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Multilateralism and the Prevention of Gender-Based Violence: Reflections in the Framework of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women

11/21/2023

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PictureAngélica María Pardo Chacón
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.

When we talk about violence prevention, the first thing that comes to mind is the creation of care routes, public policy for victim support, accompaniment, and any action that mitigates violence. For Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention, prevention is often focused on awareness and symbolic actions; such as the "pink" wagons in Mexico or the purple police shackles in Colombia. Elements that, although provide much needed visibility and influence public discussion, it is still seen as a joke for some sectors; which they call an unnecessary expense that will not contribute to the solution of a real problem that kills women and diverse community in the world and which is closely linked to the impact and disarmament agenda.

But why disarmament? The debate on the impact of weapons on gender-based violence prevention is a narrative that has been present in recent years, mainly encouraged by the feminist agenda. In some sectors the issue has made more progress than in others, and this month, on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women I would like to put into perspective some case studies and what we could continue to learn from them.

The international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) regulates the international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms. It is one of the first, if not the only one, to explicitly include in the text the risk of using arms to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children, as one of the elements to be evaluated for export authorization, included in other articles of the treaty. It is therefore natural that only four years after its entry into force, Latvia focused its work as chair of the treaty on the relationship between arms and GBV, issuing recommendations based on the Working Paper submitted by Ireland to the Conference of the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty: Article 7(4) and the assessment of GBV. Thus, since its inception ATT has been mindful of the impact of weapons in increasing the risk of GBV.

In the case of the Ottawa treaty, also known as the Convention for the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines, it has had several years of revisions and recommendations, both from civil society and the States parties aiming at the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach in mine action. Therefore, in the latest action plans of the convention, needs and strategies for the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach under the humanitarian principle of "leaving no one behind" are welcomed and proposed. This space also has advocacy groups such as the Gender and Diversity Working Group, which aims to promote inclusive and effective humanitarian interventions in mine action, through an intersectional approach, incorporating gender and other diversity factors mainly within the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

In this framework, and precisely this month, the gender program of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research delivered a report taking stock of the Oslo Action Plan, in terms of the implementation of the action points related to gender and diversity.

Other examples and cases related to the inclusion of the gender and diversity approach could be discussed at greater length. Fortunately today, multilateral processes such as Stop Killer Robots, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) have included intersectional approaches.

All these experiences in the framework of humanitarian disarmament processes and multilateralism demonstrate the importance of gender mainstreaming and the prevention of gender-based violence in all international spheres and efforts. By recognizing gender equity and overcoming all types of violence and inequality as one of the Sustainable Development Goals, the issue has begun to acquire more relevance in multilateral spaces, but why mainstreaming the gender approach in international instruments could contribute to the prevention of gender-based violence?

Weapons are one of the expressions that humanity has historically found to promote "superiority", which for the purposes of this text we will not discuss. But if we take into account that war, in a very light analysis, has been defined from the absence of its counterpart, peace, it links elements of superiority, which has been traditionally linked to masculinity and its ability to exercise power.

It is not surprising, then, that the possession, production and use of weapons is identified as a real and useful mechanism in the search for that superiority, which has been at the head of patriarchal models, such as Mark Antony, Napoleon and other male figures who have been at the forefront of the arms industry. However, if we take into account that in contrast, peace is usually associated as a "soft, weak, vulnerable" practice, characteristics traditionally assigned to the feminine, it is to be expected that social disputes and the distribution of power, related to discourses and practices in international spaces, will also result in a masculinization of peace; This is why only having men in the room makes the real inclusion of strategies that mitigate the differentiated risks and impacts of weapons on women and diverse communities more distant and less rapid, maintaining glass ceilings.

But what does multilateralism have to do with it?

Bearing in mind that men are traditionally exposed to reproducing elements related to protection, having to show virility, strength and courage, it is to be expected that in the multilateral spaces for negotiation and consensus-building around disarmament, the need for men to comply with the patriarchal logic of "real men" hinders the generation of new ideas. If we add to this the lack of real representation of women and their vision, we find a longer road for the prevention of gender-based violence in these scenarios, since they continue to replicate unequal relationships in which women, children and LGBTTIQA+ community tend to be those who occupy the categories of vulnerability and low agency, while the symbolic dispute around the values attributed to the "feminine" and "masculine" permeate all processes and institutions.

