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How military technologies and alliances in the Russia-Ukraine war will impact global peace and security in 2025

12/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Olena Kryzhanivska
The third year of the Russian war in Ukraine has brought several surprising developments, including Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the direct involvement of North Korean troops on the battlefield, and a series of long-range strikes on Russia’s strategic targets conducted by Ukraine, at times with the use of autonomous technologies. The scope of this war has clearly exceeded regional dimensions and is evolving into a global confrontation.
 
Over 50 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defense Contact Group, collaborating to coordinate military aid. Nations from at least five continents are contributing both lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia's military allies include the global power China, along with regional players like North Korea and Iran, whose involvement in the conflict continues to expand.
 
Involvement in this war is not driven solely by ideological reasons. Allied states and private-sector actors are paying close attention to weaponry deployed on the battlefield, tested against a technologically advanced adversary, and then further refined. What could these developments mean for the world?
 
Ukraine’s military and technological innovations and the need for responsible arms control
 
Both parties to the war, Ukraine and Russia, have significantly increased their military production since February 2022. While Ukraine cannot match Russia's weapon production in terms of quantity, it has deliberately prioritized quality. Ukraine's strategic objective is enhancing its domestic long-range capabilities and creating conditions for achieving a technological advantage over Russian forces.
 
Ukraine's most significant military assets are unmanned aerial systems, which have  reshaped the basic outlines of modern warfare. The main trends in UAV development in Ukraine include increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and sensor technologies; integration of computer vision and real-time data processing; as well as swarm technology. Ukraine is on track to produce 1.2 million drones in 2024, with plans to grow production toward 4 million annually. 
 
Ukraine’s drone technologies and electronic warfare systems have already attracted interest from parties involved in conflicts in other regions. The Iranian-made drones being launched at Israel from Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran motivate both the private and military sectors in Israel to consider closer cooperation with Ukraine in this domain and to learn from its battlefield experience. This development could lead to enhanced military cooperation between Ukraine and Israel, including an extensive exchange of military technologies.
 
In addition to drones, Ukraine already launched the production of artillery systems, ballistic missiles, and 155-mm caliber ammunition.
 
Currently, all weaponry produced in Ukraine is intended for domestic use, as military exports are prohibited. However, the potential opening of military exports in 2025 is anticipated to generate significant revenue for the country’s war-affected economy.
 
To prepare for this development, Ukraine will need to implement responsible arms transfer procedures, including robust end-user controls. A crucial step in this process would be Ukraine's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty, as it is currently only a signatory to the agreement.
 
As Ukraine ramps up military production drawn from battlefield experience,  the private sector in many Western countries is considering expanding production into Ukraine or neighboring region. Currently, more than 40 foreign defense companies operate in Ukraine. Collaboration with Ukrainian engineers and technical staff on producing drones, ammunition, and air defense systems is particularly attractive.
 
Prominent players such as U.S.-based Skydio, Germany’s Quantum-Systems, and Turkey’s Baykar have swiftly established offices or drone manufacturing plants in Ukraine. Meanwhile, German Rheinmetall plans to set up at least four factories in Ukraine to produce artillery shells, military vehicles, gunpowder, and anti-aircraft weapons.
 
This expansion would significantly boost Ukrainian defense production amid ongoing ammunition shortages. However, in the long term, it is difficult to predict how these advanced technologies and direct involvement in the Ukrainian battlefield might be utilized in other conflicts. A notable example is the plan to deploy battle-tested American NASAMS systems, initially used in Ukraine, to Taiwan.
 
The Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Online Portal (RULAC), based in Geneva, tracks over 110 armed conflicts globally. Military producers, motivated by profit, are likely to attract customers seeking battlefield-tested innovations that provide a decisive edge in warfare.
 
Although the full impact of these developments may not be visible by 2025, it is expected that, within a few years, military technologies refined in the Russian-Ukrainian war will begin to emerge in other parts of the world, particularly in areas where Western states are engaged.
 
Deepening military cooperation within the Russia-led alliance: potential for immediate global threats
 
Russia has mobilized its defense industry to sustain its ongoing military operations, significantly increasing production by introducing additional shifts, expanding production lines at existing facilities, and reopening decommissioned factories. These measures have led to substantial increases in output.
 
