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Grappling with End-Use Monitoring

1/8/2024

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This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Dylan Cordle
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Jen Spindel

In last year’s Looking Ahead series, John Chappell presaged renewed attention to end-use monitoring in arms transfers. As we look ahead to 2024, we argue that US arms transfers to Ukraine pose significant challenges for end-use monitoring, and that meeting these challenges will require new thinking and practices in end-use monitoring.

End-use monitoring (EUM) in the US is mandated by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act and is implemented by the Department of Defense (Golden Sentry for foreign military sales) and the Department of State (Blue Lantern for direct commercial sales). These programs have encountered difficulties in Ukraine, because “the conflict makes it impractical to request the return of equipment from the front lines to depots or other locations where US government personnel can inspect them in a safer environment.” While there is no reliable evidence of misuse of arms, Ukrainian intelligence did recover US-provided arms that were temporarily diverted by a Russian criminal organization. In May 2023, the Department of Defense Inspector General found that there was not an up-to-date list of EUM-designated arms.

Why End-Use Monitoring?

EUM is supposed to protect US weapons and technology from misuse or diversion. The nightmare scenarios are arms being sent on to a third party, and then being used in ways that are counter to US interest; or arms being captured and turned against US forces or the reverse-engineering of advanced US technology.

Despite EUM infrastructure, there have been notable failures in end-use monitoring. This is especially the case in covert assistance programs such as CIA-led Operations Cyclone (1979-89) and Timber Sycamore (2013-2017). In both cases, advanced weapons systems provided by the US to allied non-state actor groups were lost, stolen, or were ultimately used against the US. Of note, more than 600 of the 2,300 Stinger missiles provided to the Mujahideen in Operation Cyclone were unaccounted for. Javelin and TOW anti-tank missiles provided under Timber Sycamore ended up in the hands of ISIS fighters.

Misuse, loss, unauthorized transfers, and theft of US weapons and equipment have occurred in a host of recipient states. In Guatemala, DoD-provided Jeeps were used to intimidate US embassy officials. A GAO report also found that EUM was not implemented properly, nor were violations or evidence of misuse recorded. EUM also failed to prevent Saudi Arabia from unlawfully transferring US defense articles to non-state groups in Yemen. In some cases, US weapons were used to commit human rights abuses. In Iraq, the DoD failed to keep tabs on over a billion dollars' worth of arms and equipment. Items such as drones, armored vehicles, and missiles were found in the hands of ISIS fighters and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. When the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, billions of dollars' worth of military equipment was left behind, and the removal of official audit reports from US government websites did little to foster trust and transparency in the EUM regime.

End-Use Monitoring in Ukraine

Many arms the US has given Ukraine are designated for enhanced end-use monitoring, essentially an additional level of scrutiny because of their technology or vulnerability to diversion. Weapons in this category include Stinger missiles, Harpoon missiles, Javelin missiles, night vision devices, and Switchblade drones. The US has not released the exact number of each type of weapon provided, but we do know that more than 10,000 Javelin systems and 2,000 Stinger missiles have been sent to Ukraine.

In October 2022, the DoD stated it was unable to provide EUM because of the limited US presence in Ukraine. Not much changed over the next year: In November 2023, the State Department’s Inspector General noted that many of the items that should have been subject to EUM “were inaccessible or near combat zones.”

Because US personnel are largely unable to conduct EUM, the State Department’s Inspector General explained that there were risks that Russia could acquire sensitive US defense technologies by capturing US equipment. Evidence suggests that Russia has captured various pieces of Western technologies, including Javelin Missiles and even a Bradley fighting vehicle. This presents a distinct danger to US national security when paired with reports that captured equipment is being sent to Iran for reverse engineering. These examples of EUM failure, even though Ukraine is a cooperative partner, mean that 2024 needs to see revisions and updates to EUM policies.

End-Use Monitoring Needs

We suggest two types of changes to meet the challenges, and the need for accuracy and transparency, of EUM. Bureaucratic changes should address communication, resources, and coordination of US EUM efforts, and new technologies can more securely, transparently, and efficiently conduct EUM.

Bureaucratically EUM needs to emphasize use and end. Effective end-use monitoring should entail knowing how the arms are being used, not just where they end up. If the recipient uses arms in ways that violate human rights, incur significant civilian casualties, or greatly increase the risk of diversion, actions must be taken.

Additional bureaucratic needs include decompartmentalization and updating hiring authorities. Could Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry – the current US EUM programs – be combined into a single oversight program? Given the relative budget disparities between the Departments of State and Defense, it could make sense to require all EUM to be coordinated by the Department of Defense. Decompartmentalization would help prevent miscommunications, finger-pointing when things go wrong, and could increase accountability because monitoring would be the purview of one organization. In terms of hiring authorities, EUM programs have been unable to hire the appropriate staff in Ukraine to conduct EUM. An Inspector General's report recommended updating these hiring authorities. Broadly speaking, having more flexible hiring authorities – even if EUM is consolidated into one program – would enable the US to work with local partners in places where EUM is required but the US has a small personnel footprint.

The final bureaucratic need is for formal policies when EUM needs to be conducted in “non-permissive operating conditions.” The State Department Inspector General found that none of the State department bureaus responsible for EUM had formally updated their procedures for EUM in Ukraine. This policy need could be addressed by leveraging technology.

EUM is resource intensive and requires personnel to physically inspect weapons and storage facilities, and interview operators. As the US has seen in Ukraine, this process is incredibly difficult in a war zone. We suggest that EUM could be more effectively and efficiently conducted by leveraging blockchain technology. Speed and accuracy are challenges for EUM during a conflict: you want to minimize the risks to inspectors, but still have an accurate count of where and how weapons are being used. Could the US work to develop an app that uses blockchain technology – which cannot be forged or tampered with – and scanning or photographs to conduct EUM?

There are already examples of private companies and NGOs using blockchain and mobile phone apps to securely store and transmit data. For example, Volvo developed blockchain-based apps to track cobalt mined for its car batteries, with the goal of not using conflict minerals. There are also multiple use cases for nuclear fuel, with programs being developed by GE as well as the Stimson Center. Can the US government develop a similar low-footprint app and scanning system that could reliably and accurately monitor weapons in storage and weapons deployed? Such an app could use scanning and/or photographs of arms, incorporate geographic data, and would be securely stored and transmitted. The blockchain technology means that the US would have a complete record of each weapon that required EUM.

This idea is not as wild as it may sound. Because of the dangers posed by an active war zone, and the lack of US personnel within Ukraine, EUM has relied on cooperation from different Ukrainian offices, as when Ukraine’s national police unit sent photographs back to the State Department for EUM. Instead of seeing cooperation from local partners as a stop-gap measure, developing a scan/picture and tagging system, secured with blockchain, could make this a feasible and secure way to conduct EUM. Additionally, we know that Ukraine has made use of cellphones and apps during the war, and the ubiquity of cellphones means that an app-based program could have fast and wide uptake.

Regardless of how EUM proceeds, the war in Ukraine has revealed some of the weaknesses within current programs, and we envision that 2024 will bring renewed attention to EUM as the US tries to comply with its own legal and ethical guidelines.
 
​
Dylan Cordle is an MA Candidate in Political Science at the University of New Hampshire.

Jen Spindel is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire and expert listed by the Forum.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and the publication of these posts, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Explosive Violence: Projections for 2024

1/5/2024

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This is the first blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2024 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Chiara Torelli
Also available in PDF

​The signing, in November 2022, of Ireland’s Political Declaration on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), raised hopes that the impact of such violence would be curbed in the years to come. However, where 2022 saw a marked rise in the use of explosive weapons against civilians, 2023 saw the levels of harm rise higher still. With at least four high intensity conflicts carrying over into 2024, the picture continues to look bleak.
 
Between December 2022 and November 2023, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 6,904 incidents of explosive weapons use around the world, which caused 28,733 reported civilian casualties (11,501 killed, 17,232 injured). Civilians represented 69% of all 41,820 reported casualties in that time.
 
This marks a 67% increase in reported incidents compared to the same period the year prior, when AOAV picked up 4,133 incidents. Similarly, the number of civilian casualties rose by 42%, from 20,200 civilians reported killed and injured in 2022, while civilian fatalities grew by 69%, from 6,807.
 
