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Event Report - Women at the Frontlines: Integrating GBV Prevention into National and Community Arms-Control Strategies (December 4, 2025)

12/18/2025

On December 4, the Forum on the Arms Trade convened a webinar exploring the critical intersection between gender-responsive small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, Gender-Based Violence prevention, and women’s leadership in peace and security. Organized as part of the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence (GBV), the event brought together researchers, civil society actors, and community leaders to examine how arms-control frameworks can more effectively address gendered harms. Experts highlighted how the presence and misuse of firearms significantly increase the severity and lethality of GBV across both conflict and domestic settings and how existing arms-control and security governance mechanisms remain highly militarized and masculinized, limiting their ability to address the lived realities.

In their presentations, they shared insights into the interconnected nature of firearms-human-narcotics trafficking, noting how these illicit economies shape social, economic, and political spaces while restricting women’s participation in public and decision-making domains. Drawing from field experience, experts underscored the barriers women face in engaging with security institutions, while also demonstrating how women’s leadership contributes to uncovering gaps in accountability, particularly in relation to firearm access by convicted offenders and civilians. During Q/A session, the discussion also surfaced critical policy blind spots, including weak data management systems, insufficient firearm registries, and limited protections for survivors engaging with law enforcement. Speakers stressed that integrating women’s perspectives into SALW governance is not only a matter of inclusion but a necessary step toward more effective violence prevention and community safety.

Video of the event is available at https://youtu.be/1Tn82Ads8wI?t=217

Panelists

Natalia Pollachi, Project Manager, Instituto Sou da Paz
Folade Mutota, Executive Director, Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD)
Monalisa Hazarika, Emerging Expert, Forum on the Arms Trade (moderator)*

Recommendations
1. Integrate GBV prevention into SALW governance frameworks

States should embed gender-responsive safeguards into licensing, stockpile management, and disarmament processes, ensuring firearms policies account for risks of domestic and gender-based violence.

2. Strengthen data systems and accountability mechanisms

Improved firearm registries, data protection standards, and information-sharing across justice institutions are essential to close loopholes that allow perpetrators continued access to weapons.

3. Invest in women’s leadership and community-based prevention

Supporting women peacebuilders, early-warning initiatives, and survivor-centered advocacy strengthens accountability and improves the effectiveness of arms-control and violence-prevention efforts.

Suggested resources

“Pela Vida Das Mulheres: O Papel Da Arma De Fogo Na Violencia De Genero” Instituto Souda Paz, 2025 (portuguese only)
“The Role Firearms Play in Violence Against Women,” Instituto Souda Paz, 2024

* This event was inspired and led by a working group of the Forum on the Arms Trade’s emerging expert program, with more events to be announced. The Forum provides a platform for sharing of views but does not itself take a position.

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Safeguarding human rights amid global insecurity and rearmament

12/17/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Hiruni Alwishewa

The measures designed to safeguard human rights in the arms trade are currently under immense strain. The first half of the 2020s has seen an unprecedented rise in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises alongside surging rearmament. Protecting human rights and ensuring accountability in this period of heightened global insecurity will require greater and more sustained action in 2026 to reverse the erosion of human rights commitments. With the dynamics between states, corporations and citizens shifting, a wider range of non-state actors can play significant roles in these efforts.

Undermining the protection of human rights

Mitigating and preventing human rights violations in the arms trade primarily depends on the export controls and risk assessments of states, and their willingness to apply them in practice. States can update their export controls to reflect the changing geopolitical context – for example, Australia added a new condition that prohibits domestic arms manufacturers from directly exporting weapons to Israel.

For the most part, however, human rights obligations continue to be avoided or ignored, including by states that have strengthened their human rights criteria since Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force. Germany, for instance, updated its Political Principles for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment in 2019 to require an export licence to be denied where there is sufficient suspicion that the arms would be used for internal repression or other ongoing, systematic human rights violations. However, it was not until August 2025 that Germany imposed a partial export ban on arms to Israel – more than a year after the International Court of Justice found a plausible claim of genocide in Gaza.

