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Event Report - Women at the Frontlines: Integrating GBV Prevention into National and Community Arms-Control Strategies (December 4, 2025)

12/18/2025

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On December 4, the Forum on the Arms Trade convened a webinar exploring the critical intersection between gender-responsive small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, Gender-Based Violence prevention, and women’s leadership in peace and security. Organized as part of the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence (GBV), the event brought together researchers, civil society actors, and community leaders to examine how arms-control frameworks can more effectively address gendered harms. Experts highlighted how the presence and misuse of firearms significantly increase the severity and lethality of GBV across both conflict and domestic settings and how existing arms-control and security governance mechanisms remain highly militarized and masculinized, limiting their ability to address the lived realities. 

In their presentations, they shared insights into the interconnected nature of firearms-human-narcotics trafficking, noting how these illicit economies shape social, economic, and political spaces while restricting women’s participation in public and decision-making domains. Drawing from field experience, experts underscored the barriers women face in engaging with security institutions, while also demonstrating how women’s leadership contributes to uncovering gaps in accountability, particularly in relation to firearm access by convicted offenders and civilians. During Q/A session, the discussion also surfaced critical policy blind spots, including weak data management systems, insufficient firearm registries, and limited protections for survivors engaging with law enforcement. Speakers stressed that integrating women’s perspectives into SALW governance is not only a matter of inclusion but a necessary step toward more effective violence prevention and community safety.
​
Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/1Tn82Ads8wI?t=217
Panelists
  • Natalia Pollachi, Project Manager, Instituto Sou da Paz
  • Folade Mutota, Executive Director, Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD)
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations
1. Integrate GBV prevention into SALW governance frameworks

States should embed gender-responsive safeguards into licensing, stockpile management, and disarmament processes, ensuring firearms policies account for risks of domestic and gender-based violence.

2. Strengthen data systems and accountability mechanisms

Improved firearm registries, data protection standards, and information-sharing across justice institutions are essential to close loopholes that allow perpetrators continued access to weapons.

3. Invest in women’s leadership and community-based prevention

Supporting women peacebuilders, early-warning initiatives, and survivor-centered advocacy strengthens accountability and improves the effectiveness of arms-control and violence-prevention efforts.

Suggested resources
  • “Pela Vida Das Mulheres: O Papel Da Arma De Fogo Na Violencia De Genero” Instituto Souda Paz, 2025  (portuguese only)
  • “The Role Firearms Play in Violence Against Women,” Instituto Souda Paz, 2024


​* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.

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Safeguarding human rights amid global insecurity and rearmament

12/17/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Hiruni Alwishewa
The measures designed to safeguard human rights in the arms trade are currently under immense strain. The first half of the 2020s has seen an unprecedented rise in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises alongside surging rearmament. Protecting human rights and ensuring accountability in this period of heightened global insecurity will require greater and more sustained action in 2026 to reverse the erosion of human rights commitments. With the dynamics between states, corporations and citizens shifting, a wider range of non-state actors can play significant roles in these efforts.  
 
Undermining the protection of human rights
 
Mitigating and preventing human rights violations in the arms trade primarily depends on the export controls and risk assessments of states, and their willingness to apply them in practice. States can update their export controls to reflect the changing geopolitical context – for example, Australia added a new condition that prohibits domestic arms manufacturers from directly exporting weapons to Israel.
 
For the most part, however, human rights obligations continue to be avoided or ignored, including by states that have strengthened their human rights criteria since Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force. Germany, for instance, updated its Political Principles for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment in 2019 to require an export licence to be denied where there is sufficient suspicion that the arms would be used for internal repression or other ongoing, systematic human rights violations. However, it was not until August 2025 that Germany imposed a partial export ban on arms to Israel – more than a year after the International Court of Justice found a plausible claim of genocide in Gaza.
 
Moreover, the withdrawal of states from key arms control treaties such as the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2025, and Ukraine also signalling its intention to withdraw) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Lithuania in 2024), highlights the sidelining of important humanitarian arms control instruments as peacetime obligations.
 
Simultaneously, new and emerging technologies have become interwoven into military strategies, further blurring the distinctions between civilian and military technologies. For example, digital technologies developed for civilian use such as cloud storage, facial recognition and data-mining systems have been used by Israel as part of its military operations in Gaza. The increased reliance on commercial technologies that fall outside traditional arms control frameworks creates new challenges for human rights protection and complicates the attribution of responsibility for abuses.
 
Together, weakening political commitments by states, the retreat from humanitarian arms control, and technological advancement are eroding human rights safeguards in the arms sector. Reversing this trend will be critical in 2026.
 
Changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens
 
Human rights protection is no longer solely the responsibility of states. A wider constellation of actors now holds both the ability and the responsibility to affect human rights outcomes through their products and services. Since the adoption of the ATT over a decade ago, momentum around human rights risk assessment has expanded beyond States Parties to include formal recognition of the expectation that corporations in the arms sector conduct independent human rights due diligence.
 
As states abandon their human rights commitments, with changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens provide opportunities for non-state actors to engage in human rights protection. For example, corporations involved in production, financing and delivery operations can leverage their positions in the supply chain to promote human rights safeguards – a supplier can halt delivery of key components; a shipping company can decline to transport weapons; a financial institution can refuse to fund arms deals involving specific parties or high-risk destinations. Such actions, whether framed as commercial, ethical or risk-management decisions, can enhance the protection of human rights.
 
Unlike corporations, individual citizens may have limited direct influence on the arms sector as they are not the direct clients of the arms industry. However, through collective movements and organised groups such as trade unions, citizens can build pressure on governments and corporations. Boycotts and coordinated efforts to block shipments by port workers, for example, can disrupt supply chains and prompt institutional responses and greater transparency behind export decisions.
 
As always, civil society organisations and NGOs remain integral to human rights protection, transparency and accountability in the arms trade. Accountability mechanisms such as domestic litigation have been particularly useful in recent years and in relation to ongoing conflicts. Even when courts do not mandate changes to export practices, litigation and advocacy have proven critical in exposing decision-making processes, generating public interest and raising political costs.
 
Civil society actors must continue leveraging their collective power to compel, for instance, financial institutions and logistics companies to reassess their participation in arms transfers associated with human rights risks. By increasing reputational and legal pressures on both public and private entities, their advocacy can drive policy reforms, divestments, and the implementation of stronger human rights safeguards.
 
