Category: Africa

Weapons for peace? What to expect in 2021 from the EU’s new ‘peace facility’

1/11/2021

This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Roy Isbister

Frank Slijper

Just before the close of 2020, EU member states’ foreign ministries reached agreement over the set-up of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to pay for "external action having military or defence implications". It is meant to "swiftly respond to crises and conflicts" and "to empower partner countries". Its initial focus is expected to be on Africa, however its potential reach is global. While only half the size of its original ask (due to some nervousness about the basic concept and larger budgetary constraints), the EPF still provides for € 5 billion to be spent over the next seven years, including on controversial ‘train and equip’ packages. By establishing this as an ‘off-budget’ facility, member states are circumventing EU treaties under which the EU budget cannot be used to provide arms. The type of arms envisaged as being suitable for transfer under the EPF include those frequently causing the most harm and most at risk of misuse and diversion in fragile contexts, such as small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, armoured vehicles, etc.

Civil society organisations, including ours, have long argued against the EPF, as recent history suggests that providing weapons and ammunition to security forces in fragile states is more likely to exacerbate than solve local and regional conflicts. As we argued, along with twelve other organisations in a 2019 letter to the EU foreign policy chief, and in a November 2020 statement from 40 civil society organisations from around the world, we have seen little evidence that military-focused ‘train and equip’ efforts lead to improved peace, justice, and development outcomes. On the contrary, experience demonstrates that this type of military assistance can harm peace and development and rarely provides its intended leverage. It often fails to address the underlying drivers of conflict and can instead be counterproductive, leading to unintended consequences, such as the violent repression of peaceful civil society actions, furthering the impunity of military forces, fomenting military-backed violence and conflict, and corruption.

The initial focus of the EPF is likely to be in Africa, possibly in the Sahel, where Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have set up a joint force known as the G5 with 5,000 troops to confront jihadists. Somalia and the Central African Republic have also been mentioned as potential beneficiaries.

Whereas German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas calls the EPF “a fundamental investment in peace and stability that will allow the EU and its partners to effectively and flexibly address international crises”, there is reason to be wary that the EPF will be used to advance the interests of EU member states more than and potentially at the expense of the security of the people affected by crises. Time and again we have seen examples of military aid transferred to further European geopolitical interests rather than in support of the human security needs of people in fragile states.

Recent statements by key European figures strengthen such fears. Speaking about the EPF in February 2020, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stated: "We need guns, we need arms, we need military capacities and that is what we are going to help provide to our African friends because their security is our security. […] We are not going to grow, we are not going to invest, we are not going to create jobs without stability". In December 2020, President Emmanuel Macron of France (which has been a leading proponent of the EPF) said in a joint press conference with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi that he “will not condition matters of defence and economic cooperation on ... disagreements (over human rights).” While this was not in the direct context of the EPF, it nevertheless raises obvious and significant concerns about how the EPF will be used.

Beyond its fundamental conceptual failings, the EPF as it stands now also has numerous operational shortcomings. These include a lack of transparency, both in decision-making as well as public reporting; weak and permissive safeguards against ‘misuse’; a lack of meaningful involvement of local people affected by crises and insecurity (in support of whom EPF actions will ostensibly be undertaken), at any point in the process; and a weak due-diligence framework to ensure the Facility’s activities are conducted in accordance with international law.

Instead of establishing a strong framework of safeguards within the EPF itself to pritoritise the protection of civilians and their rights, member states have instead chosen to push decisions on these matters downstream, such that they will be decided politically for each assistance measure under the Facility. This means that maintaining high standards on arms transfers, strict application of international law and effective oversight will be vulnerable to political pressure and excessive secrecy.

The unresolved weaknesses of the EPF are risking the EU’s self-styled reputation as a force for good. However, little resistance to its adoption is expected from either the European Parliament or national parliaments, if they have a say at all. Therefore, as so often, it seems it will fall to civil society to hold member states to account.

Roy Isbister heads the Arms Unit at Saferworld, based in the United Kingdom, leading their work on conventional arms.

Frank Slijper leads the Arms Trade project at PAX, based in the Netherlands.

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U.S. Security Assistance to Non-State Actors: Unintended Consequences and Long-term Instability

5/18/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its authors.

Seth Binder

Robert Watson

Since the Cold War, the United States has been the dominant arms supplier in the world, providing billions per year in arms to well over 160 countries.[i] Most of the time these weapons go to the security forces of a sovereign state, but occasionally the United States has seen it in its interest to provide arms to non-state actors (NSAs), primarily rebel groups not sanctioned by their domestic state to take up arms. Despite the justifications for providing such lethal aid in the short-term, overwhelmingly the aid has not proven successful, resulting in unintended consequences and long-term instability.

