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Manipur's 'Pumpi Guns:' Why Should We Care About Them?

12/11/2024

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
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Henrique Garbino
Introduction

The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state of India, began in mid-2023 as ethnic violence erupted between the majority Meitei community, based in the Imphal Valley, and the tribal Kuki-Zo community from the surrounding hill districts. The unrest, rooted in disputes over land rights and affirmative action measures, has led to significant destruction, including over 225 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people, and the burning of thousands of homes and religious structures. Deep-seated historical grievances and recent tensions over migration and Scheduled Tribe status have intensified the violence, turning the state into a complex humanitarian crisis.

In Manipur, non-industrial weapons present yet another set of challenges to policymakers and law enforcement given their unique characteristics, the environments in which they are produced, and their users' motivations. Non-state actors with limited resources worldwide resort to them over commercial counterparts primarily for their accessibility, affordability, and anonymity. They are made from easy-to-source materials, are significantly cheaper to acquire, and lack serial numbers or standardized markings allowing them to operate under the radar. In addition to the physical characteristics, they are perceived to symbolize resourcefulness and resilience, especially in asymmetric conflicts or resistance movements.

‘Pumpi guns’ are a lesser-known, contemporary example of this phenomenon. While usually reported and clustered under ‘long-range mortars’ by Manipur law enforcement, ‘Pumpi gun’ is an umbrella term used to refer to a variety of improvised light weapons, including light cannons, light and medium mortars, and shoulder-fired grenade launchers, owing to their inherently non-standard nature. A recurring find among the weapons and other contraband seized by security forces from the ongoing violence in the state, their widespread use and novel ways of fabrication underscores a much deeper issue that needs a multilayered policy intervention.

What are Pumpi guns?

Pumpi guns are improvised weapons locally made in the Indian state of Manipur. They originated from the resistance movements of 1917-18, when they were crafted with indigenous, easy-to-source materials to fight British colonial rule. According to media reports, Pumpi guns are largely fabricated from parts of uprooted electric poles, water pipes, and galvanized iron pipes. Their production and sourcing knowledge has been passed down through generations, especially among the Kuki tribal groups. In their most rudimentary form, they are manufactured by repurposing a metal pipe or tube with a variety of make-shift stabilizing mechanisms including bi-pods, baseplates, and buttstocks to guide the projectile, which may or may not be fin-stabilized. They are chambered for both medium (20-57mm) and large-caliber ammunition (greater than 57mm) and may be either direct or indirect fire weapons.

Based on their identifiable physical characteristics, they can be classified into four major types: (i) improvised mortars; (ii) improvised cannons; (iii) improvised shoulder-fire grenade launchers; (iv) and one with multiple barrels.
PictureSource: Manipur Police, 2024. (click image for original)

Further, there seem to be striking similarities between the weapons used by the People’s Defence Force in Myanmar and Manipur’s pumpi guns. A recent video unveiled the DIY factories that are arming the anti-junta fighters and provides insights into the sourcing and manufacturing processes of improvised weapons across the Indo-Myanmar border. Given the historical and civilizational ties, and geographical proximity between Manipur and Myanmar, the transfer of knowledge and materials needed to manufacture these weapons between non-state actors is likely. Further, recent reports of 3D-printed guns found in Manipur have allegedly been trafficked from Myanmar, lending support to the existence of cross-border exchanges.

Perceived tools of resistance: One year since the Manipur Conflict

At the collective level, improvised weapons often symbolize resilience and defiance against an oppressive system. From landmines in Colombia to combat drones in Ukraine, self-narratives around improvised weapons reflect a determination to resist when denied formal means and demonstrate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of a group in duress. At the individual level, beyond self-defense and survival, owning a weapon is often linked to status in the community; reflecting gender norms and cultural traditions. In the context of armed conflicts such as in Manipur, traditional weaponry has been adapted and modernized, to now been self-seen as serving as effective tools of resistance. Armed groups rely on existing values and traditions, as well as social and economic interdependence, to manage the knowledge of weapons production and networks for their distribution.

The residents of the hill districts of Manipur are known for their prowess in improvising weapons and guerilla warfare techniques. As such, pumpi guns are an archetype of societal and community pride. Perceived as a form of resistance and self-defense, they symbolize the community’s craftsmanship and proficiency, as illustrated in social media accounts of pumpi guns’ effectiveness. They are regarded as important installments in community checkpoints and underground bunkers guarded by village youth, who allegedly undergo mandatory weapon training as part of community service. 

According to local law enforcement officials, pumpi guns are manufactured by village blacksmiths, or ‘Thih-Kheng Pa,’ as part of their community service. They are installed in trenches and bunkers built to monitor movement from long distances and are employed to create a virtual ‘geographical divide’ between the valley and hill districts of the state. As problematic as they may be to those concerned about violence, they have proved to be a strategic addition for the groups stationed at the inter-district boundaries, or the ‘buffer zone,’ to extend their area of influence, inflict serious injury to approaching security personnel, and keep infiltrators from opposing sides at bay. Pumpi guns are also used for offensive purposes to carry out raids and ambushes to gain access to strategic territories. 

Potential misfires and explosions from employing repurposed metal tubes cannot be overruled but is deemed a necessary risk its users are willing to take. There are a few media reports on injuries from shelling clubbed under “gun and mortar attacks,” which could be attributed to pumpi guns. Still, no instances of accidents with unexploded pumpi gun munitions could be found. However, the range of mortar bombs, both improvised and factory-made, recovered by Manipur Police suggests their omnipresence in the conflict.

Addressing the Challenges
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With renewed violence in the already devastating conflict in Manipur, pumpi guns have seemed to evolve in accuracy and reliability. Modifications done in recent years make use of novel technologies and adapt to the growing needs of the warring parties. Recent reports from state security forces reveal their seemingly improved parts and components. 

In addition to the improvised weapons, the warring groups’ arsenals also feature sophisticated industrial weapons. These include INSAS, AK-type, and M-16 assault rifles, as well as No. 36 hand grenades, which have been previously looted from the government stockpiles and armories. On multiple occasions, the state police and central reserve forces have reported incidents of an estimated 5,600 arms and over 650,000 rounds of ammunition being raided by non-state actors, though it is hard to verify these figures. Pumpi guns appear to be filling in a gap in the technical capabilities of groups who may not have access to industrial alternatives.

To address the proliferation of pumpi guns and their role in the ongoing conflict in Manipur, policymakers should focus on a multi-pronged strategy that balances enforcement with socio-economic development and peacebuilding efforts. Legal reforms must prioritize stricter arms control legislation and impose severe penalties for violations. Simultaneously, enhancing the management and security of government stockpiles and armories is crucial to prevent looting by non-state actors. Advanced surveillance technologies and intelligence sharing should be leveraged to monitor the supply chain of precursor materials and dismantle illicit workshops. Combating corruption within the armed forces, police, and industries involved in the supply of critical materials remains a core challenge that must be addressed through independent oversight mechanisms. Importantly, regional cooperation with Myanmar is necessary to curb the cross-border trafficking of both weapons and precursors, as well as the transfer of knowledge among non-state actors.

Economic development initiatives should provide alternative livelihoods for those involved in illicit weapons production, especially blacksmiths and community members engaged in pumpi gun manufacturing. This could involve vocational training, financial support for sustainable enterprises, and the integration of traditional craftsmanship into legal economic activities. However, such measures alone may prove insufficient, as pumpi gun production is deeply rooted in community pride and linked to genuine grievances. Community engagement must play a central role in addressing these issues by building trust between law enforcement and local populations to encourage cooperation. Integrating rebel groups into state structures, such as law enforcement or other community-oriented roles, could also be explored as part of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework. A peacebuilding perspective is essential to resolve the underlying tensions driving conflict, ensuring that solutions are holistic and inclusive rather than solely punitive.


