Category: Landmines/cluster Munitions

Victim Assistance: what can we expect in 2021?

1/5/2021

This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2021 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Wanda Muñoz

Assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions has been constantly evolving since it first was included as an obligation in Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

For instance, it is now agreed that:

Victim assistance (VA) is a holistic process and set of services that includes health, rehabilitation, psychosocial support, education and social and economic inclusion.
VA should not discriminate among survivors of different weapons, or between them and people with impairments from other causes; and it should be planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated with the full participation of survivors and other people with disabilities and their representative organizations.
VA should include and respond to the needs and rights of survivors, the families of those killed and injured, and affected communities; and it should incorporate gender, age and diversity considerations.
VA should be incorporated into larger frameworks related to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), among others, in order to be sustainable. For this strategy to be effective, it should incorporate referral services and monitoring mechanisms that ensure that survivors are effectively accessing their rights.

With this in mind, what developments can we expect on victim assistance in 2021?

We will see more and more research by survivors’ organizations. Research by the Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO) and Fundación Red de Sobrevivientes de El Salvador on the impact of COVID, and an ongoing project by the Latin American Network of Mine Survivors on armed violence, are excellent examples and should continue to be supported by the international community.

The rights of people with disabilities, including survivors, in situations of emergency, will be addressed more specifically thanks to Action #40 of the Oslo Action Plan. State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty should report on measures to ensure people with disabilities including survivors participate in, and benefit from, safety and protection programs in situations of conflict, humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters. In this regard, if State Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions want to facilitate synergies and ensure clarity that all survivors have the same rights, a similar Action should be included in the Lausanne Action Plan.

Digital accessibility will be further developed and normalized due to the ongoing movement and travel restrictions because of the COVID-19 pandemic. As more and more communications go online, and more diverse people connect via electronic platforms and services, everyone -including those involved in victim assistance- should think about how to make online communications accessible to people with different types of impairments through assistive technologies such as screen readers, magnifiers, captioning and transcriptions. The captioning and presence of a sign language interpreter in the VA meetings organized by the Implementation Support Unit of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining is an excellent example (and the captioning is useful too for those of us – the majority in those meetings- for whom English is not our mother tongue!). More thought needs to go into how we can ensure that communication technologies can be made accessible to those that are more marginalized and who often live in rural and remote areas; and to those with multiple impairments, such as deafblind persons. This can be vital, for instance, to contact essential services in cases of domestic violence; to ask for help during natural disasters; to have access to peer to peer support; or to get information about how to access rights and services, more generally.

Age and gender approaches will become clearer in the practices and in the reports of State Parties; and gender-based violence against women and girls with disabilities may start getting onto the table. It is a major issue that should be addressed if we really want to work towards gender equality. Indeed, UNFPA has reported that girls and women with disabilities face up to ten more time more sexual violence than those without disabilities! And, as we all know, the situation has been exacerbated during the pandemic. Gender-based violence was already brought up by women survivors and activists with disabilities from Pakistan and Nicaragua at the Jordan "Fostering Partnerships: Global Conference on Assistance to Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Explosive Remnants of War, and Disability Rights" conference in 2019, for instance; and briefly discussed with Ms. Soledad Cisternas, UN Special Envoy for Disability and Accessibility, at a recent meeting on victim assistance.

Meaningful synergies between the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UNCRPD and other frameworks will continue to be strengthened. The “VA Community” now systematically includes organizations and institutions working on the rights of people with disabilities in all discussions. But it is fundamental to underline that such synergies should go hand in hand with referral services and monitoring mechanisms that can effectively make sure that survivors are truly accessing services through these other frameworks. This is particularly crucial when international financial support dedicated to VA continues a downward trend; and when there seems to be a lack of evidence that suppressing VA funds and targeted programs without such referral services and monitoring mechanisms actually works. Evidence-based research should be carried out to evaluate to what extent survivors are effectively accessing their rights through larger frameworks; and what mechanisms need to be in place for these synergies to work- based on field experience and on the actual experience of survivors themselves.

In 2021, those of us interested or working on victim assistance can also look forward to:

The First Meeting of State Parties of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which should address victim assistance;
The work of Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic on the victims and the consequences of the use of incendiary weapons; and
The international process related to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which should include strong victim assistance considerations.

Undoubtedly, 2021 will also be a challenging year. But It should be one that continues the collective work to ensure we build a more inclusive, accessible world for all – including women, girls, men and boys who are survivors, families of those killed and injured, and the communities affected by all types of weapons.

Wanda Muñoz is a member of SEHLAC in Mexico and an inclusion, victim assistance, and humanitarian disarmament expert.

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Looking Ahead to the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions: 10 years of Article 7 Transparency Reporting

1/8/2020

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Lode Dewaegheneire

Transparency has always been an integral and important part of disarmament treaties. The Convention on Cluster Munitions contains comprehensive obligations on reporting in its Article 7. Inspired by its sister convention, the anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention extended the scope of reporting by including, amongst others, reporting requirements on newly discovered stockpiles, victim assistance, national resources and international cooperation and assistance. Article 7 was intended to promote compliance with the Convention and as a confidence building measure. It can also serve as a platform for exchange of information.

With the second Review Conference ahead this year, it is good to assess what has been done to promote reporting, where we stand now, and what could be recommended looking ahead.

Where do we stand?

Since reporting is a legal obligation, initial efforts were aimed at encouraging States Parties to timely submit their initial report and at improving the submission rate of annual reports. Different subsequent coordinators for Article 7 reporting, civil society and the Implementation Support Unit, planned several actions and offered assistance to States Parties.

A reporting format was recommended for use at the First Meeting of States Parties (MSP) in 2010and a reporting guide was issued to help States Parties in fulfilling their Article 7 obligations. A special focus was put on those States Parties that still had to submit their initial report and States Parties with treaty obligations.

Initial reports are crucial for the Convention since they set the benchmark against which progress in implementation will be measured and for assessing the challenges some States Parties are facing. Although Article 7 reporting is a legal obligation for all States Parties, it is of particular interest for those who still are implementing other obligations. Without annual updates, no assessment of progress is possible.

Through the years, it became clear that, to encourage States Parties to submit their reports, incentives where needed. Hence there was a shift in the efforts to better promote the opportunities reporting can offer for affected States Parties. In particular, by reporting on their challenges and on the needs, States Parties could give a clearer picture to potential sponsor states for assisting them in implementing the Convention. That can work provided that the reports are detailed and of high quality. When looking at some initial reports, one could see that this was not always the case and that assistance through coaching could be beneficial to some States Parties.

As far as the figures are concerned, nine States Parties have an outstanding initial report due, some of them are overdue for several years, as of writing of this article. One of those States Parties has cluster munitions victims. Progress has been made in this field and we observe an increased degree of initial reports submitted over time.

