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Explosive violence and the health challenges ahead for Syria

1/11/2019

1 Comment

 
This is the eighth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Iain Overton
It is a hard truth that explosive weapons have a devastating impact on health – from the direct blast that can tear limbs and families apart, to the widespread destruction of health infrastructure and all the painful reverberations this has.  And nowhere else is this truism more evident than in war-torn Syria.

There, according to data by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), not only has the use of explosive weapons caused at least 79,000 direct casualties - of which about 85% (67,000) were civilians - but it has also devastated state and civilian infrastructure, causing immeasurable harm to healthcare. In Syria, direct casualties from such violence is just the beginning.

Today, with half of Syria’s basic infrastructure non-functioning owing to the war, civilians lack access to energy systems, clean water and other basic essentials – all factors that increase the risk of the spread of disease.[1] At the same time, explosive violence has radically reduced the capacity of health facilities across the country;[2] 60% of health-care services in Syria today lie damaged or destroyed.[3] So, whilst the demand for healthcare is greater than ever, access is significantly reduced and civilians are left ‘dying from injuries and illnesses that are easily treatable and preventable.’[4]

Many medical personnel have also been killed in bombardments; 57% of Syrian medical personnel deaths between March 2011 and December 2017 were caused by explosive weapon use.[5] Others have left; by 2018, with thousands of clinicians having fled the violence, just a third of healthcare workers are said to remain in the beleaguered nation.[6] Such an exodus poses a serious problem. Many physicians are unlikely to return; for some it may be unsafe to do so, for others they may have made a new life elsewhere. In a post-conflict environment, where demand is high and resources are few, medical staff may decide that a better quality of life is to be found in the countries they fled to.[7]

The result of this is that access to care is stretched thin. Doctors’ caseloads have more than doubled,[8] while the lack of staff means there are few specialised services, particularly as donor efforts focus on emergency funding for ‘cost effective intervention’.[9]

Blast survivors are amongst the worst impacted by this reality, faced with highly limited rehabilitation services and considerable difficulties reaching care in the first place. In desperate response to this, living with suppurating wounds and mounting ill-health, many patients have been increasingly misusing antibiotics, a considerable problem in the country even prior to the conflict.[10] Evidence suggests this has likely exacerbated antimicrobial resistance in Syria[11] – causing further significant obstacles for the future.

More than 11.3 million people are said to be in need of health assistance within Syria, including 3 million with injuries and disabilities.[12] A large percentage of those injured are likely to be due to explosive weapons. Amongst 25,000 injured Syrian refugees examined by Humanity and Inclusion, 53% had been injured by such weapons.[13]

In some of the worst impacted areas, the rate of injury and disability is disturbingly high. In a survey of injury and disability across Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa, as many as 50% of responders were said to be living with some form of disability.[14] The main cause of these injuries were airstrikes (54%), followed by other explosions (28%).[15]

​Amputations are common – one doctor commented that Syria will be left with ‘a generation of amputees.’[16] Alongside this, a Humanity and Inclusion report found that, of injured people in Syria, around 8% required an orthopaedic fitting.[17] Furthermore, with the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) predicted to take 50 years, blast injuries are likely to continue to occur long after the conflict ends.[18]

Amputees have life-long healthcare needs: from rehabilitation and tissue management to further associated conditions, such as ectopic bone formations and osteoarthritis. Such conditions are difficult to manage in a developed healthcare system, let alone a post-conflict environment with a severely dilapidated and destroyed healthcare infrastructure.

The ruin of civilian infrastructure in Syria, beyond health infrastructure, will also have long lasting health impacts on the population. Again, with the displacement of skilled construction workers, alongside the sheer level of redevelopment needed, it is likely that such a threat to health will linger for a long time to come. Syria will almost certainly be witness to increased rates of water-borne or similar diseases in the coming years.[19] One study found physical damage to 457 water supply and sanitation infrastructure assets, not including damage to pipe networks.[20]

The mountains of rubble and waste left in the wake of the bombardment has – and will - also provide the perfect habitat for sand flies, leading to severe outbreaks of leishmaniasis; cases there have increased in recent years by a rate of at least 150%.[21] The most common form of leishmaniasis (cutaneous) causes severe skin lesions which can leave scars and inflict serious disability, but there has also been an increase in visceral leishmaniasis, which is often fatal. [22]

The widespread devastation may also herald further health disasters ahead. When explosive weapons destroy buildings, dangerous and toxic substances are often exposed.[23] Little research has been conducted into this harm, and we are only just beginning to understand the consequences. But studies of those exposed to the toxic dust in the collapse of the World Trade Center give stark warnings. By October 2018, over 43,000 people had been diagnosed with a 9/11 related health condition – 10,000 with cancer – and more still are likely to have been affected.[24] This was also in the US, where the medical infrastructure remained intact after the terror attack. In Syria, a lack of safety equipment in clearance operations, a prolonged and widespread exposure due to uncleared waste, and a lack of health infrastructure, only increase the health risks.

Beyond the physical harm, many more Syrians will be left psychologically affected by the bombardment. One Save the Children study found that, among Syrian refugees interviewed, almost all children and 84% of adults reported that bombing and shelling was the number one cause of psychological stress in children.[25]

The outlook for psychiatric care in Syria is dire. With less than 100 psychiatrists across the whole country prior to the crisis and many of those forced to flee, it is certain that most Syrians will be unable to access the psychological support they desperately need.