Looking ahead to 2026
 
The global security environment is in a period of profound instability due to escalating conflicts, intensifying rearmament, and accelerating technological change. Against this backdrop, 2026 will be a critical inflection point.
 
Safeguarding human rights in 2026 will depend on the willingness and capacity of non-state actors in the arms sector to act when states fail to do so. By exercising their influence and mobilising collective action, corporations, citizen movements and civil society organisations can play a decisive role in reversing the alarming erosion of human rights protection in the arms trade.
Hiruni Alwishewa is an independent researcher and expert in arms control, human rights, and corporate responsibility.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Projected Civilian Harm from Explosive Violence in 2026

12/17/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Iain Overton
Picture
Niamh Gillen

​Looking ahead to 2026, the global risk posed to civilians by explosive weapons is unlikely to diminish in any meaningful or sustained way. While overall levels of explosive violence may stabilise or decline in selected theatres, this should not be interpreted as a reduction in civilian harm. Instead, the defining characteristic of explosive violence in 2026 is likely to be its increasing intensity and concentration, with fewer incidents but with those producing higher levels of civilian casualties, particularly in populated areas.

Recent data already point to this trajectory. Globally, explosive incidents have declined, and civilian casualties in 2025 fell in aggregate compared to 2024. However, civilians harmed per incident increased. Each use of an explosive weapon is, on average, more destructive to civilian life than the year before. We expect this pattern to continue into 2026, driven by changes in how explosive weapons are deployed and boosted by a failure to see much in the way of improvements in civilian protection.

In practical terms, it’s likely then that 2026 will not be defined by a universal escalation of violence, but by a consolidation of harm. Explosive weapons will continue to be used in urban and semi-urban settings, against infrastructure closely linked to civilian survival, including housing, energy systems, transport routes and humanitarian facilities. Against this, it seems that even a modest reduction in attack frequency would be unlikely to translate into proportional reductions in civilian suffering.

Ukraine is a place where this dynamic will be most clearly felt. Despite a slight reduction in the number of recorded explosive incidents in 2025 there, civilian casualties increased, particularly injuries. This suggests explosive weapons are being used in ways that generate greater harm per strike, whether through the selection of targets, the use of higher-yield munitions, or attacks on infrastructure whose failure disproportionately affects civilians.

In Gaza, AOAV anticipates a continuation of the current pattern of constrained but persistent explosive violence. Ceasefires and pauses in hostilities have reduced civilian casualty totals, but explosive weapon use continues. This suggests that the risk environment for civilians remains largely unchanged. In 2026, civilians are therefore likely to continue to experience regular exposure to explosive violence, even in the absence of large-scale offensives, this may be through unexploded ordnance, or less frequent but still consistent use of explosive weapons by Israel. 

Sudan presents the most acute and immediate concern. Explosive weapons use has increased, alongside sharp rises in civilian casualties and deaths. AOAV sees no clear indicators that this trend will reverse in 2026. Announcements of ceasefires have not, to date, translated into reduced explosive violence, and the targeting of civilian areas, including displacement camps and urban neighbourhoods, is likely to continue.

Myanmar is expected to remain volatile, with continued increases in explosive incidents but fluctuating civilian casualty figures. Any apparent reductions in civilian casualties should be interpreted with caution. The number of civilians harmed per incident remains consistently high, indicating that explosive attacks, when they occur, continue to have severe consequences. Similarly to attacks seen in Sudan, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure across Myanmar continue to be targeted, leading to huge casualty tolls.   

Beyond these high-profile conflicts, AOAV assesses that 2026 carries a significant risk of escalation in contexts that have previously received less international attention. Pakistan stands out. Recent increases in explosive violence and civilian casualties, linked in part to cross-border dynamics, suggest a heightened risk, with relations with neighbouring Afghanistan becoming increasingly strained. Should regional tensions intensify, explosive violence in Pakistan in 2026 could produce substantially higher civilian harm than in previous years.

Yemen presents a concern, too. While often described as a frozen conflict, recent spikes in explosive violence driven by a small number of air strikes resulted in very high civilian casualty levels. 

Taken together, the principal risk in 2026 lies not in a sudden global escalation, but in the normalisation of highly destructive explosive violence against civilians. The continued use of explosive weapons in civilian environments, combined with rising harm per incident, points to a year in which fewer attacks nonetheless produce deeper and more enduring civilian suffering. 

Without meaningful restraint on the use of such weapons, 2026 is likely to reinforce, rather than reverse, this trajectory.
Iain Overton is Executive Director at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence. 

Niamh Gillen is an explosive violence researcher at Action on Armed Violence, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.


Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list / emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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The Next Frontier of Conflict: Why 3D-Printed Weapons Will Demand Attention in 2026

12/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Monalisa Hazarika
Introduction

In recent years, assumptions about the limitations of additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, in weapons production have been steadily challenged. What was once viewed as a technological novelty, useful mainly for prototypes and hobbyist projects, has evolved into a proliferating trend in the design and manufacture of weapons, now appearing in both conflict and non-conflict settings. From the inclusion of the FGC-9 in the arsenals of the People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar to the seizure of 3D-printed firearms, magazines, and ammunition by law enforcement in Australia, 3D-printed weapons have gained growing appeal among criminals, extremist groups, and even conventional militaries facing supply-chain constraints. Whether in the hands of private individuals seeking to bypass traditional arms markets, insurgent groups innovating under resource scarcity, or military forces experimenting with on-demand logistics, 3D printing is steadily carving out space in the global arms landscape.

However, across these groups and cases, the motivations differ: bypassing traditional arms markets, enhancing operational resilience, generating symbolic or propaganda value, or pursuing necessity-driven innovation in resource-limited warfare. Yet the trend is unmistakable—what was once an experimental practice is rapidly evolving and revamping its status from peripheral curiosity to an emerging challenge within modern security architecture. And this is only the beginning.

What’s Printable?: Current Capabilities of 3D-Printed Weaponry

3D printing is beginning to alter how weapons are produced and deployed. Open-access designs now allow firearms and military components to be manufactured outside traditional supply chains, accelerating their spread and availability. While seizures have risen sharply since 2021, 3D printing is also gaining traction on the battlefield, where state and non-state forces are testing, among other things, drone frames and munitions, firearms components, and front-line repairs for cost, resilience, and operational advantage.

