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Final Report — Webinar "Arms Control and Human Rights: Connecting Agendas" (April 22, 2025)

5/2/2025

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Introduction

On April 22, 2025, the webinar "Arms Control and Human Rights: Connecting Agendas" was held, organized by Control Arms in collaboration with the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asociación para las Políticas Públicas (Association for Public Policies).

The seminar examined the link between the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and efforts to address serious human rights violations, exploring examples such as:
  • The 2023 advisory opinion led by Mexico,
  • The impact of arms transfers on the Haitian crisis,
  • The role of transparency in strengthening human rights.

Participants
  • María Pía Devoto, Director, Asociación para las Políticas Públicas
  • Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico
  • Kim Lamberty, Executive Director, Quixote Center
  • Sol Zoe Nottage, Associate Researcher, ATT Monitor
Recording Guide (with timestamps)

00:04:09 – General commentary by María Pía Devoto on the relationship between Human Rights and arms transfers
  • Differences between arms trafficking, smuggling, and diversion.
  • Regional context: high firearm-related homicide rates.
  • Prevalence of legally owned firearms diverted to criminal activities.
  • Explanation of Article 11 of the ATT.
  • Setbacks in human rights in Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Haiti.

Question 1: Overview of risks, challenges, and issues regarding arms transfers in the cases of Mexico and Haiti

00:12:29 – Presentation by Kim Lamberty (Haiti):
  • Description of the severe crisis in Haiti, marked by armed gangs controlling territories.
  • Customs and state corruption facilitating arms entry.
  • Humanitarian impact: internal displacement, child recruitment, widespread sexual violence.

00:20:21 – Presentation by Pablo Arrocha (Mexico):
  • Lack of effective regulation at the U.S. border.
  • Impact of arms trafficking on organized crime violence.
  • Need to strengthen bilateral cooperation mechanisms and legal strategies.

Question 2: What are the solutions to mitigate illicit arms transfers?

00:33:29 – Kim Lamberty:
  • Pressuring governments to enhance border controls.
  • Expanding the volume of firearms traced.
  • Improving inter-agency collaboration within the United States.

00:39:38 – Pablo Arrocha:
  • Explanation of Mexico’s strategy based on strategic litigation in U.S. courts.
  • Description of parallel actions before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to reinforce a human rights approach.
  • Analyzing the full life cycle of a firearm to understand how they reach Mexico.

00:51:19 – Comment by María Pía Devoto:
  • Emphasis on the importance of transparency in arms transfers as a preventive mechanism.
  • Transparency as a means to prevent and mitigate human rights violations.

00:52:39 – Presentation by Sol Zoe Nottage:
  • Presentation on the importance of transparency within the ATT framework.
  • Analysis of States' reporting levels and their relationship to accountability in human rights.

Q&A SessionQuestion 1: How can civil society effectively address threats linked to irresponsible arms transfers? (01:00:38)
  • Response by Pablo Arrocha (01:02:56)
  • Response by Kim Lamberty (01:06:04)

Question 2: Which entities use corruption to illicitly traffic arms into Haiti? (01:07:28)
  • Response by Kim Lamberty (01:10:03)

Question 3: What could the ATT do to address internal diversion of arms? What would be the next step if Mexico's litigation strategy is successful? (01:11:00)
  • Response by Pablo Arrocha (01:13:00)

Question 4: What has changed in Haiti over the past 20 years and what was missing to prevent the current situation? (01:18:10)
  • Response by Kim Lamberty (01:20:32)

Question 5: Are lawsuits enough to change the narrative around arms in the U.S.? (01:22:23)
  • Response by Pablo Arrocha (01:24:33)

Final Reflections
01:31:00 – Sol Zoe Nottage:
  • Stressed the need for States to be transparent and highlighted the advantages of transparency for human rights protection.

01:32:27 – Pablo Arrocha:
  • Stated that the ATT must be revitalized as an ongoing process and not just seen as a past achievement.
  • Called for strengthening multilateralism in arms control.

01:36:42 – Kim Lamberty:
  • Emphasized the importance of amplifying the visibility of illegal arms trafficking and its humanitarian consequences, especially in crises like Haiti.


Presentations

Presentation used by Sol Zoe Nottage:
Implementing the ATT in the Americas: Transparency as a Means to Prevent and Mitigate Human Rights Violations.

https://www.canva.com/design/DAGkuwYqjio/GMByCdhkcroJTduBET9VrQ/edit?utm_content=DAGkuwYqjio&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link2&utm_source=sharebutton

Additional Resources

ATT Monitor. (2024). Chapter 2.1: Annual Report Analysis. Control Arms. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_2024_Chapter-2.1.pdf

Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, & Partners in Health. (2024, March). CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEXVaCX5Lf8

Human Rights Watch. (2024, November 25). Haiti: Scarce protection as sexual violence escalates. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/25/haiti-scarce-protection-sexual-violence-escalates

Quixote Center. (2024). Petition to DHS to end weapons trafficking. https://quixote.org/action#/18

ATT Monitor. (2024). ATT Arms Transfers Dashboard. https://attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard/
​
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Reporte Final — Webinar "Control de armas y derechos humanos: Conectando agendas" (22 de abril de 2025)

5/1/2025

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Introducción

El 22 de abril de 2025 se llevó a cabo el webinar "Control de armas y derechos humanos: Conectando agendas", organizado por Control Arms en colaboración con Forum on the Arms Trade y la Asociación para las Políticas Públicas. El seminario examinó el vínculo entre el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (TCA) y los esfuerzos para abordar graves violaciones de derechos humanos, explorando ejemplos como:
  • La opinión consultiva de 2023 impulsada por México,
  • El impacto de las transferencias de armas en la crisis haitiana,
  • Y el rol de la transparencia en el fortalecimiento de derechos humanos.

​Participantes
  • María Pía Devoto, Directora, Asociación para las Políticas Públicas
  • Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, Asesor Jurídico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de México
  • Kim Lamberty, Directora Ejecutiva, Quixote Center
  • Sol Zoe Nottage, Investigadora Asociada, ATT Monitor
Guía de la grabación (con marcas de tiempo)

00:03:30 – Comentario general sobre la relación entre Derechos Humanos y transferencias de armas a cargo de María Pía Devoto
  • Diferencias entre tráfico, contrabando y desvío de armas.
  • Contexto regional: gran cantidad de homicidios per cápita por causa de las armas de fuego.
  • Predominio de armas legales desviadas hacia actividades criminales.
  • Explicación del Artículo 11 del TCA
  • Retrocesos en derechos humanos en Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela y Haití.

