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Solving the Rubik’s cube: what’s next for norms in cyber space

12/27/2018

2 Comments

 
This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Allison Pytlak
A slow drift toward a militarized cyber space has characterized the last few years. At the same time, an ever-growing patchwork of multilateral initiatives has sprung up to curtail hostile actions in this domain and articulate behavioral norms for states. From high-level political declarations to closed expert groups, governments, the tech sector, academics and others are full of ideas and suggestions. Yet, are these initiatives succeeding? Do they address human impact? Do they offer change, or accept and embody the same politicization and double standards that bedevil other security issues?  
 
In 2019, it is virtually certain that hostile cyber operations will continue to occur—both between governments, and between governments and citizens. What are these threats exactly, and how can the global community act to keep the peace in cyber space?
 
The threat, is real
 
2018 was another active year for hostile cyber operations, to put it mildly.  State-sponsored hacking groups zeroed in on prominent international entities such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, alongside other targets like universities and hotel chains. Data exposure schemes kept pace with data breaches. We learned more about the vulnerability of the United States’ electrical grid.
 
While these operations do not constitute the doomsday scenarios that early cyber watchers predicted, they have nonetheless generated an increasingly militarized response from governments and experts, in which it is taken for granted that this is and will continue to be a fighting domain, and the best we can do is establish some rules of the road for damage control. This mentality is reflected in the role that digital technologies now play in some national cyber strategies and military doctrines. For instance, in September 2018 the United States’ new National Cyber Strategy adopted an aggressive stance, promising to "deter and if necessary punish those who use cyber tools for malicious purposes." The U.S., the United Kingdom and Australia have been open about the use of offensive cyber tactics against the Islamic State. Germany has slowly been transitioning to a more offensive approach; other European countries have been open about seeking the same.  
 
The slow drift can also be seen in how and where states are discussing international cyber security. In the United Nations (UN), this is an offshoot of disarmament and arms control bodies. Other multilateral fora tend to bring together individuals with that background as well. Consequently there is frequently an effort to import and apply hard security concepts to this domain—“cyber deterrence” is one example; efforts to fit traditional arms control regime-style solutions are another.
 
Accepting the militarization of cyber space without question further risks adopting frameworks and guidelines that are more permissive of harm to the population than international law allows, pushing the possibility of achieving cyber peace further away.
 
Many responses, any real solutions?
 
Navigating through the volume of policy and normative proposals that exist to guarantee global cyber stability is a bit like trying to line up the colors in a Rubik’s cube: you can see some patterns, but getting all those squares to click into place is a challenge. Below is a non-exhaustive overview.
 
The UN, the world’s largest multilateral negotiating fora, has since 2004 been the home of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on information and communications technologies, or ICTs for short. The early Groups examined existing and potential threats in cyberspace and possible cooperative measures to address them, while more recent ones worked to develop behavioral norms for actions in cyberspace, culminating in eleven norms that were recommended by the Group in 2015 and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly.  
 
This seems to have been a highpoint for the Group however—significant differences over foundational questions such as the applicability of international law and the UN Charter to cyber space prevented agreement on a report in the next round. The geopolitical lines along which countries were divided is nothing new (in general terms, the west versus the rest) yet the extreme degree to which this issue became polarized in 2018 was unexpected, and has resulted in a procedurally conflicted and potentially counterproductive two-track UN approach to one of the most ubiquitous security threats facing the international community today. In 2019, there will be two UN entities concurrently taking work forward on cyber security norms: an open-ended working group that originated from a Russian-led initiative, and a US-inspired GGE. Exactly how these entities will interact remains unknown and the cost and administrative burden of managing both is not insubstantial.
 
Some have noted that deadlock at the UN gives impetus to, and space for, the efforts of other stakeholders. Governments, the tech sector, and other experts have been interacting for years through the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, which, in November 2018 proposed a set of six norms toward cyber stability. Also in November, France launched its Paris Call for Trust and Security Cyberspace during the Paris Peace Forum. The Paris Call is unique in bringing together endorsements from government, industry, and non-governmental organizations, but so far lacks support of some states, including Russia, China, United States, India, and Brazil.
 
Within the technology sector, Microsoft has framed itself as something of a moral compass in this space, first by publishing its own International Cybersecurity Norms in 2015 and most recently by playing a driving role in the Cyber Tech Accord. The Accord binds together 60 companies to partner on initiatives that improve the security, stability and resilience of cyber space—although some critics argue that implementation has fallen short. Somewhere in between the norms and the Accord, Microsoft’s CEO also called for the development of a Digital Geneva Convention in 2017, building somewhat on the contributions of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the literature on the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber space.
 