A lot has changed since the release of the 2013 Liberator pistol, which, while fragile and unreliable, was nonetheless a proof of concept that spurred further designs. Over a decade later, designs such as the FGC-9 semiautomatic carbine and the newer Urutau gun have revolutionised this space as they are designed to be built without any regulated parts and can be fabricated entirely with consumer 3D printers and common hardware components. FGC-9, developed by Jacob “JStark1809” Duygu and first released in 2020, has been adopted by fighters in the Myanmar civil war, where People’s Defence Forces such as the KNDF and Salingyi Special Task Force have used these weapons amid ammunition shortages. Another emerging and increasingly debated development is the prospect of 3D-printed ammunition, including experimental discussions around 9mm hollow-point rounds. While open-source, peer-reviewed literature on the successful 3D printing of bullets remains limited, online forums, blogs, and media platforms already host extensive discussions exploring the feasibility of such ammunition, underscoring how innovation in this space is often driven outside formal research or regulatory scrutiny.

However, the implications extend well beyond small arms. 3D printing is increasingly applied to drones, allowing airframes, release mechanisms, and other components to be printed on demand. This lowers costs, bypasses import restrictions, and gives its users a new degree of flexibility. What began as an experiment is fast becoming a practical tool of modern conflict, which in recent years has been seen in battlefields around the world. In Ukraine, volunteer engineers and organisations are producing drone-related hardware and munitions with AM technologies. According to recent research, 3D-printed fins and sabots are attached to grenades or explosive payloads dropped from small drones, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield. Other reports highlight the manufacture of drones like the Liberator-MK1 and MK2, a fixed-wing aircraft with a 3D-printed frame reinforced with fiberglass that can carry up to 1.5kg of explosives, used by anti-junta rebels in Myanmar. In Yemen, the Houthis militia is known to 3D-print parts of drones and missiles, while a recent UN report revealed Al-Shabaab in Somalia experimenting with 3D printing to manufacture components for adaptation of commercial unmanned aerial systems.

3D printing also extends to bombs, grenades, and other munitions. Combatants have begun manufacturing explosive devices using 3D-printed casings, fins, and stabilizing components. Notable examples include so-called “candy bombs” with 3D-printed shells filled with conventional explosives such as C4 and shrapnel; the RKG-1600 munition, modified with 3D-printed stabilizing fins and tail cones; 3D-printed mortar baseplates and stabilizers; and various components used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Beyond complete weapons, 3D printing is also used to produce parts and accessories, including pistol and rifle magazines, grips, receivers, machine gun conversion devices (MCDs), and customised equipment such as drone landing pads and components for the Gripen fighter jet.

The diffusion of AM is rapidly blurring the line between civilian and military capabilities. Commercial 3D printers, widely accessible and inexpensive, now enable the production of weapons and battlefield-relevant components, placing unprecedented strain on regulatory and law-enforcement systems. Traditional interdiction strategies built around controlling physical supply chains are becoming increasingly ineffective against decentralized, digital manufacturing. From crowdfunding weapons production to disrupted plots of mass shootings using 3D printed guns, recent cases show how quickly radicalization can pair with capability. The barrier to entry is no longer engineering expertise, but access to the internet, building materials, and time, raising urgent questions for domestic and international security alike.

Looking Ahead to 2026

As 2026 approaches, strategists warn that increasingly sophisticated polymer and mixed‑material 3D‑printed firearms will be ever harder to trace or regulate. As digital blueprints for weapons become increasingly democratized, states must review their national legislation to address the emerging threats. This would require criminalizing unauthorized production and the illicit possession, transfer, and dissemination of digital design files, in line with the UN Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action, alongside the adoption of robust national deactivation standards. Experts emphasize that the priority of 2026 should be cross-sectoral collaboration and strengthening cooperation by bringing technical expertise into policy spaces, updating national laws to address digitally enabled weapons, strengthening law enforcement capacity to detect and investigate privately made firearms, enhancing knowledge sharing, and embedding “design‑against‑crime” safeguards into weapons manufacturing. 

Thankfully, these threats are no longer off the radar and are on the agenda of diplomats, lawmakers, and research networks worldwide. The UN Programme of Action has mandated an Open‑Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG), scheduled to meet in June 2026, to address challenges posed by polymer and modular weapons and 3D printing, as well as related tracing difficulties arising from those innovations. Research institutes such as UNIDIR are hosting a series of online briefings to support substantive preparations for the OETEG, engaging the diplomatic community that will be involved in the expert meetings during the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS9). Complementary progress is also underway within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Through the Firearms Protocol and Resolution 12/3 (2024) of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, states have acknowledged emerging challenges linked to privately made firearms and new production methods, including 3D printing, and have encouraged strengthened legislation, enhanced capacity-building, and improved international cooperation to address these evolving risks.

Growing momentum in coordinated international action, paired with sustained engagement from industry actors, civil society, research bodies, and regional organizations, offers a pathway to ensure regulation keeps pace with technology while reinforcing, not replacing, the effectiveness of existing arms control measures.
Monalisa Hazarika is strategic communications and partnership officer at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University of London, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Why are arms sales likely to increase in 2026?

12/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Tabitha R Agaba
As 2025 draws to a close, arms sales are likely to increase in 2026 because of the increasing geopolitical tensions, from Cambodia and the Philippines in Asia, to the recent calls by some European countries like Germany and France for their young men to join the military in preparation for a possible confrontation with Russia, and the threat of war on Venezuela by the United States.
 
In recent weeks, the U.S. has threatened violence against Nicholas Maduro's government in Venezuela over what it calls a war on drugs. The Trump administration has previously accused the Maduro government as source of drugs that flow into the U.S.. These claims have been followed by the seizing of an Venezuelan oil tanker by the U.S. in addition to the closure of the Venezuelan airspace by the Trump administration in November. In August the U.S. started deploying air and naval forces near the Venezuelan border, including the world's largest aircraft carrier the USS Gerald R. Ford, which is deployed 950km away from the Venezuelan coast according to the BBC (as of December 5).
 
The conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan have persisted in 2025 without a foreseeable solution in 2026, with the M23 armed group in the DRC gaining more ground in Eastern DRC and Uganda having promised to join the conflict should M23 take over Uvira, which it did last week. The fighting in the DRC automatically creates a need for arms whether illegally acquired or not.
 
The conflict in Sudan has intensified between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army (SAF); the United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting the RSF with weaponry.  Important to note is that the UAE, Rwanda, Thailand and the DRC haven't ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, an agreement that guides arms sales, transfers, end use control and overall international trade of arms. 
 
The French president, Emmanuel Macron asked youth above 18 years of age to sign up for a 10-month military training amidst threats of war from Russia; this is a program expected to start in 2026.  The president noted that this is a program whose main objective is to respond to threats from Russia. This voluntary military is not limited to France alone as other countries like Germany have followed suit. In November 2025, Germany voted to introduce voluntary military service.
 
Such calls not only prepare individuals for war but also put pressure for increased military spending in preparation of war. In 2026 there's likely to be an increase in the manufacture and purchase of arms as European countries prepare for a possibility of war with Russia.
 
These are just a few of the possible conflicts likely to arise in addition to the already existing ones. These developments are important to note because they will contribute to military spending in 2026 and some of the conflict actors are non-signatories to the ATT, which is a key component in arms control, and arms diversions are likely to continue.
 
Despite the presence of controls such as the UN arms embargo and the ATT, countries often divert arms to conflict zones such as Chad and the UAE's support for the RSF or Uganda’s arms diversion to South Sudan.
 
An overview of 2026 on the arms trade highlights the gaps that could easily be utilized for countries to access arms despite the numerous measures in place to mitigate them.
Tabitha R Agaba is a freelance writer and researcher based in Uganda, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Looking ahead to 2026: Protecting civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas

12/15/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Laura Boillot
​Over recent years, conflicts around the world have been marked by a devastating pattern of harm: the repeated use of explosive weapons in towns and cities, and the predictable civilian harm that follows. In 2024 alone, two-thirds of all documented incidents of explosive-weapons use occurred in Palestine, while Lebanon, Myanmar, Ukraine, Syria, and Sudan also experienced acute and widespread bombardment. Across these and other contexts, civilians continue to bear the brunt. Children, in particular, are suffering at unprecedented levels: explosive weapons are now the leading cause of child conflict-casualties globally, where more than 60% of child casualties in war zones result from explosive weapons, with nearly 12,000 children killed or injured in 2024 alone - the highest annual figure ever recorded.
 
The data from last year paint an alarming picture. Attacks with explosive weapons on civilian infrastructure and essential services rose sharply. Use of explosive weapons in attacks on healthcare increased by 64 percent, destroying hospitals and ambulances and killing health workers. Healthcare systems collapse as needs surge, yet services remain critically underfunded. Attacks on education more than doubled, directly affecting children already living through trauma. Strikes on humanitarian aid operations occurred nearly five times more frequently than the previous year.
 
These are not abstract statistics - they represent communities cut off from essential services upon which they rely, families trying to keep their loved ones safe, and long-term recovery made immeasurably harder, with an entire generation of children facing life-changing harm and trauma.
 
A wider erosion of norms

The widespread use of explosive weapons in populated areas is one manifestation of a broader erosion of norms protecting civilians in conflict. International rules and long-standing humanitarian disarmament instruments face unprecedented challenges - and in some instances deliberate efforts to roll back protections that have saved lives for decades.

We are witnessing a worrying normalisation of civilian harm - and bombing towns and cities is a consequence of this, frequently met with silence and impunity. This permissive environment reinforces a cycle where the humanitarian consequences of bombing towns and cities persists.

A tool for change: The Political Declaration on EWIPA

The Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, adopted in 2022 sets out  practical measures focussed (to its strength) on addressing the use of EWIPA. It will not bring about change overnight but it does provide a meaningful framework for reducing civilian harm - if states take their commitments seriously.

Certain principles should guide the implementation of the Declaration’s commitments, regardless of the endorsing state involved. States should adopt implementation measures that are humanitarian and progressive; pursue a collaborative, well-informed, and transparent process; and nationally internalise and externally promote the Declaration.

The international meeting held in San José, Costa Rica, in November 2025 offered a crucial moment to assess progress and set direction. What we found was clear: the potential of the Declaration remains largely untapped. Most endorsing states have not yet begun the work of implementation at the national level. To make a difference this must change in 2026.

1. Operationalising the Declaration: turning commitments into practice

Implementation cannot remain rhetorical. States must translate commitments into concrete, measurable policy and practice - and they must do so in ways that explicitly address the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

A critical gap remains the limited engagement of armed forces. Militaries are central stakeholders in this agenda, yet in many countries that have endorsed the Declaration, defence institutions remain disengaged and even cautious of its commitments. This must be a priority for 2026. Dialogue, training, doctrine and operational review, and the development of policies to refrain from the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas are essential.

Tools exist to support this work, including the military implementation toolkit and resources produced by civil society with input from members of armed forces. States do not need to start from scratch. They do, however, need to get started.

2. Addressing humanitarian consequences: meeting the needs of affected communities

Reducing future harm must go hand-in-hand with supporting communities affected by explosive weapon use today. The humanitarian consequences are severe and long-lasting: destroyed infrastructure, unexploded ordnance contamination, disrupted essential services, loss of housing and livelihoods, and widespread physical and psychological trauma. The environmental impacts of explosive weapons - including contamination, damaged water and sanitation systems, and toxic debris - further compound humanitarian crises and threaten public health unless addressed as part of response and recovery efforts.

In many contexts, access constraints further impede the delivery of life-saving assistance, while repeated attacks on healthcare facilities undermine already fragile systems and leave survivors without the treatment, rehabilitation, or mental health support they need. Communities also require sustained investment in explosive ordnance risk education and preparedness to stay safe amid ongoing bombardment, alongside protection measures that reach women, older people, persons with disabilities, and other groups facing heightened risks.

A major gap persists between the Declaration’s commitments and the scale of humanitarian response being put into practice. States should increase support for victim assistance, clearance, reconstruction, and rehabilitation—guided by affected communities. The assessments of humanitarian implementation highlight clear pathways for strengthening this dimension of the Declaration. More must be done, and urgently.

