| This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations. |  Iain Overton |  Niamh Gillen |
Looking ahead to 2026, the global risk posed to civilians by explosive weapons is unlikely to diminish in any meaningful or sustained way. While overall levels of explosive violence may stabilise or decline in selected theatres, this should not be interpreted as a reduction in civilian harm. Instead, the defining characteristic of explosive violence in 2026 is likely to be its increasing intensity and concentration, with fewer incidents but with those producing higher levels of civilian casualties, particularly in populated areas.
Recent data already point to this trajectory. Globally, explosive incidents have declined, and civilian casualties in 2025 fell in aggregate compared to 2024. However, civilians harmed per incident increased. Each use of an explosive weapon is, on average, more destructive to civilian life than the year before. We expect this pattern to continue into 2026, driven by changes in how explosive weapons are deployed and boosted by a failure to see much in the way of improvements in civilian protection.
In practical terms, it’s likely then that 2026 will not be defined by a universal escalation of violence, but by a consolidation of harm. Explosive weapons will continue to be used in urban and semi-urban settings, against infrastructure closely linked to civilian survival, including housing, energy systems, transport routes and humanitarian facilities. Against this, it seems that even a modest reduction in attack frequency would be unlikely to translate into proportional reductions in civilian suffering.
Ukraine is a place where this dynamic will be most clearly felt. Despite a slight reduction in the number of recorded explosive incidents in 2025 there, civilian casualties increased, particularly injuries. This suggests explosive weapons are being used in ways that generate greater harm per strike, whether through the selection of targets, the use of higher-yield munitions, or attacks on infrastructure whose failure disproportionately affects civilians.
In Gaza, AOAV anticipates a continuation of the current pattern of constrained but persistent explosive violence. Ceasefires and pauses in hostilities have reduced civilian casualty totals, but explosive weapon use continues. This suggests that the risk environment for civilians remains largely unchanged. In 2026, civilians are therefore likely to continue to experience regular exposure to explosive violence, even in the absence of large-scale offensives, this may be through unexploded ordnance, or less frequent but still consistent use of explosive weapons by Israel.
Sudan presents the most acute and immediate concern. Explosive weapons use has increased, alongside sharp rises in civilian casualties and deaths. AOAV sees no clear indicators that this trend will reverse in 2026. Announcements of ceasefires have not, to date, translated into reduced explosive violence, and the targeting of civilian areas, including displacement camps and urban neighbourhoods, is likely to continue.
Myanmar is expected to remain volatile, with continued increases in explosive incidents but fluctuating civilian casualty figures. Any apparent reductions in civilian casualties should be interpreted with caution. The number of civilians harmed per incident remains consistently high, indicating that explosive attacks, when they occur, continue to have severe consequences. Similarly to attacks seen in Sudan, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure across Myanmar continue to be targeted, leading to huge casualty tolls.
Beyond these high-profile conflicts, AOAV assesses that 2026 carries a significant risk of escalation in contexts that have previously received less international attention. Pakistan stands out. Recent increases in explosive violence and civilian casualties, linked in part to cross-border dynamics, suggest a heightened risk, with relations with neighbouring Afghanistan becoming increasingly strained. Should regional tensions intensify, explosive violence in Pakistan in 2026 could produce substantially higher civilian harm than in previous years.
Yemen presents a concern, too. While often described as a frozen conflict, recent spikes in explosive violence driven by a small number of air strikes resulted in very high civilian casualty levels.
Taken together, the principal risk in 2026 lies not in a sudden global escalation, but in the normalisation of highly destructive explosive violence against civilians. The continued use of explosive weapons in civilian environments, combined with rising harm per incident, points to a year in which fewer attacks nonetheless produce deeper and more enduring civilian suffering.
Without meaningful restraint on the use of such weapons, 2026 is likely to reinforce, rather than reverse, this trajectory.
Iain Overton is Executive Director at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence.
Niamh Gillen is an explosive violence researcher at Action on Armed Violence, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list / emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
Niamh Gillen is an explosive violence researcher at Action on Armed Violence, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list / emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
RSS Feed