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Event Resources and Recommendations: The ATT and the Arms Trade: Trends in Financial and Corporate Responsibility (September 7, 2022)

9/9/2022

On September 7, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade, Control Arms and PAX co-hosted an event examining emerging trends in financial and corporate approaches to the arms trade and the ATT related to human rights standards, especially those requiring and promoting human rights due diligence (HRDD).

Video of that event is available at https://youtu.be/3RagDZRtkIo?t=233

After the event, panelists provided the following recommendations, slides and resources, building off of their comments during the event:*

Cor Oudes, program lead at PAX (see slides)

Our study shows an interesting route toward improvement of human rights due diligence by arms producers. To a significant extent, their European financial backers do see, acknowledge and act on the risk of arms sales to high risk countries. However, their action is too limited and gives arms producers plenty of room to continue to attract financing while also continuing high risk arms sales. Banks that have policy but limit application in scope, should extend the application of these policies.
Banks without policies on the issue of high-risk arms trade should develop and implement these policies as soon as possible. Good policy on high risk arms trade includes the relevant risk criteria, places the responsibility for human rights due diligence with the arms company (and the bank as part of its value chain) and is based on the Arms Trade Treaty and where possible on the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.
Implementation by banks should focus on engagement with arms producers to achieve much stronger human rights due diligence on the side of the arms producer when selling arms. Engagement should have clear goals and timelines, and if unsuccessful, banks should terminate their business relations with the arms company.
See our report for more detailed recommendations to arms companies as well as financial institutions.

Lana Baydas, Senior Program Manager, ABA Center for Human Rights

As noted in the “Responsible Business Conduct in the Arms Sector” Information note by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the international community should define what “clear risk” for the prohibition of arms transfers constitutes so that it is not left to the subjective interpretation of member states and tailored to political interests and will.
States should include a mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence for arms companies in national legislation. Without a strong and meaningful commitment, any due diligence processes will be merely checking the box.
States should harmonize their terms with regard to the prohibition of arms transfers. There are different stands as to what point the arms transfers prohibition applies; some at the actual knowledge “knows” while others at the constructive knowledge “should know” of a likelihood of misuse. This variation could result in exploitation by exporters to find lenient jurisdiction.
Arms companies should integrate into their human rights due diligence program a component of end-use monitoring, which is perhaps the most important component, to ensure that the defense articles and services are not involved in the commission of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. This could be done by arms exporters requiring that their clients submit periodic and incident reports concerning their usage of the defense articles and services complementing the efforts of the regulatory authorities to monitor the diversion of weapons. Exporters should engage in periodic audits and site inspections. Exporters must track developments by collecting open-source information and consistently engaging with the client and other stakeholders.

Jillianne Lyon, Program Director, Investor Advocates for Social Justice (see slides)

Holistic regulation is needed to prioritize human rights due diligence.
Investors have a responsibility to ensure they are not contributing to harm

Recommended Resources (all in one place)

"High-risk arms trade and the financial sector," PAX, July 2022.
Cor Oudes' slides (PAX)
"Defense Industry Human Rights Due Diligence Guidance," American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, August 17, 2022.
"Responsible business conduct in the arms sector: Ensuring business practice in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," Information Note by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, August 30, 2022.
Shareholders proposals resource page, Investor Advocates for Social Justice (IASJ)
Jillianne Lyon's slides (IASJ)
See also the resource guides to previous related events co-hosted by the Forum in 2021: "Evolving Financial Approaches to Disarmament and Weapons" (Oct 21) and "Divestment and Transition) (July 21)

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.

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Event Resources and Recommendations: War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Human Rights: the Middle East (August 30, 2022)

9/2/2022

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On August 30, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Center for International Policy co-hosted an event exploring the global impacts of war in Ukraine, and examining the relationship of countries in the Middle East to that war and ongoing arms trade and human rights developments in the region.

Video of that event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfhnTc_QnH8&t=243s.

After the event, panelists provided the following recommendations and resources, building off of their comments during the event:*

Andrea Prasow, Executive Director, The Freedom Initiative

Enact sanctions for human rights abusers.
Support civil society in countries where possible, out of countries when necessary.
Reset diplomatic relations by turning down high-level, face-to-face meetings with abusers and make public the reason for doing so.
Don’t meet with human rights abusers without also meeting with human rights defenders.

Merve Tahiroğlu, Turkey Program Coordinator, Project on Middle East Democracy

The US should not sell weapons to dictators.
If it makes such sales, such as F-16s to Turkey, they should be made highly conditional. Congress should continue to express concern, as it is doing, which the administration can use to delay, at least until after Turkey's election next summer.
Related, Congress can include provisions and conditions (in the NDAA, for example) not only about conditions with the weapons but also on human rights, such as condition of certain prisoners as occurred earlier on the F-35 program.

Nancy Okail, President and CEO, Center for International Policy
see a more detailed version of the below at this link

Civil society could proactively engage with the emerging agreements and coalitions that are currently being formed in parallel to the JCPOA, to propose parameters for human rights provision for them to include in these new coalitions:
- a) push for the integration of human rights safeguards within current security dialogues,
- b) codify those measures as part of the security agreements, and
- c) propose monitoring mechanisms for human rights provisions, as well as accompanying legislations.