Pregunta 1: Visión de riesgos, desafíos y problemas en relación a las transferencias de armas en los casos de México y Haití

00:12:10 – Exposición Kim Lamberty (Haití):
  • Descripción de la grave crisis en Haití, marcada por el control de territorios por parte de bandas armadas.
  • Corrupción aduanera y estatal que facilita la entrada de armas.
  • Impacto humanitario: desplazamiento interno, reclutamiento infantil, violencia sexual generalizada.

00:20:34 – Exposición Pablo Arrocha (México):  
  • Falta de regulación efectiva en la frontera estadounidense.
  • Impacto del tráfico de armas en la violencia del crimen organizado.
  • Necesidad de fortalecer mecanismos de cooperación bilateral y estrategias jurídicas.

Pregunta 2: ¿Cuáles son las soluciones para mitigar las transferencias ilícitas de armas?

00:33:30 – Kim Lamberty:
  • Presionar a los gobiernos para aumentar los controles en fronteras
  • Ampliar el volumen de armas analizadas para su trazabilidad
  • Mejorar la colaboración entre distintas agencias gubernamentales en Estados Unidos. 

00:39:36 – Pablo Arrocha:
  • Explica la estrategia de México basada en el litigio estratégico en cortes estadounidenses.
  • Describe acciones paralelas ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos para reforzar el enfoque en derechos humanos.
  • Analizar el ciclo completo del arma para observar cómo llegan a México.

00:50:46 – Comentario María Pía Devoto:
  • Subraya la importancia de la transparencia en las transferencias de armas como mecanismo de prevención.

Transparencia como medio para prevenir y mitigar las violaciones de los derechos humanos

00:52:35 – Exposición Sol Zoe Nottage:
  • Presentación sobre la importancia de la transparencia en el marco del TCA.
  • Análisis de los niveles de reporte de los Estados y su relación con la rendición de cuentas en materia de derechos humanos.

Sesión de preguntas y respuestas (Q&A)

Pregunta 1: ¿Cómo puede la sociedad civil abordar eficazmente las amenazas vinculadas a transferencias irresponsables de armas? (01:00:48)
  • Respuesta Pablo Arrocha (01:02:50)
  • Respuesta Kim Lamberty (01:06:02)

Pregunta 2: ¿Cuáles son las entidades que utilizan la corrupción para traficar ilícitamente armas en Haití? (01:09:39)   
  • Respuesta Kim Lamberty (01:10:04)

Pregunta 3: ¿Qué se podría hacer desde el TCA para abordar el desvío interno de armas? ¿Y cuál sería el siguiente paso si la estrategia de litigios de México es exitosa? (01:12:15)
  • Respuesta Pablo Arrocha (01:13:10)

Pregunta 4: ¿Qué cambió en los últimos 20 años en Haití y qué faltó para evitar la situación actual? (01:19:25)
  • Respuesta Kim Lamberty (01:20:32)

Pregunta 5: ¿Son suficientes los litigios para cambiar la narrativa sobre armas en EE.UU.? (01:24:07)
  • Respuesta Pablo Arrocha (01:24:48)

Reflexiones finales
  • 01:31:00 – Sol Zoe Nottage:
    Subrayó la necesidad de que los Estados sean transparentes y las ventajas de la transparencia para el ejercicio de los derechos humanos.
  • 01:32:08 – Pablo Arrocha:
    Señaló que el TCA debe ser revitalizado como un proceso permanente y no solo un logro pasado.  Llamó a fortalecer el multilateralismo en el control de armas.
  • 01:35:55 – Kim Lamberty:
    Recordó la importancia de amplificar la visibilidad del tráfico de armas ilegales y sus consecuencias humanitarias, especialmente en crisis como la de Haití.

Presentaciones 

Presentación usada por Sol Zoe Nottage: Implementando el TCA en las Américas: transparencia como medio para prevenir y mitigar las violaciones de los derechos humanos.
https://www.canva.com/design/DAGkuwYqjio/GMByCdhkcroJTduBET9VrQ/edit?utm_content=DAGkuwYqjio&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link2&utm_source=sharebutton


Recursos complementarios

ATT Monitor. (2024). Chapter 2.1: Annual Report Analysis. Control Arms. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_2024_Chapter-2.1.pdf

Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, & Partners in Health. (2024, March). CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the rights of Haitian women & girls: Haiti’s transition & beyond [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEXVaCX5Lf8

Human Rights Watch. (2024, November 25). Haiti: Scarce protection as sexual violence escalates. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/25/haiti-scarce-protection-sexual-violence-escalates

Quixote Center. (2024). Petition to DHS to end weapons trafficking. https://quixote.org/action#/18

ATT Monitor. (2024). ATT Arms Transfers Dashboard. https://attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard/

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A medida que aumentan los conflictos, los Estados partes del ATT deben comprometerse a una mayor transparencia

2/5/2025

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PictureSol Zoe Nottage
Se prevé que los conflictos armados se intensifiquen en la próxima década. Datos recientes revelan no sólo un aumento en el número de conflictos en todo el mundo, sino también un incremento en su intensidad. En 2024, los niveles de violencia se dispararon un 25 por ciento en comparación con 2023, dejando a una de cada ocho personas expuestas al conflicto y resultando en aproximadamente 223,000 fallecidos. Regiones como Oriente Medio, África y Europa del Este están experimentando tanto el agravamiento de conflictos de larga data como la aparición de nuevas tensiones. Sin intervenciones diplomáticas e institucionales efectivas, es probable que esta inestabilidad persista —o incluso empeore.

El 24 de diciembre de 2024, el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (ATT) celebró una década regulando el comercio mundial de armas y promoviendo la transparencia entre sus Estados partes. Como el primer marco legalmente vinculante que integra el derecho internacional humanitario con la regulación del comercio de armas, el ATT se esfuerza por fomentar la paz global, reducir el sufrimiento humano y mejorar la cooperación entre naciones. A pesar de estos objetivos admirables, persisten desafíos significativos. Solo 116 estados han suscrito el tratado, dejando fuera a muchos de los principales exportadores e importadores de armas. Además, obstáculos como lograr la membresía universal, fortalecer el cumplimiento, perfeccionar los mecanismos de la Conferencia de Estados Partes (CSP), abordar la desviación y garantizar la transparencia en los flujos de armas continúan entorpeciendo el progreso.

