Assessing Trump's First Year (2nd term)
U.S. President Donald Trump was inaugurated one year ago (for a second term) -- on January 20, 2025. The Forum on the Arms Trade invited members of its community, including experts and emerging experts, to examine aspects of the administration's first year as relates to arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use.
Experts authored nine commentaries, writing from the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, Uganda, and the United Kingdom. Each commentary is individually authored and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the expert's organization. Inclusion here does not imply agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The Forum itself does not take positions.
These commentaries were published on January 19, 2026.
Experts authored nine commentaries, writing from the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, Uganda, and the United Kingdom. Each commentary is individually authored and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the expert's organization. Inclusion here does not imply agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The Forum itself does not take positions.
These commentaries were published on January 19, 2026.
Click links and images below to read the full commentaries:
- Profit and Provocation: Arms Sales Policy in the Trump Years, William D. Hartung, Senior Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Trump’s Power Politics and the Return of Empire, Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, DAWN
- Getting it Wrong on Guns, Jeff Abramson, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Center for International Policy
- The Rhetoric That Justifies Violence Against Civilians, Jen Spindel, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of New Hampshire
- From the Riviera to the ceasefire: Trump’s Gaza policy in 2025, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Research Coordinator, Campaign Against Arms Trade
- European Rearmament and U.S. Weapons Reliance, León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Senior Researcher, Asser Institute for International and European Law in The Hague
- 2025: The Year International Law Was Placed on Life Support, Amanda Pereira, External Consultant, BASIC*
- U.S. Landmine Policy and Practice: From Bad to Worse, Allie Hansen, Research Fellow, Center for International Policy*
- Assessing Trump's second term of office through the threat to global security, Tabitha R Agaba, independent researcher and freelance writer, based in Uganda*
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Profit and Provocation: Arms Sales Policy in the Trump Years
William D. Hartung, Senior Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
After one full term (2016 to 2020) and one year of a second, the Trump administration’s approach to arms transfers has settled into a predictable pattern. That pattern is likely to continue in 2026.
Periodically President Trump lambasts weapons makers, referring to them as war profiteers or berating them for overcharging the government. But more often than not, the president’s rhetoric is just that — stern warnings that are not translated into policy.
The policy of arms sales hypocrisy was on display within months of President Trump’s first inauguration. His first foreign trip was to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the centerpiece of that trip was a huge arms deal that the Trump administration said would be worth $110 billion. The actual offer was much smaller, since the $110 billion figure included deals already concluded under the Obama administration, plus speculative offers that would be concluded after Trump left office, if at all.
But whatever the actual figure was, the president pushed arms sales, in part in an effort to show that he was a consummate deal maker bringing jobs to America. A case in point came with Trump’s White House meeting with de facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) at which Trump pulled out a map that showed how many jobs in key states were generated by arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Last but not least, after the Saudi government organized the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, President Trump refused to cut off U.S. arms sales because he didn’t want to hurt the bottom lines of “our wonderful defense contractors.”
In short, President Trump went from verbally chiding U.S. weapons contractors to recruiting them as political partners in his efforts to solidify and expand his domestic support base.
The Trump administration has continued to aggressively promote arms sales in its second term in office, with offers exceeding $104 billion in 2025, including deals with controversial governments like Egypt ($5.5 billion), Israel ($11.1 billion), Nigeria ($346 million), the Philippines ($5.7 billion), and Saudi Arabia ($4.7 billion).
The Trump approach to arms sales is not unique. The Biden administration made a near record $145 billion in arms offers in 2024, its last year in office. President Biden called U.S. defense industry workers and the companies they work for the “arsenal of democracy.” His rhetoric ignored the fact that over 30 U.S. arms clients during his tenure were undemocratic regimes.
The Biden administration also played the jobs card, circulating data in Congress about how many jobs would be created when U.S. military aid to Ukraine came back to U.S. companies to build weapons destined for Kiev.
Both the Biden and Trump administrations pushed to streamline the arms sales approval process, although the Trump team has been more systematic in its efforts. Meanwhile, cuts at the State Department may make it difficult for officials to provide even minimal scrutiny of all of the arms offers they are meant to review with an eye towards human rights considerations.
One difference between the Trump and Biden administrations is that Biden relied more heavily on arms sales to Ukraine, Israel, and its allies in Europe and Asia as the centerpiece of its foreign and military policies, while the Trump team supplemented its extensive arms sales with direct military action like its armed regime change in Venezuela and its bombing of Iran.
So it is possible that the value of U.S. arms sales will decline as direct intervention and threats of force move to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. And if tensions with Europe persist, some offers of billions in sales agreed to in the past few years may be cancelled by the recipient nations.
In addition, if the Trump administration gets anywhere close to their proposed $1.5 trillion Pentagon spending goal, foreign sales are likely to be less important financially to the major weapons firms. That doesn’t automatically mean they won’t still push for more arms sales, especially since foreign sales sometimes sustain programs (like the F-16, the C-130, or the M-1 tank) that the Pentagon has stopped buying or is shifting away from.
From a security standpoint, the issue is not the value of proposed arms sales in any given year, but how those arms may be used and how they fit into overall U.S. strategy. The mix of tools used by the Trump administration, including its warm embrace of military intervention as a way to gain resources, portends a return to an unabashed policy of imperial domination backed by military force. Arms sales will be part of the mix, but direct military action dictated from the White House will pose the greater danger.
William D. Hartung, Senior Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
After one full term (2016 to 2020) and one year of a second, the Trump administration’s approach to arms transfers has settled into a predictable pattern. That pattern is likely to continue in 2026.
Periodically President Trump lambasts weapons makers, referring to them as war profiteers or berating them for overcharging the government. But more often than not, the president’s rhetoric is just that — stern warnings that are not translated into policy.
The policy of arms sales hypocrisy was on display within months of President Trump’s first inauguration. His first foreign trip was to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the centerpiece of that trip was a huge arms deal that the Trump administration said would be worth $110 billion. The actual offer was much smaller, since the $110 billion figure included deals already concluded under the Obama administration, plus speculative offers that would be concluded after Trump left office, if at all.
But whatever the actual figure was, the president pushed arms sales, in part in an effort to show that he was a consummate deal maker bringing jobs to America. A case in point came with Trump’s White House meeting with de facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) at which Trump pulled out a map that showed how many jobs in key states were generated by arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Last but not least, after the Saudi government organized the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, President Trump refused to cut off U.S. arms sales because he didn’t want to hurt the bottom lines of “our wonderful defense contractors.”
