Category: Europe

Event Recap, Resources and Recommendations -- War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Militarism: South East Europe and the Black Sea Region (August 18, 2022)

8/23/2022

On August 18, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Platform for Peace and Humanity co-hosted an event examining the actions and dilemmas faced by countries in South East Europe and the Black Sea Region in part due to the war in Ukraine, with panelists:

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group
A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University
Esra Serim, Independent Researcher

Panelists provided the following observations, recommendations and resources, building off of their comments during the event.*

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group

South Caucasus

Recommendations:

In Azerbaijan, major legislation like the National Security Concept (2007) and the Military Doctrine (2010) is outdated and do not include provisions for parliamentary oversight as well as civil society’s oversight and involvement in security sector reform. Azerbaijan’s military doctrine and national security concept must be updated in the near future.
The main goal of Armenia after the 2020 war seems to be the redefinition of its defense concept and security strategy and rebuilding of the army. For this purpose, the country's policy on the purchase of military weapons should be more transparent (like Georgia) and should include short-term and long-term plans. This need for transparent military procurement policy and long-term planning is also valid for Azerbaijan.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine requires a revision of the security strategy in all three countries and makes it necessary for all three countries to carry out security sector reforms more quickly and effectively, taking into account the new realities.

Suggested resources:

Michael Lambert, “The Revival of the Georgian Armaments and Defense Industry,” Russian International Affairs Council, November 8, 2021.
David Darchiashvili, “Georgia: A hostage to arms”, Saferworld, 2004.
“Georgia outlines defence procurement priorities,” Jane’s Defence, July 26, 2021.
“A difference of five times: Military spending of Armenia and Azerbaijan in numbers,” fact investigation platform, May 25, 2022.
Elkhan Mehdiyev, “Security Sector Reform in Azerbaijan: Key Milestones and Lessons Learned,” Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, May 2021.
Lt. Col. Edward J. Erickson, “The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh:Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?” Military Review, August 2021.
Ulkar Natiqqizi, “After war victory, Azerbaijan keeps increasing military spending,” Eurasianet, May 12, 2022.
“Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War’s Shadow”, International Crisis Group, April 2022.
Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian and Taline Papazian, "A WHITE PAPER: The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies," 2021.

A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University

Balkans

Assessment:

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 showed that conventional warfare in Europe was not over. Serbia is the first to take its place in the arms race in the region. Between 2015 and 2021, Serbia’s defence budget jumped by around 70% to close to $1.4bn a year. During that time, its neighbors tried to restore their armed forces.
Russia mentions Bosnia and Kosovo while threatening Ukraine and/or the international community both before and during the invasion in 2022. While this situation causes uncertainty in the Balkans, it also causes concerns about Russia taking the war further to the West, encouraging the parties to engage in arms trading.
While the rhetorical commitment to preventive diplomacy and action may still be high in the international community, in less stable countries in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, organizations have done little to create a functional conflict prevention regime at the country’s regional level. That’s also because the commitment to its implementation at the domestic level is very weak. There’s very limited coordination between Bosnian state and the international community. There are “Putin-backed separatists” in the Bosnian federal institutions. The increase in international troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very limited one. Their number remains symbolic.
Same for Kosovo. Kosovo is urging NATO and the EU to admit Balkan applicants to avoid a second European front with Russia. But the international community and the EU elites are sharing posts about Kosovo’s commitments on the EU integration process.

Recommendations:

Cooperation efforts between the Balkan states should be supported by the international community. This can be achieved through isolated but EU-backed thematic projects such as the Three Sea’s Initiative or the Open Balkans (with Kosovo), although support should be sensitive to political tensions. This may narrow the sphere of influence of external actors that threaten the stability of the region, such as Russia, China and Erdogan's Turkey, which are also arms dealers.
Continued efforts to support journalism and protection of journalists, chiefly through small grants and funding should continue and increase. Thematic journalistic grants relating to tracking and monitoring arms trades in the region should be considered by donors.
NATO and EU military peacekeeping presence in the Balkans should not increase in just numbers, but in quality and effect, working closely with both officials and civil society in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The EU should communicate more clearly its intentions with the Western Balkans.