Moreover, the withdrawal of states from key arms control treaties such as the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2025, and Ukraine also signalling its intention to withdraw) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Lithuania in 2024), highlights the sidelining of important humanitarian arms control instruments as peacetime obligations.

Simultaneously, new and emerging technologies have become interwoven into military strategies, further blurring the distinctions between civilian and military technologies. For example, digital technologies developed for civilian use such as cloud storage, facial recognition and data-mining systems have been used by Israel as part of its military operations in Gaza. The increased reliance on commercial technologies that fall outside traditional arms control frameworks creates new challenges for human rights protection and complicates the attribution of responsibility for abuses.

Together, weakening political commitments by states, the retreat from humanitarian arms control, and technological advancement are eroding human rights safeguards in the arms sector. Reversing this trend will be critical in 2026.

Changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens

Human rights protection is no longer solely the responsibility of states. A wider constellation of actors now holds both the ability and the responsibility to affect human rights outcomes through their products and services. Since the adoption of the ATT over a decade ago, momentum around human rights risk assessment has expanded beyond States Parties to include formal recognition of the expectation that corporations in the arms sector conduct independent human rights due diligence.

As states abandon their human rights commitments, with changing dynamics between states, corporations and citizens provide opportunities for non-state actors to engage in human rights protection. For example, corporations involved in production, financing and delivery operations can leverage their positions in the supply chain to promote human rights safeguards – a supplier can halt delivery of key components; a shipping company can decline to transport weapons; a financial institution can refuse to fund arms deals involving specific parties or high-risk destinations. Such actions, whether framed as commercial, ethical or risk-management decisions, can enhance the protection of human rights.

Unlike corporations, individual citizens may have limited direct influence on the arms sector as they are not the direct clients of the arms industry. However, through collective movements and organised groups such as trade unions, citizens can build pressure on governments and corporations. Boycotts and coordinated efforts to block shipments by port workers, for example, can disrupt supply chains and prompt institutional responses and greater transparency behind export decisions.

As always, civil society organisations and NGOs remain integral to human rights protection, transparency and accountability in the arms trade. Accountability mechanisms such as domestic litigation have been particularly useful in recent years and in relation to ongoing conflicts. Even when courts do not mandate changes to export practices, litigation and advocacy have proven critical in exposing decision-making processes, generating public interest and raising political costs.

Civil society actors must continue leveraging their collective power to compel, for instance, financial institutions and logistics companies to reassess their participation in arms transfers associated with human rights risks. By increasing reputational and legal pressures on both public and private entities, their advocacy can drive policy reforms, divestments, and the implementation of stronger human rights safeguards.

Looking ahead to 2026

The global security environment is in a period of profound instability due to escalating conflicts, intensifying rearmament, and accelerating technological change. Against this backdrop, 2026 will be a critical inflection point.

Safeguarding human rights in 2026 will depend on the willingness and capacity of non-state actors in the arms sector to act when states fail to do so. By exercising their influence and mobilising collective action, corporations, citizen movements and civil society organisations can play a decisive role in reversing the alarming erosion of human rights protection in the arms trade.

Hiruni Alwishewa is an independent researcher and expert in arms control, human rights, and corporate responsibility.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Projected Civilian Harm from Explosive Violence in 2026

12/17/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Iain Overton

Niamh Gillen

Looking ahead to 2026, the global risk posed to civilians by explosive weapons is unlikely to diminish in any meaningful or sustained way. While overall levels of explosive violence may stabilise or decline in selected theatres, this should not be interpreted as a reduction in civilian harm. Instead, the defining characteristic of explosive violence in 2026 is likely to be its increasing intensity and concentration, with fewer incidents but with those producing higher levels of civilian casualties, particularly in populated areas.

Recent data already point to this trajectory. Globally, explosive incidents have declined, and civilian casualties in 2025 fell in aggregate compared to 2024. However, civilians harmed per incident increased. Each use of an explosive weapon is, on average, more destructive to civilian life than the year before. We expect this pattern to continue into 2026, driven by changes in how explosive weapons are deployed and boosted by a failure to see much in the way of improvements in civilian protection.