Monalisa Hazarika is a consultant at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University and a 2024-25 Emerging Expert.

Henrique Garbino is a doctoral candidate at the Swedish Defence University and an expert listed by the Forum.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list or emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).


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How military technologies and alliances in the Russia-Ukraine war will impact global peace and security in 2025

12/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Olena Kryzhanivska
The third year of the Russian war in Ukraine has brought several surprising developments, including Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the direct involvement of North Korean troops on the battlefield, and a series of long-range strikes on Russia’s strategic targets conducted by Ukraine, at times with the use of autonomous technologies. The scope of this war has clearly exceeded regional dimensions and is evolving into a global confrontation.
 
Over 50 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defense Contact Group, collaborating to coordinate military aid. Nations from at least five continents are contributing both lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia's military allies include the global power China, along with regional players like North Korea and Iran, whose involvement in the conflict continues to expand.
 
Involvement in this war is not driven solely by ideological reasons. Allied states and private-sector actors are paying close attention to weaponry deployed on the battlefield, tested against a technologically advanced adversary, and then further refined. What could these developments mean for the world?
 
Ukraine’s military and technological innovations and the need for responsible arms control
 
Both parties to the war, Ukraine and Russia, have significantly increased their military production since February 2022. While Ukraine cannot match Russia's weapon production in terms of quantity, it has deliberately prioritized quality. Ukraine's strategic objective is enhancing its domestic long-range capabilities and creating conditions for achieving a technological advantage over Russian forces.
 
Ukraine's most significant military assets are unmanned aerial systems, which have  reshaped the basic outlines of modern warfare. The main trends in UAV development in Ukraine include increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and sensor technologies; integration of computer vision and real-time data processing; as well as swarm technology. Ukraine is on track to produce 1.2 million drones in 2024, with plans to grow production toward 4 million annually. 
 
Ukraine’s drone technologies and electronic warfare systems have already attracted interest from parties involved in conflicts in other regions. The Iranian-made drones being launched at Israel from Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran motivate both the private and military sectors in Israel to consider closer cooperation with Ukraine in this domain and to learn from its battlefield experience. This development could lead to enhanced military cooperation between Ukraine and Israel, including an extensive exchange of military technologies.
 
In addition to drones, Ukraine already launched the production of artillery systems, ballistic missiles, and 155-mm caliber ammunition.
 
Currently, all weaponry produced in Ukraine is intended for domestic use, as military exports are prohibited. However, the potential opening of military exports in 2025 is anticipated to generate significant revenue for the country’s war-affected economy.
 
To prepare for this development, Ukraine will need to implement responsible arms transfer procedures, including robust end-user controls. A crucial step in this process would be Ukraine's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty, as it is currently only a signatory to the agreement.
 
As Ukraine ramps up military production drawn from battlefield experience,  the private sector in many Western countries is considering expanding production into Ukraine or neighboring region. Currently, more than 40 foreign defense companies operate in Ukraine. Collaboration with Ukrainian engineers and technical staff on producing drones, ammunition, and air defense systems is particularly attractive.
 
Prominent players such as U.S.-based Skydio, Germany’s Quantum-Systems, and Turkey’s Baykar have swiftly established offices or drone manufacturing plants in Ukraine. Meanwhile, German Rheinmetall plans to set up at least four factories in Ukraine to produce artillery shells, military vehicles, gunpowder, and anti-aircraft weapons.
 
This expansion would significantly boost Ukrainian defense production amid ongoing ammunition shortages. However, in the long term, it is difficult to predict how these advanced technologies and direct involvement in the Ukrainian battlefield might be utilized in other conflicts. A notable example is the plan to deploy battle-tested American NASAMS systems, initially used in Ukraine, to Taiwan.
 
The Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Online Portal (RULAC), based in Geneva, tracks over 110 armed conflicts globally. Military producers, motivated by profit, are likely to attract customers seeking battlefield-tested innovations that provide a decisive edge in warfare.
 
Although the full impact of these developments may not be visible by 2025, it is expected that, within a few years, military technologies refined in the Russian-Ukrainian war will begin to emerge in other parts of the world, particularly in areas where Western states are engaged.
 
Deepening military cooperation within the Russia-led alliance: potential for immediate global threats
 
Russia has mobilized its defense industry to sustain its ongoing military operations, significantly increasing production by introducing additional shifts, expanding production lines at existing facilities, and reopening decommissioned factories. These measures have led to substantial increases in output.
 
At the start of 2023, Russia was producing six Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles per month, with a stockpile of approximately 50. By early 2024, despite extensive use, its stockpile had grown to nearly 200 Iskander 9M723 ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. Russia has already increased its overall annual artillery shell production to three million rounds. In the realm of drone warfare, Russian state sources report plans to ramp up production by nearly tenfold, targeting 1.4 million units in 2024.
 
A trend that is already alarming in the short-term perspective is the deepening cooperation between Russia, North Korea, and Iran, both on the battlefield and in defense production, as well as with China.
 
All these countries have been on (and off) various arms embargo lists for decades. Since 2006, North Korea has been under a comprehensive and open-ended UN arms embargo, prohibiting both the export and import of weapons. Iran faced a partial UN embargo on the export of technology related to nuclear weapon delivery from 2006 to 2023. Both Russia and China have been sanctioned by the EU, the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and other states.
 
The purpose of these sanctions is to limit military capabilities and pressure states to improve their behavior in the interest of international peace and security. However, the coordinated support for Ukraine provided by the Western-led coalition since 2022 has brought these states together, strengthening their military cooperation.
 
In June 2024, the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships was signed between North Korea and Russia, and in October 2024, Russia and Iran announced the preparation of a similar treaty, that "confirms the parties’ desire for closer cooperation in the field of defense and interaction in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels." The involvement of both countries in the war includes substantial military support for Russian capabilities, with Iran transferring drones and ballistic missiles, engaging in joint drone production with Russia. North Korea’s contributions include providing rocket, artillery systems, and artillery shells to Russia, as well as deploying troops to the battlefield. The Russian-Chinese cooperation is more sophisticated, and although China has never formally endorsed the war on Ukraine, its role in sustaining Russian military capabilities is significant.
 
Despite sanctions, Moscow has significantly bolstered its defense manufacturing capabilities with support from its allies, allowing for large-scale production of advanced weapon systems, drones, and artillery. This marks the most substantial military-industrial expansion since the Soviet era. This partnership is reciprocal, with Russia also transferring military equipment to its allies.
 
The close-knit cooperation between these states presents significant dangers, including the transfer of military technologies and battlefield experience gained in Ukraine to North Korea and Iran, effectively undermining the purpose of the sanctions. The widespread human rights abuses committed by Russia and its allies, coupled with their reluctance to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law, heighten concerns about how swiftly they may apply these newly acquired innovations in other conflicts.
 
Russia’s security interests span the globe, with a military presence (including private military companies) across four continents and at least 34 countries. Iran exercises influence in several regional conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestine war and in Syria and Lebanon. North Korean forces deployed alongside Russian troops are likely to learn to conduct drone warfare, which could be used in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea’s drone capabilities, along with its decision to begin serial drone production, poses a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.
 
Arms transfers between these states, carried out without consideration of international conventional arms control treaties and mechanisms, along with the exchange of critical technologies and battlefield experiences, are expected to have a profound impact on remote regions of the world, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America, both in the short and long term.
 
Conclusions
 
While the promise of incoming US President Donald Trump to quickly end the war makes predictions for 2025 difficult, it is entirely possible that we witness a deepening conflict between the large coalition supporting Ukraine and a smaller group of states aligned with Russia. The already expanded military cooperation on both sides, along with the exchange of military technologies and battlefield experiences,  will almost certainly continue and affect armed conflicts in other regions and contribute to the rise of armed violence globally.
 