Overall, the scale of civilian harm and damage to infrastructure has left a health crisis in Syria which is likely to last decades. The lack of infrastructure and staff is unlikely to be quickly remedied, whilst the harm from explosive weapons, both physically and psychologically, will in many cases require lifelong treatment. Such consequences should serve as a warning on the long-term harm from explosive weapons, and states should commit in 2019 to stop using such weapons in populated areas. That is the least that can be done in the name of humanity.

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Iain Overton is Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence

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Footnotes

[1] Interview with Omar Sobeh, Hand in Hand for Syria, WASH cluster coordinator, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[2] Cierra Carafice, ‘Where Do We Go From Here? The Story of Syria's Public Health System’, October 09 2017, Middle East Studies Center.

[3] Speech by Peter Maurer, ‘Even wars have limits: Health-care workers and facilities must be protected’, May 03 2016, ICRC. 

[4] WHO, ‘Seven years of Syria’s health tragedy’, March 14 2018.

[5] Raja Abdulrahim, ‘After the Gas and Bombs: The Health Crisis That’s Killing Syria’, April 17 2018, Wall Street Journal.

[6] Interview with Dr Mohamad Katoub, Advocacy Manager at Syrian American Medical Society, August 7th 2018.

[7] See Dathan, J. ‘When the bombs fall silent: the reverberating effects of explosive weapons’, May 2018, Action on Armed Violence.

[8] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[9] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[10] Interview with Dr Kinda Alhourani and Dr Tarek Al Mousa, Syrian Expatriate Medical Association, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 22nd 2018.

[11] Esmita Charani, Senior Lead Pharmacist, Imperial College London, Faculty of Medicine, at the Global Health Forum: The impact of conflict on health care, 19 May 2018.

[12] WHO, ‘Seven years of Syria’s health tragedy’, March 14 2018.

[13] Handicap International, ‘Syria, a mutilated future’, May 2016.

[14] Presentation by Keiko Tamura, Head of Programmes, HIHFAD, Child Protection Sub-Cluster meeting in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[15] Presentation by Keiko Tamura, Head of Programmes, HIHFAD, Child Protection Sub-Cluster meeting in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[16] Interview with Dr Mohamad Katoub, Advocacy Manager at Syrian American Medical Society, August 7th 2018.

[17] Anne Garella, ‘‘80,000 people in Syria need a prosthesis or an orthosis’’, Humanity and Inclusion, 2015. 

[18] Wilton Park and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2017, ‘Clearance of improvised explosive devices in the Middle East Monday 22 – Wednesday 24 May 2017 | WP1548’.

[19] Interview with Omar Sobeh, Hand in Hand for Syria, WASH cluster coordinator, in Gaziantep, Turkey, October 23rd 2018.

[20] World Bank, 2017, ‘The Toll of War. The economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria’.

[21] The Lancet, ‘Leishmaniasis unleashed in Syria’, February 2017, Volume 17, pp.144-145.

[22] The Lancet, ‘Leishmaniasis unleashed in Syria’, February 2017, Volume 17, pp.144-145.

[23] Andy Garrity, ‘Conflict rubble: a ubiquitous and under-studied toxic remnant of war’, July 10 2014, Conflict and Environment Observatory. 

[24] Erin Durkin, ‘September 11: nearly 10,000 people affected by 'cesspool of cancer'’, September 11 2018, The Guardian.

[25] McDonald, A. 2017. ‘Invisible Wounds: The impact of six years of war on the mental health of Syria’s children’, Save the Children. Available at: 

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In 2019, Latin American Defense Industries Will Strive to Continue Replacing Out-of-Region Imports

1/9/2019

2 Comments

 
This is the seventh blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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W. Alejandro Sanchez
Two important developments occurred in Latin America in the final months of 2018: in late November, Mexico commissioned its new long-range patrol vessel (Patrulla Oceánica de Largo Alcance: POLA) ARM Reformador (POLA-101); while in mid-December, Brazil launched its new submarine, the diesel-electric Riachuelo (S-40). What makes these two ceremonies even more significant is that both platforms were overwhelmingly manufactured domestically.

Out of all Latin American nations, SIPRI’s “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017” fact sheet (released in March 2018) only lists Brazil as a major exporter of military equipment; coming in as the world’s 24th largest. While it is not expected that other Latin American countries will be added to that list soon, the region’s defense industries have demonstrated their ambition to learn and apply what they have learned; and they are doing so very quickly for both domestic production and international trade—trends that should continue in coming years. 

Recent National Developments

Latin American shipyards have been particularly busy in the past year. For example, Brazil launched its new submarine, named Riachuelo, and it is constructing three additional Scorpène-class diesel-electronic platforms with French assistance. The PROSUB (Programa de Desenvolvimiento de Submarinos) program is a partnership between Brazil’s Itaguaí Construções Navais and Naval Group (former DCNS), following an agreement between Brasilia and Paris. The infamous nuclear-powered submarine, which Brasilia has attempted to manufacture since the 1970s, remains unclear as construction continues to be delayed.

Meanwhile, Mexico’s state run-shipyard ASTIMAR and Damen Shipyards constructed Reformador, with most of the assembly taking place in ASTIMAR’s facilities. The Reformador is the first of an order of eight POLAs, according to the ASTIMAR-Damen contract, but the future of the program will ultimately be decided by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who recently came to power. It is also worth noting that along with Reformador, the offshore patrol vessel ARM Jalisco (PO-167), was also commissioned. The latter is the seventh Oaxaca-class vessel constructed by ASTIMAR, demonstrating that the shipyard can construct a variety of platforms.