Suggested resources:

Ishaan Tharoor, "Russia’s war in Ukraine finds echoes in the Balkans," Washington Post, August 1, 2022.
Filip Ejdus, "Policy Brief on the Spectre of an Arms Race in the Western Balkans," Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, March 2020.
Vuk Vuksanovic and Marija Ignjatijevic, ““What’s Behind The Arms Buildup In The Balkans,” War on the Rocks, December 28, 2021.
"EU isolationism leaving dangerous power vacuum in Balkans, warns major new report on the arms trade," review of Tactics Institute for Security and Counter Terrorism report, June 15, 2020.
Stephen Blank, "Can Selling Weapons to Serbia Create Peace in the Balkans?" National Interest, September 26, 2021.
Special investigation series on Balkan Arms Trade by Balkan Insight

Esra Serim, PhD, France-based independent researcher

Turkey

Assessment:

To preserve Erdogan’s rule, the Turkish administration continued to pursue ambiguous and unreliable foreign policy and investing more in the defense sector. It wants to turn the country into a major arms exporter, which is also Erdogan’s personal ambition.
The fact that Turkey turned from democracy and the West and into an authoritarian regime leads to increasing the distrust in the eyes of the West. The West also questions a non-democratic Turkey, which began to set a high record in the military sector.

Recommendations:

The Erdogan regime must stop making militaristic foreign policy and supporting nationalist ideology to ensure his power at home. Turkey should not get involved into any conflict, including in Syria and Libya in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Ankara should stop taking up arms given Greek tensions and the interventions in Syria and Libya.
The Biden administration should temporarily block military export and projects including the F16 fighter jets as long as Ankara is governed by the Erdogan regime and dismantles democratic norms or does not restore democratic rule in Turkey. A NATO member cannot purchase and use both Russian and US military equipment and/or aviation. Turkey ignored US warnings not to purchase Russia’s S-400 missile defense system, which is incompatible with NATO systems.
Given the Russian threat, however, both the United States and the EU need better relations with Turkey despite Erdogan’s political actions. They should work to convince him to restore Turkish democracy and liberalization, and not to intervene in any neighboring country. In addition, the West should not ignore Turkey’s security concerns in NATO. They should also encourage Erdogan to keep shut the passage to the Black Sea for military vessels through the Turkish Straits, which is very crucial to Ukraine and the course of the war.

Suggested resources:

“Drones and Resets: The New Era of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Baku Dialogues, Summer 2022.
“Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment, October 9, 2020.
“Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2022.
“Why the West Should Make Peace with Erdogan Now,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022.
“Turkey’s Foreign Policy Becoming Alarmingly Militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 21, 2020.
“Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy,” APSA MENA Politics, November 10, 2020.

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.

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Weapons for peace? What to expect in 2021 from the EU’s new ‘peace facility’

1/11/2021

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Roy Isbister

Frank Slijper

Just before the close of 2020, EU member states’ foreign ministries reached agreement over the set-up of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to pay for "external action having military or defence implications". It is meant to "swiftly respond to crises and conflicts" and "to empower partner countries". Its initial focus is expected to be on Africa, however its potential reach is global. While only half the size of its original ask (due to some nervousness about the basic concept and larger budgetary constraints), the EPF still provides for € 5 billion to be spent over the next seven years, including on controversial ‘train and equip’ packages. By establishing this as an ‘off-budget’ facility, member states are circumventing EU treaties under which the EU budget cannot be used to provide arms. The type of arms envisaged as being suitable for transfer under the EPF include those frequently causing the most harm and most at risk of misuse and diversion in fragile contexts, such as small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, armoured vehicles, etc.

Civil society organisations, including ours, have long argued against the EPF, as recent history suggests that providing weapons and ammunition to security forces in fragile states is more likely to exacerbate than solve local and regional conflicts. As we argued, along with twelve other organisations in a 2019 letter to the EU foreign policy chief, and in a November 2020 statement from 40 civil society organisations from around the world, we have seen little evidence that military-focused ‘train and equip’ efforts lead to improved peace, justice, and development outcomes. On the contrary, experience demonstrates that this type of military assistance can harm peace and development and rarely provides its intended leverage. It often fails to address the underlying drivers of conflict and can instead be counterproductive, leading to unintended consequences, such as the violent repression of peaceful civil society actions, furthering the impunity of military forces, fomenting military-backed violence and conflict, and corruption.

