Category: Arms Sales

Why are arms sales likely to increase in 2026?

12/16/2025

This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Tabitha R Agaba

As 2025 draws to a close, arms sales are likely to increase in 2026 because of the increasing geopolitical tensions, from Cambodia and the Philippines in Asia, to the recent calls by some European countries like Germany and France for their young men to join the military in preparation for a possible confrontation with Russia, and the threat of war on Venezuela by the United States.

In recent weeks, the U.S. has threatened violence against Nicholas Maduro's government in Venezuela over what it calls a war on drugs. The Trump administration has previously accused the Maduro government as source of drugs that flow into the U.S.. These claims have been followed by the seizing of an Venezuelan oil tanker by the U.S. in addition to the closure of the Venezuelan airspace by the Trump administration in November. In August the U.S. started deploying air and naval forces near the Venezuelan border, including the world's largest aircraft carrier the USS Gerald R. Ford, which is deployed 950km away from the Venezuelan coast according to the BBC (as of December 5).

The conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan have persisted in 2025 without a foreseeable solution in 2026, with the M23 armed group in the DRC gaining more ground in Eastern DRC and Uganda having promised to join the conflict should M23 take over Uvira, which it did last week. The fighting in the DRC automatically creates a need for arms whether illegally acquired or not.

The conflict in Sudan has intensified between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army (SAF); the United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting the RSF with weaponry. Important to note is that the UAE, Rwanda, Thailand and the DRC haven't ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, an agreement that guides arms sales, transfers, end use control and overall international trade of arms.

The French president, Emmanuel Macron asked youth above 18 years of age to sign up for a 10-month military training amidst threats of war from Russia; this is a program expected to start in 2026. The president noted that this is a program whose main objective is to respond to threats from Russia. This voluntary military is not limited to France alone as other countries like Germany have followed suit. In November 2025, Germany voted to introduce voluntary military service.

Such calls not only prepare individuals for war but also put pressure for increased military spending in preparation of war. In 2026 there's likely to be an increase in the manufacture and purchase of arms as European countries prepare for a possibility of war with Russia.

These are just a few of the possible conflicts likely to arise in addition to the already existing ones. These developments are important to note because they will contribute to military spending in 2026 and some of the conflict actors are non-signatories to the ATT, which is a key component in arms control, and arms diversions are likely to continue.

Despite the presence of controls such as the UN arms embargo and the ATT, countries often divert arms to conflict zones such as Chad and the UAE's support for the RSF or Uganda’s arms diversion to South Sudan.

An overview of 2026 on the arms trade highlights the gaps that could easily be utilized for countries to access arms despite the numerous measures in place to mitigate them.

Tabitha R Agaba is a freelance writer and researcher based in Uganda, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Event Resources: Biden’s Final Two Months: A Better Approach to Arms and the Middle East (November 7, 2024)

11/7/2024

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On November 7, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and DAWN hosted “Biden’s Final Two Months: A Better Approach to Arms and the Middle East.” The Forum maintains resources on the U.S. provision of arms to Israel as well as to Saudi Arabia. DAWN also examines the implications of a U.S.-Saudi security agreement. During the event, panelists argued that the United States would be better served not providing weapons into the region.

Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/kWRsFJ3_rE0.

During and as a follow up to the event, panelists offered the following recommendations. (These recommendations were individually offered and can be attributed to the panelist offering them. They were not jointly reviewed):

Josh Paul, Senior Advisor, DAWN

Apply the law: President Biden should finally direct attorneys at the State Department and White House to make the obvious legal determination that Israel has been restricting U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and that it has been engaged in a continuous pattern of Gross Violations of Human Rights. Rolling back legal determinations is possible, but much tougher, than rolling back policy changes.

Use your leverage: President Biden should restrict lethal arms transfers of weapons that are being used in Gaza, stop replenishing the WRSA stockpile, and pause the processing of pending arms sale cases and licenses. If nothing else, this will force a corresponding pause in Israel's operations in the region.

Expand sanctions: President Biden should sanction the Settlement Councils and Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich, including through the application of Magnitsky Sanctions which would require a report to Congress explaining why an individual sanctioned has been removed from those sanctions, should they so be. Certain Settler groups should also be given FTO designations.

Recognize Statehood: The U.S. should recognize Palestinian Statehood and urge the UN Security Council to approve Palestine as a full member of the United Nations, leveling the playing field of international law in a way that would be impossible, in some aspects, for a future Administration to roll back. Recognition of the 1967 borders would also solidify international legal efforts to sanction settlements.

Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

Do not try to rush through a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia

We know that MBS had previously made foolish foreign policy decisions, like invading and blockading Yemen, and is likely to do so again if he thought he had unlimited U.S. support. We have seen the horrifying behavior that unconditional U.S. support has encouraged Israel to take.
This is an important signal to Congressional Democrats to oppose a U.S. defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, even in order to get to an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. This is not in U.S. interests.