At the start of 2023, Russia was producing six Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles per month, with a stockpile of approximately 50. By early 2024, despite extensive use, its stockpile had grown to nearly 200 Iskander 9M723 ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. Russia has already increased its overall annual artillery shell production to three million rounds. In the realm of drone warfare, Russian state sources report plans to ramp up production by nearly tenfold, targeting 1.4 million units in 2024.
 
A trend that is already alarming in the short-term perspective is the deepening cooperation between Russia, North Korea, and Iran, both on the battlefield and in defense production, as well as with China.
 
All these countries have been on (and off) various arms embargo lists for decades. Since 2006, North Korea has been under a comprehensive and open-ended UN arms embargo, prohibiting both the export and import of weapons. Iran faced a partial UN embargo on the export of technology related to nuclear weapon delivery from 2006 to 2023. Both Russia and China have been sanctioned by the EU, the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and other states.
 
The purpose of these sanctions is to limit military capabilities and pressure states to improve their behavior in the interest of international peace and security. However, the coordinated support for Ukraine provided by the Western-led coalition since 2022 has brought these states together, strengthening their military cooperation.
 
In June 2024, the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships was signed between North Korea and Russia, and in October 2024, Russia and Iran announced the preparation of a similar treaty, that "confirms the parties’ desire for closer cooperation in the field of defense and interaction in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels." The involvement of both countries in the war includes substantial military support for Russian capabilities, with Iran transferring drones and ballistic missiles, engaging in joint drone production with Russia. North Korea’s contributions include providing rocket, artillery systems, and artillery shells to Russia, as well as deploying troops to the battlefield. The Russian-Chinese cooperation is more sophisticated, and although China has never formally endorsed the war on Ukraine, its role in sustaining Russian military capabilities is significant.
 
Despite sanctions, Moscow has significantly bolstered its defense manufacturing capabilities with support from its allies, allowing for large-scale production of advanced weapon systems, drones, and artillery. This marks the most substantial military-industrial expansion since the Soviet era. This partnership is reciprocal, with Russia also transferring military equipment to its allies.
 
The close-knit cooperation between these states presents significant dangers, including the transfer of military technologies and battlefield experience gained in Ukraine to North Korea and Iran, effectively undermining the purpose of the sanctions. The widespread human rights abuses committed by Russia and its allies, coupled with their reluctance to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law, heighten concerns about how swiftly they may apply these newly acquired innovations in other conflicts.
 
Russia’s security interests span the globe, with a military presence (including private military companies) across four continents and at least 34 countries. Iran exercises influence in several regional conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestine war and in Syria and Lebanon. North Korean forces deployed alongside Russian troops are likely to learn to conduct drone warfare, which could be used in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea’s drone capabilities, along with its decision to begin serial drone production, poses a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.
 
Arms transfers between these states, carried out without consideration of international conventional arms control treaties and mechanisms, along with the exchange of critical technologies and battlefield experiences, are expected to have a profound impact on remote regions of the world, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America, both in the short and long term.
 
Conclusions
 
While the promise of incoming US President Donald Trump to quickly end the war makes predictions for 2025 difficult, it is entirely possible that we witness a deepening conflict between the large coalition supporting Ukraine and a smaller group of states aligned with Russia. The already expanded military cooperation on both sides, along with the exchange of military technologies and battlefield experiences,  will almost certainly continue and affect armed conflicts in other regions and contribute to the rise of armed violence globally.
 
In the short term, the arms transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran are particularly concerning, as all three countries openly use belligerent rhetoric. Their involvement in armed conflicts across different regions could lead to the rapid spread of advanced technologies, such as drone warfare, beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
 
The growing involvement of the private sector of both Ukraine and Russia in the war highlights the timely issue of the role of industry and other private sector actors in global arms control efforts, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments. As the war progressed and is likely to in the future, we see how the negligent actions of some military producers directly affect the lives of civilians, contributing to human suffering. The efforts of civil society organizations and media outlets that investigate and document the irresponsible transfer of weapons and their components should be supported and continued.
 
 
​Olena Kryzhanivska is an independent researcher with a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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As War Leads to More Orders, Weapons Makers Should Embrace Human Rights

4/27/2023

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by Aaron A. Acosta and Jeff Abramson

In the coming month, shareholders at major U.S. defense manufacturers will again recommend that the companies consider human rights in their business decisions. This time, the companies should agree.