There are justified reasons the United States may decide to provide security assistance to non-state actors, including support for counterterrorism operations, the responsibility to protect innocent civilians, pushback against foreign invasion, as well as other possibilities. For example, when the United States began providing the mujahideen with weapons in the 1980s, it not only helped protect innocent Afghans from callous attacks by Soviet forces, it increased the cost of the Soviet invasion until they ultimately withdrew a decade later. At a relatively low financial cost to the United States, it was able to protect lives and weaken its rival superpower.

However, even if we take the most generous view of U.S. intentions when providing security assistance and weapons to NSAs, several unintended consequences can and have occurred. In Afghanistan,[ii] the United States trained and armed fighters who later went on to join al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, which ultimately led the United States to return in 2001 where it is still fighting in a nearly two-decades long war at the cost of trillions of dollars.[iii]

More recently, the United States has been providing more than $2 billion[iv] in weapons and training to Syrian rebels, with an additional $300 million requested for fiscal year 2019.[v] The rebels’ specific task has been to help the U.S. coalition defeat the Islamic State (ISIS), but while Kurdish militias have seen success on the battlefield against ISIS, numerous reports have documented human rights abuses[vi] by U.S.-trained Syrian rebels[vii] and the diversion of U.S. provided weapons.[viii] This has perpetuated the fighting and fostered new grievances among the victims. Yet, this shouldn’t come as a surprise. U.S.-supported Nicaraguan rebels, commonly referred to as the Contras, were frequently accused of human rights abuses,[ix] and trafficking drugs and weapons.[x] But they weren’t the only ones. U.S.-supported UNITA rebels in Angola[xi] and the mujahideen in Afghanistan have also received credible allegations of human rights abuses.[xii]

Much of this comes down to the unavoidable principle-agent problem associated with the provision of arms to other forces. As the principle, the United States only has so much control over the Syrian rebels (the agent) receiving the equipment and training. The agents have different concerns, objectives, and goals, making it near impossible to guarantee arms will not be diverted, power abused, or objectives carried out.[xiii] Yet, US involvement makes it culpable.

In addition, security assistance to non-state actors is an inherently destabilizing activity. The weapons and training provided grant the recipients an extraordinary capacity for violence. Security assistance can be a powerful tool, but it is only as effective as the recipients’ capacity to receive, contain, and direct these resources toward positive ends. States often struggle to fully implement the institutional frameworks required to prevent the misapplication of assistance; the challenge for non-state actors can be even greater.[xiv]

The problem of capacity is compounded by the fact that defense articles and training have a life span that can far exceed the scope of their intended use.[xv] Arms and ammunition linger in the communities that receive them. While U.S. policy, priorities, and interests turn to other areas, the arms and training remain, potentially creating long-term instability. Arms provided to the Contras in Nicaragua have been used by drug traffickers; UNITA rebels in Angola returned to the “battlefield”;[xvi] and many of the mujahideen turned to international terrorism.

In part, this is why relations with neighboring states can be strained when providing NSAs with security assistance. But it is not the only reason. By injecting defense articles outside the pre-existing state structures, the United States undermines the “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.”[xvii] This monopoly provides the foundation for state institutions, and underpins a state’s legitimacy domestically and internationally. Unilaterally arming non-state actors upends domestic and regional security relationships already strained by conflict.

For example, relations with Turkey, a major NATO ally who sees the provision of arms to the Kurds as a direct threat, have been severely damaged by U.S. assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This has led to U.S. allies fighting each other in Syria, detracting from the mission’s original objectives and further destabilizing the region.[xviii] Former-President Obama promised there wouldn’t be mission creep,[xix] but in Syria the United States is providing training and operations support, U.S. equipment to various state and non-state actors involved in the conflict, and has attacked the Syrian regime, Russian mercenaries, and Iranian-supported militias. Now the United States is coming dangerously close to being involved in direct fighting against Turkey. All risking a further conflagration of the region.

Whether U.S. assistance has turned to short-term responses, such as U.S. support for Libyan rebels, or the long-term engagement evidenced by current U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, problems have arisen. In 1984, a Congressional resolution stated that it would be “indefensible to provide the freedom fighters [mujahideen] with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.”[xx] Now, the US is providing the “Vetted Syrian Opposition” with just enough assistance to defeat ISIS and anger nearly every ally and foe alike, but not enough assistance to decisively end the conflict against al-Assad and the Syrian regime. Despite the different policy approaches, security assistance has perpetuated and further complicated the wars, while doing nothing to address the endemic problems at the heart of the conflict.

