High School Policy Debate Resources - 2019-2020
During 2019-2020, the US high school policy debate topic is:
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States.
This resource page is designed to provide condensed information and links to assist students in their research. We intend to update it throughout the school year. We would also welcome questions, and suggestions for topics to tackle. Email us with "High School Debate" in the subject field. See below for links to answers thus far, or check out those answers on our blog.
Forum-listed experts* willing to be contacted, as they have time available, include: Jeff Abramson, Rachel Stohl, William Hartung, Shannon Dick, Seth Binder, Allison Pytlak (especially on global trade and the Arms Trade Treaty), John Lindsay-Poland (especially on US-Mexico arms flows), Andrew Feinstein, N.R. Jenzen-Jones (especially on technical weapons questions).
The Forum is also proud to partner with the Washington Urban Debate League (see announcement).
Page last updated April 10, 2020.
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States.
This resource page is designed to provide condensed information and links to assist students in their research. We intend to update it throughout the school year. We would also welcome questions, and suggestions for topics to tackle. Email us with "High School Debate" in the subject field. See below for links to answers thus far, or check out those answers on our blog.
Forum-listed experts* willing to be contacted, as they have time available, include: Jeff Abramson, Rachel Stohl, William Hartung, Shannon Dick, Seth Binder, Allison Pytlak (especially on global trade and the Arms Trade Treaty), John Lindsay-Poland (especially on US-Mexico arms flows), Andrew Feinstein, N.R. Jenzen-Jones (especially on technical weapons questions).
The Forum is also proud to partner with the Washington Urban Debate League (see announcement).
Page last updated April 10, 2020.
|
What are Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and other ways the U.S. sells weapons?
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program manages government-to-government purchases of U.S. defense articles and defense services that are on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) for export to foreign countries. The Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program regulates U.S. companies' international sales of U.S. defense articles and defense services that are on the USML. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 provide the primary legal basis for the FMS and DCS programs, which require Congressional notification and other reporting steps. What are the main legal means by which U.S. weapons are sold abroad? There are now five main mechanisms by which U.S. weapons and military services are sold abroad: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Construction Sales (FMCS), Excess Defense Articles (EDA) sales, Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and Commerce Department 600 series sales. The first three mechanisms are government-to-government sales and the latter two are commercial arms sales. The Obama Administration split the control system for commercial arms sales into two separate programs starting in 2013 as part of its Export Control Reform Initiative (see below question for more information). In government-to-government sales, the U.S. government negotiates directly with the foreign government buying the weapons. The U.S. government often approves commercial arms sales, but these deals are negotiated between U.S. companies and foreign buyers. What was the Export Control Reform Initiative? In 2010, the Obama Administration controversially determined that the U.S. arms export control system was trying to protect too much, which it argued in turn was diminishing the U.S. government’s ability to focus on the most sensitive weapons and was undermining the competitveness of key defense industry sectors. To address these issues, they decided to remove tens of thousands of arms that are less critical to maintaining a US military technical advantage from the State Department-controlled U.S. Munitions List (USML) and place many of them under a special category on the Commerce Department-controlled Commerce Control List (CCL). This now includes some types of firearms. As a result, the administration created the Commerce Department 600 Series program. The DCS program regulates U.S. companies' arms sales that are on the USML, and the Commerce Department 600 Series regulates U.S. companies’ arms sales that are on the 600 Series of the CCL. Which mechanisms account for the most U.S. arms exported each year? The FMS program consistently tops the list based on currently available data on actual exports. In Fiscal Year 2017 (Oct 1, 2016 - Sept. 30, 2017), the United States exported more than $27 billion in weapons and military services through the FMS program to countries around the world. The United States exported around $16 billion through the FMS program the previous two years. By contrast, U.S. companies exported around $3 billion in weapons through the DCS program; although, the DCS program likely provides billions of dollars more in actual sales annually as this number does not include sales of defense services. U.S. companies exported $5.7 billion in arms through the Commerce Department 600 Series program in Fiscal Year 2017. The annual value of exports of U.S. arms through other arms sales programs rarely reaches the billion-dollar mark. Does the U.S. government provide grants to foreign countries to buy US weapons? Yes. In Fiscal Year 2017, the U.S. government approved nearly $42 billion through the FMS program to countries around the world. Of the $42 billion, the Pentagon indicated that the U.S. government had provided grants totaling nearly $10 billion to countries to support their purchase of U.S. arms through the FMS program. These grants came from the U.S. State Department-funded Foreign Military Financing program and other Defense Department-funded military aid programs. The US government also allows a few select countries companies to receive grants to purchase arms through the DCS program. Perhaps controversially, the Pentagon has also provided discounts of $8.5 billion on US arms sales to wealthy nations such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait to ensure these countries buy US weapons systems. |
From the US government
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers annual reports From the Congressional Research Service Foreign Military Sales, February 21, 2020. Direct Commercial Sales, March 2, 2020. "National Debate Topic for High Schools, 2019-2020," June 2019. Additional Forum resources
Trump and Saudi Arms Sales - see resource page
Arms Trade FAQs - Video Series - including videos (below) and transcripts related to "if we don't see them, others will" Resources recommended by Andrew Feinstein (contact him): Shadow World Trailer from Louverture Films on Vimeo. See also Project Indefensible website and related publication "Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain the Global Arms Trade"
|
What data is available on U.S. arms sales?