In short, President Trump went from verbally chiding U.S. weapons contractors to recruiting them as political partners in his efforts to solidify and expand his domestic support base.
The Trump administration has continued to aggressively promote arms sales in its second term in office, with offers exceeding $104 billion in 2025, including deals with controversial governments like Egypt ($5.5 billion), Israel ($11.1 billion), Nigeria ($346 million), the Philippines ($5.7 billion), and Saudi Arabia ($4.7 billion).
The Trump approach to arms sales is not unique. The Biden administration made a near record $145 billion in arms offers in 2024, its last year in office. President Biden called U.S. defense industry workers and the companies they work for the “arsenal of democracy.” His rhetoric ignored the fact that over 30 U.S. arms clients during his tenure were undemocratic regimes.
The Biden administration also played the jobs card, circulating data in Congress about how many jobs would be created when U.S. military aid to Ukraine came back to U.S. companies to build weapons destined for Kiev.
Both the Biden and Trump administrations pushed to streamline the arms sales approval process, although the Trump team has been more systematic in its efforts. Meanwhile, cuts at the State Department may make it difficult for officials to provide even minimal scrutiny of all of the arms offers they are meant to review with an eye towards human rights considerations.
One difference between the Trump and Biden administrations is that Biden relied more heavily on arms sales to Ukraine, Israel, and its allies in Europe and Asia as the centerpiece of its foreign and military policies, while the Trump team supplemented its extensive arms sales with direct military action like its armed regime change in Venezuela and its bombing of Iran.
So it is possible that the value of U.S. arms sales will decline as direct intervention and threats of force move to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. And if tensions with Europe persist, some offers of billions in sales agreed to in the past few years may be cancelled by the recipient nations.
In addition, if the Trump administration gets anywhere close to their proposed $1.5 trillion Pentagon spending goal, foreign sales are likely to be less important financially to the major weapons firms. That doesn’t automatically mean they won’t still push for more arms sales, especially since foreign sales sometimes sustain programs (like the F-16, the C-130, or the M-1 tank) that the Pentagon has stopped buying or is shifting away from.
From a security standpoint, the issue is not the value of proposed arms sales in any given year, but how those arms may be used and how they fit into overall U.S. strategy. The mix of tools used by the Trump administration, including its warm embrace of military intervention as a way to gain resources, portends a return to an unabashed policy of imperial domination backed by military force. Arms sales will be part of the mix, but direct military action dictated from the White House will pose the greater danger.
Trump’s Power Politics and the Return of Empire
Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, DAWN
The speed, breadth, and volatility of the Trump administration’s foreign policy adventurism have left much of the world dazed and scrambling for a response. A blunt declaration of a new American empire—one that claims the might-based right to take wealth and resources wherever it can—appears to be the administration’s only unifying doctrine.
Many initially hoped that Trump would always chicken out. Early maximalism—including sweeping tariffs and threats of invasion—often gave way to retreat and recalibration, reinforcing a transactional approach grounded in leverage rather than norms. In the Middle East, the administration floated U.S. control over Gaza, then pressured Israel toward a ceasefire, producing a “peace plan” that reduced violence while entrenching Israeli power. It boasted of massive arms and trade deals with Gulf states, best understood as protection money, openly blending U.S. security commitments with business ventures that enriched Trump, his family, and his associates. With Iran, the administration hinted at sanctions relief and negotiations, only to surprise allies and adversaries alike with direct strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities amid a brief but intense Israeli assault.
At the same time, the United States expanded its use of limited-scope military force—bombardments in Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and even against alleged “drug boats” off Venezuela and Caracas itself—normalizing episodic violence untethered from legal restraints and effectively burying the post–World War II international order. Having confirmed the global community’s inability to respond, the administration widened its belligerence, from the invasion of Venezuela to aggressive posturing over Greenland, while signaling that renewed confrontation with Iran remains imminent alongside talk of a deal.
What distinguishes this moment from preceding eras—which normalized many of the same practices Trump is now utilizing—is the explicit rejection of human rights, democracy, international law, and multilateral institutions as sources of legitimacy. Withdrawals from dozens of international bodies and open declarations of intent to seize oil, minerals, and wealth mark a break from even performative adherence to global norms. Deals with Venezuela—and the prospect of one with Iran—are better understood as a global shakedown: a mafia-style system in which submission is rewarded and resistance punished. For the international community, if it still exists, the choice is stark—confront U.S. power and risk ruin, or acquiesce and perish more slowly.
Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, DAWN
The speed, breadth, and volatility of the Trump administration’s foreign policy adventurism have left much of the world dazed and scrambling for a response. A blunt declaration of a new American empire—one that claims the might-based right to take wealth and resources wherever it can—appears to be the administration’s only unifying doctrine.
Many initially hoped that Trump would always chicken out. Early maximalism—including sweeping tariffs and threats of invasion—often gave way to retreat and recalibration, reinforcing a transactional approach grounded in leverage rather than norms. In the Middle East, the administration floated U.S. control over Gaza, then pressured Israel toward a ceasefire, producing a “peace plan” that reduced violence while entrenching Israeli power. It boasted of massive arms and trade deals with Gulf states, best understood as protection money, openly blending U.S. security commitments with business ventures that enriched Trump, his family, and his associates. With Iran, the administration hinted at sanctions relief and negotiations, only to surprise allies and adversaries alike with direct strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities amid a brief but intense Israeli assault.
At the same time, the United States expanded its use of limited-scope military force—bombardments in Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and even against alleged “drug boats” off Venezuela and Caracas itself—normalizing episodic violence untethered from legal restraints and effectively burying the post–World War II international order. Having confirmed the global community’s inability to respond, the administration widened its belligerence, from the invasion of Venezuela to aggressive posturing over Greenland, while signaling that renewed confrontation with Iran remains imminent alongside talk of a deal.
What distinguishes this moment from preceding eras—which normalized many of the same practices Trump is now utilizing—is the explicit rejection of human rights, democracy, international law, and multilateral institutions as sources of legitimacy. Withdrawals from dozens of international bodies and open declarations of intent to seize oil, minerals, and wealth mark a break from even performative adherence to global norms. Deals with Venezuela—and the prospect of one with Iran—are better understood as a global shakedown: a mafia-style system in which submission is rewarded and resistance punished. For the international community, if it still exists, the choice is stark—confront U.S. power and risk ruin, or acquiesce and perish more slowly.