Affirm the need to prioritize human rights in American foreign policy

Withhold weapons sales to human rights abusing governments, as required by U.S. law.
Do not authorize new weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Israel.

Affirm support for international institutions

Including the UN, the UN Security Council, and the UN Human Rights Council

Vocally express support for international institutions that your administration previously denigrated, including the ICC and ICJ.
Express support for the crucial work of UNRWA and other international humanitarian organizations doing crucial work in the region.
These are crucial signals for Democrats in Congress to oppose Trump and the Republicans’ efforts to undermine these institutions.

Omer Ismail, Former Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

Watch his policy recommendations here (31:47 into the video).

Negar Mortazavi, Editor and Host, the Iran Podcast and Senior Non-resident Fellow, Center for International Policy

Watch her policy recommendations here (39:38 into the video).

The Forum provides a platform for expert views but does not itself take positions.

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South Korean Arms Sales Grow in the Years Ahead

1/16/2023

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Hoshik Nam

Last year, Russia and South Korea had largely different experiences in the global arms market, with it being fair to expect that South Korea will take a much larger role in arms exports in the coming years. The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed many flaws of Russian weapons systems. Rusty weapons, poor training and planning inflicted a huge loss of Russian soldiers and even some generals. Moreover, Russian defense industry failed to produce weapons fast enough to catch up the demand generated by its invasion of Ukraine. Late last year, the Russian government is reportedly known to have imported arms from North Korea and is also importing weapons from Iran. Considering the reputation of Russia as the second largest arms exporter for decades, this was a chaotic event that significantly harmed the reputation of the country’s defense industry.

On the other hand, the war contributed to the significant expansion of the South Korean defense industry. Its new arms export sales more than doubled in 2022 (about $17 billion compared to $7.5 billion in 2021) mostly due to a huge deal with Poland ($12 billion). This also diversified destinations of South Korea’s weapons to a major European NATO member. The number of NATO countries that import South Korea’s weapons may increase in the near future. For example, Norway and Estonia have expressed interest in buying weapons from South Korea since the outbreak of Russo-Ukrainian War. What does this mean to South Korean defense industry and its role in the global arms market this year and into the near future?

South Korea’s defense industry

The development of South Korean defense sector is largely attributed to the political tension with North Korea. Because both Koreas are technically still at war, the South Korean government has consistently and thoroughly invested in its defense industry since the 1970s. The government’s strong push to try to produce its own defense weapons has led the country’s defense industry to become not only a producer, but also an exporter of howitzers, battle tanks, warships, and other weapons. In addition, South Korean weapons are compatible with Western NATO weapons, particularly US ones. This is largely due to the country’s close relationship with the US as both countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and engage in an active R&D. This benefits the recipients of South Korean weapons. For example, the arms deal between Poland and South Korea last year gives Poland a chance to replace their old Soviet-era arms into more advanced technology that is compatible with US and other NATO members’ weapons.

In addition, South Korean defense companies can produce and export the weapons in a timely manner with relatively cheap prices and generous technology transfers. These are also crucial factors that have made the South Korean weapons competitive in the global arms market, which has been enhanced with the Russo-Ukraine War as major producers focus on providing weapons to the conflict. For example, even though Poland originally was interested in importing German howitzers, the German government kept postponing exporting them largely due to prioritizing exporting to Ukraine. In addition, South Korean defense industry is more open to transfer technologies, overseas production, and R&D. These factors made South Korean weapons great alternatives for countries that want to replenish their military capabilities with reasonable conditions. After seeing the recent deal with Poland, it is probable that other countries are also interested in importing arms from South Korea. Last year, countries such as Romania expressed their interests to purchase weapons from South Korea, as did Norway and Estonia, as mentioned earlier.

Can South Korea replace Russia in the global arms market?

For now, it seems unlikely. While aircraft comprise almost half of Russian arms exports between 2016 and 2020, there are only a few light combat aircrafts that South Korea has successfully exported. In addition, as many South Korean weapons still include components that are produced by foreign manufacturers, exporting the weapons require additional permission from those countries. For example, in 2020 South Korean K9 Thunder howitzers that use German diesel engines were prevented from being exported by a German defense export ban. Considering that the majority of foreign manufacturers that either coproduce or provide components of South Korean weapons are from Western countries, exporting South Korean arms to former clients of Russian arms exports (such as China, or Iran) is likely to be very difficult.

There are, however, signs that South Korea is becoming more favored in the global arms market by some Russian arms importers. For example, after having bought howitzers from South Korea in 2021, Egypt has expressed its interest to buy South Korean aircraft as well. Egypt was the fourth largest arms importer of Russian weapons between 2016-2020. Also, Vietnam, another major importer of Russian arms for decades, recently bought arms from South Korea.