3. Speaking out: building a norm against bombing populated areas

Norms strengthen when states speak clearly and consistently. Critiquing harmful practices and condemning the use of explosive weapons in populated areas - regardless of who is responsible - is an essential tool for influencing behaviour.

Too often, silence or selectivity undermines efforts to build a global standard. In 2026, we urge states to reaffirm the core humanitarian principle at the heart of the Declaration: that the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in cities is unacceptable because of the foreseeable civilian harm. Challenging the status quo is not only possible - it is necessary to reverse the slide toward the normalisation of civilian suffering.

4. Strengthening the multistakeholder approach

Effectively addressing the humanitarian consequences of explosive weapons in populated areas depends on drawing together the practical insights and experiences of armed forces with the field experience of humanitarian organisations, the perspectives of survivors and affected communities, and the expertise of civil society and international bodies. Collaboration is essential not only because it aligns diverse actors around shared humanitarian goals, but also because joint action and knowledge pooling helps ensure that implementation is informed, inclusive, and grounded in real needs. Working together delivers practical benefits - from improving victim assistance and clearing unexploded ordnance to strengthening data-sharing, crisis planning, and reconstruction efforts. This approach is already being demonstrated through the multistakeholder dialogue processes convened by Humanity & Inclusion and Article 36, which have brought together militaries, humanitarian actors, and affected communities to explore practical pathways for implementing the Declaration’s humanitarian and military commitments, generating a series of concrete recommendations for states.

Inclusive dialogue supports the drive for meaningful change within military institutions, ensures the relevance of humanitarian guidance, and grounds policy and practice in the lived experiences of civilians who have survived harm. It also strengthens ownership of the Declaration’s commitments by fostering buy-in from a broader range of actors, making implementation more durable and effective. In 2026, this collaborative approach will be essential to sustaining momentum.

5. Building momentum through national engagement and international opportunities

Both the San José outcome document and this year’s implementation assessments underscore the need for structured, national-level engagement. It is at this level that implementation happens.

At the international level, there are also several important opportunities that lie ahead and which provide opportunities for engagement: Austria’s planned workshop on military training in spring 2026; engagement with African states through a universalisation workshop in Ghana; among other planned exchanges among states and organisations.

States can also draw on a growing range of tools, case studies, and experiences - including civil-society reports, and experiences and lessons shared by states in San José to inform their work.

Looking forward

We enter 2026 with an urgent need to address the widespread civilian harm from EWIPA. The scale of civilian harm caused by explosive weapons in populated areas is unacceptable, but it is something we can take tangible steps to address. The Political Declaration gives states a framework to act, it is now up to endorsing states to put it into practice.
​
This year must be the moment when commitments move off from being words on paper and into military planning and the conduct of operations, humanitarian programming and response, and political leadership by states over the world we want to live in. Civilians living in conflict cannot wait any longer.
Laura Boillot is Director, Article 36.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Event Report -  Armed Networks:  Understanding the Nexus of Illicit Firearms and Organized Crime Across Continents (November 13, 2025)

11/21/2025

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On November 13, the Forum on the Arms Trade hosted an event to explore the nexus between illicit firearms and organized crime across two regions: Southeast Asia and East Africa. Hosted on the margins of the International Day Against Transnational Organized Crime, experts outlined how firearms trafficking overlaps with other crimes, examples of smuggling routes and actors involved, and regional factors that shape these dynamics. In their presentations, they provided a broad understanding of the convergences in violence and illicit economies, while identifying shared challenges and distinct patterns across the regions. During the Q&A, the experts offered valuable insights into the nuances of SALW circulation, highlighting the layered actors and factors shaping consumer–producer dynamics. Their reflections also introduced a fresh way of understanding ‘organised crime’ and ‘trafficking,’ drawing attention to the complex intersections of trade, survival, and security.
​
Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/jmCZ_KK1Tuk 
Panelists
  • Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow with the China Program at the Stimson Center
  • Khristopher Carlson, Senior Researcher and Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations

Reflecting on the current gaps in policy and research, they shared the following recommendations:

1. Integrating informal networks into the analysis of illicit arms flows, not just formal ‘criminal’ actors.  

In East Africa, the networks that move weapons often overlap with legitimate economic and social systems, such as livestock trading, cross-border and seasonal migration, community protection, and local governance. Effective interventions must account for these overlapping livelihood and protection networks rather than treat illicit arms flows as the work of purely criminal groups.

2. Treat illicit arms control as a governance issue, not only a law-enforcement problem.

Disruption of illicit arms flows occurs where the local authority is legitimate and trusted. Effective policy responses should therefore strengthen accountable governance in peripheral and pastoral areas where the state is either absent, lacks capacity, or is predatory. Identifying legitimate local authorities is key in this regard.

3. Improve Oversight of Financial Flows Linked to Illicit Markets

Efforts to curb illicit SALWs would benefit from stronger oversight of financial systems that enable the acquisition and movement of weapons. Support for national authorities in meeting anti–money laundering and counter-terror finance standards can help close gaps identified by international bodies. As many transactions now move through cryptocurrencies, online scams, and informal remittance systems, targeted technical assistance and partnerships with digital service providers would be useful.

4. Reduce Diversion Risks Through Stockpile Management and Localized Engagement

Limiting diversion of small arms and ammunition requires continued investment in secure stockpile management and transparent inventory systems. Capacity-building in these areas, aligned with national priorities, can help reduce accidental leakage in challenging operating environments. Engagement with local governance actors, including those involved in ceasefire arrangements, may also strengthen awareness of diversion risks in border and transit areas.