Getting it Wrong on Guns
Jeff Abramson, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Center for International Policy
As his administration did in its first term, Trump’s second term administration is getting it wrong on guns. And those errors are a microcosm of the dangerous approach being taken more broadly on arms issues.
After dangerously reclassifying semi-automatic and some other firearms as commercial items rather than military weapons in 2020, in September 2025 the Trump administration undid important restraints on the transfer of these guns put in place by the interceding Biden administration. Claiming that rules requiring greater recordkeeping and that established a list of 36 high risk countries were harming U.S. business, the Commerce Department announced that its changes “will allow U.S. firearms manufacturers to compete in overseas markets, creating hundreds of millions of dollars per year in export opportunities.”
This focus on business, despite well-known human rights concerns, is a trademark of Trump’s approach to the weapons trade, and international engagement more broadly. Early in this second term, the administration undid the Biden-era conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy and reverted to Trump’s first-term CAT policy that is more focused on economic concerns. In the just released State Department strategic plan, the administration emphasized growing the defense industrial base and promoting the sale of weapons systems, without once using the term “human rights.”
Importantly, in making changes to firearms exports, the Trump administration also abandoned the Biden administration’s policy of providing Congressional notifications. This broader undoing of transparency and reworking of rules to favor business is also apparent in Trump’s massive undermining of international anti-corruption practices, and a concern in foreign assistance.
Related, Trump’s dismantling of efforts by the Biden administration to address domestic gun violence issues was not surprising, even if the pace was more rapid than expected. Actions such as the dismantling of the White House Office of Gun Violence Prevention, cutting workers in other agencies, making sales easier, issuing expansive executive orders, and removing funds to address the root causes of violence, are well documented.
The massive layoffs and restructuring of the State Department, including as relates to monitoring arms transfers, follows a similar playbook.
While there is little reason to expect changes to a pro-business, human rights-void arms transfer approach by this administration, gun issues do resonate strongly in the U.S. and have generated pushback. In response to the September easing of firearms export rules, a bicameral group of Congressmembers sent a letter highlighting the risks of the approach and more than 80 organizations issued a statement objecting to the changes. And, on the controversial provision of weapons to Israel, the historic one vote that garnered a majority of Democratic opposition in a Senate joint resolution of disapproval was to the supply of 20,000 automatic rifles.
In the coming years of the second Trump administration, developments on domestic and international gun issues are likely to continue to be a mirror on alarming presidential practices and resistance to them.
Jeff Abramson, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Center for International Policy
As his administration did in its first term, Trump’s second term administration is getting it wrong on guns. And those errors are a microcosm of the dangerous approach being taken more broadly on arms issues.
After dangerously reclassifying semi-automatic and some other firearms as commercial items rather than military weapons in 2020, in September 2025 the Trump administration undid important restraints on the transfer of these guns put in place by the interceding Biden administration. Claiming that rules requiring greater recordkeeping and that established a list of 36 high risk countries were harming U.S. business, the Commerce Department announced that its changes “will allow U.S. firearms manufacturers to compete in overseas markets, creating hundreds of millions of dollars per year in export opportunities.”
This focus on business, despite well-known human rights concerns, is a trademark of Trump’s approach to the weapons trade, and international engagement more broadly. Early in this second term, the administration undid the Biden-era conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy and reverted to Trump’s first-term CAT policy that is more focused on economic concerns. In the just released State Department strategic plan, the administration emphasized growing the defense industrial base and promoting the sale of weapons systems, without once using the term “human rights.”
Importantly, in making changes to firearms exports, the Trump administration also abandoned the Biden administration’s policy of providing Congressional notifications. This broader undoing of transparency and reworking of rules to favor business is also apparent in Trump’s massive undermining of international anti-corruption practices, and a concern in foreign assistance.
Related, Trump’s dismantling of efforts by the Biden administration to address domestic gun violence issues was not surprising, even if the pace was more rapid than expected. Actions such as the dismantling of the White House Office of Gun Violence Prevention, cutting workers in other agencies, making sales easier, issuing expansive executive orders, and removing funds to address the root causes of violence, are well documented.
The massive layoffs and restructuring of the State Department, including as relates to monitoring arms transfers, follows a similar playbook.
While there is little reason to expect changes to a pro-business, human rights-void arms transfer approach by this administration, gun issues do resonate strongly in the U.S. and have generated pushback. In response to the September easing of firearms export rules, a bicameral group of Congressmembers sent a letter highlighting the risks of the approach and more than 80 organizations issued a statement objecting to the changes. And, on the controversial provision of weapons to Israel, the historic one vote that garnered a majority of Democratic opposition in a Senate joint resolution of disapproval was to the supply of 20,000 automatic rifles.
In the coming years of the second Trump administration, developments on domestic and international gun issues are likely to continue to be a mirror on alarming presidential practices and resistance to them.
The Rhetoric That Justifies Violence Against Civilians
Jen Spindel, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of New Hampshire
According to the Trump administration, his first year in office was spent dealing with “existential threats” posed by terrorists and violent groups abroad and at home. From attacks on boats in the Caribbean, to increased US bombings overseas in places like Somalia, Nigeria, Iran, and Iraq, to increased militarization of ICE and other federal agencies at home, the Trump administration seems to believe it is under constant attack. In rhetoric and in action, the administration is eroding one of the most fundamental distinctions related to the use of force: the distinction between civilian and military. This distinction matters because both international and US law prohibit actions – including the use of military weaponry – against civilians and non-combatants. Eroding that distinction points to increasing militarization at home and abroad and a greater likelihood of violence against civilians.
First are the reports that the United States painted a military plane to look like a civilian aircraft during the strikes on “drug boats” in the Caribbean. While the legality of the strikes was already dubious, international and US law prohibit disguising military weapons as civilian objects. The Department of Defense Law of War Manual (p. 67 and p. 327) explains that even in times of hostility, it is not ok to “resort to perfidy” or to “feign non-hostile relations in order to seek a military advantage.” I doubt Pete Hegseth would suggest his “most lethal” military was at a military disadvantage against the boats it targeted. Perfidy is the feigning of civilian or non-combatant status, and international law prohibits killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy. On both of these counts, painting a military plane as a civilian one and hiding otherwise visible missiles is a clear act of deception used to enable the killing of people on these boats. While Trump is not the first president to unilaterally declare a group terrorists and order strikes, he is the first to do so gleefully, publicly, and with cheerful disregard of international and US law.