Reflecting the increasing use of explosive weapons globally, the number of countries impacted by explosive violence rose by 11%, from 57 countries impacted between December 2021 and November 2022, to 63 between December 2022 and November 2023.
 
The standout trends in 2023 have been the considerable increase in the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the rise in civilian casualties of explosive weapons use by state actors, and a sharp increase in the use of, and harm from, manufactured air-launched explosive weapons.

An explosive year

A number of new conflicts and contained flare ups involving state actors emerged in 2023, causing recorded incidents and civilian casualties to spike. These include Azerbaijan’s offensive in the Karabakh and heightened tensions in Kosovo, as well as catastrophic escalations in Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In Sudan, armed clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued into 2024 despite hopeful steps taken in late December and early this year, while the Israeli military has warned Operation Swords of Iron will continue throughout 2024. This latter conflict has spilt over into neighbouring countries, notably Lebanon, where regular artillery exchanges between the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah have claimed casualties, combatant and civilian, on both sides. Similarly, Israel has targeted Hezbollah and Iranian affiliates in Syria, while Iranian-backed groups have increased attacks on US bases in the country. In Yemen, the Houthis have been targeting ships in the Red Sea and firing missiles towards Israel. Both the Sudanese civil war and Israel’s military operation are likely to loom large in the year to come. On the other hand, Armenia and Azerbaijan recently released a joint statement sharing the view that ‘there is a historical chance to achieve long-awaited peace in the region,’ raising hopes that explosive violence between these two states will decrease.
 
Other conflicts were carried over from 2022, notably armed resistance to the military government in Myanmar, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict between the Ethiopian government and regional armed groups, as well as the longstanding conflicts in Syria and in Yemen, amongst others. While Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDF) units, and allied Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have claimed significant successes in their battle against the military government, the junta’s superior air power is likely to draw the conflict out for many more months, if not years. Similarly, the entrenched, intractable conflicts in Syria and Yemen, while witnessing decreasing incidents when compared to previous years, remain amongst the most harmful to civilians and show no signs of abating.
 
Of note, an emerging trend on AOAV’s radar has been the increasing use of explosive weapons, mainly Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), by organised crime groups. This was especially apparent in Mexico and Sweden. While the violence remains low-level when compared to the uncountable casualties in larger-scale conflicts, it’s a trend that is likely to see continued growth.
 
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

Last year, AOAV noted the increasingly blurred distinction between civilians and armed combatants in warfare, a phenomenon which has continued to define conflicts in 2023. Many conflicts involve non-state actors who are embedded in local communities, as in Myanmar, or civilians who are recruited into or organise themselves into militias, for example in Somalia, Nigeria or Burkina Faso. Ukraine relies predominantly on an army of mobilised citizens and volunteers, while civilians have continued to play an active part by providing information to the Ukrainian army via smartphone apps. Myanmar’s resistance groups are chiefly made up of civilians who mobilised in response to the 2021 coup. In Gaza, Israel claims that Hamas is present across civilian and protected infrastructure, and hides among civilian communities. These factors are all reflected in the systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure in support of the war effort, as seen in, amongst others, Syria, Myanmar, Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan.
 
Between December 2021 and November 2022, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) dominated, representing 69% (2,846) of incidents, 95% (19,105) of civilian casualties, and 94% (6,428) of civilian fatalities. That trend continued into 2023: between December 2022 and November 2023, the use of EWIPA accounted for 75% (5,165) of incidents, 95% (27,362) of civilian casualties, and 96% (11,024) of civilian fatalities. On a more granular level, the use of EWIPA increased by 81% last year, with a 71% increase in associated civilian fatalities.
 
Perpetrators

2023 saw a notable increase in the reported use of explosive weapons by state actors when compared to the year before: between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 4,621 incidents of state-perpetrated explosive violence, which resulted in 20,993 civilian casualties of whom 8,884 were killed. Explosive weapons use by state actors consequently accounts for 67% of all recorded incidents in that time, 73% of civilian casualties, and 77% of civilian fatalities.
 
The year prior, between December 2021 and November 2022, AOAV recorded 2,476 incidents of explosive weapons use by state actors, resulting in 13,601 civilian casualties of whom 4,854 were killed. This means state use of explosive weapons increased by 87%, and civilian casualties of such violence by 54%. Civilian fatalities from state-perpetrated explosive violence increased by 83% last year. With conflicts involving state actors looking set to carry over into the coming year, it is likely the use of explosive weapons by these actors will continue to increase.
 
Weapons

Ground-launched weapons continued to be the dominant weapon-type recorded by AOAV in terms of recorded incidents. Last year, these weapons accounted for 51% (3,497) of incidents, 41% (11,645) of civilian casualties, and 26% (2,967) of civilian fatalities. Comparatively, in 2022, ground-launched weapons represented 51% (2,109) of incidents, 50% (10,099) of civilian casualties, and 44% (2,992) of civilian fatalities.
 
In accordance with the decreased proportion of harm from ground-launched weapons, both the use of and harm from air-launched explosive weapons have increased dramatically. Last year, air-launched weapons represented 20% (1,355) of incidents, 41% (11,727) of civilian casualties, and 59% (6,782) of civilian fatalities. The rate of average civilian fatalities per air strike was therefore 5.0. The year prior, these weapons accounted for 13% (527) of incidents, 20% (4,090) of civilian casualties, and 44% (2,065) of civilian fatalities, with a rate of average civilian fatalities per air strike of 3.9.
 
The use of air-launched weapons consequently increased by 157% last year, and civilian fatalities of such weapons by 228%. As state actors continue to be heavily involved in conflicts, and to mobilise their air forces in populated areas, this is a trend that is likely to continue into 2024.
 
Zones of Conflict

AOAV highlights several conflict zones, including both international and non-international armed conflicts, which are likely to continue to experience intense explosive weapon use over the coming year.
 
Gaza

While Israel carries out relatively frequent operations in Gaza, including a highly injurious operation in May 2021, Operation Swords of Iron has been one of the longest and most damaging: 2023 has so far been the deadliest year for civilians in Gaza recorded by AOAV. Between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 615 incidents of explosive weapons use in Gaza, resulting in 8,610 civilian casualties of whom 5,811 have been killed. By contrast, during the same period in the year prior, AOAV recorded 30 incidents of explosive weapons use, and 159 civilian casualties of whom 37 were killed.
 
Of note, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), AOAV’s analysis showed that English-language media captures only a third of the civilian deaths from specific explosive incidents in Gaza reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Furthermore, the use of explosive weapons in the OPT has been so intensive that it is difficult to attribute civilian casualties to specific incidents of use, as required by AOAV’s methodology. It is equally difficult to track rising injury or death tolls from specific incidents. For these reasons, AOAV’s data underrepresents the extent of harm caused by explosive weapons in the OPT.
 
Incessant air strikes and a prolonged ground incursion have characterised Operation Swords of Iron, launched on October 7th in response to the massacre perpetrated by Hamas across Israel. From October 7th to the end of November 2023, AOAV recorded 587 incidents of explosive weapons use in the context of Operations Swords of Iron, and 8,483 civilian casualties of whom 5,783 were killed. While air strikes have dominated the explosive violence landscape in Gaza in that time, accounting for 95% (555) of incidents and 95% (8,047) of civilian casualties, the use of ground-launched weapons has increased as the ground-invasion, which began on October 27th, progresses. AOAV has recorded Israeli artillery shelling (51 civilian casualties), non-specific shelling (48), and tank shelling (40) in the enclave, as well as Hamas mortar and rocket shelling, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. In early 2024, Israel announced a shift in strategy, pulling troops out of Gaza in a move US officials have interpreted as reflecting a transition to lower intensity operations. The use of ground-launched weapons is therefore likely to decrease in line with reduced ground operations, while air strikes might be expected to take up the slack.
 
