

For one thing, the demand for women’s equal, effective, or meaningful participation—while necessary and welcome—is insufficient for truly making change in weapons policy. Our current situation is dire. Trillions of dollars are being spent on militaries and technologies of violence while poverty, inequality, and climate change threaten our collective security and safety. Disarmament, as a policy and practice that leads us away from militarism and towards peace, requires new understandings, perspectives, and approaches to weapons and war. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of survivors of gun violence, of nuclear weapons use and testing, of drone strikes, of bombardment of towns and cities. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of marginalized communities—LGBT+ folks, people of color, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, people with disabilities.

Diversity is not about political correctness. It is the only way we are ever going to see change in the way that we confront issues of peace and security. Where we have achieved the most disarmament progress in recent years—banning landmines and cluster bombs and nuclear weapons, for example—we have engaged with diverse communities and put humanitarian perspectives over the profits of arms industries or the interests of powerful governments. This is not just about including women, especially women who come from the same or similar backgrounds as the men who already rule the table. It’s about completely resetting the table; or even throwing out the table and setting up an entirely new way of working.

Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behavior of those who have the most privilege. Diversity is not for its own sake, but for how it impacts what is considered normal, acceptable, and credible. Confronting norms, especially gendered norms, around weapons and war is imperative to making progress on disarmament.

As a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. This association comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”.

This type of violent, militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not comply with that gender norm—women, queer-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. It also results in violence against men. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. A big part of this is about preserving or protecting their masculinity—a masculinity that makes male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless resolutions and reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.

We are all suffering from the equation of violence and power with masculinity. It prevents those who identified as men from being something else—from performing gender differently. It prevents all of us as human beings to promote or explore strength, courage, and protection from a nonviolent perspective. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd.

It also makes it impossible to achieve gender justice. It keeps men and women in binary boxes based on their biological sex. It maintains a strict hierarchy between these boxes, in which men are tough, rational, and violent, while women are weak, irrational, and passive. In this narrative, men are agents; women are victims. (And reinforces the idea that there is nothing outside of this binary.)

The norm of violent masculinity will continue to cause suffering and reinforce inequalities until we get serious about doing something differently. This is a project of dismantling the patriarchy, which is a big project, but it starts with the language we use, the people we include in discussions, and the norms we are willing to challenge.

For 2019, let’s stop using the term “women and children”. They are not the same legally or politically. They have different needs and abilities. Let’s talk about the different impacts of weapons based on gender and age, instead of womenandchildren on one side and men on the other. Let’s talk about gender diversity in disarmament, instead of just the equal participation of women and men. Let’s get away from binary language to something more inclusive. Let’s also include survivors and those impacted by weapons, war, and violence. Let’s think about what we consider credible or powerful, and why we think that way.

As more and more governments and organizations become interested in taking up gender, and as feminists around the world from all walks of life smash down barriers outside the disarmament field, let’s not waste the opportunities ahead of us. An intersectional feminist approach to disarmament is imperative, and we have all the tools we need to achieve it.

Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

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A Worrisome Conundrum: Latin American Defense and Security Forces and Weapons Trafficking

5/18/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its author.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Latin America continues to face internal and transnational security threats that include drug cartels, transnational gangs, insurgent movements, as well as street crime. Naturally, preventing criminals and terrorists from obtaining weapons is an objective for any government. This goal becomes even more complicated when the weapons in question are obtained from the very institutions that are tasked with combating criminal and violent organizations.

Tragically, in recent years there have been a number of incidents in which weapons were taken from military bases and police stations across Latin America; this suggests a lack of adequate security measures in such facilities at best, or collusion between corrupt defense personnel and criminal enterprises at worst. When it comes to preventing violent non-state actors in Latin America from obtaining weapons to commit crimes, step one should be, unsurprisingly, that they do not come from military and police depots.

Recent Cases from Regional Armed Forces

There are a number of recent cases of the theft of weapons from military depots across Latin America. For example, in early January 2016, two rifles were robbed from the Uruguayan Army's battalion “Florida”.[i] One soldier was accused of helping criminals sneak into the facilities to steal the weapons. Unfortunately, these crimes have occurred before in the small South American state: in 2011 the Uruguayan daily El Observador reported that throughout the 2009-2011 period, as many as 19 weapons (15 FAL rifles, two submachine gun, and two Browning 9mm guns) were stolen from the Uruguayan air force and navy. Uruguayan sailors were found to have traded their weapons for recreational drugs.[ii]

Similar thefts have also occurred in Peru: in early April 2017 as many as 130 grenades were stolen from the Peruvian Air Force’s Punta Lobos base.[iii] A year earlier, 18 Galil rifles were reported missing from the arsenal of the 115th ordnance battalion in Loreto region (in the Peruvian Amazon).[iv] The hypothesis was that the weapons were delivered to FARC insurgents in Colombia or Brazilian criminals - the theft likely took place sometime in late 2015 but the weapons were only reported missing in January 2016.[v]

As for Bolivia, a group of Brazilian criminals, in cahoots with a Bolivian citizen, stole equipment from a Bolivian naval base in 2015.[vi] The weapons taken included 11 rifles, five guns as well as ammunition.