As for other nations, Peru commissioned its new landing platform dock, BAP Pisco (AMP-156), in June 2018, and construction is already underway for its sister ship, BAP Paita. The manufacturer of both vessels is the Peruvian state-run shipyard Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), which is also constructing a variety of riverine vessels for the Peruvian army. Meanwhile, earlier last year the Chilean shipyard ASMAR commenced the construction of a new ice-breaker for the Chilean Navy.

Not only shipyards had a busy 2018. In Argentina, the aircraft manufacturer FAdeA (Fábrica de Aviones Argentinos) has completed the construction and test flights of three IA-63 Pampa III advanced jet trainer aircraft destined for the Argentine Air Force. This is a major development as the Pampa program had stalled for several years. Meanwhile, Brazil’s planemaker Embraer may be purchased by Boeing, which would constitute a major merger; while another Brazilian company, Helibras, a subsidiary of Airbus, continues to deliver H225M helicopters to the Brazilian armed forces.

Trade Within and to Other Regions

Latin American defense industries are not solely constructing platforms for domestic use, they are exporting them as well. Colombia’s COTECMAR signed an agreement with the government of Honduras in late October for the construction of two naval interceptors. This agreement builds upon relations between Bogota and Tegucigalpa as COTECMAR has already delivered a multipurpose support vessel, named Gracias a Dios, to the Honduran navy. Meanwhile, Embraer continues to sell its Tucano aircraft to a variety of clients. Similarly, the Peruvian state-run company SEMAN is actively looking for potential clients for its KT-1P trainer aircraft, which were manufactured in partnership with South Korea’s KAI.

Without a doubt, Latin American governments will continue importing military equipment from extra-regional suppliers as they can provide highly sophisticated hardware. Nevertheless, the point here is that Latin American governments and armed forces want to also produce their own equipment, hence future weapons sales will continue to include “Know How” clauses, so that Latin American defense industries can learn how to manufacture more complex equipment themselves. The close relationship between Mexico and Damen is an example of this type of partnerships as the POLA is based on Damen’s Sigma Frigate 10514 model.

As a final point, the fact that Colombia’s COTECMAR has secured an additional contract to sell interceptor craft to Honduras highlights one important aspect of the ever-evolving arms trade. While extra-regional suppliers certainly offer more sophisticated equipment, countries with limited defense budgets may choose to acquire cheaper but reliable equipment from suppliers that are geographically closer, or with which they enjoy close diplomatic relations.

Analysts that monitor the global arms trade should pay special attention to South-to-South weapons contracts, particularly as certain Latin American defense industries learn how to manufacture more advanced equipment.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
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Improved Prospects for U.S. Arms Sales Restraint? Look to Congress

1/3/2019

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Jeff Abramson
The odds may at first appear to be against greater restraint in U.S. arms sales in 2019 given a president who loudly touts the supposed economic benefits of weapons sales and refuses to reconsider arms transfers to Saudi Arabia despite (1) the Saudi role in the devastating humanitarian crisis in Yemen and (2) a global outcry over the ghastly embassy assassination of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. But a close examination of Congressional action, much of it building over the last three years, reveals real prospects for limiting the president’s dangerous approach on conventional arms trade.
 
The most high profile signs of this restraint revolve around the most high profile U.S. arms purchaser, Saudi Arabia. A loud rebuke of Trump’s approach to the kingdom came in December when a bipartisan group of 56 Senators took the highly unusual step of using the 1973 War Powers Resolution to direct the president to end U.S. military action in the war in Yemen, including any refueling to the Saudi-led coalition. An earlier vote in March garnered only 44 votes. The outcry over Trump’s unabashed arms support to Saudi Arabia played a large role in changing many Senators’ minds.
 
Another War Powers-based resolution should expect to win Senate approval in the new Congress, when it is re-introduced. In the House, the new Democratic majority would also be likely to approve such a resolution. While leader Nancy Pelosi (D-California) has yet to indicate when a such a measure might be brought forward, she is one of 101 co-sponsors of the previous House version, which was blocked by a late procedural action in December.
 
The War Powers Resolution came on the heels of steps more explicitly addressing the arms trade. In June 2017, 47 Senators voted to block more than $500 million in precision-guided munitions (PGM) sales to Saudi Arabia; and in September 2016, 27 Senators supported stopping a $1 billion tank sale. While neither of these measures were successful, they indicate the building Congressional opposition to unrestricted arms sales to Riyadh. That sentiment was encapsulated after the recent War Powers vote when co-sponsor Chris Murphy (D-Connecticut) said that “momentum is…only growing. Congress has woken up to the reality that the Saudi-led coalition is using U.S. military support to kill thousands of civilians, bomb hospitals, block humanitarian aid, and arm radical militias.”
 
In addition to these very public votes, some Congressional leaders are acting in other ways to reign in unwise arms sales. Under the U.S. system, leaders within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee are pre-notified of potential arms sales. That pre-notification period has been the more traditional place for an opposition hold on controversial sales. For a period in 2017, former SFRC chair Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) declared a hold on new arms sales to Gulf Cooperation Council countries. More recently, ranking member Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) placed a hold on PGM sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While Corker is no longer in Congress, Menendez retains his position and his June 2018 hold remains in place. During the recent War Powers debate, he argued that the Trump administration view of the U.S.-Saudi relationship was “unhinged” in thinking that “selling weapons to the Saudis was more important than America’s enduring commitment to human rights, democratic values, and international norms.”
 
