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El panorama de seguridad en México para 2025 ante la llegada del presidente Trump

1/19/2025

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Esta entrada de blog forma parte de una serie serie que analiza una serie de cuestiones en 2025 relacionadas con el uso de armas, el comercio de armas y la asistencia en materia de seguridad, y a menudo ofrece recomendaciones.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(version in English)

Al hablar de democracia, 2024 fue un año preponderante y decisivo. 74 países (más el Parlamento Europeo) tuvieron elecciones en las que más de 1,600 millones de personas participaron a nivel mundial. Si bien cada uno de estos procesos tienen una importancia particular, ninguno de ellos será tan decisivo para el escenario internacional de 2025 como la reelección de Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

La victoria de Trump en noviembre fue vista como positiva para algunos, sin embargo, para la mayoría era algo que se temía, incluida la recientemente electa presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum. Su enfoque, desde el inicio de su campaña política a principios de 2024, ha sido darle continuidad al anterior gobierno del presidente López Obrador y temas como la seguridad y el narcotráfico, dos de los más relevantes para los votantes de Trump, no han sido la excepción.

El 22 de diciembre, Trump dijo que el día uno de su administración nombraría a los cárteles de droga como organizaciones terroristas, sumándose así al aumento en los aranceles como amenazas que ha lanzado contra México. Sheinbaum respondió mencionando que está dispuesta a cooperar con su gobierno, pero que el país nunca se “subordinaría”. Desde que inició su gobierno se han llevado a cabo con éxito alrededor de 12 operativos antidroga de alto perfil, incluyendo el decomiso de casi una tonelada de fentanilo en Sinaloa, el más grande en la historia de México, y que ocurrió 10 días después de los llamados de Trump a aumentar los aranceles. Se espera que la frecuencia de estos operativos aumente durante el año, en parte debido a la presión estadounidense.

Desde un punto de vista narrativo, es probable que Sheinbaum trate de mantener la opinión pública enfocada en estas operaciones, a la par de la importancia de la cooperación bilateral para atender no solo la producción de fentanilo en el país pero también la crisis de consumo en Estados Unidos. El respeto a la soberanía de México también será un elemento clave de la narrativa oficial.

Adicionalmente, el tema del contrabando desde la frontera norte también será recurrente en los medios mexicanos, considerando que el gobierno se encuentra actualmente en un proceso legal en contra de distintas empresas estadounidenses de distribución de armas por facilitar su acceso a organizaciones criminales. El 9 de enero, durante su conferencia matutina, Sheinbaum se expresó de manera favorable sobre un reciente reporte del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos que reconoce la situación, argumentando que 74% de las armas confiscadas por autoridades mexicanas han sido introducidas al país desde Estados Unidos. Sheinbaum también reconoció que este reporte podrá ser de utilidad para futuras negociaciones.

La política migratoria, intrínsecamente relacionada con la seguridad nacional de ambos países, también cambiará drásticamente en 2025. En México diversas oficinas gubernamentales, incluyendo el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), sufrieron un recorte de presupuesto en comparación con el año pasado, en línea con los principios de austeridad de Sheinbaum. Mientras que la llegada de Trump previsiblemente influenciará a las autoridades mexicanas a incrementar las deportaciones y detenciones a migrantes, el reto está en el hecho de que los recursos disponibles para una gestión adecuada de las rutas migratorias se verá reducido.

No obstante, la respuesta del gobierno a esta disyuntiva podría estar en las Fuerzas Armadas. Desde los primeros años de la administración de López Obrador, el presupuesto asignado al Ejército, la Fuerza Aérea, la Marina y la Guardia Nacional ha incrementado de manera continua en comparación con otras instituciones. Para este año su presupuesto fue reducido en un 36%, sin embargo, distintas reformas legislativas de los últimos años les han dado cada vez más facultades. En los siguientes meses (y años) es probable que veamos tareas que antes pertenecían a otras instancias ser asignadas a estas instituciones.

Mientras que la presencia de las Fuerzas Armadas es necesaria para preservar la seguridad nacional, también es cierto que han habido diversos incidentes relacionados con el uso excesivo de la fuerza y otros abusos de derechos humanos en contra de distintos grupos vulnerables (incluyendo migrantes) que las involucran, siendo uno de los más recientes el asesinato de tres personas, incluyendo una niña de ocho años, en Nuevo Laredo el 11 de octubre del año pasado. Se espera que el número de este tipo de incidentes aumente.

Por otro lado, uno de los ejes del gobierno actual (aunque su principal función sea publicitaria) es mostrarse a sí mismo como el más humanista y progresista en la historia, lo cual puede directamente contradecirse con esta ampliación de tareas que las fuerzas armadas tendrán. También se espera más presión por parte de organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

Mientras que la administración pasada de Donald Trump nos dio cierta noción de cómo podría ser su segundo periodo, la realidad es que la incertidumbre es la característica más exacta con la que podemos describir nuestros tiempos, no solo en ambos países pero también a nivel global. Hasta ahora, la retórica de Trump hacia México (y hacia otros socios también) ha sido bastante confrontativa y Sheinbaum tendrá que maniobrar el periodo 2025-2029 de manera hábil y cuidadosa, a la par de dirigir un escenario político, económico y social interno cada vez más complejo.

Gestionar el problema del narcotráfico es una tarea desafiante y delicada y, desde una perspectiva realista, ni la política hostil de Trump ni la popularidad de Sheinbaum lo resolverán. El populismo es muy próspero hoy en día y, para ambos países, hay un largo camino que se puede complicar fácilmente por ideas que en la teoría parecen buenas pero que en la práctica pueden no funcionar, a expensas tanto del pueblo estadounidense como del mexicano.


Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega es Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales con especialidad en Gobierno y Transformación Pública, por el Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
La inclusión en el programa de expertos y expertas emergentes del Foro sobre Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no implican el acuerdo ni la aprobación de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son las del autor de cada artículo.
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Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Hands of Crime: A Nearby Threat in Latin America with Gendered Implications

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Gisela Luján Andrade
(In lieu of a standard blog post, the author has crafted an article that presents reflections, research, and analysis based on two recent presentations... the introduction begins as follows:) 

The growing interest of organized crime in the military use of emerging technologies, including autonomous technology and artificial intelligence (AI), raises alarms about the tangible perils of their application and development in Latin America, making us realize that we are no longer dealing with a scenario far removed from our reality.

