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Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

12/21/2016

This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Jeff Abramson

At a time when it may be easy to anticipate the faltering of international instruments and global approaches, especially as countries in the West -- starting with the United States and United Kingdom -- put national interests above regional and international ones, it is wise to remember that states are not the exclusive drivers of change. Progress-pushing work by civil society using legal, financial, industry-led, investigative and transparency tools has impacted weapons use and the conduct of the arms trade. We should expect those tools again to make a difference in 2017.

Beginning early in the year, a UK court case initiated by civil society will address the legality of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, with potential ramifications on the European Union and more broadly on all states party to the Arms Trade Treaty. Already, legal concerns have been expressed in the United States by leading independent experts about sales and assistance to Saudi Arabia, and could be renewed should the incoming Trump administration continue a policy of arming Riyadh during the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

The persistent investigative efforts of many civil society groups, including by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that documented indiscriminate use of weapons by the Saudi-led coalition undoubtedly played a role in the Obama administration’s recent decision to hold off on delivery of precision-guided munitions. That research work also helped push the UK government to reverse its earlier conclusion that the coalition had not used cluster munitions in Yemen; explicitly in reference to weapons that had originally been supplied by London more than a quarter century ago. On Monday this week, the UK Secretary of State for Defence confirmed a pledge by Saudi Arabia not to employ the weapons (BL755s) again.

The stigma on cluster munition use, in particular, has been strengthened by the creative financial focus of the Stop Explosive Investments campaign that publishes original research into the financial institutions (and states) that invest in -- or pledge not to invest in -- companies producing cluster munitions. As such efforts help shrink the financial incentives and marketplace for indiscriminate weapons, it makes more likely decisions such as the one taken recently by Textron to suspend its product line, functionally ending production of cluster munitions in the United States.

Other industry members, including the scientists and researchers that make sophisticated weaponry possible, have taken a proactive position for a ban on so-called “killer robots.” In 2015, thousands of artificial intelligence experts and researchers -- including prominent scientists and industry leaders such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak -- issued an open letter calling for autonomous lethal weapons not to be developed. In 2014, the first robotics company -- Clearpath Robotics in Canada -- pledged not to make killer robots, In 2017, work on this issue will enter a new phase as states parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons agreed last week to formalize discussion on the topic, a step that may lead to an official protocol that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and a growing number of states say should ban the weapons.

Civil society will also play a critical role in improving transparency in many areas related to the arms trade and security assistance, at times by making sense of public-but-hard-to-gather-or-understand data. For example, SIPRI will continue its highly respected research and publications on global arms trade trends, especially related to major weapons systems. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor will track global developments on landmines and cluster munitions, serving as the de facto monitoring regime for two treaties. For the newer Arms Trade Treaty, projects such as the ATT Baseline Assessment Project and the ATT Monitor have already established a track record of aiding states in understanding their obligations as well as assessing their efforts. In the United States, the Security Assistance Monitor is now pulling together vast amounts of U.S. data into one place for improved transparency on the world’s largest arms and security assistance provider.

In looking ahead, these civil society members and many others should be watched as they employ and develop the tools that shape change in 2017 and beyond.

Jeff Abramson, who coordinates the Forum on the Arms Trade, is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and manager of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition’s (ICBL-CMC) Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor program

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Court Action to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty

12/19/2016

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This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Roy Isbister

In the United Kingdom (UK), a major feature of the first quarter of 2017 will be the High Court hearing at the start of February on the legality or otherwise of continued UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the light of Saudi violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Yemen. In June 2016, The Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) was granted permission to seek judicial review of the UK government’s arms export licensing decisions with regard to Saudi Arabia. In the past 18 months, the UK has licensed more than £3.3 billion of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, a significant proportion of which has comprised Paveway IV bombs and Typhoon combat aircraft for use by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).

