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Syria in 2020: the deadly legacy of explosive violence and its impact on infrastructure and health

12/17/2019

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Iain Overton
Picture
Jennifer Dathan
According to Action on Armed Violence’s data, throughout the course of the conflict in Syria, about three-quarters of injurious attacks there occurred in populated areas. This devastating use of explosive weapons has led to the destruction of towns and cities across Syria. In Aleppo alone, at least 15 million tons of rubble were created by this violence by 2017. These mountains of rubble, as well as the consequential redevelopment process, pose many environmental concerns for 2020 that could have a continuing and significant impact on the health of Syria’s beleaguered population. 
Scale of the damage
​

By 2017, 50% of basic social infrastructure in Syria was non-operational, mostly due to the destruction incurred during hostilities. This damage continued through 2018, including over 34,000 buildings damaged or destroyed just in Eastern Ghouta. Such harm continued across the country this year, and will do so until the conflict is brought to an end.

Estimates on the levels of rubble generated have only been carried out for Aleppo and Homs, with war damage creating 15 million and 5.3 million tons respectively. A 2019 study by REACH, a humanitarian initiative providing data from contexts of crisis, further revealed that Aleppo had almost 36,000 buildings damaged or destroyed, similar to Ghouta. Raqqa, with almost 13,000 buildings damaged or destroyed has witnessed a similar level of harm as Homs.
Picture
Figure 1 REACH, 'Syrian Cities Damage Atlas', 2019.
Overall, about a third of homes in Syria were thought to have been damaged or destroyed by 2017.  In 2018, the UN estimated the cost of material destruction in Syria at $120 billion. By 2019, 12 million people – half Syria’s pre-war population – were displaced. To clear the debris in Aleppo alone would take six years of continuous work and 26 million ‘truck-kilometers’ – but these are academic calculations.  There is not yet the equipment, funds, or capacity to carry out this work.

Combined the devastation of Syria raises serious environmental issues and health concerns, especially for those who remain or return, and those involved in clearing the destruction.
Concerns with debris

The debris poses serious health risks, exposing those in the impacted areas to hazardous material in both the air and the ground, such as toxic smokes and heavy metal. An indication of the consequences this may have on local populations might be seen from the significantly increased cancer risk for those exposed to the release of toxic dusts in the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001; some 43,000 people have been certified with a 9/11 related health condition, including almost 10,000 with a related cancer. More recently, in Paris, there has been concern over potential lead poisoning of the residents living nearby Notre-Dame Cathedral, after the fire and destruction in April 2019. 

Further environmental concerns for 2020 will be likely faced in things such as informal waste dumping and an increase in burning of waste as land is attempted to be cleared. In Lebanon, for instance, the debris left from the destruction of downtown Beirut in the civil war, which ended in 1990, contributed to the country’s lasting garbage problem, which – in turn - has led to pollution in the Mediterranean and caused significant air pollution for Beirut’s inhabitants.

A similar situation occurred in post-WWII Germany. Much of the 10 million tons of rubble taken from Nuremburg’s Old Town was deposited in an excavation pit. In the post-war years, waste continued to be dumped there. As few safety measures were carried out, leaching of this waste saw the connected Silver Lake become severely polluted, with lethal concentrations of hydrogen sulphide entering the lake. While the landfill has since been landscaped, forested and incorporated into the Volkspark Dutzendteich, the Silver Lake, or Silbersee, continues to be heavily polluted and at least fifty people have lost their lives after bathing in that lake.

Explosives among the debris
​

The failure rate of modern weapons is estimated to be about 10%. To give a scale of the numbers of weapons that may be lying in Syria unexploded, in just five months, the US-led coalition fired 30,000 artillery shells on Raqqa. With a 10% failure rate, this leaves about 3,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from just one party to the conflict in just one city. By 2018, at least 25,000 munitions had been dropped by the US-led coalition, while Russia declared more than 39,000 airstrikes in the first three years of fighting, and improvised explosive devices are littered across Syria’s scarred landscape.  The appetite for these state actors to identify the harm their bombing campaigns have caused, let alone address this harm, is minimal.