Invest in monitoring the operationalization of the US Department of Defense for a new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and put more pressure to link civilian harm to US military engagement in the Middle East.
Capitalize on the current momentum around security arrangements to scrutinize the implementation of counterterrorism measures and the way punitive laws are often manipulated to prosecute regime critics labeled "terrorists."
Civil society can continue to publicly and vocally oppose the $300 million in US military aid to Egypt.
To effectively help mitigate the effect of compounded crises, aid should be coupled with collaboration over reform and accountability mechanisms to prevent the depletion of these resources through corruption and lack of oversight.

Jeff Abramson, Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association (closing moderator)

Congress should use its 502B authority to ask the State Department for clearer assessments on select arms sales to the region.
Many provisions within the House version of the NDAA would provide greater transparency and for human rights elevation. Congress should take advantage of those when finalizing the NDAA.

Additional resources:

Joint Letter – Biden Administration Should Not Provide Military Aid to Egypt in Light of Egregious Human Rights Violations, August 8, 2022.
$3 billion potential sale of Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia, as well as a $2 billion-plus sale to the UAE of THAAD missiles, August 2022.
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, Department of Defense, August 25, 2022.
“Human Rights, Civilian Harm, and Arms Sales: A Primer on U.S. Law and Policy,“ CIVIC and ABA Center for Human Rights, February 2022.

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Event Recap, Resources and Recommendations -- War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Militarism: South East Europe and the Black Sea Region (August 18, 2022)

8/23/2022

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On August 18, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Platform for Peace and Humanity co-hosted an event examining the actions and dilemmas faced by countries in South East Europe and the Black Sea Region in part due to the war in Ukraine, with panelists:

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group
A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University
Esra Serim, Independent Researcher

Panelists provided the following observations, recommendations and resources, building off of their comments during the event.*

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group

South Caucasus

Recommendations:

In Azerbaijan, major legislation like the National Security Concept (2007) and the Military Doctrine (2010) is outdated and do not include provisions for parliamentary oversight as well as civil society’s oversight and involvement in security sector reform. Azerbaijan’s military doctrine and national security concept must be updated in the near future.
The main goal of Armenia after the 2020 war seems to be the redefinition of its defense concept and security strategy and rebuilding of the army. For this purpose, the country's policy on the purchase of military weapons should be more transparent (like Georgia) and should include short-term and long-term plans. This need for transparent military procurement policy and long-term planning is also valid for Azerbaijan.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine requires a revision of the security strategy in all three countries and makes it necessary for all three countries to carry out security sector reforms more quickly and effectively, taking into account the new realities.

Suggested resources:

Michael Lambert, “The Revival of the Georgian Armaments and Defense Industry,” Russian International Affairs Council, November 8, 2021.
David Darchiashvili, “Georgia: A hostage to arms”, Saferworld, 2004.
“Georgia outlines defence procurement priorities,” Jane’s Defence, July 26, 2021.
“A difference of five times: Military spending of Armenia and Azerbaijan in numbers,” fact investigation platform, May 25, 2022.
Elkhan Mehdiyev, “Security Sector Reform in Azerbaijan: Key Milestones and Lessons Learned,” Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, May 2021.
Lt. Col. Edward J. Erickson, “The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh:Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?” Military Review, August 2021.
Ulkar Natiqqizi, “After war victory, Azerbaijan keeps increasing military spending,” Eurasianet, May 12, 2022.
“Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War’s Shadow”, International Crisis Group, April 2022.
Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian and Taline Papazian, "A WHITE PAPER: The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies," 2021.

A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University

Balkans

Assessment:

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 showed that conventional warfare in Europe was not over. Serbia is the first to take its place in the arms race in the region. Between 2015 and 2021, Serbia’s defence budget jumped by around 70% to close to $1.4bn a year. During that time, its neighbors tried to restore their armed forces.
Russia mentions Bosnia and Kosovo while threatening Ukraine and/or the international community both before and during the invasion in 2022. While this situation causes uncertainty in the Balkans, it also causes concerns about Russia taking the war further to the West, encouraging the parties to engage in arms trading.
While the rhetorical commitment to preventive diplomacy and action may still be high in the international community, in less stable countries in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, organizations have done little to create a functional conflict prevention regime at the country’s regional level. That’s also because the commitment to its implementation at the domestic level is very weak. There’s very limited coordination between Bosnian state and the international community. There are “Putin-backed separatists” in the Bosnian federal institutions. The increase in international troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very limited one. Their number remains symbolic.
Same for Kosovo. Kosovo is urging NATO and the EU to admit Balkan applicants to avoid a second European front with Russia. But the international community and the EU elites are sharing posts about Kosovo’s commitments on the EU integration process.

Recommendations:

Cooperation efforts between the Balkan states should be supported by the international community. This can be achieved through isolated but EU-backed thematic projects such as the Three Sea’s Initiative or the Open Balkans (with Kosovo), although support should be sensitive to political tensions. This may narrow the sphere of influence of external actors that threaten the stability of the region, such as Russia, China and Erdogan's Turkey, which are also arms dealers.
Continued efforts to support journalism and protection of journalists, chiefly through small grants and funding should continue and increase. Thematic journalistic grants relating to tracking and monitoring arms trades in the region should be considered by donors.
NATO and EU military peacekeeping presence in the Balkans should not increase in just numbers, but in quality and effect, working closely with both officials and civil society in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The EU should communicate more clearly its intentions with the Western Balkans.

