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Event Resources and Recommendations: Learning from Niger: U.S. Security Assistance and Training (August 15, 2023)

8/17/2023

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On August 15, 2023, shortly after the ouster of the democratically elected president of Niger by military forces, the Forum on the Arms Trade hosted an event to discuss the U.S. involvement in training of military leaders who have gone on to replace their governments, the limitations placed on further U.S. assistance whether called a coup or not, the challenges of making decisions of which countries to aid especially as relates to training, and recommendations for improving those decisions and for much greater transparency in the future.

Video of that event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YTIIrB_E47I&t=168s
During and shortly after the event, panelists provided the following recommendations and suggested resources:*

Resources
via the Intercept (authored by Nick Turse)
  • "Niger Junta Appoints U.S.-Trained Military Officers To Key Jobs," August 16, 2023
  • "At Least Five Members Of Niger Junta Were Trained By U.S.," August 10, 2023
  • "Niger Coup Leader Joins Long Line Of U.S.-Trained Mutineers," July 27, 2023
  • "Drones and Motos: After Two Decades of U.S. Military Support, Terror Attacks Are Worse Than Ever in Niger," April 2, 2023

via International Crisis Group
  • "The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict," August 7, 2023
  • "The Complexities of Calling a Coup a Coup," February 23, 2022

via the Stimson Center Center
  • "What Niger’s Coup Says About U.S. Security Assistance in the Sahel," August 17, 2023
  • "'If we don’t sell it, someone else will:' Dependence & Influence in US Arms Transfers -- Examining assumptions about dependence and influence in the U.S. security cooperation enterprise," March 30, 2023

Recommendations/observations  (time of recording indicated, when available)

Nick Turse, contributing writer, The Intercept  
  • Re-evaluation should be done to more greatly examine the possible relation of U.S. training and coups (32:07)

Sarah Harrison, Senior Analyst, U.S. Program, International Crisis Group  
  • The United States should pay greater attention to the context of countries to which it provides security assistance, including a risk analysis of the potential for coups (34:14) 
  • Reflect on whether security assistance actually leads to transformational democratic changes (35:40)
  • Pay attention to local needs, not the outside frame of great power competition (42:08)

Elias Yousif, Research Analyst, Conventional Defense Program, Stimson Center
  • Need detailed yearly reporting on U.S. security cooperation, such as on Title X authorities with specific country amounts and types of assistance. (39:05)
  • Pay attention to disconnect between partners and U.S. goals and challenge the "If we don't sell, others will" assumptions (40:16)
  • More robust, in-depth, and multidisciplinary pre-assessments should better inform the selection of U.S. security assistance beneficiaries and partners. (48:00)
  • A greater emphasis should be placed on governance, civil-military reforms, and defense institution building as a prerequisite to combat-oriented assistance.

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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As War Leads to More Orders, Weapons Makers Should Embrace Human Rights

4/27/2023

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by Aaron A. Acosta and Jeff Abramson

In the coming month, shareholders at major U.S. defense manufacturers will again recommend that the companies consider human rights in their business decisions. This time, the companies should agree.

That defense companies face reputational risks when their weapons are used to bomb school buses or in other ways kill civilians is generally known. Nevertheless, arms manufacturers typically resist calls for shouldering the blame when their products are misused by arguing that the government provides licenses for their sales – and therefore takes that responsibility off industry’s shoulders. But an excellent brief last year by the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights lays out a range of risks arms manufacturers face that cannot simply be waved away by a government license. These include those reputational factors, as well financial, governance, regulatory and legal risks. Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Raytheon were reminded just last month of such challenges when a group of Yemeni nationals filed a lawsuit against them in Washington D.C. for “aiding and abetting war crimes and extrajudicial killings” by supplying arms to Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen. And a new database launched last week draws attention to the growing legal challenges to governments’ export licensing decisions, further highlighting that defense companies cannot, nor should not, rely solely on government determinations.

At forthcoming Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics annual general meetings, investors will sponsor resolutions calling for the companies to conduct and publish a human rights impact assessment. At Northrop Grumman, the call will be for an examination of whether the company’s political activities (direct and indirect lobbying, campaign contributions, etc.) align with those policies. In short, the arms companies – the world’s 1st, 4th and 5th largest – are being asked to begin more fully engaging in human rights due diligence.

Rather than resisting shareholder initiatives, defense manufacturers this year should embrace the push for human rights. With ongoing customer relations and follow-on services to weapons recipients, defense companies often have information on what’s happening with weapons stocks and are able to encourage and provide know-how on best practices. 

The ABA guidance mentioned earlier details practical advice to help companies manage actual and potential human rights impacts linked to their business activities. This includes evaluating the risks that potential clients may violate human rights with weapons and services they receive, proactively putting in place preventive and mitigation measures that establish good practices for companies and clients, monitoring how weapons are used, and then following up with investigation and remediation where necessary.  

The Biden administration has also made clear that human rights matter in its arms trade decisions. The President’s new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy, issued in February, places a stronger emphasis on human rights, stating the U.S. will not transfer arms when it assesses that it is “more likely than not” that they will be used to commit an array of human rights abuses. It also explicitly makes clear that as situations change, arms transfers may be cut off – a signal to industry that just getting to a contract is not enough. 

At the same time, the policy made a commitment to arms manufacturing and the defense industrial base. And that industrial base will be busy. As the war in Ukraine continues, it is clear that U.S. defense companies will have many years of orders to not only replenish the stock of U.S. weapons sent to Kyiv, but also those of partners who have done so.

Importantly, this makes now the best moment for U.S. companies to adopt and implement human rights due diligence policies. With such a substantial portion of future sales likely to go to European countries whose human rights practices and weapons-use policies tend to be more transparent, defense companies should be able to “battle-test” human rights due diligence with them.

The idea that American companies should pay attention to more than just the bottom line has, of course, been much more visible this year, as President Biden issued his first veto last month, thwarting those who argued that investors shouldn’t be able to take into account environmental, social, and governance considerations. While that may now have made “ESG” a household acronym for many Americans, ESG goals have been undergirded for more than a decade by the 2011 “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” known as the “UNGPs.”

Over the years, the U.S. government has continually and explicitly recognized the important role of the UNGPs. The first National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (NAP), which was published in 2016, emphasized that responsible business conduct principles are encompassed in the UNGPs. Importantly, the 2016 NAP stated the U.S. government “encourages businesses to treat tools like the… UN Guiding Principles as a floor rather than a ceiling for implementing responsible business practices [RBC], and to recognize that implementing RBC should be a continuing process.” A revision to the NAP is currently underway that will recognize that UNGPs “have both domestic and international applicability.”