The annual report rate for 2019 was 73 %, as of the Ninth MSP in September 2019,. And although we should aim at the full 100%, this is an improvement compared to previous years. We could consider that the different initiatives to increase the reporting rate, one of the objectives of the 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan (DAP) adopted at the First Review Conference, have been successful.

The use of the reporting guide, also encouraged by the DAP, lead in some cases to higher quality information reported. This is encouraging, although there is still room for improvement. The role the Cluster Munition Monitor is playing in clarifying some reports and in encouraging States Parties to be as comprehensive as possible should be highlighted.

For the Second Review Conference

The Second Review Conference being held this November in Switzerland will be an opportunity to assess progress made in the field of reporting and to define the priorities for the actions for the coming five years. It is important that the next Action Plan provides clear guidance. As former coordinator for Article 7 reporting, my leitmotiv was: “Reporting is not only a legal obligation, but also an opportunity and a tool.” I would like to use this phrase to make some recommendations for the Review Conference.

Reporting is a legal obligation and all States Parties are bound to Article 7 of the Convention. There should be no need for discussion about that. However, if priorities have to be set, efforts should be made to have all Stats Parties submitting their initial reports, on time, and to ensure that affected countries report annually on progress.

Some States Parties without implementation obligations believe that they should not submit an annual report. Promoting the use of the existing simplified "cover sheet" report could encourage them to fulfill their legal obligation and would improve the reporting rate.

By reporting on the challenges they meet and the assistance needed for the implementation of the Convention, States Parties can use the Article 7 report as an opportunity. As mentioned earlier, high quality reports are needed for this to work. Further efforts should be made to assist those States Parties in drafting their report. This “coaching” can be done by potential donor states and could lead to a better understanding of the needs on one side and the available offer for assistance on the other side.

Finally, after a decade of Article 7 reporting, the Review Conference could take it to the next level: starting to use it as a tool. And once again, the Convention could be inspired by the Mine Ban Treaty. That treaty's Oslo Action Plan, the result of the Fourth Review Conference held last year, innovated by defining indicators to assess the progress made in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Timely and comprehensive reporting is a key element in this approach and makes it a tool for defining the strategy of the Convention. This approach should also be considered when preparing the works of the Second Review Conference.

To conclude, reporting and its use have evolved and matured through the years in parallel with the Convention’s evolution. And although continuing efforts should be made to increase the reporting rate and to promote the opportunity of quality reporting, the Second Review Conference might be the right moment to start using the Article 7 reporting as a real management tool to reach the full implementation of the Convention.

Lode Dewaegheneire is a PhD researcher at the University of Liège (Belgium) and an independent expert. Previously as a diplomat from Belgium, he served terms as coordinator of the Article 7 committees for both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty.

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Milestones Ahead on Landmines and Cluster Munitions

1/2/2019

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Hector Guerra

The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), cornerstones of humanitarian disarmament, remain robust and meaningful international instruments that save lives, limbs, and livelihoods.

In 2018 there were advances in the universalization and implementation of the CCM. Namibia, Gambia, and Sri Lanka became States Parties. The latter, immediately after joining the Convention declared its interest and availability to preside over it, so following the Nicaraguan Presidency of the 8th Meeting of States Parties, in September 2018, the South Asian country’s candidacy was unanimously supported for it to preside over the 2019 (9th) Meeting of States Parties.

There are now 105 States Parties and 15 Signatories to CCM.

Meanwhile, Croatia, Cuba, Slovenia and Spain completed the destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions.

At the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, the resolution on the CCM continues receiving important political support, even by states not parties. Also 2018 saw an interesting swing, with Russia changing its vote from “no”, to abstention.

2018 also marked the 10th anniversary of the adoption in Dublin of the CCM—and of its signing in Oslo—, and the 15th anniversary of the Cluster Munition Coalition.

With respect to MBT, the number of its States Parties has risen to 164, that is, about 85 percent of all UN Member States, as Palestine and Sri Lanka joined the Treaty towards the end of December 2017. In both cases, entry into force took place on 1 June 2018.

At the 17th Meeting of States Parties, under the Presidency of Afghanistan, in November, Oman announced the fulfillment of its MBT obligations of destroying its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines. Also, from the MENA region, Mauritania became the 31st country to declare itself mine-free. Meanwhile, Ukraine participated at the 17MSP having belatedly presented its request for an extension of the deadline for the completion of the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.

2019 is a special year in the life of the MBT, as it marks the 20th anniversary of entry into force (1 March). Also, the 4th Review Conference of the Treaty will take place, under the Norwegian Presidency, in Oslo. As in the three previous RevCons, an action plan could be expected.

Given existing trends on the use of improvised landmines in conflict areas, one could expect that we will continue having high numbers of victims, at least into the early part of 2019.

Of course, one wonders if among the expectations for 2019, should we not expect more decisive reactions from the international community to increase the very low share (2%) victim assistance receives from the total of international and national support for mine action, abiding by the principles and spirit of humanitarian disarmament. Could 2019 be a year when tougher stances are taken against those states missing their MBT deadlines, or moving from one extension request to the other, with deadlines beyond 2025, the year agreed upon by MBT States Parties under the Maputo Action Plan to complete their respective time-bound obligations according to the Treaty?

With the Second CCM Review Conference around the corner (2020), 2019 could be a year when a series of states, in particular from among the 15 signatories (including Angola, Haiti, Jamaica, Philippines or Cyprus) could take the necessary steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions and participate in the 2RevCon as States Parties.

The two RevCons will present an opportunity to define where the treaties are and what is the state of the measures taken to reach a mine- and cluster munition-free world, given the 2025 and 2030 aspirational targets of the Maputo and Dubrovnik Action plans, respectively. The question is: Will we get to the point where no more lives, limbs and livelihoods are lost, in our lifetime, or will that ideal remain a mirage of politically-correct words stated by diplomats in conference rooms?

Hector Guerra is the director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC)

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The gender and weapons nexus recognized; feminism need apply in 2019 and beyond

12/19/2018

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Ray Acheson

2018, for some reason, was a turning point for international diplomatic recognition of gender dimensions of weapons and disarmament policy. After years or even decades—or in WILPF’s case, a century—of feminist advocacy for governments and activists to take gender into account in their work, we seem to breaking new ground.

In March, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva collaborated with WILPF, Small Arms Survey, and the Gender Mine Action Programme on a one-day training for disarmament diplomats about including gender perspectives in their work. In April, WILPF coordinated with the Canadian mission in New York on a meeting that brought together the women, peace and security (WPS) and disarmament diplomatic communities to exchange on the same subject.

In May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his new disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future. It includes a section on “Ensuring the equal, full, and effective participation of women,” and there are several references throughout the document to the gendered impacts of weapons, gender-sensitive arms control, or women’s participation in disarmament, including urging states to incorporate gender perspectives in their national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control.

In June, the Third Review Conference to the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) adopted a report with groundbreaking references to armed gender-based violence, the gendered impacts of small arms, and women’s participation in disarmament. The document builds on gains made in 2012 and 2016 to alleviate the overall gender blindness of the UNPoA. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network coordinated input and advocacy amongst civil society groups and diplomats for the inclusion of these elements in the outcome document, including through the civil society Call to Action on gender and small arms control.

