Finland

This is one of a group of eight country profiles authored by an emerging expert, originally published as part of the "Comparative Study on Arms Trade Transparency" report (see full report). The assessments and opinions expressed are the views of each assessment's author. The Forum does not itself take positions.

Sannimari Veini

In Finland, the arms trade has a growing importance for the economy as the country’s arms imports and exports have been on the rise in the 21st century[1] (a development that is easy to link to the general trend in Europe to increase armaments,[2] leading also to increased purchases from Finland). Indeed, Finland’s defense budget has been increased steadily,[3] partly due to Finland joining NATO in 2023 and its subsequent commitment to increasing its defense spending.[4] For example, in 2025, Finland’s defense spending reached 2.9% of GDP,[5] and in April 2026 the Finnish Government approved a supplementary defence budget increase of around EUR 1,13 billion (approx. USD 1,30 billion), aiming to meet 3.19% of GDP by 2029, 3.22% by 2030, and 3.5% by 2035.[6]

Relating to the defense budget increase, Finland has in recent years made high-value arms import decisions, such as joining the F-35 global partnership, purchasing 64 fighter jets and related equipment for over EUR 8 billion (approx. USD 9.2 billion),[7] and purchasing a David Sling air defense system from Israel for over EUR 317 million (approx. USD 366 million).[8] From the Russian invasion of Ukraine until mid-2024, over 40% of the additional procurement of the Finnish Defence Forces has been from Israel.[9]

On the exports side, granted export licenses for military products in Finland grew to a new high in 2024, amounting to a total of EUR 1.4 billion (approx. USD 1.6 billion), which reflects more than a tenfold increase within the past two years. On the other hand, the realized combined value of military products and civilian weapons exports in 2024 reached over EUR 316 million (approx. USD 366 million).[10] The most common destinations for granted military product export licenses have historically been European countries (64.1% in 2024), but large amounts have also been granted to Southwest Asia (in 2024 more than ever since SaferGlobe reporting started in 2002[11]), especially to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel.[12] Regarding civilian weapons exports, countries such as the United States and Canada have been among the most common destinations. In 2023, the U.S., Canada, and Australia together accounted for  more than half of total civilian arms exports.[13] In recent years, the most common product categories exported from Finland have been land vehicles and their components, small arms, explosives, and ammunition.[14]

Arms Trade Transparency in Finland

Historically speaking, transparency is highly promoted in Finland, even with regards to the arms trade, and is generally controlled by the Act on the Openness of Government Activities from 1999. The Act establishes a presumption of openness, grants broad public access to information, requires authorities to promote openness proactively, and sets clear, limited grounds for secrecy, including national security, foreign relations, commercial secrets and defense interests.[15]

Regarding the arms trade, the Finnish Defense Ministry publishes a yearly report on granted licenses and realized exports, which includes data by country and category as well as negative export license decisions (i.e., export license denials) including the destination country and the product type. Additionally, individual export licenses are, in principle, public and can be requested from the Defence Ministry.[16] National security and commercial confidentiality, however, narrow practical transparency more than in other areas. Since 2021, the Defense Ministry has started to invoke legal exceptions for transparency. From June 2021 to April 2025, a total of 19 classified export licenses to 8 different countries have been granted, with the reasons for classification including corporate secrets or security interests of the destination country.[17] Regarding arms imports, the issue is more complicated, as many debates are held behind closed doors, and regardless of some level of public discussion, the final decisions are still made without proper public scrutiny or without Parliament approval, usually in cooperation between the Defence Forces and the Defence Ministry,[18] raising serious concerns regarding accountability and oversight.

Recently, debate about the need for more secrecy regarding defense material imports and exports has increased within the Government, and the Defense and Justice Ministries are currently evaluating the need for new limitations on information.[19] Additionally, in November 2024, an initiative to renew the legislation regarding defense material exports was initiated, due to the changed global security and defense sector environment.[20]

Civilian arms exports are also an exception to the usual standard of transparency. Civilian exports are controlled by the National Police Board, which does not share export statistics publicly, but the information needs to be combined from the Customs statistics.[21] This is especially problematic, since these arms can also be exported for the use of state authorities, such as soldiers, and sometimes, their destination countries are not specified.[22]

