Assessing Biden's First Two Years
January 20, 2023: U.S. President Joe Biden was inaugurated two years ago today. The Forum on the Arms Trade invited members of its community, including experts and emerging experts, to examine aspects of the Biden administration's first two years.
Each assessment is individually authored and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the expert's organization. Inclusion here does not imply agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The Forum itself does not take positions.
(See assessment rubric.)
Each assessment is individually authored and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the expert's organization. Inclusion here does not imply agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The Forum itself does not take positions.
(See assessment rubric.)
IMPROVED
UNSATISFACTORY
DANGEROUS
- Department of Defense civilian protection policy - John Ramming Chappell
- Explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) policy - Sahr Muhammedally
- Landmine policy - Jeff Meer
UNSATISFACTORY
- Arms Trade Treaty - Rachel Stohl
- Conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy - Jeff Abramson
- Arms transfers to Taiwan - Michael Klare
- U.S. support for Saudi Arabia - Sarah Leah Whitson
- Security assistance to rights-violating countries (with caveats) - Sarah Yager
- Support for political prisoners in the Middle East - Andrea J. Prasow
- Cluster munitions policy - Sera Koulabdara
DANGEROUS
- Firearms exports - John Lindsay-Poland
Assessment: Improved
Topic: Department of Defense civilian protection policy
Explanation: The Biden administration has taken significant steps to standardize and improve the U.S. military’s approach to preventing, responding to, and making amends for civilian harm. Secretary Lloyd Austin’s 2022 Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) marks the first cabinet-level commitment to overhaul U.S. civilian protection policy. Implementing the CHMR-AP – which includes creating new positions across the Department of Defense, institutionalizing processes, and revising policy and doctrine – will take years. The ultimate success or failure of the CHMR-AP, and other civilian protection reforms brought under its ambit, will become clear as implementation progresses. Conspicuously absent from the CHMR-AP is a commitment to acknowledge and make amends for past civilian harm caused by the U.S. military, including cases dismissed based on faulty review processes.
Evaluator: John Ramming Chappell, Legal Fellow, United States, Center for Civilians in Conflict (Forum emerging expert program member)
Topic: Department of Defense civilian protection policy
Explanation: The Biden administration has taken significant steps to standardize and improve the U.S. military’s approach to preventing, responding to, and making amends for civilian harm. Secretary Lloyd Austin’s 2022 Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) marks the first cabinet-level commitment to overhaul U.S. civilian protection policy. Implementing the CHMR-AP – which includes creating new positions across the Department of Defense, institutionalizing processes, and revising policy and doctrine – will take years. The ultimate success or failure of the CHMR-AP, and other civilian protection reforms brought under its ambit, will become clear as implementation progresses. Conspicuously absent from the CHMR-AP is a commitment to acknowledge and make amends for past civilian harm caused by the U.S. military, including cases dismissed based on faulty review processes.
Evaluator: John Ramming Chappell, Legal Fellow, United States, Center for Civilians in Conflict (Forum emerging expert program member)
Assessment: Improved
Topic: Explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) policy
Explanation: In November 2019, Ireland took the lead in drafting a Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, and held consultations with states, civil society organizations, the ICRC, and the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). After three years of consultations, in November 2022, the Declaration was endorsed by over 80 states, including the United States. The Declaration is not an international treaty but states that endorse the Declaration are committing to act in good faith and take the necessary steps to implement the commitments outlined in the Declaration and enact changes in policies, guidance, tools, practices, training, and commit to sharing good practices. The Biden administration played a constructive role during the consultations even though not all of its suggestions were incorporated into the final text. The U.S. endorsement, coming from a military active state, is important as it sends a message that much more needs to be done to change military policies and practices to reduce civilian harm in urban war. The endorsement came at the heels of the August 2022 Department of Defense Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan which lays out a series of actions to mitigate and respond to civilian harm. (See Resource.)
Evaluator: Sahr Muhammedally, Director MENA and lead on Urban Warfare, Center for Civilians in Conflict (guest contributor)
Topic: Explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) policy
Explanation: In November 2019, Ireland took the lead in drafting a Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, and held consultations with states, civil society organizations, the ICRC, and the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). After three years of consultations, in November 2022, the Declaration was endorsed by over 80 states, including the United States. The Declaration is not an international treaty but states that endorse the Declaration are committing to act in good faith and take the necessary steps to implement the commitments outlined in the Declaration and enact changes in policies, guidance, tools, practices, training, and commit to sharing good practices. The Biden administration played a constructive role during the consultations even though not all of its suggestions were incorporated into the final text. The U.S. endorsement, coming from a military active state, is important as it sends a message that much more needs to be done to change military policies and practices to reduce civilian harm in urban war. The endorsement came at the heels of the August 2022 Department of Defense Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan which lays out a series of actions to mitigate and respond to civilian harm. (See Resource.)