The extension of the UNGPs into arms and security issues has also grown. A key UN working group report last year explicitly looking at the arms sector similarly made the case for implementing the UNGPs and recommendations for how businesses could do so. And, late last month under U.S. leadership, more than 20 countries again endorsed them at the Summit for Democracy as part of a code of conduct aimed at preventing the proliferation of software and technologies that enable serious human rights abuses.

Despite the growing momentum around embedding the UNGPs in companies’ policies and practices, only one of the three major weapons companies that will soon face investor-led human rights initiatives explicitly mentions them. That’s Northrop Grumman, who does not take them as authoritative, but rather says they offer “a source of guidance on how governments, companies, and other parties can address their responsibilities.” 

Last year, defense company leaders argued against shareholder proposals that highlighted human rights due diligence, but those that went to a vote at Lockheed and General Dynamics still garnered 20.2% and 25.2% shareholder support, respectively. While the Lockheed proposal asked the company to conduct a human rights impact assessment, the General Dynamics proposal asked for reporting on the company’s human rights due diligence process. This year, shareholder proposals filed at Lockheed (April 27) and General Dynamics (May 3) ask the companies to conduct human rights impact assessments, and the Northrop proposal asks the company to report on misalignment between its political activities and its human rights commitments. 

The Northrop (May 17) proposal on misalignment, filed for the first time this year, highlights the high reputational risks companies face when their political activities are in conflict with their stated commitments. Northrop’s political activities suggest it actively lobbies, makes political contributions, and otherwise pushes for government sales of its defense products and services to customers linked to irremediable human rights impacts. Recently, major proxy advisors Vanguard and Glass Lewis pointed out the significant reputational risks of misalignment between a company’s political activities and its stated commitments and values - risks that affect a company’s bottom line. 

It’s time for U.S. defense manufacturers to be proactively responsible partners in our national endeavors to promote human rights.

Aaron A. Acosta is a senior program associate at Investor Advocates for Social Justice, Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and director of the Forum on the Arms Trade

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Disconnect Continues: the United States, the Arms Trade, Humanitarian Disarmament, and the 2023 Summit for Democracy

3/26/2023

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by Jeff Abramson

As the awful war in Ukraine remains framed as a struggle between democracies and autocracies, it is important to assess whether U.S. goals to build a community of democracies match its actions. With the second Summit for Democracy taking place this week, and the Biden administration now in its third year in office, this post updates an earlier one related to the 2021 Summit. It primarily asks whether disconnects have improved in how the United States participates in the arms trade and supports humanitarian disarmament, with a lens on 2023 Summit invitations? The short answer is a tiny bit.

Compared to 2012-2021 (46%), the percentage of major weapons transfers to countries NOT invited to the latest Summit has declined, but still more than 40% of major U.S. weapons transfers over the last two years have gone to countries NOT invited to the 2023 Summit for Democracy. And, while the United States has revised its landmine policy and supported a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, writ large it continues to eschew humanitarian disarmament treaties that are supported by (often vast) majorities of INVITED countries.

Updated 2023 Summit for Democracy invitation list and other data

During a press briefing on March 22, 2023, the Untied States confirmed all the countries invited to the 2021 Summit would be invited to the 2023 Summit for Democracy as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Honduras. This revised list, combined with updated SIPRI data released in March 2023 and latest treaty support information, is used in the analysis below. Discussion of whether all invitees truly are democratic, rather than autocratic, is not part of this analysis but is recognized as also valuable.

During the Biden administration's first two years (2021-2022), more than 40% of U.S. major weapons transfers have gone to countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy

​​One might expect that an effort to build democracies globally would also result in decisions to send fewer weapons to countries who are not democracies, or put differently, that a small percentage of U.S. arms transfers would go to those countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy. Looking just at the first two years of the Biden administration, however, 41% of major U.S. weapons deliveries have gone to just such countries, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar each receiving about 10% of global deliveries. (See data [Excel] and delivery details [pdf]). 
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This is a lower percentage than during the ten-year period from 2012-2021 (46%, see previous blog entry) and the Biden administration has recently released a new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy that espouses greater human rights considerations -- both could be signs of future restraint. But, arms transfers typically take years to negotiate and complete, meaning much of Biden's first two years are based on inherited weapons deals, and it remains to be seen how and whether the new CAT policy will impact on arms sales to autocratic regimes.
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Democracies support key humanitarian disarmament treaties that the United States continues to eschew. 
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​Of those invited to the 2023 Summit, 90% are states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 75% to the Arms Trade Treaty, and 65% to the Convention on Cluster Munitions -- key treaties within the human security-centered humanitarian disarmament approach for dealing with the adverse impacts of arms. (View data [Excel].) 

​The United States is not a state party to any of these treaties, making it a minority within the community of those invited.
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Regarding the newer Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which now has 68 states parties, two-thirds of those states parties (46, or 68%) were invited to the Summit. 

​Since the 2021 Summit, the United States did announce a new landmine policy that brings it into closer alignment with Mine Ban Treaty states parties, but still reserves the ability to use victim-activated anti-personnel landmines in the Korean peninsula. In discussing the new CAT policy, U.S. officials did make clear this month that they are still considering their approach to the Arms Trade Treaty (see video at 1:15:25), which had been signed during the Obama administration, but the Trump administration rejected. (See resource page and commentary.) The Biden administration does not appear to be conducting a review of its cluster munition policy and is now facing pressure from some members of Congress to transfer treaty-barred weapons to Ukraine. 

In a break with the Trump administration, the Biden administration did more fully support the effort to create a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which it endorsed in ceremonies in Dublin in November 2022.
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Implementation and Innovation: Humanitarian Disarmament in 2023

2/2/2023

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

(photo, right: Bonnie Docherty (author) delivers statement at the endorsement conference of explosive weapons declaration in Dublin, November 2022. Credit: Erin Hunt, 2022.)

This post also is also published on humanitariandisarmament.org’s Disarmament Dialogue blog.  ​
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Bonnie Docherty
The past year underscored the need to have and to ensure respect for strong and effective humanitarian disarmament law. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, cluster munitions, antipersonnel landmines, and explosive weapons with wide area effects have been used in populated areas, mostly by Russia. Russia has in addition repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons.
 
These attacks and threats have inflicted a horrific civilian toll, but they have also generated international opprobrium because they involved weapons banned or practices restricted under humanitarian disarmament treaties and commitments. While more work needs to be done to minimize the civilian suffering in Ukraine and other armed conflicts around the world, demonstrating robust and united support for global civilian protection norms is an important step.
 
