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Predicting Even Less U.S. Arms Trade Restraint in 2025

1/27/2025

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​This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Jeff Abramson
The Biden administration has left President Trump a surprisingly low bar when it comes to improving U.S. arms trade restraint. Unfortunately and dangerously, the Trump administration is likely to lower the bar even further.
 
On paper, many Biden-era arms trade policies sounded good to advocates for human rights and protection of civilians. His administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy more fully elevated human rights concerns in part by calling for a halt to authorizations for transfers when certain harms were “more likely than not” – an improvement over previous approaches. Also positive were support for an international Political Declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as well as Department of Defense and State policies on civilian protection such as CHMR-AP and CHIRG. Even NSM-20 was notionally good policy in that it appeared to create a path to holding countries accountable for using weapons improperly. Plus, Biden reversed the first Trump administration’s stance on landmines and once again made it U.S. policy to eventually accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.
 
While these policies were often laudatory in writing, actual practice was devastating. The Biden administration’s contortions to not implement U.S. law that should have led to a halt on some (if not all) security assistance to Israel was the most high profile abandonment of a policy of restraint. So too were decisions to supply cluster munitions and landmines to Ukraine, weapons that the majority of countries – including a majority of NATO allies – had long agreed should be banned and that the United States had not used or transferred for more than a decade. The Biden administration also eventually continued arms transfers to rights-violating regimes in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
 
Receiving less attention was the shear volume of arms transfers proposed and conducted under his administration. The latest State Department factsheet revealed that fiscal year 2024 arms transfers were “the highest ever annual total of sales and assistance provided to our allies and partners” via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process (emphasis is in the original document). FMS values were than $100 billion in FY 2024 with a staggering $845 billion in open cases. More than $200 billion in authorizations were made via the separate Direct Commercial Sales process. The Forum’s tracking of FMS notifications by calendar year (as opposed to fiscal year), found nearly $146 billion in FMS sales were notified to Congress last year.  
 
Trump is likely to aim to go higher. In 2017, his first international trip was to the Middle East where he announced $110 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Although that figure was inflated, it showed what would be a hallmark of his first term, which was the promotion of U.S. arms trade, including to autocratic regimes in the Middle East. He ended his term notifying Congress of more than $134 billion in potential FMS sales in 2020 (a figure higher than Biden’s 2024 totals when adjusted for inflation) that included $10 billion in F-35 sales to the United Arab Emirates that Biden slow-walked, with the deal collapsing.
 
Could Trump revive the deal? The UAE may have indicated before the election it would not be interested, but former State Department official Josh Paul said this month it’s one to watch.
 
Now, just a week into the second Trump presidency, all signs are pointing to a return to relatively unrestrained arms sales and even less concern for human rights.
 
One of the administration first actions was a 90-day suspension on foreign aid, but with an exemption for military assistance to Egypt and Israel. The Trump administration has already acted to remove sanctions on Israelis undermining peace in the West Bank and appears to have abandoned the Biden administration’s hold on the provision of 2000-pound bombs to Israel, jettisoning what little restraint had remained. The Defense Department’s Civilian Protection Center of Excellence also appears to be in jeopardy. And while Biden administration National Security Memorandums are only under review, it would be sound logic to predict that both NSM-20 and NSM-18 (Biden’s CAT policy) may be rescinded.  
 
Trump’s claim to end the war in Ukraine as he took office obviously has not occurred, but his approach could involve much less U.S. support to the country. (No waiver was provided for Ukraine in the current suspension of new foreign aid.) Oddly, this might mean the U.S. no longer provides landmines and cluster munitions.
 
That improvement is unlikely to undo the damage the United States is causing to humanitarian disarmament treaties and multilateralism more broadly. Trump loosened restraint on both weapons in his first term, and there is no reason to expect an about face to support the Mine Ban Treaty or Convention on Cluster Munitions now. Plus, he has put a 90-day pause on humanitarian demining  – a staggering stark example of heavy-handed ineptitude as the United States has done good work in demining globally for decades with strong bi-partisan Congressional support.
 
Regarding the Arms Trade Treaty, Trump rejected the treaty in his first term and the Biden administration failed to undo Trump’s denial of U.S. signature to the treaty. This will almost certainly leave the United States even more on the outside of the core international agreement aimed at making the arms trade more responsible.
 