Operation Swords of Iron has divided nations. Protests, violence, and rising anti-semitism and Islamophobia have accompanied governments across the globe coming down in support of one or the other party. While initially support for Israel from Western governments, in particular the United States and United Kingdom, was relatively unequivocal, criticism regarding the high civilian death toll and catastrophic humanitarian crisis has been growing, with calls for a ceasefire gaining in intensity. Allegations of violations of International Humanitarian Law have been raised against all parties to the conflict, in particular Israeli military tactics that seem to subject the civilian population of Gaza to collective punishment. Israel has repeatedly stated that it would not bow to international pressure as it pursues the stated goal of eliminating Hamas, while Hamas demands a full cessation of Israeli operations in Gaza before a second truce can be negotiated.
  
Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has carried on well into its second year with no signs of abating, although levels of reported harm to civilians have been decreasing. Between December 2022 and November 2023 AOAV recorded 2,765 incidents of explosive weapons use in Ukraine, and 8,399 civilian casualties, of whom 1,831 have been killed. While this represents a 66% increase from 1,666 incidents recorded in the same period the year prior, civilian casualties have dropped by 12% from 9,557, and civilian fatalities by 47% from 3,477. This could reflect a multitude of factors, including the evacuation and migration of civilians away from conflict zones, or reporting fatigue, which would result in less of the granular reporting on which AOAV’s methodology relies.
 
As well as reporting fatigue, Ukraine is growing vulnerable to donor fatigue, with stakeholders becoming frustrated by the lack of progress, and other conflicts moving into focus. Weapons for Ukraine were diverted to Israel in October, and in the US, Republican leaders have made their support for further aid to Ukraine conditional on a substantial tightening of US immigration policy. Biden, one of Ukraine’s major supporters, was unable to reach a compromise with Senate leaders, who announced that any military support to Ukraine will be deferred until early 2024. European Union members have continued to be vocal in their support of Ukraine and their pledges of aid, although European artillery production is not set to meet their goals. The shortage of weapons and funds is being felt on the frontlines.
 
State actors were responsible for the majority, 98% (2,708), of explosive weapons use in Ukraine last year, with the Russian armed forces accounting for 92% (2,544) of reported incidents and 91% (7,621) of civilian casualties. The Ukrainian armed forces were the reported perpetrators of 4% (111) of recorded explosive violence incidents and 7% (599) of civilian casualties. This represents a 74% increase in state actors’ use of explosive weapons in Ukraine, from 1,560 incidents recorded the year prior, and in particular a 70% increase in Russian explosive weapons use (from 1,497 recorded incidents), and a 109% increase in explosive weapons use by the Ukrainian armed forces (from 53). With the reported use of explosive weapons by both states party to the conflict increasing significantly, the mutual unwillingness to engage in negotiations reflects the likelihood of ongoing hostilities.
 
Sudan

The current war in Sudan finds its roots in the country’s long history of coups, in particular the 2019 ousting of Omar al-Bashir, following which the military and pro-democracy movement agreed to share power. In October of 2021, General Abdel-Fattah Burhan dissolved this agreement, temporarily detaining the civilian Prime Minister and effectively taking control of the country. He has since acted as Sudan’s de facto ruler, with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, working alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to maintain the military’s ascendance. However, growing tensions between the two armed forces coalesced into an intractable power struggle, and on April 15th 2023, a full-scale armed conflict broke out between Burhan and Dagalo. The resulting insecurity and armed violence have spread far beyond the capital to other cities, displacing thousands and exacerbating Sudan’s existing humanitarian challenges, as well as compounding the challenges of an eventual transition to civilian, democratic rule.
 
The impact of the conflict is stark: 2023 was the most harmful year AOAV has recorded in Sudan since 2010. Between December 2021 and November 2022, AOAV recorded three incidents of explosive weapons use in Sudan, and 30 resulting civilian casualties of whom five were killed. Between December 2022 and November 2023, the number of recorded incidents rose by 4,167% to 128; civilian casualties of explosive violence rose by 7,193% to 2,188; and civilian fatalities increased by 18,420% to 926.
 
It has been consistently challenging to attribute particular incidents to either the SAF or the RSF, the two major parties to the conflict, with around 63% (81) of incidents attributed to unknown actors, or to both state and non-state actors during clashes. However, state actors, specifically the SAF, are reportedly responsible for 23% (29) of incidents and 24% (534) of civilian casualties, while non-state actors, specifically the RSF, reportedly caused 14% (18) of incidents and 14% (316) of civilian casualties.
 
The SAF has predominantly made use of air strikes, which account for 79% (23) of incidents attributed to Burhan’s forces, and 65% (349) of civilian casualties ascribed to them. SAF air strikes also account for 75% (229) of all 305 civilian fatalities attributed to the SAF. On the other hand, the RSF has chiefly relied on ground-launched weapons, in particular non-specific shelling and artillery shelling. Such weapons account for 89% (16) of incidents attributed to the RSF,      and 88% (279) of resulting civilian harm. Ground-launched weapons represent 85% (104) of all 122 civilian fatalities attributed to the RSF.
 
In early December, mediators had indefinitely suspended talks between the SAF and RSF, but in mid-December Burhan agreed to a one-on-one meeting with Dagalo. The meeting was supposed to take place on December 28, but was postponed for ‘technical reasons’ to January 2024. With neither side having gained the upper-hand militarily, 2024 is likely to bear witness to further escalations between the two if the scheduled meeting fails to bear fruit.
 
Myanmar

In February of 2021, Myanmar’s military imposed a year-long state of emergency, and arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as other senior government officials. The coup quickly devolved into a non-international armed conflict as civilians rose to protest, then mobilised into civilian defence forces loosely allied under the National Unity Government (NUG). In 2022 and 2023, these defence forces increased their attacks against the military junta and suspected collaborators, demonstrating the ability to adapt their military strategy and score significant military successes with improvised and makeshift weaponry. Established Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) also intensified their attacks against the military government, and alliances between EAOs and various People’s Defence Forces (PDF) units have held and borne military successes. The military junta, in response, has continued its tried-and-trusted ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks which support the opposition. Towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of the junta’s operations.
 
Last year saw a significant escalation in the number of recorded incidents of explosive weapons use in Myanmar, and in civilian casualties. Between December 2022 and November 2023, AOAV recorded 932 incidents of explosive weapons use in the beleaguered country, and 2,014 civilian casualties of whom 687 were killed. This is up from 525 incidents the year prior, which resulted in 957 civilian casualties of whom 309 were killed - a 78% increase in incidents, 110% increase in civilian casualties, and a 122% increase in civilian fatalities.
 
The use of explosive weapons by the military junta accounted for 43% (400) of incidents last year, 84% (1,695) of civilian casualties, and 87% (598) of civilian fatalities. Conversely, non-state actors account for 53% (496) of recorded incidents, 9% (174) of civilian casualties, and 7% (45) of civilian fatalities.
 
Accordingly, air-launched weapons account for a small proportion of incidents, 14% (130), but the majority of civilian harm: these weapons represent 47% (946) of civilian casualties, and 54% (374) of civilian fatalities. As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, air strikes will likely continue to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in the coming year, remaining responsible for the bulk of civilian harm from explosive weapons in the country.
 
 
Chiara Torelli is lead explosive violence researcher at at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) and a member of the Forum's emerging expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s). 

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Multilateralism and the Prevention of Gender-Based Violence: Reflections in the Framework of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women

11/21/2023

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PictureAngélica María Pardo Chacón
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.
When we talk about violence prevention, the first thing that comes to mind is the creation of care routes, public policy for victim support, accompaniment, and any action that mitigates violence. For Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention, prevention is often focused on awareness and symbolic actions; such as the "pink" wagons in Mexico or the purple police shackles in Colombia. Elements that, although provide much needed visibility and influence public discussion, it is still seen as a joke for some sectors; which they call an unnecessary expense that will not contribute to the solution of a real problem that kills women and diverse community in the world and which is closely linked to the impact and disarmament agenda.

But why disarmament? The debate on the impact of weapons on gender-based violence prevention is a narrative that has been present in recent years, mainly encouraged by the feminist agenda. In some sectors the issue has made more progress than in others, and this month, on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women I would like to put into perspective some case studies and what we could continue to learn from them.