Humanitarian disarmament, which seeks to prevent and remediate arms-inflicted human and environmental harm, was advanced as well as reinforced in 2022. States adopted important new standards and commitments on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, nuclear weapons, and the environment and armed conflict. To ensure that these standards and commitments achieve their potential, 2023 will be critical for implementation. It is also a time for innovation, especially in addressing the risks and dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems.
 
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

A political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, endorsed by 83 countries on November 18, aims to better protect civilians from humanitarian consequences of the bombing and shelling of cities and towns. It goes beyond urging greater compliance with existing international humanitarian law to establishing guidelines for preventing and remediating the harm from this method of warfare. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas is one of the greatest threats to civilians in contemporary armed conflicts, and the declaration contains strong provisions with the potential to address both direct and reverberating effects. But it will only be as effective as its interpretation and implementation.
 
Over the next year, signatories to the declaration should ensure that they interpret it through a humanitarian lens. Its core provision calls on states to adopt “policies and practices to help avoid civilian harm, including by restricting or refraining as appropriate from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects.” According to a report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, to live up to the declaration’s humanitarian purpose, states should understand the paragraph to mean they should refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and restrict their use of all other explosive weapons in those areas.
 
State signatories should also carry out the commitments they made in the declaration and be ready to report on their progress at the first follow-up meeting in Norway in 2024. They should, for example, review, develop, and improve relevant national policies and practices; train their armed forces on the declaration’s provisions; collect and share data; and provide assistance to victims. Several civil society organizations have published recommendations for how most effectively to implement the declaration’s commitments.
 
Nuclear Weapons

Implementation is also key for the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty’s landmark First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna last June adopted the Vienna Declaration, reaffirming states parties’ commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons and stressing the treaty’s underlying moral and ethical imperatives. The meeting further agreed to the Vienna Action Plan, which lays out steps to advance the process of implementing the treaty. Expanding support for the treaty remains a top priority. Five years after its initial signing conference, the treaty has 68 states parties and an additional 27 states have signed.
 
Another area of focus is the positive obligations to assist victims, remediate environmental contamination, and provide international cooperation and assistance. The Action Plan identifies initial steps states parties should take to establish an implementation framework. They should assess the harm caused by nuclear weapons use and testing and their capacity to address it, develop a national plan with a budget and time frame, establish a government “focal point” to guide these efforts, and adopt relevant laws and policies. In addition, they should follow principles of accessibility, inclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency at all stages of carrying out these obligations.
 
Environment and Armed Conflict

New standards were set during the past year with regard to the environment and armed conflict. On December 7, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus the International Law Commission’s Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts. The non-binding principles cover situations before, during, and after times of armed conflict.
 
The principles call for designating protected zones, explicitly applying existing international humanitarian law to the environment, and laying out rules to protect the environment during times of occupation. They also underscore the importance of cooperation in developing post-conflict remedial measures.
 
The Conflict and Environment Observatory, which advocated heavily for the principles, said that, “The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the principles and their commentaries represents the transition point between [the principles’] development and the beginning of its implementation phase.” Early steps in this stage include raising awareness about the principles and adopting national measures, such as training armed forces on their content.
 
Autonomous Weapons Systems
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While the new standards and commitments on explosive weapons, nuclear weapons, and the environment in armed conflict require implementation, the dangers raised by autonomous weapons systems are still not constrained by specific legal rules. Innovation will, therefore, be crucial in 2023. International talks at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) have been ongoing since May 2014, but no action has been taken. At the CCW’s annual meeting in November, states parties yet again failed to make any meaningful progress despite calls from a majority of states parties, plus the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society organizations, to open negotiations for a new treaty to prohibit and regulate autonomous weapons.
 
Due in large part to the CCW’s reliance on consensus-based decision making, however, states parties could only agree to discuss—for the tenth year—“possible measures” for addressing the myriad threats such weapons systems pose. States parties will need to break out of the CCW if they want to make progress toward a new instrument on autonomous weapons systems.
 
States need to innovate by changing their tactics for achieving a treaty, and there is ample precedent for taking a different approach. Existing disarmament treaties offer models for successfully adopting legal instruments in alternative forums. As discussed in a recent report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, states could turn to an independent process outside the UN, as was done for the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. Or they could initiate a UN General Assembly process, as was used for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Both approaches have several benefits: a common purpose, voting-based decision-making, clear and ambitious deadlines, and a commitment to inclusivity.
 
In 2023, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Austria are all planning conferences outside of the CCW on autonomy in weapons systems. States and others that support creating new law to address the moral, legal, accountability, and security concerns about this emerging technology should take advantage of these meetings to build momentum for negotiations.

Bonnie Docherty is a senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch and a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, where she is Director of the Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection Initiative in the International Human Rights Clinic. 

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Aid to Ukraine May Elicit Broader Arms Trade Scrutiny

1/19/2023

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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John Chappell
The coming months will likely bring renewed skepticism towards U.S. arms sales to Ukraine, especially among Republican members whose party now controls the House of Representatives.  While increased attention to U.S. security assistance to Ukraine is all but inevitable, will a change in House leadership bring productive debate about arms sales oversight and end-use monitoring? Or will legislators use Ukraine aid as yet another partisan cudgel?

An Opportunity and Its Risks

In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drew global attention, sparking efforts in the United States and Europe to provide military assistance to Ukraine’s armed forces. Scenes of attacks on civilians and accounts of war crimes drew sympathy from western publics, and diplomats protested President Putin’s blatant violation of international law prohibiting aggressive war. Last year, the United States provided tens of billions of dollars in assistance to Ukraine, with about half of it taking the form of weapons, security assistance, and Foreign Military Financing. But as economic woes continue and the war drags on, public support for continued military assistance to Ukraine has eroded, especially among Republican voters. 

The Republican Party’s victory in the 2022 midterms – albeit a narrow one – will change congressional dynamics regarding U.S. arms sales to Ukraine. As became apparent with the election of Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) as Speaker, the GOP caucus is fractured, and the Republican Party’s slim majority makes every vote count, empowering the party’s right flank. Passing legislation through the House during the 118th Congress will be difficult, and securing Senate passage, and presidential signature for many House-originated bills seems unlikely. But with Republicans holding the Speaker’s gavel and committee chairs, they will nonetheless have a great deal of influence to conduct oversight and engage in “overspeech.” House Republicans plan to investigate the business dealings of members of President Biden’s family, scrutinize the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and probe abuses of power in the federal government. 

Fights over arms sales to Ukraine may emerge more often with GOP control of the House. Debate about oversight for major arms sales could be productive. Congressional attention to U.S. end-use monitoring procedures would be welcome, especially since current end-use monitoring processes do not monitor how U.S.-origin defense articles are used. 

