Blog Archives

Event Guide and Resources– Arming the War in Israel-Palestine: Legal Considerations (January 16, 2024)

1/19/2024

On January 16, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Arms Trade Litigation Monitor co-organized an event focused on legal challenges and approaches to arming the war in Israel-Palestine, framed within the broader context of increased litigation around arms transfers in recent years.
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Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/_o2T7TD0v5s?t=65s

A guide to the recording, and suggested resources are below:

2:04 Welcome and event framing - Dr. Valentina Azarova, co-founder, Emergent Justice Collective; co-creator, Arms Trade Litigation Monitor; part of Feminist Autonomous Centre for research (FAC research)

Arms Trade Litigation Monitor
Domestic proceedings and international arms transfers, ATT Expert Group report 2021

6:24 Understanding Genocide Convention and the legal case and possible next steps regarding case filed by South Africa at the International Court of Justice – Dr. Shahd Hammouri, Lecturer in International Law, University of Kent; non-resident Fellow, Al Haq Centre for Applied International Law

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)
Discussion of earlier 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion, and pending ICJ Advisory Opinion on legality of occupation as a whole being heard in Feb
Listen also for discussion of possible steps at General Assembly, states responsibilities, enabling other litigation related to states and corporations

14:04 Continued discussion of genocide, and case filed in the United States - Katherine Gallagher, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights

Defense for Children International - Palestine v. Biden, with witness-based hearing and legal argument on January 26, 9am PST (livestream)
Listen also for concerns about specific weapons and ongoing provision of them

23:26 Transition to discussion about domestic efforts in Netherlands and United States

24:06 Challenge in the Netherlands related to F-35s - Frank Slijper, Arms Trade Project lead, PAX

Lawsuit against F-35s
Listen also for discussion of general licenses

32:24 U.S. Law and the Obstacles to Courts Taking Up Arms Issues - John Ramming Chappell, Advocacy & Legal Fellow, U.S. Program, Center for Civilians in Conflict

Law and Policy Guide to US Arms Transfers to Israel
Listen also for primary role of the President/Executive power in arms issues

40:48 Transition to additional cases and trends

42:00 Shahd Hammouri on pushing legal framework forward

Discussion of case in Australia; Norway- examining corporations; Italy- examining civil suit; Inter American Commission on Human Rights

47:42 Katherine Gallagher

Further discussion on presidential authority and expected arguments in U.S. case, and possible liability of corporations (additional note: the Alien Tort Statute as an option for cases against US corporations)
Mention of declarations filed in legal case, including by former US official Josh Paul (see Dec 22, 2023)

56:09 Beginning of Q&A

57:19 Question on could there be a case in the UK and EU states to stop arms export licences (for equipment that could be used in Gaza) under Criterion 1 (in the new UK criteria and the EU CP), which relates to states' international obligations? The Genocide Convention and ICJ rulings are not specifically listed, but both do mention "other international obligations".

59:20 Shahid Hammouri replies on ability of civil society to engage, and agrees that states will have duty not to cooperate in providing arms to Israel. Further elaboration on advisory opinion that could come from February case related to occupation.

1:03:01 Further questions on U.S. case, treaty obligations, and other activities in the United States

1:03:56 Katherine Gallagher replies on the weight of treaty obligations, and international legal order. Also discusses anti-boycott developments.
1:08:04 John Ramming Chappel discusses legislative efforts (Sanders, Van Hollen, Kaine) and other U.S. developments - See Forum resource page, S.Res.504 (as well as 502B explainer from CIVIC)

1:11:20 Questions on Dutch case, EU Common position review, updating risk assessment, investors and companies

1:12:20 Frank Slijper replies, including on limitation of the term “encouragement,” as well as general licenses falling outside needed review

The Forum on the Arms Trade provides a platform for expert views but does not itself take positions.

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Prioritising the protection of civilians from explosive weapons: Bringing about change through the framework of the Political Declaration

1/19/2024

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

“The biggest challenge in this war is dealing with my children’s fear during the constant bombings. Evacuation is tough, moving from one place to another with my two children with disabilities, trying to appear strong despite my own fears. Sadly, nowhere is safe in Gaza anymore.”
Testimony from Hani, staff member of Humanity & Inclusion in Gaza

2023 was a bleak year for the protection of civilians from explosive weapons. Data collected by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicates that use of explosive weapons increased in 2023 and was experienced across a greater number of countries than the previous year, and that more civilians were killed and injured from explosive weapon use than in recent years.

The unrelenting bombing and shelling of Gaza after the Hamas attacks of 7 October, the eruption of conflict in Sudan, and continued fighting in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen all led to increased documented civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons. In short, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas remains widespread and continues to be one of the greatest threats to civilians in armed conflicts today.

The endorsement by 83 states of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas in Dublin in November 2022 was welcomed by many as a milestone achievement. The Declaration is a recognition of this grave humanitarian problem, an expression of solidarity with those affected, and a commitment to take further action to strengthen the protection of civilians both during and after conflict. But it will only succeed in better protecting civilians if it is implemented effectively by endorser states.

Driving forward change and building new norms and expectations for behaviour takes time. Moving away from use of explosive weapons in populated areas – through the framework of the Declaration and associated revisions to policy and practice – is a long-term undertaking that must begin expeditiously at a national level.

So, what do we want to see in this area of work and under the framework of the Political Declaration in 2024? What does progress on this issue look like and what opportunities exist to push this agenda along in an effective way internationally?

States that have endorsed the Declaration start to operationalise it through national-level policy reviews and changes to practice.

Joining the Declaration comes with an expectation that changes should take place in national-level policy and practice. States should therefore review their commitments under the Political Declaration against existing national policies and practice.

A good first step to beginning the process of implementation is to identify a focal point in government responsible for coordination and oversight. The focal point should review the Declaration and its commitments, looking at how existing policies and practice can be strengthened or new ones developed, and where/how the Declaration needs to be disseminated domestically. A key priority will be to ensure dissemination of the Declaration to armed/defence forces at different levels given the crucial changes required in the areas of military doctrine and policy, as well as of training, planning and conduct of military operations. It will also be essential that states approach implementation through a humanitarian lens, focused on harm reduction and strengthening the protection of civilians.

Many states will have existing relevant policies and procedures on the conduct of military operations, and some may have tools to assess and mitigate harm to civilians. But there are specific commitments in the Declaration that need to be implemented, including placing restrictions on the use of explosive weapons, and making determinations on when it will be necessary to refrain from such use entirely, and how this is done. International Network on Explosive Weapons calls on states to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and to otherwise restrict the use of other explosive weapons in populated areas due to the likely risk of civilian harm.

The Declaration also puts considerable emphasis on addressing indirect or so-called “reverberating” effects, that stem from damage to and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, in the planning and conduct of military operations. Other key priority areas include establishing mechanisms to collect and share data on direct and indirect effects on civilians and civilian objects, and providing assistance to conflict-affected communities.