In August, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) considered gender issues for the first time, in a side event hosted by the government of Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Mines Action Canada, Project Ploughshares, and WILPF on the relationship between gender and fully autonomous weapons. Participants addressed gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms in relation to the development and use of weapons, gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.

In October, the Canadian mission to the UN organized a push to increase gender references in resolutions at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Working with other governments and civil society groups, they managed to achieve language in 17 resolutions that advocates for women’s equal participation, recognizes gendered impacts of weapons, or urges consideration of gender perspectives more broadly. This accounts for 25 percent of all First Committee resolutions in 2018. Six of these resolutions included gendered language for the first time, while three improved the gendered language. For comparison, in 2017, 15 per cent of resolutions made gender references. This figure was 13 per cent in 2016 and 12 per cent in 2015. The number of First Committee delegations speaking about gender and disarmament in their statements also continued to increase this year. Namibia on behalf of 56 states dedicated a whole statement to this topic, urging examination of how “underlying assumptions about how gender shapes [delegations’] own work and the dynamics of joint disarmament efforts.”

Also in October, the Latvian ambassador, who will preside over the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, announced that the conference and its preparatory meetings will focus on the gender-based violence provision of the Treaty as a special theme. This will provide an opportunity in 2019 to advance consideration of how to implement this aspect of the ATT, including using guidance and case studies published by groups like WILPF previously.

In addition to these forum-based efforts, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research joined the governments of Ireland, Namibia, and Canada to form the Disarmament Impact Group as an output of the International Gender Champions. The Group aims to “support the disarmament community in translating gender awareness into practical action across the range of multilateral disarmament processes and activities.” Meanwhile, academic sources like Critical Studies on Security and the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, news sources like The Nation, and public speaking forums from TEDx to the London School of Economics featured articles and talks about feminism, gender, and weapons. This has signaled an opening of academic and activist spaces for increased consideration of these issues.

So, why has all this happened so quickly? In reality, it hasn’t. It is built on a firm foundation of activism and analysis. Feminist disarmament activists and academics, particularly those with groups like WILPF and the IANSA Women’s Network, have been writing and campaigning on gender and disarmament for decades. UN agencies and some governments have been working to mainstream gender in their programming for a long time, certainly since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This has led to concrete outcomes at international disarmament diplomacy forums in recent years: the first UN General Assembly resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in 2010; the inclusion of gender-based violence in the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013; the recognition of the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and encouragement of women’s effective participation in disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Chair’s summary and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

External factors are also at play. The #MeToo movement has arguably awoken new acceptability and credibility of previously hidden or shamed perspectives and experiences. Women, trans, queer, non-binary, and non-conforming folks, as well as men who have experienced sexual and gender-based violence have collectively created new spaces to amplify these realities and demand change.

At the same time, several governments have begun pursuing what they term “Feminist Foreign Policy”. While it is debatable whether or not the foreign policies outlined by these governments can yet be truly described as feminist, it is a welcome development for government offices to be considering feminism not just a valid but an imperative approach to their international engagement.

In disarmament forums, momentum certainly seems to be on our side. There is a growing acceptance among a diverse range of governments, international organizations, and civil society groups about the reality that weapons have gendered impacts, and that women’s participation in disarmament is important. This is good progress, and imperative to making change in this field. But it’s not enough.

The work ahead

For one thing, the demand for women’s equal, effective, or meaningful participation—while necessary and welcome—is insufficient for truly making change in weapons policy. Our current situation is dire. Trillions of dollars are being spent on militaries and technologies of violence while poverty, inequality, and climate change threaten our collective security and safety. Disarmament, as a policy and practice that leads us away from militarism and towards peace, requires new understandings, perspectives, and approaches to weapons and war. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of survivors of gun violence, of nuclear weapons use and testing, of drone strikes, of bombardment of towns and cities. It requires the effective and meaningful participation of marginalized communities—LGBT+ folks, people of color, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, people with disabilities.

Diversity is not about political correctness. It is the only way we are ever going to see change in the way that we confront issues of peace and security. Where we have achieved the most disarmament progress in recent years—banning landmines and cluster bombs and nuclear weapons, for example—we have engaged with diverse communities and put humanitarian perspectives over the profits of arms industries or the interests of powerful governments. This is not just about including women, especially women who come from the same or similar backgrounds as the men who already rule the table. It’s about completely resetting the table; or even throwing out the table and setting up an entirely new way of working.

Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behavior of those who have the most privilege. Diversity is not for its own sake, but for how it impacts what is considered normal, acceptable, and credible. Confronting norms, especially gendered norms, around weapons and war is imperative to making progress on disarmament.

As a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. This association comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”.

This type of violent, militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not comply with that gender norm—women, queer-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. It also results in violence against men. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. A big part of this is about preserving or protecting their masculinity—a masculinity that makes male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless resolutions and reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.

We are all suffering from the equation of violence and power with masculinity. It prevents those who identified as men from being something else—from performing gender differently. It prevents all of us as human beings to promote or explore strength, courage, and protection from a nonviolent perspective. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd.

It also makes it impossible to achieve gender justice. It keeps men and women in binary boxes based on their biological sex. It maintains a strict hierarchy between these boxes, in which men are tough, rational, and violent, while women are weak, irrational, and passive. In this narrative, men are agents; women are victims. (And reinforces the idea that there is nothing outside of this binary.)

The norm of violent masculinity will continue to cause suffering and reinforce inequalities until we get serious about doing something differently. This is a project of dismantling the patriarchy, which is a big project, but it starts with the language we use, the people we include in discussions, and the norms we are willing to challenge.

For 2019, let’s stop using the term “women and children”. They are not the same legally or politically. They have different needs and abilities. Let’s talk about the different impacts of weapons based on gender and age, instead of womenandchildren on one side and men on the other. Let’s talk about gender diversity in disarmament, instead of just the equal participation of women and men. Let’s get away from binary language to something more inclusive. Let’s also include survivors and those impacted by weapons, war, and violence. Let’s think about what we consider credible or powerful, and why we think that way.

As more and more governments and organizations become interested in taking up gender, and as feminists around the world from all walks of life smash down barriers outside the disarmament field, let’s not waste the opportunities ahead of us. An intersectional feminist approach to disarmament is imperative, and we have all the tools we need to achieve it.

Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

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Using Non-State Initiatives to Address Non-State Actors: Lessons from the Humanitarian Disarmament Approach

5/21/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its author.

Jeff Abramson

Over the past two decades, an approach now termed “humanitarian disarmament” has had increasing success in creating multilateral instruments that ban some of the world’s worst weapons, most notably landmines, cluster munitions, and nuclear weapons. At first glance, treaty-making would appear to have little relevance to non-state actors, who functionally have rejected the authority of their state. Yet, the humanitarian disarmament approach, when perceived more broadly and examined more closely, has had and continues to offer lessons for addressing non-state actors. The key is reframing the discussion as being about human security and using the power of civil society-led initiatives to create change.