In the short term, the arms transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran are particularly concerning, as all three countries openly use belligerent rhetoric. Their involvement in armed conflicts across different regions could lead to the rapid spread of advanced technologies, such as drone warfare, beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
 
The growing involvement of the private sector of both Ukraine and Russia in the war highlights the timely issue of the role of industry and other private sector actors in global arms control efforts, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments. As the war progressed and is likely to in the future, we see how the negligent actions of some military producers directly affect the lives of civilians, contributing to human suffering. The efforts of civil society organizations and media outlets that investigate and document the irresponsible transfer of weapons and their components should be supported and continued.
 
 
​Olena Kryzhanivska is an independent researcher with a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Falta de controle sobre armas civis no Brasil: tiroteios recentes devem soar como alarme

11/21/2024

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PictureGabrielli Thomaz
available in English

Na quarta-feira, 23 de outubro, um homem de 45 anos, identificado como Edson Fernando Crippa, matou quatro pessoas e feriu outras oito em Novo Hamburgo, no Rio Grande do Sul, no Brasil. Entre os mortos estão o pai e o irmão do atirador, além de dois policiais militares. Edson manteve os familiares como reféns em casa e as negociações com a polícia duraram cerca de nove horas. Entre os sobreviventes estão um guarda municipal, cinco policiais militares, além da mãe e da cunhada do atirador. Edson foi morto pela polícia durante a troca de tiros.

O ataque aconteceu após o atirador reagir à abordagem policial durante a averiguação da denúncia de maus-tratos a um casal de idosos que, segundo relatos, era mantido em cárcere privado e impedido de sair de casa. Segundo informações de uma rádio local, o atirador tem registrado sob seu nome quatro armas, sendo duas pistolas, um rifle e uma espingarda. 

O que aconteceu em Novo Hamburgo traz à tona os riscos de morar com proprietários de armas. Um estudo da Universidade de Stanford, nos Estados Unidos, divulgado em 2022 no Annals of Internal Medicine, mostrou que pessoas que vivem com proprietários de pistolas morreram por homicídio em uma taxa duas vezes maior que seus vizinhos em casas sem armas.

O debate sobre armamento civil há anos tem sido liderado por políticos da extrema direita no Brasil. Com o lema “Não é sobre armas, é sobre liberdade”, o discurso pró-armamento tem ganhado força e, como explicado no relatório “O que o Congresso Nacional fala sobre o armamento civil?”, de autoria de Terine Husek, gerente de pesquisa do Instituto Fogo Cruzado, desde 2015 os discursos pró-armamentistas dominam a tribuna nos plenários do Congresso Federal. 

Após uma sequência de medidas assinadas no governo do então presidente Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) para facilitar a posse de armas, o número de armas para uso restrito nas mãos de civis no Brasil aumentou. Um levantamento realizado pelo advogado e gerente do Instituto Sou da Paz, Bruno Langeani, mostrou que o número de armas em circulação na categoria Caçador, Atirador Esportivo e Colecionador (CAC) no Brasil já é superior ao total de armas da instituição Polícia Militar. São armas que, quando chegam nas ruas, são roubadas, desviadas e acabam nas mãos do crime organizado, como mostrou um levantamento feito pelo jornal O Globo que explicava que entre janeiro e outubro de 2023, o Brasil registrou 1.259 ocorrências de armas que acabaram roubadas, furtadas ou perdidas, o que seria uma média de 126 por mês ou quatro por dia. 

No Brasil, CAC é o termo usado para “‘Colecionador, Atirador Desportivo ou Caçador”, para exercer qualquer uma dessas categorias, é preciso obter um certificado de CAC, apresentando uma série de documentos exigidos pelo Exército, como identidade, certificado de antecedentes e comprovante de ocupação lícita. Mas durante os primeiros meses do governo do ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro, os decretos assinados por ele permitiam que atiradores comprassem até 60 armas, e caçadores poderiam comprar até 30 armas, sem autorização do Exército ou de qualquer força de segurança. O número de munições compradas também aumentou para 2 mil, se for para uso restrito (armas de uso exclusivo das Forças Armadas, de instituições de segurança pública e de pessoas físicas e jurídicas habilitadas, devidamente autorizadas pelo Comando do Exército), e 5 mil para uso permitido a todos.

Em 2019, o número de armas nas mãos de civis era de aproximadamente 1,9 milhões, em 2022, último ano do governo Bolsonaro, esse número aumentou para 4,4 milhões. Em 2023, o atual presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva revogou parte das normas que facilitavam acesso a armas e munição. Entre as medidas está a suspensão de novos registros de armas por caçadores, atiradores e colecionadores (CACs) e por particulares (que são civis que não têm licença para CAC, mas que possuem permissão para que tenham uma arma em casa, como por exemplo para segurança pessoal); redução dos limites para compra de armas e munição de uso permitido; suspensão de novos registros de clubes e escolas de tiro; suspensão a concessão de novos registros para CACs; e criação de um grupo de trabalho para propor nova regulamentação para o Estatuto do Desarmamento. Apesar das medidas adotadas por Lula no primeiro ano de seu mandato, o número de armas nas mãos de civis voltou a crescer em 2023, e a 18ª edição do Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública mostrou que o Brasil registrou 4,8 milhões de armas de fogo oficialmente registradas. 

As normas revogadas por Lula voltaram a ser discutidas este ano no plenário do Senado Federal com o projeto de decreto legislativo (PDL) 206/2024 que tem, entre outras modificações, o fim da exigência de clubes de tiro a uma distância mínima de 1 quilômetro de escolas. (Clubes de tiro são locais que oferecem instalações para treinamento e competições de tiro, assim como programas de treinamento para iniciantes. As armas e munições usadas dentro dos clubes de tiro podem ser próprias dos frequentadores, ou oferecidas pelo clube.)

O nível de segurança nos clubes de tiro voltou a ser discutido depois que um menino de 4 anos foi atingido na cabeça por um disparo de arma de fogo em Herval d'Oeste, em Santa Catarina, no Brasil. A criança estava brincando em um sítio localizado próximo a um clube de tiro. O acidente aconteceu uma semana antes do caso do atirador de Novo Hamburgo.

O que estes dois casos têm em comum, além da proximidade entre as datas, é que evidenciam o quanto o afrouxamento das normas de controle deixaram a população vulnerável. O número de clubes de tiro saltou 1.400% durante os quatro anos de governo de Jair Bolsonaro, indo de 151 clubes em 2019, para 2.038 em 2022. Além disso, o número de CACs teve um crescimento de 665%, subindo de 117.467 em 2018 para 783.385 em 2022.

A consequência da irresponsabilidade da política de acesso à armas, além destes trágicos episódios, já é refletida há anos na porcentagem de mortes violentas no país. A edição mais recente do Atlas da Violência mostra que em 2022, 72,4% do total de homicídios no país foram praticados com armas de fogo, o que corresponde a 15,7 mortes por 100 mil habitantes. Em alguns estados os números são ainda mais alarmantes, a Bahia tem uma taxa de 37,2 e o Amapá 33,0. 


Esse cenário aponta mais do que nunca a importância de se ter políticas sérias e rígidas de acesso ao armamento e munições. No Congresso Nacional, o discurso dos que defendem o controle de armas no Brasil perdeu força. É preciso retomar a discussão para que casos como o de Novo Hamburgo, de Santa Catarina e de muitos outros estados brasileiros deixem de acontecer.