The International Network on Explosive Weapons has put together a “Questions and Answers” document on implementation of the Declaration, and in a few weeks’ time will be launching an “Implementation Framework” with further guidance for states on undertaking this process.

The first meeting to review implementation of the Declaration takes stock of the state of play and sets direction for the period ahead.

Norway will convene the first meeting under the framework of the Political Declaration since its endorsement in November 2022. The Oslo conference will take place on 23 April 2024, with a civil society forum the day before on 22 April, co-convened between International Network on Explosive Weapons and the Norwegian Red Cross which will invite state delegates to participate alongside civil society in a day of discussion and exhibitions.

The official conference aims to review implementation of the Declaration over the preceding 17-months, by giving space to discussions on approaches to implementation, opportunities to share examples of good policy and practice, and by sharing challenges and needs. It will also be important that it provides a clear sense of direction and stimulates efforts for the work ahead, by setting out priority areas for implementation and a road map for the coming year or so until states meet again.

The conference should also shine a spotlight on the devastating humanitarian consequences of explosive weapon use, especially given the recent and notable contexts where civilians continue to suffer immensely from explosive weapons use, as well as maintaining a focus on reducing civilian harm and suffering.

Norway has invited all endorsing states and other interested states to participate in the conference, alongside civil society organisations, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As such, it should be an opportunity to both encourage some new states to join ahead of, or at, the Oslo conference, and to start to build a community of practice. Working in partnerships of states, civil society and international organisations provided a solid foundation for developing the Declaration. Maintaining these partnerships and dialogue between states, their armed forces, and humanitarian organisations is going to be just as critical in this next phase of work around its implementation.

More countries join the Political Declaration

Whilst a broad range of states joined the Declaration in Dublin, no new countries have joined the Declaration since. A key aim ahead of the Oslo is for more countries to join this agreement, including across all world regions.

At the end of January, a regional workshop in Togo for West African states will be an important opportunity to encouraging more endorser states from this subregion, as well as Africa more broadly, to join.

During the Declaration negotiations and the Dublin adoption conference, the war in Ukraine and civilian suffering in Mariupol, Kharkiv and other cities placed the explosive weapons issue high on the agenda of many states, prompting their endorsement of the Declaration. The disastrous humanitarian consequences and stark examples of civilian suffering and harm from urban warfare that we have seen over the past year in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan, and elsewhere should continue to provide impetus and show that this Declaration and issue is more relevant than ever and a global issue of concern for all states.

The Declaration starts to set new norms and expectations for behaviour.

In addition to national level implementation, efforts must continue to raise awareness and understanding of this humanitarian issue, including through promotion of the Declaration and its commitments. By doing so, and by highlighting the goal and purpose of the Declaration – to reduce civilian harm and suffering – new norms and standards can be set and will start to take hold.

Speaking out in response to bombardment of populated areas and when civilians suffer is an important means to stigmatise harmful behaviour and to help establish new global norms for civilian protection. In the world today, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is the cause of immense civilian harm and suffering in Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere. States must be attentive to acknowledging this harm, wherever it takes place, and whichever actor is responsible.

Whilst it is perhaps too soon to expect to see a reduction in civilian casualties, or other significant reductions in harm, it is never too soon to start work towards this goal.

Laura Boillot is a Director at Article 36 and Coordinator for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and the publication of these posts, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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The move towards human rights due diligence policies by the arms industry

1/18/2024

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Hiruni Alwishewa

In recent years, the applicability of general guidance for due diligence from soft law instruments, such as the UNGPs and OECD Guidelines, to the arms industry have been reaffirmed. With the growing force of these soft law instruments, and the increasing expectations for corporate actors to identify, prevent and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of their business activities, arms companies have started to develop, adopt and publicise human rights and other corporate policies that integrate human rights due diligence measures.

In comparison to other high-risk sectors, particularly those for which specific regulations have been introduced (such as child labour and supply chains), the creation of such policies is a relatively new phenomenon for the arms industry. This post identifies several common aspects of these policies that are apparent from the examination of the corporate policies of selected large arms manufacturing and exporting companies based in Europe and the United States that have consistently been on SIPRI’s top one hundred arms producers lists since 2015. The selected companies (and their country of registration) were: Airbus (registered in the Netherlands, operating in France, Germany and Spain); BAE Systems (United Kingdom); Boeing (United States); Dassault (France); General Dynamics (United States); L3Harris Technologies (United States); Leonardo (Italy); Lockheed Martin (United States); MBDA (France, Italy and United Kingdom); Northrop Grumman (United States); Raytheon Technologies (United States); Rheinmetall (Germany); Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom); and Thales (France).

Limited transparency of policies

An ongoing challenge in this area, as with many other issues with the arms trade, is the lack of transparency. Some companies make reference to the existence of a human rights policy but do not disclose them publicly. Others provide policy summaries but not full disclosure of policies, thereby limiting opportunities for public scrutiny. The public availability of corporate policies is an important complement to effective due diligence by these companies as the full and public disclosure of policies creates opportunities for scrutiny by stakeholders and civil society. Indeed, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights’ recommendations also call for companies to publicly communicate information about their human rights due diligence and risks assessments undertaken for arms exports, to commit to ceasing the circumvention of export controls through the use of subsidiaries in other states, and to establish grievance mechanisms.

From the publicly available corporate polices, several common features are notable, including the importance of compliance with export controls, the establishment of human rights policies, and the inclusion of risk assessment processes.

Licensing compliance

A licensing system is an integral component of the export control regimes of all major arms exporter states, and reaffirmed as a key requirement in international and regional arms controls. Most of the publicly available policies or policy summaries (Airbus, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce) acknowledge that non-compliance with the domestic licensing regimes represents a reputational risk for the company, which may be accompanied by loss of business and perception as an unreliable export partner. In some instances, the importance of complying with licensing regimes is affirmed as a ‘special responsibility’ (Rheinmetall, Lockheed Martin).

Several American companies go further, with General Dynamics, L3Harris and Raytheon all affirming their commitment to regulatory compliance and also noting the importance of undertaking additional internal processes to the licensing process of the United States. BAE Systems, based in the United Kingdom, similarly recognises that ‘stringent internal controls’ are necessary and reaffirms its commitment ‘to maintaining an effective system of export control compliance that is designed to avoid violations, detect them promptly if they occur, and provide timely investigations and appropriate remedial actions’. Overall, this shift in recognition to acknowledge the importance of internal due diligence measures represents an important first step in the adoption and integration of human rights due diligence into the business processes of arms companies.

Human rights considerations

Some arms companies have incorporated human rights considerations into their corporate policies, either as part of their company codes of conduct or through specific human rights policies, that provide further information on their due diligence processes. The potential for the activities of arms companies to adversely affect human rights is acknowledged in some of these documents, demonstrating an acceptance of the need for these companies to integrate human rights considerations into their business processes.