From a purely self-interested point of view, the US should care about the guidelines surrounding the use of force. Without such a distinction, it would be legally and morally acceptable to fight an enemy by targeting their cities and civilian populations. No one wants to declare open target on US civilian populations, infrastructure, or medical personnel and facilities. By simply declaring people on the boat “narco-traffickers,” Trump opens the door for adversaries to declare US citizens “terrorists” or any other category of hard-to-prove potential combatant.
Second, Trump’s cavalier disregard of international law and norms in the Caribbean seems in retrospect like a testing ground for his actions at home. He declared the boats part of a “narco-trafficking” fleet that posed a threat to the United States. He has similarly declared anti-ICE protestors “terrorists” and “insurrectionists” who pose a threat to law and order in the US. Nevermind that the only violence has come from ICE agents, not the civilians they are targeting. Calling those he disagrees with terrorists or threats is not just outrageous political speech; it is a rhetorical tool that casts whole groups of people into a more acceptable category for the use of force. These are meaningful, distinctive categories that unlock and enable to use of force against civilian non-combatants. As we enter the second year of the Trump administration, observers should pay careful attention to the linkages between Trump’s rhetoric about foreign and domestic “threats” and how that rhetorical maneuvering is used to justify the spread and escalation of violence.
Jen Spindel, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of New Hampshire
According to the Trump administration, his first year in office was spent dealing with “existential threats” posed by terrorists and violent groups abroad and at home. From attacks on boats in the Caribbean, to increased US bombings overseas in places like Somalia, Nigeria, Iran, and Iraq, to increased militarization of ICE and other federal agencies at home, the Trump administration seems to believe it is under constant attack. In rhetoric and in action, the administration is eroding one of the most fundamental distinctions related to the use of force: the distinction between civilian and military. This distinction matters because both international and US law prohibit actions – including the use of military weaponry – against civilians and non-combatants. Eroding that distinction points to increasing militarization at home and abroad and a greater likelihood of violence against civilians.
First are the reports that the United States painted a military plane to look like a civilian aircraft during the strikes on “drug boats” in the Caribbean. While the legality of the strikes was already dubious, international and US law prohibit disguising military weapons as civilian objects. The Department of Defense Law of War Manual (p. 67 and p. 327) explains that even in times of hostility, it is not ok to “resort to perfidy” or to “feign non-hostile relations in order to seek a military advantage.” I doubt Pete Hegseth would suggest his “most lethal” military was at a military disadvantage against the boats it targeted. Perfidy is the feigning of civilian or non-combatant status, and international law prohibits killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy. On both of these counts, painting a military plane as a civilian one and hiding otherwise visible missiles is a clear act of deception used to enable the killing of people on these boats. While Trump is not the first president to unilaterally declare a group terrorists and order strikes, he is the first to do so gleefully, publicly, and with cheerful disregard of international and US law.
From a purely self-interested point of view, the US should care about the guidelines surrounding the use of force. Without such a distinction, it would be legally and morally acceptable to fight an enemy by targeting their cities and civilian populations. No one wants to declare open target on US civilian populations, infrastructure, or medical personnel and facilities. By simply declaring people on the boat “narco-traffickers,” Trump opens the door for adversaries to declare US citizens “terrorists” or any other category of hard-to-prove potential combatant.
Second, Trump’s cavalier disregard of international law and norms in the Caribbean seems in retrospect like a testing ground for his actions at home. He declared the boats part of a “narco-trafficking” fleet that posed a threat to the United States. He has similarly declared anti-ICE protestors “terrorists” and “insurrectionists” who pose a threat to law and order in the US. Nevermind that the only violence has come from ICE agents, not the civilians they are targeting. Calling those he disagrees with terrorists or threats is not just outrageous political speech; it is a rhetorical tool that casts whole groups of people into a more acceptable category for the use of force. These are meaningful, distinctive categories that unlock and enable to use of force against civilian non-combatants. As we enter the second year of the Trump administration, observers should pay careful attention to the linkages between Trump’s rhetoric about foreign and domestic “threats” and how that rhetorical maneuvering is used to justify the spread and escalation of violence.
From the Riviera to the ceasefire: Trump’s Gaza policy in 2025
Sam Perlo-Freeman, Research Coordinator, Campaign Against Arms Trade
President Trump’s policy in relation to Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza has been erratic, but also consistent. Erratic, in the sense of changing and apparently contradictory policy announcements and ideas, such as first working for a ceasefire, then coming out with a policy of emptying Gaza of its population, to make way for a shiny, luxurious ‘Gaza Riviera’ for Israelis, Americans, and rich foreigners, with perhaps a few Palestinian servants, owned and run by the US. This was an idea that was quietly dropped, but which greatly pleased Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and helped set the stage for Israel breaking the first ceasefire in March 2025. Trump has shown a characteristic tendency to follow whoever was the last person to speak to him that impressed him, and an equally characteristic short attention span, pushing for ceasefires then moving on to other things while the ceasefire collapses.
However, Trump’s policy has been consistent in two key respects. First, strong support for Israel: maintaining or increasing arms supplies, and even removing some very limited restrictions placed upon it by the Biden administration; supporting Israel’s conduct of the war, ignoring all human rights abuses and war crimes, while placing the biggest burden of demands on Palestinians, such as insisting on Hamas disarmament; supporting and joining Israel’s attack on Iran, and actively working against those criticising Israel at home and abroad, including attempts to deport pro-Palestinian activists such as Mahmoud Khalil and Rümeysa Öztürk; and sanctioning International Criminal Court judges who issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, as well as Palestinian NGOs. Secondly, prioritising his own ego: wanting to be seen to achieve a ‘win’ by securing a ceasefire, while not caring much what happens afterwards, especially to the Palestinians; and demanding he lead the so-called ‘Board of Peace’ running Gaza, as well as the ‘Riviera’ suggestion to create a massive vanity project on the rubble of the homes of the people of Gaza.