This short essay looks more closely at efforts to: (1) convince armed non-state actors to abide by international agreements (namely the Mine Ban Treaty via deeds of commitment); (2) end production of banned weapons (primarily via the Stop Explosive Investments campaign related to cluster munitions); and (3) stop weapon creation by pre-emptive efforts led by scientists, industry and others (as relates to killer robots).

Humanitarian Disarmament

At the core of humanitarian disarmament is defining security at a human level, rather than using more traditional assessments of security based on a state’s domestic strength or power relative to another state. By defining security based on human needs, members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in the 1990s were successfully able to argue that victim-activated antipersonnel landmines were inherently indiscriminate, harming civilians long after hostilities ceased, and should no longer be used. The Mine Ban Treaty, which was one result of their efforts, is today one of the world’s most successful international agreements—with use of factory-made antipersonnel mines now limited to only a small handful of states and non-state actors. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was concluded in 2008 and built on the same principles of banning an indiscriminate weapon. Humanitarian disarmament principles also guided the discussion around the unacceptable human consequences of nuclear weapons use and helped the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) lead the world to conclude the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and garner the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017. Efforts to implement the first of these treaties have already resulted in significant destruction of weapons stockpiles, clearance of contaminated land around the world so it could be put to productive use, assistance to victims, and declines in new casualties.[i]

While these three treaties are the best-known examples of the humanitarian disarmament approach, additional efforts are ongoing to address current and potential future use of weapons in indiscriminate ways. For example, the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) is working to tackle the use of weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas because they inflict instant and ongoing human suffering. As the name suggests, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots seeks to prohibit autonomous machines from being developed and used, highlighting the dangers of lethal weapons that act without human control. And the Control Arms campaign, in continuing to promote effective implementation and universalization of the Arms Trade Treaty, focuses on addressing the humanitarian harm caused by the arms trade.

Convincing Non-State Actors to Abide by International Norms: Landmines and Deeds of Commitment

From a traditional security perspective, directly approaching armed non-state actors can be dangerous and is always fraught with the challenge of appearing to take the side or assessing the validity of an actor’s deeds. From a human security perspective, however, there is value in making sure that armed non-state actors behave as responsibly as possible. Educating and attaining commitments from armed non-state groups can in some instances prove possible and useful.

One of the best known efforts was originally organized as the Non-State Actors Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, but later became a separate organization named Geneva Call. Geneva Call engages armed non-state actors to adopt unilaterally the “Deed of Commitment” (officially “Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action”), by which armed non-state groups publicly sign and pledge to adhere to the norms embodied in the Mine Ban Treaty. Today, Geneva Call lists 52 armed non-state actors as having signed the deed of commitment relevant to landmines. A total of 63 have signed at least one of what are now three deeds (the others are related to protection of children, and sexual violence and gender discrimination).[ii]

This effort and other similar ones, while controversial, are examples of how the humanitarian disarmament approach to promotion of international agreements can have relevance to and impact the actions of non-state actors (as well as states).

[Please see essays in this publication by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Maria Pia Devoto and Camilo Serna Villegas, for additional successful examples of reaching out to and working with non-state armed groups on landmine-related efforts.]

Ending Weapons Production: Stop Explosive Investments and Cluster Munitions

In 2009, the year after the conclusion of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the first “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: A shared responsibility” report was published and the Stop Explosive Investment campaign launched. The report raises awareness about financial institutions that invest in cluster munition production, identifying both a “Hall of Fame” to recognize financial institutions that stop doing so, and “Hall of Shame” for those who do not. The campaign also identifies and encourages states to adopt legislation banning such investment. The latest report, published in May 2017, continued to identify new institutions for its Hall of Fame; additional countries and institutions have since stopped investment or stated that they would.[iii]

Ultimately, this has successfully pressured some cluster munition producers to discontinue making the weapons. A key example is found in the actions of U.S. companies Textron and Orbital ATK that are not barred by U.S. law from producing cluster munitions, but have reiterated they would not do so even after U.S. policy changes last year walked away from government commitments to destroy certain stockpiles.[iv] In March 2018, Orbital ATK sponsored an issue brief, which read in part “there is broadly supported consensus among the world’s nations that CM [cluster munition] does not belong in modern military arsenals.” It explicitly cited the disinvestment campaign as creating risk for companies and as contributing to the wisdom of moving away from cluster munition production.[v]

Using financial pressure to change behavior is, of course, not unique to humanitarian disarmament campaigns. But approaching human security challenges with these tools in mind brings recent developments on gun control efforts in the United States into new focus. In the wake of the outcry and advocacy after the February 2018 student shooting that killed 17 people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, many major financial institutions, stores, and other non-state entities took measures that stopped the sale of assault-style weapons, barred gun-purchasing transactions, cut ties to the National Rifle Association, or took other actions that broadly supported gun control.[vi] This apparently spontaneous effort indicates the power of treating a weapons-related issue from a human security perspective and building financial and other pressure to convince non-state actors (broadly defined) to act differently.

Killer Robots: Actions by the Scientific Community To Pre-empt Weapons

Within the traditional state-based international arms control system, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the current home for discussion about the creation and use of machines that can autonomously identify and use lethal force against humans. Called lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within that structure, but more popularly termed “killer robots,” these weapons have been condemned by many who believe that machines should not be making life or death decisions and fear the human security consequences of doing so. While definitional issues of what constitutes “meaningful human control” continue to animate discussion at the CCW, 26 states have now agreed with the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’ conclusion that these weapons should be prohibited, as of the latest round of CCW meetings in April 2018.[vii]

A key fear associated with the development of killer robots is their likely use by non-state actors, in part because they could be inexpensive and ubiquitous. Many scientists, artificial intelligence (AI) experts, and industry members, who have been key voices promoting the agenda against killer robots, have explicitly raised these concerns. A 2015 open letter against autonomous weapons, which as of early May 2018 had been signed by nearly 4,000 AI/robotics researchers, reads in part:

Unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce. It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc.

High profile signers of the letter, such as Elon Musk and the recently deceased Stephen Hawking, bring international attention to the topic.[viii] The issue is also raised among the global industrial elite, such as at annual World Economic Forum gatherings in Davos. Recently, national open letters signed by AI experts, in places such as Australia, Belgium, and Canada, have called on their governments to support a ban on killer robots. A fictional video depicting these concerns, “Slaughterbots,” produced by a professor at the University of California now has had more than 2.5 million views on YouTube.[ix] In April 2018, more than 3,000 Google employees signed a letter opposing work on weapons after learning about Google’s involvement in AI technology that could improve drone targeting,[x] and controversy erupted at a South Korean university over possible collaboration with companies to make killer robots.[xi] Ultimately, actions being taken by civil society, including among those who could be responsible for creating killer robots, are building a stigma against the weapons and could serve to pre-empt their use even before states decide exactly what they want to do.