These actions are promising, and creative Congressional leaders have the opportunity to do more. While the public can be an ally for responsible action on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) because such government-to-government negotiated sales are quickly added to a public website, the increasingly important business-led Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are not as transparent, in part because any public notification often comes after the initial review period has passed. Congressmembers could insist that, or possibly take it upon themselves to make, these potential DCS transactions public immediately. Saudi PGM sales, for example, have come through the DCS process and relied upon concerned leaders to share in raising awareness.
 
While the notification period garners the most attention, Congress also can block a sale up until weapons are delivered. Given how security, geopolitical, and humanitarian realities can change between the time of notifications and often years-later deliveries, leaders should follow the entire process. To the best of my knowledge, however, the relevant chair and ranking committee members have only once used the power they gave themselves to receive from the State Department a notification of an arms shipment at least 30 days prior to its delivery. It’s time to exercise, and to expand, such authority (see Section 201).
 
In general, transparency around arms deliveries remains too obscure as a New Hampshire NPR reporter recently discovered.  When U.S. Census export data showed weapons worth more than $61 million were sold from his state to Saudi Arabia in August, he could not uncover what was in the sales nor which companies provided the weapons. Annual reports on U.S. arms transfers have grown increasingly opaque. Congress should mandate a change, demanding much greater transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S. weapons deliveries.
 
Finally, sometime in the first quarter of this year, we can expect the administration to publish final rules transferring export authority on select firearms from the State Department to the Commerce Department, despite a large number of negative public comments and great deal of concern. These rules have been at the heart of the 3-D gun printing controversy that energized public debate in the middle of last year. Members of Congress have raised an alarm that they will lose notifications about these sales, and need to be prepared to stop, or counteract, this dangerous export process change. Just as Trump’s broad approach on arms sales does, these changes risk making it easier for weapons to end up in the hands of terrorists, international criminals, and abusive regimes as well as further undermine the promotion of human rights norms that should be central to U.S. actions.
 
Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manages the Forum on the Arms Trade.
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Milestones Ahead on Landmines and Cluster Munitions

1/2/2019

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Hector Guerra
The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), cornerstones of humanitarian disarmament, remain robust and meaningful international instruments that save lives, limbs, and livelihoods.

In 2018 there were advances in the universalization and implementation of the CCM. Namibia, Gambia, and Sri Lanka became States Parties. The latter, immediately after joining the Convention declared its interest and availability to preside over it, so following the Nicaraguan Presidency of the 8th Meeting of States Parties, in September 2018, the South Asian country’s candidacy was unanimously supported for it to preside over the 2019 (9th) Meeting of States Parties.

There are now 105 States Parties and 15 Signatories to CCM.

Meanwhile, Croatia, Cuba, Slovenia and Spain completed the destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions.

At the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, the resolution on the CCM continues receiving important political support, even by states not parties. Also 2018 saw an interesting swing, with Russia changing its vote from “no”, to abstention.

2018 also marked the 10th anniversary of the adoption in Dublin of the CCM—and of its signing in Oslo—, and the 15th anniversary of the Cluster Munition Coalition.

With respect to MBT, the number of its States Parties has risen to 164, that is, about 85 percent of all UN Member States, as Palestine and Sri Lanka joined the Treaty towards the end of December 2017. In both cases, entry into force took place on 1 June 2018.

At the 17th Meeting of States Parties, under the Presidency of Afghanistan, in November, Oman announced the fulfillment of its MBT obligations of destroying its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines. Also, from the MENA region, Mauritania became the 31st country to declare itself mine-free. Meanwhile, Ukraine participated at the 17MSP having belatedly presented its request for an extension of the deadline for the completion of the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.

2019 is a special year in the life of the MBT, as it marks the 20th anniversary of entry into force (1 March). Also, the 4th Review Conference of the Treaty will take place, under the Norwegian Presidency, in Oslo. As in the three previous RevCons, an action plan could be expected.

Given existing trends on the use of improvised landmines in conflict areas, one could expect that we will continue having high numbers of victims, at least into the early part of 2019.

Of course, one wonders if among the expectations for 2019, should we not expect more decisive reactions from the international community to increase the very low share (2%) victim assistance receives from the total of international and national support for mine action, abiding by the principles and spirit of humanitarian disarmament. Could 2019 be a year when tougher stances are taken against those states missing their MBT deadlines, or moving from one extension request to the other, with deadlines beyond 2025, the year agreed upon by MBT States Parties under the Maputo Action Plan to complete their respective time-bound obligations according to the Treaty?

With the Second CCM Review Conference around the corner (2020), 2019 could be a year when a series of states, in particular from among the 15 signatories (including Angola, Haiti, Jamaica, Philippines or Cyprus) could take the necessary steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions and participate in the 2RevCon as States Parties.

The two RevCons will present an opportunity to define where the treaties are and what is the state of the measures taken to reach a mine- and cluster munition-free world, given the 2025 and 2030 aspirational targets of the Maputo and Dubrovnik Action plans, respectively. The question is: Will we get to the point where no more lives, limbs and livelihoods are lost, in our lifetime, or will that ideal remain a mirage of politically-correct words stated by diplomats in conference rooms?

Hector Guerra is the director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC)
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Solving the Rubik’s cube: what’s next for norms in cyber space

12/27/2018

2 Comments

 
This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
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Allison Pytlak
A slow drift toward a militarized cyber space has characterized the last few years. At the same time, an ever-growing patchwork of multilateral initiatives has sprung up to curtail hostile actions in this domain and articulate behavioral norms for states. From high-level political declarations to closed expert groups, governments, the tech sector, academics and others are full of ideas and suggestions. Yet, are these initiatives succeeding? Do they address human impact? Do they offer change, or accept and embody the same politicization and double standards that bedevil other security issues?  
 
