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Event Report: Challenges and Opportunities in Firearms Marking and Record-Keeping (February 12, 2026)

2/23/2026

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On February 12, the Forum on the Arms Trade convened a webinar exploring the critical role of firearms marking and record-keeping in stockpile management, diversion prevention, and traceability. This event brought together field investigators, policy researchers, and technical experts to examine how strengthening national systems can disrupt trafficking networks and enhance accountability. Panelists discussed the technical limitations of current marking methods, the challenges of digitizing fragmented databases, and the importance of international cooperation in line with the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The discussion bridged high-level policy perspectives with practical field experiences from West Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

Video of the event is available at: https://youtu.be/vFt4dx3NP2o
Experts shared how marking codes (such as ECOWAS standards) allow investigators to identify the point of diversion from state stockpiles to illicit groups. Case studies from Burkina Faso highlighted how marking internal components can link separate terrorist attacks to a common transit point.

The importance of tracking a weapon from manufacture or import through to destruction was emphasized. Currently, many systems only capture segments of a weapon's life, leading to "fragmented records" that hamper tracing. While new technologies like laser engraving, chemical taggants, and RFID offer precision, experts stressed that the "basics", such as moving away from paper-based systems to secure, searchable digital registries, remain an urgent priority globally. A significant portion of the webinar focused on whether modern markings can withstand obliteration, with case studies of the specifics of laser markings restored by forensic laboratories.

Panelists
  • Ashley Hamer, Senior Investigator, Conflict Armament Research
  • Callum Lloyd, Senior Project and Research Coordinator, Arquebus Europe
  • Silvia de Pedro, Project Advisor, UNLIREC
  • Natalia Pollachi, Project Manager, Sou da Paz Institute
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations

1. Accelerate the Digital Transformation of National Record-Keeping Systems

Member States are encouraged to prioritize the transition from manual or fragmented record-keeping to integrated, digital life-cycle management systems. Such modernization facilitates the creation of a "single source of truth," ensuring that national registries employ transaction-based logic to maintain a comprehensive history of ownership, upholding the principles of transparency and accountability.

2. Establish Technical Standards for Marking to Ensure Forensic Recoverability

Recognizing that the permanence of markings is vital for successful tracing, it was recommended that relevant authorities and manufacturers adopt standardized technical specifications. Specifically, to enhance the prospect of forensic recovery following attempted obliteration, experts proposed examples of best practices from their past and ongoing research. 

3. Promote the Harmonization of Data Protocols and Technical SOPs

To facilitate seamless international cooperation and information exchange, member states are urged to align their data entry protocols with globally recognized standards, such as the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table. Such harmonization minimizes discrepancies in the classification of calibers and models. Additionally, the development and institutionalization of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are essential to bridge the gap between domestic record-keeping and regional or international tracing frameworks, thereby strengthening the global response to illicit trafficking.

4. Strengthen the Capacity of National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)

States are encouraged to designate or enhance National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs) to serve as central hubs for the systematic collection and analysis of firearms data. By integrating registry information with ballistic intelligence, NFFPs can develop "proactive intelligence" capabilities. This strategic approach enables the identification of emerging trafficking trends and illicit flows in a timely manner.

Suggested Resources
​
  • Slides
    • Ashley Hamer, Conflict Armament Research (link) 
    • Callum Lloyd, Arquebus Europe (link)
    • Silvia de Pedro, UNLIREC (link)
    • Natalia Pollachi, Sou da Paz Institute (link)
  • ”International Exchange of Information in the Context of Firearms Control,” REGISYNC project, Policy Paper, October 2023.
  • “Effective and Innovative Practices among European Civilian Firearm Registries,” REGISYNC project, 2023. 
  • Bruno Langeani, Natalia Pollachi, “Blind Fire: The Rise of Military-Style Firearms amid Regulatory Failures and Data Deficiency in Brazil,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development,” September 2025.  
  • [Portuguese only] Detailed analysis of seized firearms in the Southeast region of Brazil (2018-2023), Sou da Paz. 
  • “The growing and multifaceted global threat of privately made and other non-industrial small arms and light weapons,” Working paper from Small Arms Survey, Instituto Sou da Paz, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), June 2024.
  • The FireCycle Solution https://arquebus.uk/products/firecycle/ 
  • Project VISTA https://www.projectvista.eu/ 
  • Joshua Bata and Erica Mumford, “Can Arms and Ammunition Flows Data Inform Conflict Early Warning and Early Response?” May 2023

*This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.
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Event Report - Women at the Frontlines: Integrating GBV Prevention into National and Community Arms-Control Strategies (December 4, 2025)

12/18/2025

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On December 4, the Forum on the Arms Trade convened a webinar exploring the critical intersection between gender-responsive small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, Gender-Based Violence prevention, and women’s leadership in peace and security. Organized as part of the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence (GBV), the event brought together researchers, civil society actors, and community leaders to examine how arms-control frameworks can more effectively address gendered harms. Experts highlighted how the presence and misuse of firearms significantly increase the severity and lethality of GBV across both conflict and domestic settings and how existing arms-control and security governance mechanisms remain highly militarized and masculinized, limiting their ability to address the lived realities. 

In their presentations, they shared insights into the interconnected nature of firearms-human-narcotics trafficking, noting how these illicit economies shape social, economic, and political spaces while restricting women’s participation in public and decision-making domains. Drawing from field experience, experts underscored the barriers women face in engaging with security institutions, while also demonstrating how women’s leadership contributes to uncovering gaps in accountability, particularly in relation to firearm access by convicted offenders and civilians. During Q/A session, the discussion also surfaced critical policy blind spots, including weak data management systems, insufficient firearm registries, and limited protections for survivors engaging with law enforcement. Speakers stressed that integrating women’s perspectives into SALW governance is not only a matter of inclusion but a necessary step toward more effective violence prevention and community safety.
​
Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/1Tn82Ads8wI?t=217
Panelists
  • Natalia Pollachi, Project Manager, Instituto Sou da Paz
  • Folade Mutota, Executive Director, Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD)
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations
1. Integrate GBV prevention into SALW governance frameworks

States should embed gender-responsive safeguards into licensing, stockpile management, and disarmament processes, ensuring firearms policies account for risks of domestic and gender-based violence.

2. Strengthen data systems and accountability mechanisms

Improved firearm registries, data protection standards, and information-sharing across justice institutions are essential to close loopholes that allow perpetrators continued access to weapons.

3. Invest in women’s leadership and community-based prevention

Supporting women peacebuilders, early-warning initiatives, and survivor-centered advocacy strengthens accountability and improves the effectiveness of arms-control and violence-prevention efforts.