One particularly troubling incident occurred in Colombia in 2015, as some 400 weapons (109 rifles, 87 pistols, among others, according to the Colombian media) were stolen from the artillery battalion “San Mateo de Pereira.”[vii] One sergeant and one soldier were reportedly charged for the theft.

Finally, in August 2017 there was a violent incident in Venezuela when a group of individuals (who apparently were anti-government, former military personnel) attempted to steal weapons from the Venezuelan Army’s Paramacay base, where the 41st armored brigade is headquartered.[viii] A firefight that reportedly lasted three hours between the military and the thieves, ensued, with several of the latter killed. It is unclear if any weapons were stolen.

Recent Cases from Regional Police Forces

As for weapons taken from police bases, there have been similar incidents, particularly in Mexico. For example, in October 2016, unidentified individuals entered a police station in Nezahualcóyotl, State of Mexico, overpowering the police officers. According to the local media, the criminals left with three handguns, one carbine and one shotgun.[ix] That same month, 20 long-range and 10 short-range weapons disappeared from a different police station in Morelos region.[x]

Meanwhile, in late October 2017, 28 guns disappeared from a police base in Iquique, Chile.[xi] The media reports on the incident stressed that the weaponry was not part of the local police’s own depot, but rather that they were delivered there for safekeeping. The origin of the weapons aside, such a crime is very problematic.

Other recent thefts have been reported across police stations in Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru.[xii]

Successful Recoveries

It is worth noting that there have been several successes when it comes to stopping these crimes and retrieving the lost weapons. Case in point, Uruguayan authorities foiled an attempt to rob an army base in Chuy in early July 2017 – according to Uruguay’s El Pais, one of the criminals was a former soldier.[xiii]

Additionally, many lost weapons have been retrieved. For example, in 2015, several individuals were detained in Brazil, and security forces retrieved the 11 AK-47 rifles that had been stolen from the aforementioned Bolivian naval base.[xiv] That same year the Chilean police (Policía de Investigaciones de Chile) recovered one Ingram Mac-10 machine pistol and one FN/FAMAE Norinco pistol, which had been stolen from a military base in Arica.[xv] Also in 2015, the Colombian army reported that it had retrieved some 12 weapons out of the 400 that were stolen from a military base in Pereira.[xvi]

An Issue that Hinders An In-depth Analysis

Before we continue with our analysis, one disclaimer is necessary: The author has not been able to find reliable governmental statistics that detail how many weapons are missing from military and police depots. There have been sporadic reports that have tried to keep track of the data. For instance, a March 2015 article in the Argentine daily La Nacion explains that a preliminary report by the Comisión Provincial por la Memoria (provincial commission for remembrance) stated that, at that time, in Buenos Aires region alone, some 900 weapons were believed to be missing from local police stations, although that was a conservative estimate.[xvii] Similarly, a 2015 report in Peru’s daily La Republica explains how, at the time, 86 members of the country’s police and military were charged with stealing weapons from their respective units and police bases.[xviii] Colombia’s renowned Semana has also reported on this problem.[xix]

Similarly, research centers such as FLACSO and the Small Arms Survey have drafted occasional case studies about weapons trafficking in different Latin American states (Ecuador and Honduras, respectively).[xx]

Nevertheless this problem requires constant monitoring not only by governmental offices, but also by non-governmental organizations in order to ensure transparency.[xxi]

Discussion

The objective of this essay is not to imply that Latin American criminals are exclusively obtaining weapons from military or police depots; in reality that number is probably minuscule when compared to other sources – many U.S. media reports consistently point out that most of the weapons Mexican cartels utilize come from the United States.[xxii] Nevertheless, this analysis has demonstrated that this is a recurring issue in the region, with missing weaponry that includes pistols, rifles, and grenades. It is a problem that should be addressed.

In many cases, weapons were taken from military bases or police stations because corrupt police or military personnel willfully cooperated with criminal organizations, begging the question: what convinces a Latin American police or military officer to provide criminals with weapons that will be most likely utilized against security forces?