An example of a stronger statement on human rights incorporation is Raytheon’s human rights policy, which acknowledges ‘that the human rights issues associated with our defense products and services are a dynamic and complex subject’, including in relation to ‘carry[ing] potential risks associated with their misuse’. Other companies, such as BAE Systems, implicitly recognise the adverse effects of arms exports, stating that: ‘We understand that some of our stakeholders have views and perceptions of defence companies and human rights, particularly in the area of exports and how our products are used’. Overall, however, there appears to be a reluctance by these arms companies to explicitly recognise the inherent and significant risks of the products which they manufacture and export, including the short- and long-term consequences for individuals and communities affected by arms sales.

The adoption of human rights policies or the inclusion of human rights considerations in corporate codes of conduct is a positive step by companies toward the dissemination of ethical business practices which have the potential to leverage prospective recipients into changing their behaviours, such as by ceasing future arms deals where weapons have been misused by a recipient. For example, L3Harris includes an option in its human rights policy to terminate a business relationship in the event there is a breach of that policy, though the focus of such options remain centred on the termination of relationships with suppliers rather than customers, who are not referenced despite them posing the ‘most salient risks’. An alternative approach is taken by Northrop Grumman, which states the company will decline a potential sale where the risk to human rights or company reputation are unacceptable irrespective of whether that sale would be legally permissible.

The most comprehensive human rights policy of the selected companies was from the Italian manufacturer Leonardo. This policy explicitly references human rights standards elaborated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and OECD Guidelines and maintains a list of states to which it does not export weapons to, referred to as the List of Sensitive Countries. This List is updated every year and is compiled based on factors including breaches of international human rights law, and currently includes several states involved in the Yemen conflict, namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt (but not Kuwait and Qatar which are also coalition states involved in this conflict), in addition to Yemen.

Risk assessments

Complementary to the incorporation of human rights considerations into corporate policies is the development of strong due diligence processes. In particular, risk assessments are an integral component of the UNGPs (Principles 17 and 18), and many corporate policies affirm that ‘enhanced’ or ‘reinforced’ due diligence is required for the arms sector by virtue of it being a high-risk sector. Several arms companies have incorporated risk assessments into their company policies to identify and mitigate the human rights risks associated with the sale of their products. For example, BAE Systems states that its risk assessments consider the type of product and its intended use, the end user, and the country of sale.

Likewise, Raytheon operates a due diligence process for these purposes, which involves ‘screen[ing] potential sales involving certain types of products in countries identified as presenting a higher risk of human rights violations from product misuse’. Raytheon is also notable because it has its own Human Rights Council which ‘is responsible for assisting the businesses in their assessment of specific sales opportunities that may present heightened human rights risks’, reflecting the requirements of UNGP Principle 18.

The extent to which risk assessments are integrated throughout the business enterprise, as required by the UNGPs (Principles 17 to 21) and the OECD Guidelines, is varied. Some companies (Airbus, Dassault) only assess human rights risks for activities under their full and direct control, thereby limiting the risk assessments to their supply chains and not extending these to potential clients.

Furthermore, only a few companies elaborate the specific criteria and processes that are used in their risk assessments. For example, Rheinmetall has asserted that in compliance with German, EU and international law, the company has developed due diligence processes which include risk identification, risk mitigation, results tracking, and complaints procedures. General Dynamics is one company that provides further information on what its risk identification processes involve, including its ‘use [of] a variety of tools, techniques, and analyses’, which may include site visits and meetings, open source and web searches for adverse media, and specialised database searches, among other methods.

Leonardo states that its risk assessment includes risk identification, qualitative and quantitative analyses of risk, a risk treatment action plan to reduce the impact of risks on a project, contingency management, and risk monitoring and review, which includes quarterly reporting on risk trends. Leonardo also identifies four criteria which it uses to assess whether the sale of arms to a state would pose an unacceptable risk: domestic export controls, sanctions, ‘know your customer’, and territory.

For the most part, however, the steps these companies are required to undertake for identifying, assessing and mitigating risks are not specified in their public policies. Consequently, there is no indication from the selected arms companies how human rights considerations are balanced against other factors, in particular, commercial and security interests. In general, aside from statements confirming that risk assessments are required to be undertaken, the corporate policies of the selected arms companies make limited references to the due diligence obligations outlined in UNGPs and OECD Guidelines and do not elaborate on the processes involvement in risk assessments.

Conclusions

From the examination of selected company policies, there are some indications that these arms companies are responding to changing societal expectations, even if only reluctantly. These development and adoption of policies that incorporate human rights due diligence measures indicate there is growing acknowledgment and acceptance by the arms industry to prevent and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of their business activities.

While not a comprehensive examination of all policies, there are nevertheless several notable insights available from the selected policies that were examined. First, some arms companies emphasise the need for due diligence that is independent of and in addition to the measures undertaken by state licensing authorities. Second, some companies have developed human rights policies that include risk assessments as part of their human rights due diligence. Third, overall, there are limited details provided on how risk assessments are conducted and what standards of due diligence are applied.

Although currently there is a lack of legislative push toward the adoption of due diligence regulations domestically or supranationally, the instruments, policies and practices from other high-risk industries (such as the mining of conflict minerals and surveillance technology sectors) can provide pertinent guidance for arms companies to (further) develop their policies to effectively incorporate the UNGPs and OECD Guidelines and, in turn, to address the adverse human rights impacts of their business activities.

Hiruni Alwishewa is a PhD Candidate in International Law at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Graduate Institute Geneva. Her research examines the responsibilities of actors involved in the transfer of arms to conflict zones.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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The 2024 review of the EU Common Position on arms exports: an opportunity for stronger cooperation on post-shipment controls?

1/17/2024

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Lauriane Héau

The EU and EU member states are currently engaged in the third review process of the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports. A legally-binding instrument for all EU member states, the EU Common Position outlines common criteria to apply for arms exports, as well as a set of information exchange and reporting measures. It then leaves EU member states free to determine the concrete means of application of these standards in their national export control systems.

The ongoing review process, expected to conclude in 2024, provides an opportunity for discussing and strengthening the implementation of the standards contained in the EU Common Position. Post-shipment controls – including on-site visits, on which this blog will focus – is one of the topics currently discussed.

As of today, post-shipment controls are only briefly mentioned in the User’s guide – a guidance document that accompanies the EU Common Position. Yet, on-site visits could play a role in strengthening the implementation of Criterion 7 of the EU Common Position, which focuses on the risk of diversion. And a number of EU member states, as well as the EU itself, have recently gained experience in adopting and using on-site visits. The blog explores these recent developments and possible ways in which the review process could serve to provide additional information, guidance and support to states that want to use post-shipment on-site visits.

What are post-shipment on-site visits?

