| This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations. |  Monalisa Hazarika |
Introduction
In recent years, assumptions about the limitations of additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, in weapons production have been steadily challenged. What was once viewed as a technological novelty, useful mainly for prototypes and hobbyist projects, has evolved into a proliferating trend in the design and manufacture of weapons, now appearing in both conflict and non-conflict settings. From the inclusion of the FGC-9 in the arsenals of the People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar to the seizure of 3D-printed firearms, magazines, and ammunition by law enforcement in Australia, 3D-printed weapons have gained growing appeal among criminals, extremist groups, and even conventional militaries facing supply-chain constraints. Whether in the hands of private individuals seeking to bypass traditional arms markets, insurgent groups innovating under resource scarcity, or military forces experimenting with on-demand logistics, 3D printing is steadily carving out space in the global arms landscape.
However, across these groups and cases, the motivations differ: bypassing traditional arms markets, enhancing operational resilience, generating symbolic or propaganda value, or pursuing necessity-driven innovation in resource-limited warfare. Yet the trend is unmistakable—what was once an experimental practice is rapidly evolving and revamping its status from peripheral curiosity to an emerging challenge within modern security architecture. And this is only the beginning.
What’s Printable?: Current Capabilities of 3D-Printed Weaponry
3D printing is beginning to alter how weapons are produced and deployed. Open-access designs now allow firearms and military components to be manufactured outside traditional supply chains, accelerating their spread and availability. While seizures have risen sharply since 2021, 3D printing is also gaining traction on the battlefield, where state and non-state forces are testing, among other things, drone frames and munitions, firearms components, and front-line repairs for cost, resilience, and operational advantage.
A lot has changed since the release of the 2013 Liberator pistol, which, while fragile and unreliable, was nonetheless a proof of concept that spurred further designs. Over a decade later, designs such as the FGC-9 semiautomatic carbine and the newer Urutau gun have revolutionised this space as they are designed to be built without any regulated parts and can be fabricated entirely with consumer 3D printers and common hardware components. FGC-9, developed by Jacob “JStark1809” Duygu and first released in 2020, has been adopted by fighters in the Myanmar civil war, where People’s Defence Forces such as the KNDF and Salingyi Special Task Force have used these weapons amid ammunition shortages. Another emerging and increasingly debated development is the prospect of 3D-printed ammunition, including experimental discussions around 9mm hollow-point rounds. While open-source, peer-reviewed literature on the successful 3D printing of bullets remains limited, online forums, blogs, and media platforms already host extensive discussions exploring the feasibility of such ammunition, underscoring how innovation in this space is often driven outside formal research or regulatory scrutiny.
However, the implications extend well beyond small arms. 3D printing is increasingly applied to drones, allowing airframes, release mechanisms, and other components to be printed on demand. This lowers costs, bypasses import restrictions, and gives its users a new degree of flexibility. What began as an experiment is fast becoming a practical tool of modern conflict, which in recent years has been seen in battlefields around the world. In Ukraine, volunteer engineers and organisations are producing drone-related hardware and munitions with AM technologies. According to recent research, 3D-printed fins and sabots are attached to grenades or explosive payloads dropped from small drones, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield. Other reports highlight the manufacture of drones like the Liberator-MK1 and MK2, a fixed-wing aircraft with a 3D-printed frame reinforced with fiberglass that can carry up to 1.5kg of explosives, used by anti-junta rebels in Myanmar. In Yemen, the Houthis militia is known to 3D-print parts of drones and missiles, while a recent UN report revealed Al-Shabaab in Somalia experimenting with 3D printing to manufacture components for adaptation of commercial unmanned aerial systems.
3D printing also extends to bombs, grenades, and other munitions. Combatants have begun manufacturing explosive devices using 3D-printed casings, fins, and stabilizing components. Notable examples include so-called “candy bombs” with 3D-printed shells filled with conventional explosives such as C4 and shrapnel; the RKG-1600 munition, modified with 3D-printed stabilizing fins and tail cones; 3D-printed mortar baseplates and stabilizers; and various components used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Beyond complete weapons, 3D printing is also used to produce parts and accessories, including pistol and rifle magazines, grips, receivers, machine gun conversion devices (MCDs), and customised equipment such as drone landing pads and components for the Gripen fighter jet.