However, should Ukraine aid become a matter uttered in the same breath as Hunter Biden’s laptop, Democrats will be unlikely to take oversight proposals seriously. Much-needed security assistance reform efforts will suffer if arms sales oversight becomes overly associated with far-right posturing.

Republican Positions on Ukraine Aid

The Republican Party is far from unified on the question of military aid to Ukraine. But enough high-profile legislators have raised concerns, whether about the scale of aid or oversight for military assistance, to put the issue on the agenda for 2023. Such concerns may result in the inclusion of additional oversight measures in future appropriations for assistance to Ukraine.

A number of Republican legislators have spoken out against continued U.S.military assistance to Ukraine without greater oversight. In December, Rep. Marjorie Taylor-Greene (R-GA) introduced a resolution to audit U.S. aid to Ukraine, drawing support from both restraint-minded and more hawkish conservatives. Taylor-Greene intends to reintroduce the measure in the 118th Congress. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) has also been a vocal critic of U.S. aid to Ukraine. 

Key Republican committee chairs are stalwart supporters of U.S. military support to Ukraine. In December 2022, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX), who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said he “100%” supports arming Ukraine against Russia. He also sponsored a bipartisan bill authorizing U.S. support to international criminal fora, including the International Criminal Court, for investigations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, McCaul backed Taylor-Greene’s audit resolution in the House Foreign Affairs Committee as ranking member, and he has voiced support for “oversight and accountability” for security assistance to Ukraine.

Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), who won the Speaker’s gavel on January 7, 2023 after fifteen rounds of voting, has expressed that Ukraine will not get a “blank check” from Congress with the House under Republican leadership. 

In the Senate, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has spearheaded Republican support for assistance to Ukraine. But Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) would be a likely Senate ally of Ukraine aid skeptics in the House. A perennial critic of U.S. arms sales, Paul delayed a vote on a $40 billion aid package to Ukraine in May 2022 with a provision requiring that an inspector general monitor the spending. Besides Senator Paul, a significant contingent of GOP Senators has voted against appropriations for aid to Ukraine.

With notable legislators calling for greater accountability and oversight for U.S. arms sales to Ukraine, 2023 will bring opportunities to consider how U.S. law and policy address U.S. arms sales.

Possible Areas of Focus in the Ukraine Aid Debate

In light of the sheer quantity of U.S. arms sales and other forms of assistance to Ukraine, three policy areas that congressional conversations may touch on include end-use monitoring, the Leahy Laws, and oversight by inspectors general. 

At this stage of the conflict, U.S. arms appear to have remained in the hands of Ukrainian forces, but the risk of unauthorized diversion may rise when the war eventually winds down. The Biden administration has taken action to prevent the diversion of U.S. arms provided to Ukraine. In October 2022, the State Department released a plan to “[s]afeguard and account for arms and munitions in Ukraine and neighboring countries.” The plan focuses on cross-border smuggling of particular powerful and mobile types of arms. But conducting end-use monitoring for U.S.-origin equipment is difficult amid ongoing armed conflict. As a September 2022 State Department cable stated, “standard verification measures are sometimes impracticable or impossible.” 

Serious legislative attention to end-use monitoring (EUM) would be a productive outcome of conversations about U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. Mandated in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and implemented by the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry Programs, significant gaps in end-use monitoring deserve attention. As a 2021 brief from the Center for Civilians in Conflict, Center for International Policy, and Stimson Center put it, “current EUM programs are designed to protect U.S. technology, not people. The word ‘use’ in end-use monitoring is an unfortunate misnomer.”

Beyond concerns about smuggling weapons outside of Ukraine, U.S. assistance could contribute to human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. Congress has previously prohibited the provision of security assistance to the Azov Battalion, a far-right armed group that is part of Ukraine’s National Guard. While Russian war crimes thus far dwarf Ukrainian violations in both gravity and quantity, some possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by Ukrainian personnel have emerged. Such accounts could trigger the Leahy Laws, which prohibit the provision of assistance to units of armed forces when credible information exists that the unit committed a “gross violation of human rights.” However, given the relative scale of Russian war crimes, significant congressional discussion of gaps in the Leahy Laws as applied in Ukraine seems unlikely, barring a significant change in how the Ukrainian military conducts hostilities.

Ukraine’s difficulties with corruption raise concerns as well, especially since military aid could exacerbate existing problems and undermine the country’s democratic institutions. In light of corruption issues, some analysts recommend the creation of an oversight body on the model of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In June 2022, the former Afghanistan Special Inspector General commented, “It is really shocking that people are not applying what we learned about the mistakes in Afghanistan to Ukraine.” Others prefer relying on existing inspectors general for U.S. government departments and agencies, such as the finally confirmed DoD Inspector General Robert Storch. In both cases, an inspector general would conduct audits and investigations to prevent misuse of U.S. aid. While tasking inspectors general to focus on U.S. arms sales to Ukraine could contribute to greater transparency, it will be important that the U.S. government absorbs their findings and incorporates reforms into policy, law, and practice. 


John Chappell is a Legal Fellow at Center for Civilians in Conflict and a joint J.D. and M.S. in Foreign Service candidate at Georgetown University. He is also a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program. 

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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South Korean Arms Sales Grow in the Years Ahead

1/16/2023

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Hoshik Nam
Last year, Russia and South Korea had largely different experiences in the global arms market, with it being fair to expect that South Korea will take a much larger role in arms exports in the coming years. The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed many flaws of Russian weapons systems. Rusty weapons, poor training and planning inflicted a huge loss of Russian soldiers and even some generals. Moreover, Russian defense industry failed to produce weapons fast enough to catch up the demand generated by its invasion of Ukraine. Late last year, the Russian government is reportedly known to have imported arms from North Korea and is also importing weapons from Iran. Considering the reputation of Russia as the second largest arms exporter for decades, this was a chaotic event that significantly harmed the reputation of the country’s defense industry.

On the other hand, the war contributed to the significant expansion of the South Korean defense industry. Its new arms export sales more than doubled in 2022 (about $17 billion compared to $7.5 billion in 2021) mostly due to a huge deal with Poland ($12 billion). This also diversified destinations of South Korea’s weapons to a major European NATO member. The number of NATO countries that import South Korea’s weapons may increase in the near future. For example, Norway and Estonia have expressed interest in buying weapons from South Korea since the outbreak of Russo-Ukrainian War. What does this mean to South Korean defense industry and its role in the global arms market this year and into the near future?
 