On-site visits are one of many post-shipment control measures, and involve an exporting state requiring and then conducting physical checks on the territory of the importing state on military materiel they previously transferred. Such visits can be useful to mitigate arms diversion risks by verifying that the arms are still in the possession of the end-user authorized at the time of the transfer. Importantly, it’s also a tool to build trust and cooperation between importing and exporting states through a dialogue on what measures are most appropriate to prevent and address diversion risks.

On-site visits are not new, but historically they were mainly implemented by the United States (US). The US has set up several programmes, including the Blue Lantern programme since 1990, which foresees what it calls ‘post-shipment checks’. These post-shipment checks can potentially occur on all exports and are based on the extra-territorial application of US export controls. However, in the last decade a growing number of states – many of them in the EU – have been adopting and conducting on-site visits.

A tool increasingly used by EU member states

As of today, around 10 EU member states have decided to adopt on-site visits. EU member states that have adopted them mostly use on-site visits in a targeted or even ‘ad hoc’ approach. For example, states including Czechia, Germany, Spain, and Sweden focus on-site visits on certain export destinations and certain military materiel only – those which are deemed to pose a particularly high risk or be more prone to diversion (eg. it often includes a focus on small arms and light weapons - SALW). Others, like Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia have only used on-site visits a handful of times when deemed particularly relevant.

When used as part of a broader set of measures, states that use on-site visits have found it a useful tool to effectively mitigate diversion risks and to build confidence between importing and exporting states. That said, the experience of these states has also revealed some challenges. For example, the lack of financial resources or diplomatic representation in smaller states can limit their capacity to conduct on-site visits, which are costly and require a lengthy set-up process. Strengthening cooperation at the EU level and possibly having the EU provide concrete support to EU member states that want to use the tool could therefore be an opportunity to address some of these challenges.

The European Peace Facility and the EU’s role in carrying out on-site visits

The EU itself has recently gained experience in conducting on-site visits in the context of the European Peace Facility (EPF). The EPF was established in 2021 to fund the provision of military assistance to partner states, including for the first time lethal military materiel. The EU has been using this tool since February 2022 to militarily support Ukraine, and at the end of 2023 also passed an assistance measure to fund the delivery of lethal military materiel to the Somali National Army.

Post-delivery monitoring, including on-site visits, is part of the conditions that can be attached to the provision of military assistance. So far, the EU’s experience remains limited, but it has confirmed having undertaken on-site visits in the very specific context of Ukraine. As it conducts further such visits – they are planned as part of the post-delivery monitoring of military materiel transferred to Somalia, the experience the EU gains could be useful also to EU member states.

Recommendations for the review process

Post-shipment controls – including on-site visits – is one of the topics that EU member states are now discussing in the enforcement focus group, one of three focus groups created as part of the ongoing EU Common Position review process. Building on previous SIPRI research, this blog offers several recommendations for the enforcement focus group and possible outcomes of its work.

Firstly, the focus group could explore the possibility of providing guidance on the adoption and implementation of on-site visits in the User’s guide to the EU Common Position. Such guidance would be especially helpful to states that want to set up on-site visits, or that have relatively little experience in using the tool. It could build on the experience of EU member states and the EU itself, as well as on the work carried out in the framework of the Arms Trade Treaty – which resulted in a set of 'operational steps for the introduction and implementation of post-shipment control’ endorsed in 2023 by the Ninth Conference of States Parties. Research organizations have also published good practice guides which could be consulted.

Secondly, increasing exchanges on the planning, outcomes and challenges encountered in conducting on-site visits could be beneficial for all states. The User’s guide already ‘invites EU member states to share their knowledge and experience on the implementation’ of on-site visits, but few such exchanges have taken place to date. The focus group could reflect on possible ways to increase these exchanges, as well as on the types of information that could be most relevant to share and discuss.

Thirdly, the EU could contribute to addressing the limited resources that some states have flagged as a challenge to set up or conduct on-site visits. It could do so by using resources it already has at its disposal – or could leverage – to support EU member states. An outcome of the focus group could be to map the extent of these resources. For example, as part of the iTrace project which Conflict Armament Research (CAR) conducts with EU funding, EU member states can already request the assistance of CAR experts in conducting ‘post-shipment verification’ tasks, but it is unclear how much states have made use of this possibility. More broadly, some EU member states with a more limited diplomatic network have expressed interest in the EU taking a stronger role, for example by having EU delegations support willing states in planning or conducting on-site visits. The focus group could reflect on potential benefits but also challenges this could pose – including political sensitivities for the importing state – as well as possible ways to address them.

Writ large, the ongoing review process provides a valuable opportunity for the EU and EU member states to strengthen their cooperation on post-shipment controls – including but not limited to on-site visits. The provision of guidance, increased exchanges and additional resources to states interested in adopting or implementing on-site visits would be a useful and practical outcome of the review process, and serve to advance efforts to combat diversion under Criterion 7.

Lauriane Héau is a Researcher in the Dual-use and Arms Trade Control Programme at SIPRI.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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3D Printed Firearms: Prospects for International Action in 2024

1/9/2024

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Monalisa Hazarika

Additive manufacturing (AM), colloquially known as 3D printing, has dramatically expanded in recent years to accommodate the manufacturing and accessibility requirements of producers -- authorized and illicit alike. The speed, accuracy, and relative ease with which private actors can build parts and components of a functioning firearm have profoundly influenced the way gun ownership is regulated and have opened a Pandora’s box of forthcoming challenges. The anonymity associated with both the acquisition and use of such weapons, despite their initial set-up cost, is what makes them the weapon of choice for many individuals, especially in countries where national laws restrict the legal acquisition of firearms. Additionally, the modularity of weapon design with exchangeable components has fanned the flames for national and international law enforcement agencies by increasing the risk of misidentification as a result of multiple serial numbers appearing on different parts of the weapon. Today, there are an array of fully 3D printed, hybrid and PKC (parts kit conversion) firearm designs made of polymer and metal components available on the internet. While not as easy as ‘Ctrl + P’, the current advent of technological innovation has blurred the barriers for acquiring a firearm, which is only bound to expand with decreasing production costs and rising quality, making them a promising alternative to a purchase on the black market.

A lot has changed since the single shot .380 ACP ‘Liberator’ by Defence Distributed made headlines back in 2013. The blueprints, or computed aided designs (CAD), are no longer limited to the households and workspaces of hobbyists and enthusiasts. This was established by EUROPOL, which recently helped dismantle 10 illegal firearms workshops in Canada, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom in December 2023. With recorded cases of their use in an attempted murder in Reykjavik, mass shootings in Halle synagogue, and arrests for their illicit manufacture in Indiana (in relation to ISIS) and Winnipeg, these weapons have also found their way in a major armed conflict, by the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) in Myanmar.

International instruments and the current state of play

3D-printed firearms and their components are within the scope of existing international instruments regulating the transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW), namely the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), the Firearms Protocol, and the Arms Trade Treaty, under which the method of production is irrelevant. Perhaps most important is the UN PoA adopted by all UN member states in 2001. It assembles every six years for a review conference and every two years for a biennial meeting of states to report on their progress in implementing the commitments and deliberate on novel and pressing issues regarding the illicit trade of SALW.

