Category: Shannon Dick

U.S. Drone Policy

12/18/2018

This is the second blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Rachel Stohl

Shannon Dick

Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly referred to as drones, have become increasingly common in military operations and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions around the world. Although the United States is the world’s leader in possessing and using armed drones, other countries are increasingly acquiring, seeking, and using lethal drone technology. In 2019. these countries may look to the U.S. example for guidance in developing their own policies on drones – which raises a number of concerns.

Although the U.S. drone program in its current form has been active for over 15 years, it remains controversial in large part because of ongoing secrecy surrounding the use of lethal drone strikes outside traditional battlefields and the resulting lack of accountability. Such features have come to define the U.S. drone program and ultimately hinder effective oversight as well as challenge assessments of the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S operations.

The United States has demonstrated its continued reliance on lethal drones to respond to perceived terrorist threats, yet with no overarching strategy to guide such use. And U.S. drone policy appears to be becoming less restrained, less transparent, and less accountable, lacking safeguards and transparency over the legal framework, use, and results of use.

In June 2018, Stimson released a report, An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy, that examined worrying trends surrounding the U.S. drone program with a particular view towards the Trump administration’s use of lethal drone strikes outside of traditional battlefields. The report found key concerns regarding changes the Trump administration has made to U.S. drone policy and use:

U.S. drone policy under the Trump administration has been defined by uncertainty coupled with less oversight and less transparency, reversing course on certain measures designed to make drone use more responsible and bring the drone program out of the shadows.
The Trump administration has increased the tempo and geographic scope of lethal drone strikes.
The threshold for strike-decisions has reportedly been lowered, and the administration may have reasserted the CIA’s role in conducting lethal strikes.

In addition to concerning regressions in U.S. drone policy, the United States also seems recommitted to pursuing a problematic multilateral process for developing international standards to guide drone transfers and use, which could weaken existing standards and result in other countries adopting policies and practices similar to the United States’. In October 2016, the United States initiated a multilateral effort to examine the implications of drone proliferation and use by drafting and circulating a “joint declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Fifty-three UN Member States signed on to the declaration and agreed to begin a process to develop global standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones.

The development of international standards through the joint declaration process has raised serious concerns that the U.S.-led process will undermine existing frameworks and result in weak standards guiding drone transfers and use. In August 2018, Stimson released The ATT and Drones to support the discussion on international standards and provide a primer on existing international standards related to drones, cautioning that any international standards should not be lower than what already exists in legally binding law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

The United States has an opportunity to be a leader on developing appropriate policy frameworks to guide the transfer and use of armed drones and set a responsible international precedent. Such an approach is particularly important as lethal drone technology continues to proliferate, and U.S. policy and practice impacts not only what happens within and to the United States, but how our allies, partners, and even our enemies utilize drones for their own purposes.

Rachel Stohl is Managing Director at the Stimson Center and Shannon Dick is Research Associate with the Conventional Defense Program.

0 Comments

What the National Security Strategy Might Mean for Conventional Arms Transfers

12/22/2017

0 Comments

This is the ninth and final blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2018 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Shannon Dick

The Trump administration recently released its National Security Strategy (NSS), presenting the administration’s broad priorities for confronting global security challenges. Among other things, the strategy reflects Trump’s “America First” approach to U.S. engagement in the world and, with that, a focus on economic concerns. One subtle but important implication of such a focus will be the impact on U.S. conventional arms transfer policies and how the administration uses arms sales as a tool to support U.S. national security policy priorities and foreign policy ideals.

The NSS references conventional arms transfer-related issues in three specific instances: twice in discussion about renewed capabilities and once in discussion about approaches to regional security in Africa. The inclusion of conventional arms in the NSS, however, reflects larger themes of investing in U.S. industry, facilitating exports, and reducing restraints.

Indeed, references to conventional weapons in the NSS reflect the administration’s emphasis on augmenting U.S. military capabilities and bolstering the defense industry. In one instance, for example, the NSS highlights military modernization as a means to reinforce the United States comparative advantage in the global market for security and influence.

MODERNIZATION: Ensuring that the U.S. military can defeat our adversaries requires weapon systems that clearly overmatch theirs in lethality. Where possible, we must improve existing systems to maximize returns on prior investments. In other areas, we should seek new capabilities that create clear advantages for our military while posing costly dilemmas for our adversaries. We must eliminate bureaucratic impediments to innovation and embrace less expensive and time-intensive commercial off-the-shelf solutions. Departments and agencies must work with industry to experiment, prototype, and rapidly field new capabilities that can be easily upgraded as new technologies come online.

As part of the effort to “renew capabilities,” the NSS also prioritizes easing processes and procedures for U.S. defense industry – particularly with regard to supporting weapons exports.

ENCOURAGE HOMELAND INVESTMENT: The United States will promote policies and incentives that return key national security industries to American shores. Where possible, the U.S. Government will work with industry partners to strengthen U.S. competitiveness in key technologies and manufacturing capabilities. In addition, we will reform regulations and processes to facilitate the export of U.S. military equipment.

At the end of the NSS, the administration does draw attention to the negative consequences of irresponsible and illegal arms transfers in its discussion of various security concerns in Africa.

