30 June 2018

To:                DDTCPublicComments@state.gov
Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy, Department of State
and
Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Room 2099B, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington DC 20230

Subject:       ITAR Amendment - Categories I, II, and III
               EAR Amendment - RIN 0694-AF47

I am writing to submit comments on the proposed changes to ITAR (USML) and EAR (CCL) recently published in the Federal Register. I write in a personal capacity but the views expressed are informed by my research, policy analysis, and teaching as a professor at the University of Michigan, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.

By way of a few introductory remarks, I am familiar with the complexities of US arms export laws and policy, as well as the regulatory framework. There is a legitimate need for periodic updates of the USML and—in view of the labyrinth of entangled laws, regulations, and agencies involved in the current system—I am supportive of the reform initiative. I am generally more concerned about keeping weapons out of the hands of those who would misuse them than in making them easier to procure, but that end is not at odds with the objective of putting in place a single control list and a single administrative agency. The reform effort has not progressed to that point, however, and I am wary about these proposed regulatory changes as an interim step. I will also add that I have been following the export control reform project since it was announced in 2009 and this is the only time I have felt the need to express concerns about the proposed changes. That is largely due to the particular, complete and recognizable, weapons that are being considered for change.

1. I urge you to delay the effective date of the proposed changes until the Government Accounting Office or the Library of Congress has publicly reported to the Congress their impact on numerous statutes referring to “defense articles.”

If enacted, the changes would have implications for several provisions of law. From my reading of both sets of proposed regulations, I am not reassured that the implications have been fully considered. The USML is formally defined in the AECA (22 USC 2778) as a definitive list of defense articles, and from a quick search of US statutes the term “defense article” appears in some 45 sections, in many instances (but

1 22 USC 2778(a)(1).

not always) explicitly linked to the USML. In addition, several provisions of the AECA itself are explicitly linked to an item’s presence on the USML (without necessarily referring to “defense articles”). On a separate statutory track, the Foreign Assistance Act was recently amended to include CCL 600 series items as defense articles, along with all items contained on the USML [22 USC 2304.(d)(2)(C)], but the legislation did not anticipate the new 500 series so there is likely a gap there with regards to Congressional intentions. To complicate things further, the US Munitions Import List (USMIL) makes liberal use of the term “defense article,” defined as articles on the USMIL—which currently include the same items that are slated to lose the “defense article” designation that extends from inclusion on the USML – so that items designated as defense articles on the USMIL will not be considered defense articles for purposes of export.³

It is very challenging to sort out the tangle. Some of the instances where terms and definitions are at variance may not prove significant, but others may have far-reaching implications. Due to the disparate definitions and linkages, the proposal to remove specified firearms from the USML raises some important questions about the continuing applicability of provisions of law that refer to “defense articles,” a term that currently encompasses such firearms. In numerous situations the current statutory treatment of non-automatic firearms would be altered – or at least become ambiguous—as a result simply of moving these weapons from Category I of the USML to the 500-series on CCL. Statutory provisions that could be affected by the proposed change range from Export-Import Bank financing of defense article sales to human rights conditionality on security assistance, to the provisions for third-party transfer of grant-supplied defense articles, and various reports to Congress. (See references in the footnote below.)⁴ In some cases, the law in question is not directly linked to arms exports, but the relevant statute refers to defense articles and links the definition to items on the USML. In this way, removing specified firearms from the USML is likely to have a host of unintended and unanticipated repercussions.

Further, if semi-automatic weapons and other non-automatic firearms are removed from the USML it will impact the ability of law enforcement to charge weapons traffickers with violating the AECA as was done in several of the cases cited in a recent report from the Department of Justice on export enforcement.⁵

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⁴ The numerous places where the meaning of “defense article” would be called into question by the proposed rules include:
- Export-Import Bank financing of defense article sales, including multiple end use considerations and other conditions (12 USC 635);
- Requirement to give Congress notice of commercial firearms sales of $1,000,000 or more (22 USC 2776)
- Annual report to Congress on military assistance, and specifically on transfers of USML Category I firearms (22 USC 2415)
- Provisions for supplying defense articles on a grant-basis, and multiple restrictions (22 USC 2314)
- Conditions for third-party transfer of defense articles provided on a grant basis (22 USC 2314)
- Certification of end use as a condition of sale or lease of defense article (22 USC 2753)
- Post-delivery verification of credible reports of misuse of weapons (22 USC 2753)
- Brokers of items included on the USML are required to register and activity must be licensed; exporters of USML items must identify all consignees and freight forwarders in license application (22 USC 2778)

As Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Tina Kaidanow explained to the House Foreign Affairs Committee last June, the US arms export architecture is very complex and involves what her predecessors have described as “cradle to grave” oversight of exported US defense articles. Removing that designation defense article from weapons that are not fully automatic has the effect of detaching them from the US Munitions List and the regulatory framework built around it: there may well be significant unintended consequences.

In the event that consideration of the proposals is not delayed, I would recommend several other changes to the proposed ITAR and EAR revisions.

2. Retain existing USML I(a) and (d) unchanged; retain the existing coverage of USML II(a) unchanged; delete proposed 0A501.a and .b; and limit proposed 0A502 to renumbering existing 0A984.

My concern here is based on principle and definition. Several of the weapons that would be moved to CCL are military-style weapons that are either used in battlefield situations or are substantially comparable to weapons as used in battlefield situations – including semi-automatic assault rifles and bolt-action sniper rifles. All of USML I(a), I(d), and II(a) are currently designated “significant military equipment” due to “their capacity for substantial military utility or capability,” per the ITAR definition. The prevalence of armed extremists and insurgents who depend on weapons currently included in USML Categories I and II makes the military utility or capability of these weapons as relevant as ever. Due to their size and long shelf life, firearms are easily diverted and resold on black markets around the world. The Department of Justice’s January 2018 summary of major US export enforcement cases noted above includes recent smuggling of semi-automatic assault rifles (and other firearms) to Dominican Republic, the Gambia, Russia via Latvia, Thailand and other destinations. In addition, the report documents the case of two men in Georgia attempting to export firearms to a range of international on the dark net, and another similar case from Kansas.

While the US military may not derive great advantage from most of these weapons, they still have the military utility and capability of threatening the lives and welfare of many people around the world. It is in the interest of the US and American citizens to keep the tightest control on them. Indeed, it is for that very reason that the same weapons being proposed for removal from the US Munitions List are expected to remain on the US Munitions Import List, where their entry into the US will remain tightly controlled. It is also for that reason that a growing number of states are imposing limitations on the retail availability of these weapons and many retailers are voluntarily removing them from their shelves. They should remain where they are, on the USML.

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8 Department of Justice, op. cit.
Before proposed regulatory changes are adopted, an opinion should be obtained from the Department of Justice concerning the legality of applying ITAR brokering restrictions to exports of firearms transferred from the USML to the CCL. Furthermore, Congress and the public should be informed as to how the proposed arrangements will address the risk of diversion.

There are several reasons to be concerned about the proposed rules pertaining to brokering. From their origin in the 1930s, a major intent of efforts to regulate arms exports has been to curtail illicit and undesirable trafficking in weapons. In the 1980s and 1990s, illicit flows of small arms flooded international markets, with calamitous effects in every region of the world. The rate of flow may have slowed since the 1990s, but as the 2018 Justice Department report attests, the efforts to supply contraband firearms are very much alive in our own time. From a global perspective, brokering laws are considered a weak link in the regulatory apparatus, to the extent that in the 1990s there was some talk of negotiating an international treaty focused entirely on arms brokering. Provisions written into US law around that time were considered some of the strongest in the world. With the transfer of specified semi-automatic and non-automatic weapons to CCL, the brokering laws would no longer be applied to these weapons (or would be applied only in a much-weakened version) and they would not be available to law enforcement for prosecution purposes.

My specific concerns with the proposal to apply existing AECA/ITAR brokering rules to items intended for transfer to the CCL are twofold, related to the dubious statutory underpinnings of the proposed rule change and to its practical implications.

