Category: Arms Trade Treaty

The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

12/19/2018

This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Ray Acheson

2018, for some reason, was a turning point for international diplomatic recognition of gender dimensions of weapons and disarmament policy. After years or even decades—or in WILPF’s case, a century—of feminist advocacy for governments and activists to take gender into account in their work, we seem to breaking new ground.

In March, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva collaborated with WILPF, Small Arms Survey, and the Gender Mine Action Programme on a one-day training for disarmament diplomats about including gender perspectives in their work. In April, WILPF coordinated with the Canadian mission in New York on a meeting that brought together the women, peace and security (WPS) and disarmament diplomatic communities to exchange on the same subject.

In May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his new disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future. It includes a section on “Ensuring the equal, full, and effective participation of women,” and there are several references throughout the document to the gendered impacts of weapons, gender-sensitive arms control, or women’s participation in disarmament, including urging states to incorporate gender perspectives in their national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control.

In June, the Third Review Conference to the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) adopted a report with groundbreaking references to armed gender-based violence, the gendered impacts of small arms, and women’s participation in disarmament. The document builds on gains made in 2012 and 2016 to alleviate the overall gender blindness of the UNPoA. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network coordinated input and advocacy amongst civil society groups and diplomats for the inclusion of these elements in the outcome document, including through the civil society Call to Action on gender and small arms control.

In August, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) considered gender issues for the first time, in a side event hosted by the government of Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Mines Action Canada, Project Ploughshares, and WILPF on the relationship between gender and fully autonomous weapons. Participants addressed gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms in relation to the development and use of weapons, gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.

In October, the Canadian mission to the UN organized a push to increase gender references in resolutions at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Working with other governments and civil society groups, they managed to achieve language in 17 resolutions that advocates for women’s equal participation, recognizes gendered impacts of weapons, or urges consideration of gender perspectives more broadly. This accounts for 25 percent of all First Committee resolutions in 2018. Six of these resolutions included gendered language for the first time, while three improved the gendered language. For comparison, in 2017, 15 per cent of resolutions made gender references. This figure was 13 per cent in 2016 and 12 per cent in 2015. The number of First Committee delegations speaking about gender and disarmament in their statements also continued to increase this year. Namibia on behalf of 56 states dedicated a whole statement to this topic, urging examination of how “underlying assumptions about how gender shapes [delegations’] own work and the dynamics of joint disarmament efforts.”

Also in October, the Latvian ambassador, who will preside over the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, announced that the conference and its preparatory meetings will focus on the gender-based violence provision of the Treaty as a special theme. This will provide an opportunity in 2019 to advance consideration of how to implement this aspect of the ATT, including using guidance and case studies published by groups like WILPF previously.

In addition to these forum-based efforts, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research joined the governments of Ireland, Namibia, and Canada to form the Disarmament Impact Group as an output of the International Gender Champions. The Group aims to “support the disarmament community in translating gender awareness into practical action across the range of multilateral disarmament processes and activities.” Meanwhile, academic sources like Critical Studies on Security and the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, news sources like The Nation, and public speaking forums from TEDx to the London School of Economics featured articles and talks about feminism, gender, and weapons. This has signaled an opening of academic and activist spaces for increased consideration of these issues.

So, why has all this happened so quickly? In reality, it hasn’t. It is built on a firm foundation of activism and analysis. Feminist disarmament activists and academics, particularly those with groups like WILPF and the IANSA Women’s Network, have been writing and campaigning on gender and disarmament for decades. UN agencies and some governments have been working to mainstream gender in their programming for a long time, certainly since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This has led to concrete outcomes at international disarmament diplomacy forums in recent years: the first UN General Assembly resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in 2010; the inclusion of gender-based violence in the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013; the recognition of the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and encouragement of women’s effective participation in disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Chair’s summary and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

External factors are also at play. The #MeToo movement has arguably awoken new acceptability and credibility of previously hidden or shamed perspectives and experiences. Women, trans, queer, non-binary, and non-conforming folks, as well as men who have experienced sexual and gender-based violence have collectively created new spaces to amplify these realities and demand change.

At the same time, several governments have begun pursuing what they term “Feminist Foreign Policy”. While it is debatable whether or not the foreign policies outlined by these governments can yet be truly described as feminist, it is a welcome development for government offices to be considering feminism not just a valid but an imperative approach to their international engagement.

In disarmament forums, momentum certainly seems to be on our side. There is a growing acceptance among a diverse range of governments, international organizations, and civil society groups about the reality that weapons have gendered impacts, and that women’s participation in disarmament is important. This is good progress, and imperative to making change in this field. But it’s not enough.

The work ahead

For one thing, the demand for women’s equal, effective, or meaningful participation—while necessary and welcome—is insufficient for truly making change in weapons policy. Our current situation is dire. Trillions of dollars are being spent on militaries and technologies of violence while poverty, inequality, and climate change threaten our collective security and safety. Disarmament, as a policy and practice that leads us away from militarism and towards peace, requires new understandings, perspectives, and approaches to weapons and war. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of survivors of gun violence, of nuclear weapons use and testing, of drone strikes, of bombardment of towns and cities. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of marginalized communities—LGBT+ folks, people of color, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, people with disabilities.

Diversity is not about political correctness. It is the only way we are ever going to see change in the way that we confront issues of peace and security. Where we have achieved the most disarmament progress in recent years—banning landmines and cluster bombs and nuclear weapons, for example—we have engaged with diverse communities and put humanitarian perspectives over the profits of arms industries or the interests of powerful governments. This is not just about including women, especially women who come from the same or similar backgrounds as the men who already rule the table. It’s about completely resetting the table; or even throwing out the table and setting up an entirely new way of working.

Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behavior of those who have the most privilege. Diversity is not for its own sake, but for how it impacts what is considered normal, acceptable, and credible. Confronting norms, especially gendered norms, around weapons and war is imperative to making progress on disarmament.

As a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. This association comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”.

This type of violent, militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not comply with that gender norm—women, queer-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. It also results in violence against men. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. A big part of this is about preserving or protecting their masculinity—a masculinity that makes male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless resolutions and reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.

We are all suffering from the equation of violence and power with masculinity. It prevents those who identified as men from being something else—from performing gender differently. It prevents all of us as human beings to promote or explore strength, courage, and protection from a nonviolent perspective. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd.

It also makes it impossible to achieve gender justice. It keeps men and women in binary boxes based on their biological sex. It maintains a strict hierarchy between these boxes, in which men are tough, rational, and violent, while women are weak, irrational, and passive. In this narrative, men are agents; women are victims. (And reinforces the idea that there is nothing outside of this binary.)

