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Paths for building cyber peace in 2022

1/18/2022

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Allison Pytlak
Malicious cyber operations are already making headlines just weeks into the new year. Last week Ukraine was hit by an operation that defaced the websites of some governmental departments; two days later “highly destructive” malware was discovered on several private and governmental networks. Earlier in January, authorities blocked internet access in Kazakhstan following days of protest and an earlier crack down on social media platforms. Meanwhile, many companies, governments, and organizations are still dealing with the extensive fallout of the Log4j vulnerability which surfaced in December 2021.

What used to feel like science fiction is fast becoming a daily reality in our ever more wired lives. The scale and frequency of malicious cyber operations has intensified during the Covid-19 pandemic in line with a greater dependency on digital networks, even as digital divides persist. For instance, malware and ransomware attacks reportedly increased by 358% and 435% respectively in 2020. Software supply chain attacks rose by 650% last year while physical supply chains attacks have contributed to economic distortion. Disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda campaigns are increasingly affecting domestic political processes and Covid-19 pandemic response. A series of revelations about Pegasus spyware has demonstrated the extent to which authorities spy on individuals and organizations, and it is estimated that more than 486 million people were affected by internet shutdowns in 2021, an increase of 80% from the preceding year.

What this points to is not only that the misuse of information and communications technologies (ICTs) has become more frequent but also that ICTs are increasingly integrated into other methods of disruption, war fighting, and repression. While “cyber” was once viewed as a standalone domain, the use of cyber-related tactics or the targeting of ICTs directly has instead become a component of broader operations that pursue strategic goals. As just one example, the operation targeting Ukraine follows on from a history of Russia-linked cyber operations against the country—including one that knocked down Ukraine’s power grid in 2015—and has occurred in a context of current heavy military build-up and political tension. 

For many perpetrators, cyber operations are attractive because they cause disruption and have impact but do not risk the potential blowback of a physical attack. They can also provide anonymity and/or ambiguity, when that is desired by those responsible. A growing number of governments publicly acknowledge that they possess or are developing offensive cyber capabilities—many of whom maintain that it is within their sovereign rights to do so, provided that such capabilities are used responsibly. This is a narrative not unfamiliar to those in arms control and non-proliferation. While there is some debate among experts about if such a neat line can be drawn between offensive and defensive operations, there is little doubt that a “militarization” of technology appears to be well underway.

While less visible than a bomb blast, cyber operations have human costs and can escalate political tension. When medical facilities are forced offline—something that is occurring with growing frequency—it means that people awaiting surgery or receiving other forms of care take are affected. When a government turns off its internet, diverse human rights and fundamental freedoms are negatively affected. Power outages can have knock-on effects for other critical infrastructure upon which scores of people depend. There are also differentiated impacts of cyber operations in relation to gender, age, race, and ability, which is only starting to be documented and discussed.

Despite being sometimes portrayed as a lawless “wild west”, state action in cyberspace ought to be constrained by and undertaken within the boundaries of existing international law, as well as a set of eleven voluntary norms that have been developed through processes at the United Nations (UN). Through these processes, all UN member states have affirmed the applicability of international law to cyberspace. Most also maintain that existing law and the UN normative framework is sufficient for addressing cyber-related threats and harms and guiding state behaviour.

Except that it isn’t sufficient, as the examples cited in this blog demonstrate— or at least, it isn’t always being adhered to. Agreement on the overall applicability of international law is positive, but it is also a blanket statement that does not account for some of the unique complications posed by cyber operations and ICT misuse, for instance in relation to the interpretation of certain legal principles (sovereignty, territoriality, due diligence, and self-defence). Additionally, some states maintain that the UN Charter applies in its entirety while others disagree. There are complications in relation to attribution and legal accountability. A few countries still do not accept the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber space and some don’t see the relevance of international human rights law when discussing cyber in an “international peace and security” context. 

In looking ahead to 2022, it is imperative that the international community take meaningful action to foster cyber peace by curtailing malicious cyber operations and challenging cyber-related militarism. Just as we are seeing in other areas where technology and military interests intersect, such as autonomous weapons, new and more specific law may well be required. Currently most countries feel that this is too political challenging, partially because the shadow of proposed cyber treaties past—and present—looms large (Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan first proposed a draft cyber treaty in 2013, and some of these countries are now leading a controversial initiative to negotiate a UN instrument on cybercrime).