When it comes to discussing the best practices to combat weapons trafficking, some suggestions are self-evident. Case in point, having a database with the model and serial numbers of missing weapons is necessary, so that when a gun is retrieved from criminal organizations, the authorities can track where said weapon came from. A problem with this proposal is that, as aforementioned, many weapons are smuggled across border lines so that crime syndicate “X” in country “Y” uses a weapon that was taken from country “Z” – as was probably the case for the Galil rifles stolen in Peru. This is a particular problem for Ecuador, which serves as a corridor for weapons smuggled from Peru to Colombia (known as “ant-type smuggling” or tráfico hormiga).[xxiii] Ideally, cooperation initiatives between regional police and armed forces should include greater sharing of information regarding the weapons that are seized from criminals.

There are already several agreements in place to promote record sharing between regional governments, such as the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA) [xxiv] Additionally there are a number of bilateral agreements among hemispheric governments to combat crimes related to weapons trafficking – for example the governments of Ecuador and the United States signed an agreement to improve cooperation to combat crimes such as drug and weapons trafficking in late April 2018.[xxv]

Furthermore, there is something particularly disappointing about finding out that the individuals tasked with protecting a country and its citizens from criminals and insurgents are precisely those providing the latter with weapons to attack the former. Is there a “best practice” that can be suggested for those specific crimes? Harsher prison sentences for those found guilty is an obvious option. In fact, several military and police personnel have been prosecuted (fairly or unfairly depends on how one interprets the evidence) for some of the aforementioned incidents: as a result of the missing Galil rifles, four army officers were given six-month prison sentences.[xxvi] Similarly, in Chile, four ex police officers have been prosecuted for the missing guns in Iquique.[xxvii]

Another suggestion would simply be, as naive as it may sound, stronger indoctrination courses in military and police academies, so that new recruits do not forget the pledge they are making to protect their country and fellow citizens, and how helping criminals obtain weapons is the polar opposite of said oath. A Latin American military officer interviewed by the author argued in favor of this proposal, arguing that “you can put five more guards, four more security cameras and three more locks at weapons arsenals, but such incidents will continue to occur… you have to train soldiers better, educate them better, pay them better.”[xxviii] On the other hand, another Latin American army officer explained to the author, that such incidents should prompt armed forces to “take security measures of the weapons depots to the extreme.”[xxix] There is certainly no one-stop-solution to address the issue of weaponry theft.

As a final point, it is important to highlight that the theft of weaponry from military bases is not a problem solely relegated to Latin America. In the U.S. “more than $1 million in weapons parts and sensitive military equipment was stolen out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and sold in a vast black market,” according to an August 2017 report by the Associated Press.[xxx] Another theft occurred in the U.S. Army’s facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, in 2016.[xxxi] Without a doubt, “rotten apples” exist in defense and security forces across the world.

Final Thoughts

Weapons trafficking is a major crime across the world, as it adds the proverbial wood to the destructive fire that is crime and terrorism. Latin America is no exception to this problem as it is not difficult to find at least one incident within the last decade of wicked personnel who have helped criminals obtain weapons from military or police arsenals. To the credit of regional defense forces, several weapons have been successfully retrieved, but the lack of open-source data that shows how many weapons are missing from depots makes it difficult to figure out what quantities we are talking about.

In any organization, including those tasked with security and defense, it is inevitable that there will be bad personnel that will seek to profit by committing criminal acts, which apparently include providing weapons to criminal entities. But while avoiding such incidents may be a utopia, it is important for Latin American police and military forces to constantly come up with new preemptive strategies not only to prevent robberies from happening – like better salaries and stricter security protocols– but, when they do occur, to be able to quickly track them, particularly across borders. Weapons trafficking is a complex and very profitable crime, and Latin American security and defense forces should be combating it, not be involved in it.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

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[i] “Militar sospechoso de robo de armas en Uruguay,” Ecos – Latinoamerica, Actualidad, January 30, 2016.

[ii] “Militares procesados por robo y tráfico de armas,” El Observador (Uruguay), April 11, 2011

[iii] “Roban 130 granadas de una base de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú,” Perú21, April 6, 2017.

[iv] “Loreto: Roban 18 fusiles de guerra de base militar en Iquitos,” Perú21, January 5, 2016.

[v] “Ministro inspecciona base militar tras robo de 18 fusiles,” RPP Noticias (Peru), January 4, 2016.

[vi] Alonaca, Jesus, “Un imputado por el robo de armas en base militar,” El Deber (Bolivia), December 11, 2015.

[vii] “Capturan a dos militares por robo de armamento en batallón de Pereira,” El Espectador, Judicial, February 2, 2015; “Ejército recupera 12 armas que fueron robadas del batallón San Mateo de Pereira,” El Espectador, Nacional, July 9, 2015.