Suggested resources
  • “Transnational Organized Crime – The Globalized Illegal Economy,” United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
  • “Illicit weapons fuelling conflicts worldwide, officials warn,” UN News, November 10, 2025
  • “Firearms and Drugs: Partners in Transnational Crime”, UNODC – Flemish Peace Institute, 2024
  • “Beyond legacy weapons: South East Asia’s illicit arms trade is diversifying”, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, June 25, 2025
  • Lauren Pinson, “Addressing the linkages between illicit arms, organized crime and armed conflict,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2022 
  • Nicolas Florquin, Sigrid Lipott, and Francis Wairagu, “Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa” Small Arms Survey, January 2019

* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.
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Event Report - “Challenges and Opportunities Posed by New Technologies and Innovation in SALW Control” (May 22, 2025)

5/28/2025

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About

On May 22, the Forum on the Arms Trade hosted an event to explore the technological advancements – such as 3D printing, modular weapon designs, polymer components, and the proliferation of online platforms – that have transformed the landscape of small arms and light weapons (SALW) manufacturing and distribution. Experts examined how such innovations present both significant challenges and unique opportunities for arms control regulation, exploring how international regulatory instruments and national practices can adapt to the evolving technological environment. Followed by an engaging Q/A, the experts presented recommendations and best practices for the upcoming Open-Ended Technical Experts Group (OETG), which is scheduled to convene within the week of the Biennial Meetings of States (BMS) in 2026 and 2028, to consider the challenges posed by recent and ongoing developments in weapons manufacturing, technology, and design, and explore potential opportunities to strengthen the implementation of the Program of Action (UN PoA) and its International Tracing Instrument (ITI). 

Speakers

  • Nicolas Florquin, Head, Data and Analytics Unit, Small Arms Survey
  • Matilde Vecchioni, Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
  • Frida Thomassen, Political Affairs Officer, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
  • Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)

Video

A recording of the event is available at https://youtu.be/SZc6k7Wf4DY?t=163
Recommendations and Resources 

Panelists provided the following recommendations and suggested resources during the event or in the drafting of this report.

Nicolas Florquin, Head, Data and Analytics Unit, Small Arms Survey

Recommendations
  • Technical measures coordinated under a strategic vision can offer some promising mitigation strategies that are important for the short to medium term, drawing upon experiences from regional contexts and other mechanisms. Some examples/factors include:
    • Resolution 12/3 (2024) of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime includes recommendations related to the regulation of 3D printed firearm blueprints, the need for specialized training for law enforcement and regulatory authorities, the need to develop capacities to detect and investigate privately made firearms (PMFs), and information sharing. 
    • Existing and new sectors/groups that have expertise or need to be considered are law enforcement and forensic experts, postal services (due to the use of parcels for trafficking PMF parts, etc.), public health sector, non-traditional groups not previously engaged in firearms-related criminal activities (for instance folks doing it as a challenge and others motivated by niche political ideologies) as well as youth, including minors, for which educators and parents are important.
    • Ideas such as “design against crime” to incorporate crime prevention features in new technologies.
  • We need to consider how to make the knowledge sharing more permanent and give the international community the means to be much more responsive and to anticipate some developments. The OETG will therefore need to consider whether the latest trends in PMFs should be integrated more systematically and in the long run in the UN PoA process and future BMSes, or another appropriate forum. This would allow for information sharing to occur on a regular basis and in the long term, and regional organisations and the law enforcement/forensic communities can play important roles in this longer term surveillance.
  • We musn't forget that legally manufactured industrial weapons still represent the bulk of seized firearms and by a margin in most places, and so while we need to tackle the threat of PMFs, the need to implement existing and well established measures to control industrially made weapons remains crucial.

Suggested resources
  • “The growing and multifaceted global threat of privately made and other non-industrial small arms and light weapons,”  Small Arms Survey, Instituto Sou da Paz, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), June 2024.
  • Yulia Yarina and Nicolas Florquin, “Dangerous Devices: Privately Made Firearms in the Caribbean,” Small Arms Survey, June 2024.
  • Matt Schroeder, Nicolas Florquin, Anne-Séverine Fabre, and Andrea Edoardo Varisco, “Privately Made Firearms in the European Union,” INSIGHT Project, Small Arms Survey, December 2023.
  • Julien Joly and Aline Shaban, “Between Tradition and the Law: Artisanal Firearm Production in West Africa,” Small Arms Survey, November 2023.
  • Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Blocking the Blueprint: Technological Barriers Against 3D-Printed Firearms,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, November 2024.
  • Small Arms Survey webpage on privately made firearms


Matilde Vecchioni, Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Recommendations
  • There is a need to bridge the gap in knowledge that exists between the technical community and diplomatic and policy circles on the current realities and developments in illicit SALW manufacturing. Technical experts, research institutions and civil society organizations have advanced knowledge about key trends, technologies, and actors in this domain. It is therefore critical, in preparation to the OETG, to ensure that platforms are provided for this technical knowledge to reach the diplomatic community.
  • The improvement of existing legislative frameworks and national regulatory approaches needs to be informed by disaggregated and up-to-date data. Enhancing law enforcement agencies capacity to collect and record – in a centralized and consistent manner – data on craft-produced SALW and components is fundamental. It can allow us to identify key national and transnational developments, pinpoint potential trends and improve traceability. On this, it is also critical to leverage good practices and effective legislative measures from national contexts and provide opportunities for these to be shared within and across regions.
  • Social media platforms and online service providers are key actors to engage. From an operational perspective, enhancing monitoring and patrolling of online spaces represents a promising strategy to prevent illicit manufacturing and to improve law enforcement’s awareness of emerging trends and tactics. Establishing cooperative relationships and open dialogue with social media providers can significantly support these objectives.
  • Technologies – such as 2D codes, chemical encoding, RFID, DLT, AI – can present significant opportunities for preventing or countering diversion in international conventional arms transfer control. However, their application requires a multi-step, needs-driven and context-specific approach. A dialogue among all relevant stakeholders remains critical, and should include the technology development companies, the industrial sectors which would need to deploy and adapt to such technologies, civil society, and state representatives.

Suggested resources
  • Matilde Vecchioni, “Unregulated Production: Examining Craft-Produced Weapons from a Global Perspective,” UNIDIR, June 2024.
  • Matilde Vecchioni, “Addressing the proliferation of improvised and craft-produced weapons: Why should we care?” UNIDIR, October 2022.
  • Sarah Grand-Clément, “Assessing Technologies to Counter the Diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” UNIDIR and Flemish Peace Institute, June 2024.
  • Sarah Grand-Clément and Diederik Cops,“Technologies to Counter the Diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Components of Conventional Weapons,”  UNIDIR and Flemish Peace Institute, August 2023.
  • Rueben Dass, “3D-Printed Firearms: Global Proliferation Trends and Analyses,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–35, May 2025.