Trump’s efforts on Gaza began even before he took office, sending envoy Steve Witkoff to work alongside outgoing Biden officials to push for a ceasefire before his inauguration on 20 January. The ceasefire came into effect on the 19th. A move primarily aimed at boosting his ego, proving his ability to solve problems, and in particular bring an end to wars (the first of the 8 or 9 or however many real or fictional conflicts he claims to have resolved), and to impose his will. At the same time, the speed with which the ceasefire was agreed by Netanyahu demonstrates the leverage that the US has always had over Israel as its lead arms supplier, providing the vast majority of munitions and all the aircraft used by Israel in its war. This is a leverage that Biden refused to use, as has been confirmed by both ex-Israeli and US officials; Biden would feign frustration at Netanyahu’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire, while tacitly approving the continuation of the war.
However, Israel clearly never intended the ceasefire to be permanent, something they had always rejected, and with Trump’s big win achieved, the Trump administration had little motivation to ensure its continued success. The Riviera proposal further damaged the prospects of any sustained move towards peace.
Perhaps the surprise is that, having allowed Israel to break the ceasefire and resume the war, with the usual script of blaming Hamas, the Trump administration then renewed serious ceasefire efforts later in the year. In some ways, the trigger for this was the bombing by Israel of a Hamas delegation in Qatar, there to discuss ceasefire proposals. This majorly angered Qatar and raised serious concerns among other Gulf allies. While Trump is not known for listening to allies, the Gulf monarchies with their enormous ostentatious wealth and transactional approach to using it in international political dealings, perhaps fits in with Trump’s own way of thinking and doing business.
Whatever the reasons, following the backlash to this attack, the Trump administration once again made serious efforts to secure a new ceasefire, once again applying real pressure on the Israeli government, and coming up with proposals that Hamas could just about accept (while threatening them with dire consequences if they didn’t play ball).
The second ceasefire, which came into effect on 10 October, was this time intended to be permanent, something that Netanyahu had hitherto rejected. The upside for Israel is that allowed their continued occupation of large parts of the Gaza Strip, with no clear path to this ending, and has allowed them to continue bombing attacks on Gaza, albeit at lower intensity, and restricting aid, albeit at higher levels that have moved Gaza out of immediate famine conditions, while continuing to impose dire humanitarian conditions on the people of Gaza. The Israeli goal of emptying Gaza of its population appears to remain, as the recent recognition deal with Somaliland indicates, but with a more gradual approach. Once again, having secured the big win of the ceasefire, and so long as the war does not resume at the high intensity of before, Trump is supremely unconcerned with these multiple violations of the terms of the ceasefire by Israel, still less the fate of the Gazan population, and is happy to allow Netanyahu to pursue his desired policies.
Most recently, Trump has announced the beginning of ‘Phase 2’ of the ceasefire, though it is very unclear what this actually means and whether there is any actual agreement between Israel and Hamas that would facilitate this, and the formation of the ‘Board of Peace’, with himself as Chair (even if it is an open question whether he will attend any of its meetings, still less stay awake during them).
The result is that the current situation of the people of Gaza remains dire, with them facing continued death from Israeli bombs and bullets, malnutrition, lack of medical care, and winter weather, while the prospect for their future freedom and security, or even the right to remain in their land, remains bleak. The genocide continues, albeit at a slower pace, one that allows Trump to tick off Gaza on his imaginary list of conflicts resolved.
Sam Perlo-Freeman, Research Coordinator, Campaign Against Arms Trade
President Trump’s policy in relation to Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza has been erratic, but also consistent. Erratic, in the sense of changing and apparently contradictory policy announcements and ideas, such as first working for a ceasefire, then coming out with a policy of emptying Gaza of its population, to make way for a shiny, luxurious ‘Gaza Riviera’ for Israelis, Americans, and rich foreigners, with perhaps a few Palestinian servants, owned and run by the US. This was an idea that was quietly dropped, but which greatly pleased Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and helped set the stage for Israel breaking the first ceasefire in March 2025. Trump has shown a characteristic tendency to follow whoever was the last person to speak to him that impressed him, and an equally characteristic short attention span, pushing for ceasefires then moving on to other things while the ceasefire collapses.
However, Trump’s policy has been consistent in two key respects. First, strong support for Israel: maintaining or increasing arms supplies, and even removing some very limited restrictions placed upon it by the Biden administration; supporting Israel’s conduct of the war, ignoring all human rights abuses and war crimes, while placing the biggest burden of demands on Palestinians, such as insisting on Hamas disarmament; supporting and joining Israel’s attack on Iran, and actively working against those criticising Israel at home and abroad, including attempts to deport pro-Palestinian activists such as Mahmoud Khalil and Rümeysa Öztürk; and sanctioning International Criminal Court judges who issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, as well as Palestinian NGOs. Secondly, prioritising his own ego: wanting to be seen to achieve a ‘win’ by securing a ceasefire, while not caring much what happens afterwards, especially to the Palestinians; and demanding he lead the so-called ‘Board of Peace’ running Gaza, as well as the ‘Riviera’ suggestion to create a massive vanity project on the rubble of the homes of the people of Gaza.
Trump’s efforts on Gaza began even before he took office, sending envoy Steve Witkoff to work alongside outgoing Biden officials to push for a ceasefire before his inauguration on 20 January. The ceasefire came into effect on the 19th. A move primarily aimed at boosting his ego, proving his ability to solve problems, and in particular bring an end to wars (the first of the 8 or 9 or however many real or fictional conflicts he claims to have resolved), and to impose his will. At the same time, the speed with which the ceasefire was agreed by Netanyahu demonstrates the leverage that the US has always had over Israel as its lead arms supplier, providing the vast majority of munitions and all the aircraft used by Israel in its war. This is a leverage that Biden refused to use, as has been confirmed by both ex-Israeli and US officials; Biden would feign frustration at Netanyahu’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire, while tacitly approving the continuation of the war.
However, Israel clearly never intended the ceasefire to be permanent, something they had always rejected, and with Trump’s big win achieved, the Trump administration had little motivation to ensure its continued success. The Riviera proposal further damaged the prospects of any sustained move towards peace.