Suggested resources:

Ishaan Tharoor, "Russia’s war in Ukraine finds echoes in the Balkans," Washington Post, August 1, 2022.
Filip Ejdus, "Policy Brief on the Spectre of an Arms Race in the Western Balkans," Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, March 2020.
Vuk Vuksanovic and Marija Ignjatijevic, ““What’s Behind The Arms Buildup In The Balkans,” War on the Rocks, December 28, 2021.
"EU isolationism leaving dangerous power vacuum in Balkans, warns major new report on the arms trade," review of Tactics Institute for Security and Counter Terrorism report, June 15, 2020.
Stephen Blank, "Can Selling Weapons to Serbia Create Peace in the Balkans?" National Interest, September 26, 2021.
Special investigation series on Balkan Arms Trade by Balkan Insight

Esra Serim, PhD, France-based independent researcher

Turkey

Assessment:

To preserve Erdogan’s rule, the Turkish administration continued to pursue ambiguous and unreliable foreign policy and investing more in the defense sector. It wants to turn the country into a major arms exporter, which is also Erdogan’s personal ambition.
The fact that Turkey turned from democracy and the West and into an authoritarian regime leads to increasing the distrust in the eyes of the West. The West also questions a non-democratic Turkey, which began to set a high record in the military sector.

Recommendations:

The Erdogan regime must stop making militaristic foreign policy and supporting nationalist ideology to ensure his power at home. Turkey should not get involved into any conflict, including in Syria and Libya in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Ankara should stop taking up arms given Greek tensions and the interventions in Syria and Libya.
The Biden administration should temporarily block military export and projects including the F16 fighter jets as long as Ankara is governed by the Erdogan regime and dismantles democratic norms or does not restore democratic rule in Turkey. A NATO member cannot purchase and use both Russian and US military equipment and/or aviation. Turkey ignored US warnings not to purchase Russia’s S-400 missile defense system, which is incompatible with NATO systems.
Given the Russian threat, however, both the United States and the EU need better relations with Turkey despite Erdogan’s political actions. They should work to convince him to restore Turkish democracy and liberalization, and not to intervene in any neighboring country. In addition, the West should not ignore Turkey’s security concerns in NATO. They should also encourage Erdogan to keep shut the passage to the Black Sea for military vessels through the Turkish Straits, which is very crucial to Ukraine and the course of the war.

Suggested resources:

“Drones and Resets: The New Era of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Baku Dialogues, Summer 2022.
“Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment, October 9, 2020.
“Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2022.
“Why the West Should Make Peace with Erdogan Now,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022.
“Turkey’s Foreign Policy Becoming Alarmingly Militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 21, 2020.
“Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy,” APSA MENA Politics, November 10, 2020.

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Disconnect: the United States, the Arms Trade, Humanitarian Disarmament, and the Summit for Democracy

5/17/2022

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by Jeff Abramson

In 2021, the United States hosted the Summit for Democracy, inviting more than 100 countries as well as individuals from civil society and the private sector to engage in a "shared effort to set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest threats faced by democracies today through collective action," with a focus on three themes: "(1) strengthening democracy and defending against authoritarianism; (2) fighting corruption; and (3) promoting respect for human rights."

Aside from some aspects of the corruption track, there appears to have been very little recognition or discussion of the role that weapons actually have on the challenges at the heart of the Summit. We certainly do know that weapons can enable authoritarians, corruption, and human rights abuses. With the war in Ukraine also increasingly being framed as a fight between autocracy (namely Russia) and democracy (Ukraine), having an understanding of where there are disconnects between rhetoric and practice is essential.

A dive into just a couple data sources, using a filter of who was invited to the Summit and who was not, indicates that much of what the United States has done over the past decade appears to run counter to Summit goals - by providing weapons to autocracies. And, U.S. policy is out of step with other democracies, especially when it comes to supporting humanitarian disarmament.

Nearly half of U.S. major weapons have gone to countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy

Over the past decade (2012-2021), 46% of the United States' deliveries of major weapons systems went to countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy - based on SIPRI data of major arms deliveries during that period. (View data.)

Democracies support key humanitarian disarmament treaties that the United States continues to eschew.

Of those invited to the Summit, 89% are states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 75% to the Arms Trade Treaty, and 63% to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (View data.)

Regarding the newer Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which only has 61 states parties, the majority of those states parties (61%) were invited to the Summit. [updated May 20, 2022]

The United States is not a state party to any of these treaties. (The United States did sign the Arms Trade Treaty. The Trump administration took steps to reject that signature. See resource page.)

For more thoughts on these disconnects and the opportunities that the humanitarian disarmament approach provide, please see Responsible Statecraft (March 2022 and July 2020) and Defense News (November 2020).

Special thanks to Hadeel Abu Ktaish who aided in compiling this data in March and April 2022.

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Understanding Firearms Trafficking to Mexico and Central America - resources

4/6/2022

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On March 24, 2022, a number of experts shared resources in a closed meeting on firearms trafficking to Mexico and Central America, building in part off of recent publications by the Government Accountability Office, including Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis and Firearms Trafficking: More Information is Needed to Inform U.S. Efforts in Central America. The information presented brought to the conversation additional data as well as recommendations for possible U.S. Congressional action.