South Korea’s defense industry

The development of South Korean defense sector is largely attributed to the political tension with North Korea. Because both Koreas are technically still at war, the South Korean government has consistently and thoroughly invested in its defense industry since the 1970s.  The government’s strong push to try to produce its own defense weapons has led the country’s defense industry to become not only a producer, but also an exporter of howitzers, battle tanks, warships, and other weapons. In addition, South Korean weapons are compatible with Western NATO weapons, particularly US ones. This is largely due to the country’s close relationship with the US as both countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and engage in an active R&D. This benefits the recipients of South Korean weapons. For example, the arms deal between Poland and South Korea last year gives Poland a chance to replace their old Soviet-era arms into more advanced technology that is compatible with US and other NATO members’ weapons.

In addition, South Korean defense companies can produce and export the weapons in a timely manner with relatively cheap prices and generous technology transfers. These are also crucial factors that have made the South Korean weapons competitive in the global arms market, which has been enhanced with the Russo-Ukraine War as major producers focus on providing weapons to the conflict. For example, even though Poland originally was interested in importing German howitzers, the German government kept postponing exporting them largely due to prioritizing exporting to Ukraine. In addition, South Korean defense industry is more open to transfer technologies, overseas production, and R&D. These factors made South Korean weapons great alternatives for countries that want to replenish their military capabilities with reasonable conditions. After seeing the recent deal with Poland, it is probable that other countries are also interested in importing arms from South Korea. Last year, countries such as Romania expressed their interests to purchase weapons from South Korea, as did Norway and Estonia, as mentioned earlier.
 
Can South Korea replace Russia in the global arms market?

For now, it seems unlikely. While aircraft comprise almost half of Russian arms exports between 2016 and 2020, there are only a few light combat aircrafts that South Korea has successfully exported. In addition, as many South Korean weapons still include components that are produced by foreign manufacturers, exporting the weapons require additional permission from those countries. For example, in 2020 South Korean K9 Thunder howitzers that use German diesel engines were prevented from being exported by a German defense export ban. Considering that the majority of foreign manufacturers that either coproduce or provide components of South Korean weapons are from Western countries, exporting South Korean arms to former clients of Russian arms exports (such as China, or Iran) is likely to be very difficult.

There are, however, signs that South Korea is becoming more favored in the global arms market by some Russian arms importers. For example, after having bought howitzers from South Korea in 2021, Egypt has expressed its interest to buy South Korean aircraft as well. Egypt was the fourth largest arms importer of Russian weapons between 2016-2020. Also, Vietnam, another major importer of Russian arms for decades, recently bought arms from South Korea. 
 
Conclusion

Some experts may suggest that last year’s increase in South Korean defense industry’s exports could be just a short-term change due to the demand caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, South Korean defense industry still has major limitations of being dependent on foreign manufacturers for some internal components of their weapons. However, the growth of the country’s defense industry did not just happen in a day. Instead, the country’s arms industry has made progresses to become more competitive in the global arms market. If recently exported arms are deployed and judged reasonably well-performing this year, the country’s arms industry will become more competitive and credible. If that is the case, South Korean defense industry may export more weapons now and in years to come.
 
Hoshik Nam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Iowa and a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program. 

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Explosive Violence: Projections for 2023

1/11/2023

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Iain Overton
Picture
Chiara Torelli
(download as pdf)

Despite hopeful steps taken in 2022, not least the late Autumn signing by over 80 states of Ireland’s Political Declaration in Dublin on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), analysis of the explosive violence which characterised this turbulent year paints a bleak picture for the year to come.
 
In total, AOAV - which records global incidents of explosive violence from reputable English language media sources - listed 4,324 incidents of explosive weapon use around the globe in 2022, and 31,162 reported casualties. 67% (20,776) of those casualties were civilians.
 
This represents a 73% increase in recorded incidents of explosive weapon use from the 2,500 incidents recorded in 2021, and a corresponding 83% increase from the 11,343 reported civilian casualties in 2021. New conflicts, in particular Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the flare-ups between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, compounded ongoing conflicts and armed struggles in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, amongst others. Many of these armed conflicts have created desperate humanitarian crises which will carry over into 2023.
 
More specifically, air-launched attacks rose by 17% between 2021 and 2022, from 441 to 517 recorded incidents, while ground-launched attacks increased by 187%, from 792 to 2,272 recorded incidents. IED attacks decreased by 13% between 2021 and 2022, from 1,033 recorded incidents to 897.
 
Correspondingly, explosive weapon use attributed to state actors rose by 228% in 2022, from 807 recorded incidents in 2021 to 2,644 over this past year, while incidents attributed to non-state actors remained consistent, decreasing by 3% from 1,370 incidents in 2021 to 1,334 in 2022. It seems likely, then, we will see more state-sponsored violence in the year to come and less so-called ‘terrorism’.
 
The distinction between civilians and armed combatants has continued to grow increasingly blurred. In the Myanmar context, civilians mobilised in response to the coup and the military regime’s oppression of the population, and in Ukraine, civilians are able to provide information to the Ukrainian army via apps on their smartphones. In Somalia, villagers have organised themselves into vigilante groups to resist Al Shabaab. The systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure in support of the war effort has been consistently visible in Myanmar and Ukraine. Rather than enhancing the principle of distinction and keeping civilians removed from armed conflict, the increasing ‘civilianisation’ of armed conflict, including growing reliance on private security companies, promises that civilians and civilian infrastructure will continue to be central in armed conflicts globally.
 
This is reflected in the fact that incidents of explosive weapons used in populated areas increased by 108% between 2021 and 2022, from 1,436 recorded incidents to 2,986, and civilian casualties from such rose by 86% (from 10,518 to 19,599).
 
EWIPA accounted for 69% of incidents recorded in 2022, and caused 94% of civilian casualties. AOAV recorded 668 incidents of non-state actors using explosive weapons in populated areas in 2022, compared to 731 in 2021 - a 9% decrease. On the other hand, incidents of state actors using explosive weapons in populated areas rose by 311% in 2022, from 518 to 2,129 recorded incidents.
 
With ongoing conflicts entering into 2023, the coming year looks set to continue the upward trend in incidents of explosive weapon use. Actors will remain actively embroiled in the complex, intractable conflicts which have come to characterise this decade, and in which state actors and their non-state proxies fight on multiple fronts, often in or near to populated civilian areas.
 
ZONES OF CONFLICT
There are several conflict areas, including both international and non-international armed conflicts, which are likely to continue to experience intensive explosive weapon use over the coming year, severely impacting civilians and civilian livelihoods.
 
Ukraine
AOAV recorded 1,853 incidents of explosive weapon use in Ukraine in 2022, a 1,585% increase compared to the 110 incidents recorded in 2021. Those incidents resulted in 10,381 reported civilian casualties in 2022, or a 36,975% increase from the 28 civilian casualties reported in 2021. This is likely under-reporting as AOAV only collects data from single-reported incidents as reported in reputable media, and cannot include collective assessments.
 