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Gabrielli Thomaz é jornalista, Assessora de imprensa do Instituto Fogo Cruzado e membro do programa de Especialistas emergentes no Forum on the Arms Trade

A inclusão no programa de especialistas emergentes do Fórum sobre Comércio de Armas e a publicação desses posts não indicam concordância ou endosso das opiniões de outros. As opiniões expressas são as visões do(s) autor(es) de cada post.



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Lack of control over civilian weapons in Brazil: recent shootings should raise alarm

11/21/2024

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PictureGabrielli Thomaz
disponível em português​

On Wednesday, October 23, a 45-year-old man, identified as Edson Fernando Crippa, killed four people and injured eight others in Novo Hamburgo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Among the dead are the shooter's father and brother, as well as two military police officers. Edson held his family members hostage at home, and the police negotiations lasted about nine hours. Among the survivors are a municipal guard, five military police officers, as well as the shooter's mother and sister-in-law. Edson was killed by the police during the exchange of gunfire.

The attack occurred after the shooter reacted to the police approach during the investigation of a report of abuse of an elderly couple who, according to reports, were being held in private confinement and prevented from leaving their home. According to information from a local radio station, the shooter has four registered weapons under his name, including two pistols, a rifle, and a shotgun.

What happened in Novo Hamburgo brings to the forefront the risks of living with gun owners. A study from Stanford University in the United States, published in 2022 in the Annals of Internal Medicine, showed that people living with handgun owners died by homicide at twice the rate of their neighbors in gun-free homes.

The debate on civilian weapons has for years been led by far-right politicians in Brazil. With the slogan "It's not about guns, it's about freedom," the pro-gun discourse has gained strength, and as explained in the report "What does the National Congress say about civilian weapons?", authored by Terine Husek, research manager at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, since 2015 pro-gun speeches have dominated the plenary sessions of the Federal Congress.

After a series of measures signed during the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) to facilitate the possession of weapons, the number of restricted-use weapons in the hands of civilians in Brazil increased. A survey conducted by the lawyer and manager of the Instituto Sou da Paz, Bruno Langeani, showed that the number of firearms in circulation in the Collector, Sports Shooter, and Hunter (CAC) category in Brazil is already higher than the total number of weapons of the Military Police institution. These are weapons that, when they reach the streets, are stolen, diverted, and end up in the hands of organized crime, as shown by a survey conducted by the newspaper O Globo, which explained that between January and October 2023, Brazil recorded 1,259 occurrences of weapons that were stolen, robbed, or lost, which would be an average of 126 per month or four per day.

In Brazil, CAC is the term used for “Collector, Sports Shooter, or Hunter.'”To practice any of these categories, one must obtain a CAC certificate by presenting a series of documents required by the Army, such as identity, background check certificate, and proof of lawful occupation. However, during the first months of former president Jair Bolsonaro's government, the decrees he signed allowed shooters to purchase up to 60 weapons, and hunters could purchase up to 30 weapons, without authorization from the Army or any security force. The number of ammunition that could be purchased also increased to 2,000 rounds for restricted use (weapons for exclusive use by the Armed Forces, public security institutions, and qualified individuals and legal entities, duly authorized by the Army Command), and 5,000 for permitted use. 

In 2019, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians was approximately 1.9 million, in 2022, the last year of the Bolsonaro government, this number increased to 4.4 million. In 2023, the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, revoked part of the rules that facilitated access to weapons and ammunition. Among the measures are the suspension of new registrations of weapons by hunters, shooters, and collectors (CACs) and by individuals (who are civilians without a CAC license, but who have permission to have a weapon at home, such as for personal security); reduction of the limits for purchasing permitted-use weapons and ammunition; suspension of new registrations of shooting clubs and schools; suspension of granting new registrations for CACs; and the creation of a working group to propose new regulations for the Disarmament Statute. Despite the measures taken by Lula in the first year of his term, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians grew again in 2023, and the 18th edition of the Brazilian Public Security Yearbook showed that Brazil recorded 4.8 million officially registered firearms.

The rules revoked by Lula have been discussed again this year in the Federal Senate plenary with the legislative decree project (PDL) 206/2024, which, among other modifications, includes the elimination of the requirement for shooting clubs to be at a minimum distance of 1 kilometer from schools.(Shooting clubs are places that offer facilities for shooting training and competitions, as well as training programs for beginners. The weapons and ammunition used inside shooting clubs can be owned by members, or provided by the club.)

The level of safety in shooting clubs has been discussed again after a 4-year-old boy was hit in the head by a firearm shot in Herval d'Oeste, in Santa Catarina, Brazil. The child was playing on a farm located near a shooting club. The accident occurred a week before the Novo Hamburgo shooter case.

What these two cases have in common, besides the proximity of the dates, is that they show how the relaxation of control norms has left the population vulnerable. The number of shooting clubs jumped 1,400% during the four years of Jair Bolsonaro's government, going from 151 clubs in 2019 to 2,038 in 2022. In addition, the number firearms registered by CACs grew by 665%, rising from 117,467 in 2018 to 783,385 in 2022.

The consequence of the irresponsibility of the weapon access policy, in addition to these tragic episodes, has been reflected for years in the percentage of violent deaths in the country. The most recent edition of the Violence Atlas shows that in 2022, 72.4% of the total homicides in the country were committed with firearms, which corresponds to 15.7 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In some states, the numbers are even more alarming, with Bahia having a rate of 37.2 and Amapá 33.0.

This scenario points more than ever to the importance of having serious and strict policies on access to weapons and ammunition. In the National Congress, the discourse of those who defend gun control in Brazil has lost strength. It is necessary to resume the discussion so that cases like the one in Novo Hamburgo, Santa Catarina, and many other Brazilian states no longer happen.


Gabrielli Thomaz is a journalist, Press Advisor at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, and a member of the Emerging Expert program at the Forum on the Arms Trade.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Event Resources: Biden’s Final Two Months: A Better Approach to Arms and the Middle East (November 7, 2024)

11/7/2024

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On November 7, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and DAWN hosted “Biden’s Final Two Months: A Better Approach to Arms and the Middle East.” The Forum maintains resources on the U.S. provision of arms to  Israel as well as to Saudi Arabia. DAWN also examines the implications of a U.S.-Saudi security agreement. During the event, panelists argued that the United States would be better served not providing weapons into the region.

Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/kWRsFJ3_rE0.
During and as a follow up to the event, panelists offered the following recommendations. (These recommendations were individually offered and can be attributed to the panelist offering them. They were not jointly reviewed):

Josh Paul, Senior Advisor, DAWN

Apply the law: President Biden should finally direct attorneys at the State Department and White House to make the obvious legal determination that Israel has been restricting U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and that it has been engaged in a continuous pattern of Gross Violations of Human Rights. Rolling back legal determinations is possible, but much tougher, than rolling back policy changes.

Use your leverage: President Biden should restrict lethal arms transfers of weapons that are being used in Gaza, stop replenishing the WRSA stockpile, and pause the processing of pending arms sale cases and licenses. If nothing else, this will force a corresponding pause in Israel's operations in the region.

Expand sanctions: President Biden should sanction the Settlement Councils and Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich, including through the application of Magnitsky Sanctions which would require a report to Congress explaining why an individual sanctioned has been removed from those sanctions, should they so be. Certain Settler groups should also be given FTO designations.

Recognize Statehood: The U.S. should recognize Palestinian Statehood and urge the UN Security Council to approve Palestine as a full member of the United Nations, leveling the playing field of international law in a way that would be impossible, in some aspects, for a future Administration to roll back. Recognition of the 1967 borders would also solidify international legal efforts to sanction settlements.

Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
​
Do not try to rush through a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia
  • We know that MBS had previously made foolish foreign policy decisions, like invading and blockading Yemen, and is likely to do so again if he thought he had unlimited U.S. support. We have seen the horrifying behavior that unconditional U.S. support has encouraged Israel to take.
  • This is an important signal to Congressional Democrats to oppose a U.S. defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, even in order to get to an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. This is not in U.S. interests.

Affirm the need to prioritize human rights in American foreign policy
  • Withhold weapons sales to human rights abusing governments, as required by U.S. law.
  • Do not authorize new weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Israel.

Affirm support for international institutions
  • Including the UN, the UN Security Council, and the UN Human Rights Council
  • Vocally express support for international institutions that your administration previously denigrated, including the ICC and ICJ.
  • Express support for the crucial work of UNRWA and other international humanitarian organizations doing crucial work in the region.
  • These are crucial signals for Democrats in Congress to oppose Trump and the Republicans’ efforts to undermine these institutions.

Omer Ismail, Former Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

Watch his policy recommendations here (31:47 into the video).


​Negar Mortazavi, Editor and Host, the Iran Podcast and Senior Non-resident Fellow, Center for International Policy

Watch her policy recommendations here (39:38 into the video).
​
The Forum provides a platform for expert views but does not itself take positions.
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Event Guide and Resources - Understanding Defense Offsets: Diving in on Recent Reports (September 5, 2024)

9/13/2024

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On September 5, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and Transparency International hosted an event discussing defense offsets. Experts examined current research on the many risks associated with increased offset demands in a lax U.S. regulatory environment, the role of offsets and anti-corruption efforts in South Korea, as well as the role of sovereign wealth funds, especially two based in the United Arab Emirates. All offered recommendations on how to improve transparency and tackle corruption that is currently endemic to offsets.
​

Video of the event is available in three recordings:
  • Original languages - https://youtu.be/ufzqZlgbwmo
  • ​English only (with interpretation) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pJN7YLrxRs
  • Korean only (with interpretation) - https://youtu.be/LF7B20ZXVtU
Select resources*
  • Colby Goodman, "Blissfully Blind: The new US push for defence industrial collaboration with partner countries and its corruption risks," Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS), April 11, 2024. See also slides used during the event.
  • Jodi Vittori and Lakshmi Kumar "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Corruption and Other Governance Risks," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 26, 2024. See also slides used during the event.
  • Byung-Ook Choi, prepared remarks, English and 한국어

Guide to the recording (with timestamps indicated)

Sara Bandali, Director of International Engagement, Transparency International-United Kingdom (TI-UK) (moderator)

4:35    Welcome and definition of offsets

Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher, Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS), and Transparency International-United States (TI-US)
    
8:24    Replying to questions: “You’ve noted some big changes in the defense offset market in the past few years. Could you highlight some of these key changes? Based on your report, what do you see as the most significant corruption risks with defense offsets? And looking ahead, how do you think these risks could evolve, particularly in the relationships between U.S. defense companies and partner countries around the world?"  

Byung-Ook Choi, Professor of National Security, Sangmyung University in Seoul, and Director,  Institute for Security and Unification Studies, a member of the Integrity Defense Committee of Transparency International Korea  

19:57    Replying to questions: “South Korea is in a unique position—not just as a major purchaser of weapons but also as an emerging supplier. Offsets have played a role in some of these recent deals, and they’ve certainly stirred up some debate.  It would be good to hear more about this and your take on how South Korea is navigating the complexities and challenges of offsets.”

29:52    Replying to questions: “You’ve highlighted some serious concerns about the transparency of these deals. How do you see these issues affecting South Korea’s broader defense strategy and its relationships with international partners, particularly the U.S.? And what role do you think public and governmental oversight should play in mitigating these risks?”

Jodi Vittori
, Non-Resident Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Professor of Practice and co-chair of the Global Politics and Security program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service


33:15    Replying to questions: “You’ve been a strong voice in the fight against corruption for quite a while, and your recent work on sovereign wealth funds dives deep into some of these issues. Can you break down how sovereign wealth funds tie into the world of offsets? It would be good to also hear more about what you discovered specifically in the case of the UAE.” 

47:53
Replying to questions: “Given what you’ve found about the UAE’s use of sovereign wealth funds in defense offsets, what do you see as the most significant risks these funds pose in terms of corruption and lack of transparency? And how do you think international regulatory bodies or governments can address these challenges?”


RECOMMENDATIONS 


“What are your top recommendations for addressing some of the challenges and issues that you have highlighted particularly on how to improve transparency and tackle corruption that is currently endemic to defence offsets, is there any advice you would give to governments/policy makers on this issue?”

54:35        Colby Goodman
57:35        Byung-Ook Choi
1:00:25    Jodi Vitorri

QUESTION AND ANSWER (Q&A)

1:01:55    “Have any of the speakers or their organizations sought to define what the boundaries should be for “legitimate” national security that would set the limits and so permit far-reaching transparency, even if it is not total transparency?”
 
With responses by Colby Goodman and Byung-Ook Choi.

1:06:43    “Are sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) which hold investments in other countries (the USA, for example) required to pay taxes on those investments? If so, does this offer an opportunity to improve disclosure (in tax filings) concerning how these SWFs are operating in a particular country?” and “the U.S. national security community is increasingly concerned with "adversarial capital" which is primarily a concern about state actors within U.S. and allied/partner countries. Is there any realistic chance to use that growing infrastructure for anti-corruption purposes or would that risk tainting good governance efforts with power politics concerns?”

With responses by Jodi Vitorri.

1:11:30    “Do you think that South Korea’s use of offsets for military and economic development is a model that could be copied by other countries? Or were there factors specific to South Korea that made it able to successfully translate offsets into a strong domestic defense industry?”

With responses by Byung-Ook Choi and Colby Goodman.


* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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Event Guide and Resources - Accountability for Gun Violence: What’s Next In Mexico’s Case Against U.S. Gun Manufacturers? (February 29, 2024)

3/5/2024

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On February 29, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asser Institute for International and European Law co-organized an event focused on lawsuits filed by Mexico against U.S. gun manufacturers and distributors that have important implications not only for armed violence in the United States and Mexico, but also for European and other manufacturers who produce weapons in the U.S.
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​Video of the event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDluRxQxXFA&t=351s
A guide to the recording, and suggested resources are below:

6:12 Welcome and event framing - León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Senior Researcher, Asser Institute for International and European Law, The Hague
  • “Appeals Court Revives Mexico’s Lawsuit Against Gunmakers,” New York Times, January 22, 2024. See also Transnational Litigation Blog, January 24, 2024, and Just Security, April 4, 2023.
  • "El Blindaje de las Armerías Europeas," El País, July 31, 2023. In English: "The armor of the European arms industry." 

11:35 Importance for Mexico – Fadia Ibrahim, Director of International Litigation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico 
  • Why Mexico is taking legal action… High profile events in El Paso and in Mexico, and daily gun violence. Cases in Massachusetts and Arizona. Also Inter American Commission on Human Rights (request, update).
  • Why suing in the United States, and actions of gun industry. 

23:57 Impact of U.S. Gun Policy on Mexico - Carlos Pérez Ricart, Professor of International Relations, Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE, Mexico)  
  • The relaxation of restraint on guns in the United States, particularly via termination of assault weapons ban in 2004 and enaction of Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) in 2005, had a disastrous effect in Mexico.
  • Lawsuit needs to be part of a broader strategy in Mexico (see next intervention).

31:24 Transition to discussion about recent decisions and implications on future legal action

34:00 Understanding the cases, their status, and next steps - Jonathan Lowy, Founder and President, Global Action on Gun Violence and co-counsel for Mexico on cases discussed in event  
  • Global Action on Gun Violence Work in Mexico - documents and other resources, including amicus briefs, on the two cases
  • Fundamental claim is negligence by manufacturers and distributors, and explanation why special protection under PLCAA should not apply here (under predicate exception). Defendants seeking review by Supreme Court, but believes Supreme Court will not choose to take it up. Some additional issues to take up at district court, after which discovery could take place.

