Category: Middle East

Event Resources and Recommendations: War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Human Rights: the Middle East (August 30, 2022)

9/2/2022

On August 30, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Center for International Policy co-hosted an event exploring the global impacts of war in Ukraine, and examining the relationship of countries in the Middle East to that war and ongoing arms trade and human rights developments in the region.

Video of that event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfhnTc_QnH8&t=243s.

After the event, panelists provided the following recommendations and resources, building off of their comments during the event:*

Andrea Prasow, Executive Director, The Freedom Initiative

Enact sanctions for human rights abusers.
Support civil society in countries where possible, out of countries when necessary.
Reset diplomatic relations by turning down high-level, face-to-face meetings with abusers and make public the reason for doing so.
Don’t meet with human rights abusers without also meeting with human rights defenders.

Merve Tahiroğlu, Turkey Program Coordinator, Project on Middle East Democracy

The US should not sell weapons to dictators.
If it makes such sales, such as F-16s to Turkey, they should be made highly conditional. Congress should continue to express concern, as it is doing, which the administration can use to delay, at least until after Turkey's election next summer.
Related, Congress can include provisions and conditions (in the NDAA, for example) not only about conditions with the weapons but also on human rights, such as condition of certain prisoners as occurred earlier on the F-35 program.

Nancy Okail, President and CEO, Center for International Policy
see a more detailed version of the below at this link

Civil society could proactively engage with the emerging agreements and coalitions that are currently being formed in parallel to the JCPOA, to propose parameters for human rights provision for them to include in these new coalitions:
- a) push for the integration of human rights safeguards within current security dialogues,
- b) codify those measures as part of the security agreements, and
- c) propose monitoring mechanisms for human rights provisions, as well as accompanying legislations.

Invest in monitoring the operationalization of the US Department of Defense for a new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and put more pressure to link civilian harm to US military engagement in the Middle East.
Capitalize on the current momentum around security arrangements to scrutinize the implementation of counterterrorism measures and the way punitive laws are often manipulated to prosecute regime critics labeled "terrorists."
Civil society can continue to publicly and vocally oppose the $300 million in US military aid to Egypt.
To effectively help mitigate the effect of compounded crises, aid should be coupled with collaboration over reform and accountability mechanisms to prevent the depletion of these resources through corruption and lack of oversight.

Jeff Abramson, Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association (closing moderator)

Congress should use its 502B authority to ask the State Department for clearer assessments on select arms sales to the region.
Many provisions within the House version of the NDAA would provide greater transparency and for human rights elevation. Congress should take advantage of those when finalizing the NDAA.

Additional resources:

Joint Letter – Biden Administration Should Not Provide Military Aid to Egypt in Light of Egregious Human Rights Violations, August 8, 2022.
$3 billion potential sale of Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia, as well as a $2 billion-plus sale to the UAE of THAAD missiles, August 2022.
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, Department of Defense, August 25, 2022.
“Human Rights, Civilian Harm, and Arms Sales: A Primer on U.S. Law and Policy,“ CIVIC and ABA Center for Human Rights, February 2022.

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.

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Judicial Review redux in the UK over sales to Saudi Arabia and Coalition

1/6/2021

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Sam Perlo-Freeman

It seems like we’ve been here before. This year, the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) hopes to take the UK Government to court, seeking a Judicial Review over its decision last July to continue arms sales to Saudi Arabia and its coalition allies in the war in Yemen, in spite of the devastating human toll exacted by that conflict, and the overwhelming evidence of gross and repeated violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the Coalition.

Didn’t CAAT just win a case like this a year or so ago? Yes, indeed.

The story so far: In June 2019, the Court of Appeal, overturning a previous High Court decision, ruled that the process by which the government made decisions on export licences to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen was “irrational and unlawful”. Specifically, Criterion 2c of the government’s Consolidated Criteria on arms exports states that an export licence shall be refused if there is a “clear risk” that the equipment “might be used” for serious violations of IHL. Yet, the government had not even attempted an assessment of past patterns of violations of IHL by Saudi Arabia and the Coalition. Instead, it had relied on its ongoing engagement with and training of the Saudi government and military to conclude there was no “clear risk”.

The Court of Appeal rejected this absurd position, that a previous record of violations was irrelevant to an assessment of future risk, and the government had to stop issuing new licences to Coalition states for possible use in Yemen, and to retake all past licencing decisions on a lawful basis. (However, existing licences, including indefinite Open General licences, were not cancelled, allowing BAE Systems’ extensive support for the Saudi Air Force to continue unabated).

A year later, in July 2020, the government announced that it had completed its review, and concluded that all was well, there were only a “small number” of possible violations of IHL among all the hundreds of incidents assessed, and that these were “isolated incidents” that did not constitute any “pattern”. Therefore, there was indeed no “clear risk” of future violations, and that arms sales could continue without any concern for the potential civilian toll this might exact.

It is this latest decision that CAAT is challenging. The idea that there have only been a “small number” of violations of IHL flies in the face of a huge body of evidence from UN experts and Yemeni and international NGOs. These organisations have used highly rigorous methodologies and sources, and have access to on-the-ground witnesses, which the UK government does not. The evidence includes repeated bombings of residential areas, schools, hospitals, market places, agricultural targets, and many others, usually with no evidence of any nearby military target . According to the Yemen Data Project, almost a third of the thousands of Coalition air strikes since the bombing began in 2015 have struck civilian targets. The “patterns” of violations are plain to see.

The government have provided only the barest outline of how they have reached these, on the face of it, absurd conclusions. They have not said what constitutes a “small number” of cases, or what they mean by a “pattern”, only that the incidents occurred “...at different times, in different circumstances and for different reasons”.

