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Aid to Ukraine May Elicit Broader Arms Trade Scrutiny

1/19/2023

This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

John Chappell

The coming months will likely bring renewed skepticism towards U.S. arms sales to Ukraine, especially among Republican members whose party now controls the House of Representatives. While increased attention to U.S. security assistance to Ukraine is all but inevitable, will a change in House leadership bring productive debate about arms sales oversight and end-use monitoring? Or will legislators use Ukraine aid as yet another partisan cudgel?

An Opportunity and Its Risks

In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drew global attention, sparking efforts in the United States and Europe to provide military assistance to Ukraine’s armed forces. Scenes of attacks on civilians and accounts of war crimes drew sympathy from western publics, and diplomats protested President Putin’s blatant violation of international law prohibiting aggressive war. Last year, the United States provided tens of billions of dollars in assistance to Ukraine, with about half of it taking the form of weapons, security assistance, and Foreign Military Financing. But as economic woes continue and the war drags on, public support for continued military assistance to Ukraine has eroded, especially among Republican voters.

The Republican Party’s victory in the 2022 midterms – albeit a narrow one – will change congressional dynamics regarding U.S. arms sales to Ukraine. As became apparent with the election of Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) as Speaker, the GOP caucus is fractured, and the Republican Party’s slim majority makes every vote count, empowering the party’s right flank. Passing legislation through the House during the 118th Congress will be difficult, and securing Senate passage, and presidential signature for many House-originated bills seems unlikely. But with Republicans holding the Speaker’s gavel and committee chairs, they will nonetheless have a great deal of influence to conduct oversight and engage in “overspeech.” House Republicans plan to investigate the business dealings of members of President Biden’s family, scrutinize the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and probe abuses of power in the federal government.

Fights over arms sales to Ukraine may emerge more often with GOP control of the House. Debate about oversight for major arms sales could be productive. Congressional attention to U.S. end-use monitoring procedures would be welcome, especially since current end-use monitoring processes do not monitor how U.S.-origin defense articles are used.

However, should Ukraine aid become a matter uttered in the same breath as Hunter Biden’s laptop, Democrats will be unlikely to take oversight proposals seriously. Much-needed security assistance reform efforts will suffer if arms sales oversight becomes overly associated with far-right posturing.

Republican Positions on Ukraine Aid

The Republican Party is far from unified on the question of military aid to Ukraine. But enough high-profile legislators have raised concerns, whether about the scale of aid or oversight for military assistance, to put the issue on the agenda for 2023. Such concerns may result in the inclusion of additional oversight measures in future appropriations for assistance to Ukraine.

A number of Republican legislators have spoken out against continued U.S.military assistance to Ukraine without greater oversight. In December, Rep. Marjorie Taylor-Greene (R-GA) introduced a resolution to audit U.S. aid to Ukraine, drawing support from both restraint-minded and more hawkish conservatives. Taylor-Greene intends to reintroduce the measure in the 118th Congress. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) has also been a vocal critic of U.S. aid to Ukraine.

Key Republican committee chairs are stalwart supporters of U.S. military support to Ukraine. In December 2022, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX), who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said he “100%” supports arming Ukraine against Russia. He also sponsored a bipartisan bill authorizing U.S. support to international criminal fora, including the International Criminal Court, for investigations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, McCaul backed Taylor-Greene’s audit resolution in the House Foreign Affairs Committee as ranking member, and he has voiced support for “oversight and accountability” for security assistance to Ukraine.

Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), who won the Speaker’s gavel on January 7, 2023 after fifteen rounds of voting, has expressed that Ukraine will not get a “blank check” from Congress with the House under Republican leadership.

In the Senate, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has spearheaded Republican support for assistance to Ukraine. But Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) would be a likely Senate ally of Ukraine aid skeptics in the House. A perennial critic of U.S. arms sales, Paul delayed a vote on a $40 billion aid package to Ukraine in May 2022 with a provision requiring that an inspector general monitor the spending. Besides Senator Paul, a significant contingent of GOP Senators has voted against appropriations for aid to Ukraine.