43:28 Possibilities in International and U.S. Law - Leila Nadya Sadat, James Carr Professor of International Criminal Law, Washington University and Fellow, Schell Center for Human Rights, Yale Law School
  • Initially took steps at the Inter American Commission on Human Rights. 
  • Recognizes that connection between migration and flow of weapons is not made often enough. 
  • Cases are strong on facts and the harm. Latest decision is conservative and may not draw attention of Supreme Court.   
  • Supreme Court and other actions on guns, including Rahimi case and others. 

54:30 International Implications including in Europe, León Castellanos-Jankiewicz
  • European companies manufacturing on U.S. soil to skirt European laws, for example.

Reaction Round

56:35 Fadia Ibrahim
  • Importance the Mexico case proves exception to perceived PLCAA immunity and expects positive outcome.

57:47 Carlos Pérez Ricart
  • Mexico needs data, to build a central firearms authority (such as ATF in the U.S.), focus on most vulnerable groups (particularly those already harmed), make a central topic in relationship with U.S. including calling for background checks in neighbor states and border infrastructure, and create binational effort to deal with technology advances (3D printers, etc). 
  • Violence in Mexico is beyond the United States but within control of the United States. Mexico itself must have a better policies too.

1:03:00 Jonathan Lowy
  • Crisis on both sides of the border, would not happen without this gun pipeline. 

1:04:32 Leila Nadya Sadat
  • Has been a huge shift in political dialogue… no longer solely about Second Amendment but rather that is about the guns (as a vector).

1:07:03 Beginning of Q&A 

1:07:33 What is your take on the attempt of some US politicians to consider drug traffickers as terrorists? What are the impacts of this attempt on the lawsuits? 
  • 1:08:24 Carlos Pérez Ricart replies that always hear this around time of election, and it’s a political issue, and less about a real response. Not believe will impact the cases.
  • 1:09:44 Fadia Ibrahim asks would that mean that the gun industry is helping terrorist groups? 

1:10:32 Is the case a game changer? What makes the Mexico case different? 
  • 1:10:51 Jonathan Lowy replies is important because federal appeals court is upholding claims against gun manufacturers as not protected under PLCAA. Also new that a country is bringing suit. Scope of the problem is massive and if addressed would have huge impact.
1:13:17 Do you see this case having broader legal implications for weapons/arms companies exporting to countries/regimes violating international humanitarian law or engage in systematic human rights abuses?
  • 1:14:04 Leila Nadya Sadat says the Mexico case is beautifully simplistic and difficult to replicate in U.S. courts. But, international courts do communicate with each other. Notices Netherlands case on F-35, and there are international treaties involved that would be good to get the U.S. to join (such as the Arms Trade Treaty). [Note: see January event as well]

1:16:00 Possibility of other countries filing lawsuit
  • 1:16:12 Jonathan Lowy replies that if Mexico cases continues to succeed it could greatly reduce the flow of weapons in the region without other countries bringing suit because it could change practices and accountability of gun industry.

This event was co-organized by the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asser Institute for International and European Law. The Forum and the Institute provide a platform for expert views but do not themselves take positions.

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Event Guide and Resources– Arming the War in Israel-Palestine: Legal Considerations (January 16, 2024)

1/19/2024

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On January 16, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Arms Trade Litigation Monitor co-organized an event focused on legal challenges and approaches to arming the war in Israel-Palestine, framed within the broader context of increased litigation around arms transfers in recent years.
. 
​Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/_o2T7TD0v5s?t=65s
A guide to the recording, and suggested resources are below:

2:04 Welcome and event framing - Dr. Valentina Azarova, co-founder, Emergent Justice Collective; co-creator, Arms Trade Litigation Monitor; part of Feminist Autonomous Centre for research (FAC research)
  • Arms Trade Litigation Monitor
  • Domestic proceedings and international arms transfers, ATT Expert Group report 2021

6:24 Understanding Genocide Convention and the legal case and possible next steps regarding case filed by South Africa at the International Court of Justice – Dr. Shahd Hammouri, Lecturer in International Law, University of Kent; non-resident Fellow, Al Haq Centre for Applied International Law 
  • Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)
  • Discussion of earlier 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion, and pending ICJ Advisory Opinion on legality of occupation as a whole being heard in Feb
  • Listen also for discussion of possible steps at General Assembly, states responsibilities, enabling other litigation related to states and corporations

14:04 Continued discussion of genocide, and case filed in the United States - Katherine Gallagher, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights
  • Defense for Children International - Palestine v. Biden, with witness-based hearing and legal argument on January 26, 9am PST (livestream)
  • Listen also for concerns about specific weapons and ongoing provision of them

23:26 Transition to discussion about domestic efforts in Netherlands and United States

24:06 Challenge in the Netherlands related to F-35s - Frank Slijper, Arms Trade Project lead, PAX 
  • Lawsuit against F-35s
  • Listen also for discussion of general licenses

32:24 U.S. Law and the Obstacles to Courts Taking Up Arms Issues - John Ramming Chappell, Advocacy & Legal Fellow, U.S. Program, Center for Civilians in Conflict
  • Law and Policy Guide to US Arms Transfers to Israel
  • Listen also for primary role of the President/Executive power in arms issues

40:48 Transition to additional cases and trends

42:00 Shahd Hammouri on pushing legal framework forward
  • Discussion of case in Australia; Norway- examining corporations; Italy- examining civil suit; Inter American Commission on Human Rights 

47:42 Katherine Gallagher
  • Further discussion on presidential authority and expected arguments in U.S. case, and possible liability of corporations (additional note: the Alien Tort Statute as an option for cases against US corporations)
  • Mention of declarations filed in legal case, including by former US official Josh Paul (see Dec 22, 2023)

56:09 Beginning of Q&A 

57:19 Question on could there be a case in the UK and EU states to stop arms export licences (for equipment that could be used in Gaza) under Criterion 1 (in the new UK criteria and the EU CP), which relates to states' international obligations? The Genocide Convention and ICJ rulings are not specifically listed, but both do mention "other international obligations". 
  • 59:20 Shahid Hammouri replies on ability of civil society to engage, and agrees that states will have duty not to cooperate in providing arms to Israel. Further elaboration on advisory opinion that could come from February case related to occupation.

1:03:01 Further questions on U.S. case, treaty obligations, and other activities in the United States 
  • 1:03:56 Katherine Gallagher replies on the weight of treaty obligations, and international legal order. Also discusses anti-boycott developments.
  • 1:08:04 John Ramming Chappel discusses legislative efforts (Sanders, Van Hollen, Kaine) and other U.S. developments - See Forum resource page,  S.Res.504 (as well as 502B explainer from CIVIC) 

1:11:20 Questions on Dutch case, EU Common position review, updating risk assessment, investors and companies
  • 1:12:20 Frank Slijper replies, including on limitation of the term “encouragement,” as well as general licenses falling outside needed review

The Forum on the Arms Trade provides a platform for expert views but does not itself take positions.

​
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Prioritising the protection of civilians from explosive weapons: Bringing about change through the framework of the Political Declaration

1/19/2024

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Picture
This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Laura Boillot
“The biggest challenge in this war is dealing with my children’s fear during the constant bombings. Evacuation is tough, moving from one place to another with my two children with disabilities, trying to appear strong despite my own fears. Sadly, nowhere is safe in Gaza anymore.”
Testimony from Hani, staff member of Humanity & Inclusion in Gaza

2023 was a bleak year for the protection of civilians from explosive weapons. Data collected by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicates that use of explosive weapons increased in 2023 and was experienced across a greater number of countries than the previous year, and that more civilians were killed and injured from explosive weapon use than in recent years.
 