Frida Thomassen, Political Affairs Officer, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Recommendations
  • For the the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group (OETG) to be successful, we need to:
    • Prioritize well informed preparatory and intersessional work, including expert seminars and consultations, to build momentum and support consensus-building ahead of formal meetings that are only 2-3 days in 2026 and 2028.
    • Actively support participation from all Member States through sponsorships, preparatory capacity-building across regions.
    • Ensure inclusive practices, including through gender balance on delegations as well as youth engagement in the process.
    • Encourage States to share effective practices and lessons learned to bridge regulatory, capacity, and technological gaps between States. 
    • Utilizing  the OETG as a platform to bring technical expertise closer to political processes, and encourage a whole-of government approach to the issue of illicit SALW. 
    • Involve relevant subject matter experts from civil society, academia, and the private sector, through briefings and consultations to enrich the group’s technical understanding.
    • Focus on developing practical recommendations that will meet consensus preferably in 2028 and latest 2030. ​​

​Suggested resources
  • Final report of Programme of Action on SALW Fourth Review Conference (Outcome Document with OETG mandate in Annex) – A/CONF.192/2024/RC/3 – 2024.
  • Side event on the OETG during First Committee, 2024. See article on this and other relevant developments   
  • Chair's Summary of the Second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on developments in SALW, 2015


The Forum on the Arms Trade provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position. Videos and resources about events are available online.
​
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Final Report — Webinar "Arms Control and Human Rights: Connecting Agendas" (April 22, 2025)

5/2/2025

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Introduction

On April 22, 2025, the webinar "Arms Control and Human Rights: Connecting Agendas" was held, organized by Control Arms in collaboration with the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Asociación para las Políticas Públicas (Association for Public Policies).

The seminar examined the link between the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and efforts to address serious human rights violations, exploring examples such as:
  • The 2023 advisory opinion led by Mexico,
  • The impact of arms transfers on the Haitian crisis,
  • The role of transparency in strengthening human rights.

Participants
  • María Pía Devoto, Director, Asociación para las Políticas Públicas
  • Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico
  • Kim Lamberty, Executive Director, Quixote Center
  • Sol Zoe Nottage, Associate Researcher, ATT Monitor
Recording Guide (with timestamps)

00:04:09 – General commentary by María Pía Devoto on the relationship between Human Rights and arms transfers
  • Differences between arms trafficking, smuggling, and diversion.
  • Regional context: high firearm-related homicide rates.
  • Prevalence of legally owned firearms diverted to criminal activities.
  • Explanation of Article 11 of the ATT.
  • Setbacks in human rights in Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Haiti.

Question 1: Overview of risks, challenges, and issues regarding arms transfers in the cases of Mexico and Haiti

00:12:29 – Presentation by Kim Lamberty (Haiti):
  • Description of the severe crisis in Haiti, marked by armed gangs controlling territories.
  • Customs and state corruption facilitating arms entry.
  • Humanitarian impact: internal displacement, child recruitment, widespread sexual violence.

00:20:21 – Presentation by Pablo Arrocha (Mexico):
  • Lack of effective regulation at the U.S. border.
  • Impact of arms trafficking on organized crime violence.
  • Need to strengthen bilateral cooperation mechanisms and legal strategies.

Question 2: What are the solutions to mitigate illicit arms transfers?

00:33:29 – Kim Lamberty:
  • Pressuring governments to enhance border controls.
  • Expanding the volume of firearms traced.
  • Improving inter-agency collaboration within the United States.

00:39:38 – Pablo Arrocha:
  • Explanation of Mexico’s strategy based on strategic litigation in U.S. courts.
  • Description of parallel actions before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to reinforce a human rights approach.
  • Analyzing the full life cycle of a firearm to understand how they reach Mexico.

00:51:19 – Comment by María Pía Devoto:
  • Emphasis on the importance of transparency in arms transfers as a preventive mechanism.
  • Transparency as a means to prevent and mitigate human rights violations.

00:52:39 – Presentation by Sol Zoe Nottage:
  • Presentation on the importance of transparency within the ATT framework.
  • Analysis of States' reporting levels and their relationship to accountability in human rights.

Q&A SessionQuestion 1: How can civil society effectively address threats linked to irresponsible arms transfers? (01:00:38)
  • Response by Pablo Arrocha (01:02:56)
  • Response by Kim Lamberty (01:06:04)

Question 2: Which entities use corruption to illicitly traffic arms into Haiti? (01:07:28)
  • Response by Kim Lamberty (01:10:03)

Question 3: What could the ATT do to address internal diversion of arms? What would be the next step if Mexico's litigation strategy is successful? (01:11:00)
  • Response by Pablo Arrocha (01:13:00)

Question 4: What has changed in Haiti over the past 20 years and what was missing to prevent the current situation? (01:18:10)
  • Response by Kim Lamberty (01:20:32)

Question 5: Are lawsuits enough to change the narrative around arms in the U.S.? (01:22:23)
  • Response by Pablo Arrocha (01:24:33)

Final Reflections
01:31:00 – Sol Zoe Nottage:
  • Stressed the need for States to be transparent and highlighted the advantages of transparency for human rights protection.

01:32:27 – Pablo Arrocha:
  • Stated that the ATT must be revitalized as an ongoing process and not just seen as a past achievement.
  • Called for strengthening multilateralism in arms control.

01:36:42 – Kim Lamberty:
  • Emphasized the importance of amplifying the visibility of illegal arms trafficking and its humanitarian consequences, especially in crises like Haiti.


Presentations

Presentation used by Sol Zoe Nottage:
Implementing the ATT in the Americas: Transparency as a Means to Prevent and Mitigate Human Rights Violations.
https://www.canva.com/design/DAGkuwYqjio/GMByCdhkcroJTduBET9VrQ/edit?utm_content=DAGkuwYqjio&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link2&utm_source=sharebutton

Additional Resources

ATT Monitor. (2024). Chapter 2.1: Annual Report Analysis. Control Arms. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_2024_Chapter-2.1.pdf

Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, & Partners in Health. (2024, March). CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEXVaCX5Lf8

Human Rights Watch. (2024, November 25). Haiti: Scarce protection as sexual violence escalates. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/25/haiti-scarce-protection-sexual-violence-escalates

Quixote Center. (2024). Petition to DHS to end weapons trafficking. https://quixote.org/action#/18

ATT Monitor. (2024). ATT Arms Transfers Dashboard. https://attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard/​
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Reporte Final — Webinar "Control de armas y derechos humanos: Conectando agendas" (22 de abril de 2025)

5/1/2025

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Introducción

El 22 de abril de 2025 se llevó a cabo el webinar "Control de armas y derechos humanos: Conectando agendas", organizado por Control Arms en colaboración con Forum on the Arms Trade y la Asociación para las Políticas Públicas. El seminario examinó el vínculo entre el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (TCA) y los esfuerzos para abordar graves violaciones de derechos humanos, explorando ejemplos como:
  • La opinión consultiva de 2023 impulsada por México,
  • El impacto de las transferencias de armas en la crisis haitiana,
  • Y el rol de la transparencia en el fortalecimiento de derechos humanos.