The international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) regulates the international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms. It is one of the first, if not the only one, to explicitly include in the text the risk of using arms to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children, as one of the elements to be evaluated for export authorization, included in other articles of the treaty. It is therefore natural that only four years after its entry into force, Latvia focused its work as chair of the treaty on the relationship between arms and GBV, issuing recommendations based on the Working Paper submitted by Ireland to the Conference of the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty: Article 7(4) and the assessment of GBV. Thus, since its inception ATT has been mindful of the impact of weapons in increasing the risk of GBV.

In the case of the Ottawa treaty, also known as the Convention for the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines, it has had several years of revisions and recommendations, both from civil society and the States parties aiming at the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach in mine action. Therefore, in the latest action plans of the convention, needs and strategies for the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach under the humanitarian principle of "leaving no one behind" are welcomed and proposed. This space also has advocacy groups such as the Gender and Diversity Working Group, which aims to promote inclusive and effective humanitarian interventions in mine action, through an intersectional approach, incorporating gender and other diversity factors mainly within the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

In this framework, and precisely this month, the gender program of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research delivered a report taking stock of the Oslo Action Plan, in terms of the implementation of the action points related to gender and diversity.

Other examples and cases related to the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach could be discussed at greater length. Fortunately today, multilateral processes such as Stop Killer Robots, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) have included intersectional approaches.

All these experiences in the framework of humanitarian disarmament processes and multilateralism demonstrate the importance of gender mainstreaming and the prevention of gender-based violence in all international spheres and efforts. By recognizing gender equity and overcoming all types of violence and inequality as one of the Sustainable Development Goals, the issue has begun to acquire more relevance in multilateral spaces, but why mainstreaming the gender approach in international instruments could contribute to the prevention of gender-based violence?

Weapons are one of the expressions that humanity has historically found to promote "superiority", which for the purposes of this text we will not discuss. But if we take into account that war, in a very light analysis, has been defined from the absence of its counterpart, peace, it links elements of superiority, which has been traditionally linked to masculinity and its ability to exercise power.

It is not surprising, then, that the possession, production and use of weapons is identified as a real and useful mechanism in the search for that superiority, which has been at the head of patriarchal models, such as Mark Antony, Napoleon and other male figures who have been at the forefront of the arms industry. However, if we take into account that in contrast, peace is usually associated as a "soft, weak, vulnerable" practice, characteristics traditionally assigned to the feminine, it is to be expected that social disputes and the distribution of power, related to discourses and practices in international spaces, will also result in a masculinization of peace; This is why only having men in the room makes the real inclusion of strategies that mitigate the differentiated risks and impacts of weapons on women and diverse communities more distant and less rapid, maintaining glass ceilings.

But what does multilateralism have to do with it?

Bearing in mind that men are traditionally exposed to reproducing elements related to protection, having to show virility, strength and courage, it is to be expected that in the multilateral spaces for negotiation and consensus-building around disarmament, the need for men to comply with the patriarchal logic of "real men" hinders the generation of new ideas. If we add to this the lack of real representation of women and their vision, we find a longer road for the prevention of gender-based violence in these scenarios, since they continue to replicate unequal relationships in which women, children and LGBTTIQA+ community tend to be those who occupy the categories of vulnerability and low agency, while the symbolic dispute around the values attributed to the "feminine" and "masculine" permeate all processes and institutions.

In order to speak of effective multilateralism, among other things, we must speak of substantive representation, which implies a qualitative change during the consultation processes and the results of specific advocacy in favor of overcoming unequal relations. Although progress has been made in efforts to include a gender perspective, in the inclusion of women in delegations, in advocacy campaigns, women and their vision continue to be in the background in most processes and while there are strategies and processes that continue to appeal, unconsciously, to the superiority of the strongest - the strongest masculinized - weapons and the potential risk of their use continue to perpetuate dynamics of inequality that contribute to the increase of Gender Based Violence.

In this order of ideas, if we take into account that the spaces where international instruments are defined are par excellence scenarios of dialogue and socialization occupied mostly by political and social elites, in which men have the majority control, and that as a space for defining agendas and building international consensus there is still a greater male representation and agency, it is possible to identify that the road to prevention and attention to GBV is still ahead of us.

For this I would like to bring an experience with the Mine Action Fellows, a Mines Action Canada program (of which I am a part), at the States Parties meeting of the Ottawa 2022 convention. There, we decided to keep a tally of minutes of statements made by women in relation to those made by men; and the result was not surprising but alarming, women spoke less than 8% of the plenary time during 3 days! And yet, according to the research "Beyond Oslo: Taking Stock of Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention" conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, by 2022, 69% of the States attending the meeting of States Parties to the MBT recorded the participation of women in their delegations.

This is what I mean when I say that there is still much to learn, when we talk about effective multilateralism, we talk about representation, but also about the quality of that representation, which has been descriptive, counting percentages of participation but not the effectiveness of that participation.

Multilateralism in some humanitarian disarmament processes has made progress in recognizing the role of weapons in gender-based violence, but there is still much to be done in relation to substantive representation, the use of time, space and therefore the distribution of power in these spaces of discussion where agendas are defined and international consensus is built. Yes, we women are increasingly part of these spaces, but the voice and decisions continue to be made by the men in the room, who often have a masculinized, patriarchal and hegemonic vision of reality; this continues to mark the long road to talk about a real response from multilateralism to gender-based violence perpetuated by or in the context of the use of weapons, whether massive, indiscriminate, autonomous, or small arms and light weapons.
​

Angélica María Pardo Chacón is a political scientist from Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá and currently is pursuing a master's degree in Global Affairs and Political Processes at the Universidad del Rosario. She is a member of the Women in Security and Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean network (Amassuru).

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Event Resources and Recommendations: Critical Perspectives on U.S. Concessions for the Abraham Accords: Saudi Arabia-Israel-United States (October 5, 2023)

10/12/2023

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On October 5, 2023, the Center for International Policy (CIP), Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), and the Forum on the Arms Trade co-organized an event hosted at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University to discuss the Biden administration’s pursuit of a grand bargain in the Middle East to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel that may come with new defense commitments from the United States, significant transfers of arms and other security assistance, and the development of uranium enrichment and construction of a nuclear plant for Saudi Arabia. The event aimed to allow those who see more danger than positives to be included in the conversation, to talk not only about the harm of this approach to U.S. interests in the region, but also to those of citizens within it.

​Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/5_l-NXb_L6o
Suggested Resources:* 
  • Sarah Leah Whitson, "The Greatly Exaggerated US Pivot and America’s Failures on Human Rights" in "A US Pivot Away from the Middle East: Fact or Fiction?," Arab Center Washington DC, September 13, 2023.
  • Letter to President Biden on U.S. Role in Potential Normalization Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel from 20 Senators, October 4, 2023. 
  • A People’s Vision for Reform in Saudi Arabia
  • Daniel Benaim and Jake Sullivan, “America’s Opportunity in the Middle East, Diplomacy Could Succeed Where Military Force Has Failed,” Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2022
  • Forum on the Arms Trade resource pages: US-Saudi Arms Sales and US Arms Sales to Israel

During the event, panelists provided many insights and recommendations. Below are links to and short recap of the portion of the conversation focused on alternate approaches/recommendations (and timestamp):

Abdullah Alaoudh, Saudi Director for the Freedom Initiative and Secretary-General of the National Assembly Party of Saudi Arabia

  • Need for institutions to be reflective of the decisions of the citizens of Saudi Arabia. See the People’s Vision presented earlier this year. [40:00]

Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN)

  • The best way for the U.S. to position itself is by pivoting its focus on the things that made it great in the first place — building off the ideas and values showing that a country can prosper under a democratic system, leading in technology and creativity.  [53:53]

Dylan Williams, Vice President for Government Affairs, Center for International Policy

  • Regionalise the effort with a multilateral process that includes those in the region, including the Palestinians, where the great powers play the role of observers and consultants. [42:02]

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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Free Carrying of Firearms: A Dangerous New Trend in the Argentine Presidential Campaign

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión original en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.
For the first time in Argentine history, the free carrying of firearms has become a topic of debate in a presidential election campaign. Why is this happening in one of the countries with the lowest homicide rates in Latin America and internationally recognized for its disarmament program? Does the citizenry desire firearms or security?
 