[viii] “De base militar de Carabobo habrían robado más de 100 fusiles y lanzagranadas,” RCN Noticias, August 7, 2017; “Dos muertos dejó enfrentamiento en la 41 Brigada Blindada del Ejército en Carabobo,” La Patilla, August 6, 2017.

[ix] “Comando irrumpe en cuartel y roba armas de la Policía Estatal en Neza,” Proceso (Mexico), October 18, 2016.

[x] Pedro Tonantzin, “’Madrugan’ a policias, les roban 30 armas en cuartel de Morelos,” Excelsior (Mexico). October 5, 2017.

[xi] “Desaparecieron 28 armas que custodiaba Carabineros en la Primera Comisaría de Iquique,” SoyChile.cl, October 30, 2017.

[xii] “Un policía estaría detrás de robo de armas en Estación de Carabineros,” Noticias RCN (Colombia), December 23, 2014; “Policía sin pistas sobre responsables de robo de armas en Jicaral,” La Nacion (Costa Rica), Crimenes, May 5, 2017; “Policía incautó más de mil armas y municiones en megaoperativo,” El Comercio (Peru). April 27, 2017.

[xiii] “Detuvieron a delincuentes que planeaban asaltar cuartel en Rocha,” Radio Montecarlo, July 7, 2017.

[xiv] “Operativo en Brasil recupera 11 fusiles AK47 robados de un puesto militar boliviano,” La Razon (Bolivia), December 17, 2015.

[xv] “PDI recupera armas robadas al Ejército en Arica,” Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Publica (Chile). August 28, 2015.

[xvi] “Ejército recupera 12 armas que fueron robadas del batallón San Mateo de Pereira,” El Espectador, Nacional, July 9, 2015.

[xvii] Jesus Cornejo, “Los policías bonaerenses pierden un arma cada 48 horas,” La Nacion (Argentina), March 9, 2015.

[xviii] “86 militares y policías enjuiciados y condenados por robo de armas y granadas,” La Republica (Peru), September 29, 2015.

[xix] “Escándalo: mil armas perdidas en guarniciones militares,” Semana, June 13, 2015.

[xx] Carlos Valdivieso, “Armas de fuego en Ecuador, ”FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales), Perfil Criminológico, No.17, July 2015; “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras,” Small Arms Survey, Research Notes, No. 62, November 2016.

[xxi] This would also serve to understand better not only how many weapons are lost or stolen, but how many are also found. The author has relied on open-source news articles and reports for this analysis. Sources consulted by the author explained that a person can request ministries and specific government agencies for information regarding the incidents discussed in this analysis, but it would take time for these petitions to be processed.

[xxii] Analyzing weapon sales and weapons trafficking in Mexico is complicated due to its proximity to the United States. For example, see: German Lopez, “Where do Mexican drug cartels get their guns? The US,” VOX, January 14, 2016. Also see: Bill Chappell, “In Mexico, Tens Of Thousands Of Illegal Guns Come From The U.S.,” NPR, International, January 12, 2016. And see: John-Lindsay Poland, “How U.S. Guns Sold to Mexico End Up With Security Forces Accused of Crime and Human Rights Abuses,” The Intercept, April 16, 2018.

[xxiii] “El tráfico de armas permea la frontera norte de Ecuador,” El Comercio (Ecuador), February 19, 2018; “Autoridades ecuatorianas identifican rutas para el tráfico de armas hacia Colombia, Centroamérica y México,” Andes, June 5, 2015.

[xxiv] The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA), 1997, http://www.weaponslaw.org/instruments/1997-oas-convention-cifta.

[xxv] “Ecuador y EEUU firman convenio de cooperación en lucha contra crimen y drogas.” EFE/El Espectador, April 16, 2018.

[xxvi] “Iquitos: Dictan 6 meses de prisión preventiva para implicados en robo de fusiles | VIDEO,” La Republica (Peru), January 22, 2016.

[xxvii] “Ex carabinero procesado por extravío de armas en Iquique dijo que se matará ‘para que ese fiscal se pudra en la cárcel,’" SoyChile.cl, November 30, 2017; “Nueva polémica en Carabineros: acusan ‘montaje’ del Labocar Temuco por el Caso Armas en Iquique,” Soychile.cl, February 1, 2018.

[xxviii] Telephone conversation between the author and a Latin American military officer, March 2018, off-the-record.

[xxix] Telephone conversation between the author and a Latin American military officer, March 2018, off-the-record.