Evaluator: Sahr Muhammedally, Director MENA and lead on Urban Warfare, Center for Civilians in Conflict (guest contributor)
Assessment: Improved
Topic: Landmine policy
Explanation: The Trump administration’s 2020 policy that allowed use of antipersonnel landmines anywhere in the world on the authority of combatant commanders remained dangerously in place as Biden entered into office. After pledging as a Presidential candidate to revise the policy, Biden finally acted in 2022 when the White House functionally returned to the Obama-era formulation of reserving use of landmines only for the Korean peninsula, returning control of the policy to the White House and setting the goal of one day joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Those are welcome improvements but still leave the United States at odds with 164 countries, including all its NATO allies, by still allowing a use for these indiscriminate weapons. The Biden White House's additional pledges to report on progress in creating alternatives to landmines and to reduce existing stockpiles of Treaty non-compliant landmines are as yet unfulfilled. (See resource.)
Evaluator: Jeff Meer, U.S. Executive Director, Humanity & Inclusion (guest contributor)
Topic: Landmine policy
Explanation: The Trump administration’s 2020 policy that allowed use of antipersonnel landmines anywhere in the world on the authority of combatant commanders remained dangerously in place as Biden entered into office. After pledging as a Presidential candidate to revise the policy, Biden finally acted in 2022 when the White House functionally returned to the Obama-era formulation of reserving use of landmines only for the Korean peninsula, returning control of the policy to the White House and setting the goal of one day joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Those are welcome improvements but still leave the United States at odds with 164 countries, including all its NATO allies, by still allowing a use for these indiscriminate weapons. The Biden White House's additional pledges to report on progress in creating alternatives to landmines and to reduce existing stockpiles of Treaty non-compliant landmines are as yet unfulfilled. (See resource.)
Evaluator: Jeff Meer, U.S. Executive Director, Humanity & Inclusion (guest contributor)
Assessment: Unsatisfactory
Topic: Arms Trade Treaty
Explanation: The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came into force in 2014, is the first international legally binding instrument to regulate the global trade in conventional arms. The ATT has 113 States Parties, including nearly all of the United States' key allies. The United States delegation made a statement at the 8th Conference of States Parties in September 2021, announcing that the United States would soon issue a new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy that would help determine “the proper relationship of the United States to the Arms Trade Treaty.” The United States also voted in favor of the annual UN resolution on the ATT in 2021 and 2002 (see 77/62), reversing the Trump administration's "no" vote in 2020, the only country to oppose it (see L.53). However, no new CAT policy has been issued, and no review of the U.S. ATT policy has been undertaken. The President also has not reversed the Trump administration’s policy of “unsigning” the ATT (which could be done with a simple letter informing the United Nations), nor has it announced that it intends to honor its signature to the treaty. This is deeply disappointing, especially since these are steps the President could take on his own authority. Eventually, the United States should seek ratification of the ATT from the Senate, but at a minimum in and in the short-term, the Biden administration should begin to socialize the ATT amongst key stakeholders, including Congress, and make the case for why the responsible and regulated arms trade is in the U.S. interest and consistent with U.S. policy and practice.
Evaluator: Rachel Stohl, Vice President of Research Programs, Stimson Center
Topic: Arms Trade Treaty
Explanation: The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came into force in 2014, is the first international legally binding instrument to regulate the global trade in conventional arms. The ATT has 113 States Parties, including nearly all of the United States' key allies. The United States delegation made a statement at the 8th Conference of States Parties in September 2021, announcing that the United States would soon issue a new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy that would help determine “the proper relationship of the United States to the Arms Trade Treaty.” The United States also voted in favor of the annual UN resolution on the ATT in 2021 and 2002 (see 77/62), reversing the Trump administration's "no" vote in 2020, the only country to oppose it (see L.53). However, no new CAT policy has been issued, and no review of the U.S. ATT policy has been undertaken. The President also has not reversed the Trump administration’s policy of “unsigning” the ATT (which could be done with a simple letter informing the United Nations), nor has it announced that it intends to honor its signature to the treaty. This is deeply disappointing, especially since these are steps the President could take on his own authority. Eventually, the United States should seek ratification of the ATT from the Senate, but at a minimum in and in the short-term, the Biden administration should begin to socialize the ATT amongst key stakeholders, including Congress, and make the case for why the responsible and regulated arms trade is in the U.S. interest and consistent with U.S. policy and practice.