In order to speak of effective multilateralism, among other things, we must speak of substantive representation, which implies a qualitative change during the consultation processes and the results of specific advocacy in favor of overcoming unequal relations. Although progress has been made in efforts to include a gender perspective, in the inclusion of women in delegations, in advocacy campaigns, women and their vision continue to be in the background in most processes and while there are strategies and processes that continue to appeal, unconsciously, to the superiority of the strongest - the strongest masculinized - weapons and the potential risk of their use continue to perpetuate dynamics of inequality that contribute to the increase of Gender Based Violence.

In this order of ideas, if we take into account that the spaces where international instruments are defined are par excellence scenarios of dialogue and socialization occupied mostly by political and social elites, in which men have the majority control, and that as a space for defining agendas and building international consensus there is still a greater male representation and agency, it is possible to identify that the road to prevention and attention to GBV is still ahead of us.

For this I would like to bring an experience with the Mine Action Fellows, a Mines Action Canada program (of which I am a part), at the States Parties meeting of the Ottawa 2022 convention. There, we decided to keep a tally of minutes of statements made by women in relation to those made by men; and the result was not surprising but alarming, women spoke less than 8% of the plenary time during 3 days! And yet, according to the research "Beyond Oslo: Taking Stock of Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention" conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, by 2022, 69% of the States attending the meeting of States Parties to the MBT recorded the participation of women in their delegations.

This is what I mean when I say that there is still much to learn, when we talk about effective multilateralism, we talk about representation, but also about the quality of that representation, which has been descriptive, counting percentages of participation but not the effectiveness of that participation.

Multilateralism in some humanitarian disarmament processes has made progress in recognizing the role of weapons in gender-based violence, but there is still much to be done in relation to substantive representation, the use of time, space and therefore the distribution of power in these spaces of discussion where agendas are defined and international consensus is built. Yes, we women are increasingly part of these spaces, but the voice and decisions continue to be made by the men in the room, who often have a masculinized, patriarchal and hegemonic vision of reality; this continues to mark the long road to talk about a real response from multilateralism to gender-based violence perpetuated by or in the context of the use of weapons, whether massive, indiscriminate, autonomous, or small arms and light weapons.
​


Angélica María Pardo Chacón is a political scientist from Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá and currently is pursuing a master's degree in Global Affairs and Political Processes at the Universidad del Rosario. She is a member of the Women in Security and Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean network (Amassuru).

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Free Carrying of Firearms: A Dangerous New Trend in the Argentine Presidential Campaign

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Emerging Expert Voices (leer la versión original en español)

This post is part of a special series of Looking Ahead blog contributions by members of the Forum's Emerging Expert programs.

For the first time in Argentine history, the free carrying of firearms has become a topic of debate in a presidential election campaign. Why is this happening in one of the countries with the lowest homicide rates in Latin America and internationally recognized for its disarmament program? Does the citizenry desire firearms or security?
 
Insecurity has been one of the most concerning issues for Argentine society for over 20 years. During that same period, public policies regarding the control of firearms and disarmament have experienced unprecedented development in our country. The understanding that firearms are not a source of security but rather a factor that jeopardizes it has, for the first time, become a central topic of discussion on the electoral agenda.
 
"I am definitely in favor of the free carrying of firearms," said former deputy Javier Milei in 2022, who is now a presidential candidate and emerged as the most voted for candidate in the primary elections. However, this eccentric outsider, a follower of Trump and Bolsonaro, is not the only member of his party who publicly expressed such views. His vice-presidential candidate admitted to being a firearm user and stated that ownership is a "right" for "law-abiding citizens who want to defend themselves." While the controversy surrounding these statements led these candidates to downplay their remarks, the electoral platform presented by the candidate at the beginning of his presidential campaign proposed, regarding firearm ownership, the "deregulation of the legal market and the protection of its legitimate and responsible use by citizens."
 
"Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed."

Milei is not the first Argentine politician to raise this debate. Five years ago, the then Minister of Security and current presidential candidate for the other major opposition front, Patricia Bullrich, had said in an informal interview outside a restaurant, "Whoever wants to be armed, can be armed; whoever doesn't want to be armed, shouldn't be armed. Argentina is a free country." While her complete statement added that she and her party preferred that people not be armed, controversy quickly erupted. For the first time, the absolute political consensus regarding the need to restrict access to firearms was called into question.
 