That defense companies face reputational risks when their weapons are used to bomb school buses or in other ways kill civilians is generally known. Nevertheless, arms manufacturers typically resist calls for shouldering the blame when their products are misused by arguing that the government provides licenses for their sales – and therefore takes that responsibility off industry’s shoulders. But an excellent brief last year by the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights lays out a range of risks arms manufacturers face that cannot simply be waved away by a government license. These include those reputational factors, as well financial, governance, regulatory and legal risks. Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Raytheon were reminded just last month of such challenges when a group of Yemeni nationals filed a lawsuit against them in Washington D.C. for “aiding and abetting war crimes and extrajudicial killings” by supplying arms to Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen. And a new database launched last week draws attention to the growing legal challenges to governments’ export licensing decisions, further highlighting that defense companies cannot, nor should not, rely solely on government determinations.

At forthcoming Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics annual general meetings, investors will sponsor resolutions calling for the companies to conduct and publish a human rights impact assessment. At Northrop Grumman, the call will be for an examination of whether the company’s political activities (direct and indirect lobbying, campaign contributions, etc.) align with those policies. In short, the arms companies – the world’s 1st, 4th and 5th largest – are being asked to begin more fully engaging in human rights due diligence.

Rather than resisting shareholder initiatives, defense manufacturers this year should embrace the push for human rights. With ongoing customer relations and follow-on services to weapons recipients, defense companies often have information on what’s happening with weapons stocks and are able to encourage and provide know-how on best practices. 

The ABA guidance mentioned earlier details practical advice to help companies manage actual and potential human rights impacts linked to their business activities. This includes evaluating the risks that potential clients may violate human rights with weapons and services they receive, proactively putting in place preventive and mitigation measures that establish good practices for companies and clients, monitoring how weapons are used, and then following up with investigation and remediation where necessary.  

The Biden administration has also made clear that human rights matter in its arms trade decisions. The President’s new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy, issued in February, places a stronger emphasis on human rights, stating the U.S. will not transfer arms when it assesses that it is “more likely than not” that they will be used to commit an array of human rights abuses. It also explicitly makes clear that as situations change, arms transfers may be cut off – a signal to industry that just getting to a contract is not enough. 

At the same time, the policy made a commitment to arms manufacturing and the defense industrial base. And that industrial base will be busy. As the war in Ukraine continues, it is clear that U.S. defense companies will have many years of orders to not only replenish the stock of U.S. weapons sent to Kyiv, but also those of partners who have done so.

Importantly, this makes now the best moment for U.S. companies to adopt and implement human rights due diligence policies. With such a substantial portion of future sales likely to go to European countries whose human rights practices and weapons-use policies tend to be more transparent, defense companies should be able to “battle-test” human rights due diligence with them.

The idea that American companies should pay attention to more than just the bottom line has, of course, been much more visible this year, as President Biden issued his first veto last month, thwarting those who argued that investors shouldn’t be able to take into account environmental, social, and governance considerations. While that may now have made “ESG” a household acronym for many Americans, ESG goals have been undergirded for more than a decade by the 2011 “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” known as the “UNGPs.”

Over the years, the U.S. government has continually and explicitly recognized the important role of the UNGPs. The first National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (NAP), which was published in 2016, emphasized that responsible business conduct principles are encompassed in the UNGPs. Importantly, the 2016 NAP stated the U.S. government “encourages businesses to treat tools like the… UN Guiding Principles as a floor rather than a ceiling for implementing responsible business practices [RBC], and to recognize that implementing RBC should be a continuing process.” A revision to the NAP is currently underway that will recognize that UNGPs “have both domestic and international applicability.”

The extension of the UNGPs into arms and security issues has also grown. A key UN working group report last year explicitly looking at the arms sector similarly made the case for implementing the UNGPs and recommendations for how businesses could do so. And, late last month under U.S. leadership, more than 20 countries again endorsed them at the Summit for Democracy as part of a code of conduct aimed at preventing the proliferation of software and technologies that enable serious human rights abuses.

Despite the growing momentum around embedding the UNGPs in companies’ policies and practices, only one of the three major weapons companies that will soon face investor-led human rights initiatives explicitly mentions them. That’s Northrop Grumman, who does not take them as authoritative, but rather says they offer “a source of guidance on how governments, companies, and other parties can address their responsibilities.” 