International attempts to regulate the arming of non-state actors have been restrained by the lack of an international consensus on the definition of a “non-state actor.” The term is broad enough to include a range of groups, including armed rebels, warlords, private security companies, terrorist organizations, and even “semi” recognized states such as Taiwan and Kosovo. In 2001, John Bolton, then U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, rejected an effort to ban military aid to non-state actors defined as “irresponsible end-users of arms” on the grounds that this would “preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal government.”[xxi]

While a definition may not determine whether a group is a responsible end-user, it would give states a better idea of their own responsibility in providing weapons, and the risks associated with doing so. The Canadian delegation to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, argued for a blanket ban on arms transfers to non-state actors, and attempted to include language in the preamble that would have emphasized states’ responsibility in providing arms to non-state actors. However, due to U.S. opposition, neither effort made it into the final document.

One solution could be to forgo any UN consensus, and instead push for regional agreements. The ECOWAS Convention of 2006[xxii] and the Kinshasa Convention of 2010 define non-state actors and prohibit the transfer of small arms and light weapons to them. The ECOWAS Convention defines NSAs as “any actor other than State Actors, mercenaries, armed militias, armed rebel groups and private security companies.” By comparison, the Kinshasa Convention defines “non-state armed groups” as any group that “is not part of the formal military establishment of a state, alliance of states or intergovernmental organization and over which the state in which it operates has no control.”[xxiii] While the definitions vary significantly, they both address the risk of arming NSAs, and contribute to a customary definition for the groups themselves. Regional arms control regimes like these could discourage interstate meddling, in that parties would have a vested interest in preventing proliferation in their neighborhood(s) and could provide a unified voice against outside intervention.

Ultimately, U.S. provision of security assistance to non-state actors carries enormous risk and should only be executed as policy after thorough cost-benefit analysis that weighs short-term benefits against the likely unintended long-term consequences. Mitigation strategies must also be considered to address the inevitable consequences if in fact assistance is initiated. Non-state actors’ lack of institutional capacity, the lifespan of materiel provided, and the general inability of the United States to align its objectives with those of its non-state proxies exposes the tension between security assistance’s long and short-term goals. An internal CIA study reportedly notes that covertly arming and training rebels has rarely worked in the past.[xxiv] America’s recent covert and overt support in Syria hasn’t seemed to fair much better. While these policies have the potential to achieve short term objectives, they create lasting and long-term consequences that have too often failed to achieve peace and stability.

Seth Binder is an independent researcher focused on U.S. security assistance and arms sales. Robert Watson is a member of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s Emerging Expert program.

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[i] Arms Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (accessed April 3, 2018), .

[ii] Jason Burke “Frankenstein the CIA Created,” The Guardian, January 17, 1999.

[iii] Cost of War Project, Brown University’s Watson Institute, November 2017.

[iv] Security Assistance Monitor data on U.S. security aid to Syria, (accessed April 1, 2018).

[v] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2019 (2018, February) Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).

[vi] “We Had Nowhere Else to Go: Forced Displacements and Demolitions in Northern Syria,” Amnesty International, October 2015.

[vii] “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2014.

[viii] “US-Allied Syrian Rebel Officer Handed Trucks and Ammunition to al-Qaeda Affiliate,” Associated Press, September 23, 2015.

[ix] Doyle McManus, “Rights Groups Accuse Contras: Atrocities in Nicaragua Against Civilians Charged,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1985.

[x] “Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,” Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, December 1988.

[xi] Edward Girardet, “Angolans Describe Human Rights Abuse During Civil War,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983.

[xii] Patricia Gossman, “The Forgotten War,” Human Rights Watch, February 1991.

[xiii] Kareem Shaheen, “US-Trained Syrian Rebels Refuse to Fight al-Qaida Group After Kidnappings,” The Guardian, August 6, 2015.

[xiv] An Vranckx, “Containing diversion: arms end-use and post-delivery controls,” GRIP, April 2016.

[xv] Paul Holden, Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain the Global Arms Trade, Zed Books, February 2017.

[xvi] “Peace in Angola When Savimbi,” Afrol News, April 11, 2001.

[xvii] Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1918.

[xviii] Carlotta Gall, “72 Turkish Jets Bomb US-Backed Kurdish Militias in Syria,” New York Times, January 20, 2018.

[xix] Micah Zenko, “Your Official Mission Creep Timeline of the US War in Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2015.

[xx] “Afghan Freedom Fighters: United States Support,” 98 Statute 3499, U.S. Congressional Resolution, October 4, 1984.

[xxi] Paul Holtom, “Prohibiting Arms Transfers to Non-State Actors and the Arms Trade Treaty,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2012.