The primary purpose of this article is to contribute to discussions in the region regarding the risks associated with the proliferation of 'low-end' autonomous weapons systems (AWS) to non-state armed actors, particularly organized crime, which constitute one of the main threats to human security in the region. Additionally, this analysis adopts a human rights and gender approach, emphasizing how the likely use of these systems by organized crime exacerbates the structural discrimination and violence already faced by women and other marginalized groups. Finally, this article calls for urgent action toward the regulation of AWS as a matter of global justice and equity.

Read the full article/post in this pdf


Gisela Luján Andrade is Founder, Perú por el Desarme.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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The UK arms trade in 2025 – controversies and challenges

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Sam Perlo-Freeman
The UK is one of the world’s largest arms exporters – exactly where in the rankings depends on which figures you look at. The UK is only 7th according to SIPRI data on major conventional weapons exports, but in financial terms, the UK is probably somewhere between 2nd and 4th alongside France and Russia. At any rate, an important player.
 
By far the most controversial, though certainly not the largest, aspect of the UK arms trade at present is its arms sales to Israel, most of which go indirectly via the US, especially components for the F-35 combat aircraft, which Israel is using in Gaza, and of which 15% by value is made in the UK. Last September, the new Labour government suspended certain licences for use by the Israeli military, having concluded that Israel was not adhering to international law in Gaza, but made a special ‘carve-out’ from its own export licensing criteria to allow the continued indirect supply of F-35 components via the US and other partner nations. The government claimed that such indirect supplies could not be stopped without jeopardising the whole F-35 supply chain. This decision faces a legal challenge brought by Palestinian NGO Al-Haq and activist legal group GLAN, and will likely be heard in spring. The latest government submission to the court makes clear that there is no new evidence of Israeli violations in Gaza that would lead the government to change this position, an extraordinary admission, placing the UK’s international commitments under the ATT, IHL, and even the Genocide Convention as lower priority than maintaining the F-35 supply chain.
 
However, while the F-35 and arms sales to Israel are rightly the focus of most current attention, of far greater significance for the UK arms industry – and also raising serious questions regarding human rights, peace, and security – are prospects for sales of the Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft, jointly produced by BAE in the UK, Leonardo in Italy, and Airbus in Germany and Spain.
 
Last year, trade unions warned that production of the Typhoon at their plant in Warton, Lancashire, may end before long if there are not significant new orders, creating a gap before full-scale production of the planned 6th-generation Tempest fighter gets under way. New orders from Germany, Italy, and Spain have helped alleviate these concerns, although this will not involve final assembly in the UK. Nonetheless, both the UK government and BAE are actively pursuing export customers as well, from their traditional customer base in the Middle East - in particular, Qatar, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia.
 
Qatar ordered 24 Typhoons in 2018, the last of which should be delivered in 2025, and has reportedly recently agreed to buy 12 more, although a contract has not yet been signed. It is unclear exactly what Qatar would want them for, given that it also has fleets of French Rafales and US F-15s, faces no external threats, and may lack the capacity to operate that many aircraft, is a good question. Qatar is rated by Transparency International Defence & Security as having a ‘critical’ risk of corruption in arms procurement, and given BAE’s grimy record in this area, this deal should face stringent due diligence in relation to corruption, including via possible offset deals.
 
Türkiye has long been seeking to modernise its combat aircraft fleet, especially since Greece recently acquired Rafales from France. Türkiye was kicked out of the F-35 programme by the US in 2019 for buying Russian air defence systems. It is now acquiring 40 F-16s instead, but is also very interested in acquiring up to 40 Eurofighters. For a long time, Germany was blocking this due to Türkiye’s human rights record and role in Syria, but has lifted this objection, and negotiations for a deal have begun.
 
However, the Turkish state remains highly authoritarian and repressive, especially towards its Kurdish minority. It remains in occupation of parts of north-east Syria, where it and its militia allies have been accused of serious abuses. Türkiye has continued a steady bombing campaign against Kurdish groups in both Iraq and Syria, causing high civilian casualties. Moreover, following the regime change in Syria, Türkiye may well be looking to pursue further military action against the Kurdish autonomous region of Rojava in the north-east, and indeed its allied militias have already launched attacks. The risk therefore that Eurofighters sold to Türkiye might be used in these conflicts is high.
 
Saudi Arabia is reportedly considering various options for increasing its combat aircraft fleet, including the Eurofighter, the Rafale, and the F-15, and most recently the Turkish domestically-produced Kaan stealth fighter currently under development. During the war in Yemen, German objections would have stopped any new sales of Eurofighters (though Germany allowed continuing supplies of spare parts for the existing Saudi fleet), but as with Türkiye, they have now lifted these objections as the truce in Yemen in place since April 2022 continues to hold.
 
However, the truce remains fragile, with numerous violations, and the conflict in Yemen remains far from solved. Saudi Arabia’s horrific human rights record has if anything worsened, with the country carrying out a record 345 executions in 2024. The record of corruption in UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia is also egregious.
 
In short, all 3 potential Middle Eastern customers for the Eurofighters raise serious red flags, although none of these will likely be of the slightest concern to the UK government, desperate as it will be to maintain the BAE production line until Tempest gets off the ground. If all goes their way, 2025 could be a bumper year for BAE, and in any event it will be a busy year for those of us seeking to advocate for ethical restraint in arms exports.


Sam Perlo-Freeman is Research Coordinator at Campaign Against Arms Trade in the UK.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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The 2025 security landscape in Mexico amid the arrival of President Trump

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(Versión en español. English updated January 19, 2025.)

2024 was a remarkable year when talking about democracy. 74 countries (plus the European Parliament) held elections with more than 1.6 billion people going to the ballots worldwide. While all of these processes have their own particular importance, none of them will be that defining for the 2025 global scenario as the reelection of Donald Trump in the United States.
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Trump’s victory in November was seen as a hope for some but dreaded by most, including the recently elected president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s approach, from the beginning of her political campaign in early 2024, has been focused on giving a certain continuity to the previous government of president López Obrador, and topics like security and drug-trafficking, two of the most relevant for Trump’s voters, have not been the exception.

On December 22nd, president Trump said that he would name drug cartels as terrorist organizations on day one of his administration, joining his calls for higher tariffs he had previously threatened. Sheinbaum responded that she was willing to cooperate with his government, but that the country would never “subordinate” [to Trump]. Since Sheinbaum took office on October 1st, around 12 high-profile successful anti-drug operations have been held, including the siege of almost one ton of fentanyl in Sinaloa, the biggest in Mexico’s history, which also happened to occur about 10 days after Trump’s tariff threats. It is expected that this rate will only increase during 2025, substantially due to Trump’s pressure.