Given this context, focus must be placed for now on accountability and implementation of existing law and norms, as well as public exchange and sharing of how states interpret their legal responsibilities with respect to international cyber peace and security. This must go hand in hand with efforts to build resilience, capacity, and trust.

Several multilateral forums offer space to do just this. Within the UN system, the UNGA’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security has just launched its second open-ended working group (OEWG) on ICTs which will build on the outcomes of the first one as well as those of the six UN expert groups that have been convened over the last nearly two decades. Most states and the OEWG Chair are in agreement that they do not want this forum to be just another “talk shop”. There are a few proposals on the table for accountability mechanisms, but it remains to be seen if the political will exists to develop them further. More than 50 states have also endorsed a proposal to develop a cyber programme of action, inspired partially by the programme of action on small arms and light weapons, which may gain traction in 2022. Within these forums, civil society and some states are also calling increasingly for human-centric approaches to international cyber security, a concept akin to that of humanitarian disarmament.

For us in the arms control and disarmament community, we can do more to call attention to the cyber-related risks of existing weapon systems, recognizing that those risks are powerful incentives to disarm and demilitarize. We can also do more to address the growing role of digital networks in facilitating the illicit trafficking of weapons, the potential role of existing arms control agreements to stop the spread of harmful digital technologies, and the pivot towards cyber products being undertaken by some traditional weapons producers. We can pull from our long and collective experience in challenging militarized narratives of “security” to push back against the willful misuse of ICTs, prevent cyber harm, and build cyber peace.


Allison Pytlak is a Program Manager in the disarmament program of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). 

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Looking Ahead: Civilians Must Be Protected from Bombing and Shelling in Towns and Cities

1/13/2022

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Laura Boillot
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Brian Castner
In mid-2021, as the Taliban ramped up their offensive against government forces across Afghanistan, the fighting grew especially fierce in Zakhail, just west of the city of Kunduz. The Taliban used motorbikes to seize civilian areas and took cover in homes and schools, while the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) launched mortars from police checkpoints into the densely populated neighborhood.

As Amnesty International documented in a new report on the conflict in Afghanistan, on the evening of June 23rd a family huddled in their home in Zakhail, trying to take cover from the fighting, when they heard a series of explosions. One by one the detonations got closer, until the fourth round struck the central courtyard of the house.
Heavy metal fragments from a mortar tore through the family members. One 30-year-old woman, Bibi Shahnaz, and her 12-year-old son Faisal were killed immediately. Another child, a 16-yearold boy, lost both legs at the knee. A man and a third child were also badly hurt. An Amnesty International researcher examined the wounds of the injured man, and after removing a leg bandage bone was still visible in the deepest wounds.

These civilians were killed and injured because they were trapped in their home, unable to flee the fighting, and caught between the explosive weapons of the Taliban and the ANDSF. “The people who can afford to leave do but the poor people stay because they will starve if they leave,” one witness said.

In this case, the family was hit when the ANDSF unit “walked” their mortars to a Taliban position, a process in which the crew makes targeting adjustments through observation and correction with each round launched to gradually direct the ordnance to the target through repeated firings. But doing so in an area with civilians is extremely reckless, and such negligence in failing to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects can constitute a war crime. But even in lawful attacks against a military objective, when fighting occurs in populated areas military forces ought to exercise extreme caution over the choice of weapons.

Attacks such as the one in Zakhail are an example of the risks that civilians face from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas – a pattern of harm which has been widely documented and results in the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of civilians each year. Amnesty International has reported other cases in point including use of inaccurate explosive weapons in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syrian and Russian air and ground launched strikes in northern Syria, Saudi Arabia and UAE-led Coalition air strikes in Yemen, and US-led Coalition air and artillery strikes in Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq, to name just a few recent examples.  

Over the past several years the ICRC and UN have raised the alarm over civilian devastation and suffering from bombing and shelling in towns, cities, and other populated areas. The current and former UN Secretary-Generals have called on Member States to engage constructively in a process to develop an international political declaration that aims to address the harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, described as “widespread’” and “largely foreseeable.”