Insecurity has been one of the most concerning issues for Argentine society for over 20 years. During that same period, public policies regarding the control of firearms and disarmament have experienced unprecedented development in our country. The understanding that firearms are not a source of security but rather a factor that jeopardizes it has, for the first time, become a central topic of discussion on the electoral agenda.
 
"I am definitely in favor of the free carrying of firearms," said former deputy Javier Milei in 2022, who is now a presidential candidate and emerged as the most voted for candidate in the primary elections. However, this eccentric outsider, a follower of Trump and Bolsonaro, is not the only member of his party who publicly expressed such views. His vice-presidential candidate admitted to being a firearm user and stated that ownership is a "right" for "law-abiding citizens who want to defend themselves." While the controversy surrounding these statements led these candidates to downplay their remarks, the electoral platform presented by the candidate at the beginning of his presidential campaign proposed, regarding firearm ownership, the "deregulation of the legal market and the protection of its legitimate and responsible use by citizens."
 
"Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed."

Milei is not the first Argentine politician to raise this debate. Five years ago, the then Minister of Security and current presidential candidate for the other major opposition front, Patricia Bullrich, had said in an informal interview outside a restaurant, "Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed; whoever doesn't want to be armed, shouldn't be armed. Argentina is a free country." While her complete statement added that she and her party preferred that people not be armed, controversy quickly erupted. For the first time, the absolute political consensus regarding the need to restrict access to firearms was called into question.
 
Beyond their ambivalences, two of the three main presidential candidates in Argentina have expressed support for free carrying. Can it be inferred that Argentine society has changed its view on firearms? The answer is not so simple. However, there are signs that the public's demand for security does not translate into support for free carrying.
 
Argentina is not a heavily armed country. Its rate of 7.4 firearms per 100,000 civilians is, according to the Small Arms Survey, lower than most countries in the region. A recent nationwide survey conducted in May 2023 reflected that 77% of respondents were against "the free carrying of firearms." The society's participation in the disarmament program allowed for the removal of over 200,000 firearms from circulation between 2007 and 2022. Due to the results achieved in its early years, this program was internationally recognized as a model policy in 2013.
 
The laws on firearm restriction passed in the National Congress in recent years also reflect this consensus, with virtually unanimous votes in favor of firearm control and disarmament. However, the last extension of the disarmament program, voted on in 2021, already sounded an alarm: while 93% of deputies voted in favor, votes against the renewal of the program were recorded for the first time, even though it had been extended seven times before.
 
An initial conclusion from this data, pending the final results of the presidential elections, is that Argentine society remains predominantly opposed to firearms. However, it can also be inferred that, like in other countries, the threshold of rejection of pro-arms rhetoric may have decreased, even if only relatively, in recent years. It is true that voting for a presidential candidate does not necessarily mean support for all of their proposals, but it probably does indicate a tolerance for most of them.
 
If this hypothesis is correct, it is necessary to pay attention to this symptom. While Argentina has a well-established social, institutional, and cultural tradition of restricting the circulation of firearms, recent experiences in other Latin American countries demonstrate how easily such controls can be undermined.
 
What's Happening with Firearms in Argentina?

Argentina currently has around 1,000,000 legally registered firearm users, although most of them are in a situation of illegality due to expired authorizations. Additionally, it is estimated that, including unregistered firearms, the total number of firearms could be three to four times the 1,700,000 recorded in official records.
 
Between 2011 and 2019, an average of 8 people per day died in Argentina as a result of firearm use. One out of every two intentional homicides in Argentina is committed with a firearm. In 2021, 76% of intentional homicides in Argentina were recorded without the involvement of other crimes.
 
Firearms are also used for gender-based violence. In general, women and gender-diverse individuals do not possess firearms (as 97% of registered users are males), but they disproportionately suffer the consequences: 1 out of every 4 femicides is committed with a firearm.
 
Since 2015, Argentina has a model law at the regional level that created and regulates the National Agency for Controlled Materials, responsible not only for the registration and control of the legal firearms market but also for "developing policies aimed at reducing the circulation of firearms in civil society and preventing the effects of armed violence" (Law 27,192). Among other functions, this agency is responsible for implementing the mentioned National Voluntary Firearm Surrender Plan. The creation of the agency was a significant advancement in this regard, although the law is still not fully implemented, as the agency lacks sufficient budgetary resources to carry out all the actions it is responsible for.
 
The Risks of Free Carrying

Various studies confirm that an increased presence of firearms in society, far from reducing crime (as stated by Milei himself), contributes to an increase in violence, crime, and deaths. Conversely, control policies are associated with a reduction in these problems. The case of the United States, the country with the highest civilian firearm ownership in the world (120 firearms per 100 people), is illustrative. Its homicide rate was 7.5 times higher than the rate in other high-income countries, which is often attributed to its firearm homicide rate, which is nearly 25 times higher. From mass shootings, some of them in schools, to a higher number of suicides and femicides, the effects of the free circulation of firearms have been widely verified in other countries.
 
Insecurity is undoubtedly a central problem for Argentine society. Even though its homicide rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries, the LAPOP survey reflects that it is one of the three countries in the region with the highest number of respondents reporting being victims of crime in 2021. Crime has been a top concern for Argentine citizens for years.
 
However, there is no serious indication that the demand for more security implies a desire among the citizenry to carry firearms. Discussions about the role of the state, primarily focused on economic policy, cannot be linearly transferred to security policies. Even those sectors with a more reductionist view of the size of the state have historically been in favor of recognizing the state's role in monopolizing the use of force.
 
Therefore, whoever assumes office in December will have a dual responsibility. On one hand, they must develop effective security policies to reduce crime rates and the perception of insecurity. On the other hand, they must ensure the validity and extension of firearm restriction policies in the face of voices seeking to downplay the significant risks of loosening firearm regulations.
 
Society is not asking for firearms; it is asking for security. And the data demonstrates that more firearms equate to less security.
​
Julián Alfie is Deputy Executive Director of the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP), based in Argentina.

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Libre portación de armas: una peligrosa novedad en la campaña presidencial de Argentina

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Voces de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes (see English translation)
​
Esta publicación forma parte de una serie especial de contribuciones al blog "Mirando hacia el Futuro" realizadas por miembros de los programas de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro.
Por primera vez en la historia argentina, la libre portación de armas de fuego ha sido tema de debate en una campaña electoral presidencial. ¿Por qué sucede esto en uno de los países con menor tasa de homicidios de América Latina y premiado internacionalmente por su programa de desarme? ¿La ciudadanía quiere armas o seguridad?

La inseguridad es, desde hace más de 20 años, uno de los temas que más preocupa a la sociedad argentina. En ese mismo lapso, las políticas públicas de control de armas de fuego y desarme tuvieron un inédito desarrollo en nuestro país. La comprensión de que las armas no son una fuente de seguridad, sino un factor que la pone en riesgo aparece, por primera vez, como un eje de discusión en la agenda electoral.

“Estoy a favor de la libre portación de armas, definitivamente”, dijo en 2022 el entonces diputado Javier Milei, hoy candidato presidencial, que resultó el más votado en las elecciones primarias. Pero este excéntrico outsider, seguidor de Trump y Bolsonaro, no es el único integrante de su partido que se expresó públicamente en ese sentido. Su candidata a vicepresidenta admitió ser usuaria de armas y opinó que la tenencia es un “derecho” para “el ciudadano de bien que se quiera defender”. Si bien la polémica que desataron esas declaraciones llevaron a esos candidatos a relativizar sus dichos, lo cierto es que la plataforma electoral presentada por el candidato al comienzo de su campaña presidencial planteaba, sobre la tenencia de armas de fuego, la “desregulación del mercado legal y proteger su uso legítimo y responsable por parte de la ciudadanía”.
 
“El que quiera andar armado, que ande armado”

Milei no es el primer político argentino en plantear este debate. 5 años atrás, la entonces Ministra de Seguridad y actual candidata a presidenta por el otro gran frente opositor –Patricia Bullrich-  había dicho, en una entrevista informal a la salida de un restaurante, que “el que quiera estar armado, que ande armado; el que no quiera estar armado, que no ande armado. La Argentina es un país libre”. Si bien su frase completa añadía que ella y su espacio preferían que la gente no estuviera armada, la polémica no tardó en estallar. Por primera vez se ponía en duda el absoluto consenso político respecto a la necesidad de restringir el acceso a las armas de fuego.