This mountain of lethal legacy makes clearance a far deadlier task. While IEDs are likely to cause injuries, the UXO from manufactured weapons generally contains significantly higher levels of explosives and tend to result in fatalities. Those carrying out the clearance are often unprepared for the task. 

When AOAV interviewed members of the Rojova Mine Control Organisation (RMCO) in 2018, they reported significant challenges to clearance efforts in Raqqa, including a lack of large and armored vehicles to clear the rubble, something necessary due to the ammunition and booby traps among the debris. 


As such, as organizations and experts do not have the capacity or equipment to clear the debris, many civilians will carry on in 2020 conducting this dangerous work. An Amnesty investigation found at least 1,000 people killed by explosives between October 2017 and April 2018 in contaminated areas – with many more dying before reaching medical care, and so going unrecorded. ​
Looking Ahead in Syria - and Beyond
​

Overall in 2020, Syria will face a mountain of conflict debris contaminating its land, air, and water, a large proportion of this caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. And it is not just Syria. Iraq, Yemen, and the Philippines are among those who have also experienced such destruction in recent years. And so, as Syrians begin to clear rubble and slowly rebuild, the safety of civilians in such clearance should be a pressing priority for humanitarian agencies. This means minimizing civilians’ exposure to toxic dust, ensuring materials are disposed of in a way that minimizes contamination of soil and water supplies, and clearing UXO. Without such measures – and fast – the Syrian conflict will continue to claim more lives. 
 
Iain Overton is Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and Forum-listed expert. Jennifer Dathan is a Researcher at AOAV.
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Explosive weapons in populated areas: looking ahead to 2020

12/16/2019

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Laura Boillot
After a decade of work building concern over the use of explosive weapons in towns, cities and other populated areas, an ambitious timeframe has now been set out for developing an international political declaration in the first half of 2020. The aim of the initiative is to develop a tool to tackle the high levels of civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas by driving change in government and military policy and practice.  
 
It is urgently needed. Over the past decade, data shows that when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, 90% of the casualties are civilians. Explosive weapon systems - including aircraft bombs, artillery, mortars and rocket systems - function by projecting blast and fragmentation across an area, and around the point of detonation, often causing multiple casualties in a single incident. This is a pattern of harm documented in Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, among other places.
 
Even looking beyond the tens of thousands of civilians that are killed and injured each year, and the many more that are traumatised, the effects of explosive weapon systems have a devastating impact on the fabric of a city and the built environment.  Buildings are reduced to rubble, hospitals and medical facilities are destroyed, and schools are forced to close. The provision of essential services is hampered. The scale of impact goes far beyond those immediately hurt, or those in the vicinity of the attack, and the impact can be felt long after the bombing ends.
 
Ill-suited for use in urban centres and other populated areas, heavy explosive weapon systems are particularly problematic owing to their large destructive capacity and high explosive content, inaccuracy, and ability to fire multiple warheads across an area – or a combination of these factors. Particular emphasis has rightly been put on addressing use of explosive weapons with wide area effects – and excessively wide in relation to the military objective being targeted.
 
Key milestones in 2019
The situation is not entirely without hope. Important progress has been made in 2019 to address this issue at the political level.
 
This issue featured prominently once again in the UN Secretary-General’s report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict issued in May 2019. Citing examples from a range of countries devastated by conflict, he concluded that the protection of civilians in armed conflict is both “tragic and appalling.” A case in point is the city of Raqqa, Syria, which experienced regular airstrikes and shelling, where nearly 80 percent of buildings in the city were destroyed or damaged and essential services, such as water, electricity and health care were absent or severely limited, rendering it inhabitable.
 