(a) The first concern is a matter of statutory coherence and proper statutory authority. The brokering clauses of the AECA require commercial brokers involved in the transfer of defense articles to register with the State Department and apply for their transactions to be licensed (22 USC 2778). The AECA brokering provisions are explicitly linked to defense articles on the USML (and by implication, ITAR). Because the proposed changes to ITAR and CCL would remove specified non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms from the USML, on the face of it, it would seem that commercial brokers of these items would be released from ITAR registration and brokering requirements. To prevent this outcome, the State Department proposes a patch, by asserting that the AECA brokering provisions will also apply to the US Munitions Import List (which, as noted above, will continue to include the items that—for export purpose—are deemed no longer to warrant control under the USML). The intended effect is that brokers wanting to export items included on the list of items controlled as defense articles for import (but not for export) will be subject to the rules pertaining to the export of such items. The logic is convoluted at best, and it raises questions about the statutory grounding for requiring brokers who are exporting items “no longer warranting control under USML” to register with the State Department and comply with related ITAR requirements. Given the complexity of the issue and the risks associated with brokering activities, it would seem advisable and prudent to seek a legal opinion within the Executive Branch to ensure that the provisions of the AECA pertaining to brokers—including the registration requirement—can be applied.

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9 Per 22 USC 2778 (b)(1)(A)(i), “…every person (other than an officer or employee of the United States Government acting in official capacity) who engages in the business of brokering activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of any defense article or defense service designated by the President under subsection (a)(1), or in the business of brokering activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of any foreign defense article or defense service (as defined in subclause (IV)), shall register with the United States Government agency charged with the administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee which shall be prescribed by such regulations.
robustly to all involved in the wide range of brokering activities associated with the export of items on the US Munitions Import List. Such a legal opinion should be obtained and considered before the regulatory changes are adopted.

(b) The second issue about brokering rules relates to the practical effects of the numerous proposed changes to ITAR section 129. It is hard to imagine, in the first place, the steps by which the licensing of a transaction will be handled by Commerce and any brokering aspects (including completion of information required by 22 CFR 129.6) will be handled by State. It boggles the mind to consider how this might actually amount to a time-saving simplification of rules. I am primarily concerned about the proposed amendment 129.2(b)(2)(vii), however, which appears to negate the controls on brokering for transactions subject to EAR and open a significant loophole for unscrupulous brokers. If I have understood the proposed changes to Section 129.2 correctly, if a Michigan-based retail sports outlet licensed to sell firearms in the US wanted to sell, say, AR-15 semi-automatic rifles to clients in another country, then so long as the Michigan retailer could secure approval via the BIS licensing process, the various parties involved in shipment, financing, and possibly transshipment would be exempt from any registration and approval requirements. Nor would they necessarily be known to licensing and enforcement agents based in the Commerce Department. What in this scenario would deter an unknown and independent handler from diverting the weapons to unauthorized end-users? I would like to assume that government officials in the State and Commerce Departments have thought through the implications of the proposed rules as they might be bent for nefarious purpose as well as their service for industry cost and convenience, but the published rules do not provide assurance in that regard. More clarification is needed about how the brokering regulations will be applied, how the inter-agency process will be managed, and the extent to which the proposed arrangements for registering and licensing brokers involved in acquiring, financing and transporting exported firearms will address the risk of diversion to non-authorized end-users. One effect of transferring non-automatic firearms from the USML to the CCL is to remove them from the remit of the State Department’s Blue Lantern program, which otherwise might be engaged to make post-shipment checks. It is not clear whether Commerce has a comparable program or what resources it will assign to monitoring the commerce in semi-automatic firearms.

4. Amend proposals for EAR Section 734.

BIS has indicated that items moving “to the CCL would be subject to existing EAR concepts of jurisdiction and controls related to ‘development’ and ‘production,’ as well operation, installation, and maintenance ‘technology.’” This approach would appear to give rise to the possibility of widespread and openly sanctioned circulation of open source, non-proprietary instructions for using computer-aided design (CAD) files to produce via 3D-printing technology, or text files to produce via CNC milling the firearms removed from USML. Until now, this development has been blocked in the courts via application of ITAR provisions requiring export license. Either the Department of Commerce should clarify that it views any software instructions for producing controlled firearms already to be within the ambit of the EAR, or EAR Section 734.7 should be amended to bring circulation of open-source, non-proprietary CAD and other electronic files under EAR control - possibly by establishing that electronic files for producing functional firearms are subject to EAR control as production technology.