[xxii] ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, June 14, 2006.

[xxiii] Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, Kinshasa, April 30, 2010.

[xxiv] Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels,” October 14, 2014, New York Times.

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Using the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Pastoralist Conflict and Wildlife Crime in Kenya’s Marginalized Regions

5/17/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its authors.

Matthew Bolton

Introduction

In early 2017, some 10,000 pastoralists armed with automatic rifles raided farms, wildlife reserves and conservancies in Laikipia, Kenya, attacking wildlife, people and raiding livestock. The region was and is currently affected by severe drought, and tensions flared as political figures exploited ethnic divisions in campaigning for the 2017 elections.[i] Numerous researchers have found that militarized state interventions to address the kind of cattle rustling observed in Laikipia often exacerbate the situation, introducing new weapons (that enter the illicit market sector through theft or sale) and extrajudicial violence. Heavy-handed suppression is also expensive, diverting important resources away from sustainable development.[ii] Militarized state responses to the collapsing populations of elephants and rhinos—such as shoot-to-kill policies—have often failed to meet human rights standards and have even been implicated in poaching.[iii] Indeed, such responses may undermine important efforts to engage and build local capacities for sustainability, peace, and alternative livelihoods.[iv]

There are, however, alternatives to militarized responses to pastoralist conflict and wildlife crime, rooted in human rights, the rule of law and international cooperation and assistance. Excess availability of arms can fuel militarization, as parties to conflict escalate responses to the increasing danger posed by each other and deadly weapons become more widespread in ownership and uses. Over the last decade states and civil society have constructed transformative legal and normative frameworks to address the human suffering caused by an unregulated arms trade and unchecked proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). These include the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW (PoA) and regional SALW instruments (including, in Africa, the Nairobi Protocol, Kinshasa Convention, ECOWAS Convention and SADC Protocol). Similarly, the previous African elephant poaching crisis in the 1980s—which was fueled by the influx of guns in Africa’s Cold War proxy conflicts—was stopped not so much by militarized interventions but rather through international legal and normative change. For example, the ivory trade ban was instituted through the framework of an international treaty – the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). It was supported by a global awareness-raising campaign—by both States and NGOs—that in many societies transformed ivory from a symbol of luxury to one of disgust.[v]

Most recently, in 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) established, for the first time, global regulations on the transfer of conventional weapons that can prevent arms getting into the hands of human rights abusers, terrorists, war criminals and organized criminal groups. Championed by African states, global civil society and faith leaders who called attention to the devastation of armed conflict on the continent, the treaty creates new opportunities to limit SALW proliferation in regions affected by pastoralist conflict, wildlife crime and armed cattle raiding. If it is universalized and rigorously implemented, States can use the ATT as a normative framework for assessing and mitigating the risks that arms transfers will exacerbate armed violence in pastoralist communities, including cattle raiding and wildlife crime, as well as counterproductive, militarized approaches to controlling pastoralist regions. ATT implementation could include supporting programs that limit the risks of diversion and misuse of SALW and associated ammunition, as well as international, regional and national cooperation and assistance for human security and sustainable development. While the majority of African states have signed the ATT, movement toward ratification has been slow outside West Africa. In particular, the level of accession in the East and Horn of Africa region—an area struggling with the human impact of pastoralist conflict—has been low.[vi] Kenya was particularly crucial in this diplomatic victory, as one of the eight “co-authors” (seen as custodians of the process) of the 2006 General Assembly Resolution that launched the treaty process. However, Kenya has not yet joined the ATT.[vii]

This article draws on and summarizes the findings of two more detailed reports written for the ATT Academy,[viii] a 2016-2017 project that trained government and civil society personnel from East and the Horn of Africa on the treaty, implemented by Pace University and Control Arms with funding from the United Nations Trust Facility for Supporting Cooperation on Arms Cooperation (UNSCAR).[ix]

Armed Violence in Kenya’s Marginalized Regions

The East and Horn of Africa region is home to one of the largest concentrations of pastoralist communities—some 20 million people whose cultures and livelihoods have traditionally revolved around herding cattle, camels, sheep and/or goats.[x] Nomadic and semi-nomadic life-ways are well-suited and adapted to the arid and semi-arid Great Rift Valley and surrounding savannahs. Seeking pasture and water through regular movement over wide areas, herders can avoid overgrazing and limit their impact on fragile ecosystems.[xi] However, pastoralists in the East and Horn of Africa have been marginalized politically, economically, and socially. Colonial governments seized some of the best grazing land traditionally used by pastoralists, enclosing it for white settlement, government use, or for wildlife reserves. Pastoralist communities were often displaced into, or confined to, marginal areas. They were also subjected to neglect through systems of indirect rule, which armed and abetted proxies doing the state’s bidding. Government interventions tended to be punitive and coercive, rather than offering investment in security and development. Such policies often continued into the postcolonial period.[xii] Scarcity of water and pasture has been exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation.[xiii]