Beyond their ambivalences, two of the three main presidential candidates in Argentina have expressed support for free carrying. Can it be inferred that Argentine society has changed its view on firearms? The answer is not so simple. However, there are signs that the public's demand for security does not translate into support for free carrying.
 
Argentina is not a heavily armed country. Its rate of 7.4 firearms per 100,000 civilians is, according to the Small Arms Survey, lower than most countries in the region. A recent nationwide survey conducted in May 2023 reflected that 77% of respondents were against "the free carrying of firearms." The society's participation in the disarmament program allowed for the removal of over 200,000 firearms from circulation between 2007 and 2022. Due to the results achieved in its early years, this program was internationally recognized as a model policy in 2013.
 
The laws on firearm restriction passed in the National Congress in recent years also reflect this consensus, with virtually unanimous votes in favor of firearm control and disarmament. However, the last extension of the disarmament program, voted on in 2021, already sounded an alarm: while 93% of deputies voted in favor, votes against the renewal of the program were recorded for the first time, even though it had been extended seven times before.
 
An initial conclusion from this data, pending the final results of the presidential elections, is that Argentine society remains predominantly opposed to firearms. However, it can also be inferred that, like in other countries, the threshold of rejection of pro-arms rhetoric may have decreased, even if only relatively, in recent years. It is true that voting for a presidential candidate does not necessarily mean support for all of their proposals, but it probably does indicate a tolerance for most of them.
 
If this hypothesis is correct, it is necessary to pay attention to this symptom. While Argentina has a well-established social, institutional, and cultural tradition of restricting the circulation of firearms, recent experiences in other Latin American countries demonstrate how easily such controls can be undermined.
 
What's Happening with Firearms in Argentina?

Argentina currently has around 1,000,000 legally registered firearm users, although most of them are in a situation of illegality due to expired authorizations. Additionally, it is estimated that, including unregistered firearms, the total number of firearms could be three to four times the 1,700,000 recorded in official records.
 
Between 2011 and 2019, an average of 8 people per day died in Argentina as a result of firearm use. One out of every two intentional homicides in Argentina is committed with a firearm. In 2021, 76% of intentional homicides in Argentina were recorded without the involvement of other crimes.
 
Firearms are also used for gender-based violence. In general, women and gender-diverse individuals do not possess firearms (as 97% of registered users are males), but they disproportionately suffer the consequences: 1 out of every 4 femicides is committed with a firearm.
 
Since 2015, Argentina has a model law at the regional level that created and regulates the National Agency for Controlled Materials, responsible not only for the registration and control of the legal firearms market but also for "developing policies aimed at reducing the circulation of firearms in civil society and preventing the effects of armed violence" (Law 27,192). Among other functions, this agency is responsible for implementing the mentioned National Voluntary Firearm Surrender Plan. The creation of the agency was a significant advancement in this regard, although the law is still not fully implemented, as the agency lacks sufficient budgetary resources to carry out all the actions it is responsible for.
 
The Risks of Free Carrying

Various studies confirm that an increased presence of firearms in society, far from reducing crime (as stated by Milei himself), contributes to an increase in violence, crime, and deaths. Conversely, control policies are associated with a reduction in these problems. The case of the United States, the country with the highest civilian firearm ownership in the world (120 firearms per 100 people), is illustrative. Its homicide rate was 7.5 times higher than the rate in other high-income countries, which is often attributed to its firearm homicide rate, which is nearly 25 times higher. From mass shootings, some of them in schools, to a higher number of suicides and femicides, the effects of the free circulation of firearms have been widely verified in other countries.
 
Insecurity is undoubtedly a central problem for Argentine society. Even though its homicide rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries, the LAPOP survey reflects that it is one of the three countries in the region with the highest number of respondents reporting being victims of crime in 2021. Crime has been a top concern for Argentine citizens for years.
 
However, there is no serious indication that the demand for more security implies a desire among the citizenry to carry firearms. Discussions about the role of the state, primarily focused on economic policy, cannot be linearly transferred to security policies. Even those sectors with a more reductionist view of the size of the state have historically been in favor of recognizing the state's role in monopolizing the use of force.
 