Evaluator: Rachel Stohl, Vice President of Research Programs, Stimson Center
Assessment: Unsatisfactory
Topic: Conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy
Explanation: Despite expectations and frequent rumors that the Biden administration would soon release a new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy, it has yet to do so now two years into term. This leaves in place a dangerous Trump era approach that overly emphasizes the economic promotion of weapons transfers without sufficient concern for the human rights implications. As such, the United States continues to transfer weapons to many rights abuses, as others in this series have pointed out.
The United States is also leading a multi-country massive transfer of weapons to Ukraine. Whether it will be possible to avoid providing arms that lead to a direct war between Russian and NATO forces, and to account for these weapons in ways that address predictable diversion risks, remains to be seen. In this tragic conflict, the United States is trying to accomplish both. But, it is also reverting to less-restrained transactional approaches by offering weapons to Saudi Arabia in hopes of increased oil production and arms to Turkey in exchange for approval of an expanded NATO. It is now critical that President Biden clarify what principles will guide U.S. arms transfers. As by far the world’s largest arms provider, U.S. CAT policy will set the tone for others as many countries ramp up weapons production and inevitably look toward sales to sustain that industry. Whether we see a global free-for-all, or arms transfers guided by restraint and transparency, may hang in the balance.
Evaluator: Jeff Abramson, Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association
Topic: Conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy
Explanation: Despite expectations and frequent rumors that the Biden administration would soon release a new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy, it has yet to do so now two years into term. This leaves in place a dangerous Trump era approach that overly emphasizes the economic promotion of weapons transfers without sufficient concern for the human rights implications. As such, the United States continues to transfer weapons to many rights abuses, as others in this series have pointed out.
The United States is also leading a multi-country massive transfer of weapons to Ukraine. Whether it will be possible to avoid providing arms that lead to a direct war between Russian and NATO forces, and to account for these weapons in ways that address predictable diversion risks, remains to be seen. In this tragic conflict, the United States is trying to accomplish both. But, it is also reverting to less-restrained transactional approaches by offering weapons to Saudi Arabia in hopes of increased oil production and arms to Turkey in exchange for approval of an expanded NATO. It is now critical that President Biden clarify what principles will guide U.S. arms transfers. As by far the world’s largest arms provider, U.S. CAT policy will set the tone for others as many countries ramp up weapons production and inevitably look toward sales to sustain that industry. Whether we see a global free-for-all, or arms transfers guided by restraint and transparency, may hang in the balance.
Evaluator: Jeff Abramson, Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association
Assessment: Unsatisfactory
Topic: Arms transfers to Taiwan
Explanation: At a time when Taiwan’s political status has become a source of mounting tension between China and Taiwan and China and the United States – with all sides increasingly relying on military means to assert their respective positions – the prudent path for the Biden administration would be to moderate U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, lest these become an added source of friction. However, the administration chose to further inflame tensions by announcing a major package of arms transfers to Taiwan on Sept. 2, 2022. The package, worth an estimated $1.1 billion, is to include some 60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles produced by Boeing and 100 AIM-9X air-to-air missiles made by Raytheon. In announcing the transfers, administration officials insisted they were solely intended to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, but Chinese officials described them as provocative, saying they “severely harm China-U.S. relations and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” A bipartisan majority in Congress has also contributed to the mounting tensions over Taiwan by approving a five-year, $10 billion foreign arms financing measure as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, signed into law by President Biden on Dec. 23, 2022. The NDAA also includes a variety of measures intended to facilitate U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan and to expand U.S. training of Taiwanese military personnel – measures that are certain to be viewed as threatening by Beijing and lead to Chinese countermoves of various sorts, further ratcheting up tensions.