The norm of violent masculinity will continue to cause suffering and reinforce inequalities until we get serious about doing something differently. This is a project of dismantling the patriarchy, which is a big project, but it starts with the language we use, the people we include in discussions, and the norms we are willing to challenge.

For 2019, let’s stop using the term “women and children”. They are not the same legally or politically. They have different needs and abilities. Let’s talk about the different impacts of weapons based on gender and age, instead of womenandchildren on one side and men on the other. Let’s talk about gender diversity in disarmament, instead of just the equal participation of women and men. Let’s get away from binary language to something more inclusive. Let’s also include survivors and those impacted by weapons, war, and violence. Let’s think about what we consider credible or powerful, and why we think that way.

As more and more governments and organizations become interested in taking up gender, and as feminists around the world from all walks of life smash down barriers outside the disarmament field, let’s not waste the opportunities ahead of us. An intersectional feminist approach to disarmament is imperative, and we have all the tools we need to achieve it.

Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

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Using the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Pastoralist Conflict and Wildlife Crime in Kenya’s Marginalized Regions

5/17/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its authors.

Matthew Bolton

Introduction

In early 2017, some 10,000 pastoralists armed with automatic rifles raided farms, wildlife reserves and conservancies in Laikipia, Kenya, attacking wildlife, people and raiding livestock. The region was and is currently affected by severe drought, and tensions flared as political figures exploited ethnic divisions in campaigning for the 2017 elections.[i] Numerous researchers have found that militarized state interventions to address the kind of cattle rustling observed in Laikipia often exacerbate the situation, introducing new weapons (that enter the illicit market sector through theft or sale) and extrajudicial violence. Heavy-handed suppression is also expensive, diverting important resources away from sustainable development.[ii] Militarized state responses to the collapsing populations of elephants and rhinos—such as shoot-to-kill policies—have often failed to meet human rights standards and have even been implicated in poaching.[iii] Indeed, such responses may undermine important efforts to engage and build local capacities for sustainability, peace, and alternative livelihoods.[iv]

There are, however, alternatives to militarized responses to pastoralist conflict and wildlife crime, rooted in human rights, the rule of law and international cooperation and assistance. Excess availability of arms can fuel militarization, as parties to conflict escalate responses to the increasing danger posed by each other and deadly weapons become more widespread in ownership and uses. Over the last decade states and civil society have constructed transformative legal and normative frameworks to address the human suffering caused by an unregulated arms trade and unchecked proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). These include the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW (PoA) and regional SALW instruments (including, in Africa, the Nairobi Protocol, Kinshasa Convention, ECOWAS Convention and SADC Protocol). Similarly, the previous African elephant poaching crisis in the 1980s—which was fueled by the influx of guns in Africa’s Cold War proxy conflicts—was stopped not so much by militarized interventions but rather through international legal and normative change. For example, the ivory trade ban was instituted through the framework of an international treaty – the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). It was supported by a global awareness-raising campaign—by both States and NGOs—that in many societies transformed ivory from a symbol of luxury to one of disgust.[v]

Most recently, in 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) established, for the first time, global regulations on the transfer of conventional weapons that can prevent arms getting into the hands of human rights abusers, terrorists, war criminals and organized criminal groups. Championed by African states, global civil society and faith leaders who called attention to the devastation of armed conflict on the continent, the treaty creates new opportunities to limit SALW proliferation in regions affected by pastoralist conflict, wildlife crime and armed cattle raiding. If it is universalized and rigorously implemented, States can use the ATT as a normative framework for assessing and mitigating the risks that arms transfers will exacerbate armed violence in pastoralist communities, including cattle raiding and wildlife crime, as well as counterproductive, militarized approaches to controlling pastoralist regions. ATT implementation could include supporting programs that limit the risks of diversion and misuse of SALW and associated ammunition, as well as international, regional and national cooperation and assistance for human security and sustainable development. While the majority of African states have signed the ATT, movement toward ratification has been slow outside West Africa. In particular, the level of accession in the East and Horn of Africa region—an area struggling with the human impact of pastoralist conflict—has been low.[vi] Kenya was particularly crucial in this diplomatic victory, as one of the eight “co-authors” (seen as custodians of the process) of the 2006 General Assembly Resolution that launched the treaty process. However, Kenya has not yet joined the ATT.[vii]

This article draws on and summarizes the findings of two more detailed reports written for the ATT Academy,[viii] a 2016-2017 project that trained government and civil society personnel from East and the Horn of Africa on the treaty, implemented by Pace University and Control Arms with funding from the United Nations Trust Facility for Supporting Cooperation on Arms Cooperation (UNSCAR).[ix]

Armed Violence in Kenya’s Marginalized Regions

The East and Horn of Africa region is home to one of the largest concentrations of pastoralist communities—some 20 million people whose cultures and livelihoods have traditionally revolved around herding cattle, camels, sheep and/or goats.[x] Nomadic and semi-nomadic life-ways are well-suited and adapted to the arid and semi-arid Great Rift Valley and surrounding savannahs. Seeking pasture and water through regular movement over wide areas, herders can avoid overgrazing and limit their impact on fragile ecosystems.[xi] However, pastoralists in the East and Horn of Africa have been marginalized politically, economically, and socially. Colonial governments seized some of the best grazing land traditionally used by pastoralists, enclosing it for white settlement, government use, or for wildlife reserves. Pastoralist communities were often displaced into, or confined to, marginal areas. They were also subjected to neglect through systems of indirect rule, which armed and abetted proxies doing the state’s bidding. Government interventions tended to be punitive and coercive, rather than offering investment in security and development. Such policies often continued into the postcolonial period.[xii] Scarcity of water and pasture has been exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation.[xiii]

In December 2016, at a Control Arms NGO meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, participants stressed the importance of not reading pastoralist conflict through the lens of “culture” (i.e. pathologizing nomadic and semi-nomadic people as somehow inherently problematic). Pastoralist conflict is often misrepresented as a localized, outmoded and “primitive” practice of “cattle rustling.” Similarly, a 2016 Kenya Wildlife Service presentation to the ATT Academy noted that the participation of pastoralists in wildlife crime may be explained by their proximity to wildlife reserves and conservancies, which were often actually alienated from pastoralist communities. However, pastoralist conflict and wildlife crime is often a manifestation of broader conflicts in the region’s “peripheries” and overlaps with tensions over power, wildlife conservation, land and water.[xiv] Cattle rustling and wildlife crime are also embedded in sophisticated organized criminal complexes and neo-patrimonial patronage systems. Arms trafficking connects patronage and stolen cattle or wildlife products through networks that extend throughout the region and even the world.[xv] The proliferation of SALW and ammunition, commercialization of cattle trafficking, the globalization of wildlife trafficking networks, private enclosure of pasture, and political polarization have increased the stakes of conflict in pastoralist communities.