Rethinking

A key lesson to learn from these diverse examples is to rethink the challenge of non-state actors. While state-based activity has its place, so too do efforts by civil society-led initiatives that directly engage or impact upon non-state actors, some armed and some responsible for producing arms. The creative work being done in support of humanitarian disarmament is grounded in concern about human security, which is often a better lens for thinking about security challenges. Many successes have been made to date, and a diverse array of approaches continue—all meriting greater attention and support.

Jeff Abramson manages the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor for the ICBL-CMC (International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition), is a non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, and coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade.

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[i] See the latest editions of the Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor for details on the use of these weapons, casualties caused by them, assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated land, and other related information, www.the-monitor.org.

[ii] “Deed of Commitment” and “Armed Non-State Actor” webpages found under the “How we work” section of the website, Geneva Call.

[iii] “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: A shared responsibility.” PAX, May 2017. The Stop Explosive Investment website details more recent developments, including: “Japanese companies divest from cluster bombs” December 2, 2017; and “Italy bans investments in cluster bombs producers,” October 4, 2017. Note, a similar report, “Don’t Bank of the Bomb,” first published in 2013 uses the same approach to identify investments in nuclear weapons production, and now supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

[iv] Textron spokesperson reconfirms that it will not make cluster munitions in John Ismay, “U.S. Will Keep Older Cluster Munitions, a Weapons Banned by 102 Nations,” New York Times, December 1, 2017.

[v] “Modernizing the U.S. Munitions Arsenal,” Government Business Council, underwritten by Orbital ATK, March 2018.

[vi] See for example: Brad Tuttle, “All the Companies Cutting Ties With the NRA After Deadly Florida School Shooting” Time, March 1, 2018; Kate Taylor, “Here are all of the retailers that have stopped selling assault-style rifles and changed firearm policies following gun-control activists' protests,” Business Insider, March 2, 2018; Stacey Samuel, “National Teachers Union Cuts Ties With Wells Fargo Over Bank's Ties To NRA, Guns,” National Public Radio, April 20, 2018.

[vii] Find a list and recap of latest meeting at “Convergence on retaining human control of weapons systems,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, April 13, 2018.

[viii] “Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers,” Future of Life Institute.

[ix] An overview of these and other developments in 2017 is found in “National campaigning against killer robots,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, December 7, 2017.

[x] Scott Shane and Daisuke Wakabayahsi, “‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon,” New York Times, April 4, 2018.

[xi] David Gilbert, “A South Korean university is building killer robots — and AI experts are not happy,” VICE News, April 5, 2018.

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Landmines: A Singular Approach to Non-State Actors -- The Colombian Case

5/16/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its authors.

Maria Pia Devoto

Camilo Serna Villegas

This document briefly recounts the background of antipersonnel landmines and how the Mine Ban Treaty was brought into being. Colombia, which has endured problems due to many armed non-state actors (specifically the FARC), provides a case study for using a humanitarian approach to these actors. It details an example of progress and achievements relating to demining and the reconciliation of those who were involved in the country’s armed conflict.

The Humanitarian Approach

The influence of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent Movement, defending humanitarian principles since their inception, along with civil society coalitions such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the political will of a group of progressive diplomats who think "out of the box," has allowed for laying the foundations for negotiations outside of the traditional bounds of treaty-making. This has led to the development of humanitarian disarmament treaties based on international humanitarian and human rights law.

The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (known as the Mine Ban Treaty or Ottawa Treaty) was the first successful case of an international negotiated treaty based on a weapon’s humanitarian consequences. Since then, this has become the contemporary approach to arms treaties and demonstrated that civil society has a fundamental role in giving treaties legitimacy and transparency.

Antipersonnel Mines

Anti-personnel mines, defined as "a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons" (Article 2.1 Mine Ban Treaty), are weapons that have been used in most conflicts since World War II.By the 1990s, these weapons had caused thousands of casualties and injuries to civilians all over the world. At that time, the ICRC stated that, in medical terms, antipersonnel mines had become an “epidemic” of injury, death and suffering.”[i]

In 1992 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was founded to address the humanitarian devastation caused by antipersonnel mines and started to call for a ban as the only solution to stop the suffering. Petitions, passed resolutions, moratoriums, seminars, national laws banning the weapon, worldwide mobilizations, and the prominent support of “Lady Di” created momentum for a ban.

The treaty was negotiated in Oslo and by December 1997—after a whole year of meetings, conferences, and civil society campaigning actions—122 nations signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa, Canada.

The Treaty

The Mine Ban Treaty is not only a prohibition on the weapon itself, but a comprehensive approach to respond to the humanitarian impact posed by these weapons: assisting victims, educating populations, destroying stockpiles, and cleaning up territories. It aims to put an end to the threat of landmines.

Twenty years after its approval, 164 states are implementing the treaty, and this has had life-saving results, as the 2017 Landmine Monitor stated. Unfortunately, a small number of states and non-state armed groups do still use antipersonnel mines, which contributed to a high number of casualties in 2016. [ii]

Since the beginning of the Ottawa Process, a group of ICBL members has understood the need to broaden the scope of treaty implementation to include other non-state actors.There is not a single definition for Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs), given the ambiguous characteristics of some groups. However, for the purpose of NGOs’ efforts, especially to address the humanitarian impact of landmines, ANSAs are defined as any armed actor with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objective.[iii]

NGOs are promoting engagement efforts with ANSAs to raise awareness about landmines and humanitarian concerns because they have control over the territories where communities are affected by these weapons. The Geneva Call, for example, promotes the “Deed for Commitment for Adherence to a total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action.”[iv] Since its creation, it has engaged about 100 ANSAs in 25 countries; 52 ANSA have signed the “Deed for Commitment” and more are engaged in mine clearance or to limit their use.[v]

FARC Changing Course: from key actors in the conflict to demining actors

The South American nation of Colombia, which has been fighting against various ANSAs for decades (FARC, ELN, M19, etc.), now finds itself in a promising time in light of the peace process with the oldest group in the country (the FARC). Many organizations operating in the country have blazed the trail for processes for dealing with the consequences of so many years of violence. Among them is the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, which works in humanitarian demining. As such, the Campaign has demining bases in many of its assigned municipalities, allowing them to get to know the people working in demining and their stories. Below is an example of that work and a broader telling of initiatives in Colombia.

It is very hot in the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines’ demining training base, located in the municipality of Algeciras Huila, a former FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrilla group stronghold. Under the scrutinizing eye of Instructor John, a decorated former sergeant and expert in demining procedures, there is a group of 20 men and women who at first glance look to be country people being trained to carry out a dangerous task: finding and deactivating antipersonnel mines located in the country's fields. However, these men and women are all ex-combatants who once used the mines as a weapon in the war that the FARC waged against the Colombian state for more than 50 years.