The slides of those briefings are below and named experts can be contacted directly.

John Lindsay-Poland- Us Firearms Exports to Mexico & Central America
Susan Waltz- Firearms Trafficking to Central America: Inspecting the data for Guatemala and considerations for Congressional action
Eugenio Weigend Vargas- Beyond our Borders: U.S. Guns Contribute to Violent Crime Abroad

Inclusion of these resources does not indicate endorsement or agreement with others. The Forum on the Arms Trade does not take positions, but does share resources by its listed experts and others, as part of its goal to provide resources for strengthening public efforts to address the humanitarian, economic and other implications of arms transfers, security assistance, and weapons use.

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Humanitarian Disarmament in 2022: Negotiations, Implementation, and a Fresh Start

2/8/2022

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This is the fifth and final blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

This post was originally published by Disarmament Dialogue.

Bonnie Docherty

While the year 2021 ended on an intense and draining note, with the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), 2022 has begun slowly for humanitarian disarmament. The COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to affect progress in the field, has postponed planned negotiations and milestone meetings.

Nevertheless, barring further pandemic-related interference, the new year promises to advance several key humanitarian disarmament issues. It should produce a new political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, see states parties convene for their first meeting under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and mark a turning point in efforts to address the threats posed by autonomous weapons systems.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

A new international instrument is on the horizon for dealing with the use in populated areas of explosive weapons, such as mortars, artillery shells, rockets, and air-dropped bombs. This method of war causes extensive civilian harm both at the time of attack and long after. That harm is exacerbated when the explosive weapons have wide area effects because they are inaccurate, have a large blast or fragmentation radius, or deliver multiple munitions at once.

Ireland initiated a process in 2019 to develop a political declaration to protect civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Draft versions of the declaration recognized the harm this practice inflicts and included commitments for restricting the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects, providing victim assistance, and collecting data.

While the latest draft should be strengthened, the negotiations for the final version have been at the mercy of COVID-19. The consultations to conclude the document, originally scheduled for late March 2020, were the first major disarmament meeting to fall victim to the global pandemic. After at last being able to reschedule the consultations for February 2022, Ireland was compelled to postpone them once again when the Omicron variant meant that the relevant state and civil society representatives would be unable to attend an in-person meeting in Geneva.
Although a new date has not yet been set, Ireland reportedly aims to hold the negotiations in the first half of 2022. If it succeeds, humanitarian disarmament will have another instrument in its toolbox—a political commitment that addresses one of the most significant humanitarian concerns of contemporary armed conflict.

Nuclear Weapons

In addition to celebrating the “Banniversary” of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first anniversary of its entry into force, on January 22, states and civil society have been busy preparing for the treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The meeting was previously moved from January to March 2022, and Austria, president of the meeting, recently announced it will need to be rescheduled again, most likely until mid-year.

Whenever it takes place, the 1MSP will be a crucial moment in the life of the TPNW. It provides states parties the opportunity to set priorities for the years ahead and to begin the process of turning the treaty’s obligations into actions.

Discussions around the TPNW’s “positive obligations” for victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance will be particularly important for advancing the humanitarian disarmament agenda. These obligations ensure that the treaty provides a comprehensive response to the consequences of nuclear weapons, i.e., addressing the harm from past use and testing as well as preventing future harm. The 1MSP’s declaration and action plan should commit states parties to establishing an implementation framework, approving an intersessional workplan, developing reporting guidelines, and including affected communities at all stages.

A working paper from Kazakhstan and Kiribati, which Austria appointed co-facilitators of the 1MSP’s work on the positive obligations, recommended addressing these and other measures in the 1MSP’s outcome documents. Many states parties and civil society organizations expressed their support in written submissions, and consultations are ongoing.

Other important areas that the 1MSP will deal with include universalization and deadlines and verification procedures for dismantling nuclear arsenals.

Killer Robots

For killer robots, the significance of 2022 is the opportunity it presents for supporters of a new treaty to change direction.

Weapons systems that select and engage targets based on sensor processing rather than human inputs raise a host of moral, legal, accountability, and security concerns. As a result, the majority of states at the CCW’s Sixth Review Conference called for negotiations to create a new legally binding instrument on the topic. Most called for a combination of prohibitions on weapons that lack meaningful human control, prohibitions on autonomous weapons systems that target people, and restrictions on all other autonomous weapons systems to ensure that they are never used without meaningful human control.

The failure of the conference to adopt a negotiation mandate underscored the shortcomings of that forum and the inability of this consensus body to make real progress on a matter of grave and urgent humanitarian concern. After eight years, CCW discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems have more than run their course.

It is time, therefore, for states that support a legally binding instrument on these emerging weapons to pursue negotiations in an alternative forum. They can look for models to the origins of other humanitarian disarmament treaties, notably the independent processes that led to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the UN General Assembly process that led to the TPNW.

Many states said that they could not consider alternative forums until after the Review Conference, but that moment has passed and the CCW has failed to produce results. This year presents a clean slate. It is time for all supporters of a treaty to shift their sights and for champion states to step up and take the lead on a new process.

* * * * *

While the pandemic is likely to play a role in the timing of progress this year, humanitarian disarmament—not a global disease—should determine 2022’s developments.