The next stage of this saga – which started with CAAT’s initial application to the High Court in 2016 – is for CAAT to seek permission for a new Judicial Review - “JR2” - of the government’s review of licencing in response to CAAT’s victory in the original Judicial Review. This starts again with the High Court, and could yet go all the way to the Supreme Court. (For those not familiar with the UK court hierarchy, check this). While the full Grounds of CAAT’s application are subject to legal confidentiality, the basic premises are straightforward:

1) We challenge the conclusion that there are only a “small number” of cases of violations of IHL, based on the huge volume of evidence above.

2) We likewise challenge the conclusion that there is no “pattern” of violations.

3) We argue that, even if there were no “pattern”, this would not be sufficient to conclude that there is no clear risk of future violations. Even a single incident could constitute a serious violation of IHL, and there can very well be a risk of further “isolated” incidents even so.

Since we know so little about the government’s methodology, or even the details of their conclusions, which they say must be kept secret for reasons of national security, we have no idea what evidence the government may or may not have to support its conclusions. If we are granted permission for JR2, most of this evidence will have to be heard in Closed session, where CAAT will be represented by security-cleared Special Advocates, who cannot disclose the content of the sessions to CAAT or our regular lawyers.

We do not know, therefore, what secret evidence the government might bring to these closed sessions in an attempt to justify their conclusions. But we find it hard to believe that there is anything that could reasonably gainsay the vast weight of evidence from so many credible and respected sources.

The way it appears to us is that, whatever the evidence, and whatever courts have said about previous decision-making processes, the government is determined to find a way to interpret things that allow them to maintain its relationship with the UK’s overwhelmingly largest arms customer, Saudi Arabia, whatever mental and legal gymnastics this may require.

We hope that the courts will exhibit similar scepticism. The government must respond to our Grounds for Judicial Review by January 22nd, after which the High Court will decide if, on the basis of these submissions, we have a case. If not, we may still seek a hearing to decide if the case may proceed. If JR2 does get the go-ahead, it will be months yet before it comes to court.

The case, as they say, continues.

Sam Perlo-Freeman is Research Coordinator at the Campaign Against Arms Trade.

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Early Actions to Watch for a More Responsible U.S. Arms Trade Policy

1/4/2021

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

We should know almost immediately if the next U.S. administration will take a more responsible approach to the arms trade. That's because a 30-day Congressional review period on the sale of 7500 precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia will end just after the expected January 20 inauguration of the next President. At that point, the new Biden administration would be able to issue licenses for the sale (unless Congress quickly takes blocking actions before then). If Biden keeps to expectations, he will not issue those licenses. That would be consistent with his October 2 pledge:

Under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relationship with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.

If Biden truly wants to uphold values and make U.S. weapons recipients accountable for their actions, his administration could also take steps to slow and suspend major weapons sales to the United Arab Emirates. Less than a month ago, nearly all the Democrats in the Senate made clear their opposition to much of a $23 billion arms package to Abu Dhabi that the Trump administration is attempting to rush forward in its closing days. The UAE, which remains a key partner in the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen and is violating the UN arms embargo on Libya, simply should not be receiving U.S. arms at this time.

At present, there is not a clear indication from the incoming President on what he will do with these time-sensitive sales. Whether any of the necessary letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) have been signed with the UAE that would put contracts in place is not clear, despite Trump administration efforts to move ahead. If not, Biden can delay concluding them. If some LOAs are signed, he can also hold off on delivery, especially for armed drones, precision-guided and other munitions that could be transferred most quickly. While the Abraham Accords offer great promise for improving regional relations in the Middle East, the reward for the accords should be peace and a lessening of prospects for conflict, not the influx of tens of billions in new weaponry.

How the U.S. approaches arming yet other countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Qatar, Bahrain and more, will be closely watched as the Biden team has indicated a desire to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (a.k.a. the Iran nuclear deal). Fueling regional arms races could make that more difficult.

Biden has also promised to reverse the Trump administration policy that transferred export oversight for semi-automatic and many other small arms to the Commerce Department, which ended Congressional transparency into such sales. Quick steps to return to the previous policy would also show his administration seeks a more responsible arms trade approach.

As the Obama presidency was nearing its end in late 2016 and early 2017, his administration held back on weapons sale to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that the Trump administration later moved forward. It will be promising if Biden renews concerns about arms sales to many regimes with highly problematic human rights records that Trump has supported, including to the Philippines (amongst a long list of countries).

Even more telling would be actions to again support the Arms Trade Treaty. An easy early first step would be for the Biden administration to retract the letter Trump sent to the United Nations in 2019 that denied legal obligations from the United States' 2013 signature. Further efforts to honor U.S. signature to the ATT, including to seek ratification of the treaty (as embedded in the 2020 Democratic party platform), may take longer but would also show U.S. dedication to again align itself with nearly all its allies in promoting global norms on responsible arms trade.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade

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Syria in 2020: the deadly legacy of explosive violence and its impact on infrastructure and health

12/17/2019

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

Jennifer Dathan

According to Action on Armed Violence’s data, throughout the course of the conflict in Syria, about three-quarters of injurious attacks there occurred in populated areas. This devastating use of explosive weapons has led to the destruction of towns and cities across Syria. In Aleppo alone, at least 15 million tons of rubble were created by this violence by 2017. These mountains of rubble, as well as the consequential redevelopment process, pose many environmental concerns for 2020 that could have a continuing and significant impact on the health of Syria’s beleaguered population.

Scale of the damage

By 2017, 50% of basic social infrastructure in Syria was non-operational, mostly due to the destruction incurred during hostilities. This damage continued through 2018, including over 34,000 buildings damaged or destroyed just in Eastern Ghouta. Such harm continued across the country this year, and will do so until the conflict is brought to an end.