Conclusion

Some experts may suggest that last year’s increase in South Korean defense industry’s exports could be just a short-term change due to the demand caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, South Korean defense industry still has major limitations of being dependent on foreign manufacturers for some internal components of their weapons. However, the growth of the country’s defense industry did not just happen in a day. Instead, the country’s arms industry has made progresses to become more competitive in the global arms market. If recently exported arms are deployed and judged reasonably well-performing this year, the country’s arms industry will become more competitive and credible. If that is the case, South Korean defense industry may export more weapons now and in years to come.

Hoshik Nam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Iowa and a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Looking Ahead: Risk in Biden’s Arms Transfers

12/16/2022

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Jordan Cohen

Despite campaign trail promises, President Biden’s weapons transfer policy to date looks very similar to Trump’s administration. Weapons are being sold to anyone willing to bid and are transferred nearly everywhere around the globe. Unfortunately, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and few signals that the administration cares about the riskiness of its clients, Biden’s risky arms transfers look likely to continue in 2023.

The Biden administration entered office promising that they would institute a foreign policy based on human rights. As Biden noted in early 2021, Washington’s diplomacy should be “rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values: defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity.” Beyond that, upon entering office, Biden froze arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While not President Biden himself, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told the press that administration was reviewing Washington’s arms sales policies.

For these reasons, there was justifiable optimism. Beyond stopping sales to risky countries, there were opportunities for the administration to release a new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, ratify the Arms Trade Treaty, fixing problems with end-use monitoring, and either transferring control for the export of certain semi-automatic firearms and ammunition back to the State Department or increasing their regulation while being under the lead of the Commerce Department. Unfortunately, none of this is currently happening.

Also, initially, it appeared the Biden administration’s weapons sales would be less risky than the Trump administration. As Lauren Woods describes, “notifications for foreign military sales (FMS) from the United States to other governments reached their lowest volume in recent memory in 2021, at just over $36 billion.” But, she continues, “already by the end of June 2022, they had reached nearly $38 billion, more than all of 2021.” While 2021 was a historically quiet year for U.S. arms sales, 2022 has picked up, reaching over $81.67 billion in notifications, which is higher than any year under Trump outside of 2020. Recipients include risky countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, and Ukraine.

Ultimately, suggesting that the Biden administration is avoiding risk in his arms sales policy is untrue. Using data from the Cato Institute’s 2021 Arms Sales Risk Index to identify risky destinations, the Biden administration has delivered over $100 million in weapons over the last two years to the following countries:

Mexico
- Risk score = 49
- Corruption = 75
- State fragility = 60
- Freedom = 39
- State violence = 75
- Conflict = 1
- $707 million delivered
Saudi Arabia
- Risk score = 72
- Corruption = 50
- State fragility = 61
- Freedom = 93
- State violence = 75
- Conflict = 100
- $1.3 billion delivered
Egypt
- Risk score = 78
- Corruption = 71
- State fragility = 77
- Freedom = 68
- State violence = 100
- Conflict = 100
- $175 million delivered
Turkey
- Risk score = 77
- Corruption = 61
- State fragility = 70
- Freedom = 30
- State violence = 75
- Conflict = 50
- $460 million delivered
Pakistan
- Risk score = 78
- Corruption = 71
- State fragility = 82
- Freedom = 62
- State violence = 75
- Conflict = 100
- $175 million delivered
India
- Risk score = 60
- Corruption = 61
- State fragility = 67
- Freedom = 30
- State violence = 75
- Conflict = 50
- $594 million delivered
Colombia
- Risk score = 64
- Corruption = 65
- State fragility = 68
- Freedom = 35
- State violence = 51
- Conflict = 100
- $128 million delivered

Recent examples of the cost of this risk include Yemen, Mexico, and Central America’s Northern Triangle. In Yemen, the Saudis continue using U.S. weapons to violate human rights, kill innocent civilians and children, and target civilian infrastructure. Despite a ceasefire that did quell most airstrikes, watchers are asking how long the peace will last since the truce ended.

The story is equally bad for different reasons in Mexico and Central America’s Northern Triangle, the latter of which contains some of the highest crime areas in the world. In Mexico, according to a study by Stop US Arms To Mexico, “nearly 17,000 firearms produced in the United States and recovered in Mexico in 2019-2020, 321 were traced to distributors in the Mexican military or other Mexican state agencies, include 25 to state governments.” Beyond contributing to violence in Mexico, these weapons also fall into the wrong hands when they are dispersed to Central America’s Northern Triangle.

According to a study conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, a total of 27,240 firearms were recovered in Central America’s Northern Triangle. Weapons made in the United States made up 40.1 percent of the total; of these firearms, 39.1 percent were traced to a nonoriginal purchaser and only 43.6 percent were traced to the party who purchased the weapons through American federal firearms sales.

Finally, the number of arms transfers to Ukraine increases the risk of Biden’s arms transfer policies. Concerns about weapons dispersion in Ukraine are well founded. Their reality is being raised by the U.S. State Department, Finland’s media, the President of Nigeria, as well as people fighting and living in Ukraine. The U.S. government is attempting to fight this, but given the sheer amount of weapons and the fact that Ukraine is a war zone, even strict weapons tracking can only go so far.