El último Informe del Monitor del TCA, que revisa la presentación de informes sobre transferencias de armas para 2022, ofrece un panorama preocupante. Solo 69 de los Estados partes obligados a presentar un informe anual lo hicieron, lo que representa una tasa de cumplimiento del 63 por ciento, la más baja desde que se comenzaron a presentar informes en 2015. Asimismo, únicamente 35 estados (32 por ciento) presentaron sus informes a tiempo. Mientras tanto, la proporción de informes confidenciales aumentó de seis (3 por ciento) en 2015 a 23 (31 por ciento) en 2021, antes de experimentar un leve descenso en 2022.

Cada año, los Estados partes están obligados a presentar informes detallados sobre exportaciones e importaciones de armas antes del 31 de mayo. Entre 2015 y 2022, 53 Estados partes reportaron más de 121 millones de exportaciones de armas, mientras que 65 registraron más de 4 millones de importaciones. Como señala el informe del Monitor del ATT, la discrepancia entre estas cifras se puede atribuir a varios factores, entre ellos la limitada capacidad de los países importadores para monitorear las transferencias, la exclusión de los principales exportadores o importadores que no son miembros y la omisión de transferencias sensibles.

El Mapa del Índice Global de Paz subraya aún más la gravedad de la situación. Los conflictos en Gaza y Ucrania han contribuido significativamente a la disminución de la paz global, registrándose 162,000 muertes en combate en 2023. Un récord de 92 países están ahora involucrados en conflictos transfronterizos, el mayor número desde la creación del GPI. Cabe destacar que la guerra en Ucrania —la primera vez desde 1945 que un conflicto en suelo europeo involucra a un miembro del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas como agresor o defensor principal— sirve como un claro recordatorio de la urgente necesidad de transparencia, especialmente considerando que 40 países europeos (35 por ciento de los Estados partes) se encuentran en la región.

Otra tendencia es el aumento de las exclusiones de información sensible. Estas exclusiones crecieron de manera constante desde 2015 hasta 2017, alcanzando su punto máximo en 2022. Entre 2015 y 2022, solo 20 informes indicaron explícitamente qué categorías de datos se clasificaron y por qué. Aunque países como Australia y Suecia aclararon consistentemente dónde clasificaron sus datos y el motivo de ello, muchos informes no alcanzan este nivel de detalle. Si bien el Artículo 13(3) del tratado permite la exclusión de información considerada comercialmente sensible o relacionada con la seguridad nacional, para el 9 de enero de 2025, 16 Estados partes optaron por clasificar información en 2023.

Proporcionar detalles adicionales en los informes, aunque no es obligatorio, mejora significativamente la transparencia y se alinea con los objetivos del tratado. El Monitor del TCA ha identificado varias buenas prácticas que no solo mejoran la claridad y precisión de los informes, sino que también respaldan los esfuerzos para prevenir la desviación de armas y promover la rendición de cuentas. Por ejemplo, en 2022, Países Bajos señaló claramente que las cifras exactas de armas suministradas a Ucrania fueron retenidas por razones de seguridad nacional. Entre 2017 y 2023, mientras que seis Estados partes ocultaron información sobre transferencias a Ucrania —con un pico durante el estallido de la guerra— la mayoría continuó presentando informes de acceso público. De manera similar, el reporte voluntario de categorías adicionales —como escopetas, municiones y definiciones nacionales de armas— puede estandarizar y mejorar la comparabilidad entre informes.

Durante la última década, la Secretaría del ATT, junto con diversas organizaciones de la sociedad civil, ha desarrollado directrices y organizado talleres para ayudar a los Estados partes a cumplir con sus obligaciones de reporte y reforzar la transparencia. Organizaciones como Control Arms y el Monitor del TCA han desempeñado roles destacados en estos esfuerzos. Sus reportes anuales no solo han seguido las tendencias en la presentación de informes, sino que también han ofrecido recomendaciones específicas por país para que logren mejorar. Desde 2024, la introducción de un tablero en Power BI por parte del Monitor del ATT ha proporcionado una visión integral de los datos de transferencias de armas reportados públicamente. De cara a 2025 y más allá, el trabajo colaborativo del Monitor del TCA y otros actores será vital para construir confianza entre los Estados partes mediante la promoción de la transparencia, la cooperación y una conducta responsable en el comercio internacional de armas convencionales.


Sol Nottage es Investigadora Asociada de Control Arms en el Monitor del ATT y profesora auxiliar en la Universidad de San Andrés y en la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina).

La inclusión en el Foro sobre el programa de expertos emergentes en el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no indica acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son únicamente las de los autores de cada artículo.

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As Conflicts Rise, ATT States Should Commit to Greater Transparency

2/5/2025

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PictureSol Zoe Nottage
Armed conflicts are projected to intensify over the coming decade. Recent data reveals not only a surge in the number of conflicts worldwide but also an increase in their intensity. In 2024, violence levels spiked by 25 percent compared to 2023, leaving one in eight people exposed to conflict and resulting in approximately 223,000 fatalities. Regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe are experiencing both the deepening of long-standing conflicts and the emergence of new tensions. Without effective diplomatic and institutional interventions, this instability is likely to persist—or even worsen.

On December 24, 2024, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) marked a decade of regulating the global arms trade and promoting transparency among its State Parties. As the first legally binding framework to integrate international humanitarian law with arms trade regulation, the ATT strives to foster global peace, reduce human suffering, and enhance cooperation among nations. Despite these laudable goals, significant challenges remain. Only 116 states have joined the treaty, leaving many major arms exporters and importers outside its framework. Moreover, hurdles such as achieving universal membership, strengthening compliance, refining Conference of States Parties (CSP) mechanisms, addressing diversion, and ensuring transparency in arms flows continue to impede progress.

The latest ATT Monitor Report, which reviews arms transfer reporting for 2022, paints a concerning picture. Only 69 of the States Parties required to submit an annual report did so—a 63 percent compliance rate that marks the lowest level since reporting began in 2015. Additionally, just 35 states (32 percent) submitted their reports on time. Meanwhile, the proportion of confidential reports increased from six (3 percent) in 2015 to 23 (31 percent) in 2021 before experiencing a slight decline in 2022.