Suggested resources
  • “Pela Vida Das Mulheres: O Papel Da Arma De Fogo Na Violencia De Genero” Instituto Souda Paz, 2025  (portuguese only)
  • “The Role Firearms Play in Violence Against Women,” Instituto Souda Paz, 2024


​* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.

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The Next Frontier of Conflict: Why 3D-Printed Weapons Will Demand Attention in 2026

12/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Monalisa Hazarika
Introduction

In recent years, assumptions about the limitations of additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, in weapons production have been steadily challenged. What was once viewed as a technological novelty, useful mainly for prototypes and hobbyist projects, has evolved into a proliferating trend in the design and manufacture of weapons, now appearing in both conflict and non-conflict settings. From the inclusion of the FGC-9 in the arsenals of the People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar to the seizure of 3D-printed firearms, magazines, and ammunition by law enforcement in Australia, 3D-printed weapons have gained growing appeal among criminals, extremist groups, and even conventional militaries facing supply-chain constraints. Whether in the hands of private individuals seeking to bypass traditional arms markets, insurgent groups innovating under resource scarcity, or military forces experimenting with on-demand logistics, 3D printing is steadily carving out space in the global arms landscape.

However, across these groups and cases, the motivations differ: bypassing traditional arms markets, enhancing operational resilience, generating symbolic or propaganda value, or pursuing necessity-driven innovation in resource-limited warfare. Yet the trend is unmistakable—what was once an experimental practice is rapidly evolving and revamping its status from peripheral curiosity to an emerging challenge within modern security architecture. And this is only the beginning.

What’s Printable?: Current Capabilities of 3D-Printed Weaponry

3D printing is beginning to alter how weapons are produced and deployed. Open-access designs now allow firearms and military components to be manufactured outside traditional supply chains, accelerating their spread and availability. While seizures have risen sharply since 2021, 3D printing is also gaining traction on the battlefield, where state and non-state forces are testing, among other things, drone frames and munitions, firearms components, and front-line repairs for cost, resilience, and operational advantage.

A lot has changed since the release of the 2013 Liberator pistol, which, while fragile and unreliable, was nonetheless a proof of concept that spurred further designs. Over a decade later, designs such as the FGC-9 semiautomatic carbine and the newer Urutau gun have revolutionised this space as they are designed to be built without any regulated parts and can be fabricated entirely with consumer 3D printers and common hardware components. FGC-9, developed by Jacob “JStark1809” Duygu and first released in 2020, has been adopted by fighters in the Myanmar civil war, where People’s Defence Forces such as the KNDF and Salingyi Special Task Force have used these weapons amid ammunition shortages. Another emerging and increasingly debated development is the prospect of 3D-printed ammunition, including experimental discussions around 9mm hollow-point rounds. While open-source, peer-reviewed literature on the successful 3D printing of bullets remains limited, online forums, blogs, and media platforms already host extensive discussions exploring the feasibility of such ammunition, underscoring how innovation in this space is often driven outside formal research or regulatory scrutiny.

However, the implications extend well beyond small arms. 3D printing is increasingly applied to drones, allowing airframes, release mechanisms, and other components to be printed on demand. This lowers costs, bypasses import restrictions, and gives its users a new degree of flexibility. What began as an experiment is fast becoming a practical tool of modern conflict, which in recent years has been seen in battlefields around the world. In Ukraine, volunteer engineers and organisations are producing drone-related hardware and munitions with AM technologies. According to recent research, 3D-printed fins and sabots are attached to grenades or explosive payloads dropped from small drones, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield. Other reports highlight the manufacture of drones like the Liberator-MK1 and MK2, a fixed-wing aircraft with a 3D-printed frame reinforced with fiberglass that can carry up to 1.5kg of explosives, used by anti-junta rebels in Myanmar. In Yemen, the Houthis militia is known to 3D-print parts of drones and missiles, while a recent UN report revealed Al-Shabaab in Somalia experimenting with 3D printing to manufacture components for adaptation of commercial unmanned aerial systems.

3D printing also extends to bombs, grenades, and other munitions. Combatants have begun manufacturing explosive devices using 3D-printed casings, fins, and stabilizing components. Notable examples include so-called “candy bombs” with 3D-printed shells filled with conventional explosives such as C4 and shrapnel; the RKG-1600 munition, modified with 3D-printed stabilizing fins and tail cones; 3D-printed mortar baseplates and stabilizers; and various components used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Beyond complete weapons, 3D printing is also used to produce parts and accessories, including pistol and rifle magazines, grips, receivers, machine gun conversion devices (MCDs), and customised equipment such as drone landing pads and components for the Gripen fighter jet.

The diffusion of AM is rapidly blurring the line between civilian and military capabilities. Commercial 3D printers, widely accessible and inexpensive, now enable the production of weapons and battlefield-relevant components, placing unprecedented strain on regulatory and law-enforcement systems. Traditional interdiction strategies built around controlling physical supply chains are becoming increasingly ineffective against decentralized, digital manufacturing. From crowdfunding weapons production to disrupted plots of mass shootings using 3D printed guns, recent cases show how quickly radicalization can pair with capability. The barrier to entry is no longer engineering expertise, but access to the internet, building materials, and time, raising urgent questions for domestic and international security alike.

Looking Ahead to 2026

As 2026 approaches, strategists warn that increasingly sophisticated polymer and mixed‑material 3D‑printed firearms will be ever harder to trace or regulate. As digital blueprints for weapons become increasingly democratized, states must review their national legislation to address the emerging threats. This would require criminalizing unauthorized production and the illicit possession, transfer, and dissemination of digital design files, in line with the UN Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action, alongside the adoption of robust national deactivation standards. Experts emphasize that the priority of 2026 should be cross-sectoral collaboration and strengthening cooperation by bringing technical expertise into policy spaces, updating national laws to address digitally enabled weapons, strengthening law enforcement capacity to detect and investigate privately made firearms, enhancing knowledge sharing, and embedding “design‑against‑crime” safeguards into weapons manufacturing. 

Thankfully, these threats are no longer off the radar and are on the agenda of diplomats, lawmakers, and research networks worldwide. The UN Programme of Action has mandated an Open‑Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG), scheduled to meet in June 2026, to address challenges posed by polymer and modular weapons and 3D printing, as well as related tracing difficulties arising from those innovations. Research institutes such as UNIDIR are hosting a series of online briefings to support substantive preparations for the OETEG, engaging the diplomatic community that will be involved in the expert meetings during the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS9). Complementary progress is also underway within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Through the Firearms Protocol and Resolution 12/3 (2024) of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, states have acknowledged emerging challenges linked to privately made firearms and new production methods, including 3D printing, and have encouraged strengthened legislation, enhanced capacity-building, and improved international cooperation to address these evolving risks.