Estimates on the levels of rubble generated have only been carried out for Aleppo and Homs, with war damage creating 15 million and 5.3 million tons respectively. A 2019 study by REACH, a humanitarian initiative providing data from contexts of crisis, further revealed that Aleppo had almost 36,000 buildings damaged or destroyed, similar to Ghouta. Raqqa, with almost 13,000 buildings damaged or destroyed has witnessed a similar level of harm as Homs.

Figure 1 REACH, 'Syrian Cities Damage Atlas', 2019.

Overall, about a third of homes in Syria were thought to have been damaged or destroyed by 2017. In 2018, the UN estimated the cost of material destruction in Syria at $120 billion. By 2019, 12 million people – half Syria’s pre-war population – were displaced. To clear the debris in Aleppo alone would take six years of continuous work and 26 million ‘truck-kilometers’ – but these are academic calculations. There is not yet the equipment, funds, or capacity to carry out this work.

Combined the devastation of Syria raises serious environmental issues and health concerns, especially for those who remain or return, and those involved in clearing the destruction.

Concerns with debris

The debris poses serious health risks, exposing those in the impacted areas to hazardous material in both the air and the ground, such as toxic smokes and heavy metal. An indication of the consequences this may have on local populations might be seen from the significantly increased cancer risk for those exposed to the release of toxic dusts in the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001; some 43,000 people have been certified with a 9/11 related health condition, including almost 10,000 with a related cancer. More recently, in Paris, there has been concern over potential lead poisoning of the residents living nearby Notre-Dame Cathedral, after the fire and destruction in April 2019.

Further environmental concerns for 2020 will be likely faced in things such as informal waste dumping and an increase in burning of waste as land is attempted to be cleared. In Lebanon, for instance, the debris left from the destruction of downtown Beirut in the civil war, which ended in 1990, contributed to the country’s lasting garbage problem, which – in turn - has led to pollution in the Mediterranean and caused significant air pollution for Beirut’s inhabitants.

A similar situation occurred in post-WWII Germany. Much of the 10 million tons of rubble taken from Nuremburg’s Old Town was deposited in an excavation pit. In the post-war years, waste continued to be dumped there. As few safety measures were carried out, leaching of this waste saw the connected Silver Lake become severely polluted, with lethal concentrations of hydrogen sulphide entering the lake. While the landfill has since been landscaped, forested and incorporated into the Volkspark Dutzendteich, the Silver Lake, or Silbersee, continues to be heavily polluted and at least fifty people have lost their lives after bathing in that lake.

Explosives among the debris

The failure rate of modern weapons is estimated to be about 10%. To give a scale of the numbers of weapons that may be lying in Syria unexploded, in just five months, the US-led coalition fired 30,000 artillery shells on Raqqa. With a 10% failure rate, this leaves about 3,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from just one party to the conflict in just one city. By 2018, at least 25,000 munitions had been dropped by the US-led coalition, while Russia declared more than 39,000 airstrikes in the first three years of fighting, and improvised explosive devices are littered across Syria’s scarred landscape. The appetite for these state actors to identify the harm their bombing campaigns have caused, let alone address this harm, is minimal.

This mountain of lethal legacy makes clearance a far deadlier task. While IEDs are likely to cause injuries, the UXO from manufactured weapons generally contains significantly higher levels of explosives and tend to result in fatalities. Those carrying out the clearance are often unprepared for the task.

When AOAV interviewed members of the Rojova Mine Control Organisation (RMCO) in 2018, they reported significant challenges to clearance efforts in Raqqa, including a lack of large and armored vehicles to clear the rubble, something necessary due to the ammunition and booby traps among the debris.

As such, as organizations and experts do not have the capacity or equipment to clear the debris, many civilians will carry on in 2020 conducting this dangerous work. An Amnesty investigation found at least 1,000 people killed by explosives between October 2017 and April 2018 in contaminated areas – with many more dying before reaching medical care, and so going unrecorded.

Looking Ahead in Syria - and Beyond

Overall in 2020, Syria will face a mountain of conflict debris contaminating its land, air, and water, a large proportion of this caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. And it is not just Syria. Iraq, Yemen, and the Philippines are among those who have also experienced such destruction in recent years. And so, as Syrians begin to clear rubble and slowly rebuild, the safety of civilians in such clearance should be a pressing priority for humanitarian agencies. This means minimizing civilians’ exposure to toxic dust, ensuring materials are disposed of in a way that minimizes contamination of soil and water supplies, and clearing UXO. Without such measures – and fast – the Syrian conflict will continue to claim more lives.

Iain Overton is Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and Forum-listed expert. Jennifer Dathan is a Researcher at AOAV.

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Arms Trade Issues Should See Center Stage in 2020 US Election

12/13/2019

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

The "should" in the title to this post is not an admonition, but rather a prediction. And a bold one. An impeachment effort is now underway related to conditions placed on security assistance to Ukraine. Plus, four Presidential vetoes were used in 2019: one to stop Congressional assertion of war powers in relation to the war in Yemen, and three to override rejection of "emergency" arms sales primarily intended to Saudi Arabia for that war. So, how could arms trade issues take an even greater public stage in 2020?

It's the election. As the 2020 campaigns kick into full gear, we should expect that those vying for the highest elected office will look for more areas where they can assert their differences with the President, especially on issues that the public supports. As the Forum's research into candidates positions is showing, there is a stark divide emerging in the approach Democratic candidates are taking on arms trade issues compared to Donald Trump. And opinion polling suggests many of these have a majority of Americans behind them.