In practical terms, it’s likely then that 2026 will not be defined by a universal escalation of violence, but by a consolidation of harm. Explosive weapons will continue to be used in urban and semi-urban settings, against infrastructure closely linked to civilian survival, including housing, energy systems, transport routes and humanitarian facilities. Against this, it seems that even a modest reduction in attack frequency would be unlikely to translate into proportional reductions in civilian suffering.

Ukraine is a place where this dynamic will be most clearly felt. Despite a slight reduction in the number of recorded explosive incidents in 2025 there, civilian casualties increased, particularly injuries. This suggests explosive weapons are being used in ways that generate greater harm per strike, whether through the selection of targets, the use of higher-yield munitions, or attacks on infrastructure whose failure disproportionately affects civilians.

In Gaza, AOAV anticipates a continuation of the current pattern of constrained but persistent explosive violence. Ceasefires and pauses in hostilities have reduced civilian casualty totals, but explosive weapon use continues. This suggests that the risk environment for civilians remains largely unchanged. In 2026, civilians are therefore likely to continue to experience regular exposure to explosive violence, even in the absence of large-scale offensives, this may be through unexploded ordnance, or less frequent but still consistent use of explosive weapons by Israel.

Sudan presents the most acute and immediate concern. Explosive weapons use has increased, alongside sharp rises in civilian casualties and deaths. AOAV sees no clear indicators that this trend will reverse in 2026. Announcements of ceasefires have not, to date, translated into reduced explosive violence, and the targeting of civilian areas, including displacement camps and urban neighbourhoods, is likely to continue.

Myanmar is expected to remain volatile, with continued increases in explosive incidents but fluctuating civilian casualty figures. Any apparent reductions in civilian casualties should be interpreted with caution. The number of civilians harmed per incident remains consistently high, indicating that explosive attacks, when they occur, continue to have severe consequences. Similarly to attacks seen in Sudan, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure across Myanmar continue to be targeted, leading to huge casualty tolls.

Beyond these high-profile conflicts, AOAV assesses that 2026 carries a significant risk of escalation in contexts that have previously received less international attention. Pakistan stands out. Recent increases in explosive violence and civilian casualties, linked in part to cross-border dynamics, suggest a heightened risk, with relations with neighbouring Afghanistan becoming increasingly strained. Should regional tensions intensify, explosive violence in Pakistan in 2026 could produce substantially higher civilian harm than in previous years.

Yemen presents a concern, too. While often described as a frozen conflict, recent spikes in explosive violence driven by a small number of air strikes resulted in very high civilian casualty levels.

Taken together, the principal risk in 2026 lies not in a sudden global escalation, but in the normalisation of highly destructive explosive violence against civilians. The continued use of explosive weapons in civilian environments, combined with rising harm per incident, points to a year in which fewer attacks nonetheless produce deeper and more enduring civilian suffering.

Without meaningful restraint on the use of such weapons, 2026 is likely to reinforce, rather than reverse, this trajectory.

Iain Overton is Executive Director at the London-based nonprofit Action on Armed Violence.

Niamh Gillen is an explosive violence researcher at Action on Armed Violence, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list / emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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The Next Frontier of Conflict: Why 3D-Printed Weapons Will Demand Attention in 2026

12/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Monalisa Hazarika

Introduction

In recent years, assumptions about the limitations of additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, in weapons production have been steadily challenged. What was once viewed as a technological novelty, useful mainly for prototypes and hobbyist projects, has evolved into a proliferating trend in the design and manufacture of weapons, now appearing in both conflict and non-conflict settings. From the inclusion of the FGC-9 in the arsenals of the People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar to the seizure of 3D-printed firearms, magazines, and ammunition by law enforcement in Australia, 3D-printed weapons have gained growing appeal among criminals, extremist groups, and even conventional militaries facing supply-chain constraints. Whether in the hands of private individuals seeking to bypass traditional arms markets, insurgent groups innovating under resource scarcity, or military forces experimenting with on-demand logistics, 3D printing is steadily carving out space in the global arms landscape.