In 2019, it is virtually certain that hostile cyber operations will continue to occur—both between governments, and between governments and citizens. What are these threats exactly, and how can the global community act to keep the peace in cyber space?
 
The threat, is real
 
2018 was another active year for hostile cyber operations, to put it mildly.  State-sponsored hacking groups zeroed in on prominent international entities such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, alongside other targets like universities and hotel chains. Data exposure schemes kept pace with data breaches. We learned more about the vulnerability of the United States’ electrical grid.
 
While these operations do not constitute the doomsday scenarios that early cyber watchers predicted, they have nonetheless generated an increasingly militarized response from governments and experts, in which it is taken for granted that this is and will continue to be a fighting domain, and the best we can do is establish some rules of the road for damage control. This mentality is reflected in the role that digital technologies now play in some national cyber strategies and military doctrines. For instance, in September 2018 the United States’ new National Cyber Strategy adopted an aggressive stance, promising to "deter and if necessary punish those who use cyber tools for malicious purposes." The U.S., the United Kingdom and Australia have been open about the use of offensive cyber tactics against the Islamic State. Germany has slowly been transitioning to a more offensive approach; other European countries have been open about seeking the same.  
 
The slow drift can also be seen in how and where states are discussing international cyber security. In the United Nations (UN), this is an offshoot of disarmament and arms control bodies. Other multilateral fora tend to bring together individuals with that background as well. Consequently there is frequently an effort to import and apply hard security concepts to this domain—“cyber deterrence” is one example; efforts to fit traditional arms control regime-style solutions are another.
 
Accepting the militarization of cyber space without question further risks adopting frameworks and guidelines that are more permissive of harm to the population than international law allows, pushing the possibility of achieving cyber peace further away.
 
Many responses, any real solutions?
 
Navigating through the volume of policy and normative proposals that exist to guarantee global cyber stability is a bit like trying to line up the colors in a Rubik’s cube: you can see some patterns, but getting all those squares to click into place is a challenge. Below is a non-exhaustive overview.
 
The UN, the world’s largest multilateral negotiating fora, has since 2004 been the home of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on information and communications technologies, or ICTs for short. The early Groups examined existing and potential threats in cyberspace and possible cooperative measures to address them, while more recent ones worked to develop behavioral norms for actions in cyberspace, culminating in eleven norms that were recommended by the Group in 2015 and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly.  
 
This seems to have been a highpoint for the Group however—significant differences over foundational questions such as the applicability of international law and the UN Charter to cyber space prevented agreement on a report in the next round. The geopolitical lines along which countries were divided is nothing new (in general terms, the west versus the rest) yet the extreme degree to which this issue became polarized in 2018 was unexpected, and has resulted in a procedurally conflicted and potentially counterproductive two-track UN approach to one of the most ubiquitous security threats facing the international community today. In 2019, there will be two UN entities concurrently taking work forward on cyber security norms: an open-ended working group that originated from a Russian-led initiative, and a US-inspired GGE. Exactly how these entities will interact remains unknown and the cost and administrative burden of managing both is not insubstantial.
 
Some have noted that deadlock at the UN gives impetus to, and space for, the efforts of other stakeholders. Governments, the tech sector, and other experts have been interacting for years through the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, which, in November 2018 proposed a set of six norms toward cyber stability. Also in November, France launched its Paris Call for Trust and Security Cyberspace during the Paris Peace Forum. The Paris Call is unique in bringing together endorsements from government, industry, and non-governmental organizations, but so far lacks support of some states, including Russia, China, United States, India, and Brazil.
 
Within the technology sector, Microsoft has framed itself as something of a moral compass in this space, first by publishing its own International Cybersecurity Norms in 2015 and most recently by playing a driving role in the Cyber Tech Accord. The Accord binds together 60 companies to partner on initiatives that improve the security, stability and resilience of cyber space—although some critics argue that implementation has fallen short. Somewhere in between the norms and the Accord, Microsoft’s CEO also called for the development of a Digital Geneva Convention in 2017, building somewhat on the contributions of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the literature on the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber space.
 
Clearly, from the number of times that I have used the word “norms” in the last several paragraph, both state and non-state actors alike are fans of developing some—or of implementing those that are already agreed. Yet what of something legally binding? That’s even more of a fraught issue, tangled up in geopolitical and ideological divide. Russia has been proposing a UN cyber treaty for well over a decade but has not gained sufficient support from other states, largely because elements of the draft it has put forward could legitimize some of their more nefarious domestic practices in curtailing internet freedom. Any new treaty-based initiative—and support for that does exist— would need to somehow account for this in a way that doesn’t isolate support or spark competition. It would also need to navigate existing regional and bilateral cyber security pacts.
 
Taking a people-centered approach in 2019
 
Perhaps the biggest blind spot in all the above initiatives is the human one. Very little information related to the human impact of cyber operations makes its way into multilateral discussion forums on cyber security and this contributes to institutionalization and taking for granted the broader societal harm of cyber conflict.
 
There is, however, an ever-growing and highly credible evidence base illustrating the negative uses of digital technology in repressing human rights, notably the rights to freedom of expression, speech, assembly, and privacy. This is not a practice limited to just a handful of governments, but one that is practiced in many parts of the world.
 