Growing momentum in coordinated international action, paired with sustained engagement from industry actors, civil society, research bodies, and regional organizations, offers a pathway to ensure regulation keeps pace with technology while reinforcing, not replacing, the effectiveness of existing arms control measures.
Monalisa Hazarika is strategic communications and partnership officer at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University of London, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Event Report -  Armed Networks:  Understanding the Nexus of Illicit Firearms and Organized Crime Across Continents (November 13, 2025)

11/21/2025

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On November 13, the Forum on the Arms Trade hosted an event to explore the nexus between illicit firearms and organized crime across two regions: Southeast Asia and East Africa. Hosted on the margins of the International Day Against Transnational Organized Crime, experts outlined how firearms trafficking overlaps with other crimes, examples of smuggling routes and actors involved, and regional factors that shape these dynamics. In their presentations, they provided a broad understanding of the convergences in violence and illicit economies, while identifying shared challenges and distinct patterns across the regions. During the Q&A, the experts offered valuable insights into the nuances of SALW circulation, highlighting the layered actors and factors shaping consumer–producer dynamics. Their reflections also introduced a fresh way of understanding ‘organised crime’ and ‘trafficking,’ drawing attention to the complex intersections of trade, survival, and security.
​
Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/jmCZ_KK1Tuk 
Panelists
  • Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow with the China Program at the Stimson Center
  • Khristopher Carlson, Senior Researcher and Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations

Reflecting on the current gaps in policy and research, they shared the following recommendations:

1. Integrating informal networks into the analysis of illicit arms flows, not just formal ‘criminal’ actors.  

In East Africa, the networks that move weapons often overlap with legitimate economic and social systems, such as livestock trading, cross-border and seasonal migration, community protection, and local governance. Effective interventions must account for these overlapping livelihood and protection networks rather than treat illicit arms flows as the work of purely criminal groups.

2. Treat illicit arms control as a governance issue, not only a law-enforcement problem.

Disruption of illicit arms flows occurs where the local authority is legitimate and trusted. Effective policy responses should therefore strengthen accountable governance in peripheral and pastoral areas where the state is either absent, lacks capacity, or is predatory. Identifying legitimate local authorities is key in this regard.

3. Improve Oversight of Financial Flows Linked to Illicit Markets

Efforts to curb illicit SALWs would benefit from stronger oversight of financial systems that enable the acquisition and movement of weapons. Support for national authorities in meeting anti–money laundering and counter-terror finance standards can help close gaps identified by international bodies. As many transactions now move through cryptocurrencies, online scams, and informal remittance systems, targeted technical assistance and partnerships with digital service providers would be useful.

4. Reduce Diversion Risks Through Stockpile Management and Localized Engagement

Limiting diversion of small arms and ammunition requires continued investment in secure stockpile management and transparent inventory systems. Capacity-building in these areas, aligned with national priorities, can help reduce accidental leakage in challenging operating environments. Engagement with local governance actors, including those involved in ceasefire arrangements, may also strengthen awareness of diversion risks in border and transit areas.

Suggested resources
  • “Transnational Organized Crime – The Globalized Illegal Economy,” United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
  • “Illicit weapons fuelling conflicts worldwide, officials warn,” UN News, November 10, 2025
  • “Firearms and Drugs: Partners in Transnational Crime”, UNODC – Flemish Peace Institute, 2024
  • “Beyond legacy weapons: South East Asia’s illicit arms trade is diversifying”, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, June 25, 2025
  • Lauren Pinson, “Addressing the linkages between illicit arms, organized crime and armed conflict,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2022 
  • Nicolas Florquin, Sigrid Lipott, and Francis Wairagu, “Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa” Small Arms Survey, January 2019

* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.
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Manipur's 'Pumpi Guns:' Why Should We Care About Them?

12/11/2024

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Picture
This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Monalisa Hazarika
Picture
Henrique Garbino
Introduction

The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state of India, began in mid-2023 as ethnic violence erupted between the majority Meitei community, based in the Imphal Valley, and the tribal Kuki-Zo community from the surrounding hill districts. The unrest, rooted in disputes over land rights and affirmative action measures, has led to significant destruction, including over 225 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people, and the burning of thousands of homes and religious structures. Deep-seated historical grievances and recent tensions over migration and Scheduled Tribe status have intensified the violence, turning the state into a complex humanitarian crisis.

In Manipur, non-industrial weapons present yet another set of challenges to policymakers and law enforcement given their unique characteristics, the environments in which they are produced, and their users' motivations. Non-state actors with limited resources worldwide resort to them over commercial counterparts primarily for their accessibility, affordability, and anonymity. They are made from easy-to-source materials, are significantly cheaper to acquire, and lack serial numbers or standardized markings allowing them to operate under the radar. In addition to the physical characteristics, they are perceived to symbolize resourcefulness and resilience, especially in asymmetric conflicts or resistance movements.

‘Pumpi guns’ are a lesser-known, contemporary example of this phenomenon. While usually reported and clustered under ‘long-range mortars’ by Manipur law enforcement, ‘Pumpi gun’ is an umbrella term used to refer to a variety of improvised light weapons, including light cannons, light and medium mortars, and shoulder-fired grenade launchers, owing to their inherently non-standard nature. A recurring find among the weapons and other contraband seized by security forces from the ongoing violence in the state, their widespread use and novel ways of fabrication underscores a much deeper issue that needs a multilayered policy intervention.

What are Pumpi guns?

Pumpi guns are improvised weapons locally made in the Indian state of Manipur. They originated from the resistance movements of 1917-18, when they were crafted with indigenous, easy-to-source materials to fight British colonial rule. According to media reports, Pumpi guns are largely fabricated from parts of uprooted electric poles, water pipes, and galvanized iron pipes. Their production and sourcing knowledge has been passed down through generations, especially among the Kuki tribal groups. In their most rudimentary form, they are manufactured by repurposing a metal pipe or tube with a variety of make-shift stabilizing mechanisms including bi-pods, baseplates, and buttstocks to guide the projectile, which may or may not be fin-stabilized. They are chambered for both medium (20-57mm) and large-caliber ammunition (greater than 57mm) and may be either direct or indirect fire weapons.