Thus, there is overwhelming evidence from the first two years of his administration that Biden will not begin making risk a key part of his arms transfer policies in 2023. Rather, it is likely that weapons continue to get delivered to dictators, fragile states, and countries at war. The risks of these weapons being used against innocent civilians, being dispersed, and entangling the U.S. into unnecessary conflicts will continue unabated.

Jordan Cohen is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute and a PhD candidate in political science at George Mason University.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Event Recap, Resources and Recommendations -- War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Militarism: South East Europe and the Black Sea Region (August 18, 2022)

8/23/2022

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On August 18, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Platform for Peace and Humanity co-hosted an event examining the actions and dilemmas faced by countries in South East Europe and the Black Sea Region in part due to the war in Ukraine, with panelists:

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group
A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University
Esra Serim, Independent Researcher

Panelists provided the following observations, recommendations and resources, building off of their comments during the event.*

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group

South Caucasus

Recommendations:

In Azerbaijan, major legislation like the National Security Concept (2007) and the Military Doctrine (2010) is outdated and do not include provisions for parliamentary oversight as well as civil society’s oversight and involvement in security sector reform. Azerbaijan’s military doctrine and national security concept must be updated in the near future.
The main goal of Armenia after the 2020 war seems to be the redefinition of its defense concept and security strategy and rebuilding of the army. For this purpose, the country's policy on the purchase of military weapons should be more transparent (like Georgia) and should include short-term and long-term plans. This need for transparent military procurement policy and long-term planning is also valid for Azerbaijan.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine requires a revision of the security strategy in all three countries and makes it necessary for all three countries to carry out security sector reforms more quickly and effectively, taking into account the new realities.

Suggested resources:

Michael Lambert, “The Revival of the Georgian Armaments and Defense Industry,” Russian International Affairs Council, November 8, 2021.
David Darchiashvili, “Georgia: A hostage to arms”, Saferworld, 2004.
“Georgia outlines defence procurement priorities,” Jane’s Defence, July 26, 2021.
“A difference of five times: Military spending of Armenia and Azerbaijan in numbers,” fact investigation platform, May 25, 2022.
Elkhan Mehdiyev, “Security Sector Reform in Azerbaijan: Key Milestones and Lessons Learned,” Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, May 2021.
Lt. Col. Edward J. Erickson, “The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh:Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?” Military Review, August 2021.
Ulkar Natiqqizi, “After war victory, Azerbaijan keeps increasing military spending,” Eurasianet, May 12, 2022.
“Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War’s Shadow”, International Crisis Group, April 2022.
Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian and Taline Papazian, "A WHITE PAPER: The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies," 2021.

A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University

Balkans

Assessment:

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 showed that conventional warfare in Europe was not over. Serbia is the first to take its place in the arms race in the region. Between 2015 and 2021, Serbia’s defence budget jumped by around 70% to close to $1.4bn a year. During that time, its neighbors tried to restore their armed forces.
Russia mentions Bosnia and Kosovo while threatening Ukraine and/or the international community both before and during the invasion in 2022. While this situation causes uncertainty in the Balkans, it also causes concerns about Russia taking the war further to the West, encouraging the parties to engage in arms trading.
While the rhetorical commitment to preventive diplomacy and action may still be high in the international community, in less stable countries in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, organizations have done little to create a functional conflict prevention regime at the country’s regional level. That’s also because the commitment to its implementation at the domestic level is very weak. There’s very limited coordination between Bosnian state and the international community. There are “Putin-backed separatists” in the Bosnian federal institutions. The increase in international troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very limited one. Their number remains symbolic.
Same for Kosovo. Kosovo is urging NATO and the EU to admit Balkan applicants to avoid a second European front with Russia. But the international community and the EU elites are sharing posts about Kosovo’s commitments on the EU integration process.

Recommendations:

Cooperation efforts between the Balkan states should be supported by the international community. This can be achieved through isolated but EU-backed thematic projects such as the Three Sea’s Initiative or the Open Balkans (with Kosovo), although support should be sensitive to political tensions. This may narrow the sphere of influence of external actors that threaten the stability of the region, such as Russia, China and Erdogan's Turkey, which are also arms dealers.
Continued efforts to support journalism and protection of journalists, chiefly through small grants and funding should continue and increase. Thematic journalistic grants relating to tracking and monitoring arms trades in the region should be considered by donors.
NATO and EU military peacekeeping presence in the Balkans should not increase in just numbers, but in quality and effect, working closely with both officials and civil society in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The EU should communicate more clearly its intentions with the Western Balkans.