Therefore, whoever assumes office in December will have a dual responsibility. On one hand, they must develop effective security policies to reduce crime rates and the perception of insecurity. On the other hand, they must ensure the validity and extension of firearm restriction policies in the face of voices seeking to downplay the significant risks of loosening firearm regulations.
 
Society is not asking for firearms; it is asking for security. And the data demonstrates that more firearms equate to less security.
​
Julián Alfie is Deputy Executive Director of the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP), based in Argentina.

​​Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Libre portación de armas: una peligrosa novedad en la campaña presidencial de Argentina

10/3/2023

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PictureJulián Alfie
Voces de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes (see English translation)
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Esta publicación forma parte de una serie especial de contribuciones al blog "Mirando hacia el Futuro" realizadas por miembros de los programas de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro.

Por primera vez en la historia argentina, la libre portación de armas de fuego ha sido tema de debate en una campaña electoral presidencial. ¿Por qué sucede esto en uno de los países con menor tasa de homicidios de América Latina y premiado internacionalmente por su programa de desarme? ¿La ciudadanía quiere armas o seguridad?

La inseguridad es, desde hace más de 20 años, uno de los temas que más preocupa a la sociedad argentina. En ese mismo lapso, las políticas públicas de control de armas de fuego y desarme tuvieron un inédito desarrollo en nuestro país. La comprensión de que las armas no son una fuente de seguridad, sino un factor que la pone en riesgo aparece, por primera vez, como un eje de discusión en la agenda electoral.

“Estoy a favor de la libre portación de armas, definitivamente”, dijo en 2022 el entonces diputado Javier Milei, hoy candidato presidencial, que resultó el más votado en las elecciones primarias. Pero este excéntrico outsider, seguidor de Trump y Bolsonaro, no es el único integrante de su partido que se expresó públicamente en ese sentido. Su candidata a vicepresidenta admitió ser usuaria de armas y opinó que la tenencia es un “derecho” para “el ciudadano de bien que se quiera defender”. Si bien la polémica que desataron esas declaraciones llevaron a esos candidatos a relativizar sus dichos, lo cierto es que la plataforma electoral presentada por el candidato al comienzo de su campaña presidencial planteaba, sobre la tenencia de armas de fuego, la “desregulación del mercado legal y proteger su uso legítimo y responsable por parte de la ciudadanía”.
 
“El que quiera andar armado, que ande armado”

Milei no es el primer político argentino en plantear este debate. 5 años atrás, la entonces Ministra de Seguridad y actual candidata a presidenta por el otro gran frente opositor –Patricia Bullrich-  había dicho, en una entrevista informal a la salida de un restaurante, que “el que quiera estar armado, que ande armado; el que no quiera estar armado, que no ande armado. La Argentina es un país libre”. Si bien su frase completa añadía que ella y su espacio preferían que la gente no estuviera armada, la polémica no tardó en estallar. Por primera vez se ponía en duda el absoluto consenso político respecto a la necesidad de restringir el acceso a las armas de fuego.

Más allá de sus ambivalencias, dos de los tres principales candidatos a ocupar la Presidencia de Argentina tuvieron expresiones favorables a la libre portación. ¿Puede inferirse que la sociedad argentina cambió su mirada sobre las armas? La respuesta no es tan sencilla. Sin embargo, existen señales de que el reclamo de la ciudadanía por seguridad no se traduce en un apoyo a la libre portación.

Argentina no es un país armado. Su tasa de 7.4 armas de fuego en manos de civiles cada 100 habitantes se encuentra, según Small Arms Survey, por debajo de la mayoría de los países de la región. Una reciente encuesta realizada en mayo de 2023 a nivel nacional reflejó que el 77% de las personas encuestadas se mostró en contra de “la libre portación de armas de fuego”. La participación de la sociedad en el plan de desarme permitió quitar de circulación más de 200.000 armas de fuego entre 2007 y 2022. Por los resultados alcanzados durante sus primeros años, en 2013 ese programa fue premiado a nivel internacional como una política modelo.

Las leyes sobre restricción de armas de fuego aprobadas en el Congreso de la Nación en los últimos años también reflejan ese consenso, con votaciones afirmativas al control de armas y el desarme prácticamente unánimes. Sin embargo, la última prórroga del plan de desarme, votada en 2021, ya había dado una señal de alerta: si bien el 93% de los diputados votó a favor, por primera vez se registraron votos en contra de la renovación de ese programa, que ya había sido prorrogado en 7 oportunidades anteriormente.