From a narrative perspective, Sheinbaum will likely try to keep the public opinion focused on these security operations, side to side with the importance of bilateral cooperation to attend not only the production of fentanyl in the country but also the consumption crisis in the U. S. The respect to Mexico’s sovereignty will also be a key element of the government’s narrative.

In addition, the issue of arms trafficking coming from the U. S. into Mexico will likely be recurring in the Mexican media, considering that the government is currently involved in a legal process against several American arms distribution companies for facilitating their access to criminal organizations. On January 9th, during her daily morning conference, Sheinbaum talked about her favorable views on a recent Justice Department report that acknowledges the issue, saying that 74% of the confiscated weapons by the Mexican government come from the northern side of the border. She stated that this report will be a helpful leverage for future negotiations.

Immigration policies, intrinsically related to national security and of both countries, will drastically change in 2025 as well. In Mexico, several government divisions, including the National Institute of Migration (INM), suffered a budget cut in comparison with last year, in line with Sheinbaum’s austerity principles. While Trump’s arrival will expectedly influence the Mexican authorities to increase deportations and migrant detentions, the challenge will lay in the fact that the available resources for the proper management of the migration routes will get reduced.

Nevertheless, the government’s answer to this issue may lay in the military. Since the first years of López Obrador’s administration, the budget assigned towards the army, the navy and the National Guard steadily increased compared to other government offices. For this year, their budget was cut by around 36%, however, different legislation reforms in recent years have granted them more and more faculties. In the coming months (and years) we will likely see more tasks assigned to these three institutions that previously were performed by others.

While the involvement of the military is necessary for preserving national security, there also have been several incidents of excessive use of violence and other human rights abuses towards different vulnerable groups (including migrants) that involved them, particularly the National Guard, one of the latest being the assassination of three people, including an eight year old child, in Nuevo Laredo on October 11th. This number is expected to increase.

On the other hand, one of the bases of the current government (but mostly a political marketing element) is to show themselves as the most humanistic and progressive in history, which may be contradictory with this broader range of tasks the military will get. More pressure from civil society organizations is likely to increase as well.

While the 2017-2021 administration of Donald Trump gave us a rather wide glance of what his second period may be, the truth is that uncertainty is the most accurate word to describe the current times, not only in both countries but also globally. So far, Trump’s rhetoric towards Mexico (and towards other partners as well) has been very confrontative and Sheinbaum will have to cleverly and carefully maneuver a highly unpredictable 2025-2029 term while managing an increasingly complex political, economic and social internal landscape. Managing the drug crisis is a delicate and challenging issue and, from a realistic perspective, neither Trump's hostile politics nor Sheinbaum’s political marketing will solve it. Populism is thriving in current times and, for both countries, there is a long path that may be easily clouded by big ideas that may not work when put into practice, at the expense of both American and Mexican people.



Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega has a B. A. in International Relations with a minor degree in Government and Public Transformation from Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program (Spanish program) and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Manipur's 'Pumpi Guns:' Why Should We Care About Them?

12/11/2024

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
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Henrique Garbino
Introduction

The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state of India, began in mid-2023 as ethnic violence erupted between the majority Meitei community, based in the Imphal Valley, and the tribal Kuki-Zo community from the surrounding hill districts. The unrest, rooted in disputes over land rights and affirmative action measures, has led to significant destruction, including over 225 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people, and the burning of thousands of homes and religious structures. Deep-seated historical grievances and recent tensions over migration and Scheduled Tribe status have intensified the violence, turning the state into a complex humanitarian crisis.

In Manipur, non-industrial weapons present yet another set of challenges to policymakers and law enforcement given their unique characteristics, the environments in which they are produced, and their users' motivations. Non-state actors with limited resources worldwide resort to them over commercial counterparts primarily for their accessibility, affordability, and anonymity. They are made from easy-to-source materials, are significantly cheaper to acquire, and lack serial numbers or standardized markings allowing them to operate under the radar. In addition to the physical characteristics, they are perceived to symbolize resourcefulness and resilience, especially in asymmetric conflicts or resistance movements.

‘Pumpi guns’ are a lesser-known, contemporary example of this phenomenon. While usually reported and clustered under ‘long-range mortars’ by Manipur law enforcement, ‘Pumpi gun’ is an umbrella term used to refer to a variety of improvised light weapons, including light cannons, light and medium mortars, and shoulder-fired grenade launchers, owing to their inherently non-standard nature. A recurring find among the weapons and other contraband seized by security forces from the ongoing violence in the state, their widespread use and novel ways of fabrication underscores a much deeper issue that needs a multilayered policy intervention.

What are Pumpi guns?

Pumpi guns are improvised weapons locally made in the Indian state of Manipur. They originated from the resistance movements of 1917-18, when they were crafted with indigenous, easy-to-source materials to fight British colonial rule. According to media reports, Pumpi guns are largely fabricated from parts of uprooted electric poles, water pipes, and galvanized iron pipes. Their production and sourcing knowledge has been passed down through generations, especially among the Kuki tribal groups. In their most rudimentary form, they are manufactured by repurposing a metal pipe or tube with a variety of make-shift stabilizing mechanisms including bi-pods, baseplates, and buttstocks to guide the projectile, which may or may not be fin-stabilized. They are chambered for both medium (20-57mm) and large-caliber ammunition (greater than 57mm) and may be either direct or indirect fire weapons.

Based on their identifiable physical characteristics, they can be classified into four major types: (i) improvised mortars; (ii) improvised cannons; (iii) improvised shoulder-fire grenade launchers; (iv) and one with multiple barrels.
PictureSource: Manipur Police, 2024. (click image for original)
Further, there seem to be striking similarities between the weapons used by the People’s Defence Force in Myanmar and Manipur’s pumpi guns. A recent video unveiled the DIY factories that are arming the anti-junta fighters and provides insights into the sourcing and manufacturing processes of improvised weapons across the Indo-Myanmar border. Given the historical and civilizational ties, and geographical proximity between Manipur and Myanmar, the transfer of knowledge and materials needed to manufacture these weapons between non-state actors is likely. Further, recent reports of 3D-printed guns found in Manipur have allegedly been trafficked from Myanmar, lending support to the existence of cross-border exchanges.

Perceived tools of resistance: One year since the Manipur Conflict

At the collective level, improvised weapons often symbolize resilience and defiance against an oppressive system. From landmines in Colombia to combat drones in Ukraine, self-narratives around improvised weapons reflect a determination to resist when denied formal means and demonstrate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of a group in duress. At the individual level, beyond self-defense and survival, owning a weapon is often linked to status in the community; reflecting gender norms and cultural traditions. In the context of armed conflicts such as in Manipur, traditional weaponry has been adapted and modernized, to now been self-seen as serving as effective tools of resistance. Armed groups rely on existing values and traditions, as well as social and economic interdependence, to manage the knowledge of weapons production and networks for their distribution.