[xxx] Kristin M. Hall. “'Easy Money' Made Selling Army Weapons Stolen by US Soldiers,” Associated Press, August 31, 2017.

[xxxi] John Vandiver, “Army offering $25K reward in search for weapons stolen from Stuttgart arms room,” Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2018.

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U.S. Security Assistance to Non-State Actors: Unintended Consequences and Long-term Instability

5/18/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its authors.

Seth Binder

Robert Watson

Since the Cold War, the United States has been the dominant arms supplier in the world, providing billions per year in arms to well over 160 countries.[i] Most of the time these weapons go to the security forces of a sovereign state, but occasionally the United States has seen it in its interest to provide arms to non-state actors (NSAs), primarily rebel groups not sanctioned by their domestic state to take up arms. Despite the justifications for providing such lethal aid in the short-term, overwhelmingly the aid has not proven successful, resulting in unintended consequences and long-term instability.

There are justified reasons the United States may decide to provide security assistance to non-state actors, including support for counterterrorism operations, the responsibility to protect innocent civilians, pushback against foreign invasion, as well as other possibilities. For example, when the United States began providing the mujahideen with weapons in the 1980s, it not only helped protect innocent Afghans from callous attacks by Soviet forces, it increased the cost of the Soviet invasion until they ultimately withdrew a decade later. At a relatively low financial cost to the United States, it was able to protect lives and weaken its rival superpower.

However, even if we take the most generous view of U.S. intentions when providing security assistance and weapons to NSAs, several unintended consequences can and have occurred. In Afghanistan,[ii] the United States trained and armed fighters who later went on to join al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, which ultimately led the United States to return in 2001 where it is still fighting in a nearly two-decades long war at the cost of trillions of dollars.[iii]

More recently, the United States has been providing more than $2 billion[iv] in weapons and training to Syrian rebels, with an additional $300 million requested for fiscal year 2019.[v] The rebels’ specific task has been to help the U.S. coalition defeat the Islamic State (ISIS), but while Kurdish militias have seen success on the battlefield against ISIS, numerous reports have documented human rights abuses[vi] by U.S.-trained Syrian rebels[vii] and the diversion of U.S. provided weapons.[viii] This has perpetuated the fighting and fostered new grievances among the victims. Yet, this shouldn’t come as a surprise. U.S.-supported Nicaraguan rebels, commonly referred to as the Contras, were frequently accused of human rights abuses,[ix] and trafficking drugs and weapons.[x] But they weren’t the only ones. U.S.-supported UNITA rebels in Angola[xi] and the mujahideen in Afghanistan have also received credible allegations of human rights abuses.[xii]

Much of this comes down to the unavoidable principle-agent problem associated with the provision of arms to other forces. As the principle, the United States only has so much control over the Syrian rebels (the agent) receiving the equipment and training. The agents have different concerns, objectives, and goals, making it near impossible to guarantee arms will not be diverted, power abused, or objectives carried out.[xiii] Yet, US involvement makes it culpable.

In addition, security assistance to non-state actors is an inherently destabilizing activity. The weapons and training provided grant the recipients an extraordinary capacity for violence. Security assistance can be a powerful tool, but it is only as effective as the recipients’ capacity to receive, contain, and direct these resources toward positive ends. States often struggle to fully implement the institutional frameworks required to prevent the misapplication of assistance; the challenge for non-state actors can be even greater.[xiv]

The problem of capacity is compounded by the fact that defense articles and training have a life span that can far exceed the scope of their intended use.[xv] Arms and ammunition linger in the communities that receive them. While U.S. policy, priorities, and interests turn to other areas, the arms and training remain, potentially creating long-term instability. Arms provided to the Contras in Nicaragua have been used by drug traffickers; UNITA rebels in Angola returned to the “battlefield”;[xvi] and many of the mujahideen turned to international terrorism.

In part, this is why relations with neighboring states can be strained when providing NSAs with security assistance. But it is not the only reason. By injecting defense articles outside the pre-existing state structures, the United States undermines the “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.”[xvii] This monopoly provides the foundation for state institutions, and underpins a state’s legitimacy domestically and internationally. Unilaterally arming non-state actors upends domestic and regional security relationships already strained by conflict.

For example, relations with Turkey, a major NATO ally who sees the provision of arms to the Kurds as a direct threat, have been severely damaged by U.S. assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This has led to U.S. allies fighting each other in Syria, detracting from the mission’s original objectives and further destabilizing the region.[xviii] Former-President Obama promised there wouldn’t be mission creep,[xix] but in Syria the United States is providing training and operations support, U.S. equipment to various state and non-state actors involved in the conflict, and has attacked the Syrian regime, Russian mercenaries, and Iranian-supported militias. Now the United States is coming dangerously close to being involved in direct fighting against Turkey. All risking a further conflagration of the region.