A central recommendation in this report is to avoid use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, owing to the cumulative, complex and long-term harm resulting from such use. The Secretary-General also reiterated his call on states to develop a political declaration on explosive weapons that would see states commit to avoiding the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas and develop operational policies based on a presumption against such use.
 
A joint warning by the UN Secretary-General and ICRC President was issued in September 2019 and reiterated the same message warning against use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area in populated areas, cautioning that “civilian devastation and suffering must stop.” It proposes militaries reassess and adapt their choice of weapons and tactics to avoid civilian harm, including taking combat outside of populated areas to try to reduce urban fighting altogether.   
 
States are starting to respond to the repeated calls of the UN Secretary-General. Following regional conferences in Africa in 2017, and Latin America in 2018, over 130 states met in Vienna in October 2019 for the first global conference on the protection of civilians in urban warfare, with a specific focus on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
 
The Vienna conference represented a turning point. The outcome of the meeting was broad support among participating states to start negotiations on developing an international political declaration on explosive weapons.
 
Later the same month, a joint statement at the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, led by Ireland and joined by a group of 71 states from all regions, expressed collective concern over the humanitarian impacts on civilians from the bombing and shelling in towns and cities and laid out the aim of negotiating an international political declaration in 2020.
 
Towards a political declaration in 2020
A widely-attended initial consultation with states on a declaration was convened by Ireland at the United Nations in Geneva in November 2019, gathering views from states and organizations on the type of actions endorsing states can be committed to undertaking. Some key themes from that discussion include:


  • Establishing a presumption of non-use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas
Many states and organisations highlighted that central to the issue, is recognising and addressing the link between the area effect of explosive weapons, and the risk of harm that using such systems in populated areas presents to civilians.
 
To address this, a presumption of non-use of explosive weapons with wide area effects should be established along with a requirement on states to actively implement this through the development and review of national operational policies and procedures. 
 
How to articulate the necessary restrictions over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in a declaration text will be a contentious issue, however. States engaged in military operations have expressed concerns over such restrictions.


  • “Existing law is adequate”
Some states argue that existing law is adequate. However, it is not an initiative aimed at changing the legal framework. There has been widespread support from states to develop a political declaration in order to drive operational change, and set clearer standards and expectations of behaviour around the use of explosive weapons.

  • “National military policies and procedures are adequate”
Certain states maintain that they have sufficiently robust military policies and procedures to adequately deal with the humanitarian harm from explosive weapon use in towns and cities, such as collateral damage estimation methodologies (CDEs) and complex targeting procedures.
 
However, the high levels of civilian harm point to the need for clearer guidelines that relate specifically to the use of explosive weapons with wide area effect in populated areas.
 
There are limitations to the extent that existing tools and procedures are sufficient in the absence of international standards that ensure the risk of harm from explosive weapon use is adequately reflected in these assessments. Nor do all states have policies, capabilities, and trainings relevant to the use of explosive weapons or are applying them. A declaration can help to identify, develop and exchange good practices.

​
  • Assisting victims and affected communities
A declaration should assist people and affected communities, including fulfilling the rights of victims, and ensuring basic needs are met in a timely manner, as well as safe and timely access to services.
 
Given the number of people that are impacted, and the extensive costs and work associated with rebuilding towns and cities, as well as the burden falling upon affected countries, the scope of this commitment has received some push back from certain states. But the fact that there are a large number of victims is not a justification for denying people their rights, but rather should be driver of the urgency of addressing this problem.
 
The next six months
The process laid out by Ireland is expected to conclude in May or June of 2020 in Dublin, following a series of meetings in Geneva in February and March or April of 2020. Ahead of the next meeting, a draft text will be circulated in the new year, and will be the basis of discussions moving forward.
 
It’s an ambitious timeframe but it can be concluded successfully in this period. It is a similar timeframe and approach that delivered the Safe School’s declaration a few years ago. Civil society’s goal will be on getting a declaration that is sufficiently strong in its commitments to have a meaningful humanitarian impact.
 