The residents of the hill districts of Manipur are known for their prowess in improvising weapons and guerilla warfare techniques. As such, pumpi guns are an archetype of societal and community pride. Perceived as a form of resistance and self-defense, they symbolize the community’s craftsmanship and proficiency, as illustrated in social media accounts of pumpi guns’ effectiveness. They are regarded as important installments in community checkpoints and underground bunkers guarded by village youth, who allegedly undergo mandatory weapon training as part of community service. 

According to local law enforcement officials, pumpi guns are manufactured by village blacksmiths, or ‘Thih-Kheng Pa,’ as part of their community service. They are installed in trenches and bunkers built to monitor movement from long distances and are employed to create a virtual ‘geographical divide’ between the valley and hill districts of the state. As problematic as they may be to those concerned about violence, they have proved to be a strategic addition for the groups stationed at the inter-district boundaries, or the ‘buffer zone,’ to extend their area of influence, inflict serious injury to approaching security personnel, and keep infiltrators from opposing sides at bay. Pumpi guns are also used for offensive purposes to carry out raids and ambushes to gain access to strategic territories. 

Potential misfires and explosions from employing repurposed metal tubes cannot be overruled but is deemed a necessary risk its users are willing to take. There are a few media reports on injuries from shelling clubbed under “gun and mortar attacks,” which could be attributed to pumpi guns. Still, no instances of accidents with unexploded pumpi gun munitions could be found. However, the range of mortar bombs, both improvised and factory-made, recovered by Manipur Police suggests their omnipresence in the conflict.

Addressing the Challenges
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With renewed violence in the already devastating conflict in Manipur, pumpi guns have seemed to evolve in accuracy and reliability. Modifications done in recent years make use of novel technologies and adapt to the growing needs of the warring parties. Recent reports from state security forces reveal their seemingly improved parts and components. 

In addition to the improvised weapons, the warring groups’ arsenals also feature sophisticated industrial weapons. These include INSAS, AK-type, and M-16 assault rifles, as well as No. 36 hand grenades, which have been previously looted from the government stockpiles and armories. On multiple occasions, the state police and central reserve forces have reported incidents of an estimated 5,600 arms and over 650,000 rounds of ammunition being raided by non-state actors, though it is hard to verify these figures. Pumpi guns appear to be filling in a gap in the technical capabilities of groups who may not have access to industrial alternatives.

To address the proliferation of pumpi guns and their role in the ongoing conflict in Manipur, policymakers should focus on a multi-pronged strategy that balances enforcement with socio-economic development and peacebuilding efforts. Legal reforms must prioritize stricter arms control legislation and impose severe penalties for violations. Simultaneously, enhancing the management and security of government stockpiles and armories is crucial to prevent looting by non-state actors. Advanced surveillance technologies and intelligence sharing should be leveraged to monitor the supply chain of precursor materials and dismantle illicit workshops. Combating corruption within the armed forces, police, and industries involved in the supply of critical materials remains a core challenge that must be addressed through independent oversight mechanisms. Importantly, regional cooperation with Myanmar is necessary to curb the cross-border trafficking of both weapons and precursors, as well as the transfer of knowledge among non-state actors.

Economic development initiatives should provide alternative livelihoods for those involved in illicit weapons production, especially blacksmiths and community members engaged in pumpi gun manufacturing. This could involve vocational training, financial support for sustainable enterprises, and the integration of traditional craftsmanship into legal economic activities. However, such measures alone may prove insufficient, as pumpi gun production is deeply rooted in community pride and linked to genuine grievances. Community engagement must play a central role in addressing these issues by building trust between law enforcement and local populations to encourage cooperation. Integrating rebel groups into state structures, such as law enforcement or other community-oriented roles, could also be explored as part of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework. A peacebuilding perspective is essential to resolve the underlying tensions driving conflict, ensuring that solutions are holistic and inclusive rather than solely punitive.


Monalisa Hazarika is a consultant at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University and a 2024-25 Emerging Expert.

Henrique Garbino is a doctoral candidate at the Swedish Defence University and an expert listed by the Forum.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list or emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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How military technologies and alliances in the Russia-Ukraine war will impact global peace and security in 2025

12/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Olena Kryzhanivska
The third year of the Russian war in Ukraine has brought several surprising developments, including Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the direct involvement of North Korean troops on the battlefield, and a series of long-range strikes on Russia’s strategic targets conducted by Ukraine, at times with the use of autonomous technologies. The scope of this war has clearly exceeded regional dimensions and is evolving into a global confrontation.
 
Over 50 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defense Contact Group, collaborating to coordinate military aid. Nations from at least five continents are contributing both lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia's military allies include the global power China, along with regional players like North Korea and Iran, whose involvement in the conflict continues to expand.
 
Involvement in this war is not driven solely by ideological reasons. Allied states and private-sector actors are paying close attention to weaponry deployed on the battlefield, tested against a technologically advanced adversary, and then further refined. What could these developments mean for the world?
 
Ukraine’s military and technological innovations and the need for responsible arms control
 
Both parties to the war, Ukraine and Russia, have significantly increased their military production since February 2022. While Ukraine cannot match Russia's weapon production in terms of quantity, it has deliberately prioritized quality. Ukraine's strategic objective is enhancing its domestic long-range capabilities and creating conditions for achieving a technological advantage over Russian forces.
 
Ukraine's most significant military assets are unmanned aerial systems, which have  reshaped the basic outlines of modern warfare. The main trends in UAV development in Ukraine include increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and sensor technologies; integration of computer vision and real-time data processing; as well as swarm technology. Ukraine is on track to produce 1.2 million drones in 2024, with plans to grow production toward 4 million annually. 
 
Ukraine’s drone technologies and electronic warfare systems have already attracted interest from parties involved in conflicts in other regions. The Iranian-made drones being launched at Israel from Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran motivate both the private and military sectors in Israel to consider closer cooperation with Ukraine in this domain and to learn from its battlefield experience. This development could lead to enhanced military cooperation between Ukraine and Israel, including an extensive exchange of military technologies.
 
In addition to drones, Ukraine already launched the production of artillery systems, ballistic missiles, and 155-mm caliber ammunition.
 
Currently, all weaponry produced in Ukraine is intended for domestic use, as military exports are prohibited. However, the potential opening of military exports in 2025 is anticipated to generate significant revenue for the country’s war-affected economy.
 