Based on their identifiable physical characteristics, they can be classified into four major types: (i) improvised mortars; (ii) improvised cannons; (iii) improvised shoulder-fire grenade launchers; (iv) and one with multiple barrels.
PictureSource: Manipur Police, 2024. (click image for original)
Further, there seem to be striking similarities between the weapons used by the People’s Defence Force in Myanmar and Manipur’s pumpi guns. A recent video unveiled the DIY factories that are arming the anti-junta fighters and provides insights into the sourcing and manufacturing processes of improvised weapons across the Indo-Myanmar border. Given the historical and civilizational ties, and geographical proximity between Manipur and Myanmar, the transfer of knowledge and materials needed to manufacture these weapons between non-state actors is likely. Further, recent reports of 3D-printed guns found in Manipur have allegedly been trafficked from Myanmar, lending support to the existence of cross-border exchanges.

Perceived tools of resistance: One year since the Manipur Conflict

At the collective level, improvised weapons often symbolize resilience and defiance against an oppressive system. From landmines in Colombia to combat drones in Ukraine, self-narratives around improvised weapons reflect a determination to resist when denied formal means and demonstrate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of a group in duress. At the individual level, beyond self-defense and survival, owning a weapon is often linked to status in the community; reflecting gender norms and cultural traditions. In the context of armed conflicts such as in Manipur, traditional weaponry has been adapted and modernized, to now been self-seen as serving as effective tools of resistance. Armed groups rely on existing values and traditions, as well as social and economic interdependence, to manage the knowledge of weapons production and networks for their distribution.

The residents of the hill districts of Manipur are known for their prowess in improvising weapons and guerilla warfare techniques. As such, pumpi guns are an archetype of societal and community pride. Perceived as a form of resistance and self-defense, they symbolize the community’s craftsmanship and proficiency, as illustrated in social media accounts of pumpi guns’ effectiveness. They are regarded as important installments in community checkpoints and underground bunkers guarded by village youth, who allegedly undergo mandatory weapon training as part of community service. 

According to local law enforcement officials, pumpi guns are manufactured by village blacksmiths, or ‘Thih-Kheng Pa,’ as part of their community service. They are installed in trenches and bunkers built to monitor movement from long distances and are employed to create a virtual ‘geographical divide’ between the valley and hill districts of the state. As problematic as they may be to those concerned about violence, they have proved to be a strategic addition for the groups stationed at the inter-district boundaries, or the ‘buffer zone,’ to extend their area of influence, inflict serious injury to approaching security personnel, and keep infiltrators from opposing sides at bay. Pumpi guns are also used for offensive purposes to carry out raids and ambushes to gain access to strategic territories. 

Potential misfires and explosions from employing repurposed metal tubes cannot be overruled but is deemed a necessary risk its users are willing to take. There are a few media reports on injuries from shelling clubbed under “gun and mortar attacks,” which could be attributed to pumpi guns. Still, no instances of accidents with unexploded pumpi gun munitions could be found. However, the range of mortar bombs, both improvised and factory-made, recovered by Manipur Police suggests their omnipresence in the conflict.

Addressing the Challenges
​
With renewed violence in the already devastating conflict in Manipur, pumpi guns have seemed to evolve in accuracy and reliability. Modifications done in recent years make use of novel technologies and adapt to the growing needs of the warring parties. Recent reports from state security forces reveal their seemingly improved parts and components. 

In addition to the improvised weapons, the warring groups’ arsenals also feature sophisticated industrial weapons. These include INSAS, AK-type, and M-16 assault rifles, as well as No. 36 hand grenades, which have been previously looted from the government stockpiles and armories. On multiple occasions, the state police and central reserve forces have reported incidents of an estimated 5,600 arms and over 650,000 rounds of ammunition being raided by non-state actors, though it is hard to verify these figures. Pumpi guns appear to be filling in a gap in the technical capabilities of groups who may not have access to industrial alternatives.

To address the proliferation of pumpi guns and their role in the ongoing conflict in Manipur, policymakers should focus on a multi-pronged strategy that balances enforcement with socio-economic development and peacebuilding efforts. Legal reforms must prioritize stricter arms control legislation and impose severe penalties for violations. Simultaneously, enhancing the management and security of government stockpiles and armories is crucial to prevent looting by non-state actors. Advanced surveillance technologies and intelligence sharing should be leveraged to monitor the supply chain of precursor materials and dismantle illicit workshops. Combating corruption within the armed forces, police, and industries involved in the supply of critical materials remains a core challenge that must be addressed through independent oversight mechanisms. Importantly, regional cooperation with Myanmar is necessary to curb the cross-border trafficking of both weapons and precursors, as well as the transfer of knowledge among non-state actors.

Economic development initiatives should provide alternative livelihoods for those involved in illicit weapons production, especially blacksmiths and community members engaged in pumpi gun manufacturing. This could involve vocational training, financial support for sustainable enterprises, and the integration of traditional craftsmanship into legal economic activities. However, such measures alone may prove insufficient, as pumpi gun production is deeply rooted in community pride and linked to genuine grievances. Community engagement must play a central role in addressing these issues by building trust between law enforcement and local populations to encourage cooperation. Integrating rebel groups into state structures, such as law enforcement or other community-oriented roles, could also be explored as part of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework. A peacebuilding perspective is essential to resolve the underlying tensions driving conflict, ensuring that solutions are holistic and inclusive rather than solely punitive.


Monalisa Hazarika is a consultant at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University and a 2024-25 Emerging Expert.

Henrique Garbino is a doctoral candidate at the Swedish Defence University and an expert listed by the Forum.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list or emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

​
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Event Guide and Resources - Accountability for Gun Violence: What’s Next In Mexico’s Case Against U.S. Gun Manufacturers? (February 29, 2024)

3/5/2024

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On February 29, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asser Institute for International and European Law co-organized an event focused on lawsuits filed by Mexico against U.S. gun manufacturers and distributors that have important implications not only for armed violence in the United States and Mexico, but also for European and other manufacturers who produce weapons in the U.S.
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​Video of the event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDluRxQxXFA&t=351s
A guide to the recording, and suggested resources are below:

6:12 Welcome and event framing - León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Senior Researcher, Asser Institute for International and European Law, The Hague
  • “Appeals Court Revives Mexico’s Lawsuit Against Gunmakers,” New York Times, January 22, 2024. See also Transnational Litigation Blog, January 24, 2024, and Just Security, April 4, 2023.
  • "El Blindaje de las Armerías Europeas," El País, July 31, 2023. In English: "The armor of the European arms industry." 

11:35 Importance for Mexico – Fadia Ibrahim, Director of International Litigation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico 
  • Why Mexico is taking legal action… High profile events in El Paso and in Mexico, and daily gun violence. Cases in Massachusetts and Arizona. Also Inter American Commission on Human Rights (request, update).
  • Why suing in the United States, and actions of gun industry. 

