Category: First 100 Days

Proposed Arms Sale Is Not the Road to Peace in Nigeria

5/8/2017

This is the twelfth and final entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future. This entry is authored by a member of the Forum's emerging expert program, designed to give opportunities to individuals beginning their careers on these issues.

Danielle Preskitt

In early April, rumors swirled of the Trump administration’s willingness to support Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram by proposing a foreign military sale (FMS) of up to 12 Embraer A-29 Super Tucano aircraft with sophisticated targeting gear for approximately $600 million. This was not the first time news of a potential FMS sale to Nigeria created controversy. According to media reports, the Obama administration was prepared to move forward a 2016 request from Nigeria for the Super Tocanos until news of the military’s bombing of a camp of displaced persons reached the White House on January 17, just a few days before the end of his administration. Doctors Without Borders estimated the bombing resulted in 52 dead and over 200 wounded. However, various media outlets have reported different numbers, a top Nigerian military official told ABC news the military found approximately 100 bodies. Some death counts have been reported as high as 200.

The timing of Obama’s decision suggests his lack of confidence in the Nigerian military and their targeting capabilities. “This large-scale attack on vulnerable people who have already fled from extreme violence is shocking and unacceptable,” stated Dr. Jean-Clément Cabrol, the director of operations for Doctors Without Borders. “The safety of civilians must be respected. We are urgently calling on all parties to ensure the facilitation of medical evacuations by air or road for survivors who are in need of emergency care.” Unfortunately, this incident was just one example illustrating the inefficiency of airstrikes in eliminating embedded terrorists.

How to prioritize addressing Boko Haram is challenging to calculate or assess from the safety of Washington, DC. Boko Haram’s barbaric tactics of imbedding themselves within civilian populations makes it difficult for the military to effectively target and destroy the terrorist organization. However, the organization poses not only an international security threat, but is the cause for Nigerians living in fear on a day to day basis. A female Nigerian, who wishes to remain anonymous for safety reasons, said in an interview with me that “men are being killed on a daily basis and nobody is doing anything about this, my question is who is supplying these weapons to these terrorists?”

A lack of transparency and shadow of lies surrounds not only the status of Boko Haram and the accuracy of reported numbers of dead and wounded, but also the Nigerian government. When analyzing the efficiency of the Nigerian government, it is important to remember the government is distinct from the military. President Buhari of Nigeria has erratically stated on multiple occasions that Boko Haram has been defeated. However, the President’s wishful thinking is blatantly false as Boko Haram continues to carry out marketplace bombings in Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as multiple suicide bombings. “Why is the government trying hard to cover these killings?” said my interviewee. “Killings are still silently ongoing in Maiduguri, Adamawa, Kaduna, Jos, Yobe, and several environs on a daily basis… Soldiers are being brought in to the 44 General Hospital…, either amputated, maimed, or killed, and yet the media is saying nothing or less about this.”

For two years, civil servants have not been paid. When protests have erupted due to discontent and lack of payment, arrests were made. “The media is afraid of speaking because journalists have also been arrested for speaking out,” she said. As of 2015, the Nigerian government has a corruption rating of 136 out of 168. Many citizens are currently seeking asylum due to problems and security threats associated with the government, as well as Boko Haram. “The Nigerian government is currently unpopular, the people have lost faith and hope in the government and believes the government has an agenda yet to be revealed to the people,” she related.

In order for the Nigerian government to gain trust within the community, transparency and freedom of expression must be reinstated under President Buhari. No longer can the government hide Boko Haram’s existence or horrific actions, or act with impunity.

While many will argue, particularly the NGO community, that combatting terrorism requires education, poverty reduction, and government stability, the threat must be addressed immediately, while evidence suggests tackling those underlying issues is not the most effective response. Instead, aiding the military could be the solution- particularly in regards to the military’s intelligence and ground force capabilities.

During my interview, I was a bit shocked by a Nigerian assessment of the overall trust the military has earned with the population in recent years. The Nigerian population appears to understand the difficulty associated with targeting shielded Boko Haram insurgents during asymmetrical warfare. “The military is no longer a feared presence within the country, this is because we have been in a democratic regime for over 17 years now, and the military have been in the duty of protecting civilians…” The military, as a whole, has purposefully taken steps toward earning trust within the population. “We have also engaged the Armed Forces in several trainings on ‘Protection of Civilian Courses’,” she said.