In December 2016, at a Control Arms NGO meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, participants stressed the importance of not reading pastoralist conflict through the lens of “culture” (i.e. pathologizing nomadic and semi-nomadic people as somehow inherently problematic). Pastoralist conflict is often misrepresented as a localized, outmoded and “primitive” practice of “cattle rustling.” Similarly, a 2016 Kenya Wildlife Service presentation to the ATT Academy noted that the participation of pastoralists in wildlife crime may be explained by their proximity to wildlife reserves and conservancies, which were often actually alienated from pastoralist communities. However, pastoralist conflict and wildlife crime is often a manifestation of broader conflicts in the region’s “peripheries” and overlaps with tensions over power, wildlife conservation, land and water.[xiv] Cattle rustling and wildlife crime are also embedded in sophisticated organized criminal complexes and neo-patrimonial patronage systems. Arms trafficking connects patronage and stolen cattle or wildlife products through networks that extend throughout the region and even the world.[xv] The proliferation of SALW and ammunition, commercialization of cattle trafficking, the globalization of wildlife trafficking networks, private enclosure of pasture, and political polarization have increased the stakes of conflict in pastoralist communities.

Using the ATT as a Framework for Addressing Armed Violence in Kenya

While support for the ATT remains strong in Kenya’s diplomatic community, civil society and faith institutions, accession has been delayed by powerful countervailing forces. These include an executive branch skittish about global treaties following confrontations with the International Criminal Court and a security establishment that resents external scrutiny. However, the ATT offers opportunities to address the negative impact of the arms trade on pastoralist conflict and wildlife crime and also mitigate problems with militarized efforts to control them.

The weapons used in pastoralist conflict in the East and Horn of Africa region are often circulating from one country to another. Assault rifles from Ugandan government stockpiles in Moroto, looted by Karamajong militias in 1979, spread to Kenya.[xvi] Guns from the conflicts in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia have converged and circulated throughout the region.[xvii] While militarizing borders may seem like an obvious solution to trafficking in the region, it can often contribute to arms proliferation, since security forces may “leak” weapons to local groups and fuel the demand for illicit meat. Nevertheless, more careful controls on the movements of arms into and through the East and Horn of Africa region could contribute to stemming diversion to unauthorized users and uses. Given that much of the supply of weapons involved in pastoralist conflict in East and the Horn of Africa has come from state sources, much more needs to be done to limit diversion of guns and ammunition to unauthorized users and uses.

The ATT requires states parties to assess and mitigate risks that a transfer of conventional arms, ammunition, or parts and components will be used to “commit or facilitate” transnational organized crime, terrorism, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, “serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children” or “undermine peace and security” (Article 7). If such risks exist, exporting states parties are obligated to collaborate with importing states in risk mitigation measures (Article 7.2). If an “overriding risk” remains, then the exporter “shall not” authorize the transfer. States parties are also required to “take measures to prevent” diversion of arms to unauthorized users or uses (Article 11). The ATT also contains more stringent prohibitions of any transfers of arms if a state party “has knowledge” that they “would be used in the commission” of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (Article 6.3).

Transparent reporting on transfers, aided by the ATT, could thus be very useful in addressing armed violence in pastoralist communities, by aiding research on movements of weapons most at risk of exacerbating the situation. One potential avenue of ATT-mandated cooperation and assistance would be a more careful identification and analysis of arms trafficking in the region, tracking how guns move and potential sources of “leakage” from state stockpiles. Sharing this information could enable states—both in the region and beyond—to target policy and programs to disrupt trafficking routes and prevent diversion of weapons to militias, gangs and organized crime networks. For example, states could improve data gathering and sharing within the CITES-mandated Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) program. MIKE enables states to record and report the types of weapons and ammunition used in poaching in an international database, but it is currently underutilized. Other potential sources of information include police and military data on illegal firearms, as well as regional institutions engaged in cooperation on countering SALW proliferation (such as the Regional Centre on Small Arms [RECSA] in East Africa), as well as conservation (such as the Lusaka Agreement Task Force).[xviii] ATT anti-diversion measures should not only be directed at halting the illicit flow of weapons to cattle raiders and militias, but could also ensure that state security forces do not use the weapons they receive in ways that create insecurity, violate human rights or contribute to gender-based violence. The ATT can serve as a catalyst for improving export, import, brokering, transit and trans-shipment controls in smart ways. The information sharing, cooperation and assistance provisions contained within the ATT enable states to work together and engage in conversations about best practices.