In response to this growing concern, the government of Ireland has led talks with states and organisations to agree to new international standards in the form of a political declaration that will be finalised and adopted by states over the coming months.

The aim of this political instrument is to set new international standards that would strengthen the protection of civilians by promoting good practice and stigmatizing harmful behaviour through the declaration’s commitments.  

Whilst not  legally binding, a political declaration can reinforce important principles of international humanitarian law and help reaffirm application of the law, and build upon these by providing clearer guidance. 

The declaration would see curbs placed on use of explosive weapons in populated areas, with a specific commitment to prevent use in populated areas when explosive weapons have “wide area effects.” Meaning, when the effects of the weapon are likely to extend beyond a particular military objective. This may be due to the large blast and fragmentation radii of the weapon, the use of inaccurate weapons systems that may strike at a distance from the intended target, the use of a weapon system that delivers multiple munitions across an area, or a combination of these factors. The Zakhail example is a case in point, where mortars, which are  highly inaccurate, can require multiple rounds to “dial in” on a target. These extra rounds can fall on areas populated by civilians and cause significant harm, as they did in this case. Beyond restrictions on use and other measures aimed at shaping military policy and practice, the declaration text will also contain other important commitments to assist individuals and communities affected and to address the long-lasting humanitarian impact when infrastructure is destroyed. And it will call on states  to gather data on the impact on civilians – including direct and reverberating effects – that can help to provide responses that will reduce harm and respond effectively to the needs of all.
​

The declaration presents a unique opportunity to set stronger normative expectations, coupled with  practical operational guidance which can offer new prospects that reduce harm experienced by civilians in conflict. It is urgently needed.


​Laura Boillot is Programme Manager for Article 36 and Coordinator for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).

Brian Castner is a Senior Crisis Advisor with Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Programme, specializing in weapons and military operations.
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U.S. Arms Sales Restraint in 2022?

1/6/2022

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Jeff Abramson
Looking at what is often the most common metric of arms sales intention and volume -- notifications of potential government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) -- the Biden administration at first blush appears to be exercising restraint in the arms trade. FMS notifications made to Congress in calendar year 2021 totaled just over $36 billion, the lowest annual amount since 2011 and second lowest since FMS grew sharply in 2006. 
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(See dedicated spreadsheet on 2021 FMS notifications here (see all 3 tabs), which was created using the spreadsheet linked to the Forum's resource page.)

While the 2021 total is the lowest in a decade, there are still many problematic sales on last year's list. Top of mind is the one that raised the most attention --  the $650 million November notification of 280 air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. The administration argued that those weapons could not be used for "offensive" purposes and therefore were in line with its human rights goals, especially as related to avoiding harm to civilians in Yemen. Nonetheless, a majority of the President's party voted (unsuccessfully) to block the sale in the Senate last month, with many arguing that providing weapons to oppressive regimes serves to legitimize them, regardless of whether you consider weapons offensive or defensive.

Those arguments can and should also be applied to others on last year's list, perhaps most noticeably the Philippines, where the administration told Congress it wanted to sell F-16s, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles valued at more than $2.5 billion to the oppressive Duterte regime. Scrutiny is also rising on countries that have in the past been less controversial, such as Israel and India, for which there were FMS notifications as well as human rights concerns.

It's Not Just Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS itself also does not tell the full arms sales picture, which appears to be increasingly comprised of company-initiated Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that are much less transparent to the public. The May scandal of JDAMs on offer to Israel during a flare up of conflict in which civilian areas were bombed was via the DCS program. Part of the controversy was that a Congressional leak was needed to raise awareness of the potential deal, in part because DCS notifications are not shared on a convenient website, whereas FMS notifications are.

The State Department arms sales factsheet from January 2021 indicates both the scale and relative lack of information we have on the DCS program. It details that in fiscal year 2020 more than $124 billion in DCS licenses were authorized, but only $38.5 billion of which were notified to Congress. (In the latest factsheet, released last month, the Biden administration provides even less clarity, removing details about how much of the $103.4 billion fiscal year 2021 DCS approvals were notified to Congress.)