This comes against the background of intense conflict in Yemen. A 10-State Saudi-led coalition began its military intervention in Yemen in March 2015, after Houthi rebels, in alliance with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, took control of the capital Sana’a and ousted current President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The Houthi-Saleh alliance swept south to take control of key cities including Aden. The country was quickly engulfed by violence, marking the end of a fragile political transition process.

From very early on in the Saudi-led bombing campaign, regular reports began to emerge of airstrikes on critical civilian objects, residential areas, and large gatherings of civilians, including Mazraq IDP camp, and relief supplies warehouses, attacks on the Old City of Sana’a. These regular attacks against civilians and civilian objects, along with the use of cluster munitions (which the UK Government may be on the verge of acknowledging for the first time), the designation of entire cities as military targets, and other practices collectively demonstrated a pattern of violations of IHL. The Houthis have also committed apparent IHL abuses, firing artillery and missiles at civilian areas in Saudi Arabia and in Yemen. All other parties to the conflict appear to have similarly committed violations of IHL.

On the basis of the scale of problems related to bombings in Yemen, in December 2015, Saferworld, with Amnesty International and Oxfam, sought a legal opinion from Matrix Chambers. The opinion found that the UK government had “misdirected itself in law” on continued arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Citing Article 6.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Matrix concluded the Government had knowledge that its arms would be used to breach IHL, and that therefore such sales were prohibited. Matrix further concluded, having examined a series of potential breaches of IHL by the RSAF, that even if the “knowledge test” for prohibiting sales under Article 6.3 was not met, the standard of “overriding risk” that UK arms would be used to commit serious violations of IHL had been met, and any reasonable risk assessment would conclude that sales to Saudi Arabia of any controlled equipment at risk of being used in the conflict in Yemen should be stopped.

When CAAT moved for judicial review, the Government sought to quash the hearing on the grounds that it had access to information not available to the UN or the public that explained Saudi actions as consistent with IHL. However the judge, in insisting that were grounds for judicial review and that the hearing should be expedited, said there was abundant evidence of breaches of IHL that the government had to take into account. He was particularly referring to UN reports citing many IHL violations.

The case will be extremely important. The UK Government has pursued an extremely narrow consideration of IHL in performing risk assessments for arms export licensing. Lawyers have advised that this is in line with a near twenty-year attempt by the UK and other Western governments to narrow the scope of IHL, rowing back on seventy years of international jurisprudence. Recognizing the importance of this case for all their years of campaigning work, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will also be presenting arguments. All feel they can raise issues that the court needs to consider that make CAAT’s success more likely.

A defeat for the Government will clarify that the risk to IHL of arms transfers cannot be set aside due to other considerations, and will potentially help give meaning to the relevant articles of the ATT. This may also have particular implications for other EU member states, as UK law is in addition subject to shared obligations under an EU instrument (the Common Position).

The recent US decision to stop the supply of precision-guided weapons to the RSAF and to limit certain intelligence-sharing due to systematic and endemic failures in targeting will be a considerable boost to CAAT. Under the US system, the President can send a ”signal” to the Saudi Government by refusing certain arms sales at the same time as continuing to support the Saudi air campaign by other means (e.g. by refuelling Saudi aircraft). However the UK does not have this option. For the UK, national law, the EU Common Position and the ATT all agree that whenever there is a clear risk that the arms in question might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, a proposed transfer must be refused. So if there are “systemic, endemic” problems with Saudi targeting in Yemen, all transfers of arms from the UK that might be used by the RSAF will have to be stopped. Parliament is already asking why the UK is ignoring what the Obama administration has determined. The court will undoubtedly ask those questions too. Hopefully, 2017 will begin with a UK High Court ruling that substantially strengthens the ATT.

Roy Isbister heads Saferworld’s Arms Unit.

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Anticipating Trump Administration Arms Sales to the Middle East?