The initial focus of the EPF is likely to be in Africa, possibly in the Sahel, where Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have set up a joint force known as the G5 with 5,000 troops to confront jihadists. Somalia and the Central African Republic have also been mentioned as potential beneficiaries.

Whereas German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas calls the EPF “a fundamental investment in peace and stability that will allow the EU and its partners to effectively and flexibly address international crises”, there is reason to be wary that the EPF will be used to advance the interests of EU member states more than and potentially at the expense of the security of the people affected by crises. Time and again we have seen examples of military aid transferred to further European geopolitical interests rather than in support of the human security needs of people in fragile states.

Recent statements by key European figures strengthen such fears. Speaking about the EPF in February 2020, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stated: "We need guns, we need arms, we need military capacities and that is what we are going to help provide to our African friends because their security is our security. […] We are not going to grow, we are not going to invest, we are not going to create jobs without stability". In December 2020, President Emmanuel Macron of France (which has been a leading proponent of the EPF) said in a joint press conference with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi that he “will not condition matters of defence and economic cooperation on ... disagreements (over human rights).” While this was not in the direct context of the EPF, it nevertheless raises obvious and significant concerns about how the EPF will be used.

Beyond its fundamental conceptual failings, the EPF as it stands now also has numerous operational shortcomings. These include a lack of transparency, both in decision-making as well as public reporting; weak and permissive safeguards against ‘misuse’; a lack of meaningful involvement of local people affected by crises and insecurity (in support of whom EPF actions will ostensibly be undertaken), at any point in the process; and a weak due-diligence framework to ensure the Facility’s activities are conducted in accordance with international law.

Instead of establishing a strong framework of safeguards within the EPF itself to pritoritise the protection of civilians and their rights, member states have instead chosen to push decisions on these matters downstream, such that they will be decided politically for each assistance measure under the Facility. This means that maintaining high standards on arms transfers, strict application of international law and effective oversight will be vulnerable to political pressure and excessive secrecy.

The unresolved weaknesses of the EPF are risking the EU’s self-styled reputation as a force for good. However, little resistance to its adoption is expected from either the European Parliament or national parliaments, if they have a say at all. Therefore, as so often, it seems it will fall to civil society to hold member states to account.

Roy Isbister heads the Arms Unit at Saferworld, based in the United Kingdom, leading their work on conventional arms.

Frank Slijper leads the Arms Trade project at PAX, based in the Netherlands.

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New European Defense Initiatives

12/19/2017

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Amy J. Nelson

With all eyes seemingly turned towards the United States’ drive to renew defense innovation and restructure its channels for procurement, Europe’s efforts to do likewise might be too easily overlooked—or worse yet, misunderstood. Over the past ten years, European countries have been steadily making strides towards revamping their militaries and enhancing collective capabilities, all while aiming to achieve “strategic autonomy” and prepare for next-generation warfare. Although this process got off to a slow, perhaps rocky, start initially, more recent European initiatives signal renewed effort and determination. The European Union (EU) may just succeed at making itself, not only a stronger military power, but also its own source of military innovation and manufacturing. We should expect to see additional benchmarks for this process in early 2018.

Following a long period of decline in defense spending, subsequent withering of European capabilities and low relative numbers of European forces, the EU is now actively pursuing its own military renewal. This European military renaissance, however, is hardly a bolt from the blue. Nor is it specifically a reaction to waning confidence in U.S. security guarantees due to the Trump administration being, well, the Trump administration. Arguably, the process began in 2007 with Lisbon Treaty reforms that included establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a “coordination platform and a source of expertise and strategic advice.”These reforms suffered setbacks in wake of the 2008 financial crisis and resulting cuts in defense spending, and EEAS was ultimately never empowered with either funding or decision-making authority. As a consequence, EU states and their militaries found themselves ill-equipped to defend themselves.