Perhaps the surprise is that, having allowed Israel to break the ceasefire and resume the war, with the usual script of blaming Hamas, the Trump administration then renewed serious ceasefire efforts later in the year. In some ways, the trigger for this was the bombing by Israel of a Hamas delegation in Qatar, there to discuss ceasefire proposals. This majorly angered Qatar and raised serious concerns among other Gulf allies. While Trump is not known for listening to allies, the Gulf monarchies with their enormous ostentatious wealth and transactional approach to using it in international political dealings, perhaps fits in with Trump’s own way of thinking and doing business.
Whatever the reasons, following the backlash to this attack, the Trump administration once again made serious efforts to secure a new ceasefire, once again applying real pressure on the Israeli government, and coming up with proposals that Hamas could just about accept (while threatening them with dire consequences if they didn’t play ball).
The second ceasefire, which came into effect on 10 October, was this time intended to be permanent, something that Netanyahu had hitherto rejected. The upside for Israel is that allowed their continued occupation of large parts of the Gaza Strip, with no clear path to this ending, and has allowed them to continue bombing attacks on Gaza, albeit at lower intensity, and restricting aid, albeit at higher levels that have moved Gaza out of immediate famine conditions, while continuing to impose dire humanitarian conditions on the people of Gaza. The Israeli goal of emptying Gaza of its population appears to remain, as the recent recognition deal with Somaliland indicates, but with a more gradual approach. Once again, having secured the big win of the ceasefire, and so long as the war does not resume at the high intensity of before, Trump is supremely unconcerned with these multiple violations of the terms of the ceasefire by Israel, still less the fate of the Gazan population, and is happy to allow Netanyahu to pursue his desired policies.
Most recently, Trump has announced the beginning of ‘Phase 2’ of the ceasefire, though it is very unclear what this actually means and whether there is any actual agreement between Israel and Hamas that would facilitate this, and the formation of the ‘Board of Peace’, with himself as Chair (even if it is an open question whether he will attend any of its meetings, still less stay awake during them).
The result is that the current situation of the people of Gaza remains dire, with them facing continued death from Israeli bombs and bullets, malnutrition, lack of medical care, and winter weather, while the prospect for their future freedom and security, or even the right to remain in their land, remains bleak. The genocide continues, albeit at a slower pace, one that allows Trump to tick off Gaza on his imaginary list of conflicts resolved.
European Rearmament and U.S. Weapons Reliance
León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Senior Researcher, Asser Institute for International and European Law in The Hague
With €800 billion earmarked for defense spending by 2030 and unprecedented popular support for war preparedness, the European Union is rapidly deepening its involvement in regional defense coordination. Yet despite American retrenchment and growing calls for strategic autonomy, Europe continues to rely heavily on U.S. military purchases. These expenditures focus overwhelmingly on traditional weaponry, reflecting a conventional approach to security that may not address emerging threats.
The recent debate over the EU’s €90 billion loan package to Ukraine reveals the continued reliance on U.S. weaponry in Europe. The European Commission aimed for a “Buy European” preference for the €60 billion allocated to military assistance, while France pushed to restrict Ukraine’s purchases to EU manufacturers. Germany and the Netherlands countered that Ukraine needed American air defense systems, F-16 spare parts, and long-range strike capabilities that European producers cannot supply at the necessary scale or speed. Ultimately, the “Buy European” clause was softened in favor of “European preference first, but if not possible then purchase abroad”, as stated by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. This means Ukraine will likely be purchasing U.S. air defense systems and deep-strike capabilities.
The Trump administration’s approach to European arms sales has also complicated the European rearmament landscape. In September, the Pentagon paused certain arms exports to European allies, including Patriot air defense systems to Denmark, citing limited US stockpiles reserved for potential Indo-Pacific contingencies. Yet earlier in 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio pressed European allies at NATO meetings to maintain orders for American weapons.
Echoing Rubio’s remarks, the Department of State’s strategic plan for 2026-2030 is unambiguous about continuing the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ policy when supporting European defense capabilities. The document emphasizes that the government “will champion reliable U.S. defense companies, resist efforts to divide the transatlantic Defense Industrial Base, and support defense industry interoperability.”
This transatlantic friction underlines European dependence on U.S. military technology to address urgent security crises—a reality that three years of war in Ukraine has sometimes reinforced rather than changed. Meanwhile, structural limits to the integration of the European industrial base continue to be prevalent. A recent Carnegie report identifies “fragile political buy-in from member states wary of binding rules, uneven distributional effects that favor established defense producers, and governance constraints stemming from limited fiscal authority” as bottlenecks.
That may yet change. In December, the European Council adopted a package of agreements to increase investment and expedite approvals for European military projects. And 1.5 billion euros will be unlocked in 2026 with the SAFE instrument, an EU loan facility providing member states with low-cost financing for European weapons production.
Whether these initiatives collectively address Europe’s U.S. dependency remains uncertain. The next multiannual EU budget (2028-2034) will reveal whether EU member states are willing to back strategic autonomy rhetoric with binding “Buy European” conditions and local content requirements that genuinely shift procurement patterns.
León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Senior Researcher, Asser Institute for International and European Law in The Hague
With €800 billion earmarked for defense spending by 2030 and unprecedented popular support for war preparedness, the European Union is rapidly deepening its involvement in regional defense coordination. Yet despite American retrenchment and growing calls for strategic autonomy, Europe continues to rely heavily on U.S. military purchases. These expenditures focus overwhelmingly on traditional weaponry, reflecting a conventional approach to security that may not address emerging threats.
The recent debate over the EU’s €90 billion loan package to Ukraine reveals the continued reliance on U.S. weaponry in Europe. The European Commission aimed for a “Buy European” preference for the €60 billion allocated to military assistance, while France pushed to restrict Ukraine’s purchases to EU manufacturers. Germany and the Netherlands countered that Ukraine needed American air defense systems, F-16 spare parts, and long-range strike capabilities that European producers cannot supply at the necessary scale or speed. Ultimately, the “Buy European” clause was softened in favor of “European preference first, but if not possible then purchase abroad”, as stated by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. This means Ukraine will likely be purchasing U.S. air defense systems and deep-strike capabilities.
The Trump administration’s approach to European arms sales has also complicated the European rearmament landscape. In September, the Pentagon paused certain arms exports to European allies, including Patriot air defense systems to Denmark, citing limited US stockpiles reserved for potential Indo-Pacific contingencies. Yet earlier in 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio pressed European allies at NATO meetings to maintain orders for American weapons.