Every year, States Parties are required to submit detailed reports on arms exports and imports by May 31. Between 2015 and 2022, 53 States Parties reported over 121 million arms exports, while 65 recorded more than 4 million arms imports. As the ATT Monitor report shows, the discrepancy between these figures can be attributed to several factors, including the limited capacity of importing countries to monitor transfers, the exclusion of major non-member exporters or importers, and the omission of sensitive transfers.

The Global Peace Index Map further underscores the gravity of the situation. Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine have been primary contributors to a decline in global peacefulness—with battle deaths reaching 162,000 in 2023. A record 92 countries are now involved in cross-border conflicts, the highest number since the inception of the GPI. Notably, the war in Ukraine—marking the first time since 1945 that a conflict on European soil involved a United Nations Security Council member as the primary aggressor or defender—serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for transparency, especially when 40 European countries (35 percent of the States Parties) are based in the region.

Another trend to look at is the increase in sensitive information exclusions. These exclusions rose steadily from 2015 to 2017, peaking in 2022. Between 2015 and 2022, only 20 reports explicitly indicated which data categories were withheld and why. Although countries like Australia and Sweden consistently showed where they excluded information, many reports fall short of this standard. While Article 13(3) of the treaty permits the exclusion of commercially sensitive or national security information, by January 9, 2025, 16 States Parties had chosen to withhold information in 2023.

Providing additional details in reports, although not mandatory, significantly enhances transparency and aligns with the treaty’s objectives. The ATT Monitor has identified several best practices that not only improve the clarity and accuracy of reports but also support efforts to prevent arms diversion and promote accountability. For example, in 2022, The Netherlands clearly noted that the precise numbers of arms supplied to Ukraine were withheld for national security reasons. Between 2017 and 2023, while six States Parties clearly stated where they withheld information on transfers to Ukraine—peaking during the outbreak of war—the majority continued to submit publicly accessible reports. Similarly, voluntary reporting on additional categories—such as shotguns, ammunition, and national definitions of arms—can further standardize and enhance comparability across reports.

Over the past decade, the ATT Secretariat, together with various civil society organizations, has developed guidelines and organized workshops to assist States Parties in meeting their reporting obligations and bolstering transparency. Organizations like Control Arms and the ATT Monitor have played leading roles in these efforts. Their annual reports have not only tracked trends in reporting but have also offered country-specific recommendations for improvement. Since 2024, the introduction of  a dashboard by the ATT Monitor has provided a comprehensive overview of publicly reported arms transfer data. Moving forward into 2025 and beyond, the collaborative work of the ATT Monitor and other stakeholders will be vital in building trust among States Parties by promoting transparency, cooperation, and responsible conduct in the international trade of conventional arms.



Sol Nottage is a Research Associate for Control Arms at the ATT Monitor and auxiliar professor at the Universidad de San Andrés and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina).
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Predicting Even Less U.S. Arms Trade Restraint in 2025

1/27/2025

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Picture
​This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Jeff Abramson
The Biden administration has left President Trump a surprisingly low bar when it comes to improving U.S. arms trade restraint. Unfortunately and dangerously, the Trump administration is likely to lower the bar even further.
 
On paper, many Biden-era arms trade policies sounded good to advocates for human rights and protection of civilians. His administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy more fully elevated human rights concerns in part by calling for a halt to authorizations for transfers when certain harms were “more likely than not” – an improvement over previous approaches. Also positive were support for an international Political Declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as well as Department of Defense and State policies on civilian protection such as CHMR-AP and CHIRG. Even NSM-20 was notionally good policy in that it appeared to create a path to holding countries accountable for using weapons improperly. Plus, Biden reversed the first Trump administration’s stance on landmines and once again made it U.S. policy to eventually accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.
 
While these policies were often laudatory in writing, actual practice was devastating. The Biden administration’s contortions to not implement U.S. law that should have led to a halt on some (if not all) security assistance to Israel was the most high profile abandonment of a policy of restraint. So too were decisions to supply cluster munitions and landmines to Ukraine, weapons that the majority of countries – including a majority of NATO allies – had long agreed should be banned and that the United States had not used or transferred for more than a decade. The Biden administration also eventually continued arms transfers to rights-violating regimes in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
 
Receiving less attention was the shear volume of arms transfers proposed and conducted under his administration. The latest State Department factsheet revealed that fiscal year 2024 arms transfers were “the highest ever annual total of sales and assistance provided to our allies and partners” via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process (emphasis is in the original document). FMS values were than $100 billion in FY 2024 with a staggering $845 billion in open cases. More than $200 billion in authorizations were made via the separate Direct Commercial Sales process. The Forum’s tracking of FMS notifications by calendar year (as opposed to fiscal year), found nearly $146 billion in FMS sales were notified to Congress last year.  
 
Trump is likely to aim to go higher. In 2017, his first international trip was to the Middle East where he announced $110 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Although that figure was inflated, it showed what would be a hallmark of his first term, which was the promotion of U.S. arms trade, including to autocratic regimes in the Middle East. He ended his term notifying Congress of more than $134 billion in potential FMS sales in 2020 (a figure higher than Biden’s 2024 totals when adjusted for inflation) that included $10 billion in F-35 sales to the United Arab Emirates that Biden slow-walked, with the deal collapsing.
 
Could Trump revive the deal? The UAE may have indicated before the election it would not be interested, but former State Department official Josh Paul said this month it’s one to watch.
 
Now, just a week into the second Trump presidency, all signs are pointing to a return to relatively unrestrained arms sales and even less concern for human rights.
 
One of the administration first actions was a 90-day suspension on foreign aid, but with an exemption for military assistance to Egypt and Israel. The Trump administration has already acted to remove sanctions on Israelis undermining peace in the West Bank and appears to have abandoned the Biden administration’s hold on the provision of 2000-pound bombs to Israel, jettisoning what little restraint had remained. The Defense Department’s Civilian Protection Center of Excellence also appears to be in jeopardy. And while Biden administration National Security Memorandums are only under review, it would be sound logic to predict that both NSM-20 and NSM-18 (Biden’s CAT policy) may be rescinded.  
 
Trump’s claim to end the war in Ukraine as he took office obviously has not occurred, but his approach could involve much less U.S. support to the country. (No waiver was provided for Ukraine in the current suspension of new foreign aid.) Oddly, this might mean the U.S. no longer provides landmines and cluster munitions.
 