Insecurity and poverty are key drivers of both pastoralist conflict and SALW proliferation. A lack of livelihood opportunities in the legitimate economy often provides incentives to engage in cattle raiding. Reducing both the supply of and demand for weapons used in pastoralist conflict thus requires peacebuilding as well as sustainable development efforts. For example, around Lake Nakuru National Park in Kenya, community groups have partnered with Kenya Wildlife Service to increase access to water, promoting sustainable rural livelihoods that reduce pressure on the park. The ATT encourages states parties to engage in “international cooperation,” information -sharing, and provision of “international assistance” (including through a newly established “voluntary trust fund”) (Articles 15 and 16). ATT states parties are also required to meet in annual Conferences of States Parties to review implementation. ATT-mandated measures could be used to build peace and development in regions where there is a nexus of pastoralist conflict, wildlife crime, and SALW proliferation. Membership in the ATT may also help with applications for development assistance, or peacebuilding and sustainable development programs that aim to address the root causes—marginalization, deprivation, persistent instability—of SALW proliferation.

Rather than seeing the ATT as a threat to Kenya’s national security—as it is sometimes misunderstood by elements of Kenya’s security establishment—the treaty offers avenues for building human security in communities suffering from armed violence. The ATT offers an approach to addressing armed violence and wildlife crime in pastoralist communities through rule of law, human rights, and international cooperation. As the Honorable David Musila, then Kenya’s Assistant Minister for Defense, stated during the 2012 ATT negotiation conference:

Kenya continues to suffer negative effects of unregulated trade of … SALW which is causing devastating impact on social, political and economic wellbeing of its people. … We realize that an ATT will not solve all the problems of the world. However, a robust legally-binding treaty on international arms transfers that will leave an effect in reducing the flow of arms from the legal to the illicit trade will certainly be a very important step in reducing human suffering.[xix]

Matthew Bolton is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pace University in New York City and directs the university’s International Disarmament Institute.

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[i] Adam Cruise and Bibi van der Zee, “Armed herders invade Kenya's most important wildlife conservancy,” The Guardian, February 2, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/02/armed-herders-elephant-kenya-wildlife-laikipia; Jennifer Bond and Kennedy Mkutu, “Behind the conflict in central Kenya that's costing lives and hitting tourism,” CNBCAfrica, February 8, 2017, http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/east-africa/2017/02/08/behind-the-conflict-in-central-kenya/.

[ii] Kennedy Agade Mkutu, Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms, Indiana University Press, 2008; James Bevan, “Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda’s most deprived region.” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 21, 2008, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP21-Karamoja.pdf.

[iii] Matthew Bolton, “How to Use the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Wildlife Crime,” Control Arms, September 2016, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Wildlife-Crime-Paper-REVISED-Email.pdf; Matthew Bolton, “Using the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Wildlife Poaching in East Africa: A Human Security Approach,” Control Arms, 2015, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BoltonPoaching-1.pdf; “The Nexus between Poaching and Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons Regional Report: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania,” RECSA, 2016.

[iv] Khristopher Carlson, Joanna Wright. and Hannah Donges, “In the Line of Fire: Elephant and Rhino Poaching in Africa,” Small Arms Survey 2015, Small Arms Survey, pp. 27-28; Dilys Roe, et al., “The Elephant in the Room: Sustainable Use in the Illegal Wildlife Trade Debate,” International Institute for Environment and Development, 2014; “Sustainable Natural Resource Management in Namibia: Successful Community-based Wildlife Conservation,” Overseas Development Institute, 2011; Peter Gettleman, “Notorious Poacher Now Leads a Fight to Save Africa’s Elephant,” Sydney Morning Herald, December 31, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/world/notorious-poacher-now-leads-a-fight-to-save-africas-elephants-20121230-2c1ix.html; Community-based Natural Resource Management Lessons from the Field: IRNDC’s Experience in Namibia, IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation), 2011, http://www.irdnc.org.na/pdf/IRDNC-Lessons-from-the-Field.pdf; Chris Ocowun, “Nebbi Chiefs Disarm Poachers.” New Vision, August 22, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201008230873.html; John Kasaona, “How poachers become caretakers,” TED, June 2010, https://www.ted.com/talks/john_kasaona_from_poachers_to_caretakers/transcript?language=en; “Planned grazing to reduce conflict,” Northern Rangelands Trust, April 18, 2009.

[v] Ronald Orenstein, Ivory, Horn and Blood: Behind the Elephant and Rhinoceros Poaching Crisis, Firefly Books, 2013 pp. 53-66.