There is also a billion dollar request for Israel's Iron Dome program supported by the administration, assistance to Egypt that the Biden administration did not fully withhold, and $20+ billion F-35 and drones sales to the UAE that raise the question of how much restraint this administration will support. 

New Policy Anticipated

As soon as this month, we expect the Biden administration to unveil a new conventional arms transfer policy that was previewed in part in November. At that time, Tim Betts, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, said the policy will "seek to elevate human rights, stress the principles of restraint and responsible use." That is certainly welcome. In all likelihood, however, the new policy will follow earlier ones in that the list of reasons to engage in weapons transfers will not be weighted. Those looking to argue for commercial interests will find language they want, and no indication that human rights have a higher priority. How the administration actually implements the policy will likely be more telling than the words in it.

An initial follow-on step should be for the Biden administration to recommit to the U.S. signature to the Arms Trade Treaty. President Trump’s repudiation of the one global treaty that establishes baselines for responsible trade of broad categories of conventional weapons, and which is already consistent with U.S. law, is a stain on U.S. international credibility and inconsistent with shared goals.

More to Watch

Getting this right is not easy, of course. But if the United States, the world’s largest weapons provider by far, actually wants to show arms transfer restraint, it needs a consistent approach to existing or future conflicts that moves away from adding more weapons to volatile situations. It must find ways to engage the Middle East and elsewhere through commercial ties, cultural and academic connections, and other approaches. And in many cases, especially in pulling back, it will need to increase and enable humanitarian assistance to those places impacted by war. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, while a positive for those supportive of a less militarized approach, has not been followed by a humanitarian response sufficient for the suffering country.

Nor has aid that would help those in Yemen been able to reach them, in part because the United States has not truly used its full power to demand that the blockade on the country be immediately ended. In Yemen, the Houthi are no saints. They have committed horrible abuses. U.S. leverage and complicity, however, is tied much more closely to Saudi Arabia, for which the U.S. continues vital aircraft maintenance support, and to the UAE, which despite claims of exiting the war is still engaged via proxy groups and control of the Socotra island.

Even more than relations with Saudi Arabia, that with the Emiratis may be most telling on potential U.S. arms restraint in the coming months and years. In December, the UAE threatened to walk away from the massive F-35 deal. The administration has consistently said it wants to make the deal work, but has insisted on publicly unspecified end-use and other conditions. In my close reading of the comments by State Department and Defense Department officials last month, it’s unclear that human rights and civilian protection concerns are being raised at all with the Emiratis. That must change. 

Finally, Congress may also play a role. A wide array of legislation has been introduced that would impact on arms trade restraint should it be adopted. A short, but incomplete, list includes the progressive Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act introduced by Rep. Ilhan Omar; the SAFEGUARD Act, led by the influential chairs of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees; and the bipartisan National Security Reforms and Accountability Act/National Security Powers Act that would “flip the script” and require Congressional approval on many arms sales -- similar to an approach once introduced by then-Senator Joe Biden in the 1986.



Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade 
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Tackling militarism’s contribution to the climate emergency

1/5/2022

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2022 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Doug Weir
The past year saw the dial finally shift on reducing the carbon bootprint of the military. Since the topic was excluded from international climate processes by the United States back in the late 1990s, it has received scant attention. Efforts to track and estimate the emissions that $2 trillion of annual global military spending creates had largely been the preserve of a few academic researchers and peace organisations. That changed in 2021.

Many highly industrialised countries have been moving towards declaring goals to reach Net Zero emissions by 2050 for a while. For some of them, the fact that militaries are the largest emitters within government – often responsible for more than 50% of emissions - has made them increasingly difficult to ignore, particularly where whole of government targets have been enshrined in law. It should be noted that Net Zero is not a panacea and will likely come too late but the concept has been widely accepted by governments as a safely distant and impressive sounding target.

But this is also a story of individuals. We saw multiple voices within national militaries, and NATO, advocating for change. These are people who could see that the wind is changing, and who could also see that the future of military energy consumption was not going to be one wholly based on fossil fuels. Moreover, Western governments have been orienting towards the security risks of climate change, with actors like NATO keen to play a leading role. However, legitimacy in this space requires that those who seek to lead it aren’t contributing to the problem.