Using the ATT as a Framework for Addressing Armed Violence in Kenya

While support for the ATT remains strong in Kenya’s diplomatic community, civil society and faith institutions, accession has been delayed by powerful countervailing forces. These include an executive branch skittish about global treaties following confrontations with the International Criminal Court and a security establishment that resents external scrutiny. However, the ATT offers opportunities to address the negative impact of the arms trade on pastoralist conflict and wildlife crime and also mitigate problems with militarized efforts to control them.

The weapons used in pastoralist conflict in the East and Horn of Africa region are often circulating from one country to another. Assault rifles from Ugandan government stockpiles in Moroto, looted by Karamajong militias in 1979, spread to Kenya.[xvi] Guns from the conflicts in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia have converged and circulated throughout the region.[xvii] While militarizing borders may seem like an obvious solution to trafficking in the region, it can often contribute to arms proliferation, since security forces may “leak” weapons to local groups and fuel the demand for illicit meat. Nevertheless, more careful controls on the movements of arms into and through the East and Horn of Africa region could contribute to stemming diversion to unauthorized users and uses. Given that much of the supply of weapons involved in pastoralist conflict in East and the Horn of Africa has come from state sources, much more needs to be done to limit diversion of guns and ammunition to unauthorized users and uses.

The ATT requires states parties to assess and mitigate risks that a transfer of conventional arms, ammunition, or parts and components will be used to “commit or facilitate” transnational organized crime, terrorism, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, “serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children” or “undermine peace and security” (Article 7). If such risks exist, exporting states parties are obligated to collaborate with importing states in risk mitigation measures (Article 7.2). If an “overriding risk” remains, then the exporter “shall not” authorize the transfer. States parties are also required to “take measures to prevent” diversion of arms to unauthorized users or uses (Article 11). The ATT also contains more stringent prohibitions of any transfers of arms if a state party “has knowledge” that they “would be used in the commission” of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (Article 6.3).

Transparent reporting on transfers, aided by the ATT, could thus be very useful in addressing armed violence in pastoralist communities, by aiding research on movements of weapons most at risk of exacerbating the situation. One potential avenue of ATT-mandated cooperation and assistance would be a more careful identification and analysis of arms trafficking in the region, tracking how guns move and potential sources of “leakage” from state stockpiles. Sharing this information could enable states—both in the region and beyond—to target policy and programs to disrupt trafficking routes and prevent diversion of weapons to militias, gangs and organized crime networks. For example, states could improve data gathering and sharing within the CITES-mandated Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) program. MIKE enables states to record and report the types of weapons and ammunition used in poaching in an international database, but it is currently underutilized. Other potential sources of information include police and military data on illegal firearms, as well as regional institutions engaged in cooperation on countering SALW proliferation (such as the Regional Centre on Small Arms [RECSA] in East Africa), as well as conservation (such as the Lusaka Agreement Task Force).[xviii] ATT anti-diversion measures should not only be directed at halting the illicit flow of weapons to cattle raiders and militias, but could also ensure that state security forces do not use the weapons they receive in ways that create insecurity, violate human rights or contribute to gender-based violence. The ATT can serve as a catalyst for improving export, import, brokering, transit and trans-shipment controls in smart ways. The information sharing, cooperation and assistance provisions contained within the ATT enable states to work together and engage in conversations about best practices.

Insecurity and poverty are key drivers of both pastoralist conflict and SALW proliferation. A lack of livelihood opportunities in the legitimate economy often provides incentives to engage in cattle raiding. Reducing both the supply of and demand for weapons used in pastoralist conflict thus requires peacebuilding as well as sustainable development efforts. For example, around Lake Nakuru National Park in Kenya, community groups have partnered with Kenya Wildlife Service to increase access to water, promoting sustainable rural livelihoods that reduce pressure on the park. The ATT encourages states parties to engage in “international cooperation,” information -sharing, and provision of “international assistance” (including through a newly established “voluntary trust fund”) (Articles 15 and 16). ATT states parties are also required to meet in annual Conferences of States Parties to review implementation. ATT-mandated measures could be used to build peace and development in regions where there is a nexus of pastoralist conflict, wildlife crime, and SALW proliferation. Membership in the ATT may also help with applications for development assistance, or peacebuilding and sustainable development programs that aim to address the root causes—marginalization, deprivation, persistent instability—of SALW proliferation.

Rather than seeing the ATT as a threat to Kenya’s national security—as it is sometimes misunderstood by elements of Kenya’s security establishment—the treaty offers avenues for building human security in communities suffering from armed violence. The ATT offers an approach to addressing armed violence and wildlife crime in pastoralist communities through rule of law, human rights, and international cooperation. As the Honorable David Musila, then Kenya’s Assistant Minister for Defense, stated during the 2012 ATT negotiation conference:

Kenya continues to suffer negative effects of unregulated trade of … SALW which is causing devastating impact on social, political and economic wellbeing of its people. … We realize that an ATT will not solve all the problems of the world. However, a robust legally-binding treaty on international arms transfers that will leave an effect in reducing the flow of arms from the legal to the illicit trade will certainly be a very important step in reducing human suffering.[xix]

Matthew Bolton is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pace University in New York City and directs the university’s International Disarmament Institute.

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[i] Adam Cruise and Bibi van der Zee, “Armed herders invade Kenya's most important wildlife conservancy,” The Guardian, February 2, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/02/armed-herders-elephant-kenya-wildlife-laikipia; Jennifer Bond and Kennedy Mkutu, “Behind the conflict in central Kenya that's costing lives and hitting tourism,” CNBCAfrica, February 8, 2017, http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/east-africa/2017/02/08/behind-the-conflict-in-central-kenya/.

[ii] Kennedy Agade Mkutu, Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms, Indiana University Press, 2008; James Bevan, “Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda’s most deprived region.” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 21, 2008, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP21-Karamoja.pdf.

[iii] Matthew Bolton, “How to Use the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Wildlife Crime,” Control Arms, September 2016, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Wildlife-Crime-Paper-REVISED-Email.pdf; Matthew Bolton, “Using the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Wildlife Poaching in East Africa: A Human Security Approach,” Control Arms, 2015, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BoltonPoaching-1.pdf; “The Nexus between Poaching and Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons Regional Report: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania,” RECSA, 2016.