John trains them in security procedures, demining position, how to handle tools, and using the personal protective equipment (flak vest, clothes and footwear, helmets, etc.) that protects them from accidental explosions. In the hot sun, each of them applies the skills learned and hopes to pass the humanitarian deminer accreditation test.

At the end of the day, everyone returns to the base house that welcomes them with shade, food and refreshments. There, they mingle with the other men and women who also work clearing the estimated 100,000 square meters of mine-contaminated land in the municipality of Algeciras.

Nancy[vi] eats her dinner and talks happily with John and the other instructors and supervisors, most of them former military. In the past, they were combatants on opposing sides, with the mission of killing each other. Today, they all depend on each other while working towards the same objective; achieving a landmine-free Colombia by 2021.

These 20 people are part of a FARC strategy that seeks to turn some of their former combatants into a humanitarian demining organization. With this intention, they created a formal entity called “Humanicemos DH” (“Humanizing Humanitarian Demining”), for which they sought and received accreditation under the national authority’s standards.

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The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines and two other humanitarian demining organizations that operate in Colombia were entrusted to train the operation of the first units of FARC ex-combatant deminers.[vii] The main goal is that by 2019 “Humanicemos DH” will be able to carry out mine clearance operations autonomously, following the safety parameters that apply internationally.

During its long conflict with the Colombian government, the FARC used anti-personnel mines as a means of encircling their camps and bases to delay government military offensives. They also use the weapons as part of their own offensives, scattering them on roads, villages, or any place where either the army or the paramilitaries could reach. Most of these mines were planted without any record or map of their location, frequently by guerrilla combatants who were later killed in action.

In 2015 the Landmine Monitor reported that the FARC was one of the largest users of landmines in the world, despite the fact that a year earlier a negotiation process had begun with the Colombian guerrilla group. What’s more, an agreement had been reached to carry out a pilot demining exercise in which members of the Armed Forces and the FARC committed to working together to demine a small area located in the mountain ranges of the Antioquia Department.

In 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC reached a final peace agreement to end the conflict, and with it the use of landmines by the latter. However, the threat of mine-contaminated land remained a pressing issue in the peace process.

To start the healing process after so many years of war, suffering, and pain, the 2016 peace agreements raised an alternative restorative justice with multiple reparation and non-repetition mechanisms. Some of these include obliging the ex-combatants to reconstruct war-affected infrastructure, clear landmines, replace illicit crops, and search for missing persons’ bodies.

Once the agreement came into force, the National Mine Action Authority distributed former FARC territory among the demining organizations that had accredited themselves in the country, thus intending to comply with the commitment made through the Mine Ban Treaty to rid Colombia from landmines by the year 2021.

Among these territories, the municipality of Algeciras was one of the most heavily mined in Colombia. This municipality, blessed with fertile land in which everything from tropical fruits to coffee is grown, was a strategic corridor between the eastern and jungle lands of San Vicente del Caguan, Caquetá, and the productive southern lands of Huila. San Vicente del Caguan was the epicenter of the failed negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government at the beginning of the 2000s. In this region, the FARC general command was established to monitor the military-cleared zone granted by the government as part of the commitment to carry out dialogues there. When the peace process ended abruptly, the FARC retreated toward the mountains and surrounding jungles, among them those in Algeciras. An indeterminate number of mines were planted and at least 57 people have fallen victim to them, among whom at least three were children.

The “Humanicemos DH” effort creates the possibility of reparation. While reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life, it will also allow them to have a source of income as they are complying with their peace process commitments and clearing land heavily contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

The experience of FARC as deminers, one where the perpetrator becomes an agent of reconciliation, has the potential to guide other non-state armed actors operating in Colombia, including the National Liberation Army (ELN) with whom the government holds dialogues in Quito, Ecuador. This experience brings hope of a sustainable and lasting peace.

Maria Pia Devoto is Director, Association for Public Policy-APP (Argentina) and a Forum on the Arms Trade-listed expert. Camilo Serna Villegas is Deputy Director, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines. Both are members of the regional organization promoting human security SEHLAC (Seguridad Humana en Latinoamerica y el Caribe).

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[i] “Overview of the Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines,” ICRC, August 2007, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/landmines-factsheet-150807.htm.

[ii] Landmine Monitor 2017, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, www.the-monitor.org/LM17.

[iii] “Non-State Armed Groups and the Mine Ban, “ Landmine Monitor Factsheet, June 2005, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/1418811/NSA_Fact_Sheet062005.pdf.

[iv]The Geneva Call is a non-governmental organization that engages armed non-state actors toward the respect of humanitarian norms, including and originally in regard to the Mine Ban Treaty.

[v] “Landmine ban,” Geneva Call, https://genevacall.org/what-we-do/landmine-ban/.

[vi] Name changed.

[vii] Ayuda Popular Noruega – APN, and The HALO Trust.

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Approaching Non-State Armed Groups: Lessons from an Anti-Landmine Activist and Researcher

5/15/2018

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This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its author.

Yeshua Moser-Punagsuwan

As a humanitarian disarmament activist, I share little in common with non-state armed groups, who by their definition have a desire to acquire arms and a willingness to use them. Nonetheless, as an actor in armed conflict, non-state armed groups must be encouraged to respect the behaviors the humanitarian movement is seeking from all actors. This requires some level of engagement.

For the past 20 years I have frequently been involved in engaging non-state armed groups in Asia; primarily on the issue of landmine use, but also on other issues. During that time, I also developed a training program for the country researchers involved in the Landmine Monitor, the annual publication of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The ICBL uses the following definition for a non-state armed group:

Non-State Armed Groups include any identifiable group that uses armed methods and is not within the formal structure of a recognized state. This includes:

counter-state armed political movements, guerrilla movements and rebel armed forces;
militias or civil patrols often operating under the sanction of official entities, but not within the legal state structure; and,
criminal groups, private military companies, others.[i]

Based on my experiences, this essay offers practical lessons for activists on whether and how to engage such groups.

Determine any existing basis for engagement

A political assessment of an opportunity to engage a non-state armed group would include any codes of conduct issued by the group. Many armed groups do have codes of conduct, the oldest known one being the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention drawn up for the Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War in China (1927-37).[ii] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) certainly has the most experience engaging non-state armed groups to allow humanitarian access for their medical interventions. Rapporteurs for UN Special Mechanisms regularly engage non-state armed groups and recommend cessation from certain war behaviors. In Kashmir, local civil society organizations successfully engaged armed groups to halt the use of explosive weapons in highly populated areas.[iii] Groups that have no political platform whatsoever, or are solely criminal enterprises, will be difficult if not impossible to engage in a humanitarian dialogue.

Why

The first thing that must be clear to an activist contacting a non-state armed group is why they have chosen to contact an armed group, and why the armed group may be responsive to such a request. If there is an identifiable political wing of an armed group, this is a probable first focus. The activist needs to understand the armed groups political motivations, and what if any entry points that opens. The armed group may have a constituency, claimed or real, such as an ethnic group or identifiable community which they claim to represent. The activist should search for allies within that group. The activist should have a clear sense of the armed group’s propaganda, especially if any of it relates to the issue about which they are being engaged.