Suggested resources:

Ishaan Tharoor, "Russia’s war in Ukraine finds echoes in the Balkans," Washington Post, August 1, 2022.
Filip Ejdus, "Policy Brief on the Spectre of an Arms Race in the Western Balkans," Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, March 2020.
Vuk Vuksanovic and Marija Ignjatijevic, ““What’s Behind The Arms Buildup In The Balkans,” War on the Rocks, December 28, 2021.
"EU isolationism leaving dangerous power vacuum in Balkans, warns major new report on the arms trade," review of Tactics Institute for Security and Counter Terrorism report, June 15, 2020.
Stephen Blank, "Can Selling Weapons to Serbia Create Peace in the Balkans?" National Interest, September 26, 2021.
Special investigation series on Balkan Arms Trade by Balkan Insight

Esra Serim, PhD, France-based independent researcher

Turkey

Assessment:

To preserve Erdogan’s rule, the Turkish administration continued to pursue ambiguous and unreliable foreign policy and investing more in the defense sector. It wants to turn the country into a major arms exporter, which is also Erdogan’s personal ambition.
The fact that Turkey turned from democracy and the West and into an authoritarian regime leads to increasing the distrust in the eyes of the West. The West also questions a non-democratic Turkey, which began to set a high record in the military sector.

Recommendations:

The Erdogan regime must stop making militaristic foreign policy and supporting nationalist ideology to ensure his power at home. Turkey should not get involved into any conflict, including in Syria and Libya in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Ankara should stop taking up arms given Greek tensions and the interventions in Syria and Libya.
The Biden administration should temporarily block military export and projects including the F16 fighter jets as long as Ankara is governed by the Erdogan regime and dismantles democratic norms or does not restore democratic rule in Turkey. A NATO member cannot purchase and use both Russian and US military equipment and/or aviation. Turkey ignored US warnings not to purchase Russia’s S-400 missile defense system, which is incompatible with NATO systems.
Given the Russian threat, however, both the United States and the EU need better relations with Turkey despite Erdogan’s political actions. They should work to convince him to restore Turkish democracy and liberalization, and not to intervene in any neighboring country. In addition, the West should not ignore Turkey’s security concerns in NATO. They should also encourage Erdogan to keep shut the passage to the Black Sea for military vessels through the Turkish Straits, which is very crucial to Ukraine and the course of the war.

Suggested resources:

“Drones and Resets: The New Era of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Baku Dialogues, Summer 2022.
“Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment, October 9, 2020.
“Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2022.
“Why the West Should Make Peace with Erdogan Now,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022.
“Turkey’s Foreign Policy Becoming Alarmingly Militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 21, 2020.
“Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy,” APSA MENA Politics, November 10, 2020.

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.

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U.S. Arms Sales Restraint in 2022?

1/6/2022

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Looking at what is often the most common metric of arms sales intention and volume -- notifications of potential government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) -- the Biden administration at first blush appears to be exercising restraint in the arms trade. FMS notifications made to Congress in calendar year 2021 totaled just over $36 billion, the lowest annual amount since 2011 and second lowest since FMS grew sharply in 2006.

(See dedicated spreadsheet on 2021 FMS notifications here (see all 3 tabs), which was created using the spreadsheet linked to the Forum's resource page.)

While the 2021 total is the lowest in a decade, there are still many problematic sales on last year's list. Top of mind is the one that raised the most attention -- the $650 million November notification of 280 air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. The administration argued that those weapons could not be used for "offensive" purposes and therefore were in line with its human rights goals, especially as related to avoiding harm to civilians in Yemen. Nonetheless, a majority of the President's party voted (unsuccessfully) to block the sale in the Senate last month, with many arguing that providing weapons to oppressive regimes serves to legitimize them, regardless of whether you consider weapons offensive or defensive.

Those arguments can and should also be applied to others on last year's list, perhaps most noticeably the Philippines, where the administration told Congress it wanted to sell F-16s, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles valued at more than $2.5 billion to the oppressive Duterte regime. Scrutiny is also rising on countries that have in the past been less controversial, such as Israel and India, for which there were FMS notifications as well as human rights concerns.

It's Not Just Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS itself also does not tell the full arms sales picture, which appears to be increasingly comprised of company-initiated Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that are much less transparent to the public. The May scandal of JDAMs on offer to Israel during a flare up of conflict in which civilian areas were bombed was via the DCS program. Part of the controversy was that a Congressional leak was needed to raise awareness of the potential deal, in part because DCS notifications are not shared on a convenient website, whereas FMS notifications are.

The State Department arms sales factsheet from January 2021 indicates both the scale and relative lack of information we have on the DCS program. It details that in fiscal year 2020 more than $124 billion in DCS licenses were authorized, but only $38.5 billion of which were notified to Congress. (In the latest factsheet, released last month, the Biden administration provides even less clarity, removing details about how much of the $103.4 billion fiscal year 2021 DCS approvals were notified to Congress.)

There is also a billion dollar request for Israel's Iron Dome program supported by the administration, assistance to Egypt that the Biden administration did not fully withhold, and $20+ billion F-35 and drones sales to the UAE that raise the question of how much restraint this administration will support.