That improvement is unlikely to undo the damage the United States is causing to humanitarian disarmament treaties and multilateralism more broadly. Trump loosened restraint on both weapons in his first term, and there is no reason to expect an about face to support the Mine Ban Treaty or Convention on Cluster Munitions now. Plus, he has put a 90-day pause on humanitarian demining  – a staggering stark example of heavy-handed ineptitude as the United States has done good work in demining globally for decades with strong bi-partisan Congressional support.
 
Regarding the Arms Trade Treaty, Trump rejected the treaty in his first term and the Biden administration failed to undo Trump’s denial of U.S. signature to the treaty. This will almost certainly leave the United States even more on the outside of the core international agreement aimed at making the arms trade more responsible.
 
Trump, of course, prides himself on being unpredictable, and anything written today may quickly appear dated as new developments take center stage. But, in so many ways, Trump is making clear that the multilateral system as currently established will not receive  support as, for example, he strives to pull the United States out of the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization.
 
In his first term, Donald Trump took a transactional and unrestrained approach to the arms trade while undermining multilateral efforts at control, and multilateralism more broadly. He is quickly on his way to doing so again in 2025.
 


Jeff Abramson is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for International Policy. 

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s). 

This post was lightly updated at 12:25 PM on January 27.

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El panorama de seguridad en México para 2025 ante la llegada del presidente Trump

1/19/2025

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Esta entrada de blog forma parte de una serie serie que analiza una serie de cuestiones en 2025 relacionadas con el uso de armas, el comercio de armas y la asistencia en materia de seguridad, y a menudo ofrece recomendaciones.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(version in English)

Al hablar de democracia, 2024 fue un año preponderante y decisivo. 74 países (más el Parlamento Europeo) tuvieron elecciones en las que más de 1,600 millones de personas participaron a nivel mundial. Si bien cada uno de estos procesos tienen una importancia particular, ninguno de ellos será tan decisivo para el escenario internacional de 2025 como la reelección de Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

La victoria de Trump en noviembre fue vista como positiva para algunos, sin embargo, para la mayoría era algo que se temía, incluida la recientemente electa presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum. Su enfoque, desde el inicio de su campaña política a principios de 2024, ha sido darle continuidad al anterior gobierno del presidente López Obrador y temas como la seguridad y el narcotráfico, dos de los más relevantes para los votantes de Trump, no han sido la excepción.

El 22 de diciembre, Trump dijo que el día uno de su administración nombraría a los cárteles de droga como organizaciones terroristas, sumándose así al aumento en los aranceles como amenazas que ha lanzado contra México. Sheinbaum respondió mencionando que está dispuesta a cooperar con su gobierno, pero que el país nunca se “subordinaría”. Desde que inició su gobierno se han llevado a cabo con éxito alrededor de 12 operativos antidroga de alto perfil, incluyendo el decomiso de casi una tonelada de fentanilo en Sinaloa, el más grande en la historia de México, y que ocurrió 10 días después de los llamados de Trump a aumentar los aranceles. Se espera que la frecuencia de estos operativos aumente durante el año, en parte debido a la presión estadounidense.

Desde un punto de vista narrativo, es probable que Sheinbaum trate de mantener la opinión pública enfocada en estas operaciones, a la par de la importancia de la cooperación bilateral para atender no solo la producción de fentanilo en el país pero también la crisis de consumo en Estados Unidos. El respeto a la soberanía de México también será un elemento clave de la narrativa oficial.

Adicionalmente, el tema del contrabando desde la frontera norte también será recurrente en los medios mexicanos, considerando que el gobierno se encuentra actualmente en un proceso legal en contra de distintas empresas estadounidenses de distribución de armas por facilitar su acceso a organizaciones criminales. El 9 de enero, durante su conferencia matutina, Sheinbaum se expresó de manera favorable sobre un reciente reporte del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos que reconoce la situación, argumentando que 74% de las armas confiscadas por autoridades mexicanas han sido introducidas al país desde Estados Unidos. Sheinbaum también reconoció que este reporte podrá ser de utilidad para futuras negociaciones.

La política migratoria, intrínsecamente relacionada con la seguridad nacional de ambos países, también cambiará drásticamente en 2025. En México diversas oficinas gubernamentales, incluyendo el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), sufrieron un recorte de presupuesto en comparación con el año pasado, en línea con los principios de austeridad de Sheinbaum. Mientras que la llegada de Trump previsiblemente influenciará a las autoridades mexicanas a incrementar las deportaciones y detenciones a migrantes, el reto está en el hecho de que los recursos disponibles para una gestión adecuada de las rutas migratorias se verá reducido.

No obstante, la respuesta del gobierno a esta disyuntiva podría estar en las Fuerzas Armadas. Desde los primeros años de la administración de López Obrador, el presupuesto asignado al Ejército, la Fuerza Aérea, la Marina y la Guardia Nacional ha incrementado de manera continua en comparación con otras instituciones. Para este año su presupuesto fue reducido en un 36%, sin embargo, distintas reformas legislativas de los últimos años les han dado cada vez más facultades. En los siguientes meses (y años) es probable que veamos tareas que antes pertenecían a otras instancias ser asignadas a estas instituciones.

Mientras que la presencia de las Fuerzas Armadas es necesaria para preservar la seguridad nacional, también es cierto que han habido diversos incidentes relacionados con el uso excesivo de la fuerza y otros abusos de derechos humanos en contra de distintos grupos vulnerables (incluyendo migrantes) que las involucran, siendo uno de los más recientes el asesinato de tres personas, incluyendo una niña de ocho años, en Nuevo Laredo el 11 de octubre del año pasado. Se espera que el número de este tipo de incidentes aumente.

Por otro lado, uno de los ejes del gobierno actual (aunque su principal función sea publicitaria) es mostrarse a sí mismo como el más humanista y progresista en la historia, lo cual puede directamente contradecirse con esta ampliación de tareas que las fuerzas armadas tendrán. También se espera más presión por parte de organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

Mientras que la administración pasada de Donald Trump nos dio cierta noción de cómo podría ser su segundo periodo, la realidad es que la incertidumbre es la característica más exacta con la que podemos describir nuestros tiempos, no solo en ambos países pero también a nivel global. Hasta ahora, la retórica de Trump hacia México (y hacia otros socios también) ha sido bastante confrontativa y Sheinbaum tendrá que maniobrar el periodo 2025-2029 de manera hábil y cuidadosa, a la par de dirigir un escenario político, económico y social interno cada vez más complejo.