Echoing Rubio’s remarks, the Department of State’s strategic plan for 2026-2030 is unambiguous about continuing the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ policy when supporting European defense capabilities. The document emphasizes that the government “will champion reliable U.S. defense companies, resist efforts to divide the transatlantic Defense Industrial Base, and support defense industry interoperability.”
This transatlantic friction underlines European dependence on U.S. military technology to address urgent security crises—a reality that three years of war in Ukraine has sometimes reinforced rather than changed. Meanwhile, structural limits to the integration of the European industrial base continue to be prevalent. A recent Carnegie report identifies “fragile political buy-in from member states wary of binding rules, uneven distributional effects that favor established defense producers, and governance constraints stemming from limited fiscal authority” as bottlenecks.
That may yet change. In December, the European Council adopted a package of agreements to increase investment and expedite approvals for European military projects. And 1.5 billion euros will be unlocked in 2026 with the SAFE instrument, an EU loan facility providing member states with low-cost financing for European weapons production.
Whether these initiatives collectively address Europe’s U.S. dependency remains uncertain. The next multiannual EU budget (2028-2034) will reveal whether EU member states are willing to back strategic autonomy rhetoric with binding “Buy European” conditions and local content requirements that genuinely shift procurement patterns.
2025: The Year International Law Was Placed on Life Support
Amanda Pereira, External Consultant, BASIC *
While one of the central strategies Donald Trump used to secure re-election was to brand himself as a “president of peace,” developments in 2025 point to a rather different record. The first year of his second administration has overseen strikes in seven countries, including the first direct U.S. strike on Venezuelan territory, alongside the continuation and expansion of U.S. military operations in Somalia, Nigeria, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Iraq. According to figures calculated using ACLED data, the administration carried out more than 600 overseas bombings in 2025 alone—a figure that reflects an escalation of kinetic action justified through counterterrorism narratives, domestic political signaling, and renewed coercive pressure in Latin America, often framed as counternarcotics enforcement.
Some observers have described the U.S. “special operation” in Venezuela—an expression with resonance that is difficult to miss—as the funeral of international law. A broader reading of 2025 suggests a more gradual and systemic process: not a single moment of death, but the deliberate placement of international law’s norms and restraints on life support, sustained only nominally while their practical authority steadily erodes. The June bombing of nuclear facilities in Iran offered a particularly stark indication that long-standing rules governing the use of force and non-proliferation are increasingly treated as optional in contemporary great-power politics.
Trump’s National Security Strategy reasserts the Western Hemisphere as a space of U.S. primacy, reviving logics of domination and intervention more characteristic of colonial and imperial eras, leaving 2025 as the year global politics openly travelled backward.
* Amanda Pereira is a member of the Forum's Emerging Expert program.
Amanda Pereira, External Consultant, BASIC *
While one of the central strategies Donald Trump used to secure re-election was to brand himself as a “president of peace,” developments in 2025 point to a rather different record. The first year of his second administration has overseen strikes in seven countries, including the first direct U.S. strike on Venezuelan territory, alongside the continuation and expansion of U.S. military operations in Somalia, Nigeria, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Iraq. According to figures calculated using ACLED data, the administration carried out more than 600 overseas bombings in 2025 alone—a figure that reflects an escalation of kinetic action justified through counterterrorism narratives, domestic political signaling, and renewed coercive pressure in Latin America, often framed as counternarcotics enforcement.
Some observers have described the U.S. “special operation” in Venezuela—an expression with resonance that is difficult to miss—as the funeral of international law. A broader reading of 2025 suggests a more gradual and systemic process: not a single moment of death, but the deliberate placement of international law’s norms and restraints on life support, sustained only nominally while their practical authority steadily erodes. The June bombing of nuclear facilities in Iran offered a particularly stark indication that long-standing rules governing the use of force and non-proliferation are increasingly treated as optional in contemporary great-power politics.
Trump’s National Security Strategy reasserts the Western Hemisphere as a space of U.S. primacy, reviving logics of domination and intervention more characteristic of colonial and imperial eras, leaving 2025 as the year global politics openly travelled backward.
* Amanda Pereira is a member of the Forum's Emerging Expert program.
U.S. Landmine Policy and Practice: From Bad to Worse
Allie Hansen, Research Fellow, Center for International Policy *
As 2025 came to a close, Pete Hegseth’s Department of War produced a memorandum that will reverse U.S. policy on anti-personnel landmines, lifting geographic limits on the use of this indiscriminate, archaic weapon that touts a 90% civilian casualty rate. This move is in blatant opposition to the international consensus: 162 countries are party to the Ottawa Convention, a treaty that bans the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). While the United States has never been a party to the treaty, both Republican and Democrat administrations since the 1990s have operated under U.S. policy that limits the use of APLs.
In 2024, the Biden administration violated its own landmine policy by transferring anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine. They justified this move by claiming the need to slow Russia’s advances amid its disregard of the “rules of war,” including the landmine ban, in its invasion of Ukraine. When one powerful state refuses to play along, the international consensus on protecting civilians erodes. In 2025, five states in Eastern Europe pulled out of the Ottawa Convention from fear from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States openly disavowing these rules will only further accelerate this trend driven by insecurity.
In the 21st century, the United States has repeatedly abused its power in the global order to bend the rules. The Trump administration isn’t content with bending - they want to throw the rules of war out the window. Reversing the landmine policy fits perfectly into their broader strategy of writing the international consensus away.
Pete Hegseth has repeatedly called for the modernization of American weapons, which is antithetical to his reversal of the landmine policy. If the United States is the most technologically advanced military in the world, a minimum requirement should be that technology will increasingly protect civilians, something landmines are plainly unable to do. In addition to this, landmines will not protect American combatants from wars in a modern world that are increasingly waged from the sky.
Hegseth has one thing right: Policies such as these will help the United States continue to fulfill his mandate of becoming the “most lethal … military on the planet” for civilians in the coming century.
* Allie Hansen is a member of the Forum's Emerging Expert program.
Allie Hansen, Research Fellow, Center for International Policy *
As 2025 came to a close, Pete Hegseth’s Department of War produced a memorandum that will reverse U.S. policy on anti-personnel landmines, lifting geographic limits on the use of this indiscriminate, archaic weapon that touts a 90% civilian casualty rate. This move is in blatant opposition to the international consensus: 162 countries are party to the Ottawa Convention, a treaty that bans the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). While the United States has never been a party to the treaty, both Republican and Democrat administrations since the 1990s have operated under U.S. policy that limits the use of APLs.