More recently, in an attempt to overcome these initial obstacles and insufficiencies, Germany announced its Framework Nations Concept (FNC) in 2013 (yes, still pre-Trump), which was designed to organize and systematize defense cooperation in Europe. The concept is hardly as alarming as the “European army” it’s been made out to be. Since 1995, Europe has in fact been home to the EU’s Eurocorps and its sub-unit, the Franco-German Brigade (FGB), which is composed of German and French units. Despite the FGB being operational for decades, it has actually never been very capable—nor terribly “active” or “successful.” Nevertheless, it is likely to remain EU force headquarters.

The FNC stands to revamp the efficacy of these forces, though, by designating framework nations to coordinate clusters and provide logistical and command and control capabilities for them. Smaller nations will then be able to add their capabilities to these clusters. The idea is to allow Europe to execute “longer and more complex operations,” as well as streamline procurement and spending. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine forced the evolution of the concept further, as well as a move to scale up of number of troops per cluster.

More recent EU initiatives have gone a step beyond, focusing on pan-European harmonization and synchronization through joint procurement and industrial cooperation. In 2016, the EU presented its EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), as an initiative to enhance coordination and investment in European security and defense, with the aim of establishing strategic autonomy, comprised of both operational and industrial autonomy. EUGS will use monies from the European Defense Fund (EDF) to conduct defense research, develop new technologies, and facilitate multinational cooperation, likely rendering the European Defense Agency something much more like an EU Department of Defense. EU funds are intended to be matched with co-financing from member states on a cluster-by-cluster basis.

To further deepen military integration within the broader clusters designated by the FNC, the EU is turning to a previously unutilized programmatic concept from the original Lisbon Treaty: Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO). Through PESCO, member states will spearhead and participate in defense innovation projects. Although voluntary, the commitments states make to these projects will be binding. As it is currently envisioned, a PESCO council will establish policy priorities and standards for evaluation, while a separate PESCO body will develop specific defense projects, to be managed by contributing member states. PESCO was only formally launched in November of this year, and the European Council of the EU formally adopted it last week (December 11, 2017).

Up next, in early 2018, we should expect to see a list of projects slated for PESCO development, as well as further formalization of rules and procedures for the program. All eyes should also be turned towards the next meeting of the EUGS’s Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), which will identify force and capability gaps, and establish strategic priorities that will, in turn, determine specific PESCO projects to fill those gaps.

What also remains to be seen, of course, is whether these initiatives will yield significant projects on reasonable timelines. As they stand now, these defense initiatives are still in their “ideational” phase. For completed projects to emerge successfully, the EU needs to move—and move fast. As technologies increasingly come out of the private sector and originate in dual-use innovation, new military might is poised to spread rapidly—standing to, once again, set Europe behind the curve. As soon as EU states can acquire new weapons and systems more cheaply elsewhere, the glue binding these states with disparate budgets and security goals together, may weaken.

An additional potential stumbling block includes the fact some EU states have not yet joined the FNC, holding out hope that their own security priorities will be directly addressed by these new initiatives. France, moreover, has chosen to forego framework state status entirely, though remains party to existing and ongoing bi- and tri-lateral projects in Europe. These cooperative defense projects are already in full swing, driven and funded by select EU member states, and remain outside the new pan-European framework. It is not yet clear how these kinds of “private endeavors” will be integrated, if at all. It also remains unclear how new EU capabilities and strategic priorities will be integrated into the NATO framework. Finally, EU states will need to be able to effectively harness innovation coming out of their private sectors to produce cutting edge military equipment. Getting to a point where these kinds of public-private partnerships function with ease is no simple task.

Having a Europe with military forces that can by themselves serve as an effective deterrent to military aggression is, of course, a desirable security goal for all. Bringing it into existence may, however, ultimately force the question of where to go with arms control in Europe, given the atrophied Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and now well-documented violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Additional follow-on effects include those that come from essentially creating a novel hub of military innovation that could, in the limit, pose a formidable challenge to the primacy of the US defense sector, as well as precipitate the chain reaction of increasing innovation, production, and ultimately diffusion of military technologies.