23:57 Impact of U.S. Gun Policy on Mexico - Carlos Pérez Ricart, Professor of International Relations, Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE, Mexico)  
  • The relaxation of restraint on guns in the United States, particularly via termination of assault weapons ban in 2004 and enaction of Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) in 2005, had a disastrous effect in Mexico.
  • Lawsuit needs to be part of a broader strategy in Mexico (see next intervention).

31:24 Transition to discussion about recent decisions and implications on future legal action

34:00 Understanding the cases, their status, and next steps - Jonathan Lowy, Founder and President, Global Action on Gun Violence and co-counsel for Mexico on cases discussed in event  
  • Global Action on Gun Violence Work in Mexico - documents and other resources, including amicus briefs, on the two cases
  • Fundamental claim is negligence by manufacturers and distributors, and explanation why special protection under PLCAA should not apply here (under predicate exception). Defendants seeking review by Supreme Court, but believes Supreme Court will not choose to take it up. Some additional issues to take up at district court, after which discovery could take place.

43:28 Possibilities in International and U.S. Law - Leila Nadya Sadat, James Carr Professor of International Criminal Law, Washington University and Fellow, Schell Center for Human Rights, Yale Law School
  • Initially took steps at the Inter American Commission on Human Rights. 
  • Recognizes that connection between migration and flow of weapons is not made often enough. 
  • Cases are strong on facts and the harm. Latest decision is conservative and may not draw attention of Supreme Court.   
  • Supreme Court and other actions on guns, including Rahimi case and others. 

54:30 International Implications including in Europe, León Castellanos-Jankiewicz
  • European companies manufacturing on U.S. soil to skirt European laws, for example.

Reaction Round

56:35 Fadia Ibrahim
  • Importance the Mexico case proves exception to perceived PLCAA immunity and expects positive outcome.

57:47 Carlos Pérez Ricart
  • Mexico needs data, to build a central firearms authority (such as ATF in the U.S.), focus on most vulnerable groups (particularly those already harmed), make a central topic in relationship with U.S. including calling for background checks in neighbor states and border infrastructure, and create binational effort to deal with technology advances (3D printers, etc). 
  • Violence in Mexico is beyond the United States but within control of the United States. Mexico itself must have a better policies too.

1:03:00 Jonathan Lowy
  • Crisis on both sides of the border, would not happen without this gun pipeline. 

1:04:32 Leila Nadya Sadat
  • Has been a huge shift in political dialogue… no longer solely about Second Amendment but rather that is about the guns (as a vector).

1:07:03 Beginning of Q&A 

1:07:33 What is your take on the attempt of some US politicians to consider drug traffickers as terrorists? What are the impacts of this attempt on the lawsuits? 
  • 1:08:24 Carlos Pérez Ricart replies that always hear this around time of election, and it’s a political issue, and less about a real response. Not believe will impact the cases.
  • 1:09:44 Fadia Ibrahim asks would that mean that the gun industry is helping terrorist groups? 

1:10:32 Is the case a game changer? What makes the Mexico case different? 
  • 1:10:51 Jonathan Lowy replies is important because federal appeals court is upholding claims against gun manufacturers as not protected under PLCAA. Also new that a country is bringing suit. Scope of the problem is massive and if addressed would have huge impact.
1:13:17 Do you see this case having broader legal implications for weapons/arms companies exporting to countries/regimes violating international humanitarian law or engage in systematic human rights abuses?
  • 1:14:04 Leila Nadya Sadat says the Mexico case is beautifully simplistic and difficult to replicate in U.S. courts. But, international courts do communicate with each other. Notices Netherlands case on F-35, and there are international treaties involved that would be good to get the U.S. to join (such as the Arms Trade Treaty). [Note: see January event as well]

1:16:00 Possibility of other countries filing lawsuit
  • 1:16:12 Jonathan Lowy replies that if Mexico cases continues to succeed it could greatly reduce the flow of weapons in the region without other countries bringing suit because it could change practices and accountability of gun industry.

This event was co-organized by the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asser Institute for International and European Law. The Forum and the Institute provide a platform for expert views but do not themselves take positions.
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3D Printed Firearms: Prospects for International Action in 2024

1/9/2024

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
Additive manufacturing (AM), colloquially known as 3D printing, has dramatically expanded in recent years to accommodate the manufacturing and accessibility requirements of producers -- authorized and illicit alike. The speed, accuracy, and relative ease with which private actors can build parts and components of a functioning firearm have profoundly influenced the way gun ownership is regulated and have opened a Pandora’s box of forthcoming challenges. The anonymity associated with both the acquisition and use of such weapons, despite their initial set-up cost, is what makes them the weapon of choice for many individuals, especially in countries where national laws restrict the legal acquisition of firearms. Additionally, the modularity of weapon design with exchangeable components has fanned the flames for national and international law enforcement agencies by increasing the risk of misidentification as a result of multiple serial numbers appearing on different parts of the weapon. Today, there are an array of  fully 3D printed, hybrid and PKC (parts kit conversion) firearm designs made of polymer and metal components available on the internet. While not as easy as ‘Ctrl + P’, the current advent of technological innovation has blurred the barriers for acquiring a firearm, which is only bound to expand with decreasing production costs and rising quality, making them a promising alternative to a purchase on the black market.
 
A lot has changed since the single shot .380 ACP ‘Liberator’ by Defence Distributed made headlines back in 2013. The blueprints, or computed aided designs (CAD), are no longer limited to the households and workspaces of hobbyists and enthusiasts. This was established by EUROPOL, which recently helped dismantle 10 illegal firearms workshops in Canada, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom in December 2023. With recorded cases of their use in an attempted murder in Reykjavik, mass shootings in Halle synagogue, and arrests for their illicit manufacture in Indiana (in relation to ISIS) and Winnipeg, these weapons have also found their way in a major armed conflict, by the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) in Myanmar.
 
International instruments and the current state of play
 
3D-printed firearms and their components are within the scope of existing international instruments regulating the transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW), namely the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), the Firearms Protocol, and the Arms Trade Treaty, under which the method of production is irrelevant. Perhaps most important is the UN PoA adopted by all UN member states in 2001. It assembles every six years for a review conference and every two years for a biennial meeting of states to report on their progress in implementing the commitments and deliberate on novel and pressing issues regarding the illicit trade of SALW.
 
Previously in 2015, at the Second Meeting of Government Experts (MGE2), the overarching theme of discussion was the growing threat of fabrication and sharing of schematics for undetectable firearms. While some states considered it exaggerated given their operational limits constraining major dangers in the years ahead, others appraised it to be an imminent threat.
 