Clearly, from the number of times that I have used the word “norms” in the last several paragraph, both state and non-state actors alike are fans of developing some—or of implementing those that are already agreed. Yet what of something legally binding? That’s even more of a fraught issue, tangled up in geopolitical and ideological divide. Russia has been proposing a UN cyber treaty for well over a decade but has not gained sufficient support from other states, largely because elements of the draft it has put forward could legitimize some of their more nefarious domestic practices in curtailing internet freedom. Any new treaty-based initiative—and support for that does exist— would need to somehow account for this in a way that doesn’t isolate support or spark competition. It would also need to navigate existing regional and bilateral cyber security pacts.
 
Taking a people-centered approach in 2019
 
Perhaps the biggest blind spot in all the above initiatives is the human one. Very little information related to the human impact of cyber operations makes its way into multilateral discussion forums on cyber security and this contributes to institutionalization and taking for granted the broader societal harm of cyber conflict.
 
There is, however, an ever-growing and highly credible evidence base illustrating the negative uses of digital technology in repressing human rights, notably the rights to freedom of expression, speech, assembly, and privacy. This is not a practice limited to just a handful of governments, but one that is practiced in many parts of the world.
 
The human rights dimension of the cyber security agenda is usually separated out from the “international security” agenda, at least in the context of the UN. This is due in part to the structure of the UN itself, but possibly also because it’s politically awkward—some of the countries that are the largest proponents of cyber stability and norm development, for example, are also quietly permitting the export of digital surveillance technologies produced by companies in their jurisdiction. This has been an on-going debate among European Union countries in particular, in which the dual-use nature of digital surveillance technologies has been at times an excuse for not taking a meaningful policy response.  
 
Continuing to factor out human rights and humanitarian impact from inter-governmental discussions about global cyber security makes it easier to think of this domain in purely military and hard security terms. Our experience in banning nuclear weapons and regulating the global arms trade demonstrates that incorporating these perspectives can alter the discourse and generate people-centered responses.  
 
Where to from here?

Like a genie out of the bottle, it’s unlikely that the digital threats will decline in 2019, so to return to the question posed at the beginning of this blog: how can the global community act to keep the peace in cyber space?
 
First, we must stop using the same words, language, and approaches that we apply to traditional disarmament and security issues, and understand cyber space on its own terms: as both a medium in which conflict can occur, as well as a multi-faceted tool to cause disruption and harm offline. Trying to determine what a cyber bomb equates to in the kinetic world is futile; there is no such thing, and this of thinking encourages “round peg in square hole”-type solutions.
 
Yet, we cannot underestimate the vulnerability of digital networks and systems that prop up existing weapons and weapon systems. Nuclear weapons are vulnerable to cyber operation. The systems that enable unmanned aerial vehicles are vulnerable to cyber attacks. This should be further incentive to disarm.
 
Third, it’s frustrating that progress at the UN has been held hostage by power politics. It’s also concerning that two of the world’s largest cyber bullies are at the helm of new efforts. This can, however, be an opportunity for other states to step up and play constructive roles in bridging differences and brokering solutions,—as they’ve started to, along with other stakeholders.
 
Fourth, it will be important to harmonize efforts across the patchwork of responses identified here, in order to avoid redundancy and maximize knowledge and move toward implementation of what has already been agreed. States should establish the strongest norms against malicious operations—and reduce the motivation to pursue aggressive cyber capabilities.
 
Last, we must stop overlooking the human dimension and talking about cyber security in sanitized and faceless terms. Human rights considerations, for example, should be included in all discussions rather than being sidelined in the standard arms control and disarmament forums.


Allison Pytlak is the Programme Manager of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
 
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The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

12/19/2018

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Ray Acheson
2018, for some reason, was a turning point for international diplomatic recognition of gender dimensions of weapons and disarmament policy. After years or even decades—or in WILPF’s case, a century—of feminist advocacy for governments and activists to take gender into account in their work, we seem to breaking new ground.
 
In March, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva collaborated with WILPF, Small Arms Survey, and the Gender Mine Action Programme on a one-day training for disarmament diplomats about including gender perspectives in their work. In April, WILPF coordinated with the Canadian mission in New York on a meeting that brought together the women, peace and security (WPS) and disarmament diplomatic communities to exchange on the same subject.
 
