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Drones and the Development of International Standards

1/7/2020

3 Comments

 
This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2020 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Rachel Stohl
In the first half of the Trump administration, the United States demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. The Trump administration has placed a primacy on immediate military action, resulting in a U.S. drone policy that appears less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable.

As the number one user of lethal drone technology in the world, the United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and setting a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our adversaries utilize drones for their own purposes.

Although the high profile drone-strike killing of Iranian general Soleimani is now front-page news, U.S. use of armed drones also remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding their lethal use -- especially outside of traditional battlefields -- and the resulting lack of accountability that often goes hand in hand with limited transparency. These trends have only been amplified during the Trump administration, where U.S. drone policy has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, and Trump has reversed course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows. Additionally, the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes has increased and the threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, while the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes has reportedly broadened.
 
The Trump administration also seems recommitted to pursuing a flawed multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which, in its current form, could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to those of the United States. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN member states signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on export and subsequent use of armed drones. Now, a core-group of states, including the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Japan, and observer states Turkey, Israel and France, are working to develop this initiative into so-called International Standards on the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed Drones, as communicated by the U.S. State Department in October 2017. While the results of this process and the standards themselves are unclear, it is moving forward.

The current U.S.-led process to develop global drone standards raises a number of concerns. For one, it risks giving the veneer of promoting responsible decision-making while proving meaningless in establishing appropriate controls, as higher standards already exist in several legal frameworks. The process also continues to be directed by a small group of states and remains closed to outside input from subject matter experts, relevant practitioners, and communities affected by drone transfers and use. Therefore, it is important that civil society representatives continue to remain engaged with states and inform them of policies and practices that support the development of responsible national policies on drones, as well as international standards to guide drone transfer and use.

In 2020, it is likely that we will continue to see increased proliferation and use of drones, but also a proliferation of new multilateral regimes and agreements. Differing standards or rules guiding drone transfers and use – that is, those enumerated in the international standards, the global counterterrorism forum, in the ATT, and in other export control regimes – could lead to confusion for states, both exporters and importers, over which rules and standards to follow or to apply. This risk could compound those already modeled by the U.S. drone program, such as the risks to civilians and challenges to the rule of law, both domestically and internationally.

As drones continue to proliferate and more countries look to acquire and use lethal drone capabilities, questions of efficacy, legality, transparency, and accountability will continue to raise concerns about the precedent being set by the current U.S. drone program. The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on this issue and ensure that U.S. policy on drones is responsible and transparent and sets an appropriate benchmark for drone transfers and use around the world. As we move into the next election cycle, it will be important for civil society to remain engaged and pursue forward progress on the issue of drones.
 
Rachel Stohl is vice president of the Stimson Center.
3 Comments

U.S. Drone Policy

12/18/2018

2 Comments

 
This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Rachel Stohl
Picture
Shannon Dick
Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly referred to as drones, have become increasingly common in military operations and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions around the world. Although the United States is the world’s leader in possessing and using armed drones, other countries are increasingly acquiring, seeking, and using lethal drone technology. In 2019. these countries may look to the U.S. example for guidance in developing their own policies on drones – which raises a number of concerns.  

Although the U.S. drone program in its current form has been active for over 15 years, it remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding the use of lethal drone strikes outside traditional battlefields and the resulting lack of accountability. Such features have come to define the U.S. drone program and ultimately hinder effective oversight as well as challenge assessments of the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S operations.
 
The United States has demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. And U.S. drone policy appears to be becoming less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable, lacking safeguards and transparency over the legal framework, use, and results of use.

In June 2018, Stimson released a report, An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy, that examined worrying trends surrounding the U.S. drone program with a particular view towards the Trump administration’s use of lethal drone strikes outside of traditional battlefields. The report found key concerns regarding changes the Trump administration has made to U.S. drone policy and use:
  • U.S. drone policy under the Trump administration has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, reversing course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows.
  • The Trump administration has increased the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes.
  • The threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, and the administration may have reasserted the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes.
In addition to concerning regressions in U.S. drone policy, the United States also seems recommitted to pursuing a problematic multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to the United States’. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN Member States signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones.