At the 3rd Review Conference (RevCon3), which took place in 2018, states noted the recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design and welcomed initiatives that raise awareness of possible associated risks, notably the difficulties encountered in marking and tracing these “ghost” guns. They agreed to streamline relevant national laws, regulations, and administrative procedures and strengthen cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement agencies to prohibit their illicit trade across online platforms and the dark web. Pushback was seen in the inclusion of “3D printing, polymer, and modular weapons” in the draft outcome document, with states expressing concerns over their explicit mention inhibiting their access to technology and how the situation was not as dire as being portrayed. While a  technical annex to the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) was proposed during RevCon3, it was ultimately dropped. Suggestions of using less aggressive and generic language and removing the paragraphs altogether suggest a lack of agreement on the severity of the issue, let alone a consensus to adopt measures for the changing security landscape. Despite the back and forth on the language used, from “distributed manufacturing” to “additive manufacturing," the outcome document had no reference to 3D printing and backtracked on the limited progress made by states who had pushed for more.
 
During the seventh and eighth Biennial Meeting of States (in 2021 and 2022, respectively), the topic of new and emerging technology, remained a contested locus among states for being “overly specific” on the implications of 3D printing for arms production. More recently, at the 78th UN General Assembly meeting in 2023, states discussed the sobering impact of conventional weapons, including the proliferation trends associated with 3D printing without engaging in a deeper dive into the affair.
 
Projections for 2024
 
The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has since 2022 launched a multiyear project for advancing global policies and commitments in the context of RevCon4 of the UN PoA, undertaking “New technologies and innovation – challenges and opportunities for the UN PoA and ITI'' as one of its 3-pillar approaches. A noteworthy agenda item from the BMS8 Outcome Document for the upcoming conference scheduled for June 2024 is to reflect on the UN Secretariat proposal for the establishment of an open-ended technical expert group to assess recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design of modular and polymer weapons and 3D printing.
 
RevCon4 presents an opportunity to assess the current state of play in the use and misuse of technology and, alternatively, how new monitoring technologies could be used to effectively track and control SALW throughout their entire life cycle. Substantial progress is anticipated under the leadership of President-designate of RevCon4, Amb. Maritza Chan, on ways of addressing the impact of new technologies, among other topics, with a series of expert-level roundtable discussions and regional preparatory meetings taking place over the next three months.
 
Some experts are of the opinion that the UN PoA and its ITI are too weak and inflexible to address the problem of illicit trade and manufacture of firearms posed by additive manufacturing due to their “vague or unelaborated” commitments and agreements, which are politically and not legally binding. However, doing away with the existing frameworks will not garner any strategic advantage unless replaced by a more effective mechanism, which is easier said than done. Getting states to agree on a legally binding text is an arduous task requiring years of negotiation and diplomatic deliberations, which at the end may result in a loss of critical momentum and a watered-down version. Instead, employing the same resources to revive trust in the efficacy of the existing frameworks, such as the PoA, by strengthening their ability to fulfill the aims that are reflected in the purpose and object of their text, could potentially yield more robust results.
 
Even though the issues surrounding additive manufacturing may appear incidental, their growing usage across fields merits greater consideration than the lowest common denominator and should be on the radar of security analysts. By bolstering existing norms and regulations and keeping them relevant to emerging threats, progress can be ensured on issues that have already been identified and anticipated in this sphere.
 
 
 
Monalisa Hazarika is an Intern at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and holds a M.A. in Conflict Management and Development from Banaras Hindu University, India. She is one of the #Leaders4Tomorrow & Leaders2theFuture under the UNODA’s Youth4Disarmament initiative.
 
​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Free Carrying of Firearms: A Dangerous New Trend in the Argentine Presidential Campaign

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión original en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.
For the first time in Argentine history, the free carrying of firearms has become a topic of debate in a presidential election campaign. Why is this happening in one of the countries with the lowest homicide rates in Latin America and internationally recognized for its disarmament program? Does the citizenry desire firearms or security?
 
Insecurity has been one of the most concerning issues for Argentine society for over 20 years. During that same period, public policies regarding the control of firearms and disarmament have experienced unprecedented development in our country. The understanding that firearms are not a source of security but rather a factor that jeopardizes it has, for the first time, become a central topic of discussion on the electoral agenda.
 
"I am definitely in favor of the free carrying of firearms," said former deputy Javier Milei in 2022, who is now a presidential candidate and emerged as the most voted for candidate in the primary elections. However, this eccentric outsider, a follower of Trump and Bolsonaro, is not the only member of his party who publicly expressed such views. His vice-presidential candidate admitted to being a firearm user and stated that ownership is a "right" for "law-abiding citizens who want to defend themselves." While the controversy surrounding these statements led these candidates to downplay their remarks, the electoral platform presented by the candidate at the beginning of his presidential campaign proposed, regarding firearm ownership, the "deregulation of the legal market and the protection of its legitimate and responsible use by citizens."
 
"Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed."

Milei is not the first Argentine politician to raise this debate. Five years ago, the then Minister of Security and current presidential candidate for the other major opposition front, Patricia Bullrich, had said in an informal interview outside a restaurant, "Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed; whoever doesn't want to be armed, shouldn't be armed. Argentina is a free country." While her complete statement added that she and her party preferred that people not be armed, controversy quickly erupted. For the first time, the absolute political consensus regarding the need to restrict access to firearms was called into question.
 
Beyond their ambivalences, two of the three main presidential candidates in Argentina have expressed support for free carrying. Can it be inferred that Argentine society has changed its view on firearms? The answer is not so simple. However, there are signs that the public's demand for security does not translate into support for free carrying.
 
Argentina is not a heavily armed country. Its rate of 7.4 firearms per 100,000 civilians is, according to the Small Arms Survey, lower than most countries in the region. A recent nationwide survey conducted in May 2023 reflected that 77% of respondents were against "the free carrying of firearms." The society's participation in the disarmament program allowed for the removal of over 200,000 firearms from circulation between 2007 and 2022. Due to the results achieved in its early years, this program was internationally recognized as a model policy in 2013.
 
The laws on firearm restriction passed in the National Congress in recent years also reflect this consensus, with virtually unanimous votes in favor of firearm control and disarmament. However, the last extension of the disarmament program, voted on in 2021, already sounded an alarm: while 93% of deputies voted in favor, votes against the renewal of the program were recorded for the first time, even though it had been extended seven times before.
 
An initial conclusion from this data, pending the final results of the presidential elections, is that Argentine society remains predominantly opposed to firearms. However, it can also be inferred that, like in other countries, the threshold of rejection of pro-arms rhetoric may have decreased, even if only relatively, in recent years. It is true that voting for a presidential candidate does not necessarily mean support for all of their proposals, but it probably does indicate a tolerance for most of them.
 