However, across these groups and cases, the motivations differ: bypassing traditional arms markets, enhancing operational resilience, generating symbolic or propaganda value, or pursuing necessity-driven innovation in resource-limited warfare. Yet the trend is unmistakable—what was once an experimental practice is rapidly evolving and revamping its status from peripheral curiosity to an emerging challenge within modern security architecture. And this is only the beginning.

What’s Printable?: Current Capabilities of 3D-Printed Weaponry

3D printing is beginning to alter how weapons are produced and deployed. Open-access designs now allow firearms and military components to be manufactured outside traditional supply chains, accelerating their spread and availability. While seizures have risen sharply since 2021, 3D printing is also gaining traction on the battlefield, where state and non-state forces are testing, among other things, drone frames and munitions, firearms components, and front-line repairs for cost, resilience, and operational advantage.

A lot has changed since the release of the 2013 Liberator pistol, which, while fragile and unreliable, was nonetheless a proof of concept that spurred further designs. Over a decade later, designs such as the FGC-9 semiautomatic carbine and the newer Urutau gun have revolutionised this space as they are designed to be built without any regulated parts and can be fabricated entirely with consumer 3D printers and common hardware components. FGC-9, developed by Jacob “JStark1809” Duygu and first released in 2020, has been adopted by fighters in the Myanmar civil war, where People’s Defence Forces such as the KNDF and Salingyi Special Task Force have used these weapons amid ammunition shortages. Another emerging and increasingly debated development is the prospect of 3D-printed ammunition, including experimental discussions around 9mm hollow-point rounds. While open-source, peer-reviewed literature on the successful 3D printing of bullets remains limited, online forums, blogs, and media platforms already host extensive discussions exploring the feasibility of such ammunition, underscoring how innovation in this space is often driven outside formal research or regulatory scrutiny.

However, the implications extend well beyond small arms. 3D printing is increasingly applied to drones, allowing airframes, release mechanisms, and other components to be printed on demand. This lowers costs, bypasses import restrictions, and gives its users a new degree of flexibility. What began as an experiment is fast becoming a practical tool of modern conflict, which in recent years has been seen in battlefields around the world. In Ukraine, volunteer engineers and organisations are producing drone-related hardware and munitions with AM technologies. According to recent research, 3D-printed fins and sabots are attached to grenades or explosive payloads dropped from small drones, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield. Other reports highlight the manufacture of drones like the Liberator-MK1 and MK2, a fixed-wing aircraft with a 3D-printed frame reinforced with fiberglass that can carry up to 1.5kg of explosives, used by anti-junta rebels in Myanmar. In Yemen, the Houthis militia is known to 3D-print parts of drones and missiles, while a recent UN report revealed Al-Shabaab in Somalia experimenting with 3D printing to manufacture components for adaptation of commercial unmanned aerial systems.

3D printing also extends to bombs, grenades, and other munitions. Combatants have begun manufacturing explosive devices using 3D-printed casings, fins, and stabilizing components. Notable examples include so-called “candy bombs” with 3D-printed shells filled with conventional explosives such as C4 and shrapnel; the RKG-1600 munition, modified with 3D-printed stabilizing fins and tail cones; 3D-printed mortar baseplates and stabilizers; and various components used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Beyond complete weapons, 3D printing is also used to produce parts and accessories, including pistol and rifle magazines, grips, receivers, machine gun conversion devices (MCDs), and customised equipment such as drone landing pads and components for the Gripen fighter jet.

The diffusion of AM is rapidly blurring the line between civilian and military capabilities. Commercial 3D printers, widely accessible and inexpensive, now enable the production of weapons and battlefield-relevant components, placing unprecedented strain on regulatory and law-enforcement systems. Traditional interdiction strategies built around controlling physical supply chains are becoming increasingly ineffective against decentralized, digital manufacturing. From crowdfunding weapons production to disrupted plots of mass shootings using 3D printed guns, recent cases show how quickly radicalization can pair with capability. The barrier to entry is no longer engineering expertise, but access to the internet, building materials, and time, raising urgent questions for domestic and international security alike.