In July of 2015, under a new joint United States Department of State and Department of Defense initiative, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) partnered with African nations in the fight against Boko Haram. However, since 2000 US security aid funding has significantly dropped. There was a small resurgence in 2012 and 2015, but 2016 remains to be the lowest since 2000.

When asked what had changed since Obama blocked the sale, Sarah Margon, Washington director of Human Rights Watch, stated: “President Trump has made really clear that fighting terrorism, as they define this, is going to be the top foreign policy priority. And that means that the consideration of mitigating circumstances and other issues that could create a problem in the long term will not be at the forefront.” While Margon may lament that situation, Senator Bob Corker, R-Tenn., the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated, "We need to deal with human rights issues, but not on weapons sales.” Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said in mid-February he was "leery" of the sale due to the Nigerian military's impunity. "Ultimately we hope that the sale goes forward," Cardin added. "But there is progress that needs to be made in protecting the civilian population."

Airstrikes may eliminate terrorists. However, due to the nature of their tactic to embed themselves amongst civilians, the attacks will cause the death of many innocent lives, a loss of faith in the government, and criticism from the international community. Ground forces used to eliminate Boko Haram city by city may be more dangerous and costly to the Nigerian military, but it is the only way to a lasting and stable peace within Nigeria. Equipping the Nigerian military with better weaponry, ammunition, training, and intelligence support is a much more efficient and safer strategy for both Nigeria, as well as the international community.

Danielle Preskitt is an intern with the Forum on the Arms Trade and a participant in the Forum’s emerging expert program.

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A View from the United Kingdom: Trump's First 100 Days

5/4/2017

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This video blog is the eleventh entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Martin Butcher

In this video interview, Martin Butcher addresses these questions, at markers indicated below:

0:07 How is President Trump perceived in the United Kingdom?
3:05 What trends are you seeing?
4:16 What advice do you have for the Trump administration?

Martin Butcher is Policy Advisor, Arms and Conflict, Oxfam International

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A View from Brazil: Trump's First 100 Days

5/3/2017

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This video blog is the tenth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Robert Muggah

In this video interview, Robert Muggah addresses these questions, at markers indicated below:

0:07 What is Brazil's involvement in the arms trade?
1:39 How is President Trump perceived in Brazil?
4:18 Do you have concerns about what you're seeing?
6:14 What advice do you have for the Trump administration?

Robert Muggah is Co-founder & Research Director at Igarapé Institute and the SecDev Foundation

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A View from Canada: Trump's First 100 Days

5/1/2017

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This video blog the ninth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Erin Hunt

In this video interview, Erin Hunt addresses three questions, at markers indicated below:

0:05 How is President Trump perceived in Canada?
0:43 What trends do you see?
1:17 What advice do you have for the Trump administration?

Erin Hunt is the program coordinator at Mines Action Canada.

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Trump’s First 100 Days of Foreign Military Sales Notifications Were More Than Eight Times That of Obama’s - No Restraint in Sight

5/1/2017

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Jeff Abramson

This is the eighth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Occurring under the news radar, the general public was notified last Friday afternoon of an additional $2.6 billion in proposed foreign military arms sales, bringing the Trump administration’s first 100 day total to more than $6 billion. That figure dwarfs President Obama’s first 100 days, which included notifications totaling just $713 million.

FMS notifications that went online Friday, April 28

The Forum on the Arms Trade’s notification tracker maintains an overview and online spreadsheet of proposed government-to-government arms sales and services through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. While just one of many sources of arms transfers, the FMS program is typically the largest and most visible, offering a good indication of what countries will be priority arms trade partners for the United States in the coming years.

The value of FMS notifications this calendar year totals nearly $6.7 billion (note: $418 million of which was officially notified the day before Donald Trump took office). While many of these potential arms sales were already in the works, the pace of notifications suggest that the weapons trade will be a significant part of the president’s approach to foreign policy. Tellingly, nearly half ($3.1 billion) of the potential sales are to countries in the Middle East (Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) for pilot training, missiles, helicopters, naval guns, equipment for artillery and infantry troops, and other weapons and services. Other countries included so far in 2017 FMS notification are Australia, Canada, Greece, Kenya, NATO, New Zealand, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

At the hundred-day marker of Obama’s first term, FMS notifications only included Australia ($560 million) and Mexico ($93 million and $60 million) for helicopters and patrol boats. By the time his presidency ended, Obama had proposed approximately $430 billion in FMS, including a record-setting $103 billion in 2010 alone -- the vast majority of that going to Saudi Arabia.