New Policy Anticipated

As soon as this month, we expect the Biden administration to unveil a new conventional arms transfer policy that was previewed in part in November. At that time, Tim Betts, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, said the policy will "seek to elevate human rights, stress the principles of restraint and responsible use." That is certainly welcome. In all likelihood, however, the new policy will follow earlier ones in that the list of reasons to engage in weapons transfers will not be weighted. Those looking to argue for commercial interests will find language they want, and no indication that human rights have a higher priority. How the administration actually implements the policy will likely be more telling than the words in it.

An initial follow-on step should be for the Biden administration to recommit to the U.S. signature to the Arms Trade Treaty. President Trump’s repudiation of the one global treaty that establishes baselines for responsible trade of broad categories of conventional weapons, and which is already consistent with U.S. law, is a stain on U.S. international credibility and inconsistent with shared goals.

More to Watch

Getting this right is not easy, of course. But if the United States, the world’s largest weapons provider by far, actually wants to show arms transfer restraint, it needs a consistent approach to existing or future conflicts that moves away from adding more weapons to volatile situations. It must find ways to engage the Middle East and elsewhere through commercial ties, cultural and academic connections, and other approaches. And in many cases, especially in pulling back, it will need to increase and enable humanitarian assistance to those places impacted by war. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, while a positive for those supportive of a less militarized approach, has not been followed by a humanitarian response sufficient for the suffering country.

Nor has aid that would help those in Yemen been able to reach them, in part because the United States has not truly used its full power to demand that the blockade on the country be immediately ended. In Yemen, the Houthi are no saints. They have committed horrible abuses. U.S. leverage and complicity, however, is tied much more closely to Saudi Arabia, for which the U.S. continues vital aircraft maintenance support, and to the UAE, which despite claims of exiting the war is still engaged via proxy groups and control of the Socotra island.

Even more than relations with Saudi Arabia, that with the Emiratis may be most telling on potential U.S. arms restraint in the coming months and years. In December, the UAE threatened to walk away from the massive F-35 deal. The administration has consistently said it wants to make the deal work, but has insisted on publicly unspecified end-use and other conditions. In my close reading of the comments by State Department and Defense Department officials last month, it’s unclear that human rights and civilian protection concerns are being raised at all with the Emiratis. That must change.

Finally, Congress may also play a role. A wide array of legislation has been introduced that would impact on arms trade restraint should it be adopted. A short, but incomplete, list includes the progressive Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act introduced by Rep. Ilhan Omar; the SAFEGUARD Act, led by the influential chairs of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees; and the bipartisan National Security Reforms and Accountability Act/National Security Powers Act that would “flip the script” and require Congressional approval on many arms sales -- similar to an approach once introduced by then-Senator Joe Biden in the 1986.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade

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Comments - U.S. Arms Exports Under Congressional Notification Thresholds

9/30/2021

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On September 30, 2021, the Forum launched a new resource page for sharing an understanding of law and practices, case studies, potential research avenues and a variety of recommendations related to arms exports that are below Congressional notification thresholds (or simply not required). We welcome additional information, suggestions, and commentary here.

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Judicial Review redux in the UK over sales to Saudi Arabia and Coalition

1/6/2021

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Sam Perlo-Freeman

It seems like we’ve been here before. This year, the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) hopes to take the UK Government to court, seeking a Judicial Review over its decision last July to continue arms sales to Saudi Arabia and its coalition allies in the war in Yemen, in spite of the devastating human toll exacted by that conflict, and the overwhelming evidence of gross and repeated violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the Coalition.

Didn’t CAAT just win a case like this a year or so ago? Yes, indeed.

The story so far: In June 2019, the Court of Appeal, overturning a previous High Court decision, ruled that the process by which the government made decisions on export licences to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen was “irrational and unlawful”. Specifically, Criterion 2c of the government’s Consolidated Criteria on arms exports states that an export licence shall be refused if there is a “clear risk” that the equipment “might be used” for serious violations of IHL. Yet, the government had not even attempted an assessment of past patterns of violations of IHL by Saudi Arabia and the Coalition. Instead, it had relied on its ongoing engagement with and training of the Saudi government and military to conclude there was no “clear risk”.

The Court of Appeal rejected this absurd position, that a previous record of violations was irrelevant to an assessment of future risk, and the government had to stop issuing new licences to Coalition states for possible use in Yemen, and to retake all past licencing decisions on a lawful basis. (However, existing licences, including indefinite Open General licences, were not cancelled, allowing BAE Systems’ extensive support for the Saudi Air Force to continue unabated).

A year later, in July 2020, the government announced that it had completed its review, and concluded that all was well, there were only a “small number” of possible violations of IHL among all the hundreds of incidents assessed, and that these were “isolated incidents” that did not constitute any “pattern”. Therefore, there was indeed no “clear risk” of future violations, and that arms sales could continue without any concern for the potential civilian toll this might exact.