With notable legislators calling for greater accountability and oversight for U.S. arms sales to Ukraine, 2023 will bring opportunities to consider how U.S. law and policy address U.S. arms sales.

Possible Areas of Focus in the Ukraine Aid Debate

In light of the sheer quantity of U.S. arms sales and other forms of assistance to Ukraine, three policy areas that congressional conversations may touch on include end-use monitoring, the Leahy Laws, and oversight by inspectors general.

At this stage of the conflict, U.S. arms appear to have remained in the hands of Ukrainian forces, but the risk of unauthorized diversion may rise when the war eventually winds down. The Biden administration has taken action to prevent the diversion of U.S. arms provided to Ukraine. In October 2022, the State Department released a plan to “[s]afeguard and account for arms and munitions in Ukraine and neighboring countries.” The plan focuses on cross-border smuggling of particular powerful and mobile types of arms. But conducting end-use monitoring for U.S.-origin equipment is difficult amid ongoing armed conflict. As a September 2022 State Department cable stated, “standard verification measures are sometimes impracticable or impossible.”

Serious legislative attention to end-use monitoring (EUM) would be a productive outcome of conversations about U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. Mandated in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and implemented by the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry Programs, significant gaps in end-use monitoring deserve attention. As a 2021 brief from the Center for Civilians in Conflict, Center for International Policy, and Stimson Center put it, “current EUM programs are designed to protect U.S. technology, not people. The word ‘use’ in end-use monitoring is an unfortunate misnomer.”

Beyond concerns about smuggling weapons outside of Ukraine, U.S. assistance could contribute to human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. Congress has previously prohibited the provision of security assistance to the Azov Battalion, a far-right armed group that is part of Ukraine’s National Guard. While Russian war crimes thus far dwarf Ukrainian violations in both gravity and quantity, some possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by Ukrainian personnel have emerged. Such accounts could trigger the Leahy Laws, which prohibit the provision of assistance to units of armed forces when credible information exists that the unit committed a “gross violation of human rights.” However, given the relative scale of Russian war crimes, significant congressional discussion of gaps in the Leahy Laws as applied in Ukraine seems unlikely, barring a significant change in how the Ukrainian military conducts hostilities.

Ukraine’s difficulties with corruption raise concerns as well, especially since military aid could exacerbate existing problems and undermine the country’s democratic institutions. In light of corruption issues, some analysts recommend the creation of an oversight body on the model of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In June 2022, the former Afghanistan Special Inspector General commented, “It is really shocking that people are not applying what we learned about the mistakes in Afghanistan to Ukraine.” Others prefer relying on existing inspectors general for U.S. government departments and agencies, such as the finally confirmed DoD Inspector General Robert Storch. In both cases, an inspector general would conduct audits and investigations to prevent misuse of U.S. aid. While tasking inspectors general to focus on U.S. arms sales to Ukraine could contribute to greater transparency, it will be important that the U.S. government absorbs their findings and incorporates reforms into policy, law, and practice.

John Chappell is a Legal Fellow at Center for Civilians in Conflict and a joint J.D. and M.S. in Foreign Service candidate at Georgetown University. He is also a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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South Korean Arms Sales Grow in the Years Ahead

1/16/2023

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Hoshik Nam

Last year, Russia and South Korea had largely different experiences in the global arms market, with it being fair to expect that South Korea will take a much larger role in arms exports in the coming years. The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed many flaws of Russian weapons systems. Rusty weapons, poor training and planning inflicted a huge loss of Russian soldiers and even some generals. Moreover, Russian defense industry failed to produce weapons fast enough to catch up the demand generated by its invasion of Ukraine. Late last year, the Russian government is reportedly known to have imported arms from North Korea and is also importing weapons from Iran. Considering the reputation of Russia as the second largest arms exporter for decades, this was a chaotic event that significantly harmed the reputation of the country’s defense industry.

On the other hand, the war contributed to the significant expansion of the South Korean defense industry. Its new arms export sales more than doubled in 2022 (about $17 billion compared to $7.5 billion in 2021) mostly due to a huge deal with Poland ($12 billion). This also diversified destinations of South Korea’s weapons to a major European NATO member. The number of NATO countries that import South Korea’s weapons may increase in the near future. For example, Norway and Estonia have expressed interest in buying weapons from South Korea since the outbreak of Russo-Ukrainian War. What does this mean to South Korean defense industry and its role in the global arms market this year and into the near future?