Access

Accessing non-state armed groups is not straightforward, as they are hunted by states and all apparatuses a state has to deploy, and are the subject of surveillance, likely by multiple parties.

Activists engaging armed groups need to be sure that their activities cannot be used by others. A negative example of this is a colleague who sought, and was granted permission, by a government, to engage a non-state armed group about possible negotiations. The state actually had no interest in negotiations, and deceptively made use of his engagement to clandestinely follow him to the meeting place. All the members of that group who agreed to meet him were then killed by government agents. My colleague survived but carried the psychological scars of this deception for many years. Never once in all my own interactions with non-state armed groups did I seek advance permission of state authorities. I might subsequently share some details of my meetings with an armed group with a state authority, but only as long as it was general and I determined it to be helpful.

Activists also need to assure their own security. Both in relation to the armed group and the armed groups enemies, which are usually the state but could also be other armed groups.

An armed group will be suspicious of anyone coming to engage them. An agreement by them to meet is usually a form of security guarantee from them (they will not harm you). However, they dictate the circumstances. This can involve waiting in an isolated area so that the activist’s approach can be observed, then being asked to move to a new location by cellphone, perhaps multiple times, sometimes blindfolding so that the activist cannot recall, even under duress, where they were.

Activists should assume they will be under surveillance by the state. In some cases, a state may reveal this in order to threaten the activist to cease their engagement with an armed group. This can be done by directly calling the activist on their cellphone with a somewhat threatening message like “We know why you are here.” and then hanging up, for example. Or it may be a blatant attempt at recruitment of the activist with offers of assistance or benefits. I’ve experienced all of these. I believe my best protection has been to make clear at all times to all actors my humanitarian agenda. Use any and all channels to put this message out, and the fact that humanitarian principles require engagement of all actors on those principles without favor.

Assumptions

Activists need to be on guard for assumptions, likely unstated, which an armed group may have about why they are being engaged with. Armed groups live within a tightly contained bubble and tend to see things in black and white. ‘Others’ are either with them or against them. In such a situation, how will an activist’s topic of engagement be perceived? I had a disastrous experience with an armed group who had become very open with me about landmine warfare, but once finished, then turned to me and asked when I would be teaching them how to breach the enemies’ minefields. Clearly, I had not laid the proper ground for them to understand why I was there. I found myself well within their military camp and some rapidly unhappy, but very well armed, combatants around me. Fast thinking managed to save the situation from deteriorating and for me to leave unscathed, but I learned a very valuable lesson from it in making sure the reason I have approached the group is unambiguous and regularly restated.

Do your research

The first casualty of armed conflict is the truth. Activists approaching an armed group need to know all the available facts, but be equally aware of where their knowledge of the situation ends. This will aid the activist in cutting through propaganda and distortion, and assist in bolstering the activist’s argument for the issue or topic of engagement. One armed group said to me, and regularly to the media, that there were no civilian mine victims from their mines as they were battery operated and ceased working shortly after being laid. My own research showed the number of civilian victims, and the persistence of the mine for much longer that this claim. Clearly laying out these facts before they raised the issue did two things: (1) it demonstrated that I knew what I was talking about, which gave me standing; and (2) it cut through a layer of propaganda and allowed us to talk about the real issues directly.

Protect your colleagues and yourself

It is frequently a criminal offense to meet with a non-state armed group within the country of the government against which it struggles. It is usually safest to meet them in their rear base, which may well be in a neighboring country. This is also likely where their leadership or decision-makers reside. Planning must be taken very seriously if any member of the activist delegation to engage the armed group resides in a country in which contact with such a group is illegal, or where the authorities are likely to take punitive action, even extra-legally, against one of the delegation. While activist organizing may be quiet and discreet, there should be no illusion that it can be protected by secrecy. Although engagement is likely to be organized as a non-public event, it should be assumed that it will be known to the authorities sooner or later. As security services have it in their own interest to portray any contact with an armed group in the most negative light, it will assist the activist’s group’s security if they issue a public report immediately after the fact announcing the engagement, humanitarian goal of the engagement, and result. Such reports will require extreme diplomacy and tact in their production. A press conference can be helpful in dissemination, if suitable to the situation.

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No conflict situation is waged by a single side, and meaningful intervention in support of humanitarian principles requires the engagement of all sides to a conflict. Engaging non-state armed groups should be approached as a high-risk activity. Activists doing so must have clear goals, and a comprehensive analysis of the situation. Even with the best of preparation, a fall back plan should be in place in the case that things go wrong. Tread carefully!

Further Reading

Ben Saul, “Enhancing Civilian Protection by Engaging Non-State Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 22, Issue 1, 1 April 2017, pages 39–66.

Andrew MacLeod, Claudia Hofmann, Ben Saul, Joshua Webb, Charu Lata Hogg, “Humanitarian Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups,” Chatam House, April 2016.

Mackenzie Kennedy, “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in the ‘Fight’ Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Eastern Congo,” The Yale Review of International Studies, February 2016.

Podcast, “Perspectives on Access: Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups,” Harvard Humanitarian Program, 22 October 2015, 1hr 11min.

Ashley Jackson, “Negotiating perceptions: Al-Shabaab and Taliban views of aid agencies,” HPG Policy Brief, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2014.

Jérémi Labbé, Reno Meyer “Engaging Nonstate Armed Groups on the Protection of Children: Towards Strategic Complementarity,” International Peace Institute, Issue Brief, April 2012.

Claudia Hofmann, Ulrich Schneckener, “Engaging non-state armed actors in state-and peace-building: options and strategies,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93 Number 883 September 2011.

Andrew Clapham, “The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed Non-State Actors: The Legal Landscape & Issues Surrounding Engagement,” Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, February 2010.

Max P. Glaser, “Engaging with non-state armed groups in the context of the ‘Global War on Terror’: observations from Lebanon and Gaza,” Humanitarian Exchange, No. 37, March 2007, Humanitarian Practice Network.

Claudia Hofmann, “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action”, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.3, September 2006, pp.396–409.

Conciliation Resources, “Choosing to engage: Armed groups and peace processes,” Accord, Issue 16, 2005.

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Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan is an independent expert.

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[i]See Landmine Monitor, “Key Developments, Non-State Armed Groups,” November 2008, http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/content/download/31633/489450/file/NSAG_Fact_Sheet_Nov_08.pdf.

[ii]See ICRC, “A collection of codes of conduct issued by armed groups,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93 Number 882 June 2011, https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/collection-codes-conduct-issued-armed-groups.

[iii]After public manifestations condemning use of grenades by insurgents in urban areas which resulted in a number of civilian casualties, the United Jihad Council, the coordinating entity for the insurgency issued instructions to its combatants to halt such activity. See Olivier Bangerter, Internal Control Codes of Conduct within Insurgent Armed Groups, Small Arms Survey, Occasional Papers 31, November 2012. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP31-internal-control.pdf.