Previously in 2015, at the Second Meeting of Government Experts (MGE2), the overarching theme of discussion was the growing threat of fabrication and sharing of schematics for undetectable firearms. While some states considered it exaggerated given their operational limits constraining major dangers in the years ahead, others appraised it to be an imminent threat.

At the 3rd Review Conference (RevCon3), which took place in 2018, states noted the recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design and welcomed initiatives that raise awareness of possible associated risks, notably the difficulties encountered in marking and tracing these “ghost” guns. They agreed to streamline relevant national laws, regulations, and administrative procedures and strengthen cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement agencies to prohibit their illicit trade across online platforms and the dark web. Pushback was seen in the inclusion of “3D printing, polymer, and modular weapons” in the draft outcome document, with states expressing concerns over their explicit mention inhibiting their access to technology and how the situation was not as dire as being portrayed. While a technical annex to the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) was proposed during RevCon3, it was ultimately dropped. Suggestions of using less aggressive and generic language and removing the paragraphs altogether suggest a lack of agreement on the severity of the issue, let alone a consensus to adopt measures for the changing security landscape. Despite the back and forth on the language used, from “distributed manufacturing” to “additive manufacturing," the outcome document had no reference to 3D printing and backtracked on the limited progress made by states who had pushed for more.

During the seventh and eighth Biennial Meeting of States (in 2021 and 2022, respectively), the topic of new and emerging technology, remained a contested locus among states for being “overly specific” on the implications of 3D printing for arms production. More recently, at the 78th UN General Assembly meeting in 2023, states discussed the sobering impact of conventional weapons, including the proliferation trends associated with 3D printing without engaging in a deeper dive into the affair.

Projections for 2024

The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has since 2022 launched a multiyear project for advancing global policies and commitments in the context of RevCon4 of the UN PoA, undertaking “New technologies and innovation – challenges and opportunities for the UN PoA and ITI'' as one of its 3-pillar approaches. A noteworthy agenda item from the BMS8 Outcome Document for the upcoming conference scheduled for June 2024 is to reflect on the UN Secretariat proposal for the establishment of an open-ended technical expert group to assess recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design of modular and polymer weapons and 3D printing.

RevCon4 presents an opportunity to assess the current state of play in the use and misuse of technology and, alternatively, how new monitoring technologies could be used to effectively track and control SALW throughout their entire life cycle. Substantial progress is anticipated under the leadership of President-designate of RevCon4, Amb. Maritza Chan, on ways of addressing the impact of new technologies, among other topics, with a series of expert-level roundtable discussions and regional preparatory meetings taking place over the next three months.

Some experts are of the opinion that the UN PoA and its ITI are too weak and inflexible to address the problem of illicit trade and manufacture of firearms posed by additive manufacturing due to their “vague or unelaborated” commitments and agreements, which are politically and not legally binding. However, doing away with the existing frameworks will not garner any strategic advantage unless replaced by a more effective mechanism, which is easier said than done. Getting states to agree on a legally binding text is an arduous task requiring years of negotiation and diplomatic deliberations, which at the end may result in a loss of critical momentum and a watered-down version. Instead, employing the same resources to revive trust in the efficacy of the existing frameworks, such as the PoA, by strengthening their ability to fulfill the aims that are reflected in the purpose and object of their text, could potentially yield more robust results.

Even though the issues surrounding additive manufacturing may appear incidental, their growing usage across fields merits greater consideration than the lowest common denominator and should be on the radar of security analysts. By bolstering existing norms and regulations and keeping them relevant to emerging threats, progress can be ensured on issues that have already been identified and anticipated in this sphere.

Monalisa Hazarika is an Intern at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and holds a M.A. in Conflict Management and Development from Banaras Hindu University, India. She is one of the #Leaders4Tomorrow & Leaders2theFuture under the UNODA’s Youth4Disarmament initiative.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Grappling with End-Use Monitoring

1/8/2024

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Dylan Cordle

Jen Spindel

In last year’s Looking Ahead series, John Chappell presaged renewed attention to end-use monitoring in arms transfers. As we look ahead to 2024, we argue that US arms transfers to Ukraine pose significant challenges for end-use monitoring, and that meeting these challenges will require new thinking and practices in end-use monitoring.

End-use monitoring (EUM) in the US is mandated by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act and is implemented by the Department of Defense (Golden Sentry for foreign military sales) and the Department of State (Blue Lantern for direct commercial sales). These programs have encountered difficulties in Ukraine, because “the conflict makes it impractical to request the return of equipment from the front lines to depots or other locations where US government personnel can inspect them in a safer environment.” While there is no reliable evidence of misuse of arms, Ukrainian intelligence did recover US-provided arms that were temporarily diverted by a Russian criminal organization. In May 2023, the Department of Defense Inspector General found that there was not an up-to-date list of EUM-designated arms.

Why End-Use Monitoring?

EUM is supposed to protect US weapons and technology from misuse or diversion. The nightmare scenarios are arms being sent on to a third party, and then being used in ways that are counter to US interest; or arms being captured and turned against US forces or the reverse-engineering of advanced US technology.

Despite EUM infrastructure, there have been notable failures in end-use monitoring. This is especially the case in covert assistance programs such as CIA-led Operations Cyclone (1979-89) and Timber Sycamore (2013-2017). In both cases, advanced weapons systems provided by the US to allied non-state actor groups were lost, stolen, or were ultimately used against the US. Of note, more than 600 of the 2,300 Stinger missiles provided to the Mujahideen in Operation Cyclone were unaccounted for. Javelin and TOW anti-tank missiles provided under Timber Sycamore ended up in the hands of ISIS fighters.

Misuse, loss, unauthorized transfers, and theft of US weapons and equipment have occurred in a host of recipient states. In Guatemala, DoD-provided Jeeps were used to intimidate US embassy officials. A GAO report also found that EUM was not implemented properly, nor were violations or evidence of misuse recorded. EUM also failed to prevent Saudi Arabia from unlawfully transferring US defense articles to non-state groups in Yemen. In some cases, US weapons were used to commit human rights abuses. In Iraq, the DoD failed to keep tabs on over a billion dollars' worth of arms and equipment. Items such as drones, armored vehicles, and missiles were found in the hands of ISIS fighters and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. When the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, billions of dollars' worth of military equipment was left behind, and the removal of official audit reports from US government websites did little to foster trust and transparency in the EUM regime.

End-Use Monitoring in Ukraine

Many arms the US has given Ukraine are designated for enhanced end-use monitoring, essentially an additional level of scrutiny because of their technology or vulnerability to diversion. Weapons in this category include Stinger missiles, Harpoon missiles, Javelin missiles, night vision devices, and Switchblade drones. The US has not released the exact number of each type of weapon provided, but we do know that more than 10,000 Javelin systems and 2,000 Stinger missiles have been sent to Ukraine.