Given the United States’ dominance of the global arms trade market and the Obama administration’s high level of sales, it might have been difficult to expect a Trump presidency to further expand U.S. arms transfers. But that now appears likely as this administration moves controversial deals to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain that Obama had put on hold. While not yet publicly notified, they are making their way through Congress. Deals to those countries, especially without preconditions, would appear to only reward suppression of human rights (Bahrain) and reckless engagement in fighting that fails to protect civilians (Saudi Arabia). Unless Congress chooses to exercise its authority over arms agreements and deliveries, there appears to be no restraint in sight.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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Cyber Insecurity Under Trump

4/29/2017

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This is the seventh entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Allison Pytlak

Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election was one of the biggest stories in recent history. "Cyberwar"’ and "cyber security" dominated headlines at the outset of Donald Trump’s presidency, even before his inauguration. Yet despite the unprecedented media chatter and controversy, the President’s response to cyber issues has been underwhelming. Key deadlines on publicly articulated deliverables have been missed entirely and other initiatives are lagging. While there are inklings of plans to strengthen America’s online infrastructure and systems, including through partnership with the private sector, technology moves notoriously faster than politics. If President Trump doesn’t act soon, it will continue to be dangerously vulnerable.

Much of the story about Trump’s first 100 days in the cyber context is rooted in the scandal over whether or not the Russian government played a role in determining the outcome of the U.S. elections, through various hacking and doxing schemes, and by extension, if the then-presidential candidate had a role in any of it. To refresh our memories, this first began in June 2016 when the Democratic National Committee reported an intrusion into its computer network and the cyber security firm CrowdStrike publicly blamed Russian hackers, following their investigation. As stolen emails from the committee began to appear on public sites, there were other voices – from the government and the intelligence community – reinforcing the view that the attacks originated from the Russian government.

In December the already suspected motive for these actions gained credence when the Washington Post disclosed a secret CIA assessment that declared it “quite clear” that a Trump presidency was the ultimate goal of the hacks. In January, the CIA, FBI and NSA – referring to themselves collectively as the “intelligence community” – publicly concluded that Russia had used cyber methods in pursuit of “undermining public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary [Hillary] Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency”.

While attribution in cyber space is complex and difficult, it is not impossible. Good forensics can uncover digital fingerprints. Ascribing such a clear and conclusive motivation to a cyber operation is more unusual, often because the evidence is circumstantial at best. Not surprisingly, the intelligence report prompted a maelstrom of finger pointing, accusations and reactions from President Obama before leaving office.

The response from then President-elect Trump was quite clear, in that he said he would appoint a team to provide an anti-hacking plan within 90 days of taking office. This was reinforced by a tweet on January 13 and followed up by an event on cyber security in late January that featured former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani, who now leads a group tasked with building private sector partnerships on cyber security. At the time Trump said, “We must protect federal networks and data. We operate these networks on behalf of the American people and they are very important.”

The 90-day mark for this plan has now come and gone with nothing in sight nor any updates on its status. As we now hit the 100-day milestone, most in the community are wondering if this plan will ever emerge.

Also languishing is the Senate Intelligence Committee’s probe into the election interference, including whether there was any coordination between the Kremlin and Trump. The Committee announced it had agreed on the scope of its investigation more than three months ago, and claims it has done some initial work. But it is significantly hampered by lack of capacity, recently promising to add more staffers after being criticized for lacking full-time dedicated staff, and those working on it part-time said to lack investigative experience.

On the international front, the State Department recently argued that a proposed new treaty to govern cyberspace would be “misguided” and “misses the mark.” Microsoft has recently begun to call for such an agreement, referring to it as a “Digital Geneva Convention." There are various multilateral discussion fora in which states meet to discuss behavioral norms in cyberspace that the United States participates in; some wonder if this will change.

The one bright spot is a pending executive order on cyber security that is expected any day. Leaked drafts indicate that it could mandate agency-by-agency reviews of security practices and requiring agency compliance with the National Institute for Standards and Technology cyber security framework. It might also make it a policy to modernize information technology or encourage the expansion of the cyber workforce. Overall, the emphasis would be on improvement and modernization; which could lay the groundwork for related legislation.

This would be positive. Research shows us that that the more developed and technologically sophisticated a country is, the more vulnerable it becomes to hacking and other malicious cyber operations because so much of how it functions involves digital networks. This vulnerability is true for both foreign and domestic cyber attacks. As Symantec recently noted, the 2015 hack of the Office of Personnel Management continues to impact the federal government technologically and financially, while state and local governments, as well as universities, find themselves under constant attack and struggling to defend the safety of the vast amount of information they keep.