The unrelenting bombing and shelling of Gaza after the Hamas attacks of 7 October, the eruption of conflict in Sudan, and continued fighting in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen all led to increased documented civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons. In short, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas remains widespread and continues to be one of the greatest threats to civilians in armed conflicts today.
 
The endorsement by 83 states of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas in Dublin in November 2022 was welcomed by many as a milestone achievement. The Declaration is a recognition of this grave humanitarian problem, an expression of solidarity with those affected, and a commitment to take further action to strengthen the protection of civilians both during and after conflict. But it will only succeed in better protecting civilians if it is implemented effectively by endorser states.
 
Driving forward change and building new norms and expectations for behaviour takes time. Moving away from use of explosive weapons in populated areas – through the framework of the Declaration and associated revisions to policy and practice – is a long-term undertaking that must begin expeditiously at a national level. 
 
So, what do we want to see in this area of work and under the framework of the Political Declaration in 2024? What does progress on this issue look like and what opportunities exist to push this agenda along in an effective way internationally?
 
  • States that have endorsed the Declaration start to operationalise it through national-level policy reviews and changes to practice.
 
Joining the Declaration comes with an expectation that changes should take place in national-level policy and practice. States should therefore review their commitments under the Political Declaration against existing national policies and practice.
 
A good first step to beginning the process of implementation is to identify a focal point in government responsible for coordination and oversight. The focal point should review the Declaration and its commitments, looking at how existing policies and practice can be strengthened or new ones developed, and where/how the Declaration needs to be disseminated domestically. A key priority will be to ensure dissemination of the Declaration to armed/defence forces at different levels given the crucial changes required in the areas of military doctrine and policy, as well as of training, planning and conduct of military operations. It will also be essential that states approach implementation through a humanitarian lens, focused on harm reduction and strengthening the protection of civilians.
 
Many states will have existing relevant policies and procedures on the conduct of military operations, and some may have tools to assess and mitigate harm to civilians. But there are specific commitments in the Declaration that need to be implemented, including placing restrictions on the use of explosive weapons, and making determinations on when it will be necessary to refrain from such use entirely, and how this is done. International Network on Explosive Weapons calls on states to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and to otherwise restrict the use of other explosive weapons in populated areas due to the likely risk of civilian harm.
 
The Declaration also puts considerable emphasis on addressing indirect or so-called “reverberating” effects, that stem from damage to and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, in the planning and conduct of military operations. Other key priority areas include establishing mechanisms to collect and share data on direct and indirect effects on civilians and civilian objects, and providing assistance to conflict-affected communities.
 
The International Network on Explosive Weapons has put together a “Questions and Answers” document on implementation of the Declaration, and in a few weeks’ time will be launching an “Implementation Framework” with further guidance for states on undertaking this process.
 
  • The first meeting to review implementation of the Declaration takes stock of the state of play and sets direction for the period ahead.
 
Norway will convene the first meeting under the framework of the Political Declaration since its endorsement in November 2022. The Oslo conference will take place on 23 April 2024, with a civil society forum the day before on 22 April, co-convened between International Network on Explosive Weapons and the Norwegian Red Cross which will invite state delegates to participate alongside civil society in a day of discussion and exhibitions.
 
The official conference aims to review implementation of the Declaration over the preceding 17-months, by giving space to discussions on approaches to implementation, opportunities to share examples of good policy and practice, and by sharing challenges and needs. It will also be important that it provides a clear sense of direction and stimulates efforts for the work ahead, by setting out priority areas for implementation and a road map for the coming year or so until states meet again.
 
The conference should also shine a spotlight on the devastating humanitarian consequences of explosive weapon use, especially given the recent and notable contexts where civilians continue to suffer immensely from explosive weapons use, as well as maintaining a focus on reducing civilian harm and suffering.
 
Norway has invited all endorsing states and other interested states to participate in the conference, alongside civil society organisations, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As such, it should be an opportunity to both encourage some new states to join ahead of, or at, the Oslo conference, and to start to build a community of practice. Working in partnerships of states, civil society and international organisations provided a solid foundation for developing the Declaration. Maintaining these partnerships and dialogue between states, their armed forces, and humanitarian organisations is going to be just as critical in this next phase of work around its implementation.
 
  • More countries join the Political Declaration
 
Whilst a broad range of states joined the Declaration in Dublin, no new countries have joined the Declaration since. A key aim ahead of the Oslo is for more countries to join this agreement, including across all world regions.
 
At the end of January, a regional workshop in Togo for West African states will be an important opportunity to encouraging more endorser states from this subregion, as well as Africa more broadly, to join.
 
During the Declaration negotiations and the Dublin adoption conference, the war in Ukraine and civilian suffering in Mariupol, Kharkiv and other cities placed the explosive weapons issue high on the agenda of many states, prompting their endorsement of the Declaration. The disastrous humanitarian consequences and stark examples of civilian suffering and harm from urban warfare that we have seen over the past year in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan, and elsewhere should continue to provide impetus and show that this Declaration and issue is more relevant than ever and a global issue of concern for all states.
 
  • The Declaration starts to set new norms and expectations for behaviour.
 
In addition to national level implementation, efforts must continue to raise awareness and understanding of this humanitarian issue, including through promotion of the Declaration and its commitments. By doing so, and by highlighting the goal and purpose of the Declaration – to reduce civilian harm and suffering – new norms and standards can be set and will start to take hold.
 
Speaking out in response to bombardment of populated areas and when civilians suffer is an important means to stigmatise harmful behaviour and to help establish new global norms for civilian protection. In the world today, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is the cause of immense civilian harm and suffering in Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere. States must be attentive to acknowledging this harm, wherever it takes place, and whichever actor is responsible.
 
Whilst it is perhaps too soon to expect to see a reduction in civilian casualties, or other significant reductions in harm, it is never too soon to start work towards this goal.
 


Laura Boillot is a Director at Article 36 and Coordinator for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and the publication of these posts, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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The move towards human rights due diligence policies by the arms industry

1/18/2024

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Picture
This is the fifth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Hiruni Alwishewa
In recent years, the applicability of general guidance for due diligence from soft law instruments, such as the UNGPs and OECD Guidelines, to the arms industry have been reaffirmed. With the growing force of these soft law instruments, and the increasing expectations for corporate actors to identify, prevent and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of their business activities, arms companies have started to develop, adopt and publicise human rights and other corporate policies that integrate human rights due diligence measures.
 
In comparison to other high-risk sectors, particularly those for which specific regulations have been introduced (such as child labour and supply chains), the creation of such policies is a relatively new phenomenon for the arms industry. This post identifies several common aspects of these policies that are apparent from the examination of the corporate policies of selected large arms manufacturing and exporting companies based in Europe and the United States that have consistently been on SIPRI’s top one hundred arms producers lists since 2015. The selected companies (and their country of registration) were: Airbus (registered in the Netherlands, operating in France, Germany and Spain); BAE Systems (United Kingdom); Boeing (United States); Dassault (France); General Dynamics (United States); L3Harris Technologies (United States); Leonardo (Italy); Lockheed Martin (United States); MBDA (France, Italy and United Kingdom); Northrop Grumman (United States); Raytheon Technologies (United States); Rheinmetall (Germany); Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom); and Thales (France).
 