The diffusion of AM is rapidly blurring the line between civilian and military capabilities. Commercial 3D printers, widely accessible and inexpensive, now enable the production of weapons and battlefield-relevant components, placing unprecedented strain on regulatory and law-enforcement systems. Traditional interdiction strategies built around controlling physical supply chains are becoming increasingly ineffective against decentralized, digital manufacturing. From crowdfunding weapons production to disrupted plots of mass shootings using 3D printed guns, recent cases show how quickly radicalization can pair with capability. The barrier to entry is no longer engineering expertise, but access to the internet, building materials, and time, raising urgent questions for domestic and international security alike.
Looking Ahead to 2026
As 2026 approaches, strategists warn that increasingly sophisticated polymer and mixed‑material 3D‑printed firearms will be ever harder to trace or regulate. As digital blueprints for weapons become increasingly democratized, states must review their national legislation to address the emerging threats. This would require criminalizing unauthorized production and the illicit possession, transfer, and dissemination of digital design files, in line with the UN Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action, alongside the adoption of robust national deactivation standards. Experts emphasize that the priority of 2026 should be cross-sectoral collaboration and strengthening cooperation by bringing technical expertise into policy spaces, updating national laws to address digitally enabled weapons, strengthening law enforcement capacity to detect and investigate privately made firearms, enhancing knowledge sharing, and embedding “design‑against‑crime” safeguards into weapons manufacturing.
Thankfully, these threats are no longer off the radar and are on the agenda of diplomats, lawmakers, and research networks worldwide. The UN Programme of Action has mandated an Open‑Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG), scheduled to meet in June 2026, to address challenges posed by polymer and modular weapons and 3D printing, as well as related tracing difficulties arising from those innovations. Research institutes such as UNIDIR are hosting a series of online briefings to support substantive preparations for the OETEG, engaging the diplomatic community that will be involved in the expert meetings during the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS9). Complementary progress is also underway within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Through the Firearms Protocol and Resolution 12/3 (2024) of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, states have acknowledged emerging challenges linked to privately made firearms and new production methods, including 3D printing, and have encouraged strengthened legislation, enhanced capacity-building, and improved international cooperation to address these evolving risks.
Growing momentum in coordinated international action, paired with sustained engagement from industry actors, civil society, research bodies, and regional organizations, offers a pathway to ensure regulation keeps pace with technology while reinforcing, not replacing, the effectiveness of existing arms control measures.
In recent years, assumptions about the limitations of additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, in weapons production have been steadily challenged. What was once viewed as a technological novelty, useful mainly for prototypes and hobbyist projects, has evolved into a proliferating trend in the design and manufacture of weapons, now appearing in both conflict and non-conflict settings. From the inclusion of the FGC-9 in the arsenals of the People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar to the seizure of 3D-printed firearms, magazines, and ammunition by law enforcement in Australia, 3D-printed weapons have gained growing appeal among criminals, extremist groups, and even conventional militaries facing supply-chain constraints. Whether in the hands of private individuals seeking to bypass traditional arms markets, insurgent groups innovating under resource scarcity, or military forces experimenting with on-demand logistics, 3D printing is steadily carving out space in the global arms landscape.
However, across these groups and cases, the motivations differ: bypassing traditional arms markets, enhancing operational resilience, generating symbolic or propaganda value, or pursuing necessity-driven innovation in resource-limited warfare. Yet the trend is unmistakable—what was once an experimental practice is rapidly evolving and revamping its status from peripheral curiosity to an emerging challenge within modern security architecture. And this is only the beginning.
What’s Printable?: Current Capabilities of 3D-Printed Weaponry
3D printing is beginning to alter how weapons are produced and deployed. Open-access designs now allow firearms and military components to be manufactured outside traditional supply chains, accelerating their spread and availability. While seizures have risen sharply since 2021, 3D printing is also gaining traction on the battlefield, where state and non-state forces are testing, among other things, drone frames and munitions, firearms components, and front-line repairs for cost, resilience, and operational advantage.
A lot has changed since the release of the 2013 Liberator pistol, which, while fragile and unreliable, was nonetheless a proof of concept that spurred further designs. Over a decade later, designs such as the FGC-9 semiautomatic carbine and the newer Urutau gun have revolutionised this space as they are designed to be built without any regulated parts and can be fabricated entirely with consumer 3D printers and common hardware components. FGC-9, developed by Jacob “JStark1809” Duygu and first released in 2020, has been adopted by fighters in the Myanmar civil war, where People’s Defence Forces such as the KNDF and Salingyi Special Task Force have used these weapons amid ammunition shortages. Another emerging and increasingly debated development is the prospect of 3D-printed ammunition, including experimental discussions around 9mm hollow-point rounds. While open-source, peer-reviewed literature on the successful 3D printing of bullets remains limited, online forums, blogs, and media platforms already host extensive discussions exploring the feasibility of such ammunition, underscoring how innovation in this space is often driven outside formal research or regulatory scrutiny.