Looking Ahead to 2026

As 2026 approaches, strategists warn that increasingly sophisticated polymer and mixed‑material 3D‑printed firearms will be ever harder to trace or regulate. As digital blueprints for weapons become increasingly democratized, states must review their national legislation to address the emerging threats. This would require criminalizing unauthorized production and the illicit possession, transfer, and dissemination of digital design files, in line with the UN Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action, alongside the adoption of robust national deactivation standards. Experts emphasize that the priority of 2026 should be cross-sectoral collaboration and strengthening cooperation by bringing technical expertise into policy spaces, updating national laws to address digitally enabled weapons, strengthening law enforcement capacity to detect and investigate privately made firearms, enhancing knowledge sharing, and embedding “design‑against‑crime” safeguards into weapons manufacturing.

Thankfully, these threats are no longer off the radar and are on the agenda of diplomats, lawmakers, and research networks worldwide. The UN Programme of Action has mandated an Open‑Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG), scheduled to meet in June 2026, to address challenges posed by polymer and modular weapons and 3D printing, as well as related tracing difficulties arising from those innovations. Research institutes such as UNIDIR are hosting a series of online briefings to support substantive preparations for the OETEG, engaging the diplomatic community that will be involved in the expert meetings during the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS9). Complementary progress is also underway within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Through the Firearms Protocol and Resolution 12/3 (2024) of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, states have acknowledged emerging challenges linked to privately made firearms and new production methods, including 3D printing, and have encouraged strengthened legislation, enhanced capacity-building, and improved international cooperation to address these evolving risks.

Growing momentum in coordinated international action, paired with sustained engagement from industry actors, civil society, research bodies, and regional organizations, offers a pathway to ensure regulation keeps pace with technology while reinforcing, not replacing, the effectiveness of existing arms control measures.

Monalisa Hazarika is strategic communications and partnership officer at the SCRAP Weapons Project of SOAS University of London, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Why are arms sales likely to increase in 2026?

12/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Tabitha R Agaba

As 2025 draws to a close, arms sales are likely to increase in 2026 because of the increasing geopolitical tensions, from Cambodia and the Philippines in Asia, to the recent calls by some European countries like Germany and France for their young men to join the military in preparation for a possible confrontation with Russia, and the threat of war on Venezuela by the United States.

In recent weeks, the U.S. has threatened violence against Nicholas Maduro's government in Venezuela over what it calls a war on drugs. The Trump administration has previously accused the Maduro government as source of drugs that flow into the U.S.. These claims have been followed by the seizing of an Venezuelan oil tanker by the U.S. in addition to the closure of the Venezuelan airspace by the Trump administration in November. In August the U.S. started deploying air and naval forces near the Venezuelan border, including the world's largest aircraft carrier the USS Gerald R. Ford, which is deployed 950km away from the Venezuelan coast according to the BBC (as of December 5).

The conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan have persisted in 2025 without a foreseeable solution in 2026, with the M23 armed group in the DRC gaining more ground in Eastern DRC and Uganda having promised to join the conflict should M23 take over Uvira, which it did last week. The fighting in the DRC automatically creates a need for arms whether illegally acquired or not.

The conflict in Sudan has intensified between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army (SAF); the United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting the RSF with weaponry. Important to note is that the UAE, Rwanda, Thailand and the DRC haven't ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, an agreement that guides arms sales, transfers, end use control and overall international trade of arms.

The French president, Emmanuel Macron asked youth above 18 years of age to sign up for a 10-month military training amidst threats of war from Russia; this is a program expected to start in 2026. The president noted that this is a program whose main objective is to respond to threats from Russia. This voluntary military is not limited to France alone as other countries like Germany have followed suit. In November 2025, Germany voted to introduce voluntary military service.

Such calls not only prepare individuals for war but also put pressure for increased military spending in preparation of war. In 2026 there's likely to be an increase in the manufacture and purchase of arms as European countries prepare for a possibility of war with Russia.

These are just a few of the possible conflicts likely to arise in addition to the already existing ones. These developments are important to note because they will contribute to military spending in 2026 and some of the conflict actors are non-signatories to the ATT, which is a key component in arms control, and arms diversions are likely to continue.

Despite the presence of controls such as the UN arms embargo and the ATT, countries often divert arms to conflict zones such as Chad and the UAE's support for the RSF or Uganda’s arms diversion to South Sudan.