12/16/2016

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

William D. Hartung

As with many other issues, Donald Trump has made conflicting statements about what a Trump administration policy toward the Middle East might look like. This is particularly true on the issue of U.S. arms transfers to the region. He has made biting criticisms of Saudi Arabia, far and away the biggest U.S. arms client, even as he and his advisors have targeted Saudi Arabia’s main rival, Iran, as the greatest security threat in the region. How this will play out in the realm of the weapons trade remains to be seen.

It might be hard for a president Trump to outdo the Obama administration’s aggressive sales push in the Middle East. According to data from the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the United States has offered a record $198 billion in arms to Persian Gulf nations under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program since 2009. Many of these deals are still in the pipeline, and some may fall by the wayside as economic and political circumstances change. But they represent an unprecedented flood of arms offers to the region.

Recent deals to re-supply Saudi Arabia with bombs and ammunition for its brutal air campaign in Yemen, which has killed thousands of civilians while involving what Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA) has said, “look like war crimes,” have been of particular concern. It’s hard to overstate the devastating humanitarian consequences of the bombing and a parallel blockade of Yemen’s ports. According to the United Nations, nearly three-quarters of the population is in need of assistance, and access to food, clean water, and medical care is scarce.

In December, the Obama administration took a step in the right direction when it indicated that it would hold up a sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia out of concern for the kingdom’s continuing air strikes on civilian targets. This had been a demand of non-governmental organizations working against U.S. support for the Saudi-led war. But the policy shift was a halfway measure, as the United States will continue to refuel Saudi aircraft that are engaged in bombing Yemen and not impact other sales, including a more than $3 billion deal on Chinook helicopters sent to Congress just days earlier.

So how will a Trump administration fit into this existing pattern of large-scale arms transfers to the Middle East? On the one hand, Trump has had harsh words for the Saudis, accusing them of being behind the 9/11 attacks and threatening to end U.S. oil imports from the kingdom. And some analysts have suggested that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric might actually lead to a reduction of U.S. sales to the region.

A countervailing factor that could lead a Trump administration to make ample arms offers to Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies is the strong anti-Iran stance of his key advisors. His appointee for National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, has implausibly described Iran as the “linchpin” of a “working coalition that extends from North Korea and China to Russia, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.” As for secretary of defense nominee Gen. James Mattis, his response to a question about the three greatest threats in the Middle East and South Asia, was “Iran, Iran, Iran.”

In the short-term, the most consequential arms transfer decision in the region is whether to continue to supply weapons in support of the Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen. Trump has fallen into the trap of seeing the conflict as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, going so far as to claim that Iran’s reason for being involved is as a first step toward crossing the border into Saudi Arabia and seizing its oil assets. The roots of the conflict are much more complicated. While Iran has supplied some weaponry to the Houthi-led opposition, the Houthi have longstanding political and economic grievances that predate Iranian involvement. The Houthi movement is far from being an Iranian “puppet,” and there is absolutely no evidence that Tehran plans to ride its limited support for the Houthi into a surge toward Saudi oil fields, as Trump as suggested.

The Trump administration’s decision about whether to continue to back the Saudis in Yemen will be carried out in the context of growing Congressional opposition. Earlier this year, a resolution sponsored by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) that would have banned U.S. sales of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia almost passed, garnering 204 votes. Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA) organized a letter signed by 64 House members calling on the Obama to reconsider a proposed tank deal to Saudi Arabia in light of its indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. And in September, a bipartisan group of Senators sponsored a resolution of disapproval in an effort to block the Saudi tank deal. The resolution received 27 votes, far from victory but a significant step forward given that a year ago only a handful of members of Congress were raising questions about U.S. arms sales to Riyadh.

The precise shape that a Trump administration policy might take toward arms sales to the Middle East in general and transfers in support of the Saudi war in Yemen in particular is unclear. Will Trump and his advisors take a hard look at the negative security consequences of flooding the region with U.S. arms, or will their exaggerated view of the threat posed by Iran serve as the rationale for even more weapons deals?
This article is adapted from a longer piece that appeared in The National Interest.

William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy.