Una conclusión inicial de estos datos, a la espera del resultado definitivo de las elecciones presidenciales, es que la sociedad argentina sigue siendo mayoritariamente contraria a las armas de fuego. Pero también es posible inferir que, al igual que en otros países, el umbral de rechazo a los discursos armamentistas puede haber disminuido, aunque sea relativamente, en los últimos años. Es cierto que el voto a un candidato a presidente no significa un apoyo a todas sus propuestas; pero probablemente sí indique, aunque sea, una tolerancia a la mayoría de ellas.

Si la hipótesis es cierta, es necesario prestarle atención a este síntoma. Si bien Argentina cuenta con una tradición social, institucional y cultural consolidadamente restrictiva de la circulación de las armas de fuego, recientes experiencias en otros países latinoamericanos demuestran la facilidad con la que esos controles pueden socavarse.
 
¿Qué pasa con las armas en Argentina?

Argentina actualmente tiene alrededor de 1.000.000 de usuarios de armas de fuego legalmente registrados, aunque la mayoría de ellos se encuentra en una situación de ilegalidad por tener su autorización vencida. Además, se estima que, incluyendo las armas de fuego no registradas, el número total de armas podría triplicar o cuadruplicar a las 1.7000.000 que constan en los registros oficiales.

Entre 2011 y 2019, en Argentina murieron en promedio 8 personas por día por la utilización de armas de fuego. Uno de cada dos homicidios dolosos en Argentina es producido con un arma de fuego. El 76% de los homicidios dolosos producidos en Argentina en 2021 se registraron sin concurrencia de otros delitos.

Las armas de fuego también son utilizadas para el ejercicio de violencias por motivos de género. En general, las mujeres y disidencias sexogenéricas no poseen armas de fuego (ya que el 97% de los usuarios registrados son varones), pero sí sufren desproporcionadamente sus consecuencias: 1 de cada 4 femicidios es cometido con armas de fuego.

Desde 2015, Argentina cuenta con una Ley modelo a nivel regional, que creó y regula la Agencia Nacional de Materiales Controlados, que tiene a su cargo no sólo el registro y control del mercado legal de armas, sino también “el desarrollo de políticas tendientes a reducir el circulante de armas en la sociedad civil y prevenir los efectos de la violencia armada” (Ley 27.192). Entre otras funciones, esa Agencia tiene a su cargo la implementación del mencionado Plan Nacional de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego. La creación de la Agencia fue un enorme avance en la materia, aunque lo cierto es que la ley sigue sin implementarse en su totalidad, ya que el organismo sigue sin contar con los recursos presupuestarios suficientes para implementar todas las acciones que tiene a su cargo.
 
Los riesgos de la libre portación

Diversos estudios confirman que la mayor presencia de armas de fuego en una sociedad, lejos de disminuir el delito (como afirmó el propio Milei), contribuyen al aumento de la violencia, el delito y las muertes. Y, a la inversa, las políticas de control se relacionan con una reducción de esos problemas. El caso de EEUU, el país con más armas de fuego en manos de civiles del mundo (120 armas por cada 100 personas), es paradigmático. Su tasa de homicidios fue 7.5 veces mayor a la tasa de otros países de altos ingresos, lo cual suele atribuirse a su tasa de homicidios con armas de fuego, que es casi 25 veces mayor. Desde matanzas masivas, algunas de ellas en escuelas, hasta un mayor número de suicidios y femicidios, los efectos de la libre circulación de armas de fuego han sido ampliamente verificados en otros países.

​La inseguridad es, sin lugar a duda, un problema central para la sociedad argentina. Aun cuando su tasa de homicidios sea relativamente baja en relación a otros países de América Latina, la encuesta realizada por LAPOP refleja que es uno de los tres países de la región con mayor cantidad de encuestados que reportan haber sido víctimas de la delincuencia en 2021. La delincuencia se ubica dese hace años en el podio de preocupaciones de la ciudadanía argentina. 

Sin embargo, no existen indicios serios de que el reclamo por más seguridad signifique que la ciudadanía quiera portar armas. Las discusiones sobre cuál debe ser el rol del Estado, principalmente centradas en la política económica, no pueden trasladarse linealmente a las políticas de seguridad. Incluso aquellos sectores con una visión más reduccionista del tamaño estatal han sido históricamente favorables a reconocerle el rol de monopolizar el uso de la fuerza.