Gestionar el problema del narcotráfico es una tarea desafiante y delicada y, desde una perspectiva realista, ni la política hostil de Trump ni la popularidad de Sheinbaum lo resolverán. El populismo es muy próspero hoy en día y, para ambos países, hay un largo camino que se puede complicar fácilmente por ideas que en la teoría parecen buenas pero que en la práctica pueden no funcionar, a expensas tanto del pueblo estadounidense como del mexicano.


Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega es Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales con especialidad en Gobierno y Transformación Pública, por el Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
La inclusión en el programa de expertos y expertas emergentes del Foro sobre Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no implican el acuerdo ni la aprobación de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son las del autor de cada artículo.
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Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Hands of Crime: A Nearby Threat in Latin America with Gendered Implications

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Gisela Luján Andrade
(In lieu of a standard blog post, the author has crafted an article that presents reflections, research, and analysis based on two recent presentations... the introduction begins as follows:) 

The growing interest of organized crime in the military use of emerging technologies, including autonomous technology and artificial intelligence (AI), raises alarms about the tangible perils of their application and development in Latin America, making us realize that we are no longer dealing with a scenario far removed from our reality.

The primary purpose of this article is to contribute to discussions in the region regarding the risks associated with the proliferation of 'low-end' autonomous weapons systems (AWS) to non-state armed actors, particularly organized crime, which constitute one of the main threats to human security in the region. Additionally, this analysis adopts a human rights and gender approach, emphasizing how the likely use of these systems by organized crime exacerbates the structural discrimination and violence already faced by women and other marginalized groups. Finally, this article calls for urgent action toward the regulation of AWS as a matter of global justice and equity.

Read the full article/post in this 
pdf


Gisela Luján Andrade is Founder, Perú por el Desarme.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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The UK arms trade in 2025 – controversies and challenges

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Sam Perlo-Freeman
The UK is one of the world’s largest arms exporters – exactly where in the rankings depends on which figures you look at. The UK is only 7th according to SIPRI data on major conventional weapons exports, but in financial terms, the UK is probably somewhere between 2nd and 4th alongside France and Russia. At any rate, an important player.
 
By far the most controversial, though certainly not the largest, aspect of the UK arms trade at present is its arms sales to Israel, most of which go indirectly via the US, especially components for the F-35 combat aircraft, which Israel is using in Gaza, and of which 15% by value is made in the UK. Last September, the new Labour government suspended certain licences for use by the Israeli military, having concluded that Israel was not adhering to international law in Gaza, but made a special ‘carve-out’ from its own export licensing criteria to allow the continued indirect supply of F-35 components via the US and other partner nations. The government claimed that such indirect supplies could not be stopped without jeopardising the whole F-35 supply chain. This decision faces a legal challenge brought by Palestinian NGO Al-Haq and activist legal group GLAN, and will likely be heard in spring. The latest government submission to the court makes clear that there is no new evidence of Israeli violations in Gaza that would lead the government to change this position, an extraordinary admission, placing the UK’s international commitments under the ATT, IHL, and even the Genocide Convention as lower priority than maintaining the F-35 supply chain.
 
However, while the F-35 and arms sales to Israel are rightly the focus of most current attention, of far greater significance for the UK arms industry – and also raising serious questions regarding human rights, peace, and security – are prospects for sales of the Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft, jointly produced by BAE in the UK, Leonardo in Italy, and Airbus in Germany and Spain.
 
Last year, trade unions warned that production of the Typhoon at their plant in Warton, Lancashire, may end before long if there are not significant new orders, creating a gap before full-scale production of the planned 6th-generation Tempest fighter gets under way. New orders from Germany, Italy, and Spain have helped alleviate these concerns, although this will not involve final assembly in the UK. Nonetheless, both the UK government and BAE are actively pursuing export customers as well, from their traditional customer base in the Middle East - in particular, Qatar, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia.
 
Qatar ordered 24 Typhoons in 2018, the last of which should be delivered in 2025, and has reportedly recently agreed to buy 12 more, although a contract has not yet been signed. It is unclear exactly what Qatar would want them for, given that it also has fleets of French Rafales and US F-15s, faces no external threats, and may lack the capacity to operate that many aircraft, is a good question. Qatar is rated by Transparency International Defence & Security as having a ‘critical’ risk of corruption in arms procurement, and given BAE’s grimy record in this area, this deal should face stringent due diligence in relation to corruption, including via possible offset deals.
 
Türkiye has long been seeking to modernise its combat aircraft fleet, especially since Greece recently acquired Rafales from France. Türkiye was kicked out of the F-35 programme by the US in 2019 for buying Russian air defence systems. It is now acquiring 40 F-16s instead, but is also very interested in acquiring up to 40 Eurofighters. For a long time, Germany was blocking this due to Türkiye’s human rights record and role in Syria, but has lifted this objection, and negotiations for a deal have begun.
 
However, the Turkish state remains highly authoritarian and repressive, especially towards its Kurdish minority. It remains in occupation of parts of north-east Syria, where it and its militia allies have been accused of serious abuses. Türkiye has continued a steady bombing campaign against Kurdish groups in both Iraq and Syria, causing high civilian casualties. Moreover, following the regime change in Syria, Türkiye may well be looking to pursue further military action against the Kurdish autonomous region of Rojava in the north-east, and indeed its allied militias have already launched attacks. The risk therefore that Eurofighters sold to Türkiye might be used in these conflicts is high.
 
Saudi Arabia is reportedly considering various options for increasing its combat aircraft fleet, including the Eurofighter, the Rafale, and the F-15, and most recently the Turkish domestically-produced Kaan stealth fighter currently under development. During the war in Yemen, German objections would have stopped any new sales of Eurofighters (though Germany allowed continuing supplies of spare parts for the existing Saudi fleet), but as with Türkiye, they have now lifted these objections as the truce in Yemen in place since April 2022 continues to hold.
 
However, the truce remains fragile, with numerous violations, and the conflict in Yemen remains far from solved. Saudi Arabia’s horrific human rights record has if anything worsened, with the country carrying out a record 345 executions in 2024. The record of corruption in UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia is also egregious.
 