In October 2022, the DoD stated it was unable to provide EUM because of the limited US presence in Ukraine. Not much changed over the next year: In November 2023, the State Department’s Inspector General noted that many of the items that should have been subject to EUM “were inaccessible or near combat zones.”

Because US personnel are largely unable to conduct EUM, the State Department’s Inspector General explained that there were risks that Russia could acquire sensitive US defense technologies by capturing US equipment. Evidence suggests that Russia has captured various pieces of Western technologies, including Javelin Missiles and even a Bradley fighting vehicle. This presents a distinct danger to US national security when paired with reports that captured equipment is being sent to Iran for reverse engineering. These examples of EUM failure, even though Ukraine is a cooperative partner, mean that 2024 needs to see revisions and updates to EUM policies.

End-Use Monitoring Needs

We suggest two types of changes to meet the challenges, and the need for accuracy and transparency, of EUM. Bureaucratic changes should address communication, resources, and coordination of US EUM efforts, and new technologies can more securely, transparently, and efficiently conduct EUM.

Bureaucratically EUM needs to emphasize use and end. Effective end-use monitoring should entail knowing how the arms are being used, not just where they end up. If the recipient uses arms in ways that violate human rights, incur significant civilian casualties, or greatly increase the risk of diversion, actions must be taken.

Additional bureaucratic needs include decompartmentalization and updating hiring authorities. Could Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry – the current US EUM programs – be combined into a single oversight program? Given the relative budget disparities between the Departments of State and Defense, it could make sense to require all EUM to be coordinated by the Department of Defense. Decompartmentalization would help prevent miscommunications, finger-pointing when things go wrong, and could increase accountability because monitoring would be the purview of one organization. In terms of hiring authorities, EUM programs have been unable to hire the appropriate staff in Ukraine to conduct EUM. An Inspector General's report recommended updating these hiring authorities. Broadly speaking, having more flexible hiring authorities – even if EUM is consolidated into one program – would enable the US to work with local partners in places where EUM is required but the US has a small personnel footprint.

The final bureaucratic need is for formal policies when EUM needs to be conducted in “non-permissive operating conditions.” The State Department Inspector General found that none of the State department bureaus responsible for EUM had formally updated their procedures for EUM in Ukraine. This policy need could be addressed by leveraging technology.

EUM is resource intensive and requires personnel to physically inspect weapons and storage facilities, and interview operators. As the US has seen in Ukraine, this process is incredibly difficult in a war zone. We suggest that EUM could be more effectively and efficiently conducted by leveraging blockchain technology. Speed and accuracy are challenges for EUM during a conflict: you want to minimize the risks to inspectors, but still have an accurate count of where and how weapons are being used. Could the US work to develop an app that uses blockchain technology – which cannot be forged or tampered with – and scanning or photographs to conduct EUM?

There are already examples of private companies and NGOs using blockchain and mobile phone apps to securely store and transmit data. For example, Volvo developed blockchain-based apps to track cobalt mined for its car batteries, with the goal of not using conflict minerals. There are also multiple use cases for nuclear fuel, with programs being developed by GE as well as the Stimson Center. Can the US government develop a similar low-footprint app and scanning system that could reliably and accurately monitor weapons in storage and weapons deployed? Such an app could use scanning and/or photographs of arms, incorporate geographic data, and would be securely stored and transmitted. The blockchain technology means that the US would have a complete record of each weapon that required EUM.

This idea is not as wild as it may sound. Because of the dangers posed by an active war zone, and the lack of US personnel within Ukraine, EUM has relied on cooperation from different Ukrainian offices, as when Ukraine’s national police unit sent photographs back to the State Department for EUM. Instead of seeing cooperation from local partners as a stop-gap measure, developing a scan/picture and tagging system, secured with blockchain, could make this a feasible and secure way to conduct EUM. Additionally, we know that Ukraine has made use of cellphones and apps during the war, and the ubiquity of cellphones means that an app-based program could have fast and wide uptake.

Regardless of how EUM proceeds, the war in Ukraine has revealed some of the weaknesses within current programs, and we envision that 2024 will bring renewed attention to EUM as the US tries to comply with its own legal and ethical guidelines.

Dylan Cordle is an MA Candidate in Political Science at the University of New Hampshire.

Jen Spindel is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire and expert listed by the Forum.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and the publication of these posts, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Explosive Violence: Projections for 2024

1/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Chiara Torelli

Also available in PDF

The signing, in November 2022, of Ireland’s Political Declaration on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), raised hopes that the impact of such violence would be curbed in the years to come. However, where 2022 saw a marked rise in the use of explosive weapons against civilians, 2023 saw the levels of harm rise higher still. With at least four high intensity conflicts carrying over into 2024, the picture continues to look bleak.

Between December 2022 and November 2023, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 6,904 incidents of explosive weapons use around the world, which caused 28,733 reported civilian casualties (11,501 killed, 17,232 injured). Civilians represented 69% of all 41,820 reported casualties in that time.

This marks a 67% increase in reported incidents compared to the same period the year prior, when AOAV picked up 4,133 incidents. Similarly, the number of civilian casualties rose by 42%, from 20,200 civilians reported killed and injured in 2022, while civilian fatalities grew by 69%, from 6,807.

Reflecting the increasing use of explosive weapons globally, the number of countries impacted by explosive violence rose by 11%, from 57 countries impacted between December 2021 and November 2022, to 63 between December 2022 and November 2023.

The standout trends in 2023 have been the considerable increase in the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the rise in civilian casualties of explosive weapons use by state actors, and a sharp increase in the use of, and harm from, manufactured air-launched explosive weapons.

An explosive year

A number of new conflicts and contained flare ups involving state actors emerged in 2023, causing recorded incidents and civilian casualties to spike. These include Azerbaijan’s offensive in the Karabakh and heightened tensions in Kosovo, as well as catastrophic escalations in Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In Sudan, armed clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued into 2024 despite hopeful steps taken in late December and early this year, while the Israeli military has warned Operation Swords of Iron will continue throughout 2024. This latter conflict has spilt over into neighbouring countries, notably Lebanon, where regular artillery exchanges between the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah have claimed casualties, combatant and civilian, on both sides. Similarly, Israel has targeted Hezbollah and Iranian affiliates in Syria, while Iranian-backed groups have increased attacks on US bases in the country. In Yemen, the Houthis have been targeting ships in the Red Sea and firing missiles towards Israel. Both the Sudanese civil war and Israel’s military operation are likely to loom large in the year to come. On the other hand, Armenia and Azerbaijan recently released a joint statement sharing the view that ‘there is a historical chance to achieve long-awaited peace in the region,’ raising hopes that explosive violence between these two states will decrease.