An overview of 2026 on the arms trade highlights the gaps that could easily be utilized for countries to access arms despite the numerous measures in place to mitigate them.

Tabitha R Agaba is a freelance writer and researcher based in Uganda, and a member of the Emerging Expert program.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Looking ahead to 2026: Protecting civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas

12/15/2025

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This blog post is one in a series of blogs and videos looking at an array of issues in 2026 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.

Laura Boillot

Over recent years, conflicts around the world have been marked by a devastating pattern of harm: the repeated use of explosive weapons in towns and cities, and the predictable civilian harm that follows. In 2024 alone, two-thirds of all documented incidents of explosive-weapons use occurred in Palestine, while Lebanon, Myanmar, Ukraine, Syria, and Sudan also experienced acute and widespread bombardment. Across these and other contexts, civilians continue to bear the brunt. Children, in particular, are suffering at unprecedented levels: explosive weapons are now the leading cause of child conflict-casualties globally, where more than 60% of child casualties in war zones result from explosive weapons, with nearly 12,000 children killed or injured in 2024 alone - the highest annual figure ever recorded.

The data from last year paint an alarming picture. Attacks with explosive weapons on civilian infrastructure and essential services rose sharply. Use of explosive weapons in attacks on healthcare increased by 64 percent, destroying hospitals and ambulances and killing health workers. Healthcare systems collapse as needs surge, yet services remain critically underfunded. Attacks on education more than doubled, directly affecting children already living through trauma. Strikes on humanitarian aid operations occurred nearly five times more frequently than the previous year.

These are not abstract statistics - they represent communities cut off from essential services upon which they rely, families trying to keep their loved ones safe, and long-term recovery made immeasurably harder, with an entire generation of children facing life-changing harm and trauma.

A wider erosion of norms

The widespread use of explosive weapons in populated areas is one manifestation of a broader erosion of norms protecting civilians in conflict. International rules and long-standing humanitarian disarmament instruments face unprecedented challenges - and in some instances deliberate efforts to roll back protections that have saved lives for decades.

We are witnessing a worrying normalisation of civilian harm - and bombing towns and cities is a consequence of this, frequently met with silence and impunity. This permissive environment reinforces a cycle where the humanitarian consequences of bombing towns and cities persists.

A tool for change: The Political Declaration on EWIPA

The Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, adopted in 2022 sets out practical measures focussed (to its strength) on addressing the use of EWIPA. It will not bring about change overnight but it does provide a meaningful framework for reducing civilian harm - if states take their commitments seriously.

Certain principles should guide the implementation of the Declaration’s commitments, regardless of the endorsing state involved. States should adopt implementation measures that are humanitarian and progressive; pursue a collaborative, well-informed, and transparent process; and nationally internalise and externally promote the Declaration.

The international meeting held in San José, Costa Rica, in November 2025 offered a crucial moment to assess progress and set direction. What we found was clear: the potential of the Declaration remains largely untapped. Most endorsing states have not yet begun the work of implementation at the national level. To make a difference this must change in 2026.

1. Operationalising the Declaration: turning commitments into practice

Implementation cannot remain rhetorical. States must translate commitments into concrete, measurable policy and practice - and they must do so in ways that explicitly address the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

A critical gap remains the limited engagement of armed forces. Militaries are central stakeholders in this agenda, yet in many countries that have endorsed the Declaration, defence institutions remain disengaged and even cautious of its commitments. This must be a priority for 2026. Dialogue, training, doctrine and operational review, and the development of policies to refrain from the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas are essential.

Tools exist to support this work, including the military implementation toolkit and resources produced by civil society with input from members of armed forces. States do not need to start from scratch. They do, however, need to get started.

2. Addressing humanitarian consequences: meeting the needs of affected communities

Reducing future harm must go hand-in-hand with supporting communities affected by explosive weapon use today. The humanitarian consequences are severe and long-lasting: destroyed infrastructure, unexploded ordnance contamination, disrupted essential services, loss of housing and livelihoods, and widespread physical and psychological trauma. The environmental impacts of explosive weapons - including contamination, damaged water and sanitation systems, and toxic debris - further compound humanitarian crises and threaten public health unless addressed as part of response and recovery efforts.