[vi] Matthew Bolton, “The Arms Trade Treaty: A Pan-African Global Policy Victory,” ThinkAfricaPress, April 8, 2013 http://www.academia.edu/3241508/The_Arms_Trade_Treaty_A_Pan-African_Global_Policy_Victory.

[vii] For further details on ATT universalization and implementation in Africa, see “Achieving ATT Universalisation in Africa,” Control Arms, August 2016, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Achieving-Arms-Free-Africa-FinalVersion-October-2016.pdf. See also the ATT secretariat website http://thearmstradetreaty.org/index.php/en/.

[viii] Matthew Bolton, “How to Use the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Wildlife Crime,” Control Arms, September 2016, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Wildlife-Crime-Paper-REVISED-Email.pdf; Matthew Bolton, “How to Use the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Pastoralist Conflict,” Control Arms, March 2017, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Pastoralist-Conflict-Final.pdf.

[ix] Matthew Bolton “The Role of Education in Advancing Arms Trade Treaty Universalization and Implementation: Lessons Learned from ATT Academy East Africa 2016-2017,” Control Arms, May 2017, https://disarmament.blogs.pace.edu/files/2017/06/ATT-Academy-Lessons-learned-final-2bwkr5w.pdf.

[x] Kennedy Mkutu, “Pastoralism and conflict in the Horn of Africa,” SaferWorld, 2001 https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/75-pastoralism-and-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa.

[xi] Robin S. Reid, Savannahs of our Birth: People, Wildlife and Change in East Africa, University of California Press, 2012.

[xii] T.O. Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” The Invention of Tradition, E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Eds), Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 211-262; Mahmoud Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton University Press, 1996.

[xiii] Essayas K. Ayana, et al., “Examining the relationship between environmental factors and conflict in pastoralist areas of East Africa,” Political Geography, volumes 557-558, July 2016, pp. 601-611.

[xiv] Khristopher Carlson, Joanna Wright, and Hannah Donges, “In the Line of Fire: Elephant and Rhino Poaching in Africa.” Small Arms Survey 2015, Small Arms Survey, p. 20.

[xv] Kennedy Agade Mkutu, Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms, Indiana University Press, 2008; Andy Catley, Jeremy Lind, Ian Scoones, Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins, Routledge/Earthscan, 2013.

[xvi] Manasseh Wepundi, et al., “Lessons from the Frontiers: Civilian disarmament in Kenya and Uganda.” SaferWorld, 2011, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/564-lessons-from-the-frontiers.

[xvii] “Regional Report on the Nexus between Illicit SALW Proliferation and Cattle Rustling: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda,” RECSA, 2016

[xviii] For further similar recommendations, see Nikhil Acharya and Arthur Muhlen-Schulte, “The Final Round: Combating Armed Actors, Organized Crime and Wildlife Trafficking,” BICC Policy Brief, March 2016, https://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/the-final-round-combating-armed-actors-organized-crime-and-wildlife-trafficking-648/.

[xix] David Musila, “Statement by David Musila, MP, Assistant Minister for Defence of the Republic of Kenya during the United Nations Conference on Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),” July 5, 2012, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/negotiating-conference/statements/5July_Kenya.pdf.

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Proposed Arms Sale Is Not the Road to Peace in Nigeria

5/8/2017

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This is the twelfth and final entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future. This entry is authored by a member of the Forum's emerging expert program, designed to give opportunities to individuals beginning their careers on these issues.

Danielle Preskitt

In early April, rumors swirled of the Trump administration’s willingness to support Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram by proposing a foreign military sale (FMS) of up to 12 Embraer A-29 Super Tucano aircraft with sophisticated targeting gear for approximately $600 million. This was not the first time news of a potential FMS sale to Nigeria created controversy. According to media reports, the Obama administration was prepared to move forward a 2016 request from Nigeria for the Super Tocanos until news of the military’s bombing of a camp of displaced persons reached the White House on January 17, just a few days before the end of his administration. Doctors Without Borders estimated the bombing resulted in 52 dead and over 200 wounded. However, various media outlets have reported different numbers, a top Nigerian military official told ABC news the military found approximately 100 bodies. Some death counts have been reported as high as 200.

The timing of Obama’s decision suggests his lack of confidence in the Nigerian military and their targeting capabilities. “This large-scale attack on vulnerable people who have already fled from extreme violence is shocking and unacceptable,” stated Dr. Jean-Clément Cabrol, the director of operations for Doctors Without Borders. “The safety of civilians must be respected. We are urgently calling on all parties to ensure the facilitation of medical evacuations by air or road for survivors who are in need of emergency care.” Unfortunately, this incident was just one example illustrating the inefficiency of airstrikes in eliminating embedded terrorists.