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Suicide Bombings in 2017: What to Expect?

12/15/2016

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This is the third blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

2016 has been labeled, repeatedly, as having been a particularly bad year. Whether it is political upheavals, refugee crises, notable deaths or economic uncertainty, the world feels a little darker, a little less stable, than it did a year ago.

It is then, perhaps, of little surprise to learn that 2016 was a particularly grim and bloody year for suicide bombings. Between January and November, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), a London-based charity that records the harm wrought by explosive violence (and one that I head up), listed 236 suicide attacks globally, as reported in English-language media. This data has yet to be formally published in our annual review, because at the time of writing there remains December to include, but terror strikes so far this year have resulted in 11,621 deaths and injuries, a 19% increase on the same period in the year before. 78% (9,020) of the total harmed so far this year have been civilians.

Suicide attacks have, it seems, firmly shifted from being an exceptional weapon of war – used rarely – to one that has been almost normalised in some conflict zones. This year, 21 countries saw at least one suicide attack at the time of writing. Of these, five countries saw civilians account for 84% of the deaths and injuries from attacks: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey.

But is there a chance that, with 2016 almost behind us, 2017 might offer some respite: a hope of less, not more, deaths from suicide attacks? Sadly, I fear not. If there is a dark prediction to be made for the next calendar year, it is that there will be more, and deadlier, suicide bombs than ever before.

Of course, it is important to note that suicide bombings, over the past six years, have not fluctuated dramatically on the global stage. Between 2011 and 2016 – the period that AOAV’s data stretches over - the year with the highest amount of suicide attacks, 2013, had 270 attacks. In comparison, the year with the lowest, 2011, had 205. Not that major a difference.

What is concerning, though, is that suicide attacks are – it seems – becoming more expertly targeted and, in turn, deadlier. By mid-December, 2016, the average number of civilian casualties per attack stands at 38. This compares to 24 in 2014.

The very fact that the armed group Islamic State (IS) is losing territory, is also likely to cause an increase next year in suicide attacks - with large numbers of civilian casualties following. Such attacks have already taken place from Paris to Jakarta, and are both a result of top-down decision-making by IS leaders, as well as a desire among IS supporters to “avenge” the Caliphate.

In 2016 alone, IS has claimed more than 1,000 “martyrdom operations.” Such figures are difficult to verify and are probably overstated, but the group has certainly increased suicide operations, both as a result of lost territory, and also through their defense of Mosul. There is no reason to think 2017 will be any less. IS boasts a long list of willing martyrs for the cause.

In addition, in Syria both IS and other groups such as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham have, throughout the conflict, gradually shifted their suicide attacks from predominantly targeting armed actors to targeting civilians. It is likely that populated areas lived in by people perceived as supporters of the Syrian regime will continue to be targeted in 2017.

Iraq may also see a bleak 2017. Admittedly, although Iraq is the one country in the world that has been most heavily affected by suicide bombings, levels of attacks there today are lower than they were between 2005 and 2007. However, in 2016, suicide bombings in Iraq increased for the first time since 2013; compared to last year civilian casualties of suicide bombings were up by 118%. Although much of this is due to the Mosul operation, it is likely that Iraq will see more suicide attacks in 2017. The country is still IS’ home-base, and is also the country where the group has traditionally committed its most lethal suicide bombings, such as the Khan Bani Saad suicide bombing in July 2015 and the Baghdad bombing in July 2016.

The arrival of IS into Afghanistan may also mean more large-scale suicide bombings in urban centers there, both as reactionary attacks but also as a result of rivalry with the Taliban. While, more broadly, Afghanistan has so far been relatively spared from sectarian violence, IS suicide attacks there appear to have been increasingly conducted along sectarian lines. If this trend continues, it does not bode well.

Libya could also have a worse year for suicide attacks. The ongoing civil war, along with the fact that IS has lost important territory in country (and as such might resort to defensive suicide bombing methods), combined with the presence of ever-fresh jihadi recruits from next-door Tunisia, means that it is likely to continue to see suicide bombings in 2017.