It is this latest decision that CAAT is challenging. The idea that there have only been a “small number” of violations of IHL flies in the face of a huge body of evidence from UN experts and Yemeni and international NGOs. These organisations have used highly rigorous methodologies and sources, and have access to on-the-ground witnesses, which the UK government does not. The evidence includes repeated bombings of residential areas, schools, hospitals, market places, agricultural targets, and many others, usually with no evidence of any nearby military target . According to the Yemen Data Project, almost a third of the thousands of Coalition air strikes since the bombing began in 2015 have struck civilian targets. The “patterns” of violations are plain to see.

The government have provided only the barest outline of how they have reached these, on the face of it, absurd conclusions. They have not said what constitutes a “small number” of cases, or what they mean by a “pattern”, only that the incidents occurred “...at different times, in different circumstances and for different reasons”.

The next stage of this saga – which started with CAAT’s initial application to the High Court in 2016 – is for CAAT to seek permission for a new Judicial Review - “JR2” - of the government’s review of licencing in response to CAAT’s victory in the original Judicial Review. This starts again with the High Court, and could yet go all the way to the Supreme Court. (For those not familiar with the UK court hierarchy, check this). While the full Grounds of CAAT’s application are subject to legal confidentiality, the basic premises are straightforward:

1) We challenge the conclusion that there are only a “small number” of cases of violations of IHL, based on the huge volume of evidence above.

2) We likewise challenge the conclusion that there is no “pattern” of violations.

3) We argue that, even if there were no “pattern”, this would not be sufficient to conclude that there is no clear risk of future violations. Even a single incident could constitute a serious violation of IHL, and there can very well be a risk of further “isolated” incidents even so.

Since we know so little about the government’s methodology, or even the details of their conclusions, which they say must be kept secret for reasons of national security, we have no idea what evidence the government may or may not have to support its conclusions. If we are granted permission for JR2, most of this evidence will have to be heard in Closed session, where CAAT will be represented by security-cleared Special Advocates, who cannot disclose the content of the sessions to CAAT or our regular lawyers.

We do not know, therefore, what secret evidence the government might bring to these closed sessions in an attempt to justify their conclusions. But we find it hard to believe that there is anything that could reasonably gainsay the vast weight of evidence from so many credible and respected sources.

The way it appears to us is that, whatever the evidence, and whatever courts have said about previous decision-making processes, the government is determined to find a way to interpret things that allow them to maintain its relationship with the UK’s overwhelmingly largest arms customer, Saudi Arabia, whatever mental and legal gymnastics this may require.

We hope that the courts will exhibit similar scepticism. The government must respond to our Grounds for Judicial Review by January 22nd, after which the High Court will decide if, on the basis of these submissions, we have a case. If not, we may still seek a hearing to decide if the case may proceed. If JR2 does get the go-ahead, it will be months yet before it comes to court.

The case, as they say, continues.

Sam Perlo-Freeman is Research Coordinator at the Campaign Against Arms Trade.

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Early Actions to Watch for a More Responsible U.S. Arms Trade Policy

1/4/2021

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

We should know almost immediately if the next U.S. administration will take a more responsible approach to the arms trade. That's because a 30-day Congressional review period on the sale of 7500 precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia will end just after the expected January 20 inauguration of the next President. At that point, the new Biden administration would be able to issue licenses for the sale (unless Congress quickly takes blocking actions before then). If Biden keeps to expectations, he will not issue those licenses. That would be consistent with his October 2 pledge:

Under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relationship with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.

If Biden truly wants to uphold values and make U.S. weapons recipients accountable for their actions, his administration could also take steps to slow and suspend major weapons sales to the United Arab Emirates. Less than a month ago, nearly all the Democrats in the Senate made clear their opposition to much of a $23 billion arms package to Abu Dhabi that the Trump administration is attempting to rush forward in its closing days. The UAE, which remains a key partner in the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen and is violating the UN arms embargo on Libya, simply should not be receiving U.S. arms at this time.

At present, there is not a clear indication from the incoming President on what he will do with these time-sensitive sales. Whether any of the necessary letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) have been signed with the UAE that would put contracts in place is not clear, despite Trump administration efforts to move ahead. If not, Biden can delay concluding them. If some LOAs are signed, he can also hold off on delivery, especially for armed drones, precision-guided and other munitions that could be transferred most quickly. While the Abraham Accords offer great promise for improving regional relations in the Middle East, the reward for the accords should be peace and a lessening of prospects for conflict, not the influx of tens of billions in new weaponry.

How the U.S. approaches arming yet other countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Qatar, Bahrain and more, will be closely watched as the Biden team has indicated a desire to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (a.k.a. the Iran nuclear deal). Fueling regional arms races could make that more difficult.

Biden has also promised to reverse the Trump administration policy that transferred export oversight for semi-automatic and many other small arms to the Commerce Department, which ended Congressional transparency into such sales. Quick steps to return to the previous policy would also show his administration seeks a more responsible arms trade approach.