In 2024, the Biden administration violated its own landmine policy by transferring anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine. They justified this move by claiming the need to slow Russia’s advances amid its disregard of the “rules of war,” including the landmine ban, in its invasion of Ukraine. When one powerful state refuses to play along, the international consensus on protecting civilians erodes. In 2025, five states in Eastern Europe pulled out of the Ottawa Convention from fear from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States openly disavowing these rules will only further accelerate this trend driven by insecurity.
In the 21st century, the United States has repeatedly abused its power in the global order to bend the rules. The Trump administration isn’t content with bending - they want to throw the rules of war out the window. Reversing the landmine policy fits perfectly into their broader strategy of writing the international consensus away.
Pete Hegseth has repeatedly called for the modernization of American weapons, which is antithetical to his reversal of the landmine policy. If the United States is the most technologically advanced military in the world, a minimum requirement should be that technology will increasingly protect civilians, something landmines are plainly unable to do. In addition to this, landmines will not protect American combatants from wars in a modern world that are increasingly waged from the sky.
Hegseth has one thing right: Policies such as these will help the United States continue to fulfill his mandate of becoming the “most lethal … military on the planet” for civilians in the coming century.
* Allie Hansen is a member of the Forum's Emerging Expert program.
Assessing Trump's second term of office through the threat to global security
Tabitha R Agaba, independent researcher and freelance writer, based in Uganda *
Trump's continued disengagement in international relations and organisations has created a gap for transnational criminal actors to thrive, in addition to weakening international organisations' mandates, and such gaps threaten global security.
Reduced funding for international organizations translates into reduced effort to combat transnational criminal actors and activities. Transnational criminal activities sustain conflict through increased support for armed groups. Reduced scrutiny around activities like illicit mining enables easy entry of conflict minerals into the global economy, which earn monetary value for transnational criminal actors and armed groups. These availed financial resources enable the purchase of weapons. Reduced scrutiny also means easier movement of illicit arms and weapons across borders, which sustains conflict.
The signed agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda in 2025 was an indicator of the administration's interest in business deals as it focused more on mineral rights of the DRC rather than international stability. Also, as that agreement was being signed, the administration was reducing support for important missions from the UN that included the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the Office of the Secretary General for children in armed conflict, peacebuilding commission, peacebuilding fund among others. The withdrawal from the UN Register of Conventional Arms means that it will not support efforts to ensure transparency in the global arms trade; this move emboldens arms diversion, illicit weapons and arms trafficking and smuggling, further threatening global security.
This disengagement has been an intentional move by the administration to reduce expenditure, yet in the grand scheme of things has created an opportunity for insecurity.
The moves have also encouraged reduced financial transparency and accountability. Financial opaqueness emboldens criminal actors because the sources of their finances can't be critiqued. This strengthens illicit economies, which are the bedrocks of transnational criminal activities and armed groups. Ignoring conflicts like Sudan, which has been described by the World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the biggest humanitarian crises of our time, and the United Arab Emirates’ participation in it, emboldens actors in conflict because previously the US has led the charge in holding such actors to account.
The withdrawal of the US from active participation in global security issues creates a vacuum that can only be addressed by a collective effort of other stakeholders to avert any impending crises on the horizon like the growing threat of annexation of Greenland by the US and the ignored Sudanese conflict.
This withdrawal or reduced involvement of the US in global security issues is a signal that the old world global order is being dismantled.
Therefore a new one is being written and active participation of more countries is demanded as part of the stopgap measures that will ensure that such gaps are not created in the future.
Should they not be adequately addressed, proxy wars, renewed conflicts and a strengthened dark global economy through transnational crime will thrive and global security will suffer.
* Tabitha R Agaba is a member of the Forum's Emerging Expert program.
Tabitha R Agaba, independent researcher and freelance writer, based in Uganda *
Trump's continued disengagement in international relations and organisations has created a gap for transnational criminal actors to thrive, in addition to weakening international organisations' mandates, and such gaps threaten global security.
Reduced funding for international organizations translates into reduced effort to combat transnational criminal actors and activities. Transnational criminal activities sustain conflict through increased support for armed groups. Reduced scrutiny around activities like illicit mining enables easy entry of conflict minerals into the global economy, which earn monetary value for transnational criminal actors and armed groups. These availed financial resources enable the purchase of weapons. Reduced scrutiny also means easier movement of illicit arms and weapons across borders, which sustains conflict.
The signed agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda in 2025 was an indicator of the administration's interest in business deals as it focused more on mineral rights of the DRC rather than international stability. Also, as that agreement was being signed, the administration was reducing support for important missions from the UN that included the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the Office of the Secretary General for children in armed conflict, peacebuilding commission, peacebuilding fund among others. The withdrawal from the UN Register of Conventional Arms means that it will not support efforts to ensure transparency in the global arms trade; this move emboldens arms diversion, illicit weapons and arms trafficking and smuggling, further threatening global security.
This disengagement has been an intentional move by the administration to reduce expenditure, yet in the grand scheme of things has created an opportunity for insecurity.
The moves have also encouraged reduced financial transparency and accountability. Financial opaqueness emboldens criminal actors because the sources of their finances can't be critiqued. This strengthens illicit economies, which are the bedrocks of transnational criminal activities and armed groups. Ignoring conflicts like Sudan, which has been described by the World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the biggest humanitarian crises of our time, and the United Arab Emirates’ participation in it, emboldens actors in conflict because previously the US has led the charge in holding such actors to account.
The withdrawal of the US from active participation in global security issues creates a vacuum that can only be addressed by a collective effort of other stakeholders to avert any impending crises on the horizon like the growing threat of annexation of Greenland by the US and the ignored Sudanese conflict.
This withdrawal or reduced involvement of the US in global security issues is a signal that the old world global order is being dismantled.
Therefore a new one is being written and active participation of more countries is demanded as part of the stopgap measures that will ensure that such gaps are not created in the future.
Should they not be adequately addressed, proxy wars, renewed conflicts and a strengthened dark global economy through transnational crime will thrive and global security will suffer.
* Tabitha R Agaba is a member of the Forum's Emerging Expert program.