Por lo tanto, quien asuma el gobierno en diciembre tendrá una doble responsabilidad. Por un lado, desarrollar políticas de seguridad eficaces, que permitan reducir los índices de criminalidad y la percepción de inseguridad. Y, por el otro, garantizar la vigencia y la extensión de las políticas de restricción de las armas de fuego, ante la aparición de voces que buscan relativizar los enormes riesgos de liberar las armas.
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La sociedad no pide armas, pide seguridad. Y los datos demuestran que más armas implica menos seguridad.
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Julián Alfie es Subdirector Ejecutivo del Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (INECIP).

La inclusión en el programa de Expertos y Expertas Emergentes del Foro sobre el Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estas publicaciones no indican acuerdo ni respaldo de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas representan las vistas de los autor(es) de cada publicación.
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South Korean Arms Sales Grow in the Years Ahead

1/16/2023

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This is the fourth blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2023 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
Picture
Hoshik Nam
Last year, Russia and South Korea had largely different experiences in the global arms market, with it being fair to expect that South Korea will take a much larger role in arms exports in the coming years. The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed many flaws of Russian weapons systems. Rusty weapons, poor training and planning inflicted a huge loss of Russian soldiers and even some generals. Moreover, Russian defense industry failed to produce weapons fast enough to catch up the demand generated by its invasion of Ukraine. Late last year, the Russian government is reportedly known to have imported arms from North Korea and is also importing weapons from Iran. Considering the reputation of Russia as the second largest arms exporter for decades, this was a chaotic event that significantly harmed the reputation of the country’s defense industry.

On the other hand, the war contributed to the significant expansion of the South Korean defense industry. Its new arms export sales more than doubled in 2022 (about $17 billion compared to $7.5 billion in 2021) mostly due to a huge deal with Poland ($12 billion). This also diversified destinations of South Korea’s weapons to a major European NATO member. The number of NATO countries that import South Korea’s weapons may increase in the near future. For example, Norway and Estonia have expressed interest in buying weapons from South Korea since the outbreak of Russo-Ukrainian War. What does this mean to South Korean defense industry and its role in the global arms market this year and into the near future?
 
South Korea’s defense industry

The development of South Korean defense sector is largely attributed to the political tension with North Korea. Because both Koreas are technically still at war, the South Korean government has consistently and thoroughly invested in its defense industry since the 1970s.  The government’s strong push to try to produce its own defense weapons has led the country’s defense industry to become not only a producer, but also an exporter of howitzers, battle tanks, warships, and other weapons. In addition, South Korean weapons are compatible with Western NATO weapons, particularly US ones. This is largely due to the country’s close relationship with the US as both countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and engage in an active R&D. This benefits the recipients of South Korean weapons. For example, the arms deal between Poland and South Korea last year gives Poland a chance to replace their old Soviet-era arms into more advanced technology that is compatible with US and other NATO members’ weapons.

In addition, South Korean defense companies can produce and export the weapons in a timely manner with relatively cheap prices and generous technology transfers. These are also crucial factors that have made the South Korean weapons competitive in the global arms market, which has been enhanced with the Russo-Ukraine War as major producers focus on providing weapons to the conflict. For example, even though Poland originally was interested in importing German howitzers, the German government kept postponing exporting them largely due to prioritizing exporting to Ukraine. In addition, South Korean defense industry is more open to transfer technologies, overseas production, and R&D. These factors made South Korean weapons great alternatives for countries that want to replenish their military capabilities with reasonable conditions. After seeing the recent deal with Poland, it is probable that other countries are also interested in importing arms from South Korea. Last year, countries such as Romania expressed their interests to purchase weapons from South Korea, as did Norway and Estonia, as mentioned earlier.
 
Can South Korea replace Russia in the global arms market?

For now, it seems unlikely. While aircraft comprise almost half of Russian arms exports between 2016 and 2020, there are only a few light combat aircrafts that South Korea has successfully exported. In addition, as many South Korean weapons still include components that are produced by foreign manufacturers, exporting the weapons require additional permission from those countries. For example, in 2020 South Korean K9 Thunder howitzers that use German diesel engines were prevented from being exported by a German defense export ban. Considering that the majority of foreign manufacturers that either coproduce or provide components of South Korean weapons are from Western countries, exporting South Korean arms to former clients of Russian arms exports (such as China, or Iran) is likely to be very difficult.