The USA and Europe continue to provide and pledge military and non-military aid to Ukraine, while relations between the USA and Russia have reached an all-time-low after a tense and difficult year. Deep rifts, political intransigeance, misinformation, and mistrust continue to make communication and diplomacy highly challenging. For these reasons, it is likely that Russia will maintain or even increase the intensity of air- and ground-attacks in Ukraine in 2023, continuing to target essential civilian infrastructure.
 
Ground-launched weapons accounted for 81% (1,494) of recorded incidents of explosive violence in Ukraine, and caused 76% (7,481) of reported civilian casualties, while air-launched weapons accounted for 6% (104) of incidents and 15% (1,541) of civilian casualties. Consistent ground shelling is likely to remain a defining feature of the conflict in Ukraine and cause civilian casualties on a daily basis in towns and villages, while more sporadic air-launched attacks continue to result in discrete mass casualty events.
 
Afghanistan
Following the Taliban take-over of Afghanistan in August 2021, the armed group claimed it would clamp down on extremist violence in the country, but 2022 has been a painfully injurious year for civilians. ISIS-K, the IS affiliate in Afghanistan, perpetrated deadly attacks throughout the year, and other groups continued to target both civilian and military infrastructure. Sunni muslims and educational facilities have been particularly targeted by ISIS-K and other groups.
 
While 2022 saw an 80% decrease in incidents of explosive violence in Afghanistan compared to 2021, from 458 recorded incidents to 90, and a corresponding 57% decrease in reported civilian casualties (AOAV recorded 3,051 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2021, and 1,312 in 2022), IEDs continue to be a leading cause of civilian harm in the country. They accounted for 64% (294) of recorded incidents and 77% (2,347) of reported civilian casualties in 2021, and 76% (68) of incidents and 85% (1,119) of civilian casualties in 2022.
 
The Taliban have so far failed to deliver on the promise of bringing stability to the country and adequately protecting minority groups and the right to education. It is consequently likely IEDs will continue to be the predominant cause of civilian harm in Afghanistan in 2023, and Sunni muslims and educational facilities will continue to be at particular risk.
 
Syria
The conflict which has plagued Syria since 2011 shows few signs of coming to a close in the coming year, and the invasion of Ukraine has made an already-complex context even more fraught. The rise of IS after their supposed defeat in 2018, the intensifying tension surrounding the Kurdish community, and the polarisation of relations between the USA, Russia, Israel and Iran, each of whom back armed groups in Syria, all speak to the intensification rather than de-escalation of the conflict. In 2022, AOAV recorded 652 incidents of explosive weapon use in Syria, compared to 709 in 2021, and 1,309 civilian casualties (down from 2,016 in 2021). This downward trend has been observable since 2017, when 1,750 incidents were recorded and 13,062 civilian casualties reported. If this pattern holds, 2023 should see a decrease in the number of recorded incidents and civilian casualties.
 
Ground-launched weapons accounted for 47% (304) of recorded incidents of explosive violence in Syria in 2022, and caused 55% (715) of reported civilian casualties, while IEDs accounted for 23% (148) of incidents and 12% (151) of civilian casualties. Air-launched weapons, which accounted for 19% (129) of recorded incidents, caused 23% (296) of civilian casualties. Given the continuing activity of both state and non-state actors across Syrian territory, both IEDs and manufactured weapons will most likely continue to cause civilian harm, with ground shelling remaining the dominant form of civilian harm in Syria in the coming year.
 
Somalia
In 2022, the Somali government intensified their fight against Al Shabaab, mobilising the broader population and leaning on US air support. Based on data recorded by AOAV in 2022, Al Shabaab and other armed groups responded by intensifying their own attacks on civilian and military infrastructure.
 
AOAV recorded 89 incidents of explosive weapon use in Somalia in 2021, compared to 95 in 2022 - a 7% increase. Correspondingly, the 1,222 reported civilian casualties recorded by AOAV in 2022 represent a 128% increase from the 537 civilian casualties recorded in 2021. At the time of writing, there has been no military breakthrough or suggestion of a diplomatic solution, leading AOAV to understand the situation will continue as is or escalate in the coming year.
 
Of note, incidents of IED attacks in Somalia decreased by 17% between 2021 and 2022, from 66 to 55 recorded incidents, but civilian casualties of IED attacks increased from 425 to 1,091, or by 158%. IED attacks consequently became more targeted and injurious in 2022 compared to 2021. Additionally, incidents of reported mine explosions, which are likely to also include directly-emplaced IEDs, increased by 650% between 2021 and 2022, from two to 15 recorded incidents, and caused 50 civilian casualties in 2022 compared to 14 in 2021. As the military conflict continues and both sides remain resistant to a diplomatic solution, the use of IEDs to target civilians and civilian infrastructure is likely to continue.
 
Myanmar
In 2022, AOAV recorded 551 incidents of explosive weapon use, a 430% increase compared to the 104 incidents recorded in 2021. Similarly, 2022 witnessed 983 civilian casualties, a 178% increase from the 353 civilian casualties reported in 2021.
 
The military coup in February 2021 devolved into a non-international armed conflict affecting the majority of the country. Established Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) intensified attacks against the new military government, and civilian defence forces were formed to resist the junta, some loosely allied under the shadow National Unity Government. The military’s response has been to target villages in air strikes and ground-attacks, resulting in an escalating humanitarian crisis. Armed groups are intensifying their attacks against the military government and suspected collaborators, and demonstrating the ability to learn quickly and adapt their military strategy, while the military government continues to implement the established ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting civilian networks which support the opposition.
 
Ground-launched weapons accounted for 32% (179) of recorded incidents of explosive weapon use in Myanmar in 2022, and 56% (553) of reported civilian casualties. IEDs accounted for 20% (112) of incidents, and 12% (114) of civilian casualties, while air-launched weapons accounted for 9% (52) of incidents and 21% (202) of civilian casualties. Mines accounted for 34% (185) of incidents, and 7% (202) of civilian casualties. Manufactured weapons, especially ground-launched weapons, will likely continue as the dominant form of civilian harm in the year to come as the military government maintains its current strategy and goals.
 
Pakistan
In 2022, AOAV recorded 126 incidents of explosive weapon use in Pakistan, a 26% increase from 100 recorded in 2021. Reported civilian casualties of explosive violence in Pakistan increased by 59% in 2022, from 445 to 706. Developments in Pakistan, where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called off the May ceasefire in November 2022, will likely lead to an increase in incidents of explosive violence, notably IED attacks. This trend was already visible in December, when AOAV recorded 54 civilian casualties of IEDs, the highest number recorded since March 2022.
 