To prepare for this development, Ukraine will need to implement responsible arms transfer procedures, including robust end-user controls. A crucial step in this process would be Ukraine's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty, as it is currently only a signatory to the agreement.
 
As Ukraine ramps up military production drawn from battlefield experience,  the private sector in many Western countries is considering expanding production into Ukraine or neighboring region. Currently, more than 40 foreign defense companies operate in Ukraine. Collaboration with Ukrainian engineers and technical staff on producing drones, ammunition, and air defense systems is particularly attractive.
 
Prominent players such as U.S.-based Skydio, Germany’s Quantum-Systems, and Turkey’s Baykar have swiftly established offices or drone manufacturing plants in Ukraine. Meanwhile, German Rheinmetall plans to set up at least four factories in Ukraine to produce artillery shells, military vehicles, gunpowder, and anti-aircraft weapons.
 
This expansion would significantly boost Ukrainian defense production amid ongoing ammunition shortages. However, in the long term, it is difficult to predict how these advanced technologies and direct involvement in the Ukrainian battlefield might be utilized in other conflicts. A notable example is the plan to deploy battle-tested American NASAMS systems, initially used in Ukraine, to Taiwan.
 
The Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Online Portal (RULAC), based in Geneva, tracks over 110 armed conflicts globally. Military producers, motivated by profit, are likely to attract customers seeking battlefield-tested innovations that provide a decisive edge in warfare.
 
Although the full impact of these developments may not be visible by 2025, it is expected that, within a few years, military technologies refined in the Russian-Ukrainian war will begin to emerge in other parts of the world, particularly in areas where Western states are engaged.
 
Deepening military cooperation within the Russia-led alliance: potential for immediate global threats
 
Russia has mobilized its defense industry to sustain its ongoing military operations, significantly increasing production by introducing additional shifts, expanding production lines at existing facilities, and reopening decommissioned factories. These measures have led to substantial increases in output.
 
At the start of 2023, Russia was producing six Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles per month, with a stockpile of approximately 50. By early 2024, despite extensive use, its stockpile had grown to nearly 200 Iskander 9M723 ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. Russia has already increased its overall annual artillery shell production to three million rounds. In the realm of drone warfare, Russian state sources report plans to ramp up production by nearly tenfold, targeting 1.4 million units in 2024.
 
A trend that is already alarming in the short-term perspective is the deepening cooperation between Russia, North Korea, and Iran, both on the battlefield and in defense production, as well as with China.
 
All these countries have been on (and off) various arms embargo lists for decades. Since 2006, North Korea has been under a comprehensive and open-ended UN arms embargo, prohibiting both the export and import of weapons. Iran faced a partial UN embargo on the export of technology related to nuclear weapon delivery from 2006 to 2023. Both Russia and China have been sanctioned by the EU, the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and other states.
 
The purpose of these sanctions is to limit military capabilities and pressure states to improve their behavior in the interest of international peace and security. However, the coordinated support for Ukraine provided by the Western-led coalition since 2022 has brought these states together, strengthening their military cooperation.
 
In June 2024, the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships was signed between North Korea and Russia, and in October 2024, Russia and Iran announced the preparation of a similar treaty, that "confirms the parties’ desire for closer cooperation in the field of defense and interaction in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels." The involvement of both countries in the war includes substantial military support for Russian capabilities, with Iran transferring drones and ballistic missiles, engaging in joint drone production with Russia. North Korea’s contributions include providing rocket, artillery systems, and artillery shells to Russia, as well as deploying troops to the battlefield. The Russian-Chinese cooperation is more sophisticated, and although China has never formally endorsed the war on Ukraine, its role in sustaining Russian military capabilities is significant.
 
Despite sanctions, Moscow has significantly bolstered its defense manufacturing capabilities with support from its allies, allowing for large-scale production of advanced weapon systems, drones, and artillery. This marks the most substantial military-industrial expansion since the Soviet era. This partnership is reciprocal, with Russia also transferring military equipment to its allies.
 
The close-knit cooperation between these states presents significant dangers, including the transfer of military technologies and battlefield experience gained in Ukraine to North Korea and Iran, effectively undermining the purpose of the sanctions. The widespread human rights abuses committed by Russia and its allies, coupled with their reluctance to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law, heighten concerns about how swiftly they may apply these newly acquired innovations in other conflicts.
 
Russia’s security interests span the globe, with a military presence (including private military companies) across four continents and at least 34 countries. Iran exercises influence in several regional conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestine war and in Syria and Lebanon. North Korean forces deployed alongside Russian troops are likely to learn to conduct drone warfare, which could be used in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea’s drone capabilities, along with its decision to begin serial drone production, poses a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.
 
Arms transfers between these states, carried out without consideration of international conventional arms control treaties and mechanisms, along with the exchange of critical technologies and battlefield experiences, are expected to have a profound impact on remote regions of the world, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America, both in the short and long term.
 
Conclusions
 
While the promise of incoming US President Donald Trump to quickly end the war makes predictions for 2025 difficult, it is entirely possible that we witness a deepening conflict between the large coalition supporting Ukraine and a smaller group of states aligned with Russia. The already expanded military cooperation on both sides, along with the exchange of military technologies and battlefield experiences,  will almost certainly continue and affect armed conflicts in other regions and contribute to the rise of armed violence globally.
 
In the short term, the arms transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran are particularly concerning, as all three countries openly use belligerent rhetoric. Their involvement in armed conflicts across different regions could lead to the rapid spread of advanced technologies, such as drone warfare, beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
 
The growing involvement of the private sector of both Ukraine and Russia in the war highlights the timely issue of the role of industry and other private sector actors in global arms control efforts, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments. As the war progressed and is likely to in the future, we see how the negligent actions of some military producers directly affect the lives of civilians, contributing to human suffering. The efforts of civil society organizations and media outlets that investigate and document the irresponsible transfer of weapons and their components should be supported and continued.
 
 
​Olena Kryzhanivska is an independent researcher with a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
​
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Falta de controle sobre armas civis no Brasil: tiroteios recentes devem soar como alarme

11/21/2024

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PictureGabrielli Thomaz
available in English

Na quarta-feira, 23 de outubro, um homem de 45 anos, identificado como Edson Fernando Crippa, matou quatro pessoas e feriu outras oito em Novo Hamburgo, no Rio Grande do Sul, no Brasil. Entre os mortos estão o pai e o irmão do atirador, além de dois policiais militares. Edson manteve os familiares como reféns em casa e as negociações com a polícia duraram cerca de nove horas. Entre os sobreviventes estão um guarda municipal, cinco policiais militares, além da mãe e da cunhada do atirador. Edson foi morto pela polícia durante a troca de tiros.