The development of international standards through the joint declaration process has raised serious concerns that the U.S.-led process will undermine existing frameworks and result in weak standards guiding drone transfers and use. In August 2018, Stimson released The ATT and Drones to support the discussion on international standards and provide a primer on existing international standards related to drones, cautioning that any international standards should not be lower than what already exists in legally binding law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and set a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our enemies utilize drones for their own purposes.

​Rachel Stohl is Managing Director at the Stimson Center and Shannon Dick is Research Associate with the Conventional Defense Program.

2 Comments

Recent Drone Proliferation and What May Lie Ahead

12/20/2017

1 Comment

 
This is the seventh blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Gettinger
Dan Gettinger
This post is an adapted from a forthcoming report about developments in the world of drones in 2017, to be published by the Center for the Study of the Drone next week.
 
Many of the trends in drone proliferation that emerged in 2016 continued into 2017 and are likely to persist in 2018. With new deals and drones, China pursued international customers for its strike-capable drones in 2017. Other countries embarked on or expanded their own programs to develop or acquire drones. And non-state actors continued to modify and deploy small armed drones, raising fresh concerns that these systems might be used to attack civilian targets.
 
2017
 
China continued to push exports of its medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned systems in 2017. In March, Chinese media reported that China would construct a factory in Saudi Arabia to produce the Caihong-series (CH) surveillance and strike drones. China also revealed that it had made its largest sale ever of the Wing Loong II, another strike-capable drone, to an unnamed customer in the Middle East. In December, it was reported that China had successfully delivered new CH-5 drones to Egypt, which is believed to already operate the Wing Loong. While these reports have yet to be confirmed by outlets outside of China, they are in line with a pattern of growth in Chinese drone exports over the past several years. In the coming year, we expect additional deliveries of Chinese drones to global customers. New Chinese drones unveiled in 2017 like the Tengoen TB001 and Beihang TYW-1 MALE UAVs, the AT200 cargo drone, and the AVIC AV500W rotary drone, could follow the Caihong and Wing Loong drones into the international market.
 
Other countries took steps to acquire or upgrade their own drones. In June, Canada announced that it will acquire a variety of unmanned systems—including armed drones—for its military. France, meanwhile, has opted to arm its fleet of MQ-9 Reapers, becoming the third country after Italy and the U.K. to fly armed U.S.-made drones. At the MAKS 2017 airshow, Russia unveiled the Kronshtadt Orion-EH, a medium-altitude long-endurance drone that has been under development since 2011 and that could eventually be armed. Kazakhstan displayed a host of drones at its May 7 military parade, including the Russian-made Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone and China’s AVIC Wing Loong. The Turkish military took delivery of additional Kale-Baykar Bayraktar TB-2 drones, a mid-sized UAV that can be armed with mini smart munitions. South Korea announced plans to establish a military unit dedicated to fielding a swarm of drones and the Czech Republic announced plans to dramatically expand military unmanned aircraft procurement with the goal of acquiring a strike-capable system by 2021.
 
Drone use by non-state actors also expanded this year. In an analysis of documents captured from the Islamic State, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found that ISIS had a formalized system for managing drone operations. While the Islamic State’s drone use declined along with its fortunes on the battlefield, other non-state actors have adapted drones to their own purposes. In Yemen, Houthi rebels unveiled a series of drones that appeared to be inspired by Iranian systems. According to a report by the Conflict Armament Research group, one of these drones was used to attack Saudi air defenses. In Mexico, authorities found a drone that was carrying a shrapnel-filled improvised explosive device. In the Philippines, authorities captured a militant who admitted to operating a drone during the attack on Piagapo city for the Maute group, a now-defunct terrorist group that was affiliated with ISIS. The rise in these incidents have inspired concerns about the use of drones to attack civilian targets. To prepare for the 2018 Winter Olympics, South Korean police simulated a drone attack on a stadium in a series of drills in December.
 