Evaluator: Michael Klare, Senior Visiting Fellow, Arms Control Association
Topic: Arms transfers to Taiwan
Explanation: At a time when Taiwan’s political status has become a source of mounting tension between China and Taiwan and China and the United States – with all sides increasingly relying on military means to assert their respective positions – the prudent path for the Biden administration would be to moderate U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, lest these become an added source of friction. However, the administration chose to further inflame tensions by announcing a major package of arms transfers to Taiwan on Sept. 2, 2022. The package, worth an estimated $1.1 billion, is to include some 60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles produced by Boeing and 100 AIM-9X air-to-air missiles made by Raytheon. In announcing the transfers, administration officials insisted they were solely intended to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, but Chinese officials described them as provocative, saying they “severely harm China-U.S. relations and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” A bipartisan majority in Congress has also contributed to the mounting tensions over Taiwan by approving a five-year, $10 billion foreign arms financing measure as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, signed into law by President Biden on Dec. 23, 2022. The NDAA also includes a variety of measures intended to facilitate U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan and to expand U.S. training of Taiwanese military personnel – measures that are certain to be viewed as threatening by Beijing and lead to Chinese countermoves of various sorts, further ratcheting up tensions.
Evaluator: Michael Klare, Senior Visiting Fellow, Arms Control Association
Assessment: Unsatisfactory
Topic: U.S. support for Saudi Arabia
Explanation: There should be little surprise that President Biden’s campaign pledge to end arms transfers to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen and to hold MBS accountable for his heinous crimes fell by the wayside. Instead, this pledge was replaced with billions in new “defensive” weapons sales to Saudi, including $3 billion in Patriot missiles in 2022 alone. New reports indicate that the Biden administration will resume offensive weapons sales as well. Saudi and U.S. defense industry lobbyists have created every incentive for the Biden administration to do the wrong thing, while Riyadh’s control over OPEC and its ability to influence global oil prices have given it a bigger stick to beat back any human rights demands in the wake of the Ukraine war. Though Saudi aerial bombardment over Yemen ended and the embargo eased under the now expired ceasefire of April 2022, the prospect for an end to the country’s war, now fought largely by proxy forces in the country, seems a long way off.
Evaluator: Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN)
Topic: U.S. support for Saudi Arabia
Explanation: There should be little surprise that President Biden’s campaign pledge to end arms transfers to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen and to hold MBS accountable for his heinous crimes fell by the wayside. Instead, this pledge was replaced with billions in new “defensive” weapons sales to Saudi, including $3 billion in Patriot missiles in 2022 alone. New reports indicate that the Biden administration will resume offensive weapons sales as well. Saudi and U.S. defense industry lobbyists have created every incentive for the Biden administration to do the wrong thing, while Riyadh’s control over OPEC and its ability to influence global oil prices have given it a bigger stick to beat back any human rights demands in the wake of the Ukraine war. Though Saudi aerial bombardment over Yemen ended and the embargo eased under the now expired ceasefire of April 2022, the prospect for an end to the country’s war, now fought largely by proxy forces in the country, seems a long way off.
Evaluator: Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN)
Assessment: Unsatisfactory (with caveats)
Topic: Security assistance to rights-violating countries
Explanation: The gap between President Biden’s pro-human rights rhetoric and his actions widened in his second year of office. That’s especially evident in the provision of security assistance to rights abusing nations. In 2022, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, The Philippines, Uganda, and Nigeria – to name a few – continued to receive U.S. security assistance and arms sales despite well documented (and in some cases increasing) human rights abuses. Many of those abuses were, in fact, carried out by the very security forces receiving U.S. aid. In December, Biden made his prioritization of security interests over human rights clear when multiple African leaders accused of grave abuses against their people were invited to a Washington summit while human rights was nowhere on the agenda. The Biden Administration held back $130 million in military financing to Egypt, but still sent approximately $1.3 billion in aid to the repressive country. And while some progress has been made to stop military assistance for countries using child soldiers, this year four countries which use child soldiers will receive at least $234 million in U.S. military aid. Our expectations in the human rights community were set high based on Biden’s own promises. To prove that his commitment to human rights is more than just talk, Biden must cut back security assistance to rights-violating regimes or set more conditions.
Evaluator: Sarah Yager, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch
Topic: Security assistance to rights-violating countries
Explanation: The gap between President Biden’s pro-human rights rhetoric and his actions widened in his second year of office. That’s especially evident in the provision of security assistance to rights abusing nations. In 2022, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, The Philippines, Uganda, and Nigeria – to name a few – continued to receive U.S. security assistance and arms sales despite well documented (and in some cases increasing) human rights abuses. Many of those abuses were, in fact, carried out by the very security forces receiving U.S. aid. In December, Biden made his prioritization of security interests over human rights clear when multiple African leaders accused of grave abuses against their people were invited to a Washington summit while human rights was nowhere on the agenda. The Biden Administration held back $130 million in military financing to Egypt, but still sent approximately $1.3 billion in aid to the repressive country. And while some progress has been made to stop military assistance for countries using child soldiers, this year four countries which use child soldiers will receive at least $234 million in U.S. military aid. Our expectations in the human rights community were set high based on Biden’s own promises. To prove that his commitment to human rights is more than just talk, Biden must cut back security assistance to rights-violating regimes or set more conditions.