Limited transparency of policies
​

An ongoing challenge in this area, as with many other issues with the arms trade, is the lack of transparency. Some companies make reference to the existence of a human rights policy but do not disclose them publicly. Others provide policy summaries but not full disclosure of policies,  thereby limiting opportunities for public scrutiny. The public availability of corporate policies is an important complement to effective due diligence by these companies as the full and public disclosure of policies creates opportunities for scrutiny by stakeholders and civil society. Indeed, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights’ recommendations also call for companies to publicly communicate information about their human rights due diligence and risks assessments undertaken for arms exports, to commit to ceasing the circumvention of export controls through the use of subsidiaries in other states, and to establish grievance mechanisms.
 
From the publicly available corporate polices, several common features are notable, including the importance of compliance with export controls, the establishment of human rights policies, and the inclusion of risk assessment processes.
 
Licensing compliance

A licensing system is an integral component of the export control regimes of all major arms exporter states, and reaffirmed as a key requirement in international and regional arms controls. Most of the publicly available policies or policy summaries (Airbus, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce) acknowledge that non-compliance with the domestic licensing regimes represents a reputational risk for the company, which may be accompanied by loss of business and perception as an unreliable export partner. In some instances, the importance of complying with licensing regimes is affirmed as a ‘special responsibility’ (Rheinmetall, Lockheed Martin).
 
Several American companies go further, with General Dynamics, L3Harris and Raytheon all affirming their commitment to regulatory compliance and also noting the importance of undertaking additional internal processes to the licensing process of the United States. BAE Systems, based in the United Kingdom, similarly recognises that ‘stringent internal controls’ are necessary and reaffirms its commitment ‘to maintaining an effective system of export control compliance that is designed to avoid violations, detect them promptly if they occur, and provide timely investigations and appropriate remedial actions’. Overall, this shift in recognition to acknowledge the importance of internal due diligence measures represents an important first step in the adoption and integration of human rights due diligence into the business processes of arms companies. 
 
Human rights considerations

Some arms companies have incorporated human rights considerations into their corporate policies, either as part of their company codes of conduct or through specific human rights policies, that provide further information on their due diligence processes. The potential for the activities of arms companies to adversely affect human rights is acknowledged in some of these documents, demonstrating an acceptance of the need for these companies to integrate human rights considerations into their business processes.
 
An example of a stronger statement on human rights incorporation is Raytheon’s human rights policy, which acknowledges ‘that the human rights issues associated with our defense products and services are a dynamic and complex subject’, including in relation to ‘carry[ing] potential risks associated with their misuse’. Other companies, such as BAE Systems, implicitly recognise the adverse effects of arms exports, stating that: ‘We understand that some of our stakeholders have views and perceptions of defence companies and human rights, particularly in the area of exports and how our products are used’. Overall, however, there appears to be a reluctance by these arms companies to explicitly recognise the inherent and significant risks of the products which they manufacture and export, including the short- and long-term consequences for individuals and communities affected by arms sales.
 
The adoption of human rights policies or the inclusion of human rights considerations in corporate codes of conduct is a positive step by companies toward the dissemination of ethical business practices which have the potential to leverage prospective recipients into changing their behaviours, such as by ceasing future arms deals where weapons have been misused by a recipient. For example, L3Harris includes an option in its human rights policy to terminate a business relationship in the event there is a breach of that policy, though the focus of such options remain centred on the termination of relationships with suppliers rather than customers, who are not referenced despite them posing the ‘most salient risks’. An alternative approach is taken by Northrop Grumman, which states the company will decline a potential sale where the risk to human rights or company reputation are unacceptable irrespective of whether that sale would be legally permissible.
 
The most comprehensive human rights policy of the selected companies was from the Italian manufacturer Leonardo. This policy explicitly references human rights standards elaborated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and OECD Guidelines and maintains a list of states to which it does not export weapons to, referred to as the List of Sensitive Countries. This List is updated every year and is compiled based on factors including breaches of international human rights law, and currently includes several states involved in the Yemen conflict, namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt (but not Kuwait and Qatar which are also coalition states involved in this conflict), in addition to Yemen.
 
Risk assessments

Complementary to the incorporation of human rights considerations into corporate policies is the development of strong due diligence processes. In particular, risk assessments are an integral component of the UNGPs (Principles 17 and 18), and many corporate policies affirm that ‘enhanced’ or ‘reinforced’ due diligence is required for the arms sector by virtue of it being a high-risk sector. Several arms companies have incorporated risk assessments into their company policies to identify and mitigate the human rights risks associated with the sale of their products. For example, BAE Systems states that its risk assessments consider the type of product and its intended use, the end user, and the country of sale.
 
Likewise, Raytheon operates a due diligence process for these purposes, which involves ‘screen[ing] potential sales involving certain types of products in countries identified as presenting a higher risk of human rights violations from product misuse’. Raytheon is also notable because it has its own Human Rights Council which ‘is responsible for assisting the businesses in their assessment of specific sales opportunities that may present heightened human rights risks’, reflecting the requirements of UNGP Principle 18.
 
The extent to which risk assessments are integrated throughout the business enterprise, as required by the UNGPs (Principles 17 to 21) and the OECD Guidelines, is varied. Some companies (Airbus, Dassault) only assess human rights risks for activities under their full and direct control, thereby limiting the risk assessments to their supply chains and not extending these to potential clients.
 
Furthermore, only a few companies elaborate the specific criteria and processes that are used in their risk assessments. For example, Rheinmetall has asserted that in compliance with German, EU and international law, the company has developed due diligence processes which include risk identification, risk mitigation, results tracking, and complaints procedures. General Dynamics is one company that provides further information on what its risk identification processes involve, including its ‘use [of] a variety of tools, techniques, and analyses’, which may include site visits and meetings, open source and web searches for adverse media, and specialised database searches, among other methods.
 
Leonardo states that its risk assessment includes risk identification, qualitative and quantitative analyses of risk, a risk treatment action plan to reduce the impact of risks on a project, contingency management, and risk monitoring and review, which includes quarterly reporting on risk trends. Leonardo also identifies four criteria which it uses to assess whether the sale of arms to a state would pose an unacceptable risk: domestic export controls, sanctions, ‘know your customer’, and territory.
 
For the most part, however, the steps these companies are required to undertake for identifying, assessing and mitigating risks are not specified in their public policies. Consequently, there is no indication from the selected arms companies how human rights considerations are balanced against other factors, in particular, commercial and security interests. In general, aside from statements confirming that risk assessments are required to be undertaken, the corporate policies of the selected arms companies make limited references to the due diligence obligations outlined in UNGPs and OECD Guidelines and do not elaborate on the processes involvement in risk assessments.
 
Conclusions

From the examination of selected company policies, there are some indications that these arms companies are responding to changing societal expectations, even if only reluctantly. These development and adoption of policies that incorporate human rights due diligence measures indicate there is growing acknowledgment and acceptance by the arms industry to prevent and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of their business activities.
 
While not a comprehensive examination of all policies, there are nevertheless several notable insights available from the selected policies that were examined. First, some arms companies emphasise the need for due diligence that is independent of and in addition to the measures undertaken by state licensing authorities. Second, some companies have developed human rights policies that include risk assessments as part of their human rights due diligence. Third, overall, there are limited details provided on how risk assessments are conducted and what standards of due diligence are applied.
 
Although currently there is a lack of legislative push toward the adoption of due diligence regulations domestically or supranationally, the instruments, policies and practices from other high-risk industries (such as the mining of conflict minerals and surveillance technology sectors) can provide pertinent guidance for arms companies to (further) develop their policies to effectively incorporate the UNGPs and OECD Guidelines and, in turn, to address the adverse human rights impacts of their business activities.
 

Hiruni Alwishewa is a PhD Candidate in International Law at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Graduate Institute Geneva. Her research examines the responsibilities of actors involved in the transfer of arms to conflict zones.
 
​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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