South Korea’s defense industry

The development of South Korean defense sector is largely attributed to the political tension with North Korea. Because both Koreas are technically still at war, the South Korean government has consistently and thoroughly invested in its defense industry since the 1970s. The government’s strong push to try to produce its own defense weapons has led the country’s defense industry to become not only a producer, but also an exporter of howitzers, battle tanks, warships, and other weapons. In addition, South Korean weapons are compatible with Western NATO weapons, particularly US ones. This is largely due to the country’s close relationship with the US as both countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and engage in an active R&D. This benefits the recipients of South Korean weapons. For example, the arms deal between Poland and South Korea last year gives Poland a chance to replace their old Soviet-era arms into more advanced technology that is compatible with US and other NATO members’ weapons.

In addition, South Korean defense companies can produce and export the weapons in a timely manner with relatively cheap prices and generous technology transfers. These are also crucial factors that have made the South Korean weapons competitive in the global arms market, which has been enhanced with the Russo-Ukraine War as major producers focus on providing weapons to the conflict. For example, even though Poland originally was interested in importing German howitzers, the German government kept postponing exporting them largely due to prioritizing exporting to Ukraine. In addition, South Korean defense industry is more open to transfer technologies, overseas production, and R&D. These factors made South Korean weapons great alternatives for countries that want to replenish their military capabilities with reasonable conditions. After seeing the recent deal with Poland, it is probable that other countries are also interested in importing arms from South Korea. Last year, countries such as Romania expressed their interests to purchase weapons from South Korea, as did Norway and Estonia, as mentioned earlier.

Can South Korea replace Russia in the global arms market?

For now, it seems unlikely. While aircraft comprise almost half of Russian arms exports between 2016 and 2020, there are only a few light combat aircrafts that South Korea has successfully exported. In addition, as many South Korean weapons still include components that are produced by foreign manufacturers, exporting the weapons require additional permission from those countries. For example, in 2020 South Korean K9 Thunder howitzers that use German diesel engines were prevented from being exported by a German defense export ban. Considering that the majority of foreign manufacturers that either coproduce or provide components of South Korean weapons are from Western countries, exporting South Korean arms to former clients of Russian arms exports (such as China, or Iran) is likely to be very difficult.

There are, however, signs that South Korea is becoming more favored in the global arms market by some Russian arms importers. For example, after having bought howitzers from South Korea in 2021, Egypt has expressed its interest to buy South Korean aircraft as well. Egypt was the fourth largest arms importer of Russian weapons between 2016-2020. Also, Vietnam, another major importer of Russian arms for decades, recently bought arms from South Korea.

Conclusion

Some experts may suggest that last year’s increase in South Korean defense industry’s exports could be just a short-term change due to the demand caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, South Korean defense industry still has major limitations of being dependent on foreign manufacturers for some internal components of their weapons. However, the growth of the country’s defense industry did not just happen in a day. Instead, the country’s arms industry has made progresses to become more competitive in the global arms market. If recently exported arms are deployed and judged reasonably well-performing this year, the country’s arms industry will become more competitive and credible. If that is the case, South Korean defense industry may export more weapons now and in years to come.

Hoshik Nam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Iowa and a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Explosive Violence: Projections for 2023

1/11/2023

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

Chiara Torelli

(download as pdf)

Despite hopeful steps taken in 2022, not least the late Autumn signing by over 80 states of Ireland’s Political Declaration in Dublin on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), analysis of the explosive violence which characterised this turbulent year paints a bleak picture for the year to come.

In total, AOAV - which records global incidents of explosive violence from reputable English language media sources - listed 4,324 incidents of explosive weapon use around the globe in 2022, and 31,162 reported casualties. 67% (20,776) of those casualties were civilians.

This represents a 73% increase in recorded incidents of explosive weapon use from the 2,500 incidents recorded in 2021, and a corresponding 83% increase from the 11,343 reported civilian casualties in 2021. New conflicts, in particular Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the flare-ups between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, compounded ongoing conflicts and armed struggles in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, amongst others. Many of these armed conflicts have created desperate humanitarian crises which will carry over into 2023.