There are, however, signs that South Korea is becoming more favored in the global arms market by some Russian arms importers. For example, after having bought howitzers from South Korea in 2021, Egypt has expressed its interest to buy South Korean aircraft as well. Egypt was the fourth largest arms importer of Russian weapons between 2016-2020. Also, Vietnam
, another major importer of Russian arms for decades, recently bought arms from South Korea. 
 
Conclusion

Some experts may suggest that last year’s increase in South Korean defense industry’s exports could be just a short-term change due to the demand caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, South Korean defense industry still has major limitations of being dependent on foreign manufacturers for some internal components of their weapons. However, the growth of the country’s defense industry did not just happen in a day. Instead, the country’s arms industry has made progresses to become more competitive in the global arms market. If recently exported arms are deployed and judged reasonably well-performing this year, the country’s arms industry will become more competitive and credible. If that is the case, South Korean defense industry may export more weapons now and in years to come.
 
Hoshik Nam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Iowa and a member of the Forum’s Emerging Expert program. 

​​
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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Event Recap, Resources and Recommendations -- War in Ukraine and Impact on Arms Trade and Militarism: South East Europe and the Black Sea Region (August 18, 2022)

8/23/2022

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On August 18, 2022, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Platform for Peace and Humanity co-hosted an event examining the actions and dilemmas faced by countries in South East Europe and the Black Sea Region in part due to the war in Ukraine, with panelists:

  • Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group
  • A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University
  • ​Esra Serim, Independent Researcher

Panelists provided the following observations, recommendations and resources, building off of their comments during the event.*

Zaur Shiriyev, Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group

South Caucasus

Recommendations:


  • In Azerbaijan, major legislation like the National Security Concept (2007) and the Military Doctrine (2010) is outdated and do not include provisions for parliamentary oversight as well as civil society’s oversight and involvement in security sector reform. Azerbaijan’s military doctrine and national security concept must be updated in the near future.
  • The main goal of Armenia after the 2020 war seems to be the redefinition of its defense concept and security strategy and rebuilding of the army. For this purpose, the country's policy on the purchase of military weapons should be more transparent (like Georgia) and should include short-term and long-term plans. This need for transparent military procurement policy and long-term planning is also valid for Azerbaijan.
  • Russia's invasion of Ukraine requires a revision of the security strategy in all three countries and makes it necessary for all three countries to carry out security sector reforms more quickly and effectively, taking into account the new realities.

Suggested resources:
  • Michael Lambert, “The Revival of the Georgian Armaments and Defense Industry,” Russian International Affairs Council,  November 8, 2021.
  • David Darchiashvili, “Georgia: A hostage to arms”, Saferworld, 2004.
  • “Georgia outlines defence procurement priorities,” Jane’s Defence, July 26, 2021.
  • “A difference of five times: Military spending of Armenia and Azerbaijan in numbers,” fact investigation platform, May 25, 2022.
  • Elkhan Mehdiyev, “Security Sector Reform in Azerbaijan: Key Milestones and Lessons Learned,” Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, May 2021.
  • Lt. Col. Edward J. Erickson, “The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh:Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?” Military Review, August 2021.
  • Ulkar Natiqqizi, “After war victory, Azerbaijan keeps increasing military spending,” Eurasianet, May 12, 2022.
  • “Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War’s Shadow”, International Crisis Group, April 2022.
  • Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian and Taline Papazian, "A WHITE PAPER: The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies," 2021.

A. Sencer Gözübenli, Balkan Studies and Foreign Policy Analyst (Croatia-based), Åbo Akademi University

Balkans

Assessment:

  • The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 showed that conventional warfare in Europe was not over. Serbia is the first to take its place in the arms race in the region. Between 2015 and 2021, Serbia’s defence budget jumped by around 70% to close to $1.4bn a year. During that time, its neighbors tried to restore their armed forces.
  • Russia mentions Bosnia and Kosovo while threatening Ukraine and/or the international community both before and during the invasion in 2022. While this situation causes uncertainty in the Balkans, it also causes concerns about Russia taking the war further to the West, encouraging the parties to engage in arms trading.
  • While the rhetorical commitment to preventive diplomacy and action may still be high in the international community, in less stable countries in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, organizations have done little to create a functional conflict prevention regime at the country’s regional level. That’s also because the commitment to its implementation at the domestic level is very weak. There’s very limited coordination between Bosnian state and the international community. There are “Putin-backed separatists” in the Bosnian federal institutions. The increase in international troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very limited one. Their number remains symbolic. 
  • Same for Kosovo. Kosovo is urging NATO and the EU to admit Balkan applicants to avoid a second European front with Russia. But the international community and the EU elites are sharing posts about Kosovo’s commitments on the EU integration process. 