Turkey has already seen several high profile suicide bombings by both IS and Kurdish separatists, both of which the country is now fighting in Syria. As a result of this intervention, Turkey is likely to continue to see suicide bombings in 2017.

Pakistan’s future is also uncertain. Despite “successes” in combatting terrorist groups in the country in recent years, there was a 114% increase in civilian casualties of suicide bombings in 2016, compared to the same period in the year before. It is likely that, as certain groups in Pakistan continue to be pushed back, more retaliatory suicide attacks may occur there in 2017.

Finally, there is the ever-present threat of suicide attacks in Western Europe. IS will “likely” carry out new terror attacks across Europe, including suicide bombings - a fear expressed by the EU-wide law enforcement agency, Europol. Intelligence services estimate that dozens of jihadis under IS’ direction are already in Europe alongside other “lone wolf” terrorists who have no direct contact with the group. While this might be scare tactics designed to bolster national security funding, if the recent past is anything to go by, suicide bombings will likely remain part of Europe's future.

Yet, despite these dire predictions, there is a frustrating lack of focused, constructive energy in the global community to address the rising use of suicide bombings. The use of aerial explosive weaponry to target insurgents has, repeatedly, been shown to act as a strong recruitment driver for terrorist groups. As AOAV regularly records, almost 90% of those killed or injured in air strikes in populated areas are civilians, and their surviving relatives are all too often radicalised following the explosive blast.

Suicidal violence is not, though, guaranteed. But it requires dynamic action to prevent future rivers of blood.

Far more needs to be done in recording the impact of suicide strikes; more needs to be done in understanding how to prevent would-be bombers getting their hands on pre-cursor materials; Islamic scholars and Imams, as well as politicians and diplomats, need to be more vocal in their condemnation of the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons against civilians; and funding needs to be found to ensure that civil society, businesses, trade officials, police units, UN agencies, militaries and any other key component of the counter-IED networks come together to respond imaginatively and creatively to this terrible weapon.

Failing to do so will result in 2017 being as terrible a year as 2016 has given us so far.

Iain Overton is Executive Director at Action on Armed Violence

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Saving Rhinos while Protecting Human Rights: The Value of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Anti-Poaching Efforts

12/14/2016

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Matthew Bolton

A family of white rhinos. Photo courtesy of Control Arms.

The world is facing what the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has described as an “Environmental Crime Crisis,” with an unprecedented slaughter of large mammals, particularly in the African continent. More than 100,000 elephants have been killed by poachers in the last five years and, over the same period, the number of rhinoceroses poached has increased every year.

The illicit wildlife trade is now increasingly sophisticated, dangerous and globalized, integrated with armed groups and organized crime. It has been fueled by a proliferation of military-grade guns in unstable regions with high concentrations of rhinos and elephants. Since 2014, the UN Security Council has identified poaching as a regional security threat in Africa (S/RES/2134 and S/RES/2136). This month UNEP released a new report showing how environmental crime “threatens peace and security.” In 2017, the Arms Trade Treaty and other international measures could offer tools to address these problems in an integrated way.

United States Contributes to Militarization of Counter-Poaching

There is an emerging global trend toward militarizing wildlife protection, including expansive arming and training of paramilitary rangers. These aggressive counter-poaching tactics are supported by policy changes that have reframed wildlife crime as a security issue. In 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking, stating that poaching had “significant effects…on the national interests of the United States.” This October, Congress passed the bi-partisan Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act, which encourages the administration to “provide defense articles (not including significant military equipment), defense services, and related training to appropriate security forces” to African countries for counter-poaching.