It’s also clear that this is not a problem that will go away anytime soon. To date, most cyber "conflict" actually entails low-level antagonistic actions like hacking, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or similar. But what is very much on the minds of many governments is how to protect their critical infrastructure, which could range from electrical grids to, in the case of the United States, nuclear or other weapons systems.

At what point does software become a weapon, and how can the arms control community, in the United States and elsewhere, address this? Experts believe it’s unlikely that a nuclear weapon could be detonated through a cyber operation or attack, but is a possibility not to be dismissed. More likely is that nuclear weapons software and associated systems could be altered as they are being built, or electronic signals might somehow be sent to nuclear weapons. Hackers could also wreak havoc through manipulating information that these systems depend on. The methods and means by which something like this, or other malicious operations, would occur require more thought.

Allison Pytlak is a Program Manager in the disarmament program (Reaching Critical Will) of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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Mexico, Arms, and the Trump Administration

4/27/2017

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John Lindsay-Poland

This video blog is the sixth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

In this video interview, John Lindsay-Poland addresses three questions, at markers indicated below:

0:05 How is President Trump perceived in Mexico on arms trade issues?
1:54 What trends do you see in arms sales and end use control?
see also slides on U.S. arms sales to Mexico
4:25 What recommendations do you have?

John Lindsay-Poland is Wage Peace program coordinator with the American Friends Service Committee. Based in California, he travels frequently to and works with communities in Mexico.

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Donald Trump and The Death of Diplomacy

4/26/2017

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This is the fifth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

William D. Hartung

Donald Trump prides himself on being the master of the “art of the deal.” But if his plans to slash spending on diplomacy are approved by Congress, there won’t be anybody home to make deals with other governments, except for Trump and his inner circle, who have so far shown a shocking lack of knowledge of foreign affairs.

Trump’s budget blueprint proposes to cut funding for the State Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) by 28%. This steep reduction is being imposed on an agency that is already underfunded, receiving just one-twelfth of the roughly $600 billion per year provided to the Pentagon. A few years ago, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put this in perspective when he noted that it takes more personnel to operate one aircraft carrier task force than there are trained diplomats in the U.S. Foreign Service.

Trump’s downgrading of diplomacy does not bode well for the ability of the United States to prevent or rein in conflicts, and may actually lead to more, and longer, U.S. military interventions. Donald Trump’s own secretary of defense, James Mattis, made this very point when he was the head of the U.S. Central Command, asserting in a Congressional hearing that if the State Department budget is cut, “I’m going to need more ammunition.”

With diminished diplomatic tools available, the Trump administration is liable to engage in the kind of unfocused military bluster we saw in its one-off cruise missile attack on a Syrian airfield in response to a chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians and its threat of preemptive military action against North Korea if it tested a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, the administration is increasing the U.S. presence in Iraq and Syria, stepping up U.S. involvement in the disastrous war in Yemen, and talking about increasing U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan – all the while encouraging U.S. military leaders to “take the gloves off” by easing the criteria for selecting bombing targets, with a noticeable uptick in civilian casualties as a result. Absent a diplomatic strategy and the personnel to craft one, U.S. involvement in these wars is likely to escalate, with increasingly negative consequences for the United States and its allies.

Another set of policy instruments that the Trump administration is likely to lean on in the absence of a robust diplomatic corps is the wide array of arms and training programs funded and operated by the Pentagon. These programs have grown dramatically since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. According to data compiled by the Security Assistance Monitor, Pentagon-funded assistance grew from $1 billion in 2002 to $10.8 billion in 2015. These funds are spread across dozens of separate initiatives that support arming and training the militaries of over 100 countries. There have been notable failures, like the lavishing of hundreds of millions in aid on the Saleh regime in Yemen under the Pentagon’s 1206 program, assistance that ended up placing arms in the remnants of the regime’s army that is now fighting along Houthi forces in that nation’s civil war.

The underlying problem is that these programs have never been adequately evaluated to determine if they are effective in meeting U.S. security objectives. As the Congressional Research Service noted in a report on the subject, “the assumption that building foreign security forces will have tangible U.S. national security benefits remains a largely untested proposition.”

It is difficult to track the Pentagon’s aid programs under the best of circumstances, but at the moment there is literally no way to know how they will fare in the fiscal year 2018 budget. Details on how much the Trump administration will spend on Pentagon assistance, and which programs will be favored, awaits the release of the administration’s full budget submission to Congress. But the fact that these arms and training programs could be implemented in the context of a rapidly shrinking diplomatic corps is cause for concern.