Trump, of course, prides himself on being unpredictable, and anything written today may quickly appear dated as new developments take center stage. But, in so many ways, Trump is making clear that the multilateral system as currently established will not receive  support as, for example, he strives to pull the United States out of the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization.
 
In his first term, Donald Trump took a transactional and unrestrained approach to the arms trade while undermining multilateral efforts at control, and multilateralism more broadly. He is quickly on his way to doing so again in 2025.
 


Jeff Abramson is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for International Policy. 

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s). 

This post was lightly updated at 12:25 PM on January 27.

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El panorama de seguridad en México para 2025 ante la llegada del presidente Trump

1/19/2025

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Esta entrada de blog forma parte de una serie serie que analiza una serie de cuestiones en 2025 relacionadas con el uso de armas, el comercio de armas y la asistencia en materia de seguridad, y a menudo ofrece recomendaciones.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(version in English)

Al hablar de democracia, 2024 fue un año preponderante y decisivo. 74 países (más el Parlamento Europeo) tuvieron elecciones en las que más de 1,600 millones de personas participaron a nivel mundial. Si bien cada uno de estos procesos tienen una importancia particular, ninguno de ellos será tan decisivo para el escenario internacional de 2025 como la reelección de Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

La victoria de Trump en noviembre fue vista como positiva para algunos, sin embargo, para la mayoría era algo que se temía, incluida la recientemente electa presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum. Su enfoque, desde el inicio de su campaña política a principios de 2024, ha sido darle continuidad al anterior gobierno del presidente López Obrador y temas como la seguridad y el narcotráfico, dos de los más relevantes para los votantes de Trump, no han sido la excepción.

El 22 de diciembre, Trump dijo que el día uno de su administración nombraría a los cárteles de droga como organizaciones terroristas, sumándose así al aumento en los aranceles como amenazas que ha lanzado contra México. Sheinbaum respondió mencionando que está dispuesta a cooperar con su gobierno, pero que el país nunca se “subordinaría”. Desde que inició su gobierno se han llevado a cabo con éxito alrededor de 12 operativos antidroga de alto perfil, incluyendo el decomiso de casi una tonelada de fentanilo en Sinaloa, el más grande en la historia de México, y que ocurrió 10 días después de los llamados de Trump a aumentar los aranceles. Se espera que la frecuencia de estos operativos aumente durante el año, en parte debido a la presión estadounidense.

Desde un punto de vista narrativo, es probable que Sheinbaum trate de mantener la opinión pública enfocada en estas operaciones, a la par de la importancia de la cooperación bilateral para atender no solo la producción de fentanilo en el país pero también la crisis de consumo en Estados Unidos. El respeto a la soberanía de México también será un elemento clave de la narrativa oficial.

Adicionalmente, el tema del contrabando desde la frontera norte también será recurrente en los medios mexicanos, considerando que el gobierno se encuentra actualmente en un proceso legal en contra de distintas empresas estadounidenses de distribución de armas por facilitar su acceso a organizaciones criminales. El 9 de enero, durante su conferencia matutina, Sheinbaum se expresó de manera favorable sobre un reciente reporte del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos que reconoce la situación, argumentando que 74% de las armas confiscadas por autoridades mexicanas han sido introducidas al país desde Estados Unidos. Sheinbaum también reconoció que este reporte podrá ser de utilidad para futuras negociaciones.

La política migratoria, intrínsecamente relacionada con la seguridad nacional de ambos países, también cambiará drásticamente en 2025. En México diversas oficinas gubernamentales, incluyendo el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), sufrieron un recorte de presupuesto en comparación con el año pasado, en línea con los principios de austeridad de Sheinbaum. Mientras que la llegada de Trump previsiblemente influenciará a las autoridades mexicanas a incrementar las deportaciones y detenciones a migrantes, el reto está en el hecho de que los recursos disponibles para una gestión adecuada de las rutas migratorias se verá reducido.

No obstante, la respuesta del gobierno a esta disyuntiva podría estar en las Fuerzas Armadas. Desde los primeros años de la administración de López Obrador, el presupuesto asignado al Ejército, la Fuerza Aérea, la Marina y la Guardia Nacional ha incrementado de manera continua en comparación con otras instituciones. Para este año su presupuesto fue reducido en un 36%, sin embargo, distintas reformas legislativas de los últimos años les han dado cada vez más facultades. En los siguientes meses (y años) es probable que veamos tareas que antes pertenecían a otras instancias ser asignadas a estas instituciones.