Recommendations: 
 
  • Cooperation efforts between the Balkan states should be supported by the international community. This can be achieved through isolated but EU-backed thematic projects such as the Three Sea’s Initiative or the Open Balkans (with Kosovo), although support should be sensitive to political tensions. This may narrow the sphere of influence of external actors that threaten the stability of the region, such as Russia, China and Erdogan's Turkey, which are also arms dealers.
  • Continued efforts to support journalism and protection of journalists, chiefly through small grants and funding should continue and increase. Thematic journalistic grants relating to tracking and monitoring arms trades in the region should be considered by donors. 
  • NATO and EU military peacekeeping presence in the Balkans should not increase in just numbers, but in quality and effect, working closely with both officials and civil society in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
  • The EU should communicate more clearly its intentions with the Western Balkans. 

Suggested resources:
 
  • Ishaan Tharoor, "Russia’s war in Ukraine finds echoes in the Balkans," Washington Post, August 1, 2022. 
  • Filip Ejdus, "Policy Brief on the Spectre of an Arms Race in the Western Balkans," Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, March 2020.  
  • Vuk Vuksanovic and Marija Ignjatijevic, ““What’s Behind The Arms Buildup In The Balkans,” War on the Rocks, December 28, 2021.
  • "EU isolationism leaving dangerous power vacuum in Balkans, warns major new report on the arms trade," review of Tactics Institute for Security and Counter Terrorism report, June 15, 2020. 
  • Stephen Blank, "Can Selling Weapons to Serbia Create Peace in the Balkans?" National Interest, September 26, 2021. 
  • Special investigation series on Balkan Arms Trade by Balkan Insight  

Esra Serim, PhD, France-based independent researcher

Turkey

Assessment:

To preserve Erdogan’s rule, the Turkish administration continued to pursue ambiguous and unreliable foreign policy and investing more in the defense sector. It wants to turn the country into a major arms exporter, which is also Erdogan’s personal ambition.
The fact that Turkey turned from democracy and the West and into an authoritarian regime leads to increasing the distrust in the eyes of the West. The West also questions a non-democratic Turkey, which began to set a high record in the military sector. 

Recommendations:
  • The Erdogan regime must stop making militaristic foreign policy and supporting nationalist ideology to ensure his power at home. Turkey should not get involved into any conflict, including in Syria and Libya in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Ankara should stop taking up arms given Greek tensions and the interventions in Syria and Libya.
  • The Biden administration should temporarily block military export and projects including the F16 fighter jets as long as Ankara is governed by the Erdogan regime and dismantles democratic norms or does not restore democratic rule in Turkey. A NATO member cannot purchase and use both Russian and US military equipment and/or aviation. Turkey ignored US warnings not to purchase Russia’s S-400 missile defense system, which is incompatible with NATO systems. 
  • Given the Russian threat, however, both the United States and the EU need better relations with Turkey despite Erdogan’s political actions. They should work to convince him to restore Turkish democracy and liberalization, and not to intervene in any neighboring country. In addition, the West should not ignore Turkey’s security concerns in NATO. They should also encourage Erdogan to keep shut the passage to the Black Sea for military vessels through the Turkish Straits, which is very crucial to Ukraine and the course of the war.

Suggested resources:
​
  • “Drones and Resets: The New Era of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Baku Dialogues, Summer 2022.
  • “Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment, October 9, 2020.
  • “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2022.
  • “Why the West Should Make Peace with Erdogan Now,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022.
  • “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Becoming Alarmingly Militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 21, 2020.
  •  “Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy,” APSA MENA Politics, November 10, 2020. 


* Panelists at this event do not necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others, nor does the Forum necessarily endorse the views and opinions of others. Please feel free to contact panelists directly for additional conversation.
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