To a certain extent, this process of Europe seizing the reins and revamping its collective military capabilities is inevitable, particularly in the current security landscape. Its potential long-term effects range from beneficial to nefarious, although it’s too soon to say for sure what exactly to expect. If successful, PESCO projects may ultimately serve to add competition and fuel innovation to the defense industrial landscape, or contribute to already bloated global military-industrial complex, with new and more weapons and systems that can increasingly, digitally, evade controls, or both. In Europe, at least, the mood seems to be one of determination mixed with cautious optimism right now.

Amy J. Nelson, Ph.D. is a Robert Bosch Fellow in residence at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. She is also a research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Center.

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European arms export policy at the crossroads

12/13/2017

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Frank Slijper

With no quick end of the war in Yemen in sight, much of the work on arms trade controls in 2018 will continue to concentrate on the massive scale of transfers of weapons to the parties involved in the conflict; in particular, the arms trade with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They are the two key actors in the so-called Saud-led coalition that has been fighting with Yemeni troops loyal to president Hadi against what used to be an alliance of Houthi fighters and soldiers loyal to ex-president Saleh. After the Houthi-Saleh alliance broke down in early December and Saleh was killed subsequently, it is hard to predict the outcome for the war, but the humanitarian crisis remains dire.

What has been clear throughout the conflict is that Saudi Arabia and UAE forces have continued to be main destinations of European (and US) arms and military support. Over the past nearly two decades, Saudi Arabia has been Europe’s number one arms destination, with the much smaller UAE at number three. These two oil-rich states have been a lifeline for Europe’s arms industry, especially in the UK and France.

This strong dependency of lucrative arms deals with the Gulf states explains much of Europe’s refusal to cut arms sales throughout the Yemen conflict, despite clear indications that these very weapons could be used in the conflict. The UK alone approved export licences for the Saudi regime worth more than 4.6 billion pounds since 2015. France is Europe’s main supplier to the Emirates, where Dassault receives full governmental support in its attempts to sell 60 Rafale fighter aircraft. Meanwhile it is going to upgrade their fleet of Mirage jets, which have been widely used in Yemen.

Europe has long boasted of having a highly advanced arms export control framework. That may be the case if you consider the level of guidance that come with the European Union’s Common Position on arms exports.

But if you consider the realities of recent major arm exports to the warring parties in Yemen, while claiming that exports need to be assessed against eight “far-reaching risk assessment criteria,” this is merely hollow rhetoric that is meaningless for millions of people in Yemen, who continue to suffer. Repeated demands from a majority of the European Parliament – through non-binding motions - for an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia have not led to decisive action – while it was no problem for EU ministers to agree to an arms embargo earlier this month against Venezuela, the number 49 arms export destination.

In 2018 the “legally binding” Common Position has its tenth anniversary, twenty years after the EU decided on a politically binding Code of Conduct guiding European arms export controls. These milestones mark undoubted advances (as well as some recent steps backwards) in terms of transparency in reporting arms transfers – something nearly non-existent twenty years ago. It has certainly not set “high common standards” reflected in real restraint in the face of blatant violations of human rights and the law of war. Only an immediate stop on arms transfers to all parties involved in the conflict in Yemen would give reason to celebrate the EU’s common export control system.

Frank Slijper is the Programme Leader on the Arms Trade at PAX, based in the Netherlands

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Sweden’s proposed “Democracy Criterion” for arms exports – taking the lead in export controls, or new words for old policies

12/12/2017

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Sam Perlo-Freeman

This month, the Swedish Parliament is expected to vote on a government proposal to strengthen Swedish arms export controls, among other things by adding a “democracy criterion” that will require a recipient state’s democratic status to be taken into account as a central factor when evaluating export license decisions. The proposed new law follows 6 years of discussions and a Parliamentary commission of inquiry, which reported in June 2017. It has the support of the governing Social Democrat-Green coalition and the center-right opposition parties, so its passage should be guaranteed.