Other conflicts were carried over from 2022, notably armed resistance to the military government in Myanmar, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict between the Ethiopian government and regional armed groups, as well as the longstanding conflicts in Syria and in Yemen, amongst others. While Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDF) units, and allied Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have claimed significant successes in their battle against the military government, the junta’s superior air power is likely to draw the conflict out for many more months, if not years. Similarly, the entrenched, intractable conflicts in Syria and Yemen, while witnessing decreasing incidents when compared to previous years, remain amongst the most harmful to civilians and show no signs of abating.

Of note, an emerging trend on AOAV’s radar has been the increasing use of explosive weapons, mainly Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), by organised crime groups. This was especially apparent in Mexico and Sweden. While the violence remains low-level when compared to the uncountable casualties in larger-scale conflicts, it’s a trend that is likely to see continued growth.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

Last year, AOAV noted the increasingly blurred distinction between civilians and armed combatants in warfare, a phenomenon which has continued to define conflicts in 2023. Many conflicts involve non-state actors who are embedded in local communities, as in Myanmar, or civilians who are recruited into or organise themselves into militias, for example in Somalia, Nigeria or Burkina Faso. Ukraine relies predominantly on an army of mobilised citizens and volunteers, while civilians have continued to play an active part by providing information to the Ukrainian army via smartphone apps. Myanmar’s resistance groups are chiefly made up of civilians who mobilised in response to the 2021 coup. In Gaza, Israel claims that Hamas is present across civilian and protected infrastructure, and hides among civilian communities. These factors are all reflected in the systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure in support of the war effort, as seen in, amongst others, Syria, Myanmar, Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan.

Between December 2021 and November 2022, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) dominated, representing 69% (2,846) of incidents, 95% (19,105) of civilian casualties, and 94% (6,428) of civilian fatalities. That trend continued into 2023: between December 2022 and November 2023, the use of EWIPA accounted for 75% (5,165) of incidents, 95% (27,362) of civilian casualties, and 96% (11,024) of civilian fatalities. On a more granular level, the use of EWIPA increased by 81% last year, with a 71% increase in associated civilian fatalities.

Perpetrators

2023 saw a notable increase in the reported use of explosive weapons by state actors when compared to the year before: between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 4,621 incidents of state-perpetrated explosive violence, which resulted in 20,993 civilian casualties of whom 8,884 were killed. Explosive weapons use by state actors consequently accounts for 67% of all recorded incidents in that time, 73% of civilian casualties, and 77% of civilian fatalities.

The year prior, between December 2021 and November 2022, AOAV recorded 2,476 incidents of explosive weapons use by state actors, resulting in 13,601 civilian casualties of whom 4,854 were killed. This means state use of explosive weapons increased by 87%, and civilian casualties of such violence by 54%. Civilian fatalities from state-perpetrated explosive violence increased by 83% last year. With conflicts involving state actors looking set to carry over into the coming year, it is likely the use of explosive weapons by these actors will continue to increase.

Weapons

Ground-launched weapons continued to be the dominant weapon-type recorded by AOAV in terms of recorded incidents. Last year, these weapons accounted for 51% (3,497) of incidents, 41% (11,645) of civilian casualties, and 26% (2,967) of civilian fatalities. Comparatively, in 2022, ground-launched weapons represented 51% (2,109) of incidents, 50% (10,099) of civilian casualties, and 44% (2,992) of civilian fatalities.

In accordance with the decreased proportion of harm from ground-launched weapons, both the use of and harm from air-launched explosive weapons have increased dramatically. Last year, air-launched weapons represented 20% (1,355) of incidents, 41% (11,727) of civilian casualties, and 59% (6,782) of civilian fatalities. The rate of average civilian fatalities per air strike was therefore 5.0. The year prior, these weapons accounted for 13% (527) of incidents, 20% (4,090) of civilian casualties, and 44% (2,065) of civilian fatalities, with a rate of average civilian fatalities per air strike of 3.9.

The use of air-launched weapons consequently increased by 157% last year, and civilian fatalities of such weapons by 228%. As state actors continue to be heavily involved in conflicts, and to mobilise their air forces in populated areas, this is a trend that is likely to continue into 2024.

Zones of Conflict

AOAV highlights several conflict zones, including both international and non-international armed conflicts, which are likely to continue to experience intense explosive weapon use over the coming year.

Gaza

While Israel carries out relatively frequent operations in Gaza, including a highly injurious operation in May 2021, Operation Swords of Iron has been one of the longest and most damaging: 2023 has so far been the deadliest year for civilians in Gaza recorded by AOAV. Between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 615 incidents of explosive weapons use in Gaza, resulting in 8,610 civilian casualties of whom 5,811 have been killed. By contrast, during the same period in the year prior, AOAV recorded 30 incidents of explosive weapons use, and 159 civilian casualties of whom 37 were killed.

Of note, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), AOAV’s analysis showed that English-language media captures only a third of the civilian deaths from specific explosive incidents in Gaza reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Furthermore, the use of explosive weapons in the OPT has been so intensive that it is difficult to attribute civilian casualties to specific incidents of use, as required by AOAV’s methodology. It is equally difficult to track rising injury or death tolls from specific incidents. For these reasons, AOAV’s data underrepresents the extent of harm caused by explosive weapons in the OPT.

Incessant air strikes and a prolonged ground incursion have characterised Operation Swords of Iron, launched on October 7th in response to the massacre perpetrated by Hamas across Israel. From October 7th to the end of November 2023, AOAV recorded 587 incidents of explosive weapons use in the context of Operations Swords of Iron, and 8,483 civilian casualties of whom 5,783 were killed. While air strikes have dominated the explosive violence landscape in Gaza in that time, accounting for 95% (555) of incidents and 95% (8,047) of civilian casualties, the use of ground-launched weapons has increased as the ground-invasion, which began on October 27th, progresses. AOAV has recorded Israeli artillery shelling (51 civilian casualties), non-specific shelling (48), and tank shelling (40) in the enclave, as well as Hamas mortar and rocket shelling, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. In early 2024, Israel announced a shift in strategy, pulling troops out of Gaza in a move US officials have interpreted as reflecting a transition to lower intensity operations. The use of ground-launched weapons is therefore likely to decrease in line with reduced ground operations, while air strikes might be expected to take up the slack.

Operation Swords of Iron has divided nations. Protests, violence, and rising anti-semitism and Islamophobia have accompanied governments across the globe coming down in support of one or the other party. While initially support for Israel from Western governments, in particular the United States and United Kingdom, was relatively unequivocal, criticism regarding the high civilian death toll and catastrophic humanitarian crisis has been growing, with calls for a ceasefire gaining in intensity. Allegations of violations of International Humanitarian Law have been raised against all parties to the conflict, in particular Israeli military tactics that seem to subject the civilian population of Gaza to collective punishment. Israel has repeatedly stated that it would not bow to international pressure as it pursues the stated goal of eliminating Hamas, while Hamas demands a full cessation of Israeli operations in Gaza before a second truce can be negotiated.

Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has carried on well into its second year with no signs of abating, although levels of reported harm to civilians have been decreasing. Between December 2022 and November 2023 AOAV recorded 2,765 incidents of explosive weapons use in Ukraine, and 8,399 civilian casualties, of whom 1,831 have been killed. While this represents a 66% increase from 1,666 incidents recorded in the same period the year prior, civilian casualties have dropped by 12% from 9,557, and civilian fatalities by 47% from 3,477. This could reflect a multitude of factors, including the evacuation and migration of civilians away from conflict zones, or reporting fatigue, which would result in less of the granular reporting on which AOAV’s methodology relies.

As well as reporting fatigue, Ukraine is growing vulnerable to donor fatigue, with stakeholders becoming frustrated by the lack of progress, and other conflicts moving into focus. Weapons for Ukraine were diverted to Israel in October, and in the US, Republican leaders have made their support for further aid to Ukraine conditional on a substantial tightening of US immigration policy. Biden, one of Ukraine’s major supporters, was unable to reach a compromise with Senate leaders, who announced that any military support to Ukraine will be deferred until early 2024. European Union members have continued to be vocal in their support of Ukraine and their pledges of aid, although European artillery production is not set to meet their goals. The shortage of weapons and funds is being felt on the frontlines.

State actors were responsible for the majority, 98% (2,708), of explosive weapons use in Ukraine last year, with the Russian armed forces accounting for 92% (2,544) of reported incidents and 91% (7,621) of civilian casualties. The Ukrainian armed forces were the reported perpetrators of 4% (111) of recorded explosive violence incidents and 7% (599) of civilian casualties. This represents a 74% increase in state actors’ use of explosive weapons in Ukraine, from 1,560 incidents recorded the year prior, and in particular a 70% increase in Russian explosive weapons use (from 1,497 recorded incidents), and a 109% increase in explosive weapons use by the Ukrainian armed forces (from 53). With the reported use of explosive weapons by both states party to the conflict increasing significantly, the mutual unwillingness to engage in negotiations reflects the likelihood of ongoing hostilities.

Sudan

The current war in Sudan finds its roots in the country’s long history of coups, in particular the 2019 ousting of Omar al-Bashir, following which the military and pro-democracy movement agreed to share power. In October of 2021, General Abdel-Fattah Burhan dissolved this agreement, temporarily detaining the civilian Prime Minister and effectively taking control of the country. He has since acted as Sudan’s de facto ruler, with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, working alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to maintain the military’s ascendance. However, growing tensions between the two armed forces coalesced into an intractable power struggle, and on April 15th 2023, a full-scale armed conflict broke out between Burhan and Dagalo. The resulting insecurity and armed violence have spread far beyond the capital to other cities, displacing thousands and exacerbating Sudan’s existing humanitarian challenges, as well as compounding the challenges of an eventual transition to civilian, democratic rule.

The impact of the conflict is stark: 2023 was the most harmful year AOAV has recorded in Sudan since 2010. Between December 2021 and November 2022, AOAV recorded three incidents of explosive weapons use in Sudan, and 30 resulting civilian casualties of whom five were killed. Between December 2022 and November 2023, the number of recorded incidents rose by 4,167% to 128; civilian casualties of explosive violence rose by 7,193% to 2,188; and civilian fatalities increased by 18,420% to 926.

It has been consistently challenging to attribute particular incidents to either the SAF or the RSF, the two major parties to the conflict, with around 63% (81) of incidents attributed to unknown actors, or to both state and non-state actors during clashes. However, state actors, specifically the SAF, are reportedly responsible for 23% (29) of incidents and 24% (534) of civilian casualties, while non-state actors, specifically the RSF, reportedly caused 14% (18) of incidents and 14% (316) of civilian casualties.

The SAF has predominantly made use of air strikes, which account for 79% (23) of incidents attributed to Burhan’s forces, and 65% (349) of civilian casualties ascribed to them. SAF air strikes also account for 75% (229) of all 305 civilian fatalities attributed to the SAF. On the other hand, the RSF has chiefly relied on ground-launched weapons, in particular non-specific shelling and artillery shelling. Such weapons account for 89% (16) of incidents attributed to the RSF, and 88% (279) of resulting civilian harm. Ground-launched weapons represent 85% (104) of all 122 civilian fatalities attributed to the RSF.

In early December, mediators had indefinitely suspended talks between the SAF and RSF, but in mid-December Burhan agreed to a one-on-one meeting with Dagalo. The meeting was supposed to take place on December 28, but was postponed for ‘technical reasons’ to January 2024. With neither side having gained the upper-hand militarily, 2024 is likely to bear witness to further escalations between the two if the scheduled meeting fails to bear fruit.

Myanmar

In February of 2021, Myanmar’s military imposed a year-long state of emergency, and arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as other senior government officials. The coup quickly devolved into a non-international armed conflict as civilians rose to protest, then mobilised into civilian defence forces loosely allied under the National Unity Government (NUG). In 2022 and 2023, these defence forces increased their attacks against the military junta and suspected collaborators, demonstrating the ability to adapt their military strategy and score significant military successes with improvised and makeshift weaponry. Established Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) also intensified their attacks against the military government, and alliances between EAOs and various People’s Defence Forces (PDF) units have held and borne military successes. The military junta, in response, has continued its tried-and-trusted ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks which support the opposition. Towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of the junta’s operations.

Last year saw a significant escalation in the number of recorded incidents of explosive weapons use in Myanmar, and in civilian casualties. Between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 932 incidents of explosive weapons use in the beleaguered country, and 2,014 civilian casualties of whom 687 were killed. This is up from 525 incidents the year prior, which resulted in 957 civilian casualties of whom 309 were killed - a 78% increase in incidents, 110% increase in civilian casualties, and a 122% increase in civilian fatalities.

The use of explosive weapons by the military junta accounted for 43% (400) of incidents last year, 84% (1,695) of civilian casualties, and 87% (598) of civilian fatalities. Conversely, non-state actors account for 53% (496) of recorded incidents, 9% (174) of civilian casualties, and 7% (45) of civilian fatalities.

Accordingly, air-launched weapons account for a small proportion of incidents, 14% (130), but the majority of civilian harm: these weapons represent 47% (946) of civilian casualties, and 54% (374) of civilian fatalities. As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, air strikes will likely continue to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in the coming year, remaining responsible for the bulk of civilian harm from explosive weapons in the country.

Chiara Torelli is lead explosive violence researcher at at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and a member of the Forum's emerging expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Event Guide and Resources– Arming the War in Israel-Palestine: Legal Considerations (January 16, 2024)

Prioritising the protection of civilians from explosive weapons: Bringing about change through the framework of the Political Declaration

The move towards human rights due diligence policies by the arms industry

The 2024 review of the EU Common Position on arms exports: an opportunity for stronger cooperation on post-shipment controls?

3D Printed Firearms: Prospects for International Action in 2024

Grappling with End-Use Monitoring

Explosive Violence: Projections for 2024

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