If this hypothesis is correct, it is necessary to pay attention to this symptom. While Argentina has a well-established social, institutional, and cultural tradition of restricting the circulation of firearms, recent experiences in other Latin American countries demonstrate how easily such controls can be undermined.
 
What's Happening with Firearms in Argentina?

Argentina currently has around 1,000,000 legally registered firearm users, although most of them are in a situation of illegality due to expired authorizations. Additionally, it is estimated that, including unregistered firearms, the total number of firearms could be three to four times the 1,700,000 recorded in official records.
 
Between 2011 and 2019, an average of 8 people per day died in Argentina as a result of firearm use. One out of every two intentional homicides in Argentina is committed with a firearm. In 2021, 76% of intentional homicides in Argentina were recorded without the involvement of other crimes.
 
Firearms are also used for gender-based violence. In general, women and gender-diverse individuals do not possess firearms (as 97% of registered users are males), but they disproportionately suffer the consequences: 1 out of every 4 femicides is committed with a firearm.
 
Since 2015, Argentina has a model law at the regional level that created and regulates the National Agency for Controlled Materials, responsible not only for the registration and control of the legal firearms market but also for "developing policies aimed at reducing the circulation of firearms in civil society and preventing the effects of armed violence" (Law 27,192). Among other functions, this agency is responsible for implementing the mentioned National Voluntary Firearm Surrender Plan. The creation of the agency was a significant advancement in this regard, although the law is still not fully implemented, as the agency lacks sufficient budgetary resources to carry out all the actions it is responsible for.
 
The Risks of Free Carrying

Various studies confirm that an increased presence of firearms in society, far from reducing crime (as stated by Milei himself), contributes to an increase in violence, crime, and deaths. Conversely, control policies are associated with a reduction in these problems. The case of the United States, the country with the highest civilian firearm ownership in the world (120 firearms per 100 people), is illustrative. Its homicide rate was 7.5 times higher than the rate in other high-income countries, which is often attributed to its firearm homicide rate, which is nearly 25 times higher. From mass shootings, some of them in schools, to a higher number of suicides and femicides, the effects of the free circulation of firearms have been widely verified in other countries.
 
Insecurity is undoubtedly a central problem for Argentine society. Even though its homicide rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries, the LAPOP survey reflects that it is one of the three countries in the region with the highest number of respondents reporting being victims of crime in 2021. Crime has been a top concern for Argentine citizens for years.
 
However, there is no serious indication that the demand for more security implies a desire among the citizenry to carry firearms. Discussions about the role of the state, primarily focused on economic policy, cannot be linearly transferred to security policies. Even those sectors with a more reductionist view of the size of the state have historically been in favor of recognizing the state's role in monopolizing the use of force.
 
Therefore, whoever assumes office in December will have a dual responsibility. On one hand, they must develop effective security policies to reduce crime rates and the perception of insecurity. On the other hand, they must ensure the validity and extension of firearm restriction policies in the face of voices seeking to downplay the significant risks of loosening firearm regulations.
 
Society is not asking for firearms; it is asking for security. And the data demonstrates that more firearms equate to less security.
​
Julián Alfie is Deputy Executive Director of the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP), based in Argentina.

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Libre portación de armas: una peligrosa novedad en la campaña presidencial de Argentina

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Voces de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes (see English translation)
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Esta publicación forma parte de una serie especial de contribuciones al blog "Mirando hacia el Futuro" realizadas por miembros de los programas de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro.
Por primera vez en la historia argentina, la libre portación de armas de fuego ha sido tema de debate en una campaña electoral presidencial. ¿Por qué sucede esto en uno de los países con menor tasa de homicidios de América Latina y premiado internacionalmente por su programa de desarme? ¿La ciudadanía quiere armas o seguridad?

La inseguridad es, desde hace más de 20 años, uno de los temas que más preocupa a la sociedad argentina. En ese mismo lapso, las políticas públicas de control de armas de fuego y desarme tuvieron un inédito desarrollo en nuestro país. La comprensión de que las armas no son una fuente de seguridad, sino un factor que la pone en riesgo aparece, por primera vez, como un eje de discusión en la agenda electoral.

“Estoy a favor de la libre portación de armas, definitivamente”, dijo en 2022 el entonces diputado Javier Milei, hoy candidato presidencial, que resultó el más votado en las elecciones primarias. Pero este excéntrico outsider, seguidor de Trump y Bolsonaro, no es el único integrante de su partido que se expresó públicamente en ese sentido. Su candidata a vicepresidenta admitió ser usuaria de armas y opinó que la tenencia es un “derecho” para “el ciudadano de bien que se quiera defender”. Si bien la polémica que desataron esas declaraciones llevaron a esos candidatos a relativizar sus dichos, lo cierto es que la plataforma electoral presentada por el candidato al comienzo de su campaña presidencial planteaba, sobre la tenencia de armas de fuego, la “desregulación del mercado legal y proteger su uso legítimo y responsable por parte de la ciudadanía”.
 
“El que quiera andar armado, que ande armado”

Milei no es el primer político argentino en plantear este debate. 5 años atrás, la entonces Ministra de Seguridad y actual candidata a presidenta por el otro gran frente opositor –Patricia Bullrich-  había dicho, en una entrevista informal a la salida de un restaurante, que “el que quiera estar armado, que ande armado; el que no quiera estar armado, que no ande armado. La Argentina es un país libre”. Si bien su frase completa añadía que ella y su espacio preferían que la gente no estuviera armada, la polémica no tardó en estallar. Por primera vez se ponía en duda el absoluto consenso político respecto a la necesidad de restringir el acceso a las armas de fuego.

Más allá de sus ambivalencias, dos de los tres principales candidatos a ocupar la Presidencia de Argentina tuvieron expresiones favorables a la libre portación. ¿Puede inferirse que la sociedad argentina cambió su mirada sobre las armas? La respuesta no es tan sencilla. Sin embargo, existen señales de que el reclamo de la ciudadanía por seguridad no se traduce en un apoyo a la libre portación.

Argentina no es un país armado. Su tasa de 7.4 armas de fuego en manos de civiles cada 100 habitantes se encuentra, según Small Arms Survey, por debajo de la mayoría de los países de la región. Una reciente encuesta realizada en mayo de 2023 a nivel nacional reflejó que el 77% de las personas encuestadas se mostró en contra de “la libre portación de armas de fuego”. La participación de la sociedad en el plan de desarme permitió quitar de circulación más de 200.000 armas de fuego entre 2007 y 2022. Por los resultados alcanzados durante sus primeros años, en 2013 ese programa fue premiado a nivel internacional como una política modelo.