In May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his new disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future. It includes a section on “Ensuring the equal, full, and effective participation of women,” and there are several references throughout the document to the gendered impacts of weapons, gender-sensitive arms control, or women’s participation in disarmament, including urging states to incorporate gender perspectives in their national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control.
 
In June, the Third Review Conference to the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) adopted a report with groundbreaking references to armed gender-based violence, the gendered impacts of small arms, and women’s participation in disarmament. The document builds on gains made in 2012 and 2016 to alleviate the overall gender blindness of the UNPoA. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network coordinated input and advocacy amongst civil society groups and diplomats for the inclusion of these elements in the outcome document, including through the civil society Call to Action on gender and small arms control.
 
In August, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) considered gender issues for the first time, in a side event hosted by the government of Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Mines Action Canada, Project Ploughshares, and WILPF on the relationship between gender and fully autonomous weapons. Participants addressed gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms in relation to the development and use of weapons, gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.
 
In October, the Canadian mission to the UN organized a push to increase gender references in resolutions at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Working with other governments and civil society groups, they managed to achieve language in 17 resolutions that advocates for women’s equal participation, recognizes gendered impacts of weapons, or urges consideration of gender perspectives more broadly. This accounts for 25 percent of all First Committee resolutions in 2018. Six of these resolutions included gendered language for the first time, while three improved the gendered language. For comparison, in 2017, 15 per cent of resolutions made gender references. This figure was 13 per cent in 2016 and 12 per cent in 2015. The number of First Committee delegations speaking about gender and disarmament in their statements also continued to increase this year. Namibia on behalf of 56 states dedicated a whole statement to this topic, urging examination of how “underlying assumptions about how gender shapes [delegations’] own work and the dynamics of joint disarmament efforts.”
 
Also in October, the Latvian ambassador, who will preside over the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, announced that the conference and its preparatory meetings will focus on the gender-based violence provision of the Treaty as a special theme. This will provide an opportunity in 2019 to advance consideration of how to implement this aspect of the ATT, including using guidance and case studies published by groups like WILPF previously.
 
In addition to these forum-based efforts, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research joined the governments of Ireland, Namibia, and Canada to form the Disarmament Impact Group as an output of the International Gender Champions. The Group aims to “support the disarmament community in translating gender awareness into practical action across the range of multilateral disarmament processes and activities.” Meanwhile, academic sources like Critical Studies on Security and the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, news sources like The Nation, and public speaking forums from TEDx to the London School of Economics featured articles and talks about feminism, gender, and weapons. This has signaled an opening of academic and activist spaces for increased consideration of these issues.
 
So, why has all this happened so quickly? In reality, it hasn’t. It is built on a firm foundation of activism and analysis. Feminist disarmament activists and academics, particularly those with groups like WILPF and the IANSA Women’s Network, have been writing and campaigning on gender and disarmament for decades. UN agencies and some governments have been working to mainstream gender in their programming for a long time, certainly since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This has led to concrete outcomes at international disarmament diplomacy forums in recent years: the first UN General Assembly resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in 2010; the inclusion of gender-based violence in the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013; the recognition of the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and encouragement of women’s effective participation in disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Chair’s summary and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.
 
External factors are also at play. The #MeToo movement has arguably awoken new acceptability and credibility of previously hidden or shamed perspectives and experiences. Women, trans, queer, non-binary, and non-conforming folks, as well as men who have experienced sexual and gender-based violence have collectively created new spaces to amplify these realities and demand change.
 
At the same time, several governments have begun pursuing what they term “Feminist Foreign Policy”. While it is debatable whether or not the foreign policies outlined by these governments can yet be truly described as feminist, it is a welcome development for government offices to be considering feminism not just a valid but an imperative approach to their international engagement.
 
In disarmament forums, momentum certainly seems to be on our side. There is a growing acceptance among a diverse range of governments, international organizations, and civil society groups about the reality that weapons have gendered impacts, and that women’s participation in disarmament is important. This is good progress, and imperative to making change in this field. But it’s not enough.
 
The work ahead
 
For one thing, the demand for women’s equal, effective, or meaningful participation—while necessary and welcome—is insufficient for truly making change in weapons policy. Our current situation is dire. Trillions of dollars are being spent on militaries and technologies of violence while poverty, inequality, and climate change threaten our collective security and safety. Disarmament, as a policy and practice that leads us away from militarism and towards peace, requires new understandings, perspectives, and approaches to weapons and war. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of survivors of gun violence, of nuclear weapons use and testing, of drone strikes, of bombardment of towns and cities. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of marginalized communities—LGBT+ folks, people of color, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, people with disabilities.
 