[iv] Khristopher Carlson, Joanna Wright. and Hannah Donges, “In the Line of Fire: Elephant and Rhino Poaching in Africa,” Small Arms Survey 2015, Small Arms Survey, pp. 27-28; Dilys Roe, et al., “The Elephant in the Room: Sustainable Use in the Illegal Wildlife Trade Debate,” International Institute for Environment and Development, 2014; “Sustainable Natural Resource Management in Namibia: Successful Community-based Wildlife Conservation,” Overseas Development Institute, 2011; Peter Gettleman, “Notorious Poacher Now Leads a Fight to Save Africa’s Elephant,” Sydney Morning Herald, December 31, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/world/notorious-poacher-now-leads-a-fight-to-save-africas-elephants-20121230-2c1ix.html; Community-based Natural Resource Management Lessons from the Field: IRNDC’s Experience in Namibia, IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation), 2011, http://www.irdnc.org.na/pdf/IRDNC-Lessons-from-the-Field.pdf; Chris Ocowun, “Nebbi Chiefs Disarm Poachers.” New Vision, August 22, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201008230873.html; John Kasaona, “How poachers become caretakers,” TED, June 2010, https://www.ted.com/talks/john_kasaona_from_poachers_to_caretakers/transcript?language=en; “Planned grazing to reduce conflict,” Northern Rangelands Trust, April 18, 2009.

[v] Ronald Orenstein, Ivory, Horn and Blood: Behind the Elephant and Rhinoceros Poaching Crisis, Firefly Books, 2013 pp. 53-66.

[vi] Matthew Bolton, “The Arms Trade Treaty: A Pan-African Global Policy Victory,” ThinkAfricaPress, April 8, 2013 http://www.academia.edu/3241508/The_Arms_Trade_Treaty_A_Pan-African_Global_Policy_Victory.

[vii] For further details on ATT universalization and implementation in Africa, see “Achieving ATT Universalisation in Africa,” Control Arms, August 2016, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Achieving-Arms-Free-Africa-FinalVersion-October-2016.pdf. See also the ATT secretariat website http://thearmstradetreaty.org/index.php/en/.

[viii] Matthew Bolton, “How to Use the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Wildlife Crime,” Control Arms, September 2016, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Wildlife-Crime-Paper-REVISED-Email.pdf; Matthew Bolton, “How to Use the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Pastoralist Conflict,” Control Arms, March 2017, https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Pastoralist-Conflict-Final.pdf.

[ix] Matthew Bolton “The Role of Education in Advancing Arms Trade Treaty Universalization and Implementation: Lessons Learned from ATT Academy East Africa 2016-2017,” Control Arms, May 2017, https://disarmament.blogs.pace.edu/files/2017/06/ATT-Academy-Lessons-learned-final-2bwkr5w.pdf.

[x] Kennedy Mkutu, “Pastoralism and conflict in the Horn of Africa,” SaferWorld, 2001 https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/75-pastoralism-and-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa.

[xi] Robin S. Reid, Savannahs of our Birth: People, Wildlife and Change in East Africa, University of California Press, 2012.

[xii] T.O. Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” The Invention of Tradition, E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Eds), Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 211-262; Mahmoud Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton University Press, 1996.

[xiii] Essayas K. Ayana, et al., “Examining the relationship between environmental factors and conflict in pastoralist areas of East Africa,” Political Geography, volumes 557-558, July 2016, pp. 601-611.

[xiv] Khristopher Carlson, Joanna Wright, and Hannah Donges, “In the Line of Fire: Elephant and Rhino Poaching in Africa.” Small Arms Survey 2015, Small Arms Survey, p. 20.

[xv] Kennedy Agade Mkutu, Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms, Indiana University Press, 2008; Andy Catley, Jeremy Lind, Ian Scoones, Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins, Routledge/Earthscan, 2013.

[xvi] Manasseh Wepundi, et al., “Lessons from the Frontiers: Civilian disarmament in Kenya and Uganda.” SaferWorld, 2011, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/564-lessons-from-the-frontiers.

[xvii] “Regional Report on the Nexus between Illicit SALW Proliferation and Cattle Rustling: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda,” RECSA, 2016

[xviii] For further similar recommendations, see Nikhil Acharya and Arthur Muhlen-Schulte, “The Final Round: Combating Armed Actors, Organized Crime and Wildlife Trafficking,” BICC Policy Brief, March 2016, https://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/the-final-round-combating-armed-actors-organized-crime-and-wildlife-trafficking-648/.

[xix] David Musila, “Statement by David Musila, MP, Assistant Minister for Defence of the Republic of Kenya during the United Nations Conference on Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),” July 5, 2012, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/negotiating-conference/statements/5July_Kenya.pdf.

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Finding Leadership Outside the White House

12/21/2017

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Less than one year into the Trump administration, it is clear that the United States is unlikely to provide positive leadership in promoting responsible arms trade and weapons use. While the Obama administration certainly did not shy away from arms deals, it did sign the Arms Trade Treaty and withhold some arms transfers due to human rights concerns. What restraint Obama showed, Trump has jettisoned, evidenced in arms sales notifications of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia in May, F-16s to Bahrain in September, and Super Tucanos to Nigeria in August – all deals that Obama had put on hold.

Further under Trump, drone use/air strikes have dramatically increased in number and/or in numbers of civilians harmed. The Defense Department has backed away from a policy that would have barred the use of certain cluster munitions, in particular older ones with an awful record for humanitarian harm. The administration also appears set to make it easier to sell small arms by transferring their control to the Commerce Department, completing the last steps of a controversial export reform initiative. In December, the United States abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the ATT, saying during First Committee that it was reviewing its policy. These and other indicators suggest that US arms use and trade, as well as any eventual new US conventional arms transfer policy, will simply remove the concept of restraint and further undermine commitment to and promotion of human rights.

This is an admittedly bleak initial picture, but there are many places the world can and should look for leadership outside of a US administration espousing an “America First” world view. Perhaps surprisingly, the first place to look is the US Congress. The close 47-53 Senate vote in June in opposition to the PGM sale to Saudi Arabia is an indicator that the Senate could take a more proactive role, especially if the rumored additional $7 billion in PGM sales come before it. Republican Senator Rand Paul and Democratic Senator Chris Murphy partnered on that work and together or separately merit watching in 2018. So too does Republican Senator Todd Young, especially in relation to the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy reacted quickly to the cluster munition policy reversal, and along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Ben Cardin have identified the need for Congressional involvement in any changes that would send small arms to Commerce control. A number of members of the House of Representatives have also taken up US weapons sales and use. A short list includes Democrats Ro Khanna, Mark Pocan and Republican Walter Jones, who co-wrote a New York Times oped critical of US support to Saudi Arabia, as well as Republican Justin Amash, and Democrat Ted Lieu, who has long expressed concerned about potential US complicity in war crimes.