The human rights dimension of the cyber security agenda is usually separated out from the “international security” agenda, at least in the context of the UN. This is due in part to the structure of the UN itself, but possibly also because it’s politically awkward—some of the countries that are the largest proponents of cyber stability and norm development, for example, are also quietly permitting the export of digital surveillance technologies produced by companies in their jurisdiction. This has been an on-going debate among European Union countries in particular, in which the dual-use nature of digital surveillance technologies has been at times an excuse for not taking a meaningful policy response.  
 
Continuing to factor out human rights and humanitarian impact from inter-governmental discussions about global cyber security makes it easier to think of this domain in purely military and hard security terms. Our experience in banning nuclear weapons and regulating the global arms trade demonstrates that incorporating these perspectives can alter the discourse and generate people-centered responses.  
 
Where to from here?

Like a genie out of the bottle, it’s unlikely that the digital threats will decline in 2019, so to return to the question posed at the beginning of this blog: how can the global community act to keep the peace in cyber space?
 
First, we must stop using the same words, language, and approaches that we apply to traditional disarmament and security issues, and understand cyber space on its own terms: as both a medium in which conflict can occur, as well as a multi-faceted tool to cause disruption and harm offline. Trying to determine what a cyber bomb equates to in the kinetic world is futile; there is no such thing, and this of thinking encourages “round peg in square hole”-type solutions.
 
Yet, we cannot underestimate the vulnerability of digital networks and systems that prop up existing weapons and weapon systems. Nuclear weapons are vulnerable to cyber operation. The systems that enable unmanned aerial vehicles are vulnerable to cyber attacks. This should be further incentive to disarm.
 
Third, it’s frustrating that progress at the UN has been held hostage by power politics. It’s also concerning that two of the world’s largest cyber bullies are at the helm of new efforts. This can, however, be an opportunity for other states to step up and play constructive roles in bridging differences and brokering solutions,—as they’ve started to, along with other stakeholders.
 
Fourth, it will be important to harmonize efforts across the patchwork of responses identified here, in order to avoid redundancy and maximize knowledge and move toward implementation of what has already been agreed. States should establish the strongest norms against malicious operations—and reduce the motivation to pursue aggressive cyber capabilities.
 
Last, we must stop overlooking the human dimension and talking about cyber security in sanitized and faceless terms. Human rights considerations, for example, should be included in all discussions rather than being sidelined in the standard arms control and disarmament forums.


Allison Pytlak is the Programme Manager of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
 
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The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

12/19/2018

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Ray Acheson
2018, for some reason, was a turning point for international diplomatic recognition of gender dimensions of weapons and disarmament policy. After years or even decades—or in WILPF’s case, a century—of feminist advocacy for governments and activists to take gender into account in their work, we seem to breaking new ground.
 
In March, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva collaborated with WILPF, Small Arms Survey, and the Gender Mine Action Programme on a one-day training for disarmament diplomats about including gender perspectives in their work. In April, WILPF coordinated with the Canadian mission in New York on a meeting that brought together the women, peace and security (WPS) and disarmament diplomatic communities to exchange on the same subject.
 
In May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his new disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future. It includes a section on “Ensuring the equal, full, and effective participation of women,” and there are several references throughout the document to the gendered impacts of weapons, gender-sensitive arms control, or women’s participation in disarmament, including urging states to incorporate gender perspectives in their national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control.
 
In June, the Third Review Conference to the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) adopted a report with groundbreaking references to armed gender-based violence, the gendered impacts of small arms, and women’s participation in disarmament. The document builds on gains made in 2012 and 2016 to alleviate the overall gender blindness of the UNPoA. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network coordinated input and advocacy amongst civil society groups and diplomats for the inclusion of these elements in the outcome document, including through the civil society Call to Action on gender and small arms control.
 
In August, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) considered gender issues for the first time, in a side event hosted by the government of Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Mines Action Canada, Project Ploughshares, and WILPF on the relationship between gender and fully autonomous weapons. Participants addressed gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms in relation to the development and use of weapons, gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.
 
In October, the Canadian mission to the UN organized a push to increase gender references in resolutions at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Working with other governments and civil society groups, they managed to achieve language in 17 resolutions that advocates for women’s equal participation, recognizes gendered impacts of weapons, or urges consideration of gender perspectives more broadly. This accounts for 25 percent of all First Committee resolutions in 2018. Six of these resolutions included gendered language for the first time, while three improved the gendered language. For comparison, in 2017, 15 per cent of resolutions made gender references. This figure was 13 per cent in 2016 and 12 per cent in 2015. The number of First Committee delegations speaking about gender and disarmament in their statements also continued to increase this year. Namibia on behalf of 56 states dedicated a whole statement to this topic, urging examination of how “underlying assumptions about how gender shapes [delegations’] own work and the dynamics of joint disarmament efforts.”
 
Also in October, the Latvian ambassador, who will preside over the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, announced that the conference and its preparatory meetings will focus on the gender-based violence provision of the Treaty as a special theme. This will provide an opportunity in 2019 to advance consideration of how to implement this aspect of the ATT, including using guidance and case studies published by groups like WILPF previously.
 
In addition to these forum-based efforts, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research joined the governments of Ireland, Namibia, and Canada to form the Disarmament Impact Group as an output of the International Gender Champions. The Group aims to “support the disarmament community in translating gender awareness into practical action across the range of multilateral disarmament processes and activities.” Meanwhile, academic sources like Critical Studies on Security and the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, news sources like The Nation, and public speaking forums from TEDx to the London School of Economics featured articles and talks about feminism, gender, and weapons. This has signaled an opening of academic and activist spaces for increased consideration of these issues.
 