Evaluator: Sarah Yager, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch
Assessment: Unsatisfactory
Topic: Support for political prisoners in the Middle East
Explanation: The Biden administration’s embrace of autocrats and dictators in the Middle East has sent a powerful message that the administration stands with human rights abusers rather than with the people of the region. In a trip to Saudi Arabia in July, President Biden fist-bumped Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, and failed to raise publicly the detention of political prisoners. Saudi Arabia remains one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms sales. In addition to a bilateral meeting with Egyptian president Abdelfattah el-Sissi on the same trip, Biden traveled to Egypt for the UN Climate Conference COP 27 in November and publicly praised El-Sissi; Egypt receives an annual $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid each year. Last year, the Biden administration introduced an indicator system (the "D" rating") in order to warn American travelers of the heightened risk of wrongful detention when traveling to certain countries; neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt are on the list, despite patterns of unjustly detaining American citizens and their family members. Both countries have also imposed travel bans on American citizens, preventing them from returning home to the United States. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also continue to imprison thousands of domestic political prisoners, too often in conditions that amount to torture.
Evaluator: Andrea J. Prasow, Executive Director, the Freedom Initiative (guest contributor)
Topic: Support for political prisoners in the Middle East
Explanation: The Biden administration’s embrace of autocrats and dictators in the Middle East has sent a powerful message that the administration stands with human rights abusers rather than with the people of the region. In a trip to Saudi Arabia in July, President Biden fist-bumped Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, and failed to raise publicly the detention of political prisoners. Saudi Arabia remains one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms sales. In addition to a bilateral meeting with Egyptian president Abdelfattah el-Sissi on the same trip, Biden traveled to Egypt for the UN Climate Conference COP 27 in November and publicly praised El-Sissi; Egypt receives an annual $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid each year. Last year, the Biden administration introduced an indicator system (the "D" rating") in order to warn American travelers of the heightened risk of wrongful detention when traveling to certain countries; neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt are on the list, despite patterns of unjustly detaining American citizens and their family members. Both countries have also imposed travel bans on American citizens, preventing them from returning home to the United States. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also continue to imprison thousands of domestic political prisoners, too often in conditions that amount to torture.
Evaluator: Andrea J. Prasow, Executive Director, the Freedom Initiative (guest contributor)
Assessment: Unsatisfactory
Topic: Cluster munitions policy
Explanation: Current U.S. policy on cluster munitions, issued by President Trump in 2017, allows the U.S. military to use all cluster munitions in existing stockpiles and enables U.S. acquisition of cluster munitions from foreign sources to replenish stocks. The 2017 policy loosened restrictions put in place by the 2008 Defense Department policy directive on cluster munitions issued by President Bush, which had required that the U.S. military no longer use cluster munitions that had a more than a 1 percent failure rate by the end of 2018. Globally, 149 new cluster munition casualties were recorded in 2021 with 97% of all casualties being civilians. Children accounted for 66% of all casualties where the age group was known, with 90 child casualties recorded. Lao PDR, a country where the U.S. used cluster munitions 50 years ago, saw tragic incidents where groups of children playing with submunitions were killed and injured. Ukraine is the only country in the world where cluster munitions are being used as of August 2022. Preliminary data indicates at least 689 casualties reported during cluster munition attacks in Ukraine for the first half of 2022. Many casualties may have gone unrecorded.Thus all evidence continues to reveal that cluster munitions are indiscriminate and cause significant casualties among civilian populations, especially children. The Biden Administration should immediately prioritize the review of its cluster munitions policy and create a clear timeline and mechanism for public reporting to destroy U.S. cluster munition stockpiles, ban the production, use, and transfer of cluster munitions and urgently take the necessary steps to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions along with 110 other countries including 23 of our NATO allies.