Whether U.S. assistance has turned to short-term responses, such as U.S. support for Libyan rebels, or the long-term engagement evidenced by current U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, problems have arisen. In 1984, a Congressional resolution stated that it would be “indefensible to provide the freedom fighters [mujahideen] with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.”[xx] Now, the US is providing the “Vetted Syrian Opposition” with just enough assistance to defeat ISIS and anger nearly every ally and foe alike, but not enough assistance to decisively end the conflict against al-Assad and the Syrian regime. Despite the different policy approaches, security assistance has perpetuated and further complicated the wars, while doing nothing to address the endemic problems at the heart of the conflict.

International attempts to regulate the arming of non-state actors have been restrained by the lack of an international consensus on the definition of a “non-state actor.” The term is broad enough to include a range of groups, including armed rebels, warlords, private security companies, terrorist organizations, and even “semi” recognized states such as Taiwan and Kosovo. In 2001, John Bolton, then U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, rejected an effort to ban military aid to non-state actors defined as “irresponsible end-users of arms” on the grounds that this would “preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal government.”[xxi]

While a definition may not determine whether a group is a responsible end-user, it would give states a better idea of their own responsibility in providing weapons, and the risks associated with doing so. The Canadian delegation to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, argued for a blanket ban on arms transfers to non-state actors, and attempted to include language in the preamble that would have emphasized states’ responsibility in providing arms to non-state actors. However, due to U.S. opposition, neither effort made it into the final document.

One solution could be to forgo any UN consensus, and instead push for regional agreements. The ECOWAS Convention of 2006[xxii] and the Kinshasa Convention of 2010 define non-state actors and prohibit the transfer of small arms and light weapons to them. The ECOWAS Convention defines NSAs as “any actor other than State Actors, mercenaries, armed militias, armed rebel groups and private security companies.” By comparison, the Kinshasa Convention defines “non-state armed groups” as any group that “is not part of the formal military establishment of a state, alliance of states or intergovernmental organization and over which the state in which it operates has no control.”[xxiii] While the definitions vary significantly, they both address the risk of arming NSAs, and contribute to a customary definition for the groups themselves. Regional arms control regimes like these could discourage interstate meddling, in that parties would have a vested interest in preventing proliferation in their neighborhood(s) and could provide a unified voice against outside intervention.

Ultimately, U.S. provision of security assistance to non-state actors carries enormous risk and should only be executed as policy after thorough cost-benefit analysis that weighs short-term benefits against the likely unintended long-term consequences. Mitigation strategies must also be considered to address the inevitable consequences if in fact assistance is initiated. Non-state actors’ lack of institutional capacity, the lifespan of materiel provided, and the general inability of the United States to align its objectives with those of its non-state proxies exposes the tension between security assistance’s long and short-term goals. An internal CIA study reportedly notes that covertly arming and training rebels has rarely worked in the past.[xxiv] America’s recent covert and overt support in Syria hasn’t seemed to fair much better. While these policies have the potential to achieve short term objectives, they create lasting and long-term consequences that have too often failed to achieve peace and stability.

Seth Binder is an independent researcher focused on U.S. security assistance and arms sales. Robert Watson is a member of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s Emerging Expert program.

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[i] Arms Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (accessed April 3, 2018), .

[ii] Jason Burke “Frankenstein the CIA Created,” The Guardian, January 17, 1999.

[iii] Cost of War Project, Brown University’s Watson Institute, November 2017.

[iv] Security Assistance Monitor data on U.S. security aid to Syria, (accessed April 1, 2018).

[v] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2019 (2018, February) Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).

[vi] “We Had Nowhere Else to Go: Forced Displacements and Demolitions in Northern Syria,” Amnesty International, October 2015.

[vii] “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2014.

[viii] “US-Allied Syrian Rebel Officer Handed Trucks and Ammunition to al-Qaeda Affiliate,” Associated Press, September 23, 2015.

[ix] Doyle McManus, “Rights Groups Accuse Contras: Atrocities in Nicaragua Against Civilians Charged,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1985.

[x] “Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,” Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, December 1988.

[xi] Edward Girardet, “Angolans Describe Human Rights Abuse During Civil War,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983.

[xii] Patricia Gossman, “The Forgotten War,” Human Rights Watch, February 1991.

[xiii] Kareem Shaheen, “US-Trained Syrian Rebels Refuse to Fight al-Qaida Group After Kidnappings,” The Guardian, August 6, 2015.