In short, all 3 potential Middle Eastern customers for the Eurofighters raise serious red flags, although none of these will likely be of the slightest concern to the UK government, desperate as it will be to maintain the BAE production line until Tempest gets off the ground. If all goes their way, 2025 could be a bumper year for BAE, and in any event it will be a busy year for those of us seeking to advocate for ethical restraint in arms exports.


Sam Perlo-Freeman is Research Coordinator at Campaign Against Arms Trade in the UK.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).


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The 2025 security landscape in Mexico amid the arrival of President Trump

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(Versión en español. English updated January 19, 2025.)

2024 was a remarkable year when talking about democracy. 74 countries (plus the European Parliament) held elections with more than 1.6 billion people going to the ballots worldwide. While all of these processes have their own particular importance, none of them will be that defining for the 2025 global scenario as the reelection of Donald Trump in the United States.
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Trump’s victory in November was seen as a hope for some but dreaded by most, including the recently elected president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s approach, from the beginning of her political campaign in early 2024, has been focused on giving a certain continuity to the previous government of president López Obrador, and topics like security and drug-trafficking, two of the most relevant for Trump’s voters, have not been the exception.

On December 22nd, president Trump said that he would name drug cartels as terrorist organizations on day one of his administration, joining his calls for higher tariffs he had previously threatened. Sheinbaum responded that she was willing to cooperate with his government, but that the country would never “subordinate” [to Trump]. Since Sheinbaum took office on October 1st,
around 12 high-profile successful anti-drug operations have been held, including the siege of almost one ton of fentanyl in Sinaloa, the biggest in Mexico’s history, which also happened to occur about 10 days after Trump’s tariff threats. It is expected that this rate will only increase during 2025, substantially due to Trump’s pressure.

From a narrative perspective, Sheinbaum will likely try to keep the public opinion focused on these security operations, side to side with the importance of bilateral cooperation to attend not only the production of fentanyl in the country but also the consumption crisis in the U. S. The respect to Mexico’s sovereignty will also be a key element of the government’s narrative.

In addition, the issue of arms trafficking coming from the U. S. into Mexico will likely be recurring in the Mexican media, considering that the government is currently involved in a legal process against several American arms distribution companies for facilitating their access to criminal organizations. On January 9th, during her daily morning conference, Sheinbaum talked about her favorable views on a recent Justice Department report that acknowledges the issue, saying that 74% of the confiscated weapons by the Mexican government come from the northern side of the border. She stated that this report will be a helpful leverage for future negotiations.

Immigration policies, intrinsically related to national security and of both countries, will drastically change in 2025 as well. In Mexico, several government divisions, including the National Institute of Migration (INM), suffered a budget cut in comparison with last year, in line with Sheinbaum’s austerity principles. While Trump’s arrival will expectedly influence the Mexican authorities to increase deportations and migrant detentions, the challenge will lay in the fact that the available resources for the proper management of the migration routes will get reduced.

Nevertheless, the government’s answer to this issue may lay in the military. Since the first years of López Obrador’s administration, the budget assigned towards the army, the navy and the National Guard steadily increased compared to other government offices. For this year, their budget was cut by around 36%, however, different legislation reforms in recent years have granted them more and more faculties. In the coming months (and years) we will likely see more tasks assigned to these three institutions that previously were performed by others.

While the involvement of the military is necessary for preserving national security, there also have been several incidents of excessive use of violence and other human rights abuses towards different vulnerable groups (including migrants) that involved them, particularly the National Guard, one of the latest being the assassination of three people, including an eight year old child, in Nuevo Laredo on October 11th. This number is expected to increase.

On the other hand, one of the bases of the current government (but mostly a political marketing element) is to show themselves as the most humanistic and progressive in history, which may be contradictory with this broader range of tasks the military will get. More pressure from civil society organizations is likely to increase as well.

While the 2017-2021 administration of Donald Trump gave us a rather wide glance of what his second period may be, the truth is that uncertainty is the most accurate word to describe the current times, not only in both countries but also globally. So far, Trump’s rhetoric towards Mexico (and towards other partners as well) has been very confrontative and Sheinbaum will have to cleverly and carefully maneuver a highly unpredictable 2025-2029 term while managing an increasingly complex political, economic and social internal landscape. Managing the drug crisis is a delicate and challenging issue and, from a realistic perspective, neither Trump's hostile politics nor Sheinbaum’s political marketing will solve it. Populism is thriving in current times and, for both countries, there is a long path that may be easily clouded by big ideas that may not work when put into practice, at the expense of both American and Mexican people.



Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega has a B. A. in International Relations with a minor degree in Government and Public Transformation from Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program (Spanish program) and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Manipur's 'Pumpi Guns:' Why Should We Care About Them?

12/11/2024

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
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Henrique Garbino
Introduction

The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state of India, began in mid-2023 as ethnic violence erupted between the majority Meitei community, based in the Imphal Valley, and the tribal Kuki-Zo community from the surrounding hill districts. The unrest, rooted in disputes over land rights and affirmative action measures, has led to significant destruction, including over 225 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people, and the burning of thousands of homes and religious structures. Deep-seated historical grievances and recent tensions over migration and Scheduled Tribe status have intensified the violence, turning the state into a complex humanitarian crisis.

In Manipur, non-industrial weapons present yet another set of challenges to policymakers and law enforcement given their unique characteristics, the environments in which they are produced, and their users' motivations. Non-state actors with limited resources worldwide resort to them over commercial counterparts primarily for their accessibility, affordability, and anonymity. They are made from easy-to-source materials, are significantly cheaper to acquire, and lack serial numbers or standardized markings allowing them to operate under the radar. In addition to the physical characteristics, they are perceived to symbolize resourcefulness and resilience, especially in asymmetric conflicts or resistance movements.

‘Pumpi guns’ are a lesser-known, contemporary example of this phenomenon. While usually reported and clustered under ‘long-range mortars’ by Manipur law enforcement, ‘Pumpi gun’ is an umbrella term used to refer to a variety of improvised light weapons, including light cannons, light and medium mortars, and shoulder-fired grenade launchers, owing to their inherently non-standard nature. A recurring find among the weapons and other contraband seized by security forces from the ongoing violence in the state, their widespread use and novel ways of fabrication underscores a much deeper issue that needs a multilayered policy intervention.

What are Pumpi guns?