Evaluation: Sera Koulabdara, CEO, Legacies of War (guest contributor)
Topic: Cluster munitions policy
Explanation: Current U.S. policy on cluster munitions, issued by President Trump in 2017, allows the U.S. military to use all cluster munitions in existing stockpiles and enables U.S. acquisition of cluster munitions from foreign sources to replenish stocks. The 2017 policy loosened restrictions put in place by the 2008 Defense Department policy directive on cluster munitions issued by President Bush, which had required that the U.S. military no longer use cluster munitions that had a more than a 1 percent failure rate by the end of 2018. Globally, 149 new cluster munition casualties were recorded in 2021 with 97% of all casualties being civilians. Children accounted for 66% of all casualties where the age group was known, with 90 child casualties recorded. Lao PDR, a country where the U.S. used cluster munitions 50 years ago, saw tragic incidents where groups of children playing with submunitions were killed and injured. Ukraine is the only country in the world where cluster munitions are being used as of August 2022. Preliminary data indicates at least 689 casualties reported during cluster munition attacks in Ukraine for the first half of 2022. Many casualties may have gone unrecorded.Thus all evidence continues to reveal that cluster munitions are indiscriminate and cause significant casualties among civilian populations, especially children. The Biden Administration should immediately prioritize the review of its cluster munitions policy and create a clear timeline and mechanism for public reporting to destroy U.S. cluster munition stockpiles, ban the production, use, and transfer of cluster munitions and urgently take the necessary steps to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions along with 110 other countries including 23 of our NATO allies.
Evaluation: Sera Koulabdara, CEO, Legacies of War (guest contributor)
Assessment: Dangerous
Topic: Firearms exports
Explanation: U.S.-sourced firearms represent more than half of all firearms in the world, and firearms are used in an estimated 174,000 homicides a year globally. The United States continued to export a massive number of firearms - more than 620,000 in 2022 - with few end use controls. In 2022, the Biden administration allowed licensed firearms exports to countries where state forces violate human rights using firearms or non-state forces use firearms in devastating violence, including the Philippines, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand, according to U.S. International Trade Commission data. As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden promised to restore semi-automatic firearms to the U.S. Munitions List, where prospective exports are notified to Congress and exports can be regulated with greater rigor than by the Commerce Department, but as president he has failed to do so. The Biden administration has not engaged with civil society groups regarding the dangers of unregulated firearms exports, or even of the impacts beyond U.S. borders of U.S. domestic gun markets. In Mexico and Central America, where the use of U.S.-sourced firearms is a central cause of forced migration, the Biden administration has framed such migration separately from gun violence, and urged migrants to stay in contexts made more dangerous by unregulated U.S. gun markets.
Evaluator: John Lindsay-Poland, Stop US Arms to Mexico, a project of Global Exchange
Topic: Firearms exports
Explanation: U.S.-sourced firearms represent more than half of all firearms in the world, and firearms are used in an estimated 174,000 homicides a year globally. The United States continued to export a massive number of firearms - more than 620,000 in 2022 - with few end use controls. In 2022, the Biden administration allowed licensed firearms exports to countries where state forces violate human rights using firearms or non-state forces use firearms in devastating violence, including the Philippines, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand, according to U.S. International Trade Commission data. As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden promised to restore semi-automatic firearms to the U.S. Munitions List, where prospective exports are notified to Congress and exports can be regulated with greater rigor than by the Commerce Department, but as president he has failed to do so. The Biden administration has not engaged with civil society groups regarding the dangers of unregulated firearms exports, or even of the impacts beyond U.S. borders of U.S. domestic gun markets. In Mexico and Central America, where the use of U.S.-sourced firearms is a central cause of forced migration, the Biden administration has framed such migration separately from gun violence, and urged migrants to stay in contexts made more dangerous by unregulated U.S. gun markets.
Evaluator: John Lindsay-Poland, Stop US Arms to Mexico, a project of Global Exchange
Assessment rubric
Excellent: Excellent improvement (or retention) of policy, making it a world-leading example.
Improved: Laudable improvement of policy, but still more to do.
No net change: No net change to pre-existing policy that was middle of the road.
Unsatisfactory: Net decline to pre-existing middle-of-the-road policy or failure to improve dangerous pre-existing policy.
Dangerous: Policy changes (or lack thereof) are dangerous to international peace and security.
Excellent: Excellent improvement (or retention) of policy, making it a world-leading example.
Improved: Laudable improvement of policy, but still more to do.
No net change: No net change to pre-existing policy that was middle of the road.
Unsatisfactory: Net decline to pre-existing middle-of-the-road policy or failure to improve dangerous pre-existing policy.
Dangerous: Policy changes (or lack thereof) are dangerous to international peace and security.