In many contexts, access constraints further impede the delivery of life-saving assistance, while repeated attacks on healthcare facilities undermine already fragile systems and leave survivors without the treatment, rehabilitation, or mental health support they need. Communities also require sustained investment in explosive ordnance risk education and preparedness to stay safe amid ongoing bombardment, alongside protection measures that reach women, older people, persons with disabilities, and other groups facing heightened risks.

A major gap persists between the Declaration’s commitments and the scale of humanitarian response being put into practice. States should increase support for victim assistance, clearance, reconstruction, and rehabilitation—guided by affected communities. The assessments of humanitarian implementation highlight clear pathways for strengthening this dimension of the Declaration. More must be done, and urgently.

3. Speaking out: building a norm against bombing populated areas

Norms strengthen when states speak clearly and consistently. Critiquing harmful practices and condemning the use of explosive weapons in populated areas - regardless of who is responsible - is an essential tool for influencing behaviour.

Too often, silence or selectivity undermines efforts to build a global standard. In 2026, we urge states to reaffirm the core humanitarian principle at the heart of the Declaration: that the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in cities is unacceptable because of the foreseeable civilian harm. Challenging the status quo is not only possible - it is necessary to reverse the slide toward the normalisation of civilian suffering.

4. Strengthening the multistakeholder approach

Effectively addressing the humanitarian consequences of explosive weapons in populated areas depends on drawing together the practical insights and experiences of armed forces with the field experience of humanitarian organisations, the perspectives of survivors and affected communities, and the expertise of civil society and international bodies. Collaboration is essential not only because it aligns diverse actors around shared humanitarian goals, but also because joint action and knowledge pooling helps ensure that implementation is informed, inclusive, and grounded in real needs. Working together delivers practical benefits - from improving victim assistance and clearing unexploded ordnance to strengthening data-sharing, crisis planning, and reconstruction efforts. This approach is already being demonstrated through the multistakeholder dialogue processes convened by Humanity & Inclusion and Article 36, which have brought together militaries, humanitarian actors, and affected communities to explore practical pathways for implementing the Declaration’s humanitarian and military commitments, generating a series of concrete recommendations for states.

Inclusive dialogue supports the drive for meaningful change within military institutions, ensures the relevance of humanitarian guidance, and grounds policy and practice in the lived experiences of civilians who have survived harm. It also strengthens ownership of the Declaration’s commitments by fostering buy-in from a broader range of actors, making implementation more durable and effective. In 2026, this collaborative approach will be essential to sustaining momentum.

5. Building momentum through national engagement and international opportunities

Both the San José outcome document and this year’s implementation assessments underscore the need for structured, national-level engagement. It is at this level that implementation happens.

At the international level, there are also several important opportunities that lie ahead and which provide opportunities for engagement: Austria’s planned workshop on military training in spring 2026; engagement with African states through a universalisation workshop in Ghana; among other planned exchanges among states and organisations.

States can also draw on a growing range of tools, case studies, and experiences - including civil-society reports, and experiences and lessons shared by states in San José to inform their work.

Looking forward

We enter 2026 with an urgent need to address the widespread civilian harm from EWIPA. The scale of civilian harm caused by explosive weapons in populated areas is unacceptable, but it is something we can take tangible steps to address. The Political Declaration gives states a framework to act, it is now up to endorsing states to put it into practice.

This year must be the moment when commitments move off from being words on paper and into military planning and the conduct of operations, humanitarian programming and response, and political leadership by states over the world we want to live in. Civilians living in conflict cannot wait any longer.

Laura Boillot is Director, Article 36.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).

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Event Report - Women at the Frontlines: Integrating GBV Prevention into National and Community Arms-Control Strategies (December 4, 2025)

Safeguarding human rights amid global insecurity and rearmament

Projected Civilian Harm from Explosive Violence in 2026

The Next Frontier of Conflict: Why 3D-Printed Weapons Will Demand Attention in 2026

Why are arms sales likely to increase in 2026?

Looking ahead to 2026: Protecting civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas

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