O ataque aconteceu após o atirador reagir à abordagem policial durante a averiguação da denúncia de maus-tratos a um casal de idosos que, segundo relatos, era mantido em cárcere privado e impedido de sair de casa. Segundo informações de uma rádio local, o atirador tem registrado sob seu nome quatro armas, sendo duas pistolas, um rifle e uma espingarda. 

O que aconteceu em Novo Hamburgo traz à tona os riscos de morar com proprietários de armas. Um estudo da Universidade de Stanford, nos Estados Unidos, divulgado em 2022 no Annals of Internal Medicine, mostrou que pessoas que vivem com proprietários de pistolas morreram por homicídio em uma taxa duas vezes maior que seus vizinhos em casas sem armas.

O debate sobre armamento civil há anos tem sido liderado por políticos da extrema direita no Brasil. Com o lema “Não é sobre armas, é sobre liberdade”, o discurso pró-armamento tem ganhado força e, como explicado no relatório “O que o Congresso Nacional fala sobre o armamento civil?”, de autoria de Terine Husek, gerente de pesquisa do Instituto Fogo Cruzado, desde 2015 os discursos pró-armamentistas dominam a tribuna nos plenários do Congresso Federal. 

Após uma sequência de medidas assinadas no governo do então presidente Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) para facilitar a posse de armas, o número de armas para uso restrito nas mãos de civis no Brasil aumentou. Um levantamento realizado pelo advogado e gerente do Instituto Sou da Paz, Bruno Langeani, mostrou que o número de armas em circulação na categoria Caçador, Atirador Esportivo e Colecionador (CAC) no Brasil já é superior ao total de armas da instituição Polícia Militar. São armas que, quando chegam nas ruas, são roubadas, desviadas e acabam nas mãos do crime organizado, como mostrou um levantamento feito pelo jornal O Globo que explicava que entre janeiro e outubro de 2023, o Brasil registrou 1.259 ocorrências de armas que acabaram roubadas, furtadas ou perdidas, o que seria uma média de 126 por mês ou quatro por dia. 

No Brasil, CAC é o termo usado para “‘Colecionador, Atirador Desportivo ou Caçador”, para exercer qualquer uma dessas categorias, é preciso obter um certificado de CAC, apresentando uma série de documentos exigidos pelo Exército, como identidade, certificado de antecedentes e comprovante de ocupação lícita. Mas durante os primeiros meses do governo do ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro, os decretos assinados por ele permitiam que atiradores comprassem até 60 armas, e caçadores poderiam comprar até 30 armas, sem autorização do Exército ou de qualquer força de segurança. O número de munições compradas também aumentou para 2 mil, se for para uso restrito (armas de uso exclusivo das Forças Armadas, de instituições de segurança pública e de pessoas físicas e jurídicas habilitadas, devidamente autorizadas pelo Comando do Exército), e 5 mil para uso permitido a todos.

Em 2019, o número de armas nas mãos de civis era de aproximadamente 1,9 milhões, em 2022, último ano do governo Bolsonaro, esse número aumentou para 4,4 milhões. Em 2023, o atual presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva revogou parte das normas que facilitavam acesso a armas e munição. Entre as medidas está a suspensão de novos registros de armas por caçadores, atiradores e colecionadores (CACs) e por particulares (que são civis que não têm licença para CAC, mas que possuem permissão para que tenham uma arma em casa, como por exemplo para segurança pessoal); redução dos limites para compra de armas e munição de uso permitido; suspensão de novos registros de clubes e escolas de tiro; suspensão a concessão de novos registros para CACs; e criação de um grupo de trabalho para propor nova regulamentação para o Estatuto do Desarmamento. Apesar das medidas adotadas por Lula no primeiro ano de seu mandato, o número de armas nas mãos de civis voltou a crescer em 2023, e a 18ª edição do Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública mostrou que o Brasil registrou 4,8 milhões de armas de fogo oficialmente registradas. 

As normas revogadas por Lula voltaram a ser discutidas este ano no plenário do Senado Federal com o projeto de decreto legislativo (PDL) 206/2024 que tem, entre outras modificações, o fim da exigência de clubes de tiro a uma distância mínima de 1 quilômetro de escolas. (Clubes de tiro são locais que oferecem instalações para treinamento e competições de tiro, assim como programas de treinamento para iniciantes. As armas e munições usadas dentro dos clubes de tiro podem ser próprias dos frequentadores, ou oferecidas pelo clube.)

O nível de segurança nos clubes de tiro voltou a ser discutido depois que um menino de 4 anos foi atingido na cabeça por um disparo de arma de fogo em Herval d'Oeste, em Santa Catarina, no Brasil. A criança estava brincando em um sítio localizado próximo a um clube de tiro. O acidente aconteceu uma semana antes do caso do atirador de Novo Hamburgo.

O que estes dois casos têm em comum, além da proximidade entre as datas, é que evidenciam o quanto o afrouxamento das normas de controle deixaram a população vulnerável. O número de clubes de tiro saltou 1.400% durante os quatro anos de governo de Jair Bolsonaro, indo de 151 clubes em 2019, para 2.038 em 2022. Além disso, o número de CACs teve um crescimento de 665%, subindo de 117.467 em 2018 para 783.385 em 2022.

A consequência da irresponsabilidade da política de acesso à armas, além destes trágicos episódios, já é refletida há anos na porcentagem de mortes violentas no país. A edição mais recente do Atlas da Violência mostra que em 2022, 72,4% do total de homicídios no país foram praticados com armas de fogo, o que corresponde a 15,7 mortes por 100 mil habitantes. Em alguns estados os números são ainda mais alarmantes, a Bahia tem uma taxa de 37,2 e o Amapá 33,0. 

Esse cenário aponta mais do que nunca a importância de se ter políticas sérias e rígidas de acesso ao armamento e munições. No Congresso Nacional, o discurso dos que defendem o controle de armas no Brasil perdeu força. É preciso retomar a discussão para que casos como o de Novo Hamburgo, de Santa Catarina e de muitos outros estados brasileiros deixem de acontecer.

​
Gabrielli Thomaz é jornalista, Assessora de imprensa do Instituto Fogo Cruzado e membro do programa de Especialistas emergentes no Forum on the Arms Trade

A inclusão no programa de especialistas emergentes do Fórum sobre Comércio de Armas e a publicação desses posts não indicam concordância ou endosso das opiniões de outros. As opiniões expressas são as visões do(s) autor(es) de cada post.