MILITARY AND SECURITY: We will continue to work with partners to improve the ability of their security services to counter terrorism, human trafficking, and the illegal trade in arms and natural resources. We will work with partners to defeat terrorist organizations and others who threaten U.S. citizens and the homeland

Overall, however, the NSS emphasizes the economy of arms sales and the benefits to be had from more investment in and export of U.S. military equipment. Yet such an approach to arms transfer control policies – that is, one that reorients the focus of U.S. policy to the competitiveness of U.S. defense companies – may overlook other fundamental tenets of U.S. policy governing weapons sales, such as the potential risks to civilian lives and human rights.

Before the NSS’s release, the Trump administration had already demonstrated a willingness to ease restrictions on certain international arms sales. In June, for example, the Trump administration approved the transfer of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia despite concerns about civilian casualties. The weapons deliveries were originally blocked in December 2016 due to mounting concerns about the Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen, and the heavy toll that airstrikes placed (and continue to place) on civilians. In August, Trump reversed course on an earlier decision to halt the sale of attack aircraft to Nigeria due to known human rights abuses. And in September, the administration approved a multi-billion-dollar arms sale to Bahrain that had previously been conditioned on improvements in the country’s human rights record – improvements that arguably have not been met.

In the end, the Trump administration’s approach to conventional arms transfers may result in more weapons sales to a wider array of actors. While such an approach may support industry’s bottom line, it could also present a number of challenges to longer-term security and foreign policy considerations.

Shannon Dick is a research associate in the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center and a Forum-listed emerging expert

0 Comments

Trump on Arms Sales

4/25/2017

1 Comment

This is the third entry in a series examining actions during the first 100 days of the new Trump administration and their possible implications on the arms trade, security assistance and weapons use in the future.

Rachel Stohl

Shannon Dick

Three months into the Trump administration and President Trump has used arms sales to support security priorities and demonstrate a commitment to industry. Yet it remains unclear how and to what extent arms sales will be used as a tool of Trump’s foreign and defense policies.

Recent actions, however, appear to suggest that human rights will no longer be a priority for advancing or withholding U.S. arms sales and thereby supporting larger U.S. foreign policy interests. Indeed, since taking office, the Trump administration has pushed forward (but Congress has yet to fully review) arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that were previously put on hold by the Obama administration due to human rights concerns. The rationale behind these decisions to provide U.S. weapons to consistent human rights violators is largely based on counterterrorism priorities and the view that these arms transfers will significantly support campaigns against terrorist groups. But there is scant evidence that allowing these arms sales will contribute to U.S. strategic goals and objectives and will not result in further human rights abuses and civilian suffering. For example, the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen has resulted in devastating impacts on the Yemeni civilian population. The campaign, undertaken with U.S. supplied weapons, has consistently struck civilian targets and could help fuel anti-American sentiment and play into terrorist groups’ narrative, ultimately working against larger interests in working to stabilize the country and end the conflict.

The Trump administration is also trying to change the bureaucratic process surrounding arms sales to foreign governments. Reportedly, the Trump administration is considering replacing foreign military financing (FMF) grants with loans. The Trump administration seems to believe that having governments pay back their weapons purchases will save the United States money in the long run. However, such thinking fundamentally misunderstands the intent of the FMF program. FMF enables foreign governments to use U.S. government grants to purchase U.S. weapons primarily through the Foreign Military Sales program. The program is often used to support foreign militaries that would otherwise be unable to purchase U.S. systems and is often cited as a crucial means to promote national security interests. Indeed, FMF allows foreign partners and allies to acquire U.S. equipment – which is often more expensive than systems from other countries – and thus augment their own military capabilities while fostering stronger security relations with the United States.

Additionally, because FMF funds are almost exclusively reserved for the procurement of U.S. weapons and equipment, the program supports U.S. industry. As Andrew Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs under the Obama administration, aptly noted in commentary for Defense News, the FMF program “helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base, it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities.” Should the administration follow through with converting grants to loans, it could harm U.S. industry and lead business into other markets that offer less expensive alternatives, such as those maintained by Russia and China. In its budget blueprint, the administration stated that the shift to loans would “potentially [allow] recipients to purchase more American-made weaponry with U.S. assistance, but on a repayable basis.” But why would buyers pay for systems they used to get for free, and in fact pay more than if they were to seek military equipment from other suppliers?

The Trump administration’s initial arms sales efforts may work to weaken long-standing U.S. policy priorities regarding conventional arms transfers. In the short term, Trump’s policy decisions are minimizing the extent to which human rights concerns are taken into consideration. In the long-term, these arms sales may result in continued sales to a wider scope of actors with poor records of good governance. Additionally, in seeking changes to grant programs, Trump’s policies may undercut U.S. industry. Such decisions could ultimately backfire on U.S. interests, both economically and politically, and leave an arms trade legacy that risks negative consequences for years to come.

Rachel Stohl is a director of the Conventional Defense program at the Stimson Center.
Shannon Dick is a research associate at the Stimson Center and and a participant in the Forum’s emerging expert program.

Note: this post was edited at 12:11PM EDT on April 26 to clarify the status of the sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Nigeria.

1 Comment

U.S. Drone Policy

What the National Security Strategy Might Mean for Conventional Arms Transfers

Trump on Arms Sales

About

Archives

Pdf's

Categories