Más allá de sus ambivalencias, dos de los tres principales candidatos a ocupar la Presidencia de Argentina tuvieron expresiones favorables a la libre portación. ¿Puede inferirse que la sociedad argentina cambió su mirada sobre las armas? La respuesta no es tan sencilla. Sin embargo, existen señales de que el reclamo de la ciudadanía por seguridad no se traduce en un apoyo a la libre portación.

Argentina no es un país armado. Su tasa de 7.4 armas de fuego en manos de civiles cada 100 habitantes se encuentra, según Small Arms Survey, por debajo de la mayoría de los países de la región. Una reciente encuesta realizada en mayo de 2023 a nivel nacional reflejó que el 77% de las personas encuestadas se mostró en contra de “la libre portación de armas de fuego”. La participación de la sociedad en el plan de desarme permitió quitar de circulación más de 200.000 armas de fuego entre 2007 y 2022. Por los resultados alcanzados durante sus primeros años, en 2013 ese programa fue premiado a nivel internacional como una política modelo.

Las leyes sobre restricción de armas de fuego aprobadas en el Congreso de la Nación en los últimos años también reflejan ese consenso, con votaciones afirmativas al control de armas y el desarme prácticamente unánimes. Sin embargo, la última prórroga del plan de desarme, votada en 2021, ya había dado una señal de alerta: si bien el 93% de los diputados votó a favor, por primera vez se registraron votos en contra de la renovación de ese programa, que ya había sido prorrogado en 7 oportunidades anteriormente.

Una conclusión inicial de estos datos, a la espera del resultado definitivo de las elecciones presidenciales, es que la sociedad argentina sigue siendo mayoritariamente contraria a las armas de fuego. Pero también es posible inferir que, al igual que en otros países, el umbral de rechazo a los discursos armamentistas puede haber disminuido, aunque sea relativamente, en los últimos años. Es cierto que el voto a un candidato a presidente no significa un apoyo a todas sus propuestas; pero probablemente sí indique, aunque sea, una tolerancia a la mayoría de ellas.

Si la hipótesis es cierta, es necesario prestarle atención a este síntoma. Si bien Argentina cuenta con una tradición social, institucional y cultural consolidadamente restrictiva de la circulación de las armas de fuego, recientes experiencias en otros países latinoamericanos demuestran la facilidad con la que esos controles pueden socavarse.
 
¿Qué pasa con las armas en Argentina?

Argentina actualmente tiene alrededor de 1.000.000 de usuarios de armas de fuego legalmente registrados, aunque la mayoría de ellos se encuentra en una situación de ilegalidad por tener su autorización vencida. Además, se estima que, incluyendo las armas de fuego no registradas, el número total de armas podría triplicar o cuadruplicar a las 1.7000.000 que constan en los registros oficiales.

Entre 2011 y 2019, en Argentina murieron en promedio 8 personas por día por la utilización de armas de fuego. Uno de cada dos homicidios dolosos en Argentina es producido con un arma de fuego. El 76% de los homicidios dolosos producidos en Argentina en 2021 se registraron sin concurrencia de otros delitos.

Las armas de fuego también son utilizadas para el ejercicio de violencias por motivos de género. En general, las mujeres y disidencias sexogenéricas no poseen armas de fuego (ya que el 97% de los usuarios registrados son varones), pero sí sufren desproporcionadamente sus consecuencias: 1 de cada 4 femicidios es cometido con armas de fuego.

Desde 2015, Argentina cuenta con una Ley modelo a nivel regional, que creó y regula la Agencia Nacional de Materiales Controlados, que tiene a su cargo no sólo el registro y control del mercado legal de armas, sino también “el desarrollo de políticas tendientes a reducir el circulante de armas en la sociedad civil y prevenir los efectos de la violencia armada” (Ley 27.192). Entre otras funciones, esa Agencia tiene a su cargo la implementación del mencionado Plan Nacional de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego. La creación de la Agencia fue un enorme avance en la materia, aunque lo cierto es que la ley sigue sin implementarse en su totalidad, ya que el organismo sigue sin contar con los recursos presupuestarios suficientes para implementar todas las acciones que tiene a su cargo.
 
Los riesgos de la libre portación

Diversos estudios confirman que la mayor presencia de armas de fuego en una sociedad, lejos de disminuir el delito (como afirmó el propio Milei), contribuyen al aumento de la violencia, el delito y las muertes. Y, a la inversa, las políticas de control se relacionan con una reducción de esos problemas. El caso de EEUU, el país con más armas de fuego en manos de civiles del mundo (120 armas por cada 100 personas), es paradigmático. Su tasa de homicidios fue 7.5 veces mayor a la tasa de otros países de altos ingresos, lo cual suele atribuirse a su tasa de homicidios con armas de fuego, que es casi 25 veces mayor. Desde matanzas masivas, algunas de ellas en escuelas, hasta un mayor número de suicidios y femicidios, los efectos de la libre circulación de armas de fuego han sido ampliamente verificados en otros países.

​La inseguridad es, sin lugar a duda, un problema central para la sociedad argentina. Aun cuando su tasa de homicidios sea relativamente baja en relación a otros países de América Latina, la encuesta realizada por LAPOP refleja que es uno de los tres países de la región con mayor cantidad de encuestados que reportan haber sido víctimas de la delincuencia en 2021. La delincuencia se ubica dese hace años en el podio de preocupaciones de la ciudadanía argentina. 

Sin embargo, no existen indicios serios de que el reclamo por más seguridad signifique que la ciudadanía quiera portar armas. Las discusiones sobre cuál debe ser el rol del Estado, principalmente centradas en la política económica, no pueden trasladarse linealmente a las políticas de seguridad. Incluso aquellos sectores con una visión más reduccionista del tamaño estatal han sido históricamente favorables a reconocerle el rol de monopolizar el uso de la fuerza.

Por lo tanto, quien asuma el gobierno en diciembre tendrá una doble responsabilidad. Por un lado, desarrollar políticas de seguridad eficaces, que permitan reducir los índices de criminalidad y la percepción de inseguridad. Y, por el otro, garantizar la vigencia y la extensión de las políticas de restricción de las armas de fuego, ante la aparición de voces que buscan relativizar los enormes riesgos de liberar las armas.
​
La sociedad no pide armas, pide seguridad. Y los datos demuestran que más armas implica menos seguridad.
​
Julián Alfie es Subdirector Ejecutivo del Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (INECIP).

La inclusión en el programa de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro sobre el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estas publicaciones no indican acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas representan las vistas de los autor(es) de cada publicación.
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Event Resources and Recommendations: Learning from Niger: U.S. Security Assistance and Training (August 15, 2023)

8/17/2023

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On August 15, 2023, shortly after the ouster of the democratically elected president of Niger by military forces, the Forum on the Arms Trade hosted an event to discuss the U.S. involvement in training of military leaders who have gone on to replace their governments, the limitations placed on further U.S. assistance whether called a coup or not, the challenges of making decisions of which countries to aid especially as relates to training, and recommendations for improving those decisions and for much greater transparency in the future.