There were times during the past year when the proliferation of unmanned systems appeared to contribute to rising tensions between a few countries. In June, U.S. forces shot down two Iranian Shahed-129 strike-capable drones in Syria after they appeared to threaten U.S.-backed allies. A few weeks later, Iranian drones interfered with U.S. Navy operations in the Persian Gulf with one drone coming within 100 feet of a Navy jet. In response to complaints by U.S. Navy officials, Iran promised to continue its drone patrols in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, in the months following a scuffle between Indian and Chinese border guards over Chinese construction in the disputed region around the Doklam Plateau, both countries deployed drones to bases nearby. China has deployed several new Xianglong “Soar Dragon” high-altitude long-endurance drones  and a CH-4 strike-capable drone to Shigatse Airport, and a BZK-005 surveillance drone to Lhasa Gongga Airport. India has also sent drones to the region, possibly basing a drone at Bagdogra Airport. In December, an Indian IAI Heron surveillance drone crashed on China’s side of the disputed border after a reported technical malfunction, leading China to file a complaint with India’s foreign ministry.
 
Looking Forward: United States May Contribute to Further Proliferation
 
It is likely that the U.S. will make a more aggressive effort to market unarmed U.S.-made drones overseas in the coming year. The Trump administration began a review of the U.S. drone export policies implemented by the Obama administration in mid-2017. In October, Reuters reported that the administration was close to completing an update to the policy, which is expected to loosen restrictions on U.S. drone exports and enable U.S. companies to sell surveillance drones like the MQ-9B Sky Guardian to customers other than NATO partners. In addition to resetting domestic policy, the U.S. may also push to renegotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime, a 1987 international agreement that established limits on missile and unmanned systems sales. Less clear, however, is whether the U.S. will continue to lead an effort to create international standards on drone exports or if such an agreement would be feasible without U.S. participation. Little in the way of concrete progress has been reported on this effort since it was announced October 2016 and, in the coming year, we’ll be looking to see if this effort gains traction inside the Trump administration and with the international community.
 
Dan Gettinger is co-director of the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College
1 Comment

A New U.S. Drone Policy?

4/24/2017

3 Comments

 
This is the first entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.
Picture
Rachel Stohl
U.S. drone policy under President Donald Trump is slowly coming into focus, despite the absence of any new executive orders or regulations.  However, we can begin to assess the ways in which President Trump plans to utilize drones in his administration. The Trump administration’s approach seems to be based on undoing the limits put in place by the Obama administration.

Trump has not been shy about using drones in operations around the world. In the first three months of the administration, U.S. drone strikes averaged about one strike per day, as compared to an estimated one strike per 5.4 days under President Obama, according to analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Trump Administration has also granted a new authority to the CIA that restores the CIA’s role in lethal strikes and has seemingly lowered the threshold on the level of acceptable civilian casualties for drone strikes. This is in direct contravention of the Obama administration approach in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) largely shared responsibility. Under Obama, the CIA gathered intelligence and identified suspected terrorists, and then provided information to the military, which was responsible for the actual strikes.

Moreover, recent actions in Yemen and Somalia have altered the designation of certain provinces to be identified as “areas of active hostilities,” allowing for less stringent battlefield rules and potentially less protections for civilians on the ground than what was required during the Obama administration. Trump’s actions call into question the status of the Presidential Policy Guidance put in place by Obama to guide the United States’ use of armed drones – as these steps appear to mark a reversal of Obama-era policies – and bring to focus repeated concerns about the lack of information on the legal framework underpinning the U.S. drone program.

The Trump Administration thus far has accepted a higher risk to civilian life in determining when to undertake drone strikes and seems undeterred by concerns about secrecy and a lack of accountability. Allies and partners are watching the ways in which U.S. drone strikes unfold under the Trump administration, particularly as they look to conduct their own drone operations and develop relevant national legislation and policies to support such operations. Yet, the apparent disregard for developing international standards on drones undermines U.S. efforts to continue work on the development of international drone standards that were begun under the Obama administration.

Trump’s reversals in his approach to U.S. drone policy appear to walk back some of the previous efforts (however limited such efforts may have been) to establish an appropriate standard for armed drone use. As such, Trump risks instituting a dangerous precedent for lethal drone use marked by secrecy, limited accountability, and legal ambiguity.