Diversity is not about political correctness. It is the only way we are ever going to see change in the way that we confront issues of peace and security. Where we have achieved the most disarmament progress in recent years—banning landmines and cluster bombs and nuclear weapons, for example—we have engaged with diverse communities and put humanitarian perspectives over the profits of arms industries or the interests of powerful governments. This is not just about including women, especially women who come from the same or similar backgrounds as the men who already rule the table. It’s about completely resetting the table; or even throwing out the table and setting up an entirely new way of working.
 
Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behavior of those who have the most privilege. Diversity is not for its own sake, but for how it impacts what is considered normal, acceptable, and credible. Confronting norms, especially gendered norms, around weapons and war is imperative to making progress on disarmament.
 
As a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. This association comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”.
 
This type of violent, militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not comply with that gender norm—women, queer-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. It also results in violence against men. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. A big part of this is about preserving or protecting their masculinity—a masculinity that makes male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless resolutions and reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.
 
We are all suffering from the equation of violence and power with masculinity. It prevents those who identified as men from being something else—from performing gender differently. It prevents all of us as human beings to promote or explore strength, courage, and protection from a nonviolent perspective. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd.
 
It also makes it impossible to achieve gender justice. It keeps men and women in binary boxes based on their biological sex. It maintains a strict hierarchy between these boxes, in which men are tough, rational, and violent, while women are weak, irrational, and passive. In this narrative, men are agents; women are victims. (And reinforces the idea that there is nothing outside of this binary.)
 
The norm of violent masculinity will continue to cause suffering and reinforce inequalities until we get serious about doing something differently. This is a project of dismantling the patriarchy, which is a big project, but it starts with the language we use, the people we include in discussions, and the norms we are willing to challenge.
 
For 2019, let’s stop using the term “women and children”. They are not the same legally or politically. They have different needs and abilities. Let’s talk about the different impacts of weapons based on gender and age, instead of womenandchildren on one side and men on the other. Let’s talk about gender diversity in disarmament, instead of just the equal participation of women and men. Let’s get away from binary language to something more inclusive. Let’s also include survivors and those impacted by weapons, war, and violence. Let’s think about what we consider credible or powerful, and why we think that way.
 
As more and more governments and organizations become interested in taking up gender, and as feminists around the world from all walks of life smash down barriers outside the disarmament field, let’s not waste the opportunities ahead of us. An intersectional feminist approach to disarmament is imperative, and we have all the tools we need to achieve it.
 
Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
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U.S. Drone Policy

12/18/2018

2 Comments

 
This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Rachel Stohl
Picture
Shannon Dick
Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly referred to as drones, have become increasingly common in military operations and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions around the world. Although the United States is the world’s leader in possessing and using armed drones, other countries are increasingly acquiring, seeking, and using lethal drone technology. In 2019. these countries may look to the U.S. example for guidance in developing their own policies on drones – which raises a number of concerns.  

Although the U.S. drone program in its current form has been active for over 15 years, it remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding the use of lethal drone strikes outside traditional battlefields and the resulting lack of accountability. Such features have come to define the U.S. drone program and ultimately hinder effective oversight as well as challenge assessments of the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S operations.
 
The United States has demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. And U.S. drone policy appears to be becoming less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable, lacking safeguards and transparency over the legal framework, use, and results of use.

In June 2018, Stimson released a report, An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy, that examined worrying trends surrounding the U.S. drone program with a particular view towards the Trump administration’s use of lethal drone strikes outside of traditional battlefields. The report found key concerns regarding changes the Trump administration has made to U.S. drone policy and use:
  • U.S. drone policy under the Trump administration has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, reversing course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows.
  • The Trump administration has increased the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes.
  • The threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, and the administration may have reasserted the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes.
In addition to concerning regressions in U.S. drone policy, the United States also seems recommitted to pursuing a problematic multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to the United States’. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN Member States signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones.

The development of international standards through the joint declaration process has raised serious concerns that the U.S.-led process will undermine existing frameworks and result in weak standards guiding drone transfers and use. In August 2018, Stimson released The ATT and Drones to support the discussion on international standards and provide a primer on existing international standards related to drones, cautioning that any international standards should not be lower than what already exists in legally binding law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and set a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our enemies utilize drones for their own purposes.

​Rachel Stohl is Managing Director at the Stimson Center and Shannon Dick is Research Associate with the Conventional Defense Program.

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Will reckless, risky and wrong-headed UK support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen continue?