Las leyes sobre restricción de armas de fuego aprobadas en el Congreso de la Nación en los últimos años también reflejan ese consenso, con votaciones afirmativas al control de armas y el desarme prácticamente unánimes. Sin embargo, la última prórroga del plan de desarme, votada en 2021, ya había dado una señal de alerta: si bien el 93% de los diputados votó a favor, por primera vez se registraron votos en contra de la renovación de ese programa, que ya había sido prorrogado en 7 oportunidades anteriormente.

Una conclusión inicial de estos datos, a la espera del resultado definitivo de las elecciones presidenciales, es que la sociedad argentina sigue siendo mayoritariamente contraria a las armas de fuego. Pero también es posible inferir que, al igual que en otros países, el umbral de rechazo a los discursos armamentistas puede haber disminuido, aunque sea relativamente, en los últimos años. Es cierto que el voto a un candidato a presidente no significa un apoyo a todas sus propuestas; pero probablemente sí indique, aunque sea, una tolerancia a la mayoría de ellas.

Si la hipótesis es cierta, es necesario prestarle atención a este síntoma. Si bien Argentina cuenta con una tradición social, institucional y cultural consolidadamente restrictiva de la circulación de las armas de fuego, recientes experiencias en otros países latinoamericanos demuestran la facilidad con la que esos controles pueden socavarse.
 
¿Qué pasa con las armas en Argentina?

Argentina actualmente tiene alrededor de 1.000.000 de usuarios de armas de fuego legalmente registrados, aunque la mayoría de ellos se encuentra en una situación de ilegalidad por tener su autorización vencida. Además, se estima que, incluyendo las armas de fuego no registradas, el número total de armas podría triplicar o cuadruplicar a las 1.7000.000 que constan en los registros oficiales.

Entre 2011 y 2019, en Argentina murieron en promedio 8 personas por día por la utilización de armas de fuego. Uno de cada dos homicidios dolosos en Argentina es producido con un arma de fuego. El 76% de los homicidios dolosos producidos en Argentina en 2021 se registraron sin concurrencia de otros delitos.

Las armas de fuego también son utilizadas para el ejercicio de violencias por motivos de género. En general, las mujeres y disidencias sexogenéricas no poseen armas de fuego (ya que el 97% de los usuarios registrados son varones), pero sí sufren desproporcionadamente sus consecuencias: 1 de cada 4 femicidios es cometido con armas de fuego.

Desde 2015, Argentina cuenta con una Ley modelo a nivel regional, que creó y regula la Agencia Nacional de Materiales Controlados, que tiene a su cargo no sólo el registro y control del mercado legal de armas, sino también “el desarrollo de políticas tendientes a reducir el circulante de armas en la sociedad civil y prevenir los efectos de la violencia armada” (Ley 27.192). Entre otras funciones, esa Agencia tiene a su cargo la implementación del mencionado Plan Nacional de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego. La creación de la Agencia fue un enorme avance en la materia, aunque lo cierto es que la ley sigue sin implementarse en su totalidad, ya que el organismo sigue sin contar con los recursos presupuestarios suficientes para implementar todas las acciones que tiene a su cargo.
 
Los riesgos de la libre portación

Diversos estudios confirman que la mayor presencia de armas de fuego en una sociedad, lejos de disminuir el delito (como afirmó el propio Milei), contribuyen al aumento de la violencia, el delito y las muertes. Y, a la inversa, las políticas de control se relacionan con una reducción de esos problemas. El caso de EEUU, el país con más armas de fuego en manos de civiles del mundo (120 armas por cada 100 personas), es paradigmático. Su tasa de homicidios fue 7.5 veces mayor a la tasa de otros países de altos ingresos, lo cual suele atribuirse a su tasa de homicidios con armas de fuego, que es casi 25 veces mayor. Desde matanzas masivas, algunas de ellas en escuelas, hasta un mayor número de suicidios y femicidios, los efectos de la libre circulación de armas de fuego han sido ampliamente verificados en otros países.

​La inseguridad es, sin lugar a duda, un problema central para la sociedad argentina. Aun cuando su tasa de homicidios sea relativamente baja en relación a otros países de América Latina, la encuesta realizada por LAPOP refleja que es uno de los tres países de la región con mayor cantidad de encuestados que reportan haber sido víctimas de la delincuencia en 2021. La delincuencia se ubica dese hace años en el podio de preocupaciones de la ciudadanía argentina. 

Sin embargo, no existen indicios serios de que el reclamo por más seguridad signifique que la ciudadanía quiera portar armas. Las discusiones sobre cuál debe ser el rol del Estado, principalmente centradas en la política económica, no pueden trasladarse linealmente a las políticas de seguridad. Incluso aquellos sectores con una visión más reduccionista del tamaño estatal han sido históricamente favorables a reconocerle el rol de monopolizar el uso de la fuerza.

Por lo tanto, quien asuma el gobierno en diciembre tendrá una doble responsabilidad. Por un lado, desarrollar políticas de seguridad eficaces, que permitan reducir los índices de criminalidad y la percepción de inseguridad. Y, por el otro, garantizar la vigencia y la extensión de las políticas de restricción de las armas de fuego, ante la aparición de voces que buscan relativizar los enormes riesgos de liberar las armas.
​
La sociedad no pide armas, pide seguridad. Y los datos demuestran que más armas implica menos seguridad.
​
Julián Alfie es Subdirector Ejecutivo del Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (INECIP).

La inclusión en el programa de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro sobre el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estas publicaciones no indican acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas representan las vistas de los autor(es) de cada publicación.
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Understanding Firearms Trafficking to Mexico and Central America - resources

4/6/2022

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On March 24, 2022, a number of experts shared resources in a closed meeting on firearms trafficking to Mexico and Central America, building in part off of recent publications by the Government Accountability Office, including Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis and Firearms Trafficking: More Information is Needed to Inform U.S. Efforts in Central America. The information presented brought to the conversation additional data as well as recommendations for possible U.S. Congressional action.
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The slides of those briefings are below and named experts can be contacted directly.
  • John Lindsay-Poland-  Us Firearms Exports to Mexico & Central America
  • Susan Waltz- Firearms Trafficking to Central America: Inspecting the data for Guatemala and considerations for Congressional action
  • Eugenio Weigend Vargas-  Beyond our Borders: U.S. Guns Contribute to Violent Crime Abroad
 
Inclusion of these resources does not indicate endorsement or agreement with others. The Forum on the Arms Trade does not take positions, but does share resources by its listed experts and others, as part of its goal to provide resources for strengthening public efforts to address the humanitarian, economic and other implications of arms transfers, security assistance, and weapons use.
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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