National and International Regulation Framework

As an EU Member State, Finland implements the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms export controls, and was one of the seven initiators of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) process, being currently a  State Party.[23] Nationally, Finland regulates defense material exports through the Act on the Export and Transit of Defence Materiel, civilian weapons through the Firearms Act, and dual-use items through the Act on Monitoring of Export of Dual-Use Goods.[24] Finland has submitted its annual ATT reports since 2015 and also reports to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, the OSCE through the Information Exchange on Conventional Arms Transfers, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.[25]

Finland also engages with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Freedom of Information standards, and has generally been considered to perform strongly in these areas. In addition, Finland’s domestic law mirrors Article 19 requirements, includes strong legislative protections of freedom of information guaranteed in the Act on the Openness of Government Activities, and follows the so-called “Nordic publicity principle”, historically predating the ICCPR.[26]
 
Debate on the Arms Trade with Israel

Finland lacks a similar jurisprudence history related to forced transparency that some other countries have. This is mainly due to discretionary classification decisions, a culture where it is uncommon to use courts to challenge security-policy related decisions, and where civil society traditionally focuses more on political advocacy than strategic litigation. However, there are some examples where the initially provided information has been very limited and where media scrutiny has increased the political pressure to publicly clarify and justify arms trade decisions. One example of politically-forced increased transparency is the recent debate relating to arms trade with Israel.

In April 2025, the national broadcasting company YLE reported that since June 2021, Finland started partially classifying defense material export licenses, while previously the licenses had been public, including the exporter, recipient country, and the type of exported item.[27] Based on internal documents reviewed by YLE, the first classified license was granted to Israel, the redaction of key information had been made due to a request of the recipient state, and the classification request was accepted by the Ministry of Defence based on national security and commercial confidentiality reasons.[28] Soon after, YLE also reported that the annual arms export report showed a significant increase in export licences and procurement decisions value to and from Israel in 2024, which YLE connected to the broader context of the situation in Gaza.[29] The articles sparked public discussion and created political pressure, as Finland has traditionally framed itself as a human rights-oriented arms exporter.[30] The Defence Minister decided to comment on the issue, clarifying to some extent that the major 2024 license involved the integration of Israel-purchased David’s Sling into the Finnish system, not transferring military expertise to Israel, and commented that exports to Israel have been “limited and mainly consisting of protective equipment.”[31]

While Finland’s arms trade with Israel has continued, the reporting revealed a shift in policy which was not previously publicly explained, and started a public debate about the relationship between classification practices and democratic accountability, pushing the Ministry to publicly frame their Israel-related arms trade, sparking new public interest in unethical and legally problematic arms trade decisions.
 
Challenges and Opportunities

While the Finnish government has recently started to move away from transparency - most notably by starting to classify defense material export licenses and the Defence Minister publicly stating the need to re-evaluate the Act on the Openness of Government Activities relating to defence material[32] - towards “national security” arguments, the public has become more interested in Finland’s arms trade. Already before the current debates, many exports were criticized as a result of being directed to unstable or sometimes conflict-patry countries, but the debate regarding Israel brought public interest to new highs. While there are attempts by the Government to find ways to limit the transparency of the arms trade even more,[33] it would, however, be of utmost importance that Finland does not further weaken the current transparency level, at least, and allows room for public oversight and democratic accountability.

Aside from this, Finland should also enact legislation to require human rights impact evaluations regarding its arms imports to fill the accountability gap. Sadly, a great opportunity was missed when the Parliament of Finland rejected the Law on Point -citizens’ initiative in April 2026. The initiative would have added an important layer to the regulation by requiring an evaluation based on human rights and international humanitarian law while doing defence procurements.[34] In addition, several smaller challenges remain. Among other things, transparency should be increased by making human rights evaluations of arms exports public, and increasing parliamentary control by requiring its pre-approval of bigger scale arms import and export decisions. This would make arms trade decisions especially to and from politically sensitive countries less driven by the executive-branch and allow for more public scrutiny.

Finland has a strong history and legal basis for transparency, and the remaining challenges could be easily resolved within this framework. It would be a shame, and a threat to democratic accountability, if Finland were to decide to abandon its long-standing transparency practices.
 