At this moment, the divide is most striking as relates to support to Saudi Arabia. Of the seven Democratic candidates slated to appear in the December debate, six have indicated that they would cut off arms supplies to Saudi Arabia given Riyadh's behavior in the war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen. (Tom Steyer's position is unclear.) While public opinion polling highlighted by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs indicates that Americans are divided on the US relationship with Saudi Arabia, a majority, regardless of party, do believe selling weapons makes the United States less safe. It is easy to see, and unfortunately tragic to predict, that another incident of misuse of US weapons by the Saudis will occur and make it into the headlines. With it will come attention again to US arms trade decisions.

Also at odds with the President, all the Democratic candidates have indicated their support for an assault weapons ban, another issue that has majority public backing. Thus far, however, Democratic candidates have not made the connection that it is illogical to oppose assault weapons at home while at the same time making their export more efficient. While the administration is pushing for just such changes, it is easy to expect more gun control-minded Democratic candidates to make the case that the Commerce Department is not the proper home for oversight of assault weapon exports. Two have done so thus far. As some members of Congress are already doing, candidates can also make the connection to US gun laws and exports with violence in Latin America that fuels Central Americans to flee north. We quickly then link to the wall and broader immigration debates, driving the arms trade into the brighter spotlight.

It's a bit more difficult to predict that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) itself will become an election issue. President Trump's repudiation of the treaty at an NRA convention in Indianapolis in April certainly was popular with the crowd there and echoed the ill-informed stance that Congressional detractors have taken that the treaty infringes on US rights. It would not be surprising that candidates who publicly criticize the NRA would also then take up the ATT. Three have explicitly supported the treaty thus far, and a number others have taken steps in the past to block opposition to it.

Candidates seeking to distinguish themselves from each other may also branch out into issues where positions have yet to be claimed. Public opinion polling shows that a majority of Americans are strongly or somewhat opposed to using lethal autonomous weapons systems in war (aka killer robots). This is an obvious area where a candidate such as Andrew Yang, who comes from the tech field and talks frequently about artificial intelligence, could be the first to also acknowledge where human-centered limits make sense and support efforts such as those led by the growing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots to ban the development and use of such weapons.

Other issues ripe for candidates to explore include declarations on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, an initiative with increasing international attention that currently lacks US diplomatic support. Treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, that are supported by nearly all of NATO and other traditional US allies, but to which the US has yet to commit, can also provide candidates a way to distinguish themselves.

It is, of course, much too early to predict who will be elected as president roughly 11 months from now. It is, however, a much safer bet that arms trade issues will have a prominent role in the public discourse that leads up to the November 3 vote.

Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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Explosive violence and the health challenges ahead for Syria

1/11/2019

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

It is a hard truth that explosive weapons have a devastating impact on health – from the direct blast that can tear limbs and families apart, to the widespread destruction of health infrastructure and all the painful reverberations this has. And nowhere else is this truism more evident than in war-torn Syria.

There, according to data by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), not only has the use of explosive weapons caused at least 79,000 direct casualties - of which about 85% (67,000) were civilians - but it has also devastated state and civilian infrastructure, causing immeasurable harm to healthcare. In Syria, direct casualties from such violence is just the beginning.

Today, with half of Syria’s basic infrastructure non-functioning owing to the war, civilians lack access to energy systems, clean water and other basic essentials – all factors that increase the risk of the spread of disease.[1] At the same time, explosive violence has radically reduced the capacity of health facilities across the country;[2] 60% of health-care services in Syria today lie damaged or destroyed.[3] So, whilst the demand for healthcare is greater than ever, access is significantly reduced and civilians are left ‘dying from injuries and illnesses that are easily treatable and preventable.’[4]

Many medical personnel have also been killed in bombardments; 57% of Syrian medical personnel deaths between March 2011 and December 2017 were caused by explosive weapon use.[5] Others have left; by 2018, with thousands of clinicians having fled the violence, just a third of healthcare workers are said to remain in the beleaguered nation.[6] Such an exodus poses a serious problem. Many physicians are unlikely to return; for some it may be unsafe to do so, for others they may have made a new life elsewhere. In a post-conflict environment, where demand is high and resources are few, medical staff may decide that a better quality of life is to be found in the countries they fled to.[7]

The result of this is that access to care is stretched thin. Doctors’ caseloads have more than doubled,[8] while the lack of staff means there are few specialised services, particularly as donor efforts focus on emergency funding for ‘cost effective intervention’.[9]

Blast survivors are amongst the worst impacted by this reality, faced with highly limited rehabilitation services and considerable difficulties reaching care in the first place. In desperate response to this, living with suppurating wounds and mounting ill-health, many patients have been increasingly misusing antibiotics, a considerable problem in the country even prior to the conflict.[10] Evidence suggests this has likely exacerbated antimicrobial resistance in Syria[11] – causing further significant obstacles for the future.

More than 11.3 million people are said to be in need of health assistance within Syria, including 3 million with injuries and disabilities.[12] A large percentage of those injured are likely to be due to explosive weapons. Amongst 25,000 injured Syrian refugees examined by Humanity and Inclusion, 53% had been injured by such weapons.[13]

In some of the worst impacted areas, the rate of injury and disability is disturbingly high. In a survey of injury and disability across Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa, as many as 50% of responders were said to be living with some form of disability.[14] The main cause of these injuries were airstrikes (54%), followed by other explosions (28%).[15]

Amputations are common – one doctor commented that Syria will be left with ‘a generation of amputees.’[16] Alongside this, a Humanity and Inclusion report found that, of injured people in Syria, around 8% required an orthopaedic fitting.[17] Furthermore, with the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) predicted to take 50 years, blast injuries are likely to continue to occur long after the conflict ends.[18]

Amputees have life-long healthcare needs: from rehabilitation and tissue management to further associated conditions, such as ectopic bone formations and osteoarthritis. Such conditions are difficult to manage in a developed healthcare system, let alone a post-conflict environment with a severely dilapidated and destroyed healthcare infrastructure.