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Lack of control over civilian weapons in Brazil: recent shootings should raise alarm

11/21/2024

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PictureGabrielli Thomaz
disponível em português​

On Wednesday, October 23, a 45-year-old man, identified as Edson Fernando Crippa, killed four people and injured eight others in Novo Hamburgo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Among the dead are the shooter's father and brother, as well as two military police officers. Edson held his family members hostage at home, and the police negotiations lasted about nine hours. Among the survivors are a municipal guard, five military police officers, as well as the shooter's mother and sister-in-law. Edson was killed by the police during the exchange of gunfire.

The attack occurred after the shooter reacted to the police approach during the investigation of a report of abuse of an elderly couple who, according to reports, were being held in private confinement and prevented from leaving their home. According to information from a local radio station, the shooter has four registered weapons under his name, including two pistols, a rifle, and a shotgun.

What happened in Novo Hamburgo brings to the forefront the risks of living with gun owners. A study from Stanford University in the United States, published in 2022 in the Annals of Internal Medicine, showed that people living with handgun owners died by homicide at twice the rate of their neighbors in gun-free homes.

The debate on civilian weapons has for years been led by far-right politicians in Brazil. With the slogan "It's not about guns, it's about freedom," the pro-gun discourse has gained strength, and as explained in the report "What does the National Congress say about civilian weapons?", authored by Terine Husek, research manager at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, since 2015 pro-gun speeches have dominated the plenary sessions of the Federal Congress.

After a series of measures signed during the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) to facilitate the possession of weapons, the number of restricted-use weapons in the hands of civilians in Brazil increased. A survey conducted by the lawyer and manager of the Instituto Sou da Paz, Bruno Langeani, showed that the number of firearms in circulation in the Collector, Sports Shooter, and Hunter (CAC) category in Brazil is already higher than the total number of weapons of the Military Police institution. These are weapons that, when they reach the streets, are stolen, diverted, and end up in the hands of organized crime, as shown by a survey conducted by the newspaper O Globo, which explained that between January and October 2023, Brazil recorded 1,259 occurrences of weapons that were stolen, robbed, or lost, which would be an average of 126 per month or four per day.

In Brazil, CAC is the term used for “Collector, Sports Shooter, or Hunter.'”To practice any of these categories, one must obtain a CAC certificate by presenting a series of documents required by the Army, such as identity, background check certificate, and proof of lawful occupation. However, during the first months of former president Jair Bolsonaro's government, the decrees he signed allowed shooters to purchase up to 60 weapons, and hunters could purchase up to 30 weapons, without authorization from the Army or any security force. The number of ammunition that could be purchased also increased to 2,000 rounds for restricted use (weapons for exclusive use by the Armed Forces, public security institutions, and qualified individuals and legal entities, duly authorized by the Army Command), and 5,000 for permitted use. 

In 2019, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians was approximately 1.9 million, in 2022, the last year of the Bolsonaro government, this number increased to 4.4 million. In 2023, the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, revoked part of the rules that facilitated access to weapons and ammunition. Among the measures are the suspension of new registrations of weapons by hunters, shooters, and collectors (CACs) and by individuals (who are civilians without a CAC license, but who have permission to have a weapon at home, such as for personal security); reduction of the limits for purchasing permitted-use weapons and ammunition; suspension of new registrations of shooting clubs and schools; suspension of granting new registrations for CACs; and the creation of a working group to propose new regulations for the Disarmament Statute. Despite the measures taken by Lula in the first year of his term, the number of weapons in the hands of civilians grew again in 2023, and the 18th edition of the Brazilian Public Security Yearbook showed that Brazil recorded 4.8 million officially registered firearms.

The rules revoked by Lula have been discussed again this year in the Federal Senate plenary with the legislative decree project (PDL) 206/2024, which, among other modifications, includes the elimination of the requirement for shooting clubs to be at a minimum distance of 1 kilometer from schools.(Shooting clubs are places that offer facilities for shooting training and competitions, as well as training programs for beginners. The weapons and ammunition used inside shooting clubs can be owned by members, or provided by the club.)

The level of safety in shooting clubs has been discussed again after a 4-year-old boy was hit in the head by a firearm shot in Herval d'Oeste, in Santa Catarina, Brazil. The child was playing on a farm located near a shooting club. The accident occurred a week before the Novo Hamburgo shooter case.

What these two cases have in common, besides the proximity of the dates, is that they show how the relaxation of control norms has left the population vulnerable. The number of shooting clubs jumped 1,400% during the four years of Jair Bolsonaro's government, going from 151 clubs in 2019 to 2,038 in 2022. In addition, the number firearms registered by CACs grew by 665%, rising from 117,467 in 2018 to 783,385 in 2022.

The consequence of the irresponsibility of the weapon access policy, in addition to these tragic episodes, has been reflected for years in the percentage of violent deaths in the country. The most recent edition of the Violence Atlas shows that in 2022, 72.4% of the total homicides in the country were committed with firearms, which corresponds to 15.7 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In some states, the numbers are even more alarming, with Bahia having a rate of 37.2 and Amapá 33.0.

This scenario points more than ever to the importance of having serious and strict policies on access to weapons and ammunition. In the National Congress, the discourse of those who defend gun control in Brazil has lost strength. It is necessary to resume the discussion so that cases like the one in Novo Hamburgo, Santa Catarina, and many other Brazilian states no longer happen.


Gabrielli Thomaz is a journalist, Press Advisor at the Fogo Cruzado Institute, and a member of the Emerging Expert program at the Forum on the Arms Trade.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Event Resources: Biden’s Final Two Months: A Better Approach to Arms and the Middle East (November 7, 2024)

11/7/2024

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On November 7, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and DAWN hosted “Biden’s Final Two Months: A Better Approach to Arms and the Middle East.” The Forum maintains resources on the U.S. provision of arms to  Israel as well as to Saudi Arabia. DAWN also examines the implications of a U.S.-Saudi security agreement. During the event, panelists argued that the United States would be better served not providing weapons into the region.

Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/kWRsFJ3_rE0.
During and as a follow up to the event, panelists offered the following recommendations. (These recommendations were individually offered and can be attributed to the panelist offering them. They were not jointly reviewed):

Josh Paul, Senior Advisor, DAWN

Apply the law: President Biden should finally direct attorneys at the State Department and White House to make the obvious legal determination that Israel has been restricting U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and that it has been engaged in a continuous pattern of Gross Violations of Human Rights. Rolling back legal determinations is possible, but much tougher, than rolling back policy changes.