However, the implications extend well beyond small arms. 3D printing is increasingly applied to drones, allowing airframes, release mechanisms, and other components to be printed on demand. This lowers costs, bypasses import restrictions, and gives its users a new degree of flexibility. What began as an experiment is fast becoming a practical tool of modern conflict, which in recent years has been seen in battlefields around the world. In Ukraine, volunteer engineers and organisations are producing drone-related hardware and munitions with AM technologies. According to recent research, 3D-printed fins and sabots are attached to grenades or explosive payloads dropped from small drones, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield. Other reports highlight the manufacture of drones like the Liberator-MK1 and MK2, a fixed-wing aircraft with a 3D-printed frame reinforced with fiberglass that can carry up to 1.5kg of explosives, used by anti-junta rebels in Myanmar. In Yemen, the Houthis militia is known to 3D-print parts of drones and missiles, while a recent UN report revealed Al-Shabaab in Somalia experimenting with 3D printing to manufacture components for adaptation of commercial unmanned aerial systems.
3D printing also extends to bombs, grenades, and other munitions. Combatants have begun manufacturing explosive devices using 3D-printed casings, fins, and stabilizing components. Notable examples include so-called “candy bombs” with 3D-printed shells filled with conventional explosives such as C4 and shrapnel; the RKG-1600 munition, modified with 3D-printed stabilizing fins and tail cones; 3D-printed mortar baseplates and stabilizers; and various components used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Beyond complete weapons, 3D printing is also used to produce parts and accessories, including pistol and rifle magazines, grips, receivers, machine gun conversion devices (MCDs), and customised equipment such as drone landing pads and components for the Gripen fighter jet.
The diffusion of AM is rapidly blurring the line between civilian and military capabilities. Commercial 3D printers, widely accessible and inexpensive, now enable the production of weapons and battlefield-relevant components, placing unprecedented strain on regulatory and law-enforcement systems. Traditional interdiction strategies built around controlling physical supply chains are becoming increasingly ineffective against decentralized, digital manufacturing. From crowdfunding weapons production to disrupted plots of mass shootings using 3D printed guns, recent cases show how quickly radicalization can pair with capability. The barrier to entry is no longer engineering expertise, but access to the internet, building materials, and time, raising urgent questions for domestic and international security alike.
Looking Ahead to 2026
As 2026 approaches, strategists warn that increasingly sophisticated polymer and mixed‑material 3D‑printed firearms will be ever harder to trace or regulate. As digital blueprints for weapons become increasingly democratized, states must review their national legislation to address the emerging threats. This would require criminalizing unauthorized production and the illicit possession, transfer, and dissemination of digital design files, in line with the UN Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action, alongside the adoption of robust national deactivation standards. Experts emphasize that the priority of 2026 should be cross-sectoral collaboration and strengthening cooperation by bringing technical expertise into policy spaces, updating national laws to address digitally enabled weapons, strengthening law enforcement capacity to detect and investigate privately made firearms, enhancing knowledge sharing, and embedding “design‑against‑crime” safeguards into weapons manufacturing.
Thankfully, these threats are no longer off the radar and are on the agenda of diplomats, lawmakers, and research networks worldwide. The UN Programme of Action has mandated an Open‑Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG), scheduled to meet in June 2026, to address challenges posed by polymer and modular weapons and 3D printing, as well as related tracing difficulties arising from those innovations. Research institutes such as UNIDIR are hosting a series of online briefings to support substantive preparations for the OETEG, engaging the diplomatic community that will be involved in the expert meetings during the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS9). Complementary progress is also underway within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Through the Firearms Protocol and Resolution 12/3 (2024) of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, states have acknowledged emerging challenges linked to privately made firearms and new production methods, including 3D printing, and have encouraged strengthened legislation, enhanced capacity-building, and improved international cooperation to address these evolving risks.
Growing momentum in coordinated international action, paired with sustained engagement from industry actors, civil society, research bodies, and regional organizations, offers a pathway to ensure regulation keeps pace with technology while reinforcing, not replacing, the effectiveness of existing arms control measures.
Monalisa Hazarika is strategic communications and partnership officer at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University of London, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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