The ruin of civilian infrastructure in Syria, beyond health infrastructure, will also have long lasting health impacts on the population. Again, with the displacement of skilled construction workers, alongside the sheer level of redevelopment needed, it is likely that such a threat to health will linger for a long time to come. Syria will almost certainly be witness to increased rates of water-borne or similar diseases in the coming years.[19] One study found physical damage to 457 water supply and sanitation infrastructure assets, not including damage to pipe networks.[20]

The mountains of rubble and waste left in the wake of the bombardment has – and will - also provide the perfect habitat for sand flies, leading to severe outbreaks of leishmaniasis; cases there have increased in recent years by a rate of at least 150%.[21] The most common form of leishmaniasis (cutaneous) causes severe skin lesions which can leave scars and inflict serious disability, but there has also been an increase in visceral leishmaniasis, which is often fatal. [22]

The widespread devastation may also herald further health disasters ahead. When explosive weapons destroy buildings, dangerous and toxic substances are often exposed.[23] Little research has been conducted into this harm, and we are only just beginning to understand the consequences. But studies of those exposed to the toxic dust in the collapse of the World Trade Center give stark warnings. By October 2018, over 43,000 people had been diagnosed with a 9/11 related health condition – 10,000 with cancer – and more still are likely to have been affected.[24] This was also in the US, where the medical infrastructure remained intact after the terror attack. In Syria, a lack of safety equipment in clearance operations, a prolonged and widespread exposure due to uncleared waste, and a lack of health infrastructure, only increase the health risks.

Beyond the physical harm, many more Syrians will be left psychologically affected by the bombardment. One Save the Children study found that, among Syrian refugees interviewed, almost all children and 84% of adults reported that bombing and shelling was the number one cause of psychological stress in children.[25]

The outlook for psychiatric care in Syria is dire. With less than 100 psychiatrists across the whole country prior to the crisis and many of those forced to flee, it is certain that most Syrians will be unable to access the psychological support they desperately need.

Overall, the scale of civilian harm and damage to infrastructure has left a health crisis in Syria which is likely to last decades. The lack of infrastructure and staff is unlikely to be quickly remedied, whilst the harm from explosive weapons, both physically and psychologically, will in many cases require lifelong treatment. Such consequences should serve as a warning on the long-term harm from explosive weapons, and states should commit in 2019 to stop using such weapons in populated areas. That is the least that can be done in the name of humanity.

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Iain Overton is Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence

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Footnotes

[1] Interview with Omar Sobeh, Hand in Hand for Syria, WASH cluster coordinator, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[2] Cierra Carafice, ‘Where Do We Go From Here? The Story of Syria's Public Health System’, October 09 2017, Middle East Studies Center.

[3] Speech by Peter Maurer, ‘Even wars have limits: Health-care workers and facilities must be protected’, May 03 2016, ICRC.

[4] WHO, ‘Seven years of Syria’s health tragedy’, March 14 2018.

[5] Raja Abdulrahim, ‘After the Gas and Bombs: The Health Crisis That’s Killing Syria’, April 17 2018, Wall Street Journal.

[6] Interview with Dr Mohamad Katoub, Advocacy Manager at Syrian American Medical Society, August 7th 2018.

[7] See Dathan, J. ‘When the bombs fall silent: the reverberating effects of explosive weapons’, May 2018, Action on Armed Violence.

[8] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[9] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[10] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[11] Esmita Charani, Senior Lead Pharmacist, Imperial College London, Faculty of Medicine, at the Global Health Forum: The impact of conflict on health care, 19 May 2018.

[12] WHO, ‘Seven years of Syria’s health tragedy’, March 14 2018.

[13] Handicap International, ‘Syria, a mutilated future’, May 2016.

[14] Presentation by Keiko Tamura, Head of Programmes, HIHFAD, Child Protection Sub-Cluster meeting in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[15] Presentation by Keiko Tamura, Head of Programmes, HIHFAD, Child Protection Sub-Cluster meeting in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[16] Interview with Dr Mohamad Katoub, Advocacy Manager at Syrian American Medical Society, August 7th 2018.

[17] Anne Garella, ‘‘80,000 people in Syria need a prosthesis or an orthosis’’, Humanity and Inclusion, 2015.

[18] Wilton Park and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2017, ‘Clearance of improvised explosive devices in the Middle East Monday 22 – Wednesday 24 May 2017 | WP1548’.

[19] Interview with Omar Sobeh, Hand in Hand for Syria, WASH cluster coordinator, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[20] World Bank, 2017, ‘The Toll of War. The economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria’.

[21] The Lancet, ‘Leishmaniasis unleashed in Syria’, February 2017, Volume 17, pp.144-145.

[22] The Lancet, ‘Leishmaniasis unleashed in Syria’, February 2017, Volume 17, pp.144-145.

[23] Andy Garrity, ‘Conflict rubble: a ubiquitous and under-studied toxic remnant of war’, July 10 2014, Conflict and Environment Observatory.

[24] Erin Durkin, ‘September 11: nearly 10,000 people affected by 'cesspool of cancer'’, September 11 2018, The Guardian.

