| This is one of a group of eight country profiles authored by an emerging expert, originally published as part of the "Comparative Study on Arms Trade Transparency" report (see full report). The assessments and opinions expressed are the views of each assessment's author. The Forum does not itself take positions. |  Tabitha R Agaba |
Uganda is located in Sub-Saharan Africa, with South Sudan to the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, Kenya to the east, and Tanzania to the south. Unfortunately, two of its neighbors are involved in ongoing conflicts, which has resulted in Uganda’s complicated relationship with arms control.
Uganda is an importer, exporter, and transit hub for arms. In 2024, it was reported that Uganda spent $2,470 on military weapon imports, making it 127 out of 133 weapons importers globally.[1] The main sources of these imports were Saudi Arabia, China and Turkey. The country also manufactures and exports small arms and light weapons. In September 2024, the country held its first defense and security exposition, where it showcased a number of items, including modified AK-47 guns, helmets, high level bullet proof vests, modified tankers and troop carriers.[2]
National Transparency and Reporting
Uganda regulates its firearms control through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs handles the procurement and supplies of military equipment.
Uganda's defense budget is among the largest in the country, frequently receiving a greater share of funding than critical sectors such as the ministry of health. Between 2022- 2024, the defense ministry received an average of $1 billion.[3]
Uganda doesn't provide public reporting on its arms transfers. In 2018, a report by Conflict Armament Research noted the country had sent weapons to South Sudan. [4] Uganda is a signatory to a few regulatory frameworks, including the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms And Light Weapons. It is also a signatory to the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Though not a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty, Uganda has been working towards implementation.
Uganda doesn't strike a balance between transparency and national interests, but rather prioritizes national interests. Nationally, arms transfers information that is not publicly available or accessible is always accessed through third party research organizations like SIPRI and Conflict Armament Research, among others.
Corruption Concerns
The country has been previously implicated by United Nations (UN) reports on its role in arms transfers to neighboring countries, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Uganda has played a critical role in the ongoing conflicts in both countries, despite UN arms embargoes. Regionally, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are accessible and commonly trafficked and smuggled across borders; aiding transnational and cross-border crime, such as wildlife crime, illegal mining, and cattle rustling, among others.
The country was implicated in several dubious arms trade deals in the 1990s. Between 1997 and 1999, the government of Uganda purchased tankers from Bulgaria and Romania, anti-aircraft guns from North Korea, and jet fighters from Belarus, all priced suspiciously high, which is common in corrupt deals.[5] Such deals are enabled by the opacity of the arms trade within Uganda. Another example of corruption within the arms trade involved the sale of a surface-to-air missile defense system by an Israeli company to the Ugandan Air force, where bribery was identified.[6]
The Role of Civil Society
Whereas there’s limited active engagement from civil society when it comes to the issue of arms trade, it is occasionally addressed through anti-corruption work. However, select non-governmental organizations, including SaferWorld, play a critical role in holding the Ugandan government accountable when it comes to arms, weapons and ammunition. They often don't critique the arms trade, but rather focus on the impact of these weapons themself. Small arms are prevalent in the country as well as the region because they are easily accessible and as such they are easy to move around, particularly with the conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as other rebel groups whose base is in the DRC. These organizations work closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, through the National Focal Point on Small and Light Weapons. The collaboration efforts between the two is part of the country's wider efforts to combat SALW, but does not extend to other conventional arms.
A report by Transparency International on Uganda’s defense and security notes that there is a high corruption risk in this sector. The report noted that the law is robust, yet enforcement remains inconsistent, and therefore procurement and operations remain risky for corruption. The report, which assessed the period between May 2024 through August 2025, indicated that Uganda didn't export any arms but rather imported from Russia, the United States of America, Belarus, France and South Africa.[7]
The transparency challenges encountered by the defense and security sector is highest at the operational level, followed by procurement, financial, political, and finally, personnel.[8] The sensitivity of the sector has often been used as a scapegoat for transparency. One of the biggest challenges in the country’s defense spending stems from offset spending and secret spending. These play a key role in obstructing transparency in the defense sector. Despite Parliament’s role of oversight of defense expenditure, the challenges presented by conflict of interest, in addition to influence from the executive, hinder its ability to effectively carry out this role.[9]
Regardless of its numerous measures to strengthen transparency frameworks, Uganda struggles with corruption across the board, with the corruption index ranking it 148 out of 182 countries in 2025.[10] This is a drop from its position in 2024. Furthermore, a 2018 survey indicated that 38% of the population had to pay a bribe to access public services.[11]
Looking Forward
To redefine transparency in Uganda, the country should adhere to the implementation of more regulatory frameworks like the Arms Trade Treaty.
Looking at the data above, the transparency efforts in the country will most likely not improve due to the increased hostile environment around civil society in Uganda. It is important to note that the information used in this report was mainly from non-governmental organisations.
Transparency around the arms trade would greatly improve if details on contracts are shared in addition to a clearer bidding process. This would avert issues like the 1997 junk helicopters, and allow citizens and civil society to keep future deals in check.
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Tabitha R Agaba is an independent writer and researcher based in Uganda whose work focuses on issues of transnational crime, crime based illicit financial flows, conflict, the arms trade and international security. Email: [email protected]
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[1] ‘Military Weapons in Uganda’ (The Observatory of Economic Complexity) <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/military-weapons/reporter/uga> accessed 9 July 2026
[2] Blanshe M, ‘Uganda: Defence Industries Come of Age…at What Cost?’ (The Africa Report, 20 September 2024) <https://www.theafricareport.com/362193/uganda-defence-industries-come-of-ageat-what-cost/> accessed 19 June 2026
[3] ibid.
[4] ‘WEAPON SUPPLIES INTO SOUTH SUDAN’S CIVIL WAR | Conflict Armament Research’ (Conflict Armament Research, November 2018) <https://www.conflictarm.com/reports/weapon-supplies-into-south-sudans-civil-war/> accessed 19 June 2026
[5] ‘Guns, Tanks & Jet Fighters – Ugandan Corruption in the 90s’ (Corruption Tracker, 24 January 2023) <https://corruption-tracker.org/case/uganda-90s> accessed 19 June 2026
[6] Dolev, D. and Blau, U. ‘Leak Hints at Corruption in Arms Deal between Israeli Company and Ugandan Air Force’ (The Times of Israel, 27 May 2023) <https://www.timesofisrael.com/leak-hints-at-corruption-in-arms-deal-between-israeli-company-and-ugandan-air-force/> accessed 19 June 2026
[7] ‘Uganda’ (Government Defence Integrity Index) <https://ti-defence.org/gdi/countries/uganda/> accessed 19 June 2026
[8] ibid.
[9] ibid.
[10] ibid.
[11] ‘Uganda: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption’ (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 21 May 2018) <https://www.u4.no/publications/uganda-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2018> accessed 19 June 2026
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