Sweden, as part of the European Union, is already bound by the EU Common Position on arms exports, which requires an export license to be denied if, among other things, there is a clear risk that the equipment to be exported might be used for violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. However, this is always part of a case-by-case evaluation relating to the specific equipment being sold; the status of the recipient state as such plays no direct role in the criteria, except in the small number of cases where there is either a UN or an EU arms embargo. The democracy criterion would therefore be significantly stricter than the EU Common Position—and indeed most if not all major arms exporters.

In fact, Swedish law already goes beyond the Common Position in terms of considering the status of the recipient, in relation to human rights abuses, but the new law clearly strengthens this.

Specifically, the law requires that the proposed recipient state’s democratic status—relating to the existence of democratic institutions, the possibility for freedom of expression and respect for fundamental democratic principles—shall be a “central condition” in the evaluation of export license applications, and that serious failings in these will constitute an “obstacle” to approval. Regarding human rights, where the existing law states that “gross and systematic” violations of human rights constitute an obstacle to approving a license, the bar is lowered to “serious and systematic” abuses. The potential for a sale to counteract sustainable development is also to be considered, and there are further measures to improve transparency in arms sales.

What the law does not enact, however, is an absolute ban on arms exports to dictatorships or to human rights abusers; each export license application is still to be judged individually, based on an overall judgment taking into account numerous factors, including those relating to security and defense policy. Thus, arms sales to non-democratic states could still be approved if the government (through the export control agency, ISP, the Inspectorate for Strategic Products) decides that defense industrial considerations outweigh the recipient’s lack of democracy. As far as I can tell, the law does not specify exactly how these issues are to be weighed against one another.

This lack of a clear ban on arms sales to non-democratic regimes, even dictatorships, has led to criticism from the peace movement, and in Parliament by the Left Party. Svenska Freds (Swedish Peace) has been particularly critical of the proposed law as leaving open too many loopholes to allow, essentially, business as usual. The proposal states that lack of democracy will be an “obstacle” to license approval, but, asks Svenska Freds Chairperson Agnes Hellström, “How high an obstacle”?

Other parties, including the Green Party and the generally right-wing Christian Democrats stated that they would have preferred a complete ban on arms sales to dictatorships, but accepted the cross-party proposal as a reasonable compromise. The two largest parties in the Swedish Parliament, the Social Democrats and the center-right Moderates both have strong traditional ties to the arms industry (via the unions and the business community respectively), and the former were the architects of the post-War policy of armed neutrality under which the Swedish arms industry—still remarkably advanced for a country of 10 million—was developed. Thus, a more absolute measure would have been unlikely to gain favor with these dominant players.

The question that will only be answered with time is, will the new regulations lead to a significant reduction in arms sales to undemocratic regimes, and perhaps a complete halt to sales to the worst dictatorships, or will the new form of words be simply used by the government to claim that it has fulfilled the promise of a ”democracy criterion,” while continuing with business as usual? (Also to be seen is whether the interests of sustaining an arms industry facing a severely limited domestic market will always be high enough to vault the democracy and human rights obstacles.)

A starting point for judging the new law is examining how Sweden’s and other major European exporters’ export control regimes are already willing to export to repressive regimes. (Please see note on data further below)

Share of exports to “Not-Free” countries

Country                                  Deliveries 2007-16               Licenses 2012-16
United Kingdom                                49%                                        38%
France 37%                                        51% (orders)
Germany 12%                                        36%
Italy 26% 15%
Spain 19% 13%
Sweden 15%                                        15%.

Sweden clearly comes toward the lower end on measures of deliveries (2007-2016) and recent licenses (2012-2016), with similar levels to Spain, although Germany has a lower share of deliveries over the longer period 2007-16. For licenses, the great bulk of Sweden’s export licenses to dictatorships come from a single $1.3 billion deal in 2016 to sell Saab Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control systems to UAE—of particular concern given the UAE’s role in the air war against Yemen, where such advanced sensor systems could play a significant role. Sweden also sold an earlier version of the Erieye to Saudi Arabia in 2010 (delivered 2014). Other significant sales to “Not Free” countries include a 2012 sale of missiles and sensors to Algeria.[1]