[25] McDonald, A. 2017. ‘Invisible Wounds: The impact of six years of war on the mental health of Syria’s children’, Save the Children. Available at:

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1 Comment

Improved Prospects for U.S. Arms Sales Restraint? Look to Congress

1/3/2019

2 Comments

This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

The odds may at first appear to be against greater restraint in U.S. arms sales in 2019 given a president who loudly touts the supposed economic benefits of weapons sales and refuses to reconsider arms transfers to Saudi Arabia despite (1) the Saudi role in the devastating humanitarian crisis in Yemen and (2) a global outcry over the ghastly embassy assassination of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. But a close examination of Congressional action, much of it building over the last three years, reveals real prospects for limiting the president’s dangerous approach on conventional arms trade.

The most high profile signs of this restraint revolve around the most high profile U.S. arms purchaser, Saudi Arabia. A loud rebuke of Trump’s approach to the kingdom came in December when a bipartisan group of 56 Senators took the highly unusual step of using the 1973 War Powers Resolution to direct the president to end U.S. military action in the war in Yemen, including any refueling to the Saudi-led coalition. An earlier vote in March garnered only 44 votes. The outcry over Trump’s unabashed arms support to Saudi Arabia played a large role in changing many Senators’ minds.

Another War Powers-based resolution should expect to win Senate approval in the new Congress, when it is re-introduced. In the House, the new Democratic majority would also be likely to approve such a resolution. While leader Nancy Pelosi (D-California) has yet to indicate when a such a measure might be brought forward, she is one of 101 co-sponsors of the previous House version, which was blocked by a late procedural action in December.

The War Powers Resolution came on the heels of steps more explicitly addressing the arms trade. In June 2017, 47 Senators voted to block more than $500 million in precision-guided munitions (PGM) sales to Saudi Arabia; and in September 2016, 27 Senators supported stopping a $1 billion tank sale. While neither of these measures were successful, they indicate the building Congressional opposition to unrestricted arms sales to Riyadh. That sentiment was encapsulated after the recent War Powers vote when co-sponsor Chris Murphy (D-Connecticut) said that “momentum is…only growing. Congress has woken up to the reality that the Saudi-led coalition is using U.S. military support to kill thousands of civilians, bomb hospitals, block humanitarian aid, and arm radical militias.”

In addition to these very public votes, some Congressional leaders are acting in other ways to reign in unwise arms sales. Under the U.S. system, leaders within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee are pre-notified of potential arms sales. That pre-notification period has been the more traditional place for an opposition hold on controversial sales. For a period in 2017, former SFRC chair Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) declared a hold on new arms sales to Gulf Cooperation Council countries. More recently, ranking member Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) placed a hold on PGM sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While Corker is no longer in Congress, Menendez retains his position and his June 2018 hold remains in place. During the recent War Powers debate, he argued that the Trump administration view of the U.S.-Saudi relationship was “unhinged” in thinking that “selling weapons to the Saudis was more important than America’s enduring commitment to human rights, democratic values, and international norms.”

These actions are promising, and creative Congressional leaders have the opportunity to do more. While the public can be an ally for responsible action on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) because such government-to-government negotiated sales are quickly added to a public website, the increasingly important business-led Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are not as transparent, in part because any public notification often comes after the initial review period has passed. Congressmembers could insist that, or possibly take it upon themselves to make, these potential DCS transactions public immediately. Saudi PGM sales, for example, have come through the DCS process and relied upon concerned leaders to share in raising awareness.

While the notification period garners the most attention, Congress also can block a sale up until weapons are delivered. Given how security, geopolitical, and humanitarian realities can change between the time of notifications and often years-later deliveries, leaders should follow the entire process. To the best of my knowledge, however, the relevant chair and ranking committee members have only once used the power they gave themselves to receive from the State Department a notification of an arms shipment at least 30 days prior to its delivery. It’s time to exercise, and to expand, such authority (see Section 201).

In general, transparency around arms deliveries remains too obscure as a New Hampshire NPR reporter recently discovered. When U.S. Census export data showed weapons worth more than $61 million were sold from his state to Saudi Arabia in August, he could not uncover what was in the sales nor which companies provided the weapons. Annual reports on U.S. arms transfers have grown increasingly opaque. Congress should mandate a change, demanding much greater transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S. weapons deliveries.

Finally, sometime in the first quarter of this year, we can expect the administration to publish final rules transferring export authority on select firearms from the State Department to the Commerce Department, despite a large number of negative public comments and great deal of concern. These rules have been at the heart of the 3-D gun printing controversy that energized public debate in the middle of last year. Members of Congress have raised an alarm that they will lose notifications about these sales, and need to be prepared to stop, or counteract, this dangerous export process change. Just as Trump’s broad approach on arms sales does, these changes risk making it easier for weapons to end up in the hands of terrorists, international criminals, and abusive regimes as well as further undermine the promotion of human rights norms that should be central to U.S. actions.

Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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Will reckless, risky and wrong-headed UK support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen continue?

12/14/2018

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Anna Stavrianakis

The war in Yemen has killed over 57,000 people since March 2015 and created a cholera epidemic and a politically induced, entirely preventable famine. The Saudi-led coalition is causing twice as many civilian casualties as all other forces fighting in Yemen – including the Houthis, who are also responsible for attacks on civilians and on aid and humanitarian actors. Primary support for the Saudi-led coalition comes from the USA; but a crucial junior partner is the UK. The UK government claims to have been at the forefront of international humanitarian assistance, giving more than £570 million to Yemen in bilateral aid since the war began. Yet the financial value of aid is a drop in the ocean compared to the value of weapons sold to the Saudi-led coalition – licences worth at least £4.7bn have been granted to Saudi Arabia and £860m to its coalition partners since the start of the war.

Rejecting responsible action

The UK’s own rules state that it cannot sell weapons to countries where there is a clear risk they might be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law. And the UK claims, repeatedly, to have one of the most rigorous control regimes in the world. Yet evidence of illegal civilian harm in the war is ongoing and growing.