William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy.

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Defense Spending and Employment Under The Trump Administration

4/26/2017

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This is the fourth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future. This entry is authored by a member of the Forum's emerging expert program, designed to give opportunities to individuals beginning their careers on these issues.

Robert Watson

President Trump has articulated few goals as thoroughly as his commitments to defense spending and job creation. His budget proposal would increase defense spending by $54 billion while cutting programs related to education, clean energy, and social welfare. And just last week he signed the “Buy American and Hire American” executive order, intended to protect the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. This order requires that federal procurement programs buy American made goods, and will restructure the H-1B visa program to make American workers more competitive. However, these policies may not be entirely compatible with respect to American security and employment. Defense spending is not nearly as effective at job creation as investment in the areas that Trump’s budget neglects, and labor restrictions may lessen the competitiveness of American defense equipment abroad.

Defense Employment

It should be noted that Trump’s defense budget is not simply for the purpose of job creation, but it is an important part of the rationale for defense spending. In 2014, the defense and aerospace industry provided direct and indirect employment to 4.4 million individuals, about 2.8% of the U.S. civilian labor force that year. From 2015 to 2016, jobs in the sector increased 3.2% after five years of decline due to the 2011 Budget Act and the military’s drawdown in the Middle East. Nevertheless, defense spending cannot and should not increase indefinitely to maintain the sector’s relatively small contribution to employment.

While defense spending does create jobs, it is not nearly as effective as investment in other sectors, particularly those that stand to lose under Trump’s new budget. It is calculated that for every $1bn spent on defense, 11,200 jobs are created. Compare this to the 16,800 jobs per $1bn spent on clean energy, 17,200 from healthcare, and 26,700 from education spending.[1] These areas also produce higher paying jobs than defense in that funding more often contributes to salaries, which are spent on domestic purchases and not in foreign economies, and does not pay for exorbitantly priced military hardware. Weapons manufacturing projects require less and less “touch labor,” which means that more money goes to research and development that does little to stimulate the civilian economy. It is also dangerous to increase the dependence of American labor on defense, particularly if defense spending continues to be prioritized over other domestic sectors. If he is sincere in his commitment to American jobs, Trump should devote state resources to sectors like education, healthcare, and clean energy, all of which create more jobs per dollar than defense.

Jobs & Security Cooperation

Another challenge for Trump’s commitment to employment is apparent in the defense industry itself, and will have an effect on U.S. security cooperation. During a visit to a Boeing factory in South Carolina, Trump praised the company’s employment of local workers and pledged to impose a “substantial penalty” on companies that move workers to other countries. These penalties would diminish American defense manufacturers’ significant advantage in international markets by preventing them from accepting the increasingly common co-production requirements of purchasing countries. This would ultimately lessen the United States’ ability to secure and maintain strategic bilateral security partnerships abroad. On the other hand, building up foreign defense industries through co-production would increase competition and likely take jobs away from Americans in the long term.

Co-production requirements are particularly common for countries attempting to improve domestic manufacturing and technological capabilities like Japan and India. The potential U.S. sale of F-16s to India is a prime example of this type of arrangement, as any purchase made by the Indian government will require co-production of the aircraft in India. Senators John Cornyn (R-Texas) and Mark Warner (D-Virginia), the co-chairs of the India Caucus, have pressed the State and Defense Departments to approve this deal, but it may run afoul of Trump’s “Hire American” policy. F-16 manufacturing was recently relocated to Greenville, South Carolina from Ft. Worth and, if Trump wants to secure this strategic sale to India, it is likely he will have to make a small concession to jobs at this facility.

This move, which received glowing praise from Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) and was widely covered by national and local media, will only provide an additional 250 jobs in Greenville. Nevertheless, a loss of any portion of these jobs to India would surely draw vitriol from Trump’s supporters there, and provide a high profile contradiction to his position on employment. The defense industry sources components from around the world, and any penalties would put these manufacturers in a difficult position. In the short term, refusing co-production arrangements would keep jobs in the U.S., but make it much more difficult to facilitate security partnerships with U.S. allies. However, in the long term, accepting them may result in a loss of American jobs to foreign competition. In the meantime, Trump will have to decide between sticking to his guns and policy promises, and sealing the deal with America’s only “Major Defense Partner,” India.