More specifically, air-launched attacks rose by 17% between 2021 and 2022, from 441 to 517 recorded incidents, while ground-launched attacks increased by 187%, from 792 to 2,272 recorded incidents. IED attacks decreased by 13% between 2021 and 2022, from 1,033 recorded incidents to 897.

Correspondingly, explosive weapon use attributed to state actors rose by 228% in 2022, from 807 recorded incidents in 2021 to 2,644 over this past year, while incidents attributed to non-state actors remained consistent, decreasing by 3% from 1,370 incidents in 2021 to 1,334 in 2022. It seems likely, then, we will see more state-sponsored violence in the year to come and less so-called ‘terrorism’.

The distinction between civilians and armed combatants has continued to grow increasingly blurred. In the Myanmar context, civilians mobilised in response to the coup and the military regime’s oppression of the population, and in Ukraine, civilians are able to provide information to the Ukrainian army via apps on their smartphones. In Somalia, villagers have organised themselves into vigilante groups to resist Al Shabaab. The systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure in support of the war effort has been consistently visible in Myanmar and Ukraine. Rather than enhancing the principle of distinction and keeping civilians removed from armed conflict, the increasing ‘civilianisation’ of armed conflict, including growing reliance on private security companies, promises that civilians and civilian infrastructure will continue to be central in armed conflicts globally.

This is reflected in the fact that incidents of explosive weapons used in populated areas increased by 108% between 2021 and 2022, from 1,436 recorded incidents to 2,986, and civilian casualties from such rose by 86% (from 10,518 to 19,599).

EWIPA accounted for 69% of incidents recorded in 2022, and caused 94% of civilian casualties. AOAV recorded 668 incidents of non-state actors using explosive weapons in populated areas in 2022, compared to 731 in 2021 - a 9% decrease. On the other hand, incidents of state actors using explosive weapons in populated areas rose by 311% in 2022, from 518 to 2,129 recorded incidents.

With ongoing conflicts entering into 2023, the coming year looks set to continue the upward trend in incidents of explosive weapon use. Actors will remain actively embroiled in the complex, intractable conflicts which have come to characterise this decade, and in which state actors and their non-state proxies fight on multiple fronts, often in or near to populated civilian areas.

ZONES OF CONFLICT
There are several conflict areas, including both international and non-international armed conflicts, which are likely to continue to experience intensive explosive weapon use over the coming year, severely impacting civilians and civilian livelihoods.

Ukraine
AOAV recorded 1,853 incidents of explosive weapon use in Ukraine in 2022, a 1,585% increase compared to the 110 incidents recorded in 2021. Those incidents resulted in 10,381 reported civilian casualties in 2022, or a 36,975% increase from the 28 civilian casualties reported in 2021. This is likely under-reporting as AOAV only collects data from single-reported incidents as reported in reputable media, and cannot include collective assessments.

The USA and Europe continue to provide and pledge military and non-military aid to Ukraine, while relations between the USA and Russia have reached an all-time-low after a tense and difficult year. Deep rifts, political intransigeance, misinformation, and mistrust continue to make communication and diplomacy highly challenging. For these reasons, it is likely that Russia will maintain or even increase the intensity of air- and ground-attacks in Ukraine in 2023, continuing to target essential civilian infrastructure.

Ground-launched weapons accounted for 81% (1,494) of recorded incidents of explosive violence in Ukraine, and caused 76% (7,481) of reported civilian casualties, while air-launched weapons accounted for 6% (104) of incidents and 15% (1,541) of civilian casualties. Consistent ground shelling is likely to remain a defining feature of the conflict in Ukraine and cause civilian casualties on a daily basis in towns and villages, while more sporadic air-launched attacks continue to result in discrete mass casualty events.

Afghanistan
Following the Taliban take-over of Afghanistan in August 2021, the armed group claimed it would clamp down on extremist violence in the country, but 2022 has been a painfully injurious year for civilians. ISIS-K, the IS affiliate in Afghanistan, perpetrated deadly attacks throughout the year, and other groups continued to target both civilian and military infrastructure. Sunni muslims and educational facilities have been particularly targeted by ISIS-K and other groups.