So how does the UK government try to convince itself and others that its arms export policy is not in tatters? First, by batting away extensive evidence of violations of international humanitarian law, claiming it can't be sure they have happened. Despite a risk-based arms transfer control framework that is explicitly preventive in orientation, the UK government demands absolute certainty that its weapons have been misused before it will countenance a suspension – and even then, concerted action to stop weapons sales is not guaranteed. Second, by working with the Saudis to claim that if attacks on civilians have happened, they must have been a mistake. Central to this has been the Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) – headed by a Bahraini military lawyer who oversaw national security trials of over 300 pro-democracy protestors in 2011. The JIAT has investigated only a small proportion of alleged incidents, and its methodology, sources and case selection criteria remain unclear. Its conclusions have taken the form of blanket denial; admission of limited, accidental civilian harm; and most frequently, a defence of air strikes that it says were carried out in line with IHL. All of these responses are contested by NGOs tracking civilian harm in the war. And third, that any past misuse of weapons doesn’t necessarily mean future misuse is likely. In the judicial review of export policy, a senior civil servant’s evidence stated that “Past behaviour is a helpful indicator of attitude towards IHL and towards future behaviour, but it is not necessarily determinative”. It is difficult to imagine civil servants or High Court judges articulating such a position if they were working in counter-terrorism policy, an issue area that operates on the basis of suspicion, intuition and an absence of evidence.

In these three ways, according to the UK government, while there may be a risk of weapons being misused in Yemen, that risk is not clear. The upshot is an exponential rise in arms sales since the war started, to the point where Saudi Arabia now accounts for almost half of UK arms exports.

Change ahead?

Nonetheless, there may be glimmers of hope for an end to the war in Yemen. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi has generated a crisis in US and UK policy that four years of war have failed to do. While his murder has little to do directly with arms sales, and it is dispiriting that four years of evidence of the misuse of weapons has failed to register in US and UK policy, it has shone a spotlight on the war in Yemen. Pre-talk consultations in Sweden between representatives of the government of Yemen and the Houthis ended on 13th December with an agreement that included a ceasefire in Hodeidah, steps to address the situation in Taiz, and prisoner exchanges. These are tentative, fragile steps that would mitigate civilian harm if adhered to, but still need considerable political effort to translate into an end to the war.

The US Senate has passed two resolutions to halt US involvement in the war and curtail its support for Saudi Arabia – a significant development. The US government has called for ceasefire – which sounds positive but may also be a move to block more radical action from Congress. In the UK, FCO Minister for the Middle East Alistair Burt appeared not to know the US was going to make that call. The UK is making increased efforts to address the humanitarian effects of its own support for the coalition by introducing a draft UN Security Council resolution – but this has been blocked by the US. Domestically, a former defence attaché to Riyadh spoke out about UK complicity through its arms sales in October 2018 – the first acknowledgement of the recklessness of UK policy from the military establishment. And a judicial review of UK policy is ongoing: the High Court found in favour of the government in July 2017, but Campaign Against Arms Trade has been granted an appeal, which will be heard in April 2019.

These moves illustrate the ways that the UK government has been forced to expend greater energy in justifying its position, working with the Saudi-led coalition to engage in legitimation work, and devote greater resources to the aid response. Looking forward to 2019, the major milestone for British policy on the horizon is the judicial review appeal. Will the Court of Appeal show greater independence from the government than the High Court? What new justifications will the government roll out? Watch this space.

Anna Stavrianakis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex.

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Finding Leadership Outside the White House

12/21/2017

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This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

Less than one year into the Trump administration, it is clear that the United States is unlikely to provide positive leadership in promoting responsible arms trade and weapons use. While the Obama administration certainly did not shy away from arms deals, it did sign the Arms Trade Treaty and withhold some arms transfers due to human rights concerns. What restraint Obama showed, Trump has jettisoned, evidenced in arms sales notifications of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia in May, F-16s to Bahrain in September, and Super Tucanos to Nigeria in August – all deals that Obama had put on hold.

Further under Trump, drone use/air strikes have dramatically increased in number and/or in numbers of civilians harmed. The Defense Department has backed away from a policy that would have barred the use of certain cluster munitions, in particular older ones with an awful record for humanitarian harm. The administration also appears set to make it easier to sell small arms by transferring their control to the Commerce Department, completing the last steps of a controversial export reform initiative. In December, the United States abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the ATT, saying during First Committee that it was reviewing its policy. These and other indicators suggest that US arms use and trade, as well as any eventual new US conventional arms transfer policy, will simply remove the concept of restraint and further undermine commitment to and promotion of human rights.

This is an admittedly bleak initial picture, but there are many places the world can and should look for leadership outside of a US administration espousing an “America First” world view. Perhaps surprisingly, the first place to look is the US Congress. The close 47-53 Senate vote in June in opposition to the PGM sale to Saudi Arabia is an indicator that the Senate could take a more proactive role, especially if the rumored additional $7 billion in PGM sales come before it. Republican Senator Rand Paul and Democratic Senator Chris Murphy partnered on that work and together or separately merit watching in 2018. So too does Republican Senator Todd Young, especially in relation to the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy reacted quickly to the cluster munition policy reversal, and along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Ben Cardin have identified the need for Congressional involvement in any changes that would send small arms to Commerce control. A number of members of the House of Representatives have also taken up US weapons sales and use. A short list includes Democrats Ro Khanna, Mark Pocan and Republican Walter Jones, who co-wrote a New York Times oped critical of US support to Saudi Arabia, as well as Republican Justin Amash, and Democrat Ted Lieu, who has long expressed concerned about potential US complicity in war crimes.