Participants in the negotiations of the explosive weapons political declaration should ensure the final draft maximizes civilian protection. States, international organizations, civil society groups, and survivors should work together to produce strong 1MSP outcome documents that help the treaty live up to its humanitarian potential in practice. Finally, proponents of a new legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems should start fresh and focus on what process can best lead them to the strongest humanitarian outcome.

Bonnie Docherty is a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, where she is Associate Director of Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection in the International Human Rights Clinic, and senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch.

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Paths for building cyber peace in 2022

1/18/2022

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Allison Pytlak

Malicious cyber operations are already making headlines just weeks into the new year. Last week Ukraine was hit by an operation that defaced the websites of some governmental departments; two days later “highly destructive” malware was discovered on several private and governmental networks. Earlier in January, authorities blocked internet access in Kazakhstan following days of protest and an earlier crack down on social media platforms. Meanwhile, many companies, governments, and organizations are still dealing with the extensive fallout of the Log4j vulnerability which surfaced in December 2021.

What used to feel like science fiction is fast becoming a daily reality in our ever more wired lives. The scale and frequency of malicious cyber operations has intensified during the Covid-19 pandemic in line with a greater dependency on digital networks, even as digital divides persist. For instance, malware and ransomware attacks reportedly increased by 358% and 435% respectively in 2020. Software supply chain attacks rose by 650% last year while physical supply chains attacks have contributed to economic distortion. Disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda campaigns are increasingly affecting domestic political processes and Covid-19 pandemic response. A series of revelations about Pegasus spyware has demonstrated the extent to which authorities spy on individuals and organizations, and it is estimated that more than 486 million people were affected by internet shutdowns in 2021, an increase of 80% from the preceding year.

What this points to is not only that the misuse of information and communications technologies (ICTs) has become more frequent but also that ICTs are increasingly integrated into other methods of disruption, war fighting, and repression. While “cyber” was once viewed as a standalone domain, the use of cyber-related tactics or the targeting of ICTs directly has instead become a component of broader operations that pursue strategic goals. As just one example, the operation targeting Ukraine follows on from a history of Russia-linked cyber operations against the country—including one that knocked down Ukraine’s power grid in 2015—and has occurred in a context of current heavy military build-up and political tension.

For many perpetrators, cyber operations are attractive because they cause disruption and have impact but do not risk the potential blowback of a physical attack. They can also provide anonymity and/or ambiguity, when that is desired by those responsible. A growing number of governments publicly acknowledge that they possess or are developing offensive cyber capabilities—many of whom maintain that it is within their sovereign rights to do so, provided that such capabilities are used responsibly. This is a narrative not unfamiliar to those in arms control and non-proliferation. While there is some debate among experts about if such a neat line can be drawn between offensive and defensive operations, there is little doubt that a “militarization” of technology appears to be well underway.

While less visible than a bomb blast, cyber operations have human costs and can escalate political tension. When medical facilities are forced offline—something that is occurring with growing frequency—it means that people awaiting surgery or receiving other forms of care take are affected. When a government turns off its internet, diverse human rights and fundamental freedoms are negatively affected. Power outages can have knock-on effects for other critical infrastructure upon which scores of people depend. There are also differentiated impacts of cyber operations in relation to gender, age, race, and ability, which is only starting to be documented and discussed.

Despite being sometimes portrayed as a lawless “wild west”, state action in cyberspace ought to be constrained by and undertaken within the boundaries of existing international law, as well as a set of eleven voluntary norms that have been developed through processes at the United Nations (UN). Through these processes, all UN member states have affirmed the applicability of international law to cyberspace. Most also maintain that existing law and the UN normative framework is sufficient for addressing cyber-related threats and harms and guiding state behaviour.

Except that it isn’t sufficient, as the examples cited in this blog demonstrate— or at least, it isn’t always being adhered to. Agreement on the overall applicability of international law is positive, but it is also a blanket statement that does not account for some of the unique complications posed by cyber operations and ICT misuse, for instance in relation to the interpretation of certain legal principles (sovereignty, territoriality, due diligence, and self-defence). Additionally, some states maintain that the UN Charter applies in its entirety while others disagree. There are complications in relation to attribution and legal accountability. A few countries still do not accept the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber space and some don’t see the relevance of international human rights law when discussing cyber in an “international peace and security” context.

In looking ahead to 2022, it is imperative that the international community take meaningful action to foster cyber peace by curtailing malicious cyber operations and challenging cyber-related militarism. Just as we are seeing in other areas where technology and military interests intersect, such as autonomous weapons, new and more specific law may well be required. Currently most countries feel that this is too political challenging, partially because the shadow of proposed cyber treaties past—and present—looms large (Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan first proposed a draft cyber treaty in 2013, and some of these countries are now leading a controversial initiative to negotiate a UN instrument on cybercrime).

Given this context, focus must be placed for now on accountability and implementation of existing law and norms, as well as public exchange and sharing of how states interpret their legal responsibilities with respect to international cyber peace and security. This must go hand in hand with efforts to build resilience, capacity, and trust.