Arming Saudi Arabia, or rather a commitment not to do so is also an appropriate litmus test on international leadership as the Saudi-led coalition continues to use weapons to the detriment of civilians in Yemen. In 2017, the European Parliament again called for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia -- a call not heeded by suppliers such as France and the United Kingdom, but one other European countries can and do support. Related, Sweden’s pending “democracy criterion” in arms sales is worth watching for an impact nationally and regionally. So too is Japan’s leadership of the Arms Trade Treaty for the 2018 Conference of States Parties, where thus far countries have frustratingly refused to directly address the inconsistency of arming the Saudis.

The recent conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the international civil society coalition that fought hard for the treaty (ICAN), draws global attention to the truth that leadership need not come from the normal “big players.” Those countries, led by the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), tend to put traditional state-centered security over the needs of individuals (aka human security). But human security is at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty and a host of other successful treaties and initiatives broadly classified as “humanitarian disarmament.” On key treaties in this realm, Nicaragua is taking on the presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Afghanistan will have leadership of the Mine Ban Treaty. They have the potential to bring a different type of leadership to arms-related issues in 2018. So too do some of the countries that were at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty, such as Mexico and New Zealand, who were also progressive voices during the Arms Trade Treaty negotiation.

The Nobel Peace Prize also reminds us that civil society campaigns play a critical role. In 2018, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots will continue calling for all countries to ban the development of fully autonomous weapons (“killer robots”). The countries participating in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) working group may choose that path, which a growing number (22) are supporting. Leading roboticists and artificial intelligence experts are banding together with that message and writing letters to governments, spurring national parliamentary debates. In another campaign, the International Network on Explosive Weapons is helping to build momentum to address and end the practice of using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. These weapons are particularly devastating to civilians and civilian infrastructure, causing both immediate harm at the time of use and ongoing suffering from the disruption of economic and social activity.

Members of industry and the financial sector will also have the opportunity to display leadership. Late in 2016, German arms manufacturer Heckler and Koch announced that it would no longer sell weapons to undemocratic and corrupt countries. More recently in Japan, four banks and insurance companies recently announced that they would ban investments in cluster munition producers, joining a growing group that have made similar commitments in other countries.

While the future is always difficult to predict, in 2018 it would be wise to look outside the White House for leadership on proper restraint in the use and sale of weapons – without which, we can unfortunately foresee new suffering by civilians and the undermining of their human rights.

Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association.

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A View from Brazil: Trump's First 100 Days

5/3/2017

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This video blog is the tenth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Robert Muggah

In this video interview, Robert Muggah addresses these questions, at markers indicated below:

0:07 What is Brazil's involvement in the arms trade?
1:39 How is President Trump perceived in Brazil?
4:18 Do you have concerns about what you're seeing?
6:14 What advice do you have for the Trump administration?

Robert Muggah is Co-founder & Research Director at Igarapé Institute and the SecDev Foundation

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The "business as usual" approach to arms sales? That’s so last year

1/10/2017

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Allison Pytlak

You don’t have to be an arms control wonk to have noticed that 2016 was peppered with headlines about the sale of weapons to places they shouldn’t be and used in any number of horrific ways against soldiers and civilians alike. Many of these stories zeroed in on the double standards in play; namely that vendors of such weapons are some of same countries that had only recently championed the adoption of new legally binding standards on the arms trade in order to prevent such atrocities from occurring. The international community as a whole has largely failed to hold states to account for these transfers, yet a mushrooming of national-level advocacy has helped to bring the policy and practice of some countries better in line with their legal obligations. As always, there are a few outliers but as the new year begins, that club might just be shrinking.

Over the years many measures have been put into place to better regulate the international arms trade, usually by requiring governments to assess the impact of their arms transfers before they fully authorize them. At a global level the culmination of such efforts is the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), an international agreement that built on good national and regional practices to establish a single global standard by which to assess the risks associated with transferring arms and to stop them from going to places they shouldn’t.

Lauded by many in the international community, the ATT has generated significant optimism that a corner had been turned and that humanitarian considerations would play the role that they ought to within the international arms trade.

This is why it has been extremely disappointing to see that many of the same countries that championed the ATT took a business as usual approach to their arms transfers in 2015 and 2016. This was especially notable with respect to transfers to Saudi Arabia from countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) – although transfers to other countries have also caused concern. Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, both domestic and international, is widely condemned. The ATT is meant to prevent arms transfers where there is a substantial risk that those arms would be used in specific negative ways, such as perpetuating war crimes, human rights abuse or genocide, among other actions.

Many of these transactions took place in 2015. Some continued last year but 2016 also saw important actions being taken in national parliaments to push back on them. The Netherlands, for example, instituted a presumption of denial against transfers to Saudi Arabia, and the Spanish Congress passed a motion calling on the acting government to deny and revoke licenses to all parties to the conflict. Switzerland, Sweden and parts of Belgium have also either stopped authorizing licenses or denied them. Other countries however, notably Canada, France, the UK and the US have proceeded as normal.

So will 2017 bring more of the same?

The answer depends partly on where you look. For example, efforts to address this situation in an official way under the ATT, such as at its annual conference of states parties last August, were unsuccessful. Civil society united around efforts to see this addressed as part of the formal agenda and when that failed, utilized side events, media and bilateral advocacy meetings to make the point that such transfers are contrary to Treaty obligations for those countries that have joined. This should have been the single most relevant opportunity to take up the matter of treaty compliance but instead it was awkwardly shoved under the carpet.

As already mentioned, there are several national processes underway meant to hold governments accountable to their international commitments, similar to the approaches described above. In looking ahead to 2017, these include a High Court hearing scheduled for early February in the United Kingdom on the legality of continued arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the light of Saudi violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Yemen. Italian civil society is continuing to strive to curtail Italian exports to Saudi Arabia through parliamentary channels and the media. A legal challenge has also been presented in Canada, following Ottawa’s decision last year to move ahead with a deal authorizing the sale of light armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia, even as it moves to finalize its ATT accession and has publicly condemned the country’s human rights record. The timing of the accession and the legal challenge bring these transfers under heightened scrutiny from media, civil society and legislators – which may be the means by which the deal could be stopped, although no one is holding their breath.

Tragically, the deepening famine in Yemen, coupled with growing evidence of foreign-made arms being used there indiscriminately by Saudi-led coalition forces, is finally starting to percolate through to the attention of the general public which, in turn, is putting pressure on policy makers. Public opinion could also be a factor that may shift government positions in 2017. In the United States for example, a decision was taken in December to "hold up" a sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia out of concern for the kingdom’s continuing air strikes on civilian targets. It will continue to refuel Saudi aircraft that are a part of the Yemen bombing campaign though and other sales remain in place, which makes this a half-measure. The US is a signatory to the ATT and has in place its own export laws.