Video of that event is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YTIIrB_E47I&t=168s
During and shortly after the event, panelists provided the following recommendations and suggested resources:*

Resources
via the Intercept (authored by Nick Turse)
  • "Niger Junta Appoints U.S.-Trained Military Officers To Key Jobs," August 16, 2023
  • "At Least Five Members Of Niger Junta Were Trained By U.S.," August 10, 2023
  • "Niger Coup Leader Joins Long Line Of U.S.-Trained Mutineers," July 27, 2023
  • "Drones and Motos: After Two Decades of U.S. Military Support, Terror Attacks Are Worse Than Ever in Niger," April 2, 2023

via International Crisis Group
  • "The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict," August 7, 2023
  • "The Complexities of Calling a Coup a Coup," February 23, 2022

via the Stimson Center Center
  • "What Niger’s Coup Says About U.S. Security Assistance in the Sahel," August 17, 2023
  • "'If we don’t sell it, someone else will:' Dependence & Influence in US Arms Transfers -- Examining assumptions about dependence and influence in the U.S. security cooperation enterprise," March 30, 2023

Recommendations/observations  (time of recording indicated, when available)

Nick Turse, contributing writer, The Intercept  
  • Re-evaluation should be done to more greatly examine the possible relation of U.S. training and coups (32:07)

Sarah Harrison, Senior Analyst, U.S. Program, International Crisis Group  
  • The United States should pay greater attention to the context of countries to which it provides security assistance, including a risk analysis of the potential for coups (34:14) 
  • Reflect on whether security assistance actually leads to transformational democratic changes (35:40)
  • Pay attention to local needs, not the outside frame of great power competition (42:08)

Elias Yousif, Research Analyst, Conventional Defense Program, Stimson Center
  • Need detailed yearly reporting on U.S. security cooperation, such as on Title X authorities with specific country amounts and types of assistance. (39:05)
  • Pay attention to disconnect between partners and U.S. goals and challenge the "If we don't sell, others will" assumptions (40:16)
  • More robust, in-depth, and multidisciplinary pre-assessments should better inform the selection of U.S. security assistance beneficiaries and partners. (48:00)
  • A greater emphasis should be placed on governance, civil-military reforms, and defense institution building as a prerequisite to combat-oriented assistance.

* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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As War Leads to More Orders, Weapons Makers Should Embrace Human Rights

4/27/2023

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by Aaron A. Acosta and Jeff Abramson

In the coming month, shareholders at major U.S. defense manufacturers will again recommend that the companies consider human rights in their business decisions. This time, the companies should agree.

That defense companies face reputational risks when their weapons are used to bomb school buses or in other ways kill civilians is generally known. Nevertheless, arms manufacturers typically resist calls for shouldering the blame when their products are misused by arguing that the government provides licenses for their sales – and therefore takes that responsibility off industry’s shoulders. But an excellent brief last year by the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights lays out a range of risks arms manufacturers face that cannot simply be waved away by a government license. These include those reputational factors, as well financial, governance, regulatory and legal risks. Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Raytheon were reminded just last month of such challenges when a group of Yemeni nationals filed a lawsuit against them in Washington D.C. for “aiding and abetting war crimes and extrajudicial killings” by supplying arms to Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen. And a new database launched last week draws attention to the growing legal challenges to governments’ export licensing decisions, further highlighting that defense companies cannot, nor should not, rely solely on government determinations.

At forthcoming Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics annual general meetings, investors will sponsor resolutions calling for the companies to conduct and publish a human rights impact assessment. At Northrop Grumman, the call will be for an examination of whether the company’s political activities (direct and indirect lobbying, campaign contributions, etc.) align with those policies. In short, the arms companies – the world’s 1st, 4th and 5th largest – are being asked to begin more fully engaging in human rights due diligence.

Rather than resisting shareholder initiatives, defense manufacturers this year should embrace the push for human rights. With ongoing customer relations and follow-on services to weapons recipients, defense companies often have information on what’s happening with weapons stocks and are able to encourage and provide know-how on best practices. 

The ABA guidance mentioned earlier details practical advice to help companies manage actual and potential human rights impacts linked to their business activities. This includes evaluating the risks that potential clients may violate human rights with weapons and services they receive, proactively putting in place preventive and mitigation measures that establish good practices for companies and clients, monitoring how weapons are used, and then following up with investigation and remediation where necessary.  

The Biden administration has also made clear that human rights matter in its arms trade decisions. The President’s new conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy, issued in February, places a stronger emphasis on human rights, stating the U.S. will not transfer arms when it assesses that it is “more likely than not” that they will be used to commit an array of human rights abuses. It also explicitly makes clear that as situations change, arms transfers may be cut off – a signal to industry that just getting to a contract is not enough. 

At the same time, the policy made a commitment to arms manufacturing and the defense industrial base. And that industrial base will be busy. As the war in Ukraine continues, it is clear that U.S. defense companies will have many years of orders to not only replenish the stock of U.S. weapons sent to Kyiv, but also those of partners who have done so.

Importantly, this makes now the best moment for U.S. companies to adopt and implement human rights due diligence policies. With such a substantial portion of future sales likely to go to European countries whose human rights practices and weapons-use policies tend to be more transparent, defense companies should be able to “battle-test” human rights due diligence with them.

The idea that American companies should pay attention to more than just the bottom line has, of course, been much more visible this year, as President Biden issued his first veto last month, thwarting those who argued that investors shouldn’t be able to take into account environmental, social, and governance considerations. While that may now have made “ESG” a household acronym for many Americans, ESG goals have been undergirded for more than a decade by the 2011 “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” known as the “UNGPs.”

Over the years, the U.S. government has continually and explicitly recognized the important role of the UNGPs. The first National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (NAP), which was published in 2016, emphasized that responsible business conduct principles are encompassed in the UNGPs. Importantly, the 2016 NAP stated the U.S. government “encourages businesses to treat tools like the… UN Guiding Principles as a floor rather than a ceiling for implementing responsible business practices [RBC], and to recognize that implementing RBC should be a continuing process.” A revision to the NAP is currently underway that will recognize that UNGPs “have both domestic and international applicability.”

The extension of the UNGPs into arms and security issues has also grown. A key UN working group report last year explicitly looking at the arms sector similarly made the case for implementing the UNGPs and recommendations for how businesses could do so. And, late last month under U.S. leadership, more than 20 countries again endorsed them at the Summit for Democracy as part of a code of conduct aimed at preventing the proliferation of software and technologies that enable serious human rights abuses.

Despite the growing momentum around embedding the UNGPs in companies’ policies and practices, only one of the three major weapons companies that will soon face investor-led human rights initiatives explicitly mentions them. That’s Northrop Grumman, who does not take them as authoritative, but rather says they offer “a source of guidance on how governments, companies, and other parties can address their responsibilities.” 

Last year, defense company leaders argued against shareholder proposals that highlighted human rights due diligence, but those that went to a vote at Lockheed and General Dynamics still garnered 20.2% and 25.2% shareholder support, respectively. While the Lockheed proposal asked the company to conduct a human rights impact assessment, the General Dynamics proposal asked for reporting on the company’s human rights due diligence process. This year, shareholder proposals filed at Lockheed (April 27) and General Dynamics (May 3) ask the companies to conduct human rights impact assessments, and the Northrop proposal asks the company to report on misalignment between its political activities and its human rights commitments. 

The Northrop (May 17) proposal on misalignment, filed for the first time this year, highlights the high reputational risks companies face when their political activities are in conflict with their stated commitments. Northrop’s political activities suggest it actively lobbies, makes political contributions, and otherwise pushes for government sales of its defense products and services to customers linked to irremediable human rights impacts. Recently, major proxy advisors Vanguard and Glass Lewis pointed out the significant reputational risks of misalignment between a company’s political activities and its stated commitments and values - risks that affect a company’s bottom line. 

It’s time for U.S. defense manufacturers to be proactively responsible partners in our national endeavors to promote human rights.

Aaron A. Acosta is a senior program associate at Investor Advocates for Social Justice, Jeff Abramson is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association and director of the Forum on the Arms Trade

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Disconnect Continues: the United States, the Arms Trade, Humanitarian Disarmament, and the 2023 Summit for Democracy

3/26/2023

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by Jeff Abramson

As the awful war in Ukraine remains framed as a struggle between democracies and autocracies, it is important to assess whether U.S. goals to build a community of democracies match its actions. With the second Summit for Democracy taking place this week, and the Biden administration now in its third year in office, this post updates an earlier one related to the 2021 Summit. It primarily asks whether disconnects have improved in how the United States participates in the arms trade and supports humanitarian disarmament, with a lens on 2023 Summit invitations? The short answer is a tiny bit.

Compared to 2012-2021 (46%), the percentage of major weapons transfers to countries NOT invited to the latest Summit has declined, but still more than 40% of major U.S. weapons transfers over the last two years have gone to countries NOT invited to the 2023 Summit for Democracy. And, while the United States has revised its landmine policy and supported a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, writ large it continues to eschew humanitarian disarmament treaties that are supported by (often vast) majorities of INVITED countries.