How to prioritize addressing Boko Haram is challenging to calculate or assess from the safety of Washington, DC. Boko Haram’s barbaric tactics of imbedding themselves within civilian populations makes it difficult for the military to effectively target and destroy the terrorist organization. However, the organization poses not only an international security threat, but is the cause for Nigerians living in fear on a day to day basis. A female Nigerian, who wishes to remain anonymous for safety reasons, said in an interview with me that “men are being killed on a daily basis and nobody is doing anything about this, my question is who is supplying these weapons to these terrorists?”

A lack of transparency and shadow of lies surrounds not only the status of Boko Haram and the accuracy of reported numbers of dead and wounded, but also the Nigerian government. When analyzing the efficiency of the Nigerian government, it is important to remember the government is distinct from the military. President Buhari of Nigeria has erratically stated on multiple occasions that Boko Haram has been defeated. However, the President’s wishful thinking is blatantly false as Boko Haram continues to carry out marketplace bombings in Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as multiple suicide bombings. “Why is the government trying hard to cover these killings?” said my interviewee. “Killings are still silently ongoing in Maiduguri, Adamawa, Kaduna, Jos, Yobe, and several environs on a daily basis… Soldiers are being brought in to the 44 General Hospital…, either amputated, maimed, or killed, and yet the media is saying nothing or less about this.”

For two years, civil servants have not been paid. When protests have erupted due to discontent and lack of payment, arrests were made. “The media is afraid of speaking because journalists have also been arrested for speaking out,” she said. As of 2015, the Nigerian government has a corruption rating of 136 out of 168. Many citizens are currently seeking asylum due to problems and security threats associated with the government, as well as Boko Haram. “The Nigerian government is currently unpopular, the people have lost faith and hope in the government and believes the government has an agenda yet to be revealed to the people,” she related.

In order for the Nigerian government to gain trust within the community, transparency and freedom of expression must be reinstated under President Buhari. No longer can the government hide Boko Haram’s existence or horrific actions, or act with impunity.

While many will argue, particularly the NGO community, that combatting terrorism requires education, poverty reduction, and government stability, the threat must be addressed immediately, while evidence suggests tackling those underlying issues is not the most effective response. Instead, aiding the military could be the solution- particularly in regards to the military’s intelligence and ground force capabilities.

During my interview, I was a bit shocked by a Nigerian assessment of the overall trust the military has earned with the population in recent years. The Nigerian population appears to understand the difficulty associated with targeting shielded Boko Haram insurgents during asymmetrical warfare. “The military is no longer a feared presence within the country, this is because we have been in a democratic regime for over 17 years now, and the military have been in the duty of protecting civilians…” The military, as a whole, has purposefully taken steps toward earning trust within the population. “We have also engaged the Armed Forces in several trainings on ‘Protection of Civilian Courses’,” she said.

In July of 2015, under a new joint United States Department of State and Department of Defense initiative, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) partnered with African nations in the fight against Boko Haram. However, since 2000 US security aid funding has significantly dropped. There was a small resurgence in 2012 and 2015, but 2016 remains to be the lowest since 2000.

When asked what had changed since Obama blocked the sale, Sarah Margon, Washington director of Human Rights Watch, stated: “President Trump has made really clear that fighting terrorism, as they define this, is going to be the top foreign policy priority. And that means that the consideration of mitigating circumstances and other issues that could create a problem in the long term will not be at the forefront.” While Margon may lament that situation, Senator Bob Corker, R-Tenn., the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated, "We need to deal with human rights issues, but not on weapons sales.” Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said in mid-February he was "leery" of the sale due to the Nigerian military's impunity. "Ultimately we hope that the sale goes forward," Cardin added. "But there is progress that needs to be made in protecting the civilian population."

Airstrikes may eliminate terrorists. However, due to the nature of their tactic to embed themselves amongst civilians, the attacks will cause the death of many innocent lives, a loss of faith in the government, and criticism from the international community. Ground forces used to eliminate Boko Haram city by city may be more dangerous and costly to the Nigerian military, but it is the only way to a lasting and stable peace within Nigeria. Equipping the Nigerian military with better weaponry, ammunition, training, and intelligence support is a much more efficient and safer strategy for both Nigeria, as well as the international community.

Danielle Preskitt is an intern with the Forum on the Arms Trade and a participant in the Forum’s emerging expert program.

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Using the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Pastoralist Conflict and Wildlife Crime in Kenya’s Marginalized Regions

Proposed Arms Sale Is Not the Road to Peace in Nigeria

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