Rachel Stohl is a Senior Associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center.
3 Comments

Drone Proliferation in 2017: Trends to Watch

12/13/2016

3 Comments

 
This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.
Picture
Dan Gettinger
If the past year is anything to go by, 2017 will be a consequential time for issues relating to global drone proliferation. In the past year, China has stepped up exports of armed drones, the U.S. and other countries have taken steps to limit drone proliferation, and drones have been adopted by a growing number of non-state actors. Each of these areas experienced significant developments in 2016 that will shape events in the coming year.

Several countries began flying armament-capable Chinese-made drones in operations in 2016. Following Iraq’s acquisition of China’s CH-4 drone in October 2015, recent satellite images and postings on social media suggest that Jordan and Egypt have also purchased the CH-4, a smaller version of the U.S. Reaper drone. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have purchased the Wing Loong, the Chinese equivalent of the U.S. Predator drone, and have used it in operations over Yemen and Libya. Photos of drones in Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan suggest that these countries may also have acquired new armament-capable Chinese drones in 2016, although this has not been confirmed.

It will be important to monitor the continued growth in Chinese drone exports and capabilities in 2017, even as other countries take steps to limit the proliferation of unmanned aircraft. In August 2016, Defense News reported that the U.S. Department of State was encouraging other countries to sign on to a “joint declaration of principles” regarding armed drone exports. The one-page document lists five principles, including a resolution to engage in responsible export practices and to continue discussions around regulating the evolving technology. The joint declaration was formally announced in early October but, as Forum-listed expert Rachel Stohl (Stimson Center) argues in a statement, the joint declaration “does not go far enough to ensure that the standards are meaningful” and lacks the signatures of key countries like Israel and China.

The coming year could determine whether or not the joint declaration is indeed a step toward a global agreement on drone exports. In the meantime, the past year has demonstrated that unmanned systems technology is no longer in the hands of only the more advanced militaries in the world. As a recent publication by the Center for the Study of the Drone illustrates, there are over 30 different types of drones made in the United States, China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey that are currently in use in Syria and Iraq. Hobby drones are increasingly a tool of non-state groups in this conflict. In October 2016, an exploding ISIL drone killed two Kurdish Peshmerga and injured two French soldiers, the latest development in a worrying trend that has accelerated in the past year.

Even as more state and non-state actors adopt drones, not all drone proliferation is necessarily dangerous. As Michael Horowitz, Sara E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann write in International Security, drones could prove to be a stabilizing force along disputed or hot borders. In 2017, it will be interesting to see what role drones play along the border between Pakistan and India and in the South China Sea where drones such as the Indian Air Force IAI Heron and China’s BZK-005 are already active.  

Dan Gettinger is Co-Director of the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College.
3 Comments

The Age of Drones

3/11/2015

2 Comments

 
Rachel StohlRachel Stohl
The increased U.S. reliance on unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more colloquially known as “drones,” has been controversial in the United States and around the world. Although drones have many peaceful applications, most policy attention is focused on the proliferation and use of armed drones, particularly away from traditional battlefields.

In February 2015, the United States announced a new export policy for U.S.-origin military and commercial drones. The new policy assesses each potential transfer on a case-by-case basis, includes the potential for enhanced end-use monitoring, and could require all sales through the Foreign Military Sales program. Commercial U.S.-origin drones are to be reviewed under the Export Administration Regulations. In addition, drone transfers will require recipients to agree to “Principles for Proper Use” before the export is authorized. These four principles require compliance with international legal precedents focused on human rights, international humanitarian law, privacy and use of force regulations. Implementation of these principles will be crucial and enforcement key to ensuring the technology is used with transparency and accountability.

Eighty-five countries are estimated to have armed and unarmed drones in their military arsenals and for commercial purposes. The United States has already sold sophisticated drones to close allies such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, France, and South Korea. Experts and market forecasters estimate that the market for drones will double in the next decade and other governments are eager to enter the drones market. As the use of drones in commercial and military realms increases, governments and other relevant entities will need to develop international norms and policies governing drone use and transfers to address proliferation challenges and appropriate standards of use.

Rachel Stohl is a Senior Associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center.

2 Comments

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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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