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A View from Brazil: Trump's First 100 Days

5/3/2017

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This video blog is the tenth entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Robert Muggah

In this video interview, Robert Muggah addresses these questions, at markers indicated below:

0:07 What is Brazil's involvement in the arms trade?
1:39 How is President Trump perceived in Brazil?
4:18 Do you have concerns about what you're seeing?
6:14 What advice do you have for the Trump administration?

Robert Muggah is Co-founder & Research Director at Igarapé Institute and the SecDev Foundation

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Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

12/21/2016

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

At a time when it may be easy to anticipate the faltering of international instruments and global approaches, especially as countries in the West -- starting with the United States and United Kingdom -- put national interests above regional and international ones, it is wise to remember that states are not the exclusive drivers of change. Progress-pushing work by civil society using legal, financial, industry-led, investigative and transparency tools has impacted weapons use and the conduct of the arms trade. We should expect those tools again to make a difference in 2017.

Beginning early in the year, a UK court case initiated by civil society will address the legality of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, with potential ramifications on the European Union and more broadly on all states party to the Arms Trade Treaty. Already, legal concerns have been expressed in the United States by leading independent experts about sales and assistance to Saudi Arabia, and could be renewed should the incoming Trump administration continue a policy of arming Riyadh during the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

The persistent investigative efforts of many civil society groups, including by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that documented indiscriminate use of weapons by the Saudi-led coalition undoubtedly played a role in the Obama administration’s recent decision to hold off on delivery of precision-guided munitions. That research work also helped push the UK government to reverse its earlier conclusion that the coalition had not used cluster munitions in Yemen; explicitly in reference to weapons that had originally been supplied by London more than a quarter century ago. On Monday this week, the UK Secretary of State for Defence confirmed a pledge by Saudi Arabia not to employ the weapons (BL755s) again.

The stigma on cluster munition use, in particular, has been strengthened by the creative financial focus of the Stop Explosive Investments campaign that publishes original research into the financial institutions (and states) that invest in -- or pledge not to invest in -- companies producing cluster munitions. As such efforts help shrink the financial incentives and marketplace for indiscriminate weapons, it makes more likely decisions such as the one taken recently by Textron to suspend its product line, functionally ending production of cluster munitions in the United States.

Other industry members, including the scientists and researchers that make sophisticated weaponry possible, have taken a proactive position for a ban on so-called “killer robots.” In 2015, thousands of artificial intelligence experts and researchers -- including prominent scientists and industry leaders such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak -- issued an open letter calling for autonomous lethal weapons not to be developed. In 2014, the first robotics company -- Clearpath Robotics in Canada -- pledged not to make killer robots, In 2017, work on this issue will enter a new phase as states parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons agreed last week to formalize discussion on the topic, a step that may lead to an official protocol that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and a growing number of states say should ban the weapons.

Civil society will also play a critical role in improving transparency in many areas related to the arms trade and security assistance, at times by making sense of public-but-hard-to-gather-or-understand data. For example, SIPRI will continue its highly respected research and publications on global arms trade trends, especially related to major weapons systems. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor will track global developments on landmines and cluster munitions, serving as the de facto monitoring regime for two treaties. For the newer Arms Trade Treaty, projects such as the ATT Baseline Assessment Project and the ATT Monitor have already established a track record of aiding states in understanding their obligations as well as assessing their efforts. In the United States, the Security Assistance Monitor is now pulling together vast amounts of U.S. data into one place for improved transparency on the world’s largest arms and security assistance provider.

In looking ahead, these civil society members and many others should be watched as they employ and develop the tools that shape change in 2017 and beyond.

Jeff Abramson, who coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade, is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manager of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition’s (ICBL-CMC) Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor program

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Deadline Approaches on Landmine and Cluster Munition Reporting

4/28/2016

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Jeff Abramson

In recent decades, international agreements on conventional weapons trade and use have recognized the value of greater transparency, in part by creating reporting mechanisms and requirements. A short list of such agreements, whether legally binding or simply voluntary, include the UN Register on Conventional Arms, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the more recent Arms Trade Treaty. With the creation of these and other agreements, many government officials now complain of reporting fatigue, drawing into question the value and functioning of many transparency measures. In a series of blog posts over the next two months, Forum on the Arms Trade-listed experts will examine official transparency reporting, where it struggles, and the important role civil society often plays in monitoring and improving global understanding of the trade and use of conventional weapons.

April 30 marks the annual reporting deadline for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. These reports provide a wealth of government-certified information on weapons stockpiles and their destruction, contaminated land and its clearance, measures to protect and assist those endangered or already harmed by these indiscriminate weapons, as well as national laws and implementing measures. Such official reports make it much easier to track progress as well as hold governments accountable to treaty mandates, as well as broader efforts to promote conventional weapons control.

In times of conflict, they can also assist in understanding weapons flows and potential dangers. For example, the appearance of East German PPM-2 landmines in Yemen suggests that new supplies (of old landmines) are coming into the country because those types of mines had not been previously reported by Yemen as part of its stockpile or contamination. Similarly, Ukraine’s most recent transparency report indicates that hundreds of landmines have fallen out of their control, stockpiled in Crimea before the separation of the region.

These reports alone, however, often need to be augmented by additional information, typically gathered and analyzed by members of civil society. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor -- with its weapons use research led by Human Rights Watch -- as well as many other groups contribute to tracking supplies of landmines and cluster munitions and documenting their use. This is critical, for example, in places such as Syria and Yemen where these weapons have recently been used and are often supplied by countries not party to the treaties, and therefore outside the treaties’ reporting regimes. Importantly, this collective work has contributed to growing international efforts to cut off arms supplies to Saudi Arabia -- in part because of Saudi-led coalition use of cluster munition in civilian areas.

With the upcoming reporting deadline, states have the opportunity, and obligation, to again contribute to improved transparency. Their collective record, however, is a bit disappointing. When last year’s Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor were published, 94 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had failed to meet their annual reporting obligations and more than three dozen States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions had failed to meet their initial or annual reporting mandates. Since then, Mine Ban Treaty members have adopted a new guide to assist in reporting.
As is common at this point in the year, the number of reports available on the official treaty websites is low (Mine Ban Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions). Hopefully the upcoming intersessional meeting on the Mine Ban Treaty will spur countries to submit their reports before that meeting opens on May 19. For the first time, however, there will be no intersessional meeting for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. There is a danger that reporting will lag without that mid-year spur to action.

An additional opportunity, however, exists for states that have not yet joined the treaties to demonstrate commitment to transparency and treaty objectives by submitting voluntary reports, as a number of states have done in the past. The United States, in particular, has expressed a goal of eventually joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Given the size of the US stockpile, and lack of transparency in the progress of destroying it, submitting such a report would be an important step in demonstrating U.S. commitment to the treaty.

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