Use your leverage: President Biden should restrict lethal arms transfers of weapons that are being used in Gaza, stop replenishing the WRSA stockpile, and pause the processing of pending arms sale cases and licenses. If nothing else, this will force a corresponding pause in Israel's operations in the region.

Expand sanctions: President Biden should sanction the Settlement Councils and Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich, including through the application of Magnitsky Sanctions which would require a report to Congress explaining why an individual sanctioned has been removed from those sanctions, should they so be. Certain Settler groups should also be given FTO designations.

Recognize Statehood: The U.S. should recognize Palestinian Statehood and urge the UN Security Council to approve Palestine as a full member of the United Nations, leveling the playing field of international law in a way that would be impossible, in some aspects, for a future Administration to roll back. Recognition of the 1967 borders would also solidify international legal efforts to sanction settlements.

Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
​
Do not try to rush through a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia
  • We know that MBS had previously made foolish foreign policy decisions, like invading and blockading Yemen, and is likely to do so again if he thought he had unlimited U.S. support. We have seen the horrifying behavior that unconditional U.S. support has encouraged Israel to take.
  • This is an important signal to Congressional Democrats to oppose a U.S. defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, even in order to get to an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. This is not in U.S. interests.

Affirm the need to prioritize human rights in American foreign policy
  • Withhold weapons sales to human rights abusing governments, as required by U.S. law.
  • Do not authorize new weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Israel.

Affirm support for international institutions
  • Including the UN, the UN Security Council, and the UN Human Rights Council
  • Vocally express support for international institutions that your administration previously denigrated, including the ICC and ICJ.
  • Express support for the crucial work of UNRWA and other international humanitarian organizations doing crucial work in the region.
  • These are crucial signals for Democrats in Congress to oppose Trump and the Republicans’ efforts to undermine these institutions.

Omer Ismail, Former Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

Watch his policy recommendations here (31:47 into the video).

​Negar Mortazavi, Editor and Host, the Iran Podcast and Senior Non-resident Fellow, Center for International Policy

Watch her policy recommendations here (39:38 into the video).
​
The Forum provides a platform for expert views but does not itself take positions.
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Event Guide and Resources - Understanding Defense Offsets: Diving in on Recent Reports (September 5, 2024)

9/13/2024

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On September 5, 2024, the Forum on the Arms Trade and Transparency International hosted an event discussing defense offsets. Experts examined current research on the many risks associated with increased offset demands in a lax U.S. regulatory environment, the role of offsets and anti-corruption efforts in South Korea, as well as the role of sovereign wealth funds, especially two based in the United Arab Emirates. All offered recommendations on how to improve transparency and tackle corruption that is currently endemic to offsets.
​
Video of the event is available in three recordings:
  • Original languages - https://youtu.be/ufzqZlgbwmo
  • ​English only (with interpretation) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pJN7YLrxRs
  • Korean only (with interpretation) - https://youtu.be/LF7B20ZXVtU
Select resources*
  • Colby Goodman, "Blissfully Blind: The new US push for defence industrial collaboration with partner countries and its corruption risks," Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS), April 11, 2024. See also slides used during the event.
  • Jodi Vittori and Lakshmi Kumar "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Corruption and Other Governance Risks," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 26, 2024. See also slides used during the event.
  • Byung-Ook Choi, prepared remarks, English and 한국어

Guide to the recording (with timestamps indicated)

Sara Bandali, Director of International Engagement, Transparency International-United Kingdom (TI-UK) (moderator)

4:35    Welcome and definition of offsets

Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher, Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS), and Transparency International-United States (TI-US)
    
8:24    Replying to questions: “You’ve noted some big changes in the defense offset market in the past few years. Could you highlight some of these key changes? Based on your report, what do you see as the most significant corruption risks with defense offsets? And looking ahead, how do you think these risks could evolve, particularly in the relationships between U.S. defense companies and partner countries around the world?"  

Byung-Ook Choi, Professor of National Security, Sangmyung University in Seoul, and Director,  Institute for Security and Unification Studies, a member of the Integrity Defense Committee of Transparency International Korea  

19:57    Replying to questions: “South Korea is in a unique position—not just as a major purchaser of weapons but also as an emerging supplier. Offsets have played a role in some of these recent deals, and they’ve certainly stirred up some debate.  It would be good to hear more about this and your take on how South Korea is navigating the complexities and challenges of offsets.”

29:52    Replying to questions: “You’ve highlighted some serious concerns about the transparency of these deals. How do you see these issues affecting South Korea’s broader defense strategy and its relationships with international partners, particularly the U.S.? And what role do you think public and governmental oversight should play in mitigating these risks?”

Jodi Vittori, Non-Resident Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Professor of Practice and co-chair of the Global Politics and Security program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service

33:15    Replying to questions: “You’ve been a strong voice in the fight against corruption for quite a while, and your recent work on sovereign wealth funds dives deep into some of these issues. Can you break down how sovereign wealth funds tie into the world of offsets? It would be good to also hear more about what you discovered specifically in the case of the UAE.” 

47:53 Replying to questions: “Given what you’ve found about the UAE’s use of sovereign wealth funds in defense offsets, what do you see as the most significant risks these funds pose in terms of corruption and lack of transparency? And how do you think international regulatory bodies or governments can address these challenges?”

RECOMMENDATIONS 

“What are your top recommendations for addressing some of the challenges and issues that you have highlighted particularly on how to improve transparency and tackle corruption that is currently endemic to defence offsets, is there any advice you would give to governments/policy makers on this issue?”

54:35        Colby Goodman
57:35        Byung-Ook Choi
1:00:25    Jodi Vitorri

QUESTION AND ANSWER (Q&A)

1:01:55    “Have any of the speakers or their organizations sought to define what the boundaries should be for “legitimate” national security that would set the limits and so permit far-reaching transparency, even if it is not total transparency?”
 
With responses by Colby Goodman and Byung-Ook Choi.

1:06:43    “Are sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) which hold investments in other countries (the USA, for example) required to pay taxes on those investments? If so, does this offer an opportunity to improve disclosure (in tax filings) concerning how these SWFs are operating in a particular country?” and “the U.S. national security community is increasingly concerned with "adversarial capital" which is primarily a concern about state actors within U.S. and allied/partner countries. Is there any realistic chance to use that growing infrastructure for anti-corruption purposes or would that risk tainting good governance efforts with power politics concerns?”

With responses by Jodi Vitorri.

1:11:30    “Do you think that South Korea’s use of offsets for military and economic development is a model that could be copied by other countries? Or were there factors specific to South Korea that made it able to successfully translate offsets into a strong domestic defense industry?”

With responses by Byung-Ook Choi and Colby Goodman.


* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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    March 11 (2015)

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