Mientras que la presencia de las Fuerzas Armadas es necesaria para preservar la seguridad nacional, también es cierto que han habido diversos incidentes relacionados con el uso excesivo de la fuerza y otros abusos de derechos humanos en contra de distintos grupos vulnerables (incluyendo migrantes) que las involucran, siendo uno de los más recientes el asesinato de tres personas, incluyendo una niña de ocho años, en Nuevo Laredo el 11 de octubre del año pasado. Se espera que el número de este tipo de incidentes aumente.

Por otro lado, uno de los ejes del gobierno actual (aunque su principal función sea publicitaria) es mostrarse a sí mismo como el más humanista y progresista en la historia, lo cual puede directamente contradecirse con esta ampliación de tareas que las fuerzas armadas tendrán. También se espera más presión por parte de organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

Mientras que la administración pasada de Donald Trump nos dio cierta noción de cómo podría ser su segundo periodo, la realidad es que la incertidumbre es la característica más exacta con la que podemos describir nuestros tiempos, no solo en ambos países pero también a nivel global. Hasta ahora, la retórica de Trump hacia México (y hacia otros socios también) ha sido bastante confrontativa y Sheinbaum tendrá que maniobrar el periodo 2025-2029 de manera hábil y cuidadosa, a la par de dirigir un escenario político, económico y social interno cada vez más complejo.

Gestionar el problema del narcotráfico es una tarea desafiante y delicada y, desde una perspectiva realista, ni la política hostil de Trump ni la popularidad de Sheinbaum lo resolverán. El populismo es muy próspero hoy en día y, para ambos países, hay un largo camino que se puede complicar fácilmente por ideas que en la teoría parecen buenas pero que en la práctica pueden no funcionar, a expensas tanto del pueblo estadounidense como del mexicano.


Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega es Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales con especialidad en Gobierno y Transformación Pública, por el Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
La inclusión en el programa de expertos y expertas emergentes del Foro sobre Comercio de Armas y la publicación de estos artículos no implican el acuerdo ni la aprobación de las opiniones de otros. Las opiniones expresadas son las del autor de cada artículo.
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Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Hands of Crime: A Nearby Threat in Latin America with Gendered Implications

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Gisela Luján Andrade
(In lieu of a standard blog post, the author has crafted an article that presents reflections, research, and analysis based on two recent presentations... the introduction begins as follows:) 

The growing interest of organized crime in the military use of emerging technologies, including autonomous technology and artificial intelligence (AI), raises alarms about the tangible perils of their application and development in Latin America, making us realize that we are no longer dealing with a scenario far removed from our reality.

The primary purpose of this article is to contribute to discussions in the region regarding the risks associated with the proliferation of 'low-end' autonomous weapons systems (AWS) to non-state armed actors, particularly organized crime, which constitute one of the main threats to human security in the region. Additionally, this analysis adopts a human rights and gender approach, emphasizing how the likely use of these systems by organized crime exacerbates the structural discrimination and violence already faced by women and other marginalized groups. Finally, this article calls for urgent action toward the regulation of AWS as a matter of global justice and equity.

Read the full article/post in this 
pdf


Gisela Luján Andrade is Founder, Perú por el Desarme.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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The UK arms trade in 2025 – controversies and challenges

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Sam Perlo-Freeman
The UK is one of the world’s largest arms exporters – exactly where in the rankings depends on which figures you look at. The UK is only 7th according to SIPRI data on major conventional weapons exports, but in financial terms, the UK is probably somewhere between 2nd and 4th alongside France and Russia. At any rate, an important player.
 
By far the most controversial, though certainly not the largest, aspect of the UK arms trade at present is its arms sales to Israel, most of which go indirectly via the US, especially components for the F-35 combat aircraft, which Israel is using in Gaza, and of which 15% by value is made in the UK. Last September, the new Labour government suspended certain licences for use by the Israeli military, having concluded that Israel was not adhering to international law in Gaza, but made a special ‘carve-out’ from its own export licensing criteria to allow the continued indirect supply of F-35 components via the US and other partner nations. The government claimed that such indirect supplies could not be stopped without jeopardising the whole F-35 supply chain. This decision faces a legal challenge brought by Palestinian NGO Al-Haq and activist legal group GLAN, and will likely be heard in spring. The latest government submission to the court makes clear that there is no new evidence of Israeli violations in Gaza that would lead the government to change this position, an extraordinary admission, placing the UK’s international commitments under the ATT, IHL, and even the Genocide Convention as lower priority than maintaining the F-35 supply chain.
 