Transparency Reports

Puolustusministeriön raportti puolustustarvikkeiden viennistä 2024 (Ministry of Defence Report on Exports of Defence Products 2024)
Finnish Arms Control Report (SaferGlobe ry., 2002 - 2024)

----------------------

​Sannimari Veini holds an LLM degree and previously worked as a Research Assistant at the Justus Liebig University Giessen and was an Associated Researcher at CBWNet and PRIF, focusing on chemical and biological weapons and the interaction of the disarmament regimes with other fields of international law. ​
​Email: [email protected]


----------------------
[1] ‘Suomen asevalvontaraportti 2025: Suomen myöntämien asevientilupien arvo kymmenkertaistunut kahdessa vuodessa’ (SaferGlobe, 27 October 2025) <https://saferglobe.fi/2025/10/27/suomen-myontamien-asevientilupien-arvo-kymmenkertaistunut-kahdessa-vuodessa/> accessed 26 February 2026

[2] Liana Fix, ‘Europe Rearms’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 15 May 2026) <https://www.cfr.org/articles/europe-rearms> accessed 10 June 2026

[3] ‘Puolustusbudjetti’ (Ministry of Defence, 2026) <https://defmin.fi/ministerio/toiminta-ja-talous/puolustusbudjetti> accessed 10 March 2026

[4] ‘Quarterly Review Q2/2025’ (State Treasury, 27 June 2025) <https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/publications/quarterly-review-q2-2025/ > accessed 10 March 2026

[5] Mika Arola; Jussi Tuulisaari, ‘Debt Management Annual Review 2025’ (State Treasury, 2025) <https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/annualreview2025/operating-environment/ > accessed 10 March 2026

[6] ‘Puolustusministeri Häkkänen: kehysriihessä päätettiin yli miljardin euron puolustuksen vahvistamispaketista’ (Ministry of Defence, 24 April 2026) <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/-/236553176/puolustusministeri-hakkanen-kehysriihessa-paatettiin-yli-miljardin-euron-puolustuksen-vahvistamispaketista> accessed 10 June 2026

[7] ‘The Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II is Finland’s next multi-role fighter’ (Air Force, 10 December 2021) <https://ilmavoimat.fi/-/lockheed-martin-f-35a-lightning-ii-on-suomen-seuraava-monitoimihavittaja?languageId=en_US> accessed 1 March 2026

[8] ‘RAFAEL COMPLETES SALE OF DAVID’S SLING TO FINLAND’ (RAFAEL, 13 November 2023) <https://www.rafael.co.il/news/rafael-completes-sale-of-davids-sling-to-finland/> accessed 10 March 2026

[9] Kai Byman, ‘Suomi ostaa hirveästi aseita maalta, joka säikkyy Venäjää itsekkäistä syistä – ja siinä voi piillä riski’ (Yle, 29 June 2024) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20096895> accessed 13 February 2026

[10] ‘Suomen asevalvontaraportti 2025: Suomen myöntämien asevientilupien arvo kymmenkertaistunut kahdessa vuodessa’ (SaferGlobe, 27 October 2025) <https://saferglobe.fi/2025/10/27/suomen-myontamien-asevientilupien-arvo-kymmenkertaistunut-kahdessa-vuodessa/> accessed 26 February 2026

[11] ibid.

[12] ibid, ‘Suomen asevalvontaraportti 2024: Toteutuneissa asevienneissä ennätysvuosi’ (SaferGlobe, 21 October 2024) <https://saferglobe.fi/2024/10/21/saferglobe-suomen-sotatuotteille-myontamien-vientilupien-arvo-liki-kaksinkertaistui-myos-sotatuotteiden-ja-siviiliaseiden-toteutuneissa-vienneissa-ennatysvuosi/> accessed 26 February 2026

[13] ‘Suomen asevalvontaraportti 2024: Toteutuneissa asevienneissä ennätysvuosi’ (SaferGlobe, 21 October 2024) <https://saferglobe.fi/2024/10/21/saferglobe-suomen-sotatuotteille-myontamien-vientilupien-arvo-liki-kaksinkertaistui-myos-sotatuotteiden-ja-siviiliaseiden-toteutuneissa-vienneissa-ennatysvuosi/> accessed 26 February 2026

[14] ibid.