[xiv] An Vranckx, “Containing diversion: arms end-use and post-delivery controls,” GRIP, April 2016.

[xv] Paul Holden, Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain the Global Arms Trade, Zed Books, February 2017.

[xvi] “Peace in Angola When Savimbi,” Afrol News, April 11, 2001.

[xvii] Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1918.

[xviii] Carlotta Gall, “72 Turkish Jets Bomb US-Backed Kurdish Militias in Syria,” New York Times, January 20, 2018.

[xix] Micah Zenko, “Your Official Mission Creep Timeline of the US War in Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2015.

[xx] “Afghan Freedom Fighters: United States Support,” 98 Statute 3499, U.S. Congressional Resolution, October 4, 1984.

[xxi] Paul Holtom, “Prohibiting Arms Transfers to Non-State Actors and the Arms Trade Treaty,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2012.

[xxii] ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, June 14, 2006.

[xxiii] Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, Kinshasa, April 30, 2010.

[xxiv] Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels,” October 14, 2014, New York Times.

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Mexico, Arms, and the Trump Administration

4/27/2017

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John Lindsay-Poland

This video blog is the sixth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

In this video interview, John Lindsay-Poland addresses three questions, at markers indicated below:

0:05 How is President Trump perceived in Mexico on arms trade issues?
1:54 What trends do you see in arms sales and end use control?
see also slides on U.S. arms sales to Mexico
4:25 What recommendations do you have?

John Lindsay-Poland is Wage Peace program coordinator with the American Friends Service Committee. Based in California, he travels frequently to and works with communities in Mexico.

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Improving Transparency and Seeking Control over the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

6/6/2016

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Natalie Goldring

This is the fifth blog post in a series on official transparency reporting, where it struggles, and the important role civil society often plays in monitoring and improving global understanding of the trade and use of conventional weapons.

The United Nations is not known for its command of acronyms. So when countries reached agreement on an instrument to control the illicit arms trade, its unwieldy title was, “The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.” In this post, I’ll use the shorthand “Programme of Action”, or “PoA’.

The Programme of Action was agreed in 2001 after a great deal of discord and acrimony, and with considerable uncertainty about its prospects. Although it still needs strengthening, fifteen years later, the PoA is a pillar of the nascent regime to exercise better control over the international arms trade. The PoA recommends action on national, regional, and global levels. The assembled governments committed themselves to addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons by developing or strengthening norms to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade, manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, with a particular emphasis on post-conflict situations and excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons.

From 6-10 June, governments will gather at the United Nations to discuss progress in implementing the Programme of Action, at the sixth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS6). One key area for improvement is taking advantage of potential points of synergy between the Programme of Action and the Arms Trade Treaty; another is fully integrating ammunition into the Programme of Action.

As part of the implementation of the Programme of Action, States are requested to report on their activities in many substantive and procedural areas. They’re asked, for example, to report on whether small arms and light weapons (SALW) are manufactured in their countries, and if so, what laws, regulations, and administrative procedures regulate SALW manufacture. They are also asked to report on issues such as stockpile security, marking and tracing weapons, and procedures governing brokering, among other issues.

As of 1 June, more than 70 countries have reported on their PoA activities over the last two years, including each of the top ten conventional arms suppliers identified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and six of the leading recipients. The country reports provide a useful starting point for discussion during the conference, as do the proposals circulated in advance by several countries and regional organizations, which are available at: www.un.org/disarmament/bms6/

The success of the conference, of course, should not be measured by the papers or the discussions. In the end, what matters is whether States have the political will and the financial and other resources to actually control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and decrease the enormous toll caused by armed violence.

Dr. Natalie Goldring is a Senior Fellow and Adjunct Full Professor with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. She also represents the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy at the United Nations on conventional weapons.

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The technology of research

5/29/2015

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Nicholas Marsh

Research on the arms trade has been transformed. In the mid-1990s a main activity involved sitting in libraries pouring over dusty books, periodicals and press clippings. Some people uncovered information through fieldwork. Then the internet arrived, and with it a deluge of information from news sites and online databases. In addition to the patience and persistence needed to hunt through libraries or interview sources, a key skill for arms trade research became the ability to manage and present in an easily comprehendible way huge quantities of textual and numerical data.

By 2011, authors working with the Small Arms Survey wrote about how video clips uploaded to YouTube and other forms of social media “contain a wealth of information that is beginning to shape public understanding of the arms trade.” Personally, I had used YouTube and other sites to locate images of arms used in the Libyan civil war, including weapons supplied by foreign powers. However, when a few of the small band of arms trade researchers got together we realized that social media presented huge problems. Watching videos and searching through them for information was very time consuming; and geo-locating and verifying their contents even more so. We earnestly wondered whether a funder would provide a grant for someone to spend all their time looking at YouTube videos, searching Facebook and tracking other online sources.