IEDs accounted for 52% (65) of recorded incidents of explosive weapon use in Pakistan in 2022, and caused 74% (521) of reported civilian casualties. Civilian casualties of IEDs in Pakistan rose by 69% in 2022, from 308 civilian casualties of IEDs reported in 2021. Ground-launched weapons accounted for 45% (57) of incidents and 25% (173) of civilian casualties. In particular, grenades thrown by unknown non-state actors represented 38% (48) of incidents and caused 19% (134) of civilian casualties. IEDs will likely continue to cause the majority of civilian harm as a fragile peace crumbles.
 
COVID-19
Analysis of AOAV data across the years impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic shows a marked decrease in recorded incidents and civilian casualties of explosive violence. In 2020, AOAV recorded a 24% decrease in incidents compared to 2019, from 3,816 to 2,909, followed by a further 14% decrease to 2,500 recorded incidents in 2021. Similarly, there was a 43% decrease in reported civilian casualties from 2019 to 2020, from 19,401 to 11,055 followed by a 3% increase to 11,343 civilian casualties in 2021. There are myriad factors which could have influenced the way COVID-19 impacted explosive weapon use globally, from lockdowns and restrictions to cultural attitudes towards illness and the virus.
 
AOAV recorded a 59% decrease in incidents of air-launched weapon use between 2019 and 2020, from 1,305 to 529 incidents, and a further 17% decrease to 441 incidents in 2021. Similarly, incidents of ground-launched weapons decreased by 11% between 2019 and 2020, from 1,067 recorded incidents to 949, and by another 17% to 792 incidents in 2021. Recorded IED attacks dropped by 4% between 2019 and 2020, from 1,230 to 1,176 incidents, and by a further 12% to 1,033 incidents in 2021.
 
However, data collected by AOAV in 2022 shows a general reversal of this trend. As mentioned previously, recorded incidents of explosive weapon use rose by 73% between 2021 and 2022, and reported civilian casualties similarly rose by 83%. Air-launched attacks rose by 17% in 2022, while ground-launched attacks increased by 187%. IED attacks, on the other hand, have continued to decrease, dropping by 13% in 2022. This upward trend is in no small part due to conflicts which escalated or began during and after the COVID-19 lockdowns, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the military coup in Myanmar, but it is also likely that, as restrictions continue to ease, the legal and illegal networks which facilitate explosive violence will gather momentum. As has been noted elsewhere, 2023 might prove to be a bumper year for arms sales.  Civilians be warned.

Iain Overton is Executive Director at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and an expert listed by the Forum. Chiara Torelli is lead explosive violence researcher at AOAV.

​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Looking Ahead: Risk in Biden’s Arms Transfers

12/16/2022

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Jordan Cohen
Jordan Cohen
Despite campaign trail promises, President Biden’s weapons transfer policy to date looks very similar to Trump’s administration. Weapons are being sold to anyone willing to bid and are transferred nearly everywhere around the globe. Unfortunately, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and few signals that the administration cares about the riskiness of its clients, Biden’s risky arms transfers look likely to continue in 2023.
 
The Biden administration entered office promising that they would institute a foreign policy based on human rights. As Biden noted in early 2021, Washington’s diplomacy should be “rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values: defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity.” Beyond that, upon entering office, Biden froze arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While not President Biden himself, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told the press that administration was reviewing Washington’s arms sales policies.
 
For these reasons, there was justifiable optimism. Beyond stopping sales to risky countries, there were opportunities for the administration to release a new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, ratify the Arms Trade Treaty, fixing problems with end-use monitoring, and either transferring control for the export of certain semi-automatic firearms and ammunition back to the State Department or increasing their regulation while being under the lead of the Commerce Department. Unfortunately, none of this is currently happening.
 
Also, initially, it appeared the Biden administration’s weapons sales would be less risky than the Trump administration. As Lauren Woods describes, “notifications for foreign military sales (FMS) from the United States to other governments reached their lowest volume in recent memory in 2021, at just over $36 billion.” But, she continues, “already by the end of June 2022, they had reached nearly $38 billion, more than all of 2021.” While 2021 was a historically quiet year for U.S. arms sales, 2022 has picked up, reaching over $81.67 billion in notifications, which is higher than any year under Trump outside of 2020. Recipients include risky countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, and Ukraine.
 
Ultimately, suggesting that the Biden administration is avoiding risk in his arms sales policy is untrue. Using data from the Cato Institute’s 2021 Arms Sales Risk Index to identify risky destinations, the Biden administration has delivered over $100 million in weapons over the last two years to the following countries:
 
  • Mexico
    • Risk score = 49
    • Corruption = 75
    • State fragility = 60
    • Freedom = 39
    • State violence = 75
    • Conflict = 1
    • $707 million delivered
  • Saudi Arabia
    • Risk score = 72
    • Corruption = 50
    • State fragility = 61
    • Freedom = 93
    • State violence = 75
    • Conflict = 100
    • $1.3 billion delivered
  • Egypt
    • Risk score = 78
    • Corruption = 71
    • State fragility = 77
    • Freedom = 68
    • State violence = 100
    • Conflict = 100
    • $175 million delivered
  • Turkey
    • Risk score = 77
    • Corruption = 61
    • State fragility = 70
    • Freedom = 30
    • State violence = 75
    • Conflict = 50
    • $460 million delivered
  • Pakistan
    • Risk score = 78
    • Corruption = 71
    • State fragility = 82
    • Freedom = 62
    • State violence = 75
    • Conflict = 100
    • $175 million delivered
  • India
    • Risk score = 60
    • Corruption = 61
    • State fragility = 67
    • Freedom = 30
    • State violence = 75
    • Conflict = 50
    • $594 million delivered
  • Colombia
    • Risk score = 64
    • Corruption = 65
    • State fragility = 68
    • Freedom = 35
    • State violence = 51
    • Conflict = 100
    • $128 million delivered
 
 
Recent examples of the cost of this risk include Yemen, Mexico, and Central America’s Northern Triangle. In Yemen, the Saudis continue using U.S. weapons to violate human rights, kill innocent civilians and children, and target civilian infrastructure. Despite a ceasefire that did quell most airstrikes, watchers are asking how long the peace will last since the truce ended.

The story is equally bad for different reasons in Mexico and Central America’s Northern Triangle, the latter of which contains some of the highest crime areas in the world. In Mexico, according to a study by Stop US Arms To Mexico, “nearly 17,000 firearms produced in the United States and recovered in Mexico in 2019-2020, 321 were traced to distributors in the Mexican military or other Mexican state agencies, include 25 to state governments.” Beyond contributing to violence in Mexico, these weapons also fall into the wrong hands when they are dispersed to Central America’s Northern Triangle.