Several multilateral forums offer space to do just this. Within the UN system, the UNGA’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security has just launched its second open-ended working group (OEWG) on ICTs which will build on the outcomes of the first one as well as those of the six UN expert groups that have been convened over the last nearly two decades. Most states and the OEWG Chair are in agreement that they do not want this forum to be just another “talk shop”. There are a few proposals on the table for accountability mechanisms, but it remains to be seen if the political will exists to develop them further. More than 50 states have also endorsed a proposal to develop a cyber programme of action, inspired partially by the programme of action on small arms and light weapons, which may gain traction in 2022. Within these forums, civil society and some states are also calling increasingly for human-centric approaches to international cyber security, a concept akin to that of humanitarian disarmament.

For us in the arms control and disarmament community, we can do more to call attention to the cyber-related risks of existing weapon systems, recognizing that those risks are powerful incentives to disarm and demilitarize. We can also do more to address the growing role of digital networks in facilitating the illicit trafficking of weapons, the potential role of existing arms control agreements to stop the spread of harmful digital technologies, and the pivot towards cyber products being undertaken by some traditional weapons producers. We can pull from our long and collective experience in challenging militarized narratives of “security” to push back against the willful misuse of ICTs, prevent cyber harm, and build cyber peace.

Allison Pytlak is a Program Manager in the disarmament program of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

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Looking Ahead: Civilians Must Be Protected from Bombing and Shelling in Towns and Cities

1/13/2022

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

Brian Castner

In mid-2021, as the Taliban ramped up their offensive against government forces across Afghanistan, the fighting grew especially fierce in Zakhail, just west of the city of Kunduz. The Taliban used motorbikes to seize civilian areas and took cover in homes and schools, while the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) launched mortars from police checkpoints into the densely populated neighborhood.

As Amnesty International documented in a new report on the conflict in Afghanistan, on the evening of June 23rd a family huddled in their home in Zakhail, trying to take cover from the fighting, when they heard a series of explosions. One by one the detonations got closer, until the fourth round struck the central courtyard of the house.
Heavy metal fragments from a mortar tore through the family members. One 30-year-old woman, Bibi Shahnaz, and her 12-year-old son Faisal were killed immediately. Another child, a 16-yearold boy, lost both legs at the knee. A man and a third child were also badly hurt. An Amnesty International researcher examined the wounds of the injured man, and after removing a leg bandage bone was still visible in the deepest wounds.

These civilians were killed and injured because they were trapped in their home, unable to flee the fighting, and caught between the explosive weapons of the Taliban and the ANDSF. “The people who can afford to leave do but the poor people stay because they will starve if they leave,” one witness said.

In this case, the family was hit when the ANDSF unit “walked” their mortars to a Taliban position, a process in which the crew makes targeting adjustments through observation and correction with each round launched to gradually direct the ordnance to the target through repeated firings. But doing so in an area with civilians is extremely reckless, and such negligence in failing to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects can constitute a war crime. But even in lawful attacks against a military objective, when fighting occurs in populated areas military forces ought to exercise extreme caution over the choice of weapons.

Attacks such as the one in Zakhail are an example of the risks that civilians face from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas – a pattern of harm which has been widely documented and results in the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of civilians each year. Amnesty International has reported other cases in point including use of inaccurate explosive weapons in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syrian and Russian air and ground launched strikes in northern Syria, Saudi Arabia and UAE-led Coalition air strikes in Yemen, and US-led Coalition air and artillery strikes in Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq, to name just a few recent examples.

Over the past several years the ICRC and UN have raised the alarm over civilian devastation and suffering from bombing and shelling in towns, cities, and other populated areas. The current and former UN Secretary-Generals have called on Member States to engage constructively in a process to develop an international political declaration that aims to address the harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, described as “widespread’” and “largely foreseeable.”

In response to this growing concern, the government of Ireland has led talks with states and organisations to agree to new international standards in the form of a political declaration that will be finalised and adopted by states over the coming months.

The aim of this political instrument is to set new international standards that would strengthen the protection of civilians by promoting good practice and stigmatizing harmful behaviour through the declaration’s commitments.

Whilst not legally binding, a political declaration can reinforce important principles of international humanitarian law and help reaffirm application of the law, and build upon these by providing clearer guidance.

The declaration would see curbs placed on use of explosive weapons in populated areas, with a specific commitment to prevent use in populated areas when explosive weapons have “wide area effects.” Meaning, when the effects of the weapon are likely to extend beyond a particular military objective. This may be due to the large blast and fragmentation radii of the weapon, the use of inaccurate weapons systems that may strike at a distance from the intended target, the use of a weapon system that delivers multiple munitions across an area, or a combination of these factors. The Zakhail example is a case in point, where mortars, which are highly inaccurate, can require multiple rounds to “dial in” on a target. These extra rounds can fall on areas populated by civilians and cause significant harm, as they did in this case. Beyond restrictions on use and other measures aimed at shaping military policy and practice, the declaration text will also contain other important commitments to assist individuals and communities affected and to address the long-lasting humanitarian impact when infrastructure is destroyed. And it will call on states to gather data on the impact on civilians – including direct and reverberating effects – that can help to provide responses that will reduce harm and respond effectively to the needs of all.

The declaration presents a unique opportunity to set stronger normative expectations, coupled with practical operational guidance which can offer new prospects that reduce harm experienced by civilians in conflict. It is urgently needed.

Laura Boillot is Programme Manager for Article 36 and Coordinator for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).

Brian Castner is a Senior Crisis Advisor with Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Programme, specializing in weapons and military operations.

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U.S. Arms Sales Restraint in 2022?