Last year, defense company leaders argued against shareholder proposals that highlighted human rights due diligence, but those that went to a vote at Lockheed and General Dynamics still garnered 20.2% and 25.2% shareholder support, respectively. While the Lockheed proposal asked the company to conduct a human rights impact assessment, the General Dynamics proposal asked for reporting on the company’s human rights due diligence process. This year, shareholder proposals filed at Lockheed (April 27) and General Dynamics (May 3) ask the companies to conduct human rights impact assessments, and the Northrop proposal asks the company to report on misalignment between its political activities and its human rights commitments. 

The Northrop (May 17) proposal on misalignment, filed for the first time this year, highlights the high reputational risks companies face when their political activities are in conflict with their stated commitments. Northrop’s political activities suggest it actively lobbies, makes political contributions, and otherwise pushes for government sales of its defense products and services to customers linked to irremediable human rights impacts. Recently, major proxy advisors Vanguard and Glass Lewis pointed out the significant reputational risks of misalignment between a company’s political activities and its stated commitments and values - risks that affect a company’s bottom line. 

It’s time for U.S. defense manufacturers to be proactively responsible partners in our national endeavors to promote human rights.


Aaron A. Acosta is a senior program associate at Investor Advocates for Social Justice, Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and director of the Forum on the Arms Trade

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Aid to Ukraine May Elicit Broader Arms Trade Scrutiny

1/19/2023

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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John Chappell
The coming months will likely bring renewed skepticism towards U.S. arms sales to Ukraine, especially among Republican members whose party now controls the House of Representatives.  While increased attention to U.S. security assistance to Ukraine is all but inevitable, will a change in House leadership bring productive debate about arms sales oversight and end-use monitoring? Or will legislators use Ukraine aid as yet another partisan cudgel?

An Opportunity and Its Risks

In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drew global attention, sparking efforts in the United States and Europe to provide military assistance to Ukraine’s armed forces. Scenes of attacks on civilians and accounts of war crimes drew sympathy from western publics, and diplomats protested President Putin’s blatant violation of international law prohibiting aggressive war. Last year, the United States provided tens of billions of dollars in assistance to Ukraine, with about half of it taking the form of weapons, security assistance, and Foreign Military Financing. But as economic woes continue and the war drags on, public support for continued military assistance to Ukraine has eroded, especially among Republican voters. 

The Republican Party’s victory in the 2022 midterms – albeit a narrow one – will change congressional dynamics regarding U.S. arms sales to Ukraine. As became apparent with the election of Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) as Speaker, the GOP caucus is fractured, and the Republican Party’s slim majority makes every vote count, empowering the party’s right flank. Passing legislation through the House during the 118th Congress will be difficult, and securing Senate passage, and presidential signature for many House-originated bills seems unlikely. But with Republicans holding the Speaker’s gavel and committee chairs, they will nonetheless have a great deal of influence to conduct oversight and engage in “overspeech.” House Republicans plan to investigate the business dealings of members of President Biden’s family, scrutinize the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and probe abuses of power in the federal government. 

Fights over arms sales to Ukraine may emerge more often with GOP control of the House. Debate about oversight for major arms sales could be productive. Congressional attention to U.S. end-use monitoring procedures would be welcome, especially since current end-use monitoring processes do not monitor how U.S.-origin defense articles are used. 

However, should Ukraine aid become a matter uttered in the same breath as Hunter Biden’s laptop, Democrats will be unlikely to take oversight proposals seriously. Much-needed security assistance reform efforts will suffer if arms sales oversight becomes overly associated with far-right posturing.

Republican Positions on Ukraine Aid

The Republican Party is far from unified on the question of military aid to Ukraine. But enough high-profile legislators have raised concerns, whether about the scale of aid or oversight for military assistance, to put the issue on the agenda for 2023. Such concerns may result in the inclusion of additional oversight measures in future appropriations for assistance to Ukraine.

A number of Republican legislators have spoken out against continued U.S.military assistance to Ukraine without greater oversight. In December, Rep. Marjorie Taylor-Greene (R-GA) introduced a resolution to audit U.S. aid to Ukraine, drawing support from both restraint-minded and more hawkish conservatives. Taylor-Greene intends to reintroduce the measure in the 118th Congress. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) has also been a vocal critic of U.S. aid to Ukraine. 