More broadly, militaries reflect the societies that provide them licence to operate. There is a rising tide of concern over climate change and therefore pressure on militaries to be seen to be acting on it, and not just in response to it. And if the policy changes that we saw in 2021 have appeared to be rapid, this should be seen as a reflection of just how far behind the curve militaries have been in this space. They and their political masters had opted to exclude themselves from international efforts to reduce emissions.

The past 12 months have seen a flurry of announcements. In May, NATO members gave the first vague commitments that they would cut military emissions. The UK and Switzerland had already acknowledged that military emissions cuts would be part of their 2050 Net Zero goals. NATO also announced that it would work on an emissions tracking methodology for its members – a good example of how far behind other sectors the military are on cuts. Almost unnoticed during the Glasgow climate summit in November, the U.S. Department of Defense quietly announced that it too would aim to be Net Zero by 2050. NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg had attended its first COP to confirm that global emissions targets would not be met without military emissions being included.

The acknowledgement by states that their militaries are major emitters, and that they cannot be exempt from society-wide decarbonisation feels like a watershed moment. But it is just the first step in what will be a very long and difficult road. Militaries, and the technology companies that support them, are highly polluting industries. Just like cement, steel or aviation, tackling emissions will be a huge challenge. It also carries with it risks. These include military-grade greenwashing when targets can’t be met, increasing military spending to rearm with less polluting vehicles, the temptation to offset difficult emissions instead of reducing them at source, or transitions to costly new synthetic fuels, diverting resources away from other more important reduction pathways.

Looking ahead

In 2022, the trends initiated in 2021 will intensify and accelerate. We will see more industrialised countries accept the need for military decarbonisation. Luxembourg’s Green Party defence minister set out his its plans in December, South Korea did likewise, following a pledge made at COP26 in Glasgow. But beyond the headline pledges, the hard work needs to begin to establish expectations and standards on militaries. The historic environmental exceptionalism that kept them out of climate talks, and global environmental norm-setting bodies more generally, will continue. Scrutiny will be needed over how they record and what they report. Transparent data is at the core of any action to reduce emissions, which is why we launched the data portal militaryemissions.org with colleagues from Lancaster and Durham universities at COP26. What we can’t see, they won’t cut, so making emissions reporting open and standardised is a critical first step.

The UK will pass on its COP presidency to Egypt in November 2022. We do not expect them to be overly sympathetic to calls for military emissions to be placed on the formal agenda of COP27. But it is vital that they are. While the U.S.’s massive military expenditure and relative transparency has meant that much of the discourse has focused on the Department of Defense’s gargantuan annual emissions – equivalent to those of Portugal, or Sweden – this is a global problem, and it needs global standards. As we show on militaryemissions.org there are many large military spenders who report very little emissions data, this includes China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Israel. We hope and expect that 2022 will see increasing attention on their emissions.

Beyond military emissions themselves, we expect to see a steady uptick in attention on the linkages between conventional arms and climate change. We have already documented how the arms industry reports its environmental footprint – more transparently than most militaries, as it turns out – and colleagues at UNIDIR have posed several research questions in this space. But we need to get ahead of this issue. The pledges made in Glasgow are far short of what is needed to slow global heating. The climate crisis will have a massive impact on human security globally and it’s critical that we understand how arms transfers and militarism will be influenced by it, and how they will drive and exacerbate insecurity. We would encourage everyone working in this space to spend a little of 2022 exploring how the issues they work on will be impacted by a hotter, more insecure world, and how they may make that world a more dangerous place.
 
Doug Weir is the Research and Policy Director of the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), www.ceobs.org @detoxconflict  Find our more about military emissions on CEOBS’ dedicated page www.ceobs.org/projects/military-emissions and explore the military emissions that your government reports to the UN at militaryemissions.org
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

    We have a number of special series including: 


    Looking Ahead 2025
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    Looking Ahead 2023
    Looking Ahead 2022
    ​Looking Ahead 2021
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    Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. Institutional affiliation is indicated for identification purposes only.

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