There may also be recourse through somewhat under-explored channels like reports by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on arms transfers law and human rights law, and through regional bodies such as the European Union, whose parliament voted for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia last year.

All of this is very positive but national actions cannot become a replacement for multilateral accountability. More must be done to uphold existing international law in the first place via the institutions that were created for that purpose. If states continue to avoid implementing their obligations thoroughly, and if those that are in compliance do not make better use of these agreements to address breaches of them, then they will collectively devalue the very mechanisms that they have put so many resources into creating.

Taken together, it’s obvious that there are ample tools with which to push back against a business as usual approach in 2017 from those who still defend it. The real question is if there is enough political will.

Allison Pytlak is a Program Manager in the disarmament program (Reaching Critical Will) of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

12/21/2016

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

At a time when it may be easy to anticipate the faltering of international instruments and global approaches, especially as countries in the West -- starting with the United States and United Kingdom -- put national interests above regional and international ones, it is wise to remember that states are not the exclusive drivers of change. Progress-pushing work by civil society using legal, financial, industry-led, investigative and transparency tools has impacted weapons use and the conduct of the arms trade. We should expect those tools again to make a difference in 2017.

Beginning early in the year, a UK court case initiated by civil society will address the legality of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, with potential ramifications on the European Union and more broadly on all states party to the Arms Trade Treaty. Already, legal concerns have been expressed in the United States by leading independent experts about sales and assistance to Saudi Arabia, and could be renewed should the incoming Trump administration continue a policy of arming Riyadh during the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

The persistent investigative efforts of many civil society groups, including by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that documented indiscriminate use of weapons by the Saudi-led coalition undoubtedly played a role in the Obama administration’s recent decision to hold off on delivery of precision-guided munitions. That research work also helped push the UK government to reverse its earlier conclusion that the coalition had not used cluster munitions in Yemen; explicitly in reference to weapons that had originally been supplied by London more than a quarter century ago. On Monday this week, the UK Secretary of State for Defence confirmed a pledge by Saudi Arabia not to employ the weapons (BL755s) again.

The stigma on cluster munition use, in particular, has been strengthened by the creative financial focus of the Stop Explosive Investments campaign that publishes original research into the financial institutions (and states) that invest in -- or pledge not to invest in -- companies producing cluster munitions. As such efforts help shrink the financial incentives and marketplace for indiscriminate weapons, it makes more likely decisions such as the one taken recently by Textron to suspend its product line, functionally ending production of cluster munitions in the United States.

Other industry members, including the scientists and researchers that make sophisticated weaponry possible, have taken a proactive position for a ban on so-called “killer robots.” In 2015, thousands of artificial intelligence experts and researchers -- including prominent scientists and industry leaders such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak -- issued an open letter calling for autonomous lethal weapons not to be developed. In 2014, the first robotics company -- Clearpath Robotics in Canada -- pledged not to make killer robots, In 2017, work on this issue will enter a new phase as states parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons agreed last week to formalize discussion on the topic, a step that may lead to an official protocol that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and a growing number of states say should ban the weapons.

Civil society will also play a critical role in improving transparency in many areas related to the arms trade and security assistance, at times by making sense of public-but-hard-to-gather-or-understand data. For example, SIPRI will continue its highly respected research and publications on global arms trade trends, especially related to major weapons systems. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor will track global developments on landmines and cluster munitions, serving as the de facto monitoring regime for two treaties. For the newer Arms Trade Treaty, projects such as the ATT Baseline Assessment Project and the ATT Monitor have already established a track record of aiding states in understanding their obligations as well as assessing their efforts. In the United States, the Security Assistance Monitor is now pulling together vast amounts of U.S. data into one place for improved transparency on the world’s largest arms and security assistance provider.

In looking ahead, these civil society members and many others should be watched as they employ and develop the tools that shape change in 2017 and beyond.

Jeff Abramson, who coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade, is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manager of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition’s (ICBL-CMC) Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor program

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Court Action to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty

12/19/2016

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Roy Isbister

In the United Kingdom (UK), a major feature of the first quarter of 2017 will be the High Court hearing at the start of February on the legality or otherwise of continued UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the light of Saudi violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Yemen. In June 2016, The Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) was granted permission to seek judicial review of the UK government’s arms export licensing decisions with regard to Saudi Arabia. In the past 18 months, the UK has licensed more than £3.3 billion of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, a significant proportion of which has comprised Paveway IV bombs and Typhoon combat aircraft for use by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).

This comes against the background of intense conflict in Yemen. A 10-State Saudi-led coalition began its military intervention in Yemen in March 2015, after Houthi rebels, in alliance with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, took control of the capital Sana’a and ousted current President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The Houthi-Saleh alliance swept south to take control of key cities including Aden. The country was quickly engulfed by violence, marking the end of a fragile political transition process.

From very early on in the Saudi-led bombing campaign, regular reports began to emerge of airstrikes on critical civilian objects, residential areas, and large gatherings of civilians, including Mazraq IDP camp, and relief supplies warehouses, attacks on the Old City of Sana’a. These regular attacks against civilians and civilian objects, along with the use of cluster munitions (which the UK Government may be on the verge of acknowledging for the first time), the designation of entire cities as military targets, and other practices collectively demonstrated a pattern of violations of IHL. The Houthis have also committed apparent IHL abuses, firing artillery and missiles at civilian areas in Saudi Arabia and in Yemen. All other parties to the conflict appear to have similarly committed violations of IHL.

On the basis of the scale of problems related to bombings in Yemen, in December 2015, Saferworld, with Amnesty International and Oxfam, sought a legal opinion from Matrix Chambers. The opinion found that the UK government had “misdirected itself in law” on continued arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Citing Article 6.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Matrix concluded the Government had knowledge that its arms would be used to breach IHL, and that therefore such sales were prohibited. Matrix further concluded, having examined a series of potential breaches of IHL by the RSAF, that even if the “knowledge test” for prohibiting sales under Article 6.3 was not met, the standard of “overriding risk” that UK arms would be used to commit serious violations of IHL had been met, and any reasonable risk assessment would conclude that sales to Saudi Arabia of any controlled equipment at risk of being used in the conflict in Yemen should be stopped.

When CAAT moved for judicial review, the Government sought to quash the hearing on the grounds that it had access to information not available to the UN or the public that explained Saudi actions as consistent with IHL. However the judge, in insisting that were grounds for judicial review and that the hearing should be expedited, said there was abundant evidence of breaches of IHL that the government had to take into account. He was particularly referring to UN reports citing many IHL violations.