Fortunately, the solution came as a new group of researchers – often blogging in their spare time – dedicated the time and developed the methods needed to analyze videos and other material found via social media. This was made possible by a key new element of the technology of research – the ability via social media to rapidly create networks, share information, and even raise money. Eliot Higgins and the others publishing at Bellingcat are among the most prominent today at this, and they are joined by other researchers who have made globally important findings from sources of information that didn’t exist just over a decade ago.

While our knowledge has certainly advanced, there are still very important areas that are unknown or at best opaque. Outlined below are areas where the need remains to develop new technologies of research, without forgetting the contributions of written sources, databases, social media, and fieldwork.

Beyond the low hanging fruit. Arms flows into and within the wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Ukraine have understandably received a lot of attention, but there are many other wars where information from social media, databases and written sources is much more difficult to obtain or analyze – in particular sub-Saharan Africa. Fieldwork has always been an answer, but safety and more importantly resource constraints mean that it can only be carried out in a fraction of the places where it is needed. We need to develop methods to obtain more information on arms flows into and within the more difficult places to research.

Outside warfare. Most attention is understandably focused upon warfare, but by far the greatest proportion of violent deaths are homicides. The methods and flows of arms to areas with high levels of criminal violence are much less understood than to war zones with comparable levels of violent death. Analysis of these requires new data and innovative methodologies to analyze it. Some important work has been done, but much more is needed.

The Homicide Monitor interface panel. Photo: Screengrab

Repressive regimes and their weapons. An area that has been studied for a long time, but certainly needs more attention, is transfers to repressive governments. As well as items that have been studied for decades – weapons, ammunition, police equipment, and torture materials – a focus is needed on new technologies such as equipment used for mass surveillance.

Deeper questions on what matters and works. Finally, and most importantly, research has mostly focused upon working out what is being transferred to whom and how those transactions take place. These are important goals, but the information created needs to be used to answer larger questions. After over two decades of international attention on the conventional arms trade, culminating in the Arms Trade Treaty, we still need to know much more about:

What is the size of the illicit arms trade? Is it increasing or decreasing, and if so where?
Are the many national and international policy initiatives concerning the authorized trade and arms holdings actually working? If so, under what circumstances?
What kinds of arms transfers have the greatest influence upon violent death, injury, repression, corruption and other forms of harm?

Answering these requires not just more and better data, but greatly improved technologies of research in order to analyze results. Answering them is needed as research on the arms trade shouldn’t just be about working out who sent what to where, but how the arms trade affects the world around us.

Nicholas Marsh is a Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

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Trends in illicit trafficking

3/11/2015

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Nicholas Marsh

Bucking the role of shadowy arms dealers found in the popular imagination, governments and non-state groups fighting in recent high profile wars – e.g. Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Libya – get their arms from states. Supplies for rebels often come from looting state arsenals or from not-even-covert shipments organized by friendly states. Governments receive military aid or generous financing terms. Much work has been expended on conflict economies, and they are still important, but in many contemporary wars weapons can be obtained for free. The prospect of more great power confrontation raises the concerning likelihood that weapons supplies to proxies will more frequently be used as a means to try to obtain foreign policy goals.

In recent years homicide accounts for over ten times more violent deaths than warfare. Regions affected by high levels of homicide, which are often as violent as war zones, also experience high levels of illicit firearms. Crime is the most important global driver of illicit firearms ownership, use and trafficking. The acquisition of these arms is via purchases from retail shops of lawfully imported or locally produced guns; pilfering from government stocks held by the police and armed forces; and illicit cross-border trafficking. Authorized exports have been increasing to many of these countries.

Hitherto research on illicit trafficking has mainly been conducted via case studies and field work. This important work will be augmented by the systematic collection and analysis of data. Doing so will enable researchers to track global and regional trends (albeit with important caveats about data quality and comprehensiveness), and better understand the economic and political foundations of the illicit arms trade.

Nicholas Marsh is a Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

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Understanding Firearms Trafficking to Mexico and Central America - resources

Event Recap: Legal Approaches to Reduce Gun Violence -- Mexican and U.S. Strategies, August 18, 2021

The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

A Worrisome Conundrum: Latin American Defense and Security Forces and Weapons Trafficking

U.S. Security Assistance to Non-State Actors: Unintended Consequences and Long-term Instability

Mexico, Arms, and the Trump Administration

Improving Transparency and Seeking Control over the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

The technology of research

Trends in illicit trafficking

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