Pumpi guns are improvised weapons locally made in the Indian state of Manipur. They originated from the resistance movements of 1917-18, when they were crafted with indigenous, easy-to-source materials to fight British colonial rule. According to media reports, Pumpi guns are largely fabricated from parts of uprooted electric poles, water pipes, and galvanized iron pipes. Their production and sourcing knowledge has been passed down through generations, especially among the Kuki tribal groups. In their most rudimentary form, they are manufactured by repurposing a metal pipe or tube with a variety of make-shift stabilizing mechanisms including bi-pods, baseplates, and buttstocks to guide the projectile, which may or may not be fin-stabilized. They are chambered for both medium (20-57mm) and large-caliber ammunition (greater than 57mm) and may be either direct or indirect fire weapons.

Based on their identifiable physical characteristics, they can be classified into four major types: (i) improvised mortars; (ii) improvised cannons; (iii) improvised shoulder-fire grenade launchers; (iv) and one with multiple barrels.
PictureSource: Manipur Police, 2024. (click image for original)

Further, there seem to be striking similarities between the weapons used by the People’s Defence Force in Myanmar and Manipur’s pumpi guns. A recent video unveiled the DIY factories that are arming the anti-junta fighters and provides insights into the sourcing and manufacturing processes of improvised weapons across the Indo-Myanmar border. Given the historical and civilizational ties, and geographical proximity between Manipur and Myanmar, the transfer of knowledge and materials needed to manufacture these weapons between non-state actors is likely. Further, recent reports of 3D-printed guns found in Manipur have allegedly been trafficked from Myanmar, lending support to the existence of cross-border exchanges.

Perceived tools of resistance: One year since the Manipur Conflict

At the collective level, improvised weapons often symbolize resilience and defiance against an oppressive system. From landmines in Colombia to combat drones in Ukraine, self-narratives around improvised weapons reflect a determination to resist when denied formal means and demonstrate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of a group in duress. At the individual level, beyond self-defense and survival, owning a weapon is often linked to status in the community; reflecting gender norms and cultural traditions. In the context of armed conflicts such as in Manipur, traditional weaponry has been adapted and modernized, to now been self-seen as serving as effective tools of resistance. Armed groups rely on existing values and traditions, as well as social and economic interdependence, to manage the knowledge of weapons production and networks for their distribution.

The residents of the hill districts of Manipur are known for their prowess in improvising weapons and guerilla warfare techniques. As such, pumpi guns are an archetype of societal and community pride. Perceived as a form of resistance and self-defense, they symbolize the community’s craftsmanship and proficiency, as illustrated in social media accounts of pumpi guns’ effectiveness. They are regarded as important installments in community checkpoints and underground bunkers guarded by village youth, who allegedly undergo mandatory weapon training as part of community service. 

According to local law enforcement officials, pumpi guns are manufactured by village blacksmiths, or ‘Thih-Kheng Pa,’ as part of their community service. They are installed in trenches and bunkers built to monitor movement from long distances and are employed to create a virtual ‘geographical divide’ between the valley and hill districts of the state. As problematic as they may be to those concerned about violence, they have proved to be a strategic addition for the groups stationed at the inter-district boundaries, or the ‘buffer zone,’ to extend their area of influence, inflict serious injury to approaching security personnel, and keep infiltrators from opposing sides at bay. Pumpi guns are also used for offensive purposes to carry out raids and ambushes to gain access to strategic territories. 

Potential misfires and explosions from employing repurposed metal tubes cannot be overruled but is deemed a necessary risk its users are willing to take. There are a few media reports on injuries from shelling clubbed under “gun and mortar attacks,” which could be attributed to pumpi guns. Still, no instances of accidents with unexploded pumpi gun munitions could be found. However, the range of mortar bombs, both improvised and factory-made, recovered by Manipur Police suggests their omnipresence in the conflict.

Addressing the Challenges
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With renewed violence in the already devastating conflict in Manipur, pumpi guns have seemed to evolve in accuracy and reliability. Modifications done in recent years make use of novel technologies and adapt to the growing needs of the warring parties. Recent reports from state security forces reveal their seemingly improved parts and components. 

In addition to the improvised weapons, the warring groups’ arsenals also feature sophisticated industrial weapons. These include INSAS, AK-type, and M-16 assault rifles, as well as No. 36 hand grenades, which have been previously looted from the government stockpiles and armories. On multiple occasions, the state police and central reserve forces have reported incidents of an estimated 5,600 arms and over 650,000 rounds of ammunition being raided by non-state actors, though it is hard to verify these figures. Pumpi guns appear to be filling in a gap in the technical capabilities of groups who may not have access to industrial alternatives.

To address the proliferation of pumpi guns and their role in the ongoing conflict in Manipur, policymakers should focus on a multi-pronged strategy that balances enforcement with socio-economic development and peacebuilding efforts. Legal reforms must prioritize stricter arms control legislation and impose severe penalties for violations. Simultaneously, enhancing the management and security of government stockpiles and armories is crucial to prevent looting by non-state actors. Advanced surveillance technologies and intelligence sharing should be leveraged to monitor the supply chain of precursor materials and dismantle illicit workshops. Combating corruption within the armed forces, police, and industries involved in the supply of critical materials remains a core challenge that must be addressed through independent oversight mechanisms. Importantly, regional cooperation with Myanmar is necessary to curb the cross-border trafficking of both weapons and precursors, as well as the transfer of knowledge among non-state actors.

Economic development initiatives should provide alternative livelihoods for those involved in illicit weapons production, especially blacksmiths and community members engaged in pumpi gun manufacturing. This could involve vocational training, financial support for sustainable enterprises, and the integration of traditional craftsmanship into legal economic activities. However, such measures alone may prove insufficient, as pumpi gun production is deeply rooted in community pride and linked to genuine grievances. Community engagement must play a central role in addressing these issues by building trust between law enforcement and local populations to encourage cooperation. Integrating rebel groups into state structures, such as law enforcement or other community-oriented roles, could also be explored as part of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework. A peacebuilding perspective is essential to resolve the underlying tensions driving conflict, ensuring that solutions are holistic and inclusive rather than solely punitive.


Monalisa Hazarika is a consultant at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University and a 2024-25 Emerging Expert.

Henrique Garbino is a doctoral candidate at the Swedish Defence University and an expert listed by the Forum.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list or emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).


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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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