The case will be extremely important. The UK Government has pursued an extremely narrow consideration of IHL in performing risk assessments for arms export licensing. Lawyers have advised that this is in line with a near twenty-year attempt by the UK and other Western governments to narrow the scope of IHL, rowing back on seventy years of international jurisprudence. Recognizing the importance of this case for all their years of campaigning work, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will also be presenting arguments. All feel they can raise issues that the court needs to consider that make CAAT’s success more likely.

A defeat for the Government will clarify that the risk to IHL of arms transfers cannot be set aside due to other considerations, and will potentially help give meaning to the relevant articles of the ATT. This may also have particular implications for other EU member states, as UK law is in addition subject to shared obligations under an EU instrument (the Common Position).

The recent US decision to stop the supply of precision-guided weapons to the RSAF and to limit certain intelligence-sharing due to systematic and endemic failures in targeting will be a considerable boost to CAAT. Under the US system, the President can send a ”signal” to the Saudi Government by refusing certain arms sales at the same time as continuing to support the Saudi air campaign by other means (e.g. by refuelling Saudi aircraft). However the UK does not have this option. For the UK, national law, the EU Common Position and the ATT all agree that whenever there is a clear risk that the arms in question might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, a proposed transfer must be refused. So if there are “systemic, endemic” problems with Saudi targeting in Yemen, all transfers of arms from the UK that might be used by the RSAF will have to be stopped. Parliament is already asking why the UK is ignoring what the Obama administration has determined. The court will undoubtedly ask those questions too. Hopefully, 2017 will begin with a UK High Court ruling that substantially strengthens the ATT.

Roy Isbister heads Saferworld’s Arms Unit.

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Saving Rhinos while Protecting Human Rights: The Value of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Anti-Poaching Efforts

12/14/2016

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Matthew Bolton

A family of white rhinos. Photo courtesy of Control Arms.

The world is facing what the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has described as an “Environmental Crime Crisis,” with an unprecedented slaughter of large mammals, particularly in the African continent. More than 100,000 elephants have been killed by poachers in the last five years and, over the same period, the number of rhinoceroses poached has increased every year.

The illicit wildlife trade is now increasingly sophisticated, dangerous and globalized, integrated with armed groups and organized crime. It has been fueled by a proliferation of military-grade guns in unstable regions with high concentrations of rhinos and elephants. Since 2014, the UN Security Council has identified poaching as a regional security threat in Africa (S/RES/2134 and S/RES/2136). This month UNEP released a new report showing how environmental crime “threatens peace and security.” In 2017, the Arms Trade Treaty and other international measures could offer tools to address these problems in an integrated way.

United States Contributes to Militarization of Counter-Poaching

There is an emerging global trend toward militarizing wildlife protection, including expansive arming and training of paramilitary rangers. These aggressive counter-poaching tactics are supported by policy changes that have reframed wildlife crime as a security issue. In 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking, stating that poaching had “significant effects…on the national interests of the United States.” This October, Congress passed the bi-partisan Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act, which encourages the administration to “provide defense articles (not including significant military equipment), defense services, and related training to appropriate security forces” to African countries for counter-poaching.

It is unclear how seriously the incoming administration will take the threat of global wildlife crime. Trump’s climate change-denying pick for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Scott Pruitt, wants to strip away protections from the environment. Trump has defended his sons’ hunting of endangered species in Zimbabwe; photos surfaced last year of Donald Trump, Jr. holding the severed tail of an elephant and of him with a dead leopard. Nevertheless, co-sponsor of the Wildlife Trafficking Act Senator Jeff Flake (R-Arizona) told National Geographic that he will continue to advocate for action on poaching in the incoming Congress.

The Human Rights Impact of Militarization

As with the “War on Drugs”, the militarization of poaching has had unintended consequences. In several countries, the military, police and even wildlife rangers have been involved in poaching, either directly or indirectly. The flow of arms into already unstable regions also means that many poachers obtain their weapons and ammunition from state sources, either through theft or corruption. Militarized rangers have also been implicated in human rights abuses (see, for example, this disturbing report about a counter-poaching operation in Tanzania).

Last week, I was speaking with wildlife rangers in a major East African national park, home to many rhinos. The park has suffered due to serious threats from poaching since 2011; two rhinos were recently killed by poachers using large-caliber rifles. In the last few years the country has stiffened the penalties for wildlife crimes and deployed an eight-fold increase in rangers – many with paramilitary training – in the park. The government attributes to this more aggressive response a reduction in killing of rhinos in the park from 24 in 2013 to three this year.

However, many of the poachers caught following incidents in the park are low-level criminals, often from poorer, rural areas around the park where the profits from rhino horn can be very tempting. They risk being killed on the spot or long-term prison sentences, while the international organized crime bosses evade punishment.

The paramilitary rangers' rules of engagement are also concerning. I asked a ranger about his rules of engagement when encountering a suspected poacher. He replied that if they are armed, “You shoot to kill, that's what we are told in training. If someone has a rifle, what do you do? That's why we shoot first.” Shoot-to-kill policies contravene international human rights law. Police (and rangers) are supposed to try to persuade a suspect to lay down their weapon, avoid killing a suspect if possible and try to make an arrest. The ranger told me, “if they pose a threat you forget about human rights.” But governments are not allowed to forget about human rights, even if they are inconvenient. The ranger also admitted that the militarized tactics could encourage poachers to also be better armed and more aggressive themselves.

Addressing Poaching through International Arms Control

If Trump does decide to take wildlife crime seriously (or is encouraged to by Congressional Republicans) it is unlikely that he will be a strong champion for addressing the human rights concerns of militarized counter-poaching. Congress, the policy community and activists must therefore make a compelling case for alternative methods of addressing poaching, while respecting the rule of law.

The last African elephant poaching crisis, in the 1980s, was fueled by the influx of guns in Africa’s Cold War proxy conflicts. It was stopped not so much by militarizing wildlife protection, but rather through international legal and normative change, including the ivory ban and a broad-based public awareness campaign in countries creating the demand. More recently, the Obama Administration has supported diplomatic and aid efforts beyond militarized conservation, raising awareness of the impact of poaching, seeking a stronger ivory ban and supporting peace and conservation projects in affected areas.

This September, I authored a report, published by Control Arms and Pace University, that outlines how the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) could be used as part of a broader effort to address poaching in ways that are consistent international human rights standards. The report was produced for a training program on the ATT for East African officials and civil society advocates.

The ATT, negotiated within the UN, establishes global rules for the transfer of conventional weapons, preventing the sale of arms to those who engage in human rights and humanitarian law abuses, organized crime, terrorism and gender-based violence. It provides a framework for governments to engage collaboratively in “risk mitigation measures” to prevent potential diversion of guns to unauthorized people or uses. It has 91 member governments, including several major exporting countries.