[15] Johannes Ijäs, ‘Suomi saattoi tehdä massiivisen puolustusvirheen – Häkkänen puuttui peliin’ (Iltalehti, 7 February 2026) <https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/d9cc332a-130d-42c3-920b-e54d946c827b> accessed 10 March 2026

[16] ‘Vienti- ja siirtoluvat’ (Ministry of Defence) <https://defmin.fi/luvat-ja-asiointi/vienti-ja-siirtoluvat> accessed 26 February 2026

[17] Eero Mäntymaa, ‘Ylen selvitys paljastaa: Suomi alkoi kaikessa hiljaisuudessa salaamaan asevientiään’ (Yle, 18 April 2025) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20154448> accessed 13 February 2026

[18] ‘Puolustusmateriaali ja puolustusteollisuus’ (Ministry of Defence) <https://defmin.fi/vastuualueet/puolustusmateriaali-ja-puolustusteollisuus> accessed 10 June 2026

[19] Johannes Ijäs, ‘Suomi saattoi tehdä massiivisen puolustusvirheen – Häkkänen puuttui peliin’ (Iltalehti, 7 February 2026) <https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/d9cc332a-130d-42c3-920b-e54d946c827b> accessed 10 March 2026

[20] Ministry of Defence, Puolustusministeriön raportti puolustustarvikkeiden viennistä 2024 (Ministry of Defence, 2024) <https://defmin.fi/documents/236553176/238659714/Puolustusministerion_raportti_puolustustarvikkeiden_viennista_2024.pdf/5de87ae8-f689-6613-cb54-b54e08490193/Puolustusministerion_raportti_puolustustarvikkeiden_viennista_2024.pdf?t=1768995236962> 6

[21] ‘Suomen asevalvontaraportti 2025: Suomen myöntämien asevientilupien arvo kymmenkertaistunut kahdessa vuodessa’ (SaferGlobe, 27 October 2025) <https://saferglobe.fi/2025/10/27/suomen-myontamien-asevientilupien-arvo-kymmenkertaistunut-kahdessa-vuodessa/> accessed 26 February 2026

[22] ‘Uusi raportti: 2023 asekauppalupia Suomesta myönnetty taas muun muassa Arabiemiraateille ja Israeliin’ (Rauhanliitto, 21 October 2024) <https://rauhanliitto.fi/rauhanliitto/ajankohtaista/uusi-raportti-2023-asekauppalupia-suomesta-myonnetty-taas-muun-muassa-arabiemiraateille-ja-israeliin> accessed 1 March 2026

[23] ‘Arms control and disarmament’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) <https://um.fi/arms-control-and-disarmament> accessed 10 March 2026

[24] Laki puolustustarvikkeiden viennistä (282/2012)
<https://www.finlex.fi/fi/lainsaadanto/2012/282>, Ampuma-aselaki (1/1998) <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/lainsaadanto/1998/1> and Laki kaksikäyttötuotteiden vientivalvonnasta (500/2024) <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/lainsaadanto/2024/500> 

[25] Ministry of Defence, Puolustusministeriön raportti puolustustarvikkeiden viennistä 2024 (Ministry of Defence, 2024) <https://defmin.fi/documents/236553176/238659714/Puolustusministerion_raportti_puolustustarvikkeiden_viennista_2024.pdf/5de87ae8-f689-6613-cb54-b54e08490193/Puolustusministerion_raportti_puolustustarvikkeiden_viennista_2024.pdf?t=1768995236962> 5

[26] Ainur Elmgren, ‘Open government in the Nordics’ (Nordics.info, 27 February 2019) <https://nordics.info/show/artikel/open-government > accessed 11 March 2026

[27] Eero Mäntymaa, ‘Ylen selvitys paljastaa: Suomi alkoi kaikessa hiljaisuudessa salaamaan asevientiään’ (Yle, 18 April 2025) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20154448> accessed 13 February 2026

[28] ‘Finland restricts public access to arms export licences at buyers' request’ (Yle, 18 April 2025) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20157006> accessed 13 February 2026

[29] ‘Defence minister: Situation in Gaza won't affect Finland's arms trade with Israel’ (Yle, 12 August 2025) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20177004> accessed 13 February 2026

[30] This framing had, however, already been questioned earlier due to Finland’s arms exports to countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi-Arabia.

[31] ‘Defence minister: Situation in Gaza won't affect Finland's arms trade with Israel’ (Yle, 12 August 2025) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20177004> accessed 13 February 2026

[32] Johannes Ijäs, ‘Suomi saattoi tehdä massiivisen puolustusvirheen – Häkkänen puuttui peliin’ (Iltalehti, 7 February 2026) <https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/d9cc332a-130d-42c3-920b-e54d946c827b> accessed 10 March 2026

[33] ibid.

[34] See: https://lakisarmaan.fi/english