+++
 
Further reading
 
INEW has published a paper on key elements for a political declaration on explosive weapons in populated areas which can be found here: http://bit.ly/Elements4Declaration as well as a Frequently Asked Questions document http://bit.ly/INEWQandA which lays out more information on policy positions on key issues. 

Laura Boillot is the Coordinator of the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) and Programme Manager for Article 36.
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Arms Trade Issues Should See Center Stage in 2020 US Election

12/13/2019

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Jeff Abramson
The "should" in the title to this post is not an admonition, but rather a prediction. And a bold one. An impeachment effort is now underway related to conditions placed on security assistance to Ukraine. Plus, four Presidential vetoes were used in 2019: one to stop Congressional assertion of war powers in relation to the war in Yemen, and three to override rejection of "emergency" arms sales primarily intended to Saudi Arabia for that war. So, how could arms trade issues take an even greater public stage in 2020?

​It's the election.
As the 2020 campaigns kick into full gear, we should expect that those vying for the highest elected office will look for more areas where they can assert their differences with the President, especially on issues that the public supports. As the Forum's research into candidates positions is showing, there is a stark divide emerging in the approach Democratic candidates are taking on arms trade issues compared to Donald Trump. And opinion polling suggests many of these have a majority of Americans behind them.

At this moment, the divide is most striking as relates to support to Saudi Arabia. Of the seven Democratic candidates slated to appear in the December debate, six have indicated that they would cut off arms supplies to Saudi Arabia given Riyadh's behavior in the war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen. (Tom Steyer's position is unclear.) While public opinion polling highlighted by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs indicates that Americans are divided on the US relationship with Saudi Arabia,  a majority, regardless of party, do believe selling weapons makes the United States less safe. It is easy to see, and unfortunately tragic to predict, that another incident of misuse of US weapons by the Saudis will occur and make it into the headlines. With it will come attention again to US arms trade decisions.

Also at odds with the President, all the Democratic candidates have indicated their support for an assault weapons ban, another issue that has majority public backing. Thus far, however, Democratic candidates have not made the connection that it is illogical to oppose assault weapons at home while at the same time making their export more efficient. While the administration is pushing for just such changes, it is easy to expect more gun control-minded Democratic candidates to make the case that the Commerce Department is not the proper home for oversight of assault weapon exports. Two have done so thus far. As some members of Congress are already doing, candidates can also make the connection to US gun laws and exports with violence in Latin America that fuels Central Americans to flee north. We quickly then link to the wall and broader immigration debates, driving the arms trade into the brighter spotlight.

It's a bit more difficult to predict that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) itself will become an election issue. President Trump's repudiation of the treaty at an NRA convention in Indianapolis in April certainly was popular with the crowd there and echoed the ill-informed stance that Congressional detractors have taken that the treaty infringes on US rights. It would not be surprising that candidates who publicly criticize the NRA would also then take up the ATT. Three have explicitly supported the treaty thus far, and a number others have taken steps in the past to block opposition to it.

Candidates seeking to distinguish themselves from each other may also branch out into issues where positions have yet to be claimed. Public opinion polling shows that a majority of Americans are strongly or somewhat opposed to using lethal autonomous weapons systems in war
(aka killer robots). This is an obvious area where a candidate such as Andrew Yang, who comes from the tech field and talks frequently about artificial intelligence, could be the first to also acknowledge where human-centered limits make sense and support efforts such as those led by the growing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots to ban the development and use of such weapons. 

Other issues ripe for candidates to explore include declarations on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, an initiative with increasing international attention that currently lacks US diplomatic support. Treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, that are supported by nearly all of NATO and other traditional US allies, but to which the US has yet to commit, can also provide candidates a way to distinguish themselves.

It is, of course, much too early to predict who will be elected as president roughly 11 months from now. It is, however, a much safer bet that arms trade issues will have a prominent role in the public discourse that leads up to the November 3 vote.


Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade.
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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