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10 When questions arose in 1996 as to the authority of the President to restrict munitions imports under the AECA, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department was asked to provide an opinion. A similar request for opinion is warranted here. See https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1996/02/31/op-olc-v020-p0049_0.pdf.
5. **Amend provisions for License Control – Crime Control**

Shotguns controlled under 0A502 are subject to the Crime Control because they are not controlled by Wassenaar. It is not evident, however, why items 0A501a are controlled for Regional Security but not Crime Control, as firearms are a main element of crime control equipment used by police and security forces. Moreover, federal statutes explicitly prohibit the export of crime control equipment to police and security forces in countries whose governments have a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, with exceptions requiring Presidential certification. To bring the proposed regulations into alignment with provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act [22 USC 2304(a)(2), which makes explicit reference to crime control equipment under the aegis of the (expired) Export Administration Act], items in 0A501A should be subject to Crime Control.

6. **Include information from enhanced reporting on certain firearms exports in annual 655 Report.**

Enhanced reporting of items in the 501 series is potentially one bright spot in the proposed regulations. Several proposed changes are welcome, including: proposed changes in EAR part 748 requiring information about required import licenses; proposed changes in reporting mandated in EAR part 758; the required use of EEI filing for 0A501.a firearms; and the proposed recordkeeping requirement in part 762.

If the proposed rules are ultimately accepted, the information provided to the Wassenaar Arrangement and the UN Register of Conventional Arms will provide more granular information about US commercial exports of firearms, which seemingly could be included without significant additional effort in the annual 655 report mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 USC 2415.

7. **The balance of costs and benefits significantly favors industry over the taxpayer.**

The two sets of proposed rules include calculations of expected costs and benefits of the changes. Having invested several hours parsing the proposed rules, I suspect that one major benefit of the changes will accrue to the attorneys who help clients wend their way through federal regulations. The registration system as it was initially set up was intended to pay for itself, via modest registration and licensing fees that covered the costs of recording and updating information on US arms manufacturers and reviewing details for proposed transactions. In some sense, it has been a fee-for-service arrangement. The proposed changes significantly alter that approach with regards to firearms proposed for transfer to the CCL.

Except for the presumably few brokers unable to qualify for the firearms registration exemption outlined in proposed changes to ITAR section 129.2, no registration or license fees will be collected. Some of the transactions may be straightforward, but the workload promises to be substantial, with 4000-10,000 applications and virtually every 0A501 transaction subject to at least regional security controls, with no license exceptions available. Whereas under the current system fees paid by industry and brokers help offset the costs of processing the license applications, under the proposed system the expenses associated with reviewing license applications will be charged to the taxpayer. In the current political environment where government hiring is anathema, unless a streamlined new process delivers extraordinary returns, it is difficult to imagine how the tally could come out in the taxpayer’s favor without
significant sacrifice of quality control. With respect to firearms exports, taxpayers and the public at large should be concerned about pressures to cut corners that could result in authorization of irresponsible transfers. **In my view as a taxpayer, the ITAR fee structure is yet one more reason for retaining non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms on the USML, and should these weapons ultimately be transferred to the CCL, I urge public officials at the Commerce Department to explore charging a service fee for processing export license applications.**

**Conclusion**

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on these rules. I am disappointed, however, that by and large they downplay the lethality of the weapons currently controlled in ITAR categories I and III. I realize that these documents were prepared for a different purpose than the materials posted to inform the global public about US government programs and policy, but **the difference between the tone and emphasis of the proposed rules and the public presentation of US policy on the export of small arms and light weapons over the past twenty years is striking.** By contrast to the public statements and documents, including the 2017 Congressional testimony by a State Department official, the emphasis in these regulations is on reducing transaction costs for industry rather than promoting the public good, including national security and public safety.

In response to public comments on the proposed regulatory changes, I hope that the Departments of State and Commerce will reconsider the proposal to transfer any complete weapons from the USML to CCL. In the event that the proposed regulations go forward substantially unchanged, I can only hope that other countries will tighten and strictly enforce their own import restrictions to reduce the risk of diversion and misuse.

**Thank you,**

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