Trump’s labor policies face a number of contradictions and challenges that will test his commitment to domestic employment and the defense industry. His “Buy American and Hire American” executive order will be a stumbling block to achieving U.S. security cooperation objectives, and will likely make the international arms trade more competitive, for better or worse. Furthermore, if Trump is really as committed to jobs as he claims, it would be more productive to invest in areas that are not related to defense, sectors that his current budget will leave wanting.

[1] Paul Holden, et al. Indefensible, (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2016), p.92.

Robert Watson is a Middle East and North Africa intern with the Security Assistance Monitor and a participant in the Forum’s emerging expert program.

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Trump on Arms Sales

4/25/2017

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This is the third entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Rachel Stohl

Shannon Dick

Three months into the Trump administration and President Trump has used arms sales to support security priorities and demonstrate a commitment to industry. Yet it remains unclear how and to what extent arms sales will be used as a tool of Trump’s foreign and defense policies.

Recent actions, however, appear to suggest that human rights will no longer be a priority for advancing or withholding U.S. arms sales and thereby supporting larger U.S. foreign policy interests. Indeed, since taking office, the Trump administration has pushed forward (but Congress has yet to fully review) arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that were previously put on hold by the Obama administration due to human rights concerns. The rationale behind these decisions to provide U.S. weapons to consistent human rights violators is largely based on counterterrorism priorities and the view that these arms transfers will significantly support campaigns against terrorist groups. But there is scant evidence that allowing these arms sales will contribute to U.S. strategic goals and objectives and will not result in further human rights abuses and civilian suffering. For example, the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen has resulted in devastating impacts on the Yemeni civilian population. The campaign, undertaken with U.S. supplied weapons, has consistently struck civilian targets and could help fuel anti-American sentiment and play into terrorist groups’ narrative, ultimately working against larger interests in working to stabilize the country and end the conflict.

The Trump administration is also trying to change the bureaucratic process surrounding arms sales to foreign governments. Reportedly, the Trump administration is considering replacing foreign military financing (FMF) grants with loans. The Trump administration seems to believe that having governments pay back their weapons purchases will save the United States money in the long run. However, such thinking fundamentally misunderstands the intent of the FMF program. FMF enables foreign governments to use U.S. government grants to purchase U.S. weapons primarily through the Foreign Military Sales program. The program is often used to support foreign militaries that would otherwise be unable to purchase U.S. systems and is often cited as a crucial means to promote national security interests. Indeed, FMF allows foreign partners and allies to acquire U.S. equipment – which is often more expensive than systems from other countries – and thus augment their own military capabilities while fostering stronger security relations with the United States.

Additionally, because FMF funds are almost exclusively reserved for the procurement of U.S. weapons and equipment, the program supports U.S. industry. As Andrew Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs under the Obama administration, aptly noted in commentary for Defense News, the FMF program “helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base, it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities.” Should the administration follow through with converting grants to loans, it could harm U.S. industry and lead business into other markets that offer less expensive alternatives, such as those maintained by Russia and China. In its budget blueprint, the administration stated that the shift to loans would “potentially [allow] recipients to purchase more American-made weaponry with U.S. assistance, but on a repayable basis.” But why would buyers pay for systems they used to get for free, and in fact pay more than if they were to seek military equipment from other suppliers?

The Trump administration’s initial arms sales efforts may work to weaken long-standing U.S. policy priorities regarding conventional arms transfers. In the short term, Trump’s policy decisions are minimizing the extent to which human rights concerns are taken into consideration. In the long-term, these arms sales may result in continued sales to a wider scope of actors with poor records of good governance. Additionally, in seeking changes to grant programs, Trump’s policies may undercut U.S. industry. Such decisions could ultimately backfire on U.S. interests, both economically and politically, and leave an arms trade legacy that risks negative consequences for years to come.

Rachel Stohl is a director of the Conventional Defense program at the Stimson Center.
Shannon Dick is a research associate at the Stimson Center and and a participant in the Forum’s emerging expert program.

Note: this post was edited at 12:11PM EDT on April 26 to clarify the status of the sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Nigeria.

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Proposed Arms Sale Is Not the Road to Peace in Nigeria

A View from the United Kingdom: Trump's First 100 Days

A View from Brazil: Trump's First 100 Days

A View from Canada: Trump's First 100 Days

Trump’s First 100 Days of Foreign Military Sales Notifications Were More Than Eight Times That of Obama’s - No Restraint in Sight

Cyber Insecurity Under Trump

Mexico, Arms, and the Trump Administration

Donald Trump and The Death of Diplomacy

Defense Spending and Employment Under The Trump Administration

Trump on Arms Sales

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