So, why has all this happened so quickly? In reality, it hasn’t. It is built on a firm foundation of activism and analysis. Feminist disarmament activists and academics, particularly those with groups like WILPF and the IANSA Women’s Network, have been writing and campaigning on gender and disarmament for decades. UN agencies and some governments have been working to mainstream gender in their programming for a long time, certainly since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This has led to concrete outcomes at international disarmament diplomacy forums in recent years: the first UN General Assembly resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in 2010; the inclusion of gender-based violence in the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013; the recognition of the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and encouragement of women’s effective participation in disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Chair’s summary and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.
 
External factors are also at play. The #MeToo movement has arguably awoken new acceptability and credibility of previously hidden or shamed perspectives and experiences. Women, trans, queer, non-binary, and non-conforming folks, as well as men who have experienced sexual and gender-based violence have collectively created new spaces to amplify these realities and demand change.
 
At the same time, several governments have begun pursuing what they term “Feminist Foreign Policy”. While it is debatable whether or not the foreign policies outlined by these governments can yet be truly described as feminist, it is a welcome development for government offices to be considering feminism not just a valid but an imperative approach to their international engagement.
 
In disarmament forums, momentum certainly seems to be on our side. There is a growing acceptance among a diverse range of governments, international organizations, and civil society groups about the reality that weapons have gendered impacts, and that women’s participation in disarmament is important. This is good progress, and imperative to making change in this field. But it’s not enough.
 
The work ahead
 
For one thing, the demand for women’s equal, effective, or meaningful participation—while necessary and welcome—is insufficient for truly making change in weapons policy. Our current situation is dire. Trillions of dollars are being spent on militaries and technologies of violence while poverty, inequality, and climate change threaten our collective security and safety. Disarmament, as a policy and practice that leads us away from militarism and towards peace, requires new understandings, perspectives, and approaches to weapons and war. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of survivors of gun violence, of nuclear weapons use and testing, of drone strikes, of bombardment of towns and cities. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of marginalized communities—LGBT+ folks, people of color, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, people with disabilities.
 
Diversity is not about political correctness. It is the only way we are ever going to see change in the way that we confront issues of peace and security. Where we have achieved the most disarmament progress in recent years—banning landmines and cluster bombs and nuclear weapons, for example—we have engaged with diverse communities and put humanitarian perspectives over the profits of arms industries or the interests of powerful governments. This is not just about including women, especially women who come from the same or similar backgrounds as the men who already rule the table. It’s about completely resetting the table; or even throwing out the table and setting up an entirely new way of working.
 
Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behavior of those who have the most privilege. Diversity is not for its own sake, but for how it impacts what is considered normal, acceptable, and credible. Confronting norms, especially gendered norms, around weapons and war is imperative to making progress on disarmament.
 
As a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. This association comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”.
 
This type of violent, militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not comply with that gender norm—women, queer-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. It also results in violence against men. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. A big part of this is about preserving or protecting their masculinity—a masculinity that makes male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless resolutions and reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.
 
We are all suffering from the equation of violence and power with masculinity. It prevents those who identified as men from being something else—from performing gender differently. It prevents all of us as human beings to promote or explore strength, courage, and protection from a nonviolent perspective. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd.
 
It also makes it impossible to achieve gender justice. It keeps men and women in binary boxes based on their biological sex. It maintains a strict hierarchy between these boxes, in which men are tough, rational, and violent, while women are weak, irrational, and passive. In this narrative, men are agents; women are victims. (And reinforces the idea that there is nothing outside of this binary.)
 
The norm of violent masculinity will continue to cause suffering and reinforce inequalities until we get serious about doing something differently. This is a project of dismantling the patriarchy, which is a big project, but it starts with the language we use, the people we include in discussions, and the norms we are willing to challenge.
 
For 2019, let’s stop using the term “women and children”. They are not the same legally or politically. They have different needs and abilities. Let’s talk about the different impacts of weapons based on gender and age, instead of womenandchildren on one side and men on the other. Let’s talk about gender diversity in disarmament, instead of just the equal participation of women and men. Let’s get away from binary language to something more inclusive. Let’s also include survivors and those impacted by weapons, war, and violence. Let’s think about what we consider credible or powerful, and why we think that way.
 
As more and more governments and organizations become interested in taking up gender, and as feminists around the world from all walks of life smash down barriers outside the disarmament field, let’s not waste the opportunities ahead of us. An intersectional feminist approach to disarmament is imperative, and we have all the tools we need to achieve it.
 
Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
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U.S. Drone Policy

12/18/2018

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Rachel Stohl
Picture
Shannon Dick
Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly referred to as drones, have become increasingly common in military operations and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions around the world. Although the United States is the world’s leader in possessing and using armed drones, other countries are increasingly acquiring, seeking, and using lethal drone technology. In 2019. these countries may look to the U.S. example for guidance in developing their own policies on drones – which raises a number of concerns.  

Although the U.S. drone program in its current form has been active for over 15 years, it remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding the use of lethal drone strikes outside traditional battlefields and the resulting lack of accountability. Such features have come to define the U.S. drone program and ultimately hinder effective oversight as well as challenge assessments of the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S operations.
 
The United States has demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. And U.S. drone policy appears to be becoming less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable, lacking safeguards and transparency over the legal framework, use, and results of use.