1/6/2022

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Looking at what is often the most common metric of arms sales intention and volume -- notifications of potential government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) -- the Biden administration at first blush appears to be exercising restraint in the arms trade. FMS notifications made to Congress in calendar year 2021 totaled just over $36 billion, the lowest annual amount since 2011 and second lowest since FMS grew sharply in 2006.

(See dedicated spreadsheet on 2021 FMS notifications here (see all 3 tabs), which was created using the spreadsheet linked to the Forum's resource page.)

While the 2021 total is the lowest in a decade, there are still many problematic sales on last year's list. Top of mind is the one that raised the most attention -- the $650 million November notification of 280 air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. The administration argued that those weapons could not be used for "offensive" purposes and therefore were in line with its human rights goals, especially as related to avoiding harm to civilians in Yemen. Nonetheless, a majority of the President's party voted (unsuccessfully) to block the sale in the Senate last month, with many arguing that providing weapons to oppressive regimes serves to legitimize them, regardless of whether you consider weapons offensive or defensive.

Those arguments can and should also be applied to others on last year's list, perhaps most noticeably the Philippines, where the administration told Congress it wanted to sell F-16s, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles valued at more than $2.5 billion to the oppressive Duterte regime. Scrutiny is also rising on countries that have in the past been less controversial, such as Israel and India, for which there were FMS notifications as well as human rights concerns.

It's Not Just Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS itself also does not tell the full arms sales picture, which appears to be increasingly comprised of company-initiated Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that are much less transparent to the public. The May scandal of JDAMs on offer to Israel during a flare up of conflict in which civilian areas were bombed was via the DCS program. Part of the controversy was that a Congressional leak was needed to raise awareness of the potential deal, in part because DCS notifications are not shared on a convenient website, whereas FMS notifications are.

The State Department arms sales factsheet from January 2021 indicates both the scale and relative lack of information we have on the DCS program. It details that in fiscal year 2020 more than $124 billion in DCS licenses were authorized, but only $38.5 billion of which were notified to Congress. (In the latest factsheet, released last month, the Biden administration provides even less clarity, removing details about how much of the $103.4 billion fiscal year 2021 DCS approvals were notified to Congress.)

There is also a billion dollar request for Israel's Iron Dome program supported by the administration, assistance to Egypt that the Biden administration did not fully withhold, and $20+ billion F-35 and drones sales to the UAE that raise the question of how much restraint this administration will support.

New Policy Anticipated

As soon as this month, we expect the Biden administration to unveil a new conventional arms transfer policy that was previewed in part in November. At that time, Tim Betts, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, said the policy will "seek to elevate human rights, stress the principles of restraint and responsible use." That is certainly welcome. In all likelihood, however, the new policy will follow earlier ones in that the list of reasons to engage in weapons transfers will not be weighted. Those looking to argue for commercial interests will find language they want, and no indication that human rights have a higher priority. How the administration actually implements the policy will likely be more telling than the words in it.

An initial follow-on step should be for the Biden administration to recommit to the U.S. signature to the Arms Trade Treaty. President Trump’s repudiation of the one global treaty that establishes baselines for responsible trade of broad categories of conventional weapons, and which is already consistent with U.S. law, is a stain on U.S. international credibility and inconsistent with shared goals.

More to Watch

Getting this right is not easy, of course. But if the United States, the world’s largest weapons provider by far, actually wants to show arms transfer restraint, it needs a consistent approach to existing or future conflicts that moves away from adding more weapons to volatile situations. It must find ways to engage the Middle East and elsewhere through commercial ties, cultural and academic connections, and other approaches. And in many cases, especially in pulling back, it will need to increase and enable humanitarian assistance to those places impacted by war. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, while a positive for those supportive of a less militarized approach, has not been followed by a humanitarian response sufficient for the suffering country.

Nor has aid that would help those in Yemen been able to reach them, in part because the United States has not truly used its full power to demand that the blockade on the country be immediately ended. In Yemen, the Houthi are no saints. They have committed horrible abuses. U.S. leverage and complicity, however, is tied much more closely to Saudi Arabia, for which the U.S. continues vital aircraft maintenance support, and to the UAE, which despite claims of exiting the war is still engaged via proxy groups and control of the Socotra island.

Even more than relations with Saudi Arabia, that with the Emiratis may be most telling on potential U.S. arms restraint in the coming months and years. In December, the UAE threatened to walk away from the massive F-35 deal. The administration has consistently said it wants to make the deal work, but has insisted on publicly unspecified end-use and other conditions. In my close reading of the comments by State Department and Defense Department officials last month, it’s unclear that human rights and civilian protection concerns are being raised at all with the Emiratis. That must change.

Finally, Congress may also play a role. A wide array of legislation has been introduced that would impact on arms trade restraint should it be adopted. A short, but incomplete, list includes the progressive Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act introduced by Rep. Ilhan Omar; the SAFEGUARD Act, led by the influential chairs of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees; and the bipartisan National Security Reforms and Accountability Act/National Security Powers Act that would “flip the script” and require Congressional approval on many arms sales -- similar to an approach once introduced by then-Senator Joe Biden in the 1986.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade

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Tackling militarism’s contribution to the climate emergency

1/5/2022

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Doug Weir

The past year saw the dial finally shift on reducing the carbon bootprint of the military. Since the topic was excluded from international climate processes by the United States back in the late 1990s, it has received scant attention. Efforts to track and estimate the emissions that $2 trillion of annual global military spending creates had largely been the preserve of a few academic researchers and peace organisations. That changed in 2021.