As the Obama presidency was nearing its end in late 2016 and early 2017, his administration held back on weapons sale to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that the Trump administration later moved forward. It will be promising if Biden renews concerns about arms sales to many regimes with highly problematic human rights records that Trump has supported, including to the Philippines (amongst a long list of countries).

Even more telling would be actions to again support the Arms Trade Treaty. An easy early first step would be for the Biden administration to retract the letter Trump sent to the United Nations in 2019 that denied legal obligations from the United States' 2013 signature. Further efforts to honor U.S. signature to the ATT, including to seek ratification of the treaty (as embedded in the 2020 Democratic party platform), may take longer but would also show U.S. dedication to again align itself with nearly all its allies in promoting global norms on responsible arms trade.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade

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Taking Stock and Looking Ahead for Responsible Policies on U.S. Arms Sales

1/13/2020

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Shannon Dick

During the last three years, the United States’ approach to conventional arms sales has been characterized by its transactional nature and focus on short-term objectives. In this environment, the Trump administration has repeatedly challenged key tenets of U.S. arms transfer laws and policies, resulting in increased arms sales to countries of concern. At the same time, Congress has increasingly spoken out about U.S. arms sales decisions, leading to greater examination of and public discourse on the opportunities and, importantly, the risks presented by certain arms transfer decisions. Given these dynamics, the upcoming year presents an opportunity to reevaluate how the United States engages in the global arms trade and identify ways to ensure greater responsibility and accountability in U.S. arms transfer decisions in the years to come.

During the Trump administration, expediency, special interests, and perceived economic incentives have often come at the expense of long-standing approaches to U.S. arms transfer decisions. In the last year alone, the administration:

Released a fact sheet detailing its implementation plan for the revised Conventional Arms Transfer policy, which places a primacy on economic considerations and assisting U.S. defense industry, and seeks to incentivize arms sales as one response to concerns about great power competition. In so doing, however, the policy and its corresponding implementation plan gloss over considerations of human rights and international law – issues that serve to mitigate the inherent risks of arms sales.
Withdrew America’s signature from the Arms Trade Treaty – the only legal, international agreement that seeks to promote international security and reduce human suffering by regulating the global trade in conventional weapons – in a move that was influenced by and predominately supports special interest groups in the United States, such as the National Rifle Association.
Declared a national emergency to bypass Congress and push through more than $8 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other countries – thereby continuing a pattern of approving arms sales to countries with known human rights concerns. Members of Congress had previously opposed the sales due to continued human rights abuses and the growing humanitarian catastrophe resulting from U.S.-backed, Saudi-led coalition bombings in Yemen.
Took additional steps to transfer oversight of firearms exports from the U.S. Department of State to the Department of Commerce, which would make it easier for U.S. arms manufacturers to sell their products abroad and increase the risk that U.S. weapons fall into the wrong hands or are used irresponsibly. The move would likely also result in less transparency around arms sales as well as challenge U.S. investigations of illegal arms transfers – among other concerns.

With these activities, the Trump administration has underscored its commitment to boost U.S. arms sales and to do so more quickly. But such an approach risks overlooking important considerations – such as ensuring appropriate end use, protecting against deleterious proliferation, and protecting human rights – and could lead to longer-term consequences for U.S. national security and foreign policy. These trends have already animated some congressional action and may continue to serve as fuel in underscoring the importance of Congress to hold the administration accountable and reassert its role in overseeing U.S. arms sales.

The political environment going into 2020 could present an opportunity to build on the attention and momentum of the past few years and embolden the American public and Congress to take more proactive steps to ensure proper oversight of and responsibility in U.S. arms sales. There are several avenues for improvement within the U.S. arms transfer policy framework, and actions taken this year could help lay the groundwork for establishing more robust, responsible, and accountable policies in 2021 and beyond.

In general, 2020 provides an opportunity to ensure that U.S. arms sales to foreign governments better align with those governments’ legitimate needs and capacities, as well as U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. For example, a recipient’s past behaviors could be taken into consideration when reviewing potential arms transfers in order to better safeguard human rights and mitigate potential harm. Additionally, Congress could pass legislation to restrict or prohibit future sales to countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE in light of the ongoing war in Yemen, as well as revise the procedures for considering and reviewing arms sales for all countries engaged in conflict. In addition, greater articulation and explanation of the Trump administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and implementation plan could help identify gaps in current policy and practice in order to better safeguard U.S. arms transfers. And finally, members of Congress could strengthen existing legislation by requiring the administration to report on potential violations of U.S. arms export laws. Such steps could ultimately serve to better inform the American public of the processes and risks involved in U.S. arms sales around the world.

Shannon Dick is a research analyst at the Stimson Center

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Judicial Review redux in the UK over sales to Saudi Arabia and Coalition

Early Actions to Watch for a More Responsible U.S. Arms Trade Policy

Taking Stock and Looking Ahead for Responsible Policies on U.S. Arms Sales

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