Arming Saudi Arabia, or rather a commitment not to do so is also an appropriate litmus test on international leadership as the Saudi-led coalition continues to use weapons to the detriment of civilians in Yemen. In 2017, the European Parliament again called for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia -- a call not heeded by suppliers such as France and the United Kingdom, but one other European countries can and do support. Related, Sweden’s pending “democracy criterion” in arms sales is worth watching for an impact nationally and regionally. So too is Japan’s leadership of the Arms Trade Treaty for the 2018 Conference of States Parties, where thus far countries have frustratingly refused to directly address the inconsistency of arming the Saudis.

The recent conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the international civil society coalition that fought hard for the treaty (ICAN), draws global attention to the truth that leadership need not come from the normal “big players.” Those countries, led by the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), tend to put traditional state-centered security over the needs of individuals (aka human security). But human security is at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty and a host of other successful treaties and initiatives broadly classified as “humanitarian disarmament.” On key treaties in this realm, Nicaragua is taking on the presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Afghanistan will have leadership of the Mine Ban Treaty. They have the potential to bring a different type of leadership to arms-related issues in 2018. So too do some of the countries that were at the heart of the nuclear ban treaty, such as Mexico and New Zealand, who were also progressive voices during the Arms Trade Treaty negotiation.

The Nobel Peace Prize also reminds us that civil society campaigns play a critical role. In 2018, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots will continue calling for all countries to ban the development of fully autonomous weapons (“killer robots”). The countries participating in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) working group may choose that path, which a growing number (22) are supporting. Leading roboticists and artificial intelligence experts are banding together with that message and writing letters to governments, spurring national parliamentary debates. In another campaign, the International Network on Explosive Weapons is helping to build momentum to address and end the practice of using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. These weapons are particularly devastating to civilians and civilian infrastructure, causing both immediate harm at the time of use and ongoing suffering from the disruption of economic and social activity.

Members of industry and the financial sector will also have the opportunity to display leadership. Late in 2016, German arms manufacturer Heckler and Koch announced that it would no longer sell weapons to undemocratic and corrupt countries. More recently in Japan, four banks and insurance companies recently announced that they would ban investments in cluster munition producers, joining a growing group that have made similar commitments in other countries.

While the future is always difficult to predict, in 2018 it would be wise to look outside the White House for leadership on proper restraint in the use and sale of weapons – without which, we can unfortunately foresee new suffering by civilians and the undermining of their human rights.

Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association.

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European arms export policy at the crossroads

12/13/2017

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Frank Slijper

With no quick end of the war in Yemen in sight, much of the work on arms trade controls in 2018 will continue to concentrate on the massive scale of transfers of weapons to the parties involved in the conflict; in particular, the arms trade with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They are the two key actors in the so-called Saud-led coalition that has been fighting with Yemeni troops loyal to president Hadi against what used to be an alliance of Houthi fighters and soldiers loyal to ex-president Saleh. After the Houthi-Saleh alliance broke down in early December and Saleh was killed subsequently, it is hard to predict the outcome for the war, but the humanitarian crisis remains dire.

What has been clear throughout the conflict is that Saudi Arabia and UAE forces have continued to be main destinations of European (and US) arms and military support. Over the past nearly two decades, Saudi Arabia has been Europe’s number one arms destination, with the much smaller UAE at number three. These two oil-rich states have been a lifeline for Europe’s arms industry, especially in the UK and France.

This strong dependency of lucrative arms deals with the Gulf states explains much of Europe’s refusal to cut arms sales throughout the Yemen conflict, despite clear indications that these very weapons could be used in the conflict. The UK alone approved export licences for the Saudi regime worth more than 4.6 billion pounds since 2015. France is Europe’s main supplier to the Emirates, where Dassault receives full governmental support in its attempts to sell 60 Rafale fighter aircraft. Meanwhile it is going to upgrade their fleet of Mirage jets, which have been widely used in Yemen.

Europe has long boasted of having a highly advanced arms export control framework. That may be the case if you consider the level of guidance that come with the European Union’s Common Position on arms exports.

But if you consider the realities of recent major arm exports to the warring parties in Yemen, while claiming that exports need to be assessed against eight “far-reaching risk assessment criteria,” this is merely hollow rhetoric that is meaningless for millions of people in Yemen, who continue to suffer. Repeated demands from a majority of the European Parliament – through non-binding motions - for an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia have not led to decisive action – while it was no problem for EU ministers to agree to an arms embargo earlier this month against Venezuela, the number 49 arms export destination.

In 2018 the “legally binding” Common Position has its tenth anniversary, twenty years after the EU decided on a politically binding Code of Conduct guiding European arms export controls. These milestones mark undoubted advances (as well as some recent steps backwards) in terms of transparency in reporting arms transfers – something nearly non-existent twenty years ago. It has certainly not set “high common standards” reflected in real restraint in the face of blatant violations of human rights and the law of war. Only an immediate stop on arms transfers to all parties involved in the conflict in Yemen would give reason to celebrate the EU’s common export control system.

Frank Slijper is the Programme Leader on the Arms Trade at PAX, based in the Netherlands

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Event Resources and Recommendations: War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Human Rights: the Middle East (August 30, 2022)

Judicial Review redux in the UK over sales to Saudi Arabia and Coalition

Early Actions to Watch for a More Responsible U.S. Arms Trade Policy

Syria in 2020: the deadly legacy of explosive violence and its impact on infrastructure and health

Arms Trade Issues Should See Center Stage in 2020 US Election

Explosive violence and the health challenges ahead for Syria

Improved Prospects for U.S. Arms Sales Restraint? Look to Congress

Will reckless, risky and wrong-headed UK support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen continue?

Finding Leadership Outside the White House

European arms export policy at the crossroads

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