Many highly industrialised countries have been moving towards declaring goals to reach Net Zero emissions by 2050 for a while. For some of them, the fact that militaries are the largest emitters within government – often responsible for more than 50% of emissions - has made them increasingly difficult to ignore, particularly where whole of government targets have been enshrined in law. It should be noted that Net Zero is not a panacea and will likely come too late but the concept has been widely accepted by governments as a safely distant and impressive sounding target.

But this is also a story of individuals. We saw multiple voices within national militaries, and NATO, advocating for change. These are people who could see that the wind is changing, and who could also see that the future of military energy consumption was not going to be one wholly based on fossil fuels. Moreover, Western governments have been orienting towards the security risks of climate change, with actors like NATO keen to play a leading role. However, legitimacy in this space requires that those who seek to lead it aren’t contributing to the problem.

More broadly, militaries reflect the societies that provide them licence to operate. There is a rising tide of concern over climate change and therefore pressure on militaries to be seen to be acting on it, and not just in response to it. And if the policy changes that we saw in 2021 have appeared to be rapid, this should be seen as a reflection of just how far behind the curve militaries have been in this space. They and their political masters had opted to exclude themselves from international efforts to reduce emissions.

The past 12 months have seen a flurry of announcements. In May, NATO members gave the first vague commitments that they would cut military emissions. The UK and Switzerland had already acknowledged that military emissions cuts would be part of their 2050 Net Zero goals. NATO also announced that it would work on an emissions tracking methodology for its members – a good example of how far behind other sectors the military are on cuts. Almost unnoticed during the Glasgow climate summit in November, the U.S. Department of Defense quietly announced that it too would aim to be Net Zero by 2050. NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg had attended its first COP to confirm that global emissions targets would not be met without military emissions being included.

The acknowledgement by states that their militaries are major emitters, and that they cannot be exempt from society-wide decarbonisation feels like a watershed moment. But it is just the first step in what will be a very long and difficult road. Militaries, and the technology companies that support them, are highly polluting industries. Just like cement, steel or aviation, tackling emissions will be a huge challenge. It also carries with it risks. These include military-grade greenwashing when targets can’t be met, increasing military spending to rearm with less polluting vehicles, the temptation to offset difficult emissions instead of reducing them at source, or transitions to costly new synthetic fuels, diverting resources away from other more important reduction pathways.

Looking ahead

In 2022, the trends initiated in 2021 will intensify and accelerate. We will see more industrialised countries accept the need for military decarbonisation. Luxembourg’s Green Party defence minister set out his its plans in December, South Korea did likewise, following a pledge made at COP26 in Glasgow. But beyond the headline pledges, the hard work needs to begin to establish expectations and standards on militaries. The historic environmental exceptionalism that kept them out of climate talks, and global environmental norm-setting bodies more generally, will continue. Scrutiny will be needed over how they record and what they report. Transparent data is at the core of any action to reduce emissions, which is why we launched the data portal militaryemissions.org with colleagues from Lancaster and Durham universities at COP26. What we can’t see, they won’t cut, so making emissions reporting open and standardised is a critical first step.

The UK will pass on its COP presidency to Egypt in November 2022. We do not expect them to be overly sympathetic to calls for military emissions to be placed on the formal agenda of COP27. But it is vital that they are. While the U.S.’s massive military expenditure and relative transparency has meant that much of the discourse has focused on the Department of Defense’s gargantuan annual emissions – equivalent to those of Portugal, or Sweden – this is a global problem, and it needs global standards. As we show on militaryemissions.org there are many large military spenders who report very little emissions data, this includes China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Israel. We hope and expect that 2022 will see increasing attention on their emissions.

Beyond military emissions themselves, we expect to see a steady uptick in attention on the linkages between conventional arms and climate change. We have already documented how the arms industry reports its environmental footprint – more transparently than most militaries, as it turns out – and colleagues at UNIDIR have posed several research questions in this space. But we need to get ahead of this issue. The pledges made in Glasgow are far short of what is needed to slow global heating. The climate crisis will have a massive impact on human security globally and it’s critical that we understand how arms transfers and militarism will be influenced by it, and how they will drive and exacerbate insecurity. We would encourage everyone working in this space to spend a little of 2022 exploring how the issues they work on will be impacted by a hotter, more insecure world, and how they may make that world a more dangerous place.

Doug Weir is the Research and Policy Director of the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), www.ceobs.org @detoxconflict Find our more about military emissions on CEOBS’ dedicated page www.ceobs.org/projects/military-emissions and explore the military emissions that your government reports to the UN at militaryemissions.org

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Event Resources and Recommendations: The ATT and the Arms Trade: Trends in Financial and Corporate Responsibility (September 7, 2022)

Event Resources and Recommendations: War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Human Rights: the Middle East (August 30, 2022)

Event Recap, Resources and Recommendations -- War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Militarism: South East Europe and the Black Sea Region (August 18, 2022)

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Looking Ahead: Civilians Must Be Protected from Bombing and Shelling in Towns and Cities

U.S. Arms Sales Restraint in 2022?

Tackling militarism’s contribution to the climate emergency

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