While 2022 saw an 80% decrease in incidents of explosive violence in Afghanistan compared to 2021, from 458 recorded incidents to 90, and a corresponding 57% decrease in reported civilian casualties (AOAV recorded 3,051 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2021, and 1,312 in 2022), IEDs continue to be a leading cause of civilian harm in the country. They accounted for 64% (294) of recorded incidents and 77% (2,347) of reported civilian casualties in 2021, and 76% (68) of incidents and 85% (1,119) of civilian casualties in 2022.

The Taliban have so far failed to deliver on the promise of bringing stability to the country and adequately protecting minority groups and the right to education. It is consequently likely IEDs will continue to be the predominant cause of civilian harm in Afghanistan in 2023, and Sunni muslims and educational facilities will continue to be at particular risk.

Syria
The conflict which has plagued Syria since 2011 shows few signs of coming to a close in the coming year, and the invasion of Ukraine has made an already-complex context even more fraught. The rise of IS after their supposed defeat in 2018, the intensifying tension surrounding the Kurdish community, and the polarisation of relations between the USA, Russia, Israel and Iran, each of whom back armed groups in Syria, all speak to the intensification rather than de-escalation of the conflict. In 2022, AOAV recorded 652 incidents of explosive weapon use in Syria, compared to 709 in 2021, and 1,309 civilian casualties (down from 2,016 in 2021). This downward trend has been observable since 2017, when 1,750 incidents were recorded and 13,062 civilian casualties reported. If this pattern holds, 2023 should see a decrease in the number of recorded incidents and civilian casualties.

Ground-launched weapons accounted for 47% (304) of recorded incidents of explosive violence in Syria in 2022, and caused 55% (715) of reported civilian casualties, while IEDs accounted for 23% (148) of incidents and 12% (151) of civilian casualties. Air-launched weapons, which accounted for 19% (129) of recorded incidents, caused 23% (296) of civilian casualties. Given the continuing activity of both state and non-state actors across Syrian territory, both IEDs and manufactured weapons will most likely continue to cause civilian harm, with ground shelling remaining the dominant form of civilian harm in Syria in the coming year.

Somalia
In 2022, the Somali government intensified their fight against Al Shabaab, mobilising the broader population and leaning on US air support. Based on data recorded by AOAV in 2022, Al Shabaab and other armed groups responded by intensifying their own attacks on civilian and military infrastructure.

AOAV recorded 89 incidents of explosive weapon use in Somalia in 2021, compared to 95 in 2022 - a 7% increase. Correspondingly, the 1,222 reported civilian casualties recorded by AOAV in 2022 represent a 128% increase from the 537 civilian casualties recorded in 2021. At the time of writing, there has been no military breakthrough or suggestion of a diplomatic solution, leading AOAV to understand the situation will continue as is or escalate in the coming year.

Of note, incidents of IED attacks in Somalia decreased by 17% between 2021 and 2022, from 66 to 55 recorded incidents, but civilian casualties of IED attacks increased from 425 to 1,091, or by 158%. IED attacks consequently became more targeted and injurious in 2022 compared to 2021. Additionally, incidents of reported mine explosions, which are likely to also include directly-emplaced IEDs, increased by 650% between 2021 and 2022, from two to 15 recorded incidents, and caused 50 civilian casualties in 2022 compared to 14 in 2021. As the military conflict continues and both sides remain resistant to a diplomatic solution, the use of IEDs to target civilians and civilian infrastructure is likely to continue.

Myanmar
In 2022, AOAV recorded 551 incidents of explosive weapon use, a 430% increase compared to the 104 incidents recorded in 2021. Similarly, 2022 witnessed 983 civilian casualties, a 178% increase from the 353 civilian casualties reported in 2021.