In my report and the training of officials we argue that governments should use the ATT to reduce the risk of automatic and large-caliber weapons being diverted to poaching. We also show how to use the treaty to improve armed rangers’ respect for human rights.

The United States has signed the ATT, but not yet ratified, stymied by gun lobby conspiracy theories claiming the treaty would threaten Second Amendment rights. In fact, the treaty affirms governments’ right to allow “lawful ownership” of guns, such as for “recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities.” In 2014 President Obama revised U.S. arms export control measures, which are broadly consistent with the ATT, without actually fully joining the treaty. Given the NRA’s endorsement of Trump, it is unlikely the incoming administration will think highly of the treaty’s potential.

But multilateral diplomacy, international law and arms control offer sophisticated tools (such as the ATT) for solving global problems (like poaching) that cannot simply be shot at. They make it possible to defend wildlife and human rights at the same time. In 2017 we must mobilize to shield both rhinos and people from roll back of their much-needed protections.

Dr. Matthew Bolton is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pace University

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Improving Transparency and Seeking Control over the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

6/6/2016

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Natalie Goldring

This is the fifth blog post in a series on official transparency reporting, where it struggles, and the important role civil society often plays in monitoring and improving global understanding of the trade and use of conventional weapons.

The United Nations is not known for its command of acronyms. So when countries reached agreement on an instrument to control the illicit arms trade, its unwieldy title was, “The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.” In this post, I’ll use the shorthand “Programme of Action”, or “PoA’.

The Programme of Action was agreed in 2001 after a great deal of discord and acrimony, and with considerable uncertainty about its prospects. Although it still needs strengthening, fifteen years later, the PoA is a pillar of the nascent regime to exercise better control over the international arms trade. The PoA recommends action on national, regional, and global levels. The assembled governments committed themselves to addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons by developing or strengthening norms to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade, manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, with a particular emphasis on post-conflict situations and excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons.

From 6-10 June, governments will gather at the United Nations to discuss progress in implementing the Programme of Action, at the sixth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS6). One key area for improvement is taking advantage of potential points of synergy between the Programme of Action and the Arms Trade Treaty; another is fully integrating ammunition into the Programme of Action.

As part of the implementation of the Programme of Action, States are requested to report on their activities in many substantive and procedural areas. They’re asked, for example, to report on whether small arms and light weapons (SALW) are manufactured in their countries, and if so, what laws, regulations, and administrative procedures regulate SALW manufacture. They are also asked to report on issues such as stockpile security, marking and tracing weapons, and procedures governing brokering, among other issues.

As of 1 June, more than 70 countries have reported on their PoA activities over the last two years, including each of the top ten conventional arms suppliers identified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and six of the leading recipients. The country reports provide a useful starting point for discussion during the conference, as do the proposals circulated in advance by several countries and regional organizations, which are available at: www.un.org/disarmament/bms6/

The success of the conference, of course, should not be measured by the papers or the discussions. In the end, what matters is whether States have the political will and the financial and other resources to actually control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and decrease the enormous toll caused by armed violence.

Dr. Natalie Goldring is a Senior Fellow and Adjunct Full Professor with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. She also represents the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy at the United Nations on conventional weapons.

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The ATT and Transparency

5/23/2016

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Rachel Stohl

This is the fourth blog post in a series on official transparency reporting, where it struggles, and the important role civil society often plays in monitoring and improving global understanding of the trade and use of conventional weapons.

Paul Holtom

Increasing transparency and oversight of the international arms trade are at the heart of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Under the ATT, States Parties have three reporting obligations. First, States Parties must provide a one-off report that outlines the measures it has undertaken to implement the Treaty; although this has to be updated if new measures are undertaken. Second, States Parties have to make available an annual report on their authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms, which could contain the same information as provided to the UN Register. Third, States Parties are encouraged to report on measures they have taken to address the diversion of arms.

The First Conference of States Parties (CSP1) took note of provisional reporting templates for the initial report on measures to implement the ATT and the annual report on arms exports and imports. However, The ATT does not require States Parties to utilize a standardized reporting form. The ATT requires States Parties to provide useful information on implementation of the ATT with regards to arms transfer control systems and responsible transfer decisions. States, international organizations, and civil society will utilize these reports to monitor ATT implementation and better understand how States Parties interpret and understand the treaty’s provisions and obligations. Reports also provide insights into how States have incorporated the ATT into their national systems. They can highlight best practices, lessons learned, and model legislation that other countries can utilize in the development or enhancement of their own national systems. Additionally, reports provide opportunities to match assistance requests with available resources. In these ways, reporting allows for accurate monitoring and assessment of ATT implementation by States and by civil society – and can provide a greater understanding of the global arms trade overall.

States Parties considered the production of reporting templates a useful endeavor to assist with the provision of information on implementation and transfers. Thirty-five States Parties to-date are known to have used the provisional reporting template for their initial report on measures to implement the ATT. A further six States Parties used their completed ATT-BAP Baseline Assessment Survey and France provided a narrative report.

For the annual report – the first of which is due on 31 May 2016 – States Parties may utilize the provisional reporting template or their submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (Register), including the separate form for additional information on transfers of small arms and light weapons. It will be important to encourage States Parties to provide information on authorizations and actual exports and imports for all categories required under the ATT, including the number of units transferred, a description of these items transferred and information on the end-user.

The annual report is crucial for getting a global picture of what types of weapons States are importing and exporting. The annual report will therefore go a long way in helping identify trends in the global arms trade, if the reports are made public and States are comprehensive in the provision of information.

In the very near future – potentially at the Second Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in August – States Parties will need to consider how to best ensure universal reporting. CSP2 will also be asked to decide if the adoption of reporting templates is the best approach for achieving this goal. States Parties also need to consider whether to develop a reporting template for the voluntary report on diversion, which could help to improve accountability and mitigate potentially harmful arms transfers. Comprehensive reporting will lead to increased transparency of the systems governing arms transfers and how the provisions of the Treaty are applied to international arms transfers. In the end, robust reporting has the opportunity to contribute to greater accountability in the global arms trade and encourage States to undertake more transparent and responsible arms transfers.

Rachel Stohl is Senior Associate, Managing Across Boundaries, at the Stimson Center. Paul Holtom is Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University (UK). Together, they developed the ATT-Baseline Assessment Project.

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The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

Using the Arms Trade Treaty to Address Pastoralist Conflict and Wildlife Crime in Kenya’s Marginalized Regions

Finding Leadership Outside the White House

A View from Brazil: Trump's First 100 Days

The "business as usual" approach to arms sales? That’s so last year

Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

Court Action to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty

Saving Rhinos while Protecting Human Rights: The Value of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Anti-Poaching Efforts

Improving Transparency and Seeking Control over the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

The ATT and Transparency

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