One of the most controversial deals in Sweden in recent years, however, was the sale in 2008 and then 2010 of Gripen multi-role combat aircraft to Thailand. The deal was negotiated under the military regime that took power in Thailand through the coup of 2006, but the orders and deliveries took place between the restoration of civilian rule following the general election of December 2007, and the most recent coup of 2014. Nonetheless, the sale of such major equipment to a military establishment with a long history of coups, and where the return democracy was always highly fragile, was controversial. In the end, Sweden approved export licenses for delivery of around $100 million worth of military equipment to Thailand—now firmly in the grip of military rule—in 2016.[2]

While exports to Saudi Arabia have been a major focus of concern, in fact since the Erieye deal, export license approvals to the Saudis have been negligible; partly due to the breakdown in Swedish-Saudi relations following the non-renewal by Sweden in 2015 of a military cooperation agreement (although this agreement had produced few if any tangible results), but very likely also in part due to the high sensitivity of such sales. From 2014-16, license approvals to Saudi have amounted to just a few million crowns (less than $1 million).[3]

Thus, while Sweden does sell arms to dictatorships and human rights abusers, the evidence suggests that, in comparison with most other significant European arms producers, concerns over human rights do lead to some degree of restraint on the part of Swedish authorities. The new rules certainly have loopholes that will allow the Swedish government to sell arms to dictatorships when it really wants to, and it is possible that there will be no practical change; however, it seems likely that the strong level of pressure for restraint from both civil society, media and elements within Parliament, and the expectations of such accompanying the new law, will lead to some greater degree of caution on the part of ISP. For example, any significant licensing of arms sales to Saudi Arabia would immediately draw loud outcries and would (not unreasonably) be taken as proof that the new law is in practice meaningless. Sales to Saudi also jar heavily with Sweden’s declared feminist foreign policy. But a complete end to arms sales to undemocratic regimes is not on the cards.

Either way, assuming the new law is passed, Sweden will be a country worth watching to see if public opprobrium against the arms trade can create sufficient political will to make a more restrictive arms export policy a reality, in the face of the strong defense industrial pressure to maintain exports.

Samuel Perlo-Freeman is a Fellow at the World Peace Foundation (WPF), and Project Manager for the WPF project on Global Arms Business and Corruption

Notes on the data:

Analysis looked at the top 6 EU arms industries--the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden-- comparing across two measures: first, SIPRI data for deliveries of major conventional weapons over the period 2007-16, using their Trend Indicator Value (TIV) volume measure; second, the value of export licenses granted over the period 2012-16. For license values, unfortunately France changed their export licensing system in 2015 in a way that led to a massive increase in their license values, in a way that makes the data almost meaningless. Therefore, I used figures for export orders instead, which only France provides.[4]

For each measure, I looked at the total value of exports, and within this the share of the total going to countries classified as “Not Free” by Freedom House.

There are two caveat to the SIPRI TIV measure: first, it is a volume rather than a financial measure; since Western European countries have similar levels of income, unit costs are probably comparable, so this issue is not critical. Secondly, SIPRI data only includes major conventional weapons, which include some subsystems such as radars and engines, but not most. This tends to understate UK exports in particular, where a large proportion involves subsystems and components.

There are likewise caveats to the license data: first, not all licenses turn into deliveries, and the ratio of licenses to deliveries over time varies considerably between countries. I have not checked if this varies also by recipient country. Second, export license data only covers individual licenses, which allow a single delivery of specified equipment. It does not include open or general licenses, which allow for multiple deliveries of a category of equipment, and which therefore do not carry a financial value. The UK makes particularly high use of open licenses, so that export license figures severely understate the value of UK exports. Again, whether this understatement differs significantly by type of recipient, and therefore may distort the shares below, is unclear. The value of license data is that it gives the most direct idea of export license decision-making by governments.

[1] SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
[2] Swedish arms export control report for 2016.
[3] Swedish arms export control reports.
[4] License and order values come from national reports on arms export controls, available from SIPRI at https://www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports; export for the UK, where data is taken from the Campaign Against Arms Trade database on UK arms export licenses, which presents data in a far more user-friendly fashion than government sources; see https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/export-licences.

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