It is unclear how seriously the incoming administration will take the threat of global wildlife crime. Trump’s climate change-denying pick for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Scott Pruitt, wants to strip away protections from the environment. Trump has defended his sons’ hunting of endangered species in Zimbabwe; photos surfaced last year of Donald Trump, Jr. holding the severed tail of an elephant and of him with a dead leopard. Nevertheless, co-sponsor of the Wildlife Trafficking Act Senator Jeff Flake (R-Arizona) told National Geographic that he will continue to advocate for action on poaching in the incoming Congress.

The Human Rights Impact of Militarization

As with the “War on Drugs”, the militarization of poaching has had unintended consequences. In several countries, the military, police and even wildlife rangers have been involved in poaching, either directly or indirectly. The flow of arms into already unstable regions also means that many poachers obtain their weapons and ammunition from state sources, either through theft or corruption. Militarized rangers have also been implicated in human rights abuses (see, for example, this disturbing report about a counter-poaching operation in Tanzania).

Last week, I was speaking with wildlife rangers in a major East African national park, home to many rhinos. The park has suffered due to serious threats from poaching since 2011; two rhinos were recently killed by poachers using large-caliber rifles. In the last few years the country has stiffened the penalties for wildlife crimes and deployed an eight-fold increase in rangers – many with paramilitary training – in the park. The government attributes to this more aggressive response a reduction in killing of rhinos in the park from 24 in 2013 to three this year.

However, many of the poachers caught following incidents in the park are low-level criminals, often from poorer, rural areas around the park where the profits from rhino horn can be very tempting. They risk being killed on the spot or long-term prison sentences, while the international organized crime bosses evade punishment.

The paramilitary rangers' rules of engagement are also concerning. I asked a ranger about his rules of engagement when encountering a suspected poacher. He replied that if they are armed, “You shoot to kill, that's what we are told in training. If someone has a rifle, what do you do? That's why we shoot first.” Shoot-to-kill policies contravene international human rights law. Police (and rangers) are supposed to try to persuade a suspect to lay down their weapon, avoid killing a suspect if possible and try to make an arrest. The ranger told me, “if they pose a threat you forget about human rights.” But governments are not allowed to forget about human rights, even if they are inconvenient. The ranger also admitted that the militarized tactics could encourage poachers to also be better armed and more aggressive themselves.

Addressing Poaching through International Arms Control

If Trump does decide to take wildlife crime seriously (or is encouraged to by Congressional Republicans) it is unlikely that he will be a strong champion for addressing the human rights concerns of militarized counter-poaching. Congress, the policy community and activists must therefore make a compelling case for alternative methods of addressing poaching, while respecting the rule of law.

The last African elephant poaching crisis, in the 1980s, was fueled by the influx of guns in Africa’s Cold War proxy conflicts. It was stopped not so much by militarizing wildlife protection, but rather through international legal and normative change, including the ivory ban and a broad-based public awareness campaign in countries creating the demand. More recently, the Obama Administration has supported diplomatic and aid efforts beyond militarized conservation, raising awareness of the impact of poaching, seeking a stronger ivory ban and supporting peace and conservation projects in affected areas.

This September, I authored a report, published by Control Arms and Pace University, that outlines how the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) could be used as part of a broader effort to address poaching in ways that are consistent international human rights standards. The report was produced for a training program on the ATT for East African officials and civil society advocates.

The ATT, negotiated within the UN, establishes global rules for the transfer of conventional weapons, preventing the sale of arms to those who engage in human rights and humanitarian law abuses, organized crime, terrorism and gender-based violence. It provides a framework for governments to engage collaboratively in “risk mitigation measures” to prevent potential diversion of guns to unauthorized people or uses. It has 91 member governments, including several major exporting countries.

In my report and the training of officials we argue that governments should use the ATT to reduce the risk of automatic and large-caliber weapons being diverted to poaching. We also show how to use the treaty to improve armed rangers’ respect for human rights.