Updated 2023 Summit for Democracy invitation list and other data

During a press briefing on March 22, 2023, the Untied States confirmed all the countries invited to the 2021 Summit would be invited to the 2023 Summit for Democracy as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Honduras. This revised list, combined with updated SIPRI data released in March 2023 and latest treaty support information, is used in the analysis below. Discussion of whether all invitees truly are democratic, rather than autocratic, is not part of this analysis but is recognized as also valuable.

During the Biden administration's first two years (2021-2022), more than 40% of U.S. major weapons transfers have gone to countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy

​​One might expect that an effort to build democracies globally would also result in decisions to send fewer weapons to countries who are not democracies, or put differently, that a small percentage of U.S. arms transfers would go to those countries not invited to the Summit for Democracy. Looking just at the first two years of the Biden administration, however, 41% of major U.S. weapons deliveries have gone to just such countries, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar each receiving about 10% of global deliveries. (See data [Excel] and delivery details [pdf]). 
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This is a lower percentage than during the ten-year period from 2012-2021 (46%, see previous blog entry) and the Biden administration has recently released a new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy that espouses greater human rights considerations -- both could be signs of future restraint. But, arms transfers typically take years to negotiate and complete, meaning much of Biden's first two years are based on inherited weapons deals, and it remains to be seen how and whether the new CAT policy will impact on arms sales to autocratic regimes.
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Democracies support key humanitarian disarmament treaties that the United States continues to eschew. 
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​Of those invited to the 2023 Summit, 90% are states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 75% to the Arms Trade Treaty, and 65% to the Convention on Cluster Munitions -- key treaties within the human security-centered humanitarian disarmament approach for dealing with the adverse impacts of arms. (View data [Excel].) 

​The United States is not a state party to any of these treaties, making it a minority within the community of those invited.
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Regarding the newer Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which now has 68 states parties, two-thirds of those states parties (46, or 68%) were invited to the Summit. 

​Since the 2021 Summit, the United States did announce a new landmine policy that brings it into closer alignment with Mine Ban Treaty states parties, but still reserves the ability to use victim-activated anti-personnel landmines in the Korean peninsula. In discussing the new CAT policy, U.S. officials did make clear this month that they are still considering their approach to the Arms Trade Treaty (see video at 1:15:25), which had been signed during the Obama administration, but the Trump administration rejected. (See resource page and commentary.) The Biden administration does not appear to be conducting a review of its cluster munition policy and is now facing pressure from some members of Congress to transfer treaty-barred weapons to Ukraine. 

In a break with the Trump administration, the Biden administration did more fully support the effort to create a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which it endorsed in ceremonies in Dublin in November 2022.
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Implementation and Innovation: Humanitarian Disarmament in 2023

2/2/2023

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This is the sixth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

(photo, right: Bonnie Docherty (author) delivers statement at the endorsement conference of explosive weapons declaration in Dublin, November 2022. Credit: Erin Hunt, 2022.)

This post also is also published on humanitariandisarmament.org’s Disarmament Dialogue blog.  ​
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Bonnie Docherty
The past year underscored the need to have and to ensure respect for strong and effective humanitarian disarmament law. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, cluster munitions, antipersonnel landmines, and explosive weapons with wide area effects have been used in populated areas, mostly by Russia. Russia has in addition repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons.
 
These attacks and threats have inflicted a horrific civilian toll, but they have also generated international opprobrium because they involved weapons banned or practices restricted under humanitarian disarmament treaties and commitments. While more work needs to be done to minimize the civilian suffering in Ukraine and other armed conflicts around the world, demonstrating robust and united support for global civilian protection norms is an important step.
 
Humanitarian disarmament, which seeks to prevent and remediate arms-inflicted human and environmental harm, was advanced as well as reinforced in 2022. States adopted important new standards and commitments on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, nuclear weapons, and the environment and armed conflict. To ensure that these standards and commitments achieve their potential, 2023 will be critical for implementation. It is also a time for innovation, especially in addressing the risks and dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems.
 
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

A political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, endorsed by 83 countries on November 18, aims to better protect civilians from humanitarian consequences of the bombing and shelling of cities and towns. It goes beyond urging greater compliance with existing international humanitarian law to establishing guidelines for preventing and remediating the harm from this method of warfare. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas is one of the greatest threats to civilians in contemporary armed conflicts, and the declaration contains strong provisions with the potential to address both direct and reverberating effects. But it will only be as effective as its interpretation and implementation.
 
Over the next year, signatories to the declaration should ensure that they interpret it through a humanitarian lens. Its core provision calls on states to adopt “policies and practices to help avoid civilian harm, including by restricting or refraining as appropriate from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects.” According to a report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, to live up to the declaration’s humanitarian purpose, states should understand the paragraph to mean they should refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and restrict their use of all other explosive weapons in those areas.
 
State signatories should also carry out the commitments they made in the declaration and be ready to report on their progress at the first follow-up meeting in Norway in 2024. They should, for example, review, develop, and improve relevant national policies and practices; train their armed forces on the declaration’s provisions; collect and share data; and provide assistance to victims. Several civil society organizations have published recommendations for how most effectively to implement the declaration’s commitments.
 
Nuclear Weapons

Implementation is also key for the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty’s landmark First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna last June adopted the Vienna Declaration, reaffirming states parties’ commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons and stressing the treaty’s underlying moral and ethical imperatives. The meeting further agreed to the Vienna Action Plan, which lays out steps to advance the process of implementing the treaty. Expanding support for the treaty remains a top priority. Five years after its initial signing conference, the treaty has 68 states parties and an additional 27 states have signed.
 
Another area of focus is the positive obligations to assist victims, remediate environmental contamination, and provide international cooperation and assistance. The Action Plan identifies initial steps states parties should take to establish an implementation framework. They should assess the harm caused by nuclear weapons use and testing and their capacity to address it, develop a national plan with a budget and time frame, establish a government “focal point” to guide these efforts, and adopt relevant laws and policies. In addition, they should follow principles of accessibility, inclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency at all stages of carrying out these obligations.
 
Environment and Armed Conflict

New standards were set during the past year with regard to the environment and armed conflict. On December 7, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus the International Law Commission’s Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts. The non-binding principles cover situations before, during, and after times of armed conflict.
 
The principles call for designating protected zones, explicitly applying existing international humanitarian law to the environment, and laying out rules to protect the environment during times of occupation. They also underscore the importance of cooperation in developing post-conflict remedial measures.
 
The Conflict and Environment Observatory, which advocated heavily for the principles, said that, “The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the principles and their commentaries represents the transition point between [the principles’] development and the beginning of its implementation phase.” Early steps in this stage include raising awareness about the principles and adopting national measures, such as training armed forces on their content.
 
Autonomous Weapons Systems
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While the new standards and commitments on explosive weapons, nuclear weapons, and the environment in armed conflict require implementation, the dangers raised by autonomous weapons systems are still not constrained by specific legal rules. Innovation will, therefore, be crucial in 2023. International talks at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) have been ongoing since May 2014, but no action has been taken. At the CCW’s annual meeting in November, states parties yet again failed to make any meaningful progress despite calls from a majority of states parties, plus the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society organizations, to open negotiations for a new treaty to prohibit and regulate autonomous weapons.
 
Due in large part to the CCW’s reliance on consensus-based decision making, however, states parties could only agree to discuss—for the tenth year—“possible measures” for addressing the myriad threats such weapons systems pose. States parties will need to break out of the CCW if they want to make progress toward a new instrument on autonomous weapons systems.
 
States need to innovate by changing their tactics for achieving a treaty, and there is ample precedent for taking a different approach. Existing disarmament treaties offer models for successfully adopting legal instruments in alternative forums. As discussed in a recent report by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, states could turn to an independent process outside the UN, as was done for the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. Or they could initiate a UN General Assembly process, as was used for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Both approaches have several benefits: a common purpose, voting-based decision-making, clear and ambitious deadlines, and a commitment to inclusivity.
 
In 2023, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Austria are all planning conferences outside of the CCW on autonomy in weapons systems. States and others that support creating new law to address the moral, legal, accountability, and security concerns about this emerging technology should take advantage of these meetings to build momentum for negotiations.

Bonnie Docherty is a senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch and a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, where she is Director of the Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection Initiative in the International Human Rights Clinic. 

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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