Alas, there is not one universally used estimate of U.S. arms sales.
According to a May 2019 State Department factsheet, the FMS program "manages the transfer of approximately $43 billion per year of defense equipment" and the DCS program "provides regulatory approvals for more than $136 billion per year in sales of defense equipment, services, and related manufacturing technologies controlled under" the USML. Because there is less public transparency around DCS, because approvals do not necessarily result in sales, and because DCS often includes small arms and light weapons that are not considered major defense articles, some estimates of U.S. arms sales do not include DCS in their totals.
Some official U.S. government sources of data include the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Historical Factsbook, the State Department’s Section 655 Annual Military Assistance report and the World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade (WMEAT) report, and the Commerce Department's U.S. export data compiled by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The Security Assistance Monitor provides additional descriptions of these information sources (see "Sources") and at times is the most reliable place to find the latest information, especially after the State Department revised its website in 2019.
The Forum on the Arms Trade maintains a resource page about FMS notifications (as well as a spreadsheet).
The Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) collects a much broader range of information, including on FMS and DCS notifications and deliveries, as well as certain sales via the CCL (including the 600 series). Read this latest report examining 2018 notifications, both FMS and DCS, finding the Trump administration made $78.8 billion in arms deals (not deliveries) in 2018, with DCS accounting for an increasing share of deals. Click here to access a snapshot of SAM's database (and adjust the Program/Recipient tab to sort by FMS, DCS, and other categories).
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) maintains what is likely the world's most cited information on the global arms trade of major defense articles, including in yearly factsheets (see latest arms transfers report) as well as via their long-standing database. As has been the case for many years, U.S. arms exports account for the largest (and growing) portion of an expanding global arms trade, with the United State last estimated as accounting for 36 percent of global major weapons supply over the 2014-2018 time period.
Common argument: jobs (and economy)
The Trump administration and the President himself have often claimed that supporting the U.S. economy and jobs associated with arms transfers are a critical reason for continuing and increasing U.S. arms sales (see also the Conventional Arms Trade Policy, official site/Forum site). Many times claims about job numbers appear to be exaggerated or arms deals come with co-production agreements that could offshore jobs or otherwise result in fewer U.S. jobs. See pages 11-13 of the SAM report for an overview of data and discussion on this topic.
This issue has become increasingly prominent in the controversy over the Trump administration's "emergency" arms sales to Saudi Arabia, with the first resolution to be pushed forward using privileged status by Senator Menendez (S.J. Res 36) on June 18 explicitly seeking to block co-production. During his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12, State Department Assistance Secretary R. Clarke Cooper argued that instead of exporting jobs, co-production would increase U.S. jobs (see video at 1:59:30).
Common argument: if we don't sell the weapons, others will
It is commonly argued that the United States should sell weapons because other countries will supply them if the United States doesn't, thereby weakening U.S. influence (as well as the U.S. economy, see above). President Trump has used that argument, for example, in promoting and defending arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In his written testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12 regarding "emergency" sales to Saudi Arabia, State Department Assistance Secretary R. Clarke Cooper explained, "Our adversaries, including Russia and China, have adopted deliberate, long-term strategies of trying to disrupt our partnerships by seeking to replace the United States as the credible supplier of choice. We simply cannot allow openings that our adversaries will exploit to disrupt partnerships, to reduce our regional influence, to impact our defense industrial base, and to spread chaos."
Forum-listed experts are frequently asked to address versions of this argument. See the video series for three experts' responses (and transcripts). Common counter arguments are quickly outlined below:
The evidence that suppliers have leverage over the actions of purchasing states is not strong. The Saudi-led coalition's targeting of buildings and other infrastructure in Yemen that the United States had put on a "do not target" list underscores the limits of influence.
It is not easy for countries to simply "switch" suppliers, especially to Russian or Chinese systems, which may not be as capable and are not interoperable with a country's existing systems (if American). Functionally, this mean that it would take years or decades to change one's defensive systems to new partner(s), creating a barrier to other suppliers.