However, while the F-35 and arms sales to Israel are rightly the focus of most current attention, of far greater significance for the UK arms industry – and also raising serious questions regarding human rights, peace, and security – are prospects for sales of the Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft, jointly produced by BAE in the UK, Leonardo in Italy, and Airbus in Germany and Spain.
 
Last year, trade unions warned that production of the Typhoon at their plant in Warton, Lancashire, may end before long if there are not significant new orders, creating a gap before full-scale production of the planned 6th-generation Tempest fighter gets under way. New orders from Germany, Italy, and Spain have helped alleviate these concerns, although this will not involve final assembly in the UK. Nonetheless, both the UK government and BAE are actively pursuing export customers as well, from their traditional customer base in the Middle East - in particular, Qatar, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia.
 
Qatar ordered 24 Typhoons in 2018, the last of which should be delivered in 2025, and has reportedly recently agreed to buy 12 more, although a contract has not yet been signed. It is unclear exactly what Qatar would want them for, given that it also has fleets of French Rafales and US F-15s, faces no external threats, and may lack the capacity to operate that many aircraft, is a good question. Qatar is rated by Transparency International Defence & Security as having a ‘critical’ risk of corruption in arms procurement, and given BAE’s grimy record in this area, this deal should face stringent due diligence in relation to corruption, including via possible offset deals.
 
Türkiye has long been seeking to modernise its combat aircraft fleet, especially since Greece recently acquired Rafales from France. Türkiye was kicked out of the F-35 programme by the US in 2019 for buying Russian air defence systems. It is now acquiring 40 F-16s instead, but is also very interested in acquiring up to 40 Eurofighters. For a long time, Germany was blocking this due to Türkiye’s human rights record and role in Syria, but has lifted this objection, and negotiations for a deal have begun.
 
However, the Turkish state remains highly authoritarian and repressive, especially towards its Kurdish minority. It remains in occupation of parts of north-east Syria, where it and its militia allies have been accused of serious abuses. Türkiye has continued a steady bombing campaign against Kurdish groups in both Iraq and Syria, causing high civilian casualties. Moreover, following the regime change in Syria, Türkiye may well be looking to pursue further military action against the Kurdish autonomous region of Rojava in the north-east, and indeed its allied militias have already launched attacks. The risk therefore that Eurofighters sold to Türkiye might be used in these conflicts is high.
 
Saudi Arabia is reportedly considering various options for increasing its combat aircraft fleet, including the Eurofighter, the Rafale, and the F-15, and most recently the Turkish domestically-produced Kaan stealth fighter currently under development. During the war in Yemen, German objections would have stopped any new sales of Eurofighters (though Germany allowed continuing supplies of spare parts for the existing Saudi fleet), but as with Türkiye, they have now lifted these objections as the truce in Yemen in place since April 2022 continues to hold.
 
However, the truce remains fragile, with numerous violations, and the conflict in Yemen remains far from solved. Saudi Arabia’s horrific human rights record has if anything worsened, with the country carrying out a record 345 executions in 2024. The record of corruption in UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia is also egregious.
 
In short, all 3 potential Middle Eastern customers for the Eurofighters raise serious red flags, although none of these will likely be of the slightest concern to the UK government, desperate as it will be to maintain the BAE production line until Tempest gets off the ground. If all goes their way, 2025 could be a bumper year for BAE, and in any event it will be a busy year for those of us seeking to advocate for ethical restraint in arms exports.


Sam Perlo-Freeman is Research Coordinator at Campaign Against Arms Trade in the UK.

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).


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The 2025 security landscape in Mexico amid the arrival of President Trump

1/16/2025

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This blog post is one in a series looking at an array of issues in 2025 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, often offering recommendations.
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Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega
(Versión en español. English updated January 19, 2025.)