Key Republican committee chairs are stalwart supporters of U.S. military support to Ukraine. In December 2022, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX), who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said he “100%” supports arming Ukraine against Russia. He also sponsored a bipartisan bill authorizing U.S. support to international criminal fora, including the International Criminal Court, for investigations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, McCaul backed Taylor-Greene’s audit resolution in the House Foreign Affairs Committee as ranking member, and he has voiced support for “oversight and accountability” for security assistance to Ukraine.

Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), who won the Speaker’s gavel on January 7, 2023 after fifteen rounds of voting, has expressed that Ukraine will not get a “blank check” from Congress with the House under Republican leadership. 

In the Senate, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has spearheaded Republican support for assistance to Ukraine. But Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) would be a likely Senate ally of Ukraine aid skeptics in the House. A perennial critic of U.S. arms sales, Paul delayed a vote on a $40 billion aid package to Ukraine in May 2022 with a provision requiring that an inspector general monitor the spending. Besides Senator Paul, a significant contingent of GOP Senators has voted against appropriations for aid to Ukraine.

With notable legislators calling for greater accountability and oversight for U.S. arms sales to Ukraine, 2023 will bring opportunities to consider how U.S. law and policy address U.S. arms sales.

Possible Areas of Focus in the Ukraine Aid Debate

In light of the sheer quantity of U.S. arms sales and other forms of assistance to Ukraine, three policy areas that congressional conversations may touch on include end-use monitoring, the Leahy Laws, and oversight by inspectors general. 

At this stage of the conflict, U.S. arms appear to have remained in the hands of Ukrainian forces, but the risk of unauthorized diversion may rise when the war eventually winds down. The Biden administration has taken action to prevent the diversion of U.S. arms provided to Ukraine. In October 2022, the State Department released a plan to “[s]afeguard and account for arms and munitions in Ukraine and neighboring countries.” The plan focuses on cross-border smuggling of particular powerful and mobile types of arms. But conducting end-use monitoring for U.S.-origin equipment is difficult amid ongoing armed conflict. As a September 2022 State Department cable stated, “standard verification measures are sometimes impracticable or impossible.” 

Serious legislative attention to end-use monitoring (EUM) would be a productive outcome of conversations about U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. Mandated in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and implemented by the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry Programs, significant gaps in end-use monitoring deserve attention. As a 2021 brief from the Center for Civilians in Conflict, Center for International Policy, and Stimson Center put it, “current EUM programs are designed to protect U.S. technology, not people. The word ‘use’ in end-use monitoring is an unfortunate misnomer.”

Beyond concerns about smuggling weapons outside of Ukraine, U.S. assistance could contribute to human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. Congress has previously prohibited the provision of security assistance to the Azov Battalion, a far-right armed group that is part of Ukraine’s National Guard. While Russian war crimes thus far dwarf Ukrainian violations in both gravity and quantity, some possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by Ukrainian personnel have emerged. Such accounts could trigger the Leahy Laws, which prohibit the provision of assistance to units of armed forces when credible information exists that the unit committed a “gross violation of human rights.” However, given the relative scale of Russian war crimes, significant congressional discussion of gaps in the Leahy Laws as applied in Ukraine seems unlikely, barring a significant change in how the Ukrainian military conducts hostilities.

Ukraine’s difficulties with corruption raise concerns as well, especially since military aid could exacerbate existing problems and undermine the country’s democratic institutions. In light of corruption issues, some analysts recommend the creation of an oversight body on the model of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In June 2022, the former Afghanistan Special Inspector General commented, “It is really shocking that people are not applying what we learned about the mistakes in Afghanistan to Ukraine.” Others prefer relying on existing inspectors general for U.S. government departments and agencies, such as the finally confirmed DoD Inspector General Robert Storch. In both cases, an inspector general would conduct audits and investigations to prevent misuse of U.S. aid. While tasking inspectors general to focus on U.S. arms sales to Ukraine could contribute to greater transparency, it will be important that the U.S. government absorbs their findings and incorporates reforms into policy, law, and practice. 


John Chappell is a Legal Fellow at Center for Civilians in Conflict and a joint J.D. and M.S. in Foreign Service candidate at Georgetown University. He is also a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program. 

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).


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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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