The United States has signed the ATT, but not yet ratified, stymied by gun lobby conspiracy theories claiming the treaty would threaten Second Amendment rights. In fact, the treaty affirms governments’ right to allow “lawful ownership” of guns, such as for “recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities.” In 2014 President Obama revised U.S. arms export control measures, which are broadly consistent with the ATT, without actually fully joining the treaty. Given the NRA’s endorsement of Trump, it is unlikely the incoming administration will think highly of the treaty’s potential.

But multilateral diplomacy, international law and arms control offer sophisticated tools (such as the ATT) for solving global problems (like poaching) that cannot simply be shot at. They make it possible to defend wildlife and human rights at the same time. In 2017 we must mobilize to shield both rhinos and people from roll back of their much-needed protections.

Dr. Matthew Bolton is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pace University

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Drone Proliferation in 2017: Trends to Watch

12/13/2016

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2017 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Dan Gettinger

If the past year is anything to go by, 2017 will be a consequential time for issues relating to global drone proliferation. In the past year, China has stepped up exports of armed drones, the U.S. and other countries have taken steps to limit drone proliferation, and drones have been adopted by a growing number of non-state actors. Each of these areas experienced significant developments in 2016 that will shape events in the coming year.

Several countries began flying armament-capable Chinese-made drones in operations in 2016. Following Iraq’s acquisition of China’s CH-4 drone in October 2015, recent satellite images and postings on social media suggest that Jordan and Egypt have also purchased the CH-4, a smaller version of the U.S. Reaper drone. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have purchased the Wing Loong, the Chinese equivalent of the U.S. Predator drone, and have used it in operations over Yemen and Libya. Photos of drones in Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan suggest that these countries may also have acquired new armament-capable Chinese drones in 2016, although this has not been confirmed.

It will be important to monitor the continued growth in Chinese drone exports and capabilities in 2017, even as other countries take steps to limit the proliferation of unmanned aircraft. In August 2016, Defense News reported that the U.S. Department of State was encouraging other countries to sign on to a “joint declaration of principles” regarding armed drone exports. The one-page document lists five principles, including a resolution to engage in responsible export practices and to continue discussions around regulating the evolving technology. The joint declaration was formally announced in early October but, as Forum-listed expert Rachel Stohl (Stimson Center) argues in a statement, the joint declaration “does not go far enough to ensure that the standards are meaningful” and lacks the signatures of key countries like Israel and China.

The coming year could determine whether or not the joint declaration is indeed a step toward a global agreement on drone exports. In the meantime, the past year has demonstrated that unmanned systems technology is no longer in the hands of only the more advanced militaries in the world. As a recent publication by the Center for the Study of the Drone illustrates, there are over 30 different types of drones made in the United States, China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey that are currently in use in Syria and Iraq. Hobby drones are increasingly a tool of non-state groups in this conflict. In October 2016, an exploding ISIL drone killed two Kurdish Peshmerga and injured two French soldiers, the latest development in a worrying trend that has accelerated in the past year.

Even as more state and non-state actors adopt drones, not all drone proliferation is necessarily dangerous. As Michael Horowitz, Sara E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann write in International Security, drones could prove to be a stabilizing force along disputed or hot borders. In 2017, it will be interesting to see what role drones play along the border between Pakistan and India and in the South China Sea where drones such as the Indian Air Force IAI Heron and China’s BZK-005 are already active.

Dan Gettinger is Co-Director of the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College.

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Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

Court Action to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty

Anticipating Trump Administration Arms Sales to the Middle East?

Suicide Bombings in 2017: What to Expect?

Saving Rhinos while Protecting Human Rights: The Value of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Anti-Poaching Efforts

Drone Proliferation in 2017: Trends to Watch

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Looking Outside the State-Centered Box: Tools for Change in 2017

Court Action to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty

Anticipating Trump Administration Arms Sales to the Middle East?

﻿Suicide Bombings in 2017: What to Expect?

Saving Rhinos while Protecting Human Rights: The Value of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Anti-Poaching Efforts

Drone Proliferation in 2017: Trends to Watch

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Suicide Bombings in 2017: What to Expect?