2024 was a remarkable year when talking about democracy. 74 countries (plus the European Parliament) held elections with more than 1.6 billion people going to the ballots worldwide. While all of these processes have their own particular importance, none of them will be that defining for the 2025 global scenario as the reelection of Donald Trump in the United States.
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Trump’s victory in November was seen as a hope for some but dreaded by most, including the recently elected president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s approach, from the beginning of her political campaign in early 2024, has been focused on giving a certain continuity to the previous government of president López Obrador, and topics like security and drug-trafficking, two of the most relevant for Trump’s voters, have not been the exception.

On December 22nd, president Trump said that he would name drug cartels as terrorist organizations on day one of his administration, joining his calls for higher tariffs he had previously threatened. Sheinbaum responded that she was willing to cooperate with his government, but that the country would never “subordinate” [to Trump]. Since Sheinbaum took office on October 1st,
around 12 high-profile successful anti-drug operations have been held, including the siege of almost one ton of fentanyl in Sinaloa, the biggest in Mexico’s history, which also happened to occur about 10 days after Trump’s tariff threats. It is expected that this rate will only increase during 2025, substantially due to Trump’s pressure.

From a narrative perspective, Sheinbaum will likely try to keep the public opinion focused on these security operations, side to side with the importance of bilateral cooperation to attend not only the production of fentanyl in the country but also the consumption crisis in the U. S. The respect to Mexico’s sovereignty will also be a key element of the government’s narrative.

In addition, the issue of arms trafficking coming from the U. S. into Mexico will likely be recurring in the Mexican media, considering that the government is currently involved in a legal process against several American arms distribution companies for facilitating their access to criminal organizations. On January 9th, during her daily morning conference, Sheinbaum talked about her favorable views on a recent Justice Department report that acknowledges the issue, saying that 74% of the confiscated weapons by the Mexican government come from the northern side of the border. She stated that this report will be a helpful leverage for future negotiations.

Immigration policies, intrinsically related to national security and of both countries, will drastically change in 2025 as well. In Mexico, several government divisions, including the National Institute of Migration (INM), suffered a budget cut in comparison with last year, in line with Sheinbaum’s austerity principles. While Trump’s arrival will expectedly influence the Mexican authorities to increase deportations and migrant detentions, the challenge will lay in the fact that the available resources for the proper management of the migration routes will get reduced.

Nevertheless, the government’s answer to this issue may lay in the military. Since the first years of López Obrador’s administration, the budget assigned towards the army, the navy and the National Guard steadily increased compared to other government offices. For this year, their budget was cut by around 36%, however, different legislation reforms in recent years have granted them more and more faculties. In the coming months (and years) we will likely see more tasks assigned to these three institutions that previously were performed by others.

While the involvement of the military is necessary for preserving national security, there also have been several incidents of excessive use of violence and other human rights abuses towards different vulnerable groups (including migrants) that involved them, particularly the National Guard, one of the latest being the assassination of three people, including an eight year old child, in Nuevo Laredo on October 11th. This number is expected to increase.

On the other hand, one of the bases of the current government (but mostly a political marketing element) is to show themselves as the most humanistic and progressive in history, which may be contradictory with this broader range of tasks the military will get. More pressure from civil society organizations is likely to increase as well.

While the 2017-2021 administration of Donald Trump gave us a rather wide glance of what his second period may be, the truth is that uncertainty is the most accurate word to describe the current times, not only in both countries but also globally. So far, Trump’s rhetoric towards Mexico (and towards other partners as well) has been very confrontative and Sheinbaum will have to cleverly and carefully maneuver a highly unpredictable 2025-2029 term while managing an increasingly complex political, economic and social internal landscape. Managing the drug crisis is a delicate and challenging issue and, from a realistic perspective, neither Trump's hostile politics nor Sheinbaum’s political marketing will solve it. Populism is thriving in current times and, for both countries, there is a long path that may be easily clouded by big ideas that may not work when put into practice, at the expense of both American and Mexican people.



Carlos Rodrigo Peña Vega has a B. A. in International Relations with a minor degree in Government and Public Transformation from Tecnológico de Monterrey.
 
Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade emerging expert program (Spanish program) and the publication of these posts does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. The opinions expressed are the views of each post's author(s).
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    The "Looking Ahead Blog" features comments concerning short- to medium-term trends related to the arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use. Typically about 500-1000 words, each comment is written by an expert listed on the Forum on the Arms Trade related to topics of each expert's choosing.

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