According to a study conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, a total of 27,240 firearms were recovered in Central America’s Northern Triangle. Weapons made in the United States made up 40.1 percent of the total; of these firearms, 39.1 percent were traced to a nonoriginal purchaser and only 43.6 percent were traced to the party who purchased the weapons through American federal firearms sales.

Finally, the number of arms transfers to Ukraine increases the risk of Biden’s arms transfer policies. Concerns about weapons dispersion in Ukraine are well founded. Their reality is being raised by the U.S. State Department, Finland’s media, the President of Nigeria, as well as people fighting and living in Ukraine. The U.S. government is attempting to fight this, but given the sheer amount of weapons and the fact that Ukraine is a war zone, even strict weapons tracking can only go so far.

Thus, there is overwhelming evidence from the first two years of his administration that Biden will not begin making risk a key part of his arms transfer policies in 2023. Rather, it is likely that weapons continue to get delivered to dictators, fragile states, and countries at war. The risks of these weapons being used against innocent civilians, being dispersed, and entangling the U.S. into unnecessary conflicts will continue unabated.

Jordan Cohen is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute and a PhD candidate in political science at George Mason University.

​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Discussions on autonomous weapons systems in 2023: Like it or not, the issue is already out of the CCW

12/15/2022

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Wanda Muñoz Jaime
Wanda Muñoz Jaime
(See full brief in English, Español) Discussions on autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are at a complex juncture: while autonomy in weaponry continues increasing rapidly, the CCW demonstrates its inability to launch negotiations on a legally binding instrument at every single one of its meetings. Heavily militarized countries and some of their allies maintain, once and again, that the CCW is the “only appropriate forum” for addressing this issue. Yet, to anyone who has been following the debates objectively for any length of time, it is quite obvious that it will be impossible for negotiations on a legally binding instrument to be launched there in the foreseeable future.
 
In 2023, we may or may not see the launch of negotiations in another forum, depending, among other factors, on the political will of those countries that have been traditionally committed to disarmament. But what is certain is that discussions are already out of the CCW. More stakeholders are getting involved and raising their voices to reject autonomous weapons, and this trend will only intensify next year. Here are some reasons why:
 
  • Every time the CCW addresses the issue of AWS it demonstrates that it is not fit for purpose.
  • Stakeholders of other international forums are already raising awareness on the concerns raised by AWS.
  • The threats of autonomy in weapons systems are increasingly clear.
  • Stakeholders will keep calling out the lack of coherence demonstrated by States that aim to lead international discussions on the ethics of artificial intelligence while stalling progress towards negotiations on legally binding instruments on autonomous weapons at the CCW.
 
It is also essential to ask whether the CCW is worth our tax-payer money given the lack of results.
 
Read  more in this 6-page brief (English, Español)
 
 
Wanda Muñoz Jaime represents SEHLAC in México and is a member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and the Feminist AI Research Network. She is an expert at the Global Partnership of Artificial Intelligence, nominated by Mexico.

​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
 
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Event Resources and Recommendations: The ATT and the Arms Trade: Trends in Financial and Corporate Responsibility (September 7, 2022)

9/9/2022

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On September 7, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade, Control Arms and PAX co-hosted an event  examining emerging trends in financial and corporate approaches to the arms trade and the ATT related to human rights standards, especially those requiring and promoting human rights due diligence (HRDD). 

​Video of that event is available at https://youtu.be/3RagDZRtkIo?t=233 ​

After the event, panelists provided the following recommendations, slides and resources, building off of their comments during the event:*

Cor Oudes, program lead at PAX  (see slides)
  • Our study shows an interesting route toward improvement of human rights due diligence by arms producers. To a significant extent, their European financial backers do see, acknowledge and act on the risk of arms sales to high risk countries. However, their action is too limited and gives arms producers plenty of room to continue to attract financing while also continuing high risk arms sales. Banks that have policy but limit application in scope, should extend the application of these policies.
  • Banks without policies on the issue of high-risk arms trade should develop and implement these policies as soon as possible. Good policy on high risk arms trade includes the relevant risk criteria, places the responsibility for human rights due diligence with the arms company (and the bank as part of its value chain) and is based on the Arms Trade Treaty and where possible on the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.
  • Implementation by banks should focus on engagement with arms producers to achieve much stronger human rights due diligence on the side of the arms producer when selling arms. Engagement should have clear goals and timelines, and if unsuccessful, banks should terminate their business relations with the arms company.  
  • See our report for more detailed recommendations to arms companies as well as financial institutions.

Lana Baydas, Senior Program Manager, ABA Center for Human Rights
  • As noted in the “Responsible Business Conduct in the Arms Sector” Information note by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the international community should define what “clear risk” for the prohibition of arms transfers constitutes so that it is not left to the subjective interpretation of member states and tailored to political interests and will.
  • States should include a mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence for arms companies in national legislation. Without a strong and meaningful commitment, any due diligence processes will be merely checking the box.
  • States should harmonize their terms with regard to the prohibition of arms transfers. There are different stands as to what point the arms transfers prohibition applies; some at the actual knowledge “knows” while others at the constructive knowledge “should know” of a likelihood of misuse. This variation could result in exploitation by exporters to find lenient jurisdiction.
  • Arms companies should integrate into their human rights due diligence program a component of end-use monitoring, which is perhaps the most important component, to ensure that the defense articles and services are not involved in the commission of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. This could be done by arms exporters requiring that their clients submit periodic and incident reports concerning their usage of the defense articles and services complementing the efforts of the regulatory authorities to monitor the diversion of weapons. Exporters should engage in periodic audits and site inspections. Exporters must track developments by collecting open-source information and consistently engaging with the client and other stakeholders.

Jillianne Lyon,  Program Director, Investor Advocates for Social Justice (see slides)
  • Holistic regulation is needed to prioritize human rights due diligence.
  • Investors have a responsibility to ensure they are not contributing to harm

Recommended Resources (all in one place)
  • "High-risk arms trade and the financial sector," PAX, July 2022.
  • Cor Oudes' slides (PAX)
  • "Defense Industry Human Rights Due Diligence Guidance," American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, August 17, 2022.
  • "Responsible business conduct in the arms sector: Ensuring business practice in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," Information Note by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, August 30, 2022.
  • Shareholders proposals resource page, Investor Advocates for Social Justice (IASJ)
  • Jillianne Lyon's slides (IASJ)
  • See also the resource guides to previous related events co-hosted by the Forum in 2021: "Evolving Financial Approaches to Disarmament and Weapons" (Oct 21) and "Divestment and Transition) (July 21)
​
* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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