12/14/2018

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Anna Stavrianakis
The war in Yemen has killed over 57,000 people since March 2015 and created a cholera epidemic and a politically induced, entirely preventable famine. The Saudi-led coalition is causing twice as many civilian casualties as all other forces fighting in Yemen – including the Houthis, who are also responsible for attacks on civilians and on aid and humanitarian actors. Primary support for the Saudi-led coalition comes from the USA; but a crucial junior partner is the UK. The UK government claims to have been at the forefront of international humanitarian assistance, giving more than £570 million to Yemen in bilateral aid since the war began. Yet the financial value of aid is a drop in the ocean compared to the value of weapons sold to the Saudi-led coalition – licences worth at least £4.7bn have been granted to Saudi Arabia and £860m to its coalition partners since the start of the war.
 
Rejecting responsible action
 
The UK’s own rules state that it cannot sell weapons to countries where there is a clear risk they might be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law. And the UK claims, repeatedly, to have one of the most rigorous control regimes in the world. Yet evidence of illegal civilian harm in the war is ongoing and growing.
 
So how does the UK government try to convince itself and others that its arms export policy is not in tatters? First, by batting away extensive evidence of violations of international humanitarian law, claiming it can't be sure they have happened. Despite a risk-based arms transfer control framework that is explicitly preventive in orientation, the UK government demands absolute certainty that its weapons have been misused before it will countenance a suspension – and even then, concerted action to stop weapons sales is not guaranteed. Second, by working with the Saudis to claim that if attacks on civilians have happened, they must have been a mistake. Central to this has been the Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) – headed by a Bahraini military lawyer who oversaw national security trials of over 300 pro-democracy protestors in 2011. The JIAT has investigated only a small proportion of alleged incidents, and its methodology, sources and case selection criteria remain unclear. Its conclusions have taken the form of blanket denial; admission of limited, accidental civilian harm; and most frequently, a defence of air strikes that it says were carried out in line with IHL. All of these responses are contested by NGOs tracking civilian harm in the war. And third, that any past misuse of weapons doesn’t necessarily mean future misuse is likely. In the judicial review of export policy, a senior civil servant’s evidence stated that “Past behaviour is a helpful indicator of attitude towards IHL and towards future behaviour, but it is not necessarily determinative”. It is difficult to imagine civil servants or High Court judges articulating such a position if they were working in counter-terrorism policy, an issue area that operates on the basis of suspicion, intuition and an absence of evidence.   
 
In these three ways, according to the UK government, while there may be a risk of weapons being misused in Yemen, that risk is not clear. The upshot is an exponential rise in arms sales since the war started, to the point where Saudi Arabia now accounts for almost half of UK arms exports.
 
Change ahead?
 
Nonetheless, there may be glimmers of hope for an end to the war in Yemen. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi has generated a crisis in US and UK policy that four years of war have failed to do. While his murder has little to do directly with arms sales, and it is dispiriting that four years of evidence of the misuse of weapons has failed to register in US and UK policy, it has shone a spotlight on the war in Yemen. Pre-talk consultations in Sweden between representatives of the government of Yemen and the Houthis ended on 13th December with an agreement that included a ceasefire in Hodeidah, steps to address the situation in Taiz, and prisoner exchanges. These are tentative, fragile steps that would mitigate civilian harm if adhered to, but still need considerable political effort to translate into an end to the war.
 
The US Senate has passed two resolutions to halt US involvement in the war and curtail its support for Saudi Arabia – a significant development. The US government has called for ceasefire – which sounds positive but may also be a move to block more radical action from Congress. In the UK, FCO Minister for the Middle East Alistair Burt appeared not to know the US was going to make that call. The UK is making increased efforts to address the humanitarian effects of its own support for the coalition by introducing a draft UN Security Council resolution – but this has been blocked by the US. Domestically, a former defence attaché to Riyadh spoke out about UK complicity through its arms sales in October 2018 – the first acknowledgement of the recklessness of UK policy from the military establishment. And a judicial review of UK policy is ongoing: the High Court found in favour of the government in July 2017, but Campaign Against Arms Trade has been granted an appeal, which will be heard in April 2019.
 
These moves illustrate the ways that the UK government has been forced to expend greater energy in justifying its position, working with the Saudi-led coalition to engage in legitimation work, and devote greater resources to the aid response. Looking forward to 2019, the major milestone for British policy on the horizon is the judicial review appeal. Will the Court of Appeal show greater independence from the government than the High Court? What new justifications will the government roll out? Watch this space. 


Anna Stavrianakis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex.
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