In June 2018, Stimson released a report, An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy, that examined worrying trends surrounding the U.S. drone program with a particular view towards the Trump administration’s use of lethal drone strikes outside of traditional battlefields. The report found key concerns regarding changes the Trump administration has made to U.S. drone policy and use:
  • U.S. drone policy under the Trump administration has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, reversing course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows.
  • The Trump administration has increased the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes.
  • The threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, and the administration may have reasserted the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes.
In addition to concerning regressions in U.S. drone policy, the United States also seems recommitted to pursuing a problematic multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to the United States’. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN Member States signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones.

The development of international standards through the joint declaration process has raised serious concerns that the U.S.-led process will undermine existing frameworks and result in weak standards guiding drone transfers and use. In August 2018, Stimson released The ATT and Drones to support the discussion on international standards and provide a primer on existing international standards related to drones, cautioning that any international standards should not be lower than what already exists in legally binding law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and set a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our enemies utilize drones for their own purposes.

​Rachel Stohl is Managing Director at the Stimson Center and Shannon Dick is Research Associate with the Conventional Defense Program.

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Will reckless, risky and wrong-headed UK support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen continue?

12/14/2018

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Anna Stavrianakis
The war in Yemen has killed over 57,000 people since March 2015 and created a cholera epidemic and a politically induced, entirely preventable famine. The Saudi-led coalition is causing twice as many civilian casualties as all other forces fighting in Yemen – including the Houthis, who are also responsible for attacks on civilians and on aid and humanitarian actors. Primary support for the Saudi-led coalition comes from the USA; but a crucial junior partner is the UK. The UK government claims to have been at the forefront of international humanitarian assistance, giving more than £570 million to Yemen in bilateral aid since the war began. Yet the financial value of aid is a drop in the ocean compared to the value of weapons sold to the Saudi-led coalition – licences worth at least £4.7bn have been granted to Saudi Arabia and £860m to its coalition partners since the start of the war.
 
Rejecting responsible action
 
The UK’s own rules state that it cannot sell weapons to countries where there is a clear risk they might be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law. And the UK claims, repeatedly, to have one of the most rigorous control regimes in the world. Yet evidence of illegal civilian harm in the war is ongoing and growing.
 
So how does the UK government try to convince itself and others that its arms export policy is not in tatters? First, by batting away extensive evidence of violations of international humanitarian law, claiming it can't be sure they have happened. Despite a risk-based arms transfer control framework that is explicitly preventive in orientation, the UK government demands absolute certainty that its weapons have been misused before it will countenance a suspension – and even then, concerted action to stop weapons sales is not guaranteed. Second, by working with the Saudis to claim that if attacks on civilians have happened, they must have been a mistake. Central to this has been the Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) – headed by a Bahraini military lawyer who oversaw national security trials of over 300 pro-democracy protestors in 2011. The JIAT has investigated only a small proportion of alleged incidents, and its methodology, sources and case selection criteria remain unclear. Its conclusions have taken the form of blanket denial; admission of limited, accidental civilian harm; and most frequently, a defence of air strikes that it says were carried out in line with IHL. All of these responses are contested by NGOs tracking civilian harm in the war. And third, that any past misuse of weapons doesn’t necessarily mean future misuse is likely. In the judicial review of export policy, a senior civil servant’s evidence stated that “Past behaviour is a helpful indicator of attitude towards IHL and towards future behaviour, but it is not necessarily determinative”. It is difficult to imagine civil servants or High Court judges articulating such a position if they were working in counter-terrorism policy, an issue area that operates on the basis of suspicion, intuition and an absence of evidence.   
 
In these three ways, according to the UK government, while there may be a risk of weapons being misused in Yemen, that risk is not clear. The upshot is an exponential rise in arms sales since the war started, to the point where Saudi Arabia now accounts for almost half of UK arms exports.
 
Change ahead?
 
Nonetheless, there may be glimmers of hope for an end to the war in Yemen. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi has generated a crisis in US and UK policy that four years of war have failed to do. While his murder has little to do directly with arms sales, and it is dispiriting that four years of evidence of the misuse of weapons has failed to register in US and UK policy, it has shone a spotlight on the war in Yemen. Pre-talk consultations in Sweden between representatives of the government of Yemen and the Houthis ended on 13th December with an agreement that included a ceasefire in Hodeidah, steps to address the situation in Taiz, and prisoner exchanges. These are tentative, fragile steps that would mitigate civilian harm if adhered to, but still need considerable political effort to translate into an end to the war.
 
The US Senate has passed two resolutions to halt US involvement in the war and curtail its support for Saudi Arabia – a significant development. The US government has called for ceasefire – which sounds positive but may also be a move to block more radical action from Congress. In the UK, FCO Minister for the Middle East Alistair Burt appeared not to know the US was going to make that call. The UK is making increased efforts to address the humanitarian effects of its own support for the coalition by introducing a draft UN Security Council resolution – but this has been blocked by the US. Domestically, a former defence attaché to Riyadh spoke out about UK complicity through its arms sales in October 2018 – the first acknowledgement of the recklessness of UK policy from the military establishment. And a judicial review of UK policy is ongoing: the High Court found in favour of the government in July 2017, but Campaign Against Arms Trade has been granted an appeal, which will be heard in April 2019.
 
These moves illustrate the ways that the UK government has been forced to expend greater energy in justifying its position, working with the Saudi-led coalition to engage in legitimation work, and devote greater resources to the aid response. Looking forward to 2019, the major milestone for British policy on the horizon is the judicial review appeal. Will the Court of Appeal show greater independence from the government than the High Court? What new justifications will the government roll out? Watch this space. 


Anna Stavrianakis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex.
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