The U.S. provision of weapons to countries engaged in conflict and/or likely to abuse human rights runs the risk of exacerbating violence and abuse, runs counter to U.S. law and moral responsibility, as well as undermines global efforts to improve responsibility in the arms trade (such as the Arms Trade Treaty).
Alas, there is not one universally used estimate of U.S. arms sales.
According to a May 2019 State Department factsheet, the FMS program "manages the transfer of approximately $43 billion per year of defense equipment" and the DCS program "provides regulatory approvals for more than $136 billion per year in sales of defense equipment, services, and related manufacturing technologies controlled under" the USML. Because there is less public transparency around DCS, because approvals do not necessarily result in sales, and because DCS often includes small arms and light weapons that are not considered major defense articles, some estimates of U.S. arms sales do not include DCS in their totals.
Some official U.S. government sources of data include the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Historical Factsbook, the State Department’s Section 655 Annual Military Assistance report and the World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade (WMEAT) report, and the Commerce Department's U.S. export data compiled by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The Security Assistance Monitor provides additional descriptions of these information sources (see "Sources") and at times is the most reliable place to find the latest information, especially after the State Department revised its website in 2019.
The Forum on the Arms Trade maintains a resource page about FMS notifications (as well as a spreadsheet).
The Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) collects a much broader range of information, including on FMS and DCS notifications and deliveries, as well as certain sales via the CCL (including the 600 series). Read this latest report examining 2018 notifications, both FMS and DCS, finding the Trump administration made $78.8 billion in arms deals (not deliveries) in 2018, with DCS accounting for an increasing share of deals. Click here to access a snapshot of SAM's database (and adjust the Program/Recipient tab to sort by FMS, DCS, and other categories).
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) maintains what is likely the world's most cited information on the global arms trade of major defense articles, including in yearly factsheets (see latest arms transfers report) as well as via their long-standing database. As has been the case for many years, U.S. arms exports account for the largest (and growing) portion of an expanding global arms trade, with the United State last estimated as accounting for 36 percent of global major weapons supply over the 2014-2018 time period.
Common argument: jobs (and economy)
The Trump administration and the President himself have often claimed that supporting the U.S. economy and jobs associated with arms transfers are a critical reason for continuing and increasing U.S. arms sales (see also the Conventional Arms Trade Policy, official site/Forum site). Many times claims about job numbers appear to be exaggerated or arms deals come with co-production agreements that could offshore jobs or otherwise result in fewer U.S. jobs. See pages 11-13 of the SAM report for an overview of data and discussion on this topic.
This issue has become increasingly prominent in the controversy over the Trump administration's "emergency" arms sales to Saudi Arabia, with the first resolution to be pushed forward using privileged status by Senator Menendez (S.J. Res 36) on June 18 explicitly seeking to block co-production. During his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12, State Department Assistance Secretary R. Clarke Cooper argued that instead of exporting jobs, co-production would increase U.S. jobs (see video at 1:59:30).
Common argument: if we don't sell the weapons, others will
It is commonly argued that the United States should sell weapons because other countries will supply them if the United States doesn't, thereby weakening U.S. influence (as well as the U.S. economy, see above). President Trump has used that argument, for example, in promoting and defending arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In his written testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12 regarding "emergency" sales to Saudi Arabia, State Department Assistance Secretary R. Clarke Cooper explained, "Our adversaries, including Russia and China, have adopted deliberate, long-term strategies of trying to disrupt our partnerships by seeking to replace the United States as the credible supplier of choice. We simply cannot allow openings that our adversaries will exploit to disrupt partnerships, to reduce our regional influence, to impact our defense industrial base, and to spread chaos."
Forum-listed experts are frequently asked to address versions of this argument. See the video series for three experts' responses (and transcripts). Common counter arguments are quickly outlined below:
The evidence that suppliers have leverage over the actions of purchasing states is not strong. The Saudi-led coalition's targeting of buildings and other infrastructure in Yemen that the United States had put on a "do not target" list underscores the limits of influence.
It is not easy for countries to simply "switch" suppliers, especially to Russian or Chinese systems, which may not be as capable and are not interoperable with a country's existing systems (if American). Functionally, this mean that it would take years or decades to change one's defensive systems to new partner(s), creating a barrier to other suppliers.
The U.S. provision of weapons to countries engaged in conflict and/or likely to abuse human rights runs the risk of exacerbating violence and abuse, runs counter to U.S. law and moral responsibility, as well as undermines global efforts to improve responsibility in the arms trade (such as the Arms Trade Treaty).
Questions Received and Answered
* Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. Please contact experts directly for further comments.