The military coup in February 2021 devolved into a non-international armed conflict affecting the majority of the country. Established Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) intensified attacks against the new military government, and civilian defence forces were formed to resist the junta, some loosely allied under the shadow National Unity Government. The military’s response has been to target villages in air strikes and ground-attacks, resulting in an escalating humanitarian crisis. Armed groups are intensifying their attacks against the military government and suspected collaborators, and demonstrating the ability to learn quickly and adapt their military strategy, while the military government continues to implement the established ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting civilian networks which support the opposition.

Ground-launched weapons accounted for 32% (179) of recorded incidents of explosive weapon use in Myanmar in 2022, and 56% (553) of reported civilian casualties. IEDs accounted for 20% (112) of incidents, and 12% (114) of civilian casualties, while air-launched weapons accounted for 9% (52) of incidents and 21% (202) of civilian casualties. Mines accounted for 34% (185) of incidents, and 7% (202) of civilian casualties. Manufactured weapons, especially ground-launched weapons, will likely continue as the dominant form of civilian harm in the year to come as the military government maintains its current strategy and goals.

Pakistan
In 2022, AOAV recorded 126 incidents of explosive weapon use in Pakistan, a 26% increase from 100 recorded in 2021. Reported civilian casualties of explosive violence in Pakistan increased by 59% in 2022, from 445 to 706. Developments in Pakistan, where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called off the May ceasefire in November 2022, will likely lead to an increase in incidents of explosive violence, notably IED attacks. This trend was already visible in December, when AOAV recorded 54 civilian casualties of IEDs, the highest number recorded since March 2022.

IEDs accounted for 52% (65) of recorded incidents of explosive weapon use in Pakistan in 2022, and caused 74% (521) of reported civilian casualties. Civilian casualties of IEDs in Pakistan rose by 69% in 2022, from 308 civilian casualties of IEDs reported in 2021. Ground-launched weapons accounted for 45% (57) of incidents and 25% (173) of civilian casualties. In particular, grenades thrown by unknown non-state actors represented 38% (48) of incidents and caused 19% (134) of civilian casualties. IEDs will likely continue to cause the majority of civilian harm as a fragile peace crumbles.

COVID-19
Analysis of AOAV data across the years impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic shows a marked decrease in recorded incidents and civilian casualties of explosive violence. In 2020, AOAV recorded a 24% decrease in incidents compared to 2019, from 3,816 to 2,909, followed by a further 14% decrease to 2,500 recorded incidents in 2021. Similarly, there was a 43% decrease in reported civilian casualties from 2019 to 2020, from 19,401 to 11,055 followed by a 3% increase to 11,343 civilian casualties in 2021. There are myriad factors which could have influenced the way COVID-19 impacted explosive weapon use globally, from lockdowns and restrictions to cultural attitudes towards illness and the virus.

AOAV recorded a 59% decrease in incidents of air-launched weapon use between 2019 and 2020, from 1,305 to 529 incidents, and a further 17% decrease to 441 incidents in 2021. Similarly, incidents of ground-launched weapons decreased by 11% between 2019 and 2020, from 1,067 recorded incidents to 949, and by another 17% to 792 incidents in 2021. Recorded IED attacks dropped by 4% between 2019 and 2020, from 1,230 to 1,176 incidents, and by a further 12% to 1,033 incidents in 2021.

However, data collected by AOAV in 2022 shows a general reversal of this trend. As mentioned previously, recorded incidents of explosive weapon use rose by 73% between 2021 and 2022, and reported civilian casualties similarly rose by 83%. Air-launched attacks rose by 17% in 2022, while ground-launched attacks increased by 187%. IED attacks, on the other hand, have continued to decrease, dropping by 13% in 2022. This upward trend is in no small part due to conflicts which escalated or began during and after the COVID-19 lockdowns, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the military coup in Myanmar, but it is also likely that, as restrictions continue to ease, the legal and illegal networks which facilitate explosive violence will gather momentum. As has been noted elsewhere, 2023 might prove to be a bumper year for arms sales. Civilians be warned.

Iain Overton is Executive Director at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and an expert listed by the Forum. Chiara Torelli is lead explosive violence researcher at AOAV.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Aid to Ukraine May Elicit Broader Arms Trade Scrutiny

South Korean Arms Sales Grow in the Years Ahead

Explosive Violence: Projections for 2023

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