​Participantes
  • María Pía Devoto, Directora, Asociación para las Políticas Públicas
  • Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, Asesor Jurídico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de México
  • Kim Lamberty, Directora Ejecutiva, Quixote Center
  • Sol Zoe Nottage, Investigadora Asociada, ATT Monitor
Guía de la grabación (con marcas de tiempo)

00:03:30 – Comentario general sobre la relación entre Derechos Humanos y transferencias de armas a cargo de María Pía Devoto
  • Diferencias entre tráfico, contrabando y desvío de armas.
  • Contexto regional: gran cantidad de homicidios per cápita por causa de las armas de fuego.
  • Predominio de armas legales desviadas hacia actividades criminales.
  • Explicación del Artículo 11 del TCA
  • Retrocesos en derechos humanos en Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela y Haití.

Pregunta 1: Visión de riesgos, desafíos y problemas en relación a las transferencias de armas en los casos de México y Haití

00:12:10 – Exposición Kim Lamberty (Haití):
  • Descripción de la grave crisis en Haití, marcada por el control de territorios por parte de bandas armadas.
  • Corrupción aduanera y estatal que facilita la entrada de armas.
  • Impacto humanitario: desplazamiento interno, reclutamiento infantil, violencia sexual generalizada.

00:20:34 – Exposición Pablo Arrocha (México):  
  • Falta de regulación efectiva en la frontera estadounidense.
  • Impacto del tráfico de armas en la violencia del crimen organizado.
  • Necesidad de fortalecer mecanismos de cooperación bilateral y estrategias jurídicas.

Pregunta 2: ¿Cuáles son las soluciones para mitigar las transferencias ilícitas de armas?

00:33:30 – Kim Lamberty:
  • Presionar a los gobiernos para aumentar los controles en fronteras
  • Ampliar el volumen de armas analizadas para su trazabilidad
  • Mejorar la colaboración entre distintas agencias gubernamentales en Estados Unidos. 

00:39:36 – Pablo Arrocha:
  • Explica la estrategia de México basada en el litigio estratégico en cortes estadounidenses.
  • Describe acciones paralelas ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos para reforzar el enfoque en derechos humanos.
  • Analizar el ciclo completo del arma para observar cómo llegan a México.

00:50:46 – Comentario María Pía Devoto:
  • Subraya la importancia de la transparencia en las transferencias de armas como mecanismo de prevención.

Transparencia como medio para prevenir y mitigar las violaciones de los derechos humanos

00:52:35 – Exposición Sol Zoe Nottage:
  • Presentación sobre la importancia de la transparencia en el marco del TCA.
  • Análisis de los niveles de reporte de los Estados y su relación con la rendición de cuentas en materia de derechos humanos.

Sesión de preguntas y respuestas (Q&A)

Pregunta 1: ¿Cómo puede la sociedad civil abordar eficazmente las amenazas vinculadas a transferencias irresponsables de armas? (01:00:48)
  • Respuesta Pablo Arrocha (01:02:50)
  • Respuesta Kim Lamberty (01:06:02)

Pregunta 2: ¿Cuáles son las entidades que utilizan la corrupción para traficar ilícitamente armas en Haití? (01:09:39)   
  • Respuesta Kim Lamberty (01:10:04)

Pregunta 3: ¿Qué se podría hacer desde el TCA para abordar el desvío interno de armas? ¿Y cuál sería el siguiente paso si la estrategia de litigios de México es exitosa? (01:12:15)
  • Respuesta Pablo Arrocha (01:13:10)

Pregunta 4: ¿Qué cambió en los últimos 20 años en Haití y qué faltó para evitar la situación actual? (01:19:25)
  • Respuesta Kim Lamberty (01:20:32)

Pregunta 5: ¿Son suficientes los litigios para cambiar la narrativa sobre armas en EE.UU.? (01:24:07)
  • Respuesta Pablo Arrocha (01:24:48)

Reflexiones finales
  • 01:31:00 – Sol Zoe Nottage:
    Subrayó la necesidad de que los Estados sean transparentes y las ventajas de la transparencia para el ejercicio de los derechos humanos.
  • 01:32:08 – Pablo Arrocha:
    Señaló que el TCA debe ser revitalizado como un proceso permanente y no solo un logro pasado.  Llamó a fortalecer el multilateralismo en el control de armas.
  • 01:35:55 – Kim Lamberty:
    Recordó la importancia de amplificar la visibilidad del tráfico de armas ilegales y sus consecuencias humanitarias, especialmente en crisis como la de Haití.

Presentaciones 

Presentación usada por Sol Zoe Nottage: Implementando el TCA en las Américas: transparencia como medio para prevenir y mitigar las violaciones de los derechos humanos.
https://www.canva.com/design/DAGkuwYqjio/GMByCdhkcroJTduBET9VrQ/edit?utm_content=DAGkuwYqjio&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link2&utm_source=sharebutton

Recursos complementarios

ATT Monitor. (2024). Chapter 2.1: Annual Report Analysis. Control Arms. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_2024_Chapter-2.1.pdf

Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, & Partners in Health. (2024, March). CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the rights of Haitian women & girls: Haiti’s transition & beyond [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEXVaCX5Lf8

Human Rights Watch. (2024, November 25). Haiti: Scarce protection as sexual violence escalates. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/25/haiti-scarce-protection-sexual-violence-escalates

Quixote Center. (2024). Petition to DHS to end weapons trafficking. https://quixote.org/action#/18

ATT Monitor